SENEGAL: The environmental crisis resulting from global warming has reduced fishing(...). Fishing is an important source of resources for the primary sector and one of the main sources of protein for the population.

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: ... the poor spend upwards of 50% of their income on food — the poorest spend 80% or more. The increase in food prices has increased not just poverty, but also hunger.

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: ... women continue to be the first to lose their jobs and are increasingly finding themselves engaged in petty informal trading of vegetables and tomatoes as a coping mechanism.

CLIMATE CHANGE: The Least Developed Countries, who contributed the least in pollution, will suffer the most. Many small island developing states may one day just disappear from the map.

LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES: Unprecedented food crises, triggered by soaring food prices and leading to "food riots", have shaken over 30 LDCs, where workers and peasants have become unable to afford food items basic for survival.

BENIN: The price of maize, the most widely consumed product, soared 220%.

CAMBODIA: More than 90% of the workers laid off were women from rural communities.

CANADA: ... women are over-represented in part-time and precarious work and are often the first to be laid off.

CHINA: Initial damage has included decreasing exports and remittances from abroad and galloping devaluation.

INDIA: ... there has been drastically reduced growth in personal and consumer loans and industrial production.

MALAYSIA: ... the coming recession could be worse than that of 1997.

NICARAGUA: ... more than 400,000 children could die from avoidable causes as a result of the crisis.

PERU: ... 200,000 layoffs, as well as a fall in the purchasing power of wages and savings.

UNITED STATES: ... many of these fortunate enough to own homes have lost all or most of their equity or are trapped in mortgages that now far exceed the value of their homes.

POLAND: ... the growth of the gray — informal — economy will affect women more than men, as they are more often engaged in low-paid jobs, especially in the private service sector.

Social Watch is an international network of citizens’ organizations struggling to eradicate poverty and the causes of poverty, to ensure an equitable distribution of wealth and the realization of human rights. We are committed to social, economic and gender justice, and we emphasize the right of all people not to be poor.

Social Watch holds governments, the UN system and international organizations accountable for the fulfilment of national, regional and international commitments to eradicate poverty.
SOCIAL WATCH REPORT 2009

People first
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Social Watch: promoting accountability

Social Watch, a network that today has members in over 60 countries around the world, was created in 1995 as a “meeting place for non-governmental organizations concerned with social development and gender discrimination,” responding to the need to promote the political will required for making the United Nations promises come true. Since then, this network, which is continually growing both qualitatively and quantitatively, has published 14 yearly reports on progress and setbacks in the struggle against poverty and for gender equality, which have been used as tools for advocacy on a local, regional, and international level.

From its number 0, published in 1996, to this present issue, the 14th, the Social Watch Report has brought to light more than 600 reports from civil society organizations, all of them sharing the aim of reminding governments of their commitments and tracking their implementation, both country by country and at the international level.

The present issue, featuring contributions from 61 national Social Watch coalitions, sustains the flame that brought the network into existence in 1995: the need to generate tools and strategies to rectify the lack of accountability mechanisms and ensure compliance with international commitments related to social policies and development goals.

In the decade Social Watch was created, a series of high-level United Nations conferences, starting with the “Children’s Summit” in 1990 and ending with the Millennium Summit in 2000, redefined the global social agenda. In 1995, the Social Summit (Copenhagen) and the Women’s Conference (Beijing) defined, for the first time, the eradication of poverty and gender equality as common universal objectives, setting concrete targets and timelines to achieve the goal vaguely formulated in 1946 in the UN Charter as “dignity for all.” To promote the political will needed for those promises to become a reality, the Social Watch network was created as a “meeting place for non-governmental organizations concerned with social development and gender discrimination” (Social Watch No. 0, 1996), by a group of civil society organizations.

Thus, the Social Watch Report was formulated as a powerful tool for the presentation of internationally available statistical information and for reporting on qualitative aspects of the issues addressed through analyses by social organizations working at a national level. A yearly publication, the Report is devoted to progress and setbacks in the struggle against poverty and for gender equality, two largely overlapping objectives, since the absolute majority of the persons living in poverty are women.

The Social Watch yearly reports, while adding an international dimension to local efforts and campaigns, became the first sustained monitoring initiative on social development and gender equality at a national level, and the first to combine both in one international overview.

The report No. 0, published in 1996, featured contributions from 13 organizations; since then, the network has been steadily rising. Currently, Social Watch has members (“watchers”) in over 60 countries around the world, and membership grows each year.

A flexible network

As the “meeting place” has grown, several aspects of it have evolved, but the founding ideas and objectives remain. In preparing for their participation in the Copenhagen Social Summit, civil society organizations adopted flexible and ad hoc ways of organizing as a network. No formal governing structure or steering committee was created and no stable coordinating group was established. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) preferred to inform each other and coordinate activities in horizontal open spaces, an approach that some analysts regard as a forerunner of the organizational format later adopted by the World Social Forum. Many of the NGOs that took part in the Social Summit later formed the backbone of Social Watch. As a result, the structure and functioning of the network preserves much of original flexibility and openness.

