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Will EU inroads foster greater social security?
Joseph M. Sammut
Kopin
In 2006, Malta continued its inroads within the EU, with reforms in legislation aimed at adopting EU directives and reaching EU targets. Still, women face disadvantages to build an adequate pension and the new social security scheme may lower pension payments. Meanwhile, Malta claims to devote 0.15% of its GNI to ‘development aid’, although how much of this money actually goes towards its stated goal is highly questioned.
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Advances
in gender equality
The legislative framework for gender equality improved considerably in Malta on
joining the EU in 2004. Malta is continuously updating its own legislation in
line with existing European Community legislation on equal gender treatment in
the areas of employment and social solidarity. The employment rate among women
registered a slight increase (one percentage point) between 2000 and 2005. There
is still a large gap between women (33.7%) and men (73.8%) in the rate of
employment. The employment rate for older women is 12.4% compared to 50.8% for
men. The rate of employment for women between the ages of 20 and 49 falls by 8.9
percentage points when they have a child, while that of men increases by 4.4
percentage points. Around one fifth of working women (21.8%) work part-time, as
compared to only 4.5% of working men. Malta has the widest gender imbalance in
the EU regarding political decision making, with women holding only 9% of seats
in parliament, while in the economic sphere, women account for only 17.7% of
managerial positions. However, Malta tops all EU countries as the least
inequitable with regard to the gender pay gap (4%). Women also represent the
majority of new higher education graduates (57%), although this fact is not yet
reflected in the different spheres of society. At the social level, women –
and especially elderly women and single mothers – are at a greater risk of
exclusion and poverty (Eurostat, 2006).
Poverty and social exclusion
The at-risk-of-poverty rate for 2004 stood at 15.5% among women (compared to an
EU average of 20%) and 14.2% among men (EU average 15%). Children (21.9%) and
the elderly (16.5%) are the population categories at highest risk of poverty.
When analyzing poverty by household type, single-parent households (which are
mainly headed by women) account for the highest percentage (47.9%) (NSO, 2007b).
Half of the unemployed fell under the poverty line, in contrast to 5.5% of the
working population. Most of the unemployed under the poverty line were male
(53.7%). The ratio between the highest and lowest equivalized income quintiles
was estimated at 4:1. The overall poverty rate in Malta (14.9%) is 1.1
percentage points lower than the EU average (16%) (Eurostat, 2007, figures
for 2004).
Pension reform based on EU policy
Malta, like other developed countries, is facing an ageing population. Due to
the effects of demographic trends on economic and social policies, a bill to
amend the Social Security Act was presented to Parliament in July 2006 and
became an Act on 1 January 2007 (Malta Parliament, 2006). The Act introduced a
new pension system that responds to the need to provide for adequate and
sustainable pensions in view of future trends. The new system is built on the EU
policy (European Commission, 2003)
to improve incentives for older workers to remain longer in the labour market,
to strengthen the link between contributions and benefits, and to increase
public and private funding, in light of the long-term implications of increased
life expectancy on pension expenditures.
The government adopted a White Paper on a pension reform strategy in November
2004 and asked social partners and other interested parties to provide feedback
and submit proposals. A multidisciplinary team was created to form the Pension
Working Group (2005), which assessed the feedback received and presented its
final recommendations to the government in 2005. That same year, the Ministry
for the Family and Social Solidarity (2005), in collaboration with other
concerned ministries, released the National
Report on Strategies for Social Protection and Social Inclusion, which included a section on pension reform.
The old contributory social security system, introduced in 1956, catered for old
age pensions and survivors’ pensions. In 1965 the system was expanded to
include disability pensions. In 1979 a mandatory earnings-related pension scheme
that covered old age pensions and survivors’ pensions was also introduced. It
is called the ‘two-thirds pension’ because the initial benefits upon
retirement were calculated as two thirds of the average income during the
highest-earning three years of the previous 10 years, after a contribution
period of 30 years. The retirement age was 60 for women and 61 for men. The
lower the number of years of contributions, the lower the pension disbursed, and
at least 10 years of contributions were required to be entitled for such a
pension.
From a benefit scheme to a contribution scheme
The new pension reform gradually increases the retirement age from 60 and 61
years to 65 years for both genders. Workers will have to contribute to the
scheme for 40 years in order to qualify for the full two-thirds pension, which
will now be based on the average salary during the highest-earning 10 of those
40 years. The old system capped at a maximum pensionable income (MPI) of EUR
15,525 (USD 21,475).
The new system raises the amount in accordance with the increase in the cost of
living adjustment until 2010. By 2014, the MPI will be gradually increased to
EUR 20,700 (USD 28,630), and social security contributions will be adjusted in
line with this new MPI. After 2014, revision adjustments will be weighted 70% on
wage indexation and 30% on inflation. Currently, the national minimum pension is
equivalent to four fifths of the national minimum wage for married people and
two thirds of the national minimum wage for single people. For people born on or
after 1 January 1962, the guaranteed national minimum pension will be equivalent
to 60% of the median national income.
