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Weaknesses and new rights
Pablo José Martínez Osés
Plataforma 2015 y más
In Spain, per capita social expenditure is below the average for the 15 EU member countries before the 2004 expansion (EU-15), and the government has to face the challenge of closing this gap. Since 1998 the country has accumulated a social security surplus, which is a compelling argument against proposals to privatize social insurance and thus divert resources from the public treasury. In the social sphere, new rights such as those of people who are dependent on care have been recognized, but it will be difficult to implement measures to satisfy these new demands.
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One of the basic pillars of Spanish social security is that it is
universal, and provides access to contributory and non-contributory pensions for
all. The system is based on compulsory contributions to a common fund, and
benefits are paid in accordance with different categories based on labour and
personal circumstances. In 1995 the government signed the Toledo Agreement
(still in force), which established the separation of funding sources; this
means that contributory pensions are financed from contributions and
non-contributory pensions from the general state budget.
However, comparisons with the figures for the 15 members of
the European Union before the 2004 enlargement of the bloc (EU-15) reveal
certain weaknesses in this social protection system. Spain is still enjoying
greater economic growth than the European mean, and average wealth as income per
capita stands at 91% of the average for the EU-15.
But social spending per capita is only 62% of the average for these 15
countries. According to EUROSTAT (2006), in 2003 Spain allocated 19.7% of its
GDP to social protection, while the figure for the EU-15 group was 28.3
%. Expenditure for the most vulnerable sectors (the elderly, the
disabled and the very poor) comes to only 9.8
% of GDP, which means Spain is second to last in the EU-15 ranking.
In contrast, Sweden allocates 17.6% to this sector, and Germany 14.7%.
The amounts that are actually paid in social security pensions follow the same
pattern. The average contributory pension in Spain comes to only 68% of the
EU-15 figure, and non-contributory pensions stand at only
-46% of the average for the
EU-15.
The debate about the viability of the
social security system
There is concern in Spain, as there is in the rest of Europe, about how
financially viable the pension system will be in the decades to come, given that
the population in general is ageing. The so-called demographic dependency ratio
could rise with the increase in life expectancy, and this would mean that
contributions from the active population would be insufficient to cover the
costs of the system. The European Commission has issued statements to this
effect,
warning of the danger of the system collapsing, and it is coordinating an
exchange of information among EU countries about reforms to European pension
systems.
But what is involved here goes beyond just bringing the amounts paid and the
coverage provided in the Spanish system up to the levels of the European
average. Another related aspect of the situation is that private business
sectors close to the spheres of power (Sáez
and Taguas, 2007)
are
promoting the idea that pension reform should involve the privatization of
social insurance. The proposal is to replace the present payments system with an
individual capitalization system in which each working person would subscribe on
an individual basis to a private pension plan. In fact, private pension plans
that are voluntary and complementary to the universal public system – and that
involve tax incentives – are already in operation.
These proposals would mean gradually extending privatization, and the suggestion
is that public protection should be reduced to a common minimum while two other
systems (one compulsory and the other voluntary) involving individual
capitalization with private organizations would be set up. Besides this, there
is also a move to raise the retirement age from 65 -to
70. These changes would open the door for banking organizations, savings funds
and life insurance companies to get their hands on this enormous goldmine of
resources that is currently administered by the public treasury, and the usual
arguments about greater profitability and efficiency have been used to support
this idea (Navarro, 2007).
However, these proposals run counter to the recommendations of the
above-mentioned Toledo Agreement, and they are not accepted by the present
government or stakeholders.
A bill was brought before parliament recently proposing that the reserve fund of
the pension system (which is fed with surpluses from the social security fund)
be quoted on the stock exchange and be administered by private financial
organizations, in line with principles of security, profitability and social,
economic and environmental responsibility.
These proposals threaten to undermine a mechanism that helps to guarantee social
rights and foster the redistribution of income, and they ought to be duly
examined and responded to. In spite of the frequent predictions that the pension
system is headed for collapse, the fact is that since 1998, the Spanish social
security system has actually accumulated a surplus. There are various reasons
for this, including a massive influx of women and immigrants into the labour
market, which has the capacity to absorb even more. If women’s participation
in the Spanish economy was at the level of the European average, nearly three
million more women would join the labour market as new contributors. It follows
that if the government invested in programmes to promote the labour insertion of
women and immigrants, this would serve to consolidate the present pension
system.