In addition to national coalitions, the network is structured around three bodies: the General Assembly, the Coordinating Committee and the International Secretariat. In recent years, some regional and sub-regional coordination structures were established as a space for articulation—not as a necessary intermediate body to link the national with the global.

The Social Watch network is not an incorporated entity and it did not start by drafting its governing bylaws. Instead, a short Memorandum of Understanding between national groups and the network became the basic framework establishing mutual expectations, respecting both the autonomy of national coalitions and democratic horizontal decision-making. A key principle that distinguishes Social Watch from other international civil society networks is that no central body provides funds for its members. These operational principles help avoid the tensions associated with donor/recipient relationships within the network—since there aren’t any—and also the loss of energy.

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN NATIONAL GROUPS AND THE SOCIAL WATCH NETWORK

1. Coalitions must be based in the country and be active in social development issues in that country (not exclusively as academics or consultants).
2. Their basic commitment to the international network is to provide a national report, with their own conclusions and determination of priorities, to be included in the annual publication.
3. They are expected to use their national report and the global report in lobbying activities at a national level.
4. They must be open to the incorporation of other organizations, work actively to broaden awareness of Social Watch and encourage the participation of other organizations.
5. They are responsible for raising funds for their activities. National coalitions are not dependent for funds on, or financially accountable to, the Secretariat or any other international Social Watch entity.
6. Each coalition determines its own organizational structure.
7. Social Watch membership and the exercise of governmental functions are absolutely incompatible.
8. Cooperation with other national platforms should be encouraged at sub-regional, regional and global levels.

that could result from lengthy discussions about money, budgeting and reporting, as well as procedural matters. It has also resulted in members’ strong sense of tenure over the network.

National coalitions organize the way they want – or can – according to the conditions in each country. The membership of Social Watch coalitions is very diverse, including research institutes or centres, NGOs, grassroots organizations, trade unions, women’s groups, rural organizations and others. Since the international Social Watch report can only devote a couple of pages to each country and is only available in English and Spanish, the local coalitions publish more extensive national reports in national languages in Benin, Brazil, Czech Republic, Germany, India, Italy, Poland, the Philippines, and the Arab region.

General Assembly
The General Assembly is the Social Watch network’s highest directive body. Policy discussion and medium- to long-term strategic planning happens in its realm, which serves as a decision-making forum. However, it is also a space for reinforcing the sense of belonging and strengthening the network’s identity and unity. It takes place every three years and up to now has been held three times: in Rome 2000, Beirut 2003 and Sofia 2006. This year, the General Assembly will meet for the fourth time in Accra, Ghana in October. In addition to setting medium- and long-term priorities and identifying potential alliances in advocacy strategy, the Assembly elects members of the Coordinating Committee to whom coordination and political leadership between assemblies are delegated.

Coordinating Committee
The Coordinating Committee (CC) is the key political body for the ‘daily’ work of the network, with an organizational structure which requires fluid communications, facilitated principally through an email list, plus biannual face-to-face meetings and regular telephone conferences to discuss specific issues.

As the CC’s task is to “ensure the political visibility and participation of the network in relevant spaces and processes,” its composition endeavours to represent a geographical and gender balance, as well as considering the contribution, in terms of experience and capabilities, that members can provide to the whole network. In general, the CC’s decisions are adopted by consensus, and every single decision (and discussion) is communicated to the watchers in a timely manner. The constant participation of two Secretariat members as ad hoc members of the CC ensures coordination between the two bodies, the function of the Secretariat being to support and implement the strategic decisions made.

International Secretariat
The Secretariat is the main executive body of Social Watch. The first external evaluation of the network (1995-2000) noted that, “Of the various roles in the Social Watch network, that of the Secretariat has changed the most” (Hessini and Nayar, 2000). Originally the Secretariat’s function was limited to responsibility for the production of the Report, but due to the network’s growth it has subsequently incorporated a series of new functions, including research, capacity building, campaigning, promotion of the network and its representation in international forums.

The local, the global and the Report
Every year Social Watch chooses to analyze a different subject in depth through its Report, usually focusing on topics under discussion on the international agenda that can be addressed from a local perspective. Experts from diverse origins and disciplines contribute alternative views on the issues through thematic articles. This international perspective is complemented with national and regional reports through which member organizations contribute a local perspective, reporting on the state of affairs in their countries in relation to each year’s specific theme.

In addition, Social Watch produces indexes and tables with comparable international information, presenting a macro-perspective of the situation related to certain dimensions of develop-
ment while also providing national level readings. Social Watch has developed alternative indicators to measure progress or setbacks in gender equity and the meeting of basic human capacities, which are now used as reference points for both civil society and international institutions.

Although members use the document for advocacy work in diverse situations, Report launches are key opportunities for dissemination of its contents, taking place both in relevant spaces of international and national debate and decision-making. This year, some preliminary findings from the 2009 Report were showcased in the publication *Who Pays? The Global Crisis and What Needs to Be Done*, which was presented in June in New York at the UN Conference on the Financial and Economic Crisis and its Impacts on Development. In addition, in order to share best practices related to the work of national Social Watch groups, the publication *Learning from Successful Experiences: Summary of the Analysis Four Case Studies from the Social Watch National Coalitions* was produced and disseminated.