A clause was also introduced through which persons over 61 years of age who were
born on or after 1 January 1962 and have 40 years of credited contributions can
opt for early retirement and start collecting a pension, as long as they do not
resume paid employment before reaching 65. In addition, the Act established the
crediting of contributions for parents (including adoptive parents) who were
born on or after 1 January 1962, who have the legal care and custody of children
less than six years old (or 10 years in the case of severely disabled children),
and have stopped work to take care of their children. This provision applies to
both mothers and fathers, who can claim the crediting of contributions for up to
two years per child (four in the case of disabled children). The new Act also
gives one year credit for students and workers who want to further their
education and skills. Meanwhile, people working on a part-time basis can be
granted the reduction of the minimum national insurance contribution to one
tenth of their weekly earnings.
The new scheme mentions the introduction of a second pillar private pension at a
later date, and a third pillar pension which is to remain totally on a voluntary
basis. The second pillar will be built by directing a percentage of social
services contributions to be invested through a retirement fund handled by
professional fund managers. The government plans to introduce the second pillar
scheme at the ‘opportune’ time, depending on the economic climate, so as not
to impose heavier burdens on workers and employers.
The new pension scheme maintains the pay-as-you-go nature of the existing
pension system, but has made substantial changes to the accrual of pension
entitlements, the age at which benefits can be drawn, and the contribution
periods required. Essentially, there has been a shift from a defined benefit
pension scheme to a defined contribution scheme, which in turn shifts more risks
towards the individuals concerned and results in a more restricted distribution
to lower income earners and women.
Women disadvantaged to build an adequate pension
In principle, the new pension system gives everyone the same possibilities of
building an adequate pension. In Maltese society, however, many women still
devote more time to unpaid work and less time to paid work than men, which
results in lower average pensions for women. The trend is for women’s career
patterns to be shaped by their care obligations towards the family. Statistics
show that the most common reason for women to be unemployed is due to personal
or family responsibilities (44%) (NSO, 2007a). The 2005 employment rate for
women, 34.9%, is considerably below the Lisbon Strategy target of 60%, as is the
employment rate of older workers (31.5%). The employment rate for older women of
12.4% is among the lowest in the EU-25 and decreased by 1.5 percentage points
between 2003 and 2004. Under the new scheme, it will be difficult for many
married women and mothers to reach the 40-year target for a full two-thirds
pension; women in certain age groups, who stopped participating in the economy
for a period of 10 years or more, will not have made the contributions needed to
qualify. Although the new scheme gives two years credit for each child,
considering the wide gender gap in employment rates there is a need for more
effective means to protect women against discrimination in their old age. Women
should be better remunerated for their care-giving role in the family, a factor
which has a considerable weight in Maltese society.
The new pension system does not include an automatic scheme for persons who care
for elderly and less healthy individuals. The Social Security Act provides for a
carer’s pension for single people who have left the paid work force to care
for their elderly relatives, but this is governed by a means test and subject to
certain conditions; for instance, the patient must be bedridden or wheelchair
bound. In several EU countries, care of the elderly has begun to be credited
within the pension system (European Commission, 2006, p. 142),
an important feature left out of the new pension scheme even though home care is
considered a priority in elderly care in Malta (MFSS, 2005).
Pension payments on the decline
Due to the considerable lengthening of the measuring period from the top-earning
three of the final 10 years (a period when workers would be near the top of
their earning history) to the best 10 of the full 40 years, the remuneration may
no longer be representative of the final salary of workers before they retire.
This kind of reform is more likely to harm those who had steep earning rises in
their careers, but may not be any more beneficial to those on a low-income
trajectory. With the new changes, pension payments are expected to be on the
decline, which in turn is likely to raise the risk of the elderly falling back
on means-tested social assistance or dropping below the poverty line.
The shift to a more direct contribution scheme and the determination of benefits
by the amount of funds accumulated make it crucial to have an adequate crediting
system in place for periods during which workers are prevented from contributing
by circumstances such as illness, unemployment, training, or caring for children
and the elderly.
The second pillar, when introduced, creates new questions. In general,
multi-pillar reforms are still too new for their long-term impact to be evident.
A study by the Hungarian Central Bank (Orban, 2005) notes that “the returns
recorded so far in the private pension funds fall short of expectations and, on
the condition that these low returns persist, the second pillar is projected to
provide annuities that do not make up for the reduction in benefits received
from the public pillar.” Shifting
the weight to a direct contribution structure increases the risks shouldered by
individual contributors instead of the state, and can reduce the redistributive
element present in a more public direct benefit. Given the gender differentials
in employment in Malta, it will also tend to lead to greater gender inequality.
The second pillar will also introduce investment and administrative charge risks
to pension schemes.