The argument about increased profitability is clearly questionable, since
numerous studies have shown that the costs of running private individual
capitalization systems are much higher than those of public social security, and
what is more, the cost of a changeover from one system to the other could amount
to as much as 10% of GDP.
In response to this pressure for privatization, even if we accept the prediction
that the pension system will eventually collapse, there are other alternative
ways to ensure that it will remain viable in the future. The tax burden in Spain
(the percentage of taxes over GDP) is still among the lowest in the EU-15
countries, so income from this source could be increased – preferably in the
form of progressively incremented income taxes, since this contributes to the
redistribution of wealth. Another measure could be to promote a lengthening of
active labour life beyond the age of 65 with the option of flexible timetables
for those who wish to continue working.
New rights, new challenges
New laws have been enacted in Spain recently to permit same-sex marriages and to
effectively ensure equality between women and men; these broaden the recognition
of rights and incorporate measures for ‘positive discrimination’. Meanwhile,
in November 2006, Congress passed the Law
to Promote Personal Autonomy and Care for Persons in a Situation of Dependency
(the Dependency Law) which covers care for the elderly and people living with
serious disabilities who find it difficult to cope for themselves in everyday
situations. This sets up a scale for evaluating the seriousness of cases of
dependency so that support can be provided. Thus, with the Dependency Law, Spain
is recognizing a new right that is universal, subjective and completely
effective: the right of people who cannot look after themselves to be cared for
by the state. In addition, remuneration will be paid for services that up to now
have usually been ‘invisible’, tasks involving family care that fall mainly
to women (and
also immigrants) and which are not given a valuation in the sphere of work. This
law has been called the fourth pillar of the welfare state, but in fact it only
amounts to a part of that pillar, which also consists of other social services.
The Dependency Law is important because it recognizes a right for 1,125,000
people (IMSERSO, 2004), and this figure will undoubtedly
rise in the years ahead. Implementing the law means a whole series of big
challenges will have to be met, particularly since social and health care
services are very decentralized. This will involve not only economic transfers,
some of which have already been enacted, but also mechanisms for interregional
coordination and support, which have been poorly developed up until now.
The law will be implemented progressively, beginning in 2007, until the entire
dependent population is covered in 2015. This will call for budget allocations
that will amount to more than EUR 12 billion (USD 16.34 billion) by the end of
the eight-year cycle, which is slightly more than 1% of GDP. Successful
implementation of this commitment will require far-reaching political and
regional agreement.
The new law might expose the fact that, in Spain, there is a serious lack of
infrastructure adapted to the needs of this population sector, and unfortunately
there is no commitment in the offing to make this kind of investment.
Cooperation for development:
pending
consolidation
In 2006 Spanish official development assistance (ODA) continued to increase, and
efforts to gear aid to the fight against poverty continued. In addition, at the
end of the year the Foreign Debt Law was enacted, which linked some elements of
debt management to the fight against poverty. This law ought to be applied
promptly to consolidate its provisions, mainly those that have to do with
modifying the mechanisms that generate foreign debt, namely the Development
Assistance Fund and the Spanish Export Credit Insurance Company (CESCE).
The government has also put into operation and strengthened new instruments in
line with the recommendations of the 2005 Paris Declaration of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD). The initiatives to convert debt into development projects and
direct support for national budgets in countries that receive aid should be
intensified and extended to more countries, and greater social control and
participation in how these budgets are oriented and executed should be promoted.
These kinds of measures can
make a direct contribution to much-needed investment in basic social services,
which is something governments in developing countries must do if they are to
progress towards the Millennium Development Goals set in 2000.
It is less than a year since important legislation for Spanish development
assistance was concluded, and action must be taken to promote some basic
measures so that the trends that were initiated should not be merely transitory.
It has become urgently necessary to impose regulations (which people have been
demanding for some time) to sever the links between economic and commercial
interests and Spanish foreign assistance, and to thoroughly overhaul the system
through which Spanish cooperation is managed (the Spanish International
Cooperation Agency). Almost the only step taken in this reform so far has been
to announce it, and there will have to be a commitment from various ministerial
departments to inaugurate structures for political and strategic guidance that
is well prepared and coherently coordinated, so as to achieve solid cooperation.