For example, this year Social Watch drafted recommendations on issues related to the financial architecture and its impacts on development for the Commission of Experts of the President of the UN General Assembly on Reforms of the International Monetary and Financial System. In addition, in order to share best practices related to the work of national Social Watch groups, the publication *Learning from Successful Experiences: Summary of the Analysis Four Case Studies from the Social Watch National Coalitions* was produced and disseminated. Through its website, blog, and presence in social networking platforms, Social Watch is also utilizing new multimedia tools to disseminate information on gender, development and human rights issues, generate discussions among fellow civil society practitioners, and conduct outreach to policymakers and journalists. Additionally, on several occasions, Social Watch spokespersons have addressed the UN General Assembly and other intergovernmental bodies on behalf of the network or wider civil society constituencies.

References

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Table of Contents

Voices that make a difference .......................................................... 3
Roberto Bissio

People first ..................................................................................... 5
Roberto Bissio

THEMATIC REPORTS

A human rights-based response to the financial and economic crisis .................................................. 13
Aldo Caliari, Center of Concern

Gender equality and the financial crisis .................................................. 17
Nancy Barone, Canadian Feminist Alliance for International Action; Mirjana Dokmanovic, Association Technology and Society, Serbia and Women in Development Europe (WID); Genoveva Tisheva, Bulgarian Gender Research Foundation and Bulgarian-European Partnership Association; Emily Sikazwe, Women for Change

The global food price crisis .................................................................. 21
Sophia Murphy, Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy

Justice to cool the planet ....................................................................... 25
Isagani Serrano, PRRM, Social Watch Filipinas

Energy challenges for Europe .................................................................. 29
Elena Trifonova, Bulgarian-European Partnership Association

Holding transnational corporations accountable for human rights obligations: the role of civil society ........................................................................ 31
Jana Silverman, Social Watch; Álvaro Orsatti, Trade Union Confederation of the Americas

The global economic crisis and the least developed countries: citizens’ concerns ...................................... 35
Arjun Karik, LDC Watch

Mounting development challenges posed by the world economic crisis: policy options in the Arab region ........................................................................ 39
Kinda Mohamadieh, Arab NGO Network for Development; Oliver Pearce, Christian Aid

Europe’s response to the global financial and economic crisis ...................................................................... 43
Miyaj van Reisen, Europe External Policy Advisors (EEPA); Simon Stocker y Louisa Vogiazides, Eurostep

NATIONAL REPORTS

ALGERIA ................................................................................. 60
ARGENTINA ........................................................................... 62
BAHRAIN ............................................................................. 64
BANGLADESH ..................................................................... 66
BELGIUM ............................................................................. 68
BENIN ................................................................................. 70
BOLIVIA .............................................................................. 72
BRAZIL ................................................................................. 74
BULGARIA ........................................................................... 76
BURMA (MYANMAR) ................................................................. 78
CAMBODIA .......................................................................... 80
CANADA .................................................................................. 82
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC .................................................. 84
CHILE .................................................................................... 86
COSTA RICA ........................................................................ 88
CYPRUS ................................................................................ 90
CZECH REPUBLIC ................................................................ 92
EGYPT .................................................................................. 94
EL SALVADOR ..................................................................... 96
ERITREA ............................................................................... 98
FRANCE ............................................................................... 100
GERMANY ........................................................................... 102
GHANA ............................................................................... 104
GUATEMALA ...................................................................... 106
HONDURAS .......................................................................... 108
HUNGARY ........................................................................... 110
ITALY .................................................................................... 112

IT NATIOnAL rePOrTS
Voices that make a difference

This Social Watch Report goes to print in September 2009, a year after the US Government failed to rescue Lehman Brothers from bankruptcy. The collapse of this global investment bank marked the peak of a crisis that started at the epicenter of globalized finance on Wall Street and soon spread to national economies everywhere.

Since “crisis” has been the keyword for 2009, the question that Social Watch asked its network of national grassroots organizations to respond to in framing their country reports was obvious: What is the social and environmental impact of the global economic and financial crisis in your country? What is your Government doing about it? What proposals are being put forward by civil society?

Each national Social Watch coalition, examining the situation in its own country, has identified a variety of ways in which the crisis is affecting them. Those findings are the heart of this report and they provide the bottom-up perspective of the people working with and from the grassroots.

This is not a commissioned report. Each national Social Watch chapter is made up of organizations and movements that are active year-round on social development issues. Their findings are not intended as pure research. Rather, they are used to draw the attention of the authorities to issues of concern and to help shape more equitable, gender-sensitive and pro-poor policies.