The shift to more direct contribution implies that an individual’s
contributions and benefits will become directly linked, reducing the
possibilities of redistribution. Such a move will be negative for lower-income
individuals. The longevity risk is shifted squarely to the shoulders of
individual contributors of the same generation and not borne by the state, since
the move to a direct contribution scheme shifts the financial risk of changing
economic and demographic factors from the state to the individual. Taken
together, all these measures tend to disadvantage those with low lifetime
earnings, and their net outcome increases the risk that women will continue to
have lower annual pension incomes.
In general, the parametric reforms are driven by the objective of increasing
revenues and decreasing ‘generosity’ in terms of the annual pension benefits
paid out, and thus they are likely to have a negative impact on the incomes of
certain strata of pensioners. The new pension reform is mainly driven by
demographic pressure and fiscal stability concerns, and its impact on income
adequacy and pensioner poverty does not always appear to have been given
sufficient assessment. The new reform sends a clear signal to individuals that
they need to work more to qualify for the same benefit, rather than simply
cutting benefits and then possibly facing a political backlash and being forced
to increase them once again. Pensions were introduced in Malta not by chance,
but as the result of social consensus after the Second World War that poverty
amongst the elderly must be eliminated.
Social assistance to refugees
The government offers asylum seekers and refugees free accommodation in open
centres, as well as an allowance for food and transportation for unemployed
immigrants. Services and the duration of the period for which services are
offered are regulated by an ‘integration and service agreement’ or a
‘return and service agreement’. Refugees are given social security benefits
and are also assisted with a rent subsidy (MFSS, 2007).
As of January 2007, the daily allowance given to unemployed refugees in open
centres varies according to the status of the immigrant. A person with temporary
humanitarian protection is given EUR 4.65, an asylum seeker (someone who is
still awaiting a reply from the Refugee Commission) receives EUR 4.65, and a
rejected asylum seeker receives EUR 3.5. Couples with children receive EUR 2.33
for every child. Persons with refugee status receive weekly social security
benefits which amount to EUR 81.20 and EUR 8.14 for every dependant.
Both refugees and individuals with temporary humanitarian protection are
entitled to work after being issued a work permit by the Employment License
Unit, valid for one year. Upon employment, all social security benefits and
allowances are stopped. All allowances given in the open centres as well as
social security benefits and rent subsidies to refugees are taken from the
government budget. All immigrants, irrespective of their status, are entitled to
free health care.
It should be noted that in the Maltese context, the allowances given to asylum
seekers and rejected asylum seekers could be compared at par or worse to persons
living on a ‘dollar a day’ in a poor country, if they are not aided by
charity organisations.
Official development assistance
According to the European Commission (2007, p. 164), Malta spent EUR 7 million
(USD 9.68
million) or
0.15% of its GNI on official development assistance (ODA) in 2006. However,
questions have been raised on whether the money was actually spent on aid
towards the development of poor countries or for other purposes.
CONCORD (2007), an EU non-governmental development organization (NGDO) platform
of which the Maltese NGDO Platform is a member, criticizes the government of a
lack of transparency on where the money goes and to whom. CONCORD stresses that
currently Maltese ODA figures include the cancellation of Iraq’s debt to
Malta, money spent on migrants during their first year in the country, the
repatriating of migrants, and a number of scholarships given to people from
developing countries. This money is not helping any developing country to
develop and thus should not be counted as ODA. CONCORD further criticizes the
government for wanting to tie ODA to the acceptance of the repatriation of
migrants. The Maltese NGDO Platform has serious reservations on this measure and
considers that it undermines the rightful focus of ODA, namely tackling poverty.
References
CONCORD (2007). “Hold the applause! EU governments risk breaking the aid
promises”. April.
Commission of the European Communities (2003). “Joint report by the Commission
and the Council on adequate and sustainable pensions”.
European Commission (2006). “Adequate and Sustainable Pensions Synthesis
Report 2006”.
European Commission (2007). “‘European Commission Communication” (COM
(2007).
Eurostat (2006). “EU
Labour Force Survey - Principal results 2005”. Statistics in focus.
Luxembourg: Eurostat.
Eurostat (2007). Europe in figures — Eurostat yearbook 2006-07. Luxembourg: Eurostat.
<ec.europa.eu/eurostat>.
Malta Government
(2004). “White Paper on Pensions Reform”. House of Representatives, Malta,
24 November.
Malta Parliament (2006). “Act XIX of 2006”, Malta. <www.parliament.gov.mt/information/Acts/>.
MFSS (Ministry for the Family and Social Solidarity) (2005). “National Report
on Strategies for Social Protection and Social Inclusion”. Malta, 15 July.
MFSS (2007). Organisation for Integration and Welfare of Asylum Seekers (OIWAS).
Malta.
NSO
(National Statistic Office) (2007a). “International Women’s Day 2007”. Press
release No. 37/2007, 8 March.
NSO (2007b). “Survey on Income and Living Conditions 2005”. Press
release No. 75/2007, 9 May.
Orban, P.
(2005). “The sustainability of the Hungarian pension system: a
reassessment”. Magyar Nemzeti Bank. December.
Pension Working Group (2005). “National Strategy on Pensions Malta”. Malta,
15 June.
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