The challenge is to consolidate a new dimension of cooperation and executive
action on the political stage. In this reform Spain is seeking to permanently
consolidate what have been isolated innovations up to now.
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Progress made and
challenges pending in development cooperation in 2006
Intermón Oxfam
Isabel Kreisler
According to
data from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD, in 2006
Spain increased its official development assistance (ODA) by 20.3%
over the 2005 figure. This is a significant rise, and it confirms the
upward trend in Spanish foreign assistance and the country’s commitment
to reaching the Millennium Development Goals.
Spain’s contribution of EUR 3.03
billion
(over USD 4.12 billion) put it in eighth place in the ranking of
donor countries. In relative terms, this came to 0.32%
of gross national income (GNI) in 2006.
For the first time Spain contributed more than the mean for DAC
donors (although total DAC assistance fell by 5.1% against the previous
year, the first ODA decrease since 1997).
These data showing a quantitative increase in ODA are a good sign, but two
serious reservations must be borne in mind. First,
Spain has not complied with its own timetable for increasing ODA, in
which a figure of 0.35%
of GNI was set for 2006
as a prior step to reaching 0.5%
in 2008.
Nor has it complied with the commitment agreed by the European countries
to allocate 0.33% of GNI to international cooperation in 2007 (having
fallen short by 0.01%). Second, as is the case with the other donor
countries and as has happened in previous years, the official figure for
ODA has been inflated by debt forgiveness operations. If we considered
these amounts separately
(as the donors themselves recommended in 2002 in the Monterrey
Consensus), Spanish
ODA in 2006 would be only 0.28% of GNI.
For Spanish cooperation agencies, another significant development in 2006
has been the large sums contributed to international bodies, mainly to the
United Nations system. Again, while this demonstration of a commitment to
multilateralism on the part of the government is welcome, the question
arises as to whether it can sustain these payments and whether it can
obtain guarantees that this assistance is used in the most effective way.
What the government has done amounts to handing over a blank cheque
without any pre-established strategic framework to supervise how the funds
are employed.
All in all, the quality of Spanish ODA is still an area that needs serious
attention.
Some progress has been made. Like the rest of the DAC donor countries,
Spain has formally adopted the commitments stemming from the Paris
Declaration, and it has developed sectoral strategies which should
help to improve how assistance is managed in the near future.
However, as regards the quality of assistance, it is still very
worrying that new foreign debt is being generated through mechanisms that
are long overdue for reform like Development Assistance Fund (FAD)
concessionary credits that are linked to exports by Spanish
companies and are counted as ODA, or the Spanish
Export Credit Insurance Company (CESCE) credit insurance schemes.
If the government is to make good on its commitment to international
cooperation, and if a coherent development policy is to be sustained,
these instruments need urgent reform. Future increases in ODA will
have to be met by consolidated expenditure from the national budget and
not depend on volatile expedients
like forgiving foreign debt or the ability of debtor countries to
repay credits, which is how Spain’s obligations to multilateral bodies
are being discharged at the present time.
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References
EUROSTAT
(2006).
IMSERSOL (Instituto de Mayores y Servicios Sociales) (2004). Atención
a las Personas en Situación de Dependencia en España (Libro Blanco).
Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales. :
<www.seg-social.es/imserso/dependencia/may_libroblanco.html>.
Navarro, V. (2007). “¿La seguridad social en España
es inviable?” in Nou Cicle, el color del
progrés, magazine online. :
<www.noucicle.org/NCarticles/1620.html>.
Sáez, M.J. y Taguas, D. (2007). “La
Reforma de las Pensiones” in Envejecimiento
y pensiones: La reforma permanente.
Revista Panorama Social No. 4, Fundación de Cajas de Ahorro.
Notes:
From 79.4% in 1997.
Both comparisons take account of the amount of pension received by retired
persons in comparable situations.
The ratio of the population under 15 years of age and 65 and older to those aged
15 to 64.
For example, COM (2001) 362 final, of 3 July 2001.
David Taguas is currently in charge of the Economic Office of the Presidency of
the Spanish government. The same idea is dealt with in an editorial in El País,
“Augurios de crisis”, 12 February 2002.
Vicens Navarro holds the Chair of Public
Policies at the Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona, Spain.
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