Asked to comment on the crisis, the Social Watch national chapters decided on their own priorities and emphases and even on their own definition of what the current crisis encompasses. To make the report possible, each national Social Watch coalition raises its own funds and defines its own ways to consult with the grassroots to gather evidence and validate their findings. They do not shy away from criticizing national authorities, policies, elites or governance systems whenever they feel it is necessary. And the voicing of critical views helps strengthen democratic processes. But even when the reports find that much can (and needs to) improve at home, these findings also point to international constraints that cannot be solved at the country level.

There is little democracy in international decision-making either for civil society or for governments. Civil society organizations cannot attend, even as observers, many of the key decision-making fora and in many cases this is also true for governments of developing countries, especially the least developed countries. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the two main pillars of global financial governance, are controlled by seven countries and the United States has veto power in both institutions (as does the EU, if its member countries take a common position).

Thus, the convening at the heads of state level of the “G-20”, an informal grouping of 22 economies from the North and the South considered to be of “systemic importance” is a welcome step towards recognizing the new realities in the world economy. But it is clearly not enough, for two main reasons: first of all, because some 170 countries are left out, as happened at the G-20 summits in Washington (November 2008), London (April 2009) and Pittsburgh (September 2009). And secondly, because the G-20 has no institutional weight, no legal status, no accountability, no secretariat in charge of following up on its resolutions and unknown rules for reaching a decision in case the closed-door negotiations fail to reach an agreement.

Yet, it is argued that the advantage of the G-20 is that a reduced number of leaders meeting at the highest level is able to produce significant results, while a large meeting conducted in a transparent way could only produce inflamed speeches for political consumption but no significant agreements. What happened over the last 12 months, instead, was that the General Assembly of the United Nations, meeting in Doha in December 2008 and in New York in June 2009, managed to come out with a consensus of the “G-192” (the total number of members of the UN) that goes deeper in its analysis of the global crisis than has any other internationally agreed document.

Social Watch was an active participant in all the hearings convened by Father Miguel D’Escoto, president of the 63rd session of the UN General Assembly, and submitted recommendations to the commission of experts led by economist Joseph Stiglitz that advised the highest international body in its deliberations on the economic and financial crisis and its impact on development. Social Watch organized, together with dozens of local and international civil society organizations, a “Peoples’ Voices” event in New York that brought together local victims of the crisis with activists and researchers from around the world. Our network was also actively involved in the round tables during the June High Level Conference itself and even when only a few of our recommendations actually found their way into the final outcome document, we publicly commended the government negotiators for having achieved a consensus that seemed impossible.

Now it is time to put those agreements into practice; to transform the words into action.

The whys and hows of bringing this about is what the reader will find in this Social Watch Report 2009.

ROBERTO BISSIO
Social Watch International Secretariat
People first

Roberto Bissio
Social Watch International Secretariat

The bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers investment bank in September 2008 is seen by many as the tipping point in a series of collapses in the banking system that spread like prairie fire through the financial markets and stock exchanges of the richest economies of the world. Since then, the word “crisis” has dominated the media as well as political discussion worldwide. The Great Depression that shook the world in the early 1930s is frequently cited as the only precedent and well-known historian Eric Hobsbawm has compared the fall of Wall Street to the fall of the Berlin Wall. Regarded as the greatest historian of the twentieth century, Hobsbawm said, “the totally unrestricted and uncontrolled free-market capitalist economy […] that captured the world and its governments in the years since Margaret Thatcher and President Reagan […] is breaking down before our eyes”, the same as “the centrally state-planned economies of the Soviet type broke down twenty years ago”.

The dust has not settled yet. While politically connected US investment banks such as Goldman Sachs, have started to make profits again and reward their executives with multimillion dollar bonuses, unemployment is still growing in most of the so-called “advanced” economies and the tsunami wave of the crisis is only now, one year after the earthquake at the financial epicenter, starting to hit more distant shores. In Bolivia, for example, the local Social Watch coalition in its contribution for this report writes that “as a cycle of world growth roared past (previous to the crisis), Bolivia stood by and watched, unable to take advantage of the opportunity to establish its own rhythm of development. Its economy was just beginning to pick up speed, when the global boom began to stall and then go into reverse.”

The findings from civil society organizations in over 60 countries are included in this Social Watch report, the first global bottom-up report on the social impact of the crisis. UN agencies and other institutions have reported estimates of the millions of jobs that will be lost worldwide, the millions more people who will be thrown into poverty and the additional number of children likely to die as a result of the inability of the markets to solve the problems they created (contrary to what was the prevailing credo until last year). Valuable as these are, they are calculated from global aggregates, not the results of direct observation from the ground. The accumulation of findings from rich and poor countries of all continents show remarkable similarities and also a diversity of situations that enriches the picture available so far, makes it even more dramatic and challenges decision-makers with the urgency of implementing policies that put people first. It is not just a matter of social justice, but also of sound economic policy, as a brief overview of the country reports demonstrates.

Innocent bystanders

In capitalist finances, like in a casino, the riskier the bets the higher the earnings. But risky bets also mean frequent losses. In that logic, the scandal is not the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, but the decision by US president George W. Bush and his Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson to spend hundreds of billions of dollars of taxpayers’ money to rescue failed banks, such as Goldman Sachs, of which Paulson was Chief Executive Officer before joining the Government, and insurance groups, such as A.I.G. When President Yayi Boni of Benin, elected owing to his solid reputation as a banker, learned of this decision, he wondered publicly where the trillions of dollars of rescue funds would come from and concluded that the poor would end up paying for the crisis. The Belgian report for Social Watch agrees: when the shares of banks and the principal enterprises in the country collapsed, the Belgian Government went to the rescue of the banks and provided deposit guarantees. The crisis is still causing unemployment to rise, while the cost of the bank rescue is making itself felt in the drastic increase of public debt, with serious repercussions in the provision of social security. In Benin itself, the local Social Watch coalition has discovered that in its efforts to stimulate the economy the State is competing with the poor for scarce construction materials and grassroots organizations are mobilizing against the rising cost of living.

Many of the national Social Watch reports show how women tend to suffer the impact of the crisis disproportionately. In the words of the Polish coalition, “the decrease in family incomes due to the economic crisis might cause pauperization of whole social groups, particularly among the lower and middle classes. It is very likely that this will in turn have a more significant impact on women, since they traditionally are the main responsible for family well-being (this is particularly true among the lower income groups). According to some analysts, crises amplify the grey (informal) sector in the Polish economy as many, especially small entrepreneurs try to minimize labour costs and avoid taxation and other costs associated with formal employment. It seems very likely that the growth of the grey economy will affect women more than men, as they are more often engaged in low paid jobs, especially in the private service sector (e.g. in retail).”

In France the global crisis has had a direct impact on the people, as it has in all the developed countries where it began. The most obvious effects have been rising unemployment and increased social exclusion, and “sectors that not long ago were in a comfortable situation are even suffering food shortages” according to the French Social Watch report. Similarly, the German Government’s crisis management strategy does not include social or indeed ecological goals. Its stimulus packages and tax cuts are socially inequitable; layoffs and the rise in part-time workers are revealing the ugly face of deregulation. Poverty is becoming “massive” in both Eastern and Western extremes of Europe, report the Social Watch coalitions from Portugal and Moldova.

In the Czech Republic, “the global economic crisis (...) is lowering the standard of living” mainly because of increased unemployment. The Czech Social Watch coalition challenges the official unemployment figure, arguing that 178,000 people who were considered to be not actively seeking employment were left out and that adding this group would have pushed the unemployment rate 50% higher.

Foreign workers, particularly those from Asia, are found to be those suffering the most in the Czech Republic, but also the Social Watch coalitions in Malta, Slovakia and Cyprus report on rising difficulties for foreigners and even cases of xenophobia. At the other end, economic difficulties derived from diminishing remittances by exported workers are reported from the Philippines, Morocco, Mexico, Nicaragua and many other places. In the case of Egypt “the drop in remittances and the return of émigrés has put pressure on a labour market badly prepared to absorb more unemployed workers.” In El Salvador, “more than 300,000 families – 26.7% of the population – receive money from abroad, which helps defray the cost of food, clothing and basic services.” Flows of remittances almost stopped growing in 2008 and it is estimated that they will start falling in 2009.

The speed at which countries get affected by the tsunami is not related to its physical distance to Wall Street, of course, but with how its economy is linked to those at the epicenter. In Mozambique, for example, which is one of the poorest countries in the world, the privately own Mozambique International Bank (Millennium Bim) has published a report forecasting that the nation’s economy will shrink because of negative growth in donor countries that finance more than half the national budget, and those that make foreign direct investments. Social Watch-Mozambique reports that prices for aluminum, tobacco, sugar, tea, chest-

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naturally

As Brazilian financial expert Fernando Cardim writes in his analysis for the local Social Watch report: “increasing income and tax revenues (…) is precisely what President Obama is trying to accomplish in the United States. It is also what the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Dominique Strauss-Kahn, has defended repeatedly since 2007.” Yet, “the Fund itself has resisted adopting this view, as demonstrated by the conditionalities imposed on the Central European countries that were bailed out by the IMF.”

In the case of Romania, the national Social Watch report notes that “the IMF loan seems to have been contracted under external pressures, mainly to save foreign companies’ interests in Romania. It will not serve to repay the country’s foreign debt but will cover the debts of local subsidiaries of foreign banks. Public funds will thus be used to repair the damage done by private capital.” Instead of reaching to local needs, the IMF went to Romania as a result of “desperate calls from the Austrian Government for EU and IMF intervention to rescue its banks in Eastern Europe.”

Austrian banks had lent the region an amount equivalent to 70% of Austria’s GDP. Now, “the repayment of a loan that represents 40% of Romania’s annual budget will only be possible over the next years through decreasing the population’s standard of living.”

In Hungary, an IMF bailout was needed to avoid total collapse of the economy, but it led to devaluation, tax increases, proycyclical measures such as spending cuts and other unpopular measures. Prime Minister Ferenc Gyucsany was forced to resign in March 2009. The new Government plans to cut pensions, public sector bonuses and maternity support; to mortgage energy and transport subsidies; and to raise the age for retirement.

Similarly in Serbia, pressure by the IMF to decrease the state deficit led the Government to announce in March 2009 the introduction of a temporary “solidarity” salary and a pension tax of 6% for those who earned above USD 170. This created discontent among workers and pensioners while trade unions announced protests. They argued that the “solidarity” tax would hit the poorest, cause a reduction in salaries and increase unemployment and work in the informal sector, while the rich would remain untouched. Overnight, the whole savings plan was revoked. According to the Serbian Social Watch coalition, the Government “was caught between fear of social turbulence on one side and pressure from the IMF on the other, and the following weeks were marked by discordant voices from policy makers, who announced new packages of saving measures in the evening that were revoked the following morning.” The menu of new ideas included reducing the number of ministries, increasing property taxes, taxing mobile phone bills and new car purchases, introducing a luxury car tax, banning new employment in the public sector, limiting business trips abroad and reducing working hours. Yet, the Serbian “watchers” note that “the newly adopted Law on Confiscation of Property Gained by Crime, the State could collect USD 2.64 billion in one year, a sum equaling the one Serbia is asking for from the IMF.”

In Bulgaria NGOs and trade unions also do not agree that reducing social expenditures is acceptable in times of crisis. “Any further reduction could shatter the country’s social peace,” warns the local Social Watch. Although NGO experts support the increase in the share of investment going to transport infrastructure, they are sharply critical of the Government’s failure to use EU structural funds allocated to Bulgaria during its first two years of full membership. “Only 0.6% of the EUR 2.2 billion had spent by the end of 2008. Lack of financial capacity, excessive bureaucracy and scarcely transparent procedures have all prevented the funds from reaching their intended beneficiaries.”

**Slowing down can be dramatic**

When the financial crisis started, some economists put forward the “decoupling” hypothesis, according to which emerging economies would be relatively untouched by the global financial crisis owing to their substantial foreign exchange reserves, robust corporate balance sheets and relatively healthy banking sectors. Yet they felt the impact anyhow. As Social Watch-India observes, “the Government’s initial prediction that the country would emerge unscathed, was shortsighted” and economic growth dropped from a healthy 9.3% in 2007 to 7.3% in 2008. For 2009, the IMF forecasts a growth of 4.5%. Similar drops from two digits growth figures to 5% occurred in Vietnam, Peru and Cambodia.

Five per cent growth can make finance ministers in OECD countries envious, since most of them are trying to emerge from negative growth (i.e., recession), but the departure point should not be ignored. Five per cent growth per year in low-income countries means an increase of less than a dime a day for the average person. But a few cents make enormous difference when you are poor. As Social Watch Cambodia points out for example, the reduction of the growth rate by one half means that “people living around Tonle Sap, the country’s major lake, are especially vulnerable, since they had already gone into debt to make ends meet. Last year they had to sell productive assets and pull their children out of school to go to work.”

**Permanent crisis**

The term “crisis” refers to a turning point, a decisive moment, an unstable time, yet for many of the developing countries, the greater the linkage with the globalized economy, the bigger and faster has been the impact. Mexico and Chile, two Latin American countries tied to the US economy by free trade and investment agreements, were immediately affected. The price of copper, Chile’s main export, peaked at over USD 4 per pound in mid 2008, only to fall to USD 1.4 at the end of the year. Yet, the most noticeable impact of the crisis is, according to the Chilean Social Watch report, the fall in pension fund holdings, which are invested in local and foreign financial assets. The value of retirement savings suffered a loss of USD 27 billion, more than 26% of the total funds, by the end of 2008. This is the reason why household wealth in Chile suffered the greatest losses in Latin America, yet despite repeated protests from the people affected, they were not as lucky as the shareholders of some of the big global banks and nobody came to their rescue or did anything to compensate them.

Falling commodity prices have caused the crisis to spread to many countries. In Uganda the local Social Watch coalition estimates that this might reverse recent social progress and make it impossible to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. Zambia suffers even more than Chile from the drop in copper prices, on which the country is highly dependent. The Zambian contribution to Social Watch rightly notes that: “Unlike the United States and other countries that have responded to the economic meltdown by providing financing to failing banks and major industries to try to keep them afloat, Zambian President Rupiah Banda does not have any resources to give out.”

The report from Ghana comments on the same problem: “The question that citizens are trying to come to grips with is whether the country should focus on aid from the international community to cope with the economic fallout, or resort to harsh fiscal and monetary initiatives.”
the reporting Social Watch coalitions, the crisis they are suffering is a matter of decades and did not start with the collapse of the financial markets. In the Central African Republic, poverty is seen as increasing and not diminishing since 1990, with political instability and violence damaging an already weak economy.

Eritrea is reported as having “a deep economic, social and political mess of its own making” before being hit by the global crisis, while in Nigeria most people “have been living for a long time in a situation of economic meltdown. Corruption is widespread, the country lacks electricity, education and health are in a deplorable condition, and the armed fight for the control of oil resources continues to be intense.” In Yemen, the local Social Watch team sees lack of rights as being at the origin of crisis after crisis since 1990, with 42% of the population living below the poverty line and an even worse situation for women. In Burma, there is a crisis in every area, whether the economy, politics, food or environment, with the Government showing itself to be unable to support its own citizens in the aftermath of a devastating cyclone and yet spending nearly half of its budget on the military.

In Nepal the crisis is expected to hit soon, adding its effects to “other crises, related to the environment, food, energy, finance and politics [that] have been buffeting the society for a long time.” In Bangladesh, cyclone Sidr on top of two consecutive floods has shown the extreme vulnerability of millions of people threatened by climate change. A complete lack of governmental authority is at the root of problems in Somalia, while foreign occupation is the major concern in Palestine. Also contributing from a critical conflict situation, the Iraqi Social Watch decided this year to focus its report on the situation of women. Their findings have, however, universal value: “a culture of equality of access and opportunity is needed in addition to legislation.”

**Polarization**

In March 2009, at the height of the crisis and the political debate on how to cut expenses in Serbia, an automobile fair was held in Belgrade. All the most expensive models were sold on opening day for a total of more than USD 2.6 million!

Polarization is being exacerbated everywhere by the crisis. The Social Watch report from Bahrain describes “increasing numbers of millionaires, and a shrinking middle class and impoverished lower class.” The sense of unfairness, more than absolute poverty, has led to “repeated confrontations and tension between impoverished communities and security forces, especially in the villages, which is why the World Bank now ranks Bahrain low in political stability.”

In Vietnam, frequently quoted as an example of a development model that lifted millions of people out of poverty, consumption by the richest 20% of the population accounts for 43.3% of total expenditure in the country, while the remaining 80% spends very modestly. Similar polarization is described by the Social Watch report for Honduras, where the confrontation between rich and poor is clearly at the root of the coup d’etat that deposed President Manuel Zelaya in June 2009, reviving a “regime change” practice that Latin America had seemed to have abandoned in favour of democratic methods two decades ago.

In neighbouring Costa Rica, a traditional haven of peace and constitutional stability in Central America, the local watchers warn that “if the challenges [of the crisis] are not dealt with on the basis of social dialogue and by means of a firm change of course, the persistence of traditional solutions (one-time cash handouts and cuts in public spending, as well as the reduction of rights) will doubtless lead to greater inequality and poverty and to the risk we have already pointed out of turning conjunctural poverty due to the loss of income, into structural poverty, and increasing violence against women, children and the elderly.”

**The game of the ostrich**

“In Kenya the Government is in denial”, – write the local watchers – “playing the game of the ostrich, burying its head in the sand. The governing elite argues that the crisis is circumstantial and that the national economy is sheltered enough by its weak ties with international capital.”

Similar denials are reported from many countries. In the case of Moldova, Social Watch found out that before the elections in April 2009, the Government vehemently denied the crisis would affect the country and tried to artificially maintain the economic situation. The World Bank was not so optimistic, and included Moldova among the developing countries with the highest level of vulnerability. After the elections, however, President Voronin declared in a meeting with businesspeople, members of the acting Government, congresspersons and politicians that “the crisis is a fire, a catastrophe.” Government officials explained that the downplaying of the crisis before the elections has been aimed at not ‘creating panic.’”

In other situations, not only did incumbent politicians downplay the importance of the crisis, but leaders of social organizations have adopted the same approach, afraid that the fear of a catastrophe might lead decision-makers to accept opportunistic demands by the already privileged. Social Watch Bolivia reports that “Bolivian entrepreneurs are part of this trend, responding to the severe global downturn through unequal negotiations that shift the burden of the crisis onto the shoulders of their workers through layoffs and reductions in benefits and wages.”

In Slovenia, the local watchers also detected employers abusing the fear of the crisis to restructure workers’ rights. In Guatemala, the Government measures aimed at confronting the food crisis, such as zero tariff import quotas, result in benefits for one group but not to the consumers.

From Paraguay, the local Social Watch coalition reports that the first sectors to demand additional support “were those that had benefited from the prior Government’s neoliberal policies and market integration: agro-exporters, industrialists, importers and advertising executives. (…) The soy producers, for example, insisted that the Government not only to cover their losses, but also provide enough funding to maintain their level of production and profit through public subsidies. They earned extraordinary profits in the previous cycle, thanks in part to speculation in the futures market for agricultural commodities that accompanied the promotion of biofuels in many countries.”

In Poland “the public believes that banks are manipulating the exchange rates at the clients’ cost. At present the difference between the purchase and the selling rate can reach as much as 12%,” while even the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection is unable to impose exchange rate restrictions. Consumer groups are therefore forming through the Internet in order to purchase foreign currencies in wholesale quantities, hoping to negotiate the amount of spread and sometimes even renegotiate terms and conditions of credit agreements.”

After having attended a seminar organized by Third World Network on Asian responses to the crisis, Social Watch advocacy coordinator Natalia Cardona wrote that there seems to be “an atmosphere of defensiveness among governments in the region. Rather than a proactive and new approach to changing the international financial system they are relying on old policy to try to deal with new and worsening economic problems.”

Social Watch Argentina finds the Government to be similarly unprepared for the magnitude of the challenges posed by the crisis, while the Brazilian coalition believes its leaders are “confusing the inability to act with financial and fiscal prudence.”

In times of recession, “tax revenues go down while social security spending rises. Fiscal deficits then rise precisely because governments were not bold enough to act against the contraction of the economy. Paradoxically, the attempt to look prudent...”

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puts a country in an even worse fiscal position than would be the case if its Government had acted decisively to support demand.”

Supporting the already privileged

Further, not all attempts to stimulate the economy are successful, or even fair. The Canadian watchers believe that their Government’s “short-sighted economic stimulus plan that does not meet the needs of the thousands of citizens feeling the brunt of the crisis. Jobs being created by Government investments are in male-dominated industries, while women are over-represented in part-time and precarious work and are often the first to be laid off.”

Those are almost the same words used by the Thai Social Watch report: “One of the most controversial measures was the one-time THB 2,000 (USD 57) cash handouts to government and private-sector employees earning less than THB 14,000 (USD 397) per month. Even those eligible for the fund criticized the policy as blatant populism as opposed to a meaningful stimulus. For example, by far the most workers in this category are working in the informal sector, and are thus ineligible; this also raises the issue of gender discrimination, since the vast majority of women are working in the informal economy.”

While Western economies inject massive new bailout funds into their financial institutions, and in some cases re-nationalize their banks, the parliament in Kenya, according to the local Social Watch coalition, is legislating the privatization of the few remaining strategic public assets in order to provide a one-time government revenue injection. Among the organizations set for privatization are the Kenya Electricity Generation Company; the Kenya Pipeline Company; the state-owned sugar industries, hotels, banks and others.

In Lebanon, both the Prime Minister and Minister of Finance have acknowledged the negative impacts expected from the global crisis and the need to protect the national economy. However, the analysis by the local Social Watch concludes that measures they are implementing speed up the procedures needed for the country to join the World Trade Organization, which will mean liberalizing services and productive sectors of the economy.

Similarly, in Thailand “to complement its stimulus plan, the Government is also working on a major overhaul of the regulatory structure for financial markets. However, contrary to many other countries that are establishing greater safeguards to protect consumers and their economies, Thailand is moving towards wholesale deregulation and liberalization to increase the role of the capital market in developing the economy.” The Thai watchers fear that “this initiative, led by many of the same people involved in the 1997 financial crisis looking exclusively for short term gains, will pave the way for a new crisis as soon as the country is again on its feet.”

In Malaysia, which relies heavily on exports for economic growth and imports most of its food, socialwatchers report that the country “will have to brace for years of economic difficulties. There is a sharp fall in industrial production, the unemployment rate is soaring and analysts warn that the coming recession could be worse than that of 1997. The Government has been criticized for acting too late and for focusing on bailing out companies. Civil society organizations are holding protests and public fora to raise public awareness of the negative impacts of these crises, especially on the vulnerable groups in society.”

This is quite the opposite of the policies being implemented in Venezuela, where poverty reduction is explicitly sought through massive government spending, even when the policies are not always as transparent as the local “watchers” would like.

Algeria, on the other hand, seems to have learned some lessons from the crisis. In September 2008 Sid Said, a leader of the General Union of Algerian Workers, announced that the Government had abandoned its “everything can be privatized” policy. The local Social Watch report estimates that “220 public enterprises awaiting privatization as soon as new regulatory measures were implemented were cut from the list of companies to be sold. In addition, the Government’s inter-ministe-
ping up demands for real and structural change. The U.S. cannot afford to squander this opportunity for real change.”

In Ghana, Social Watch demands support for women farmers “in the form of investments in inputs, such as fertilizers, and also in training and access to markets. These would boost agriculture while contributing to job creation, economic growth, and the well-being of the population.” A similar demand comes from Senegal, the most food-import dependent country in West Africa. Where civil society proposes “returning to traditional agriculture, duly encouraged and supported by the State.”

Real wage increase should be the stimulus, concludes Social Watch in Bulgaria. And in the Philippines, “A stimulus package is definitely in order but, unlike the one outlined by the Government, it should be based on a clear national strategy that is rights-based, pro-poor and sustainable that aims to strengthen domestic demand, especially in light of the current economic climate that is hostile to exports. It should place a premium on food security, on job creation by strengthening local enterprises to benefit both male and female workers, and on investment in pro-poor and green infrastructure projects (e.g., construction of a network of irrigation systems, electrification of far-flung villages and developing clean energy) as well as expansion of social and economic security for the poor and unemployed. (...) Finally, renegotiation of the national debt so that the bulk of the country’s revenues go to urgently meeting the basic needs of the people rather than to service the debt requires serious consideration.”

In Thailand, Social Watch advocates for a wide alliance similar to the one that led to the “People’s constitution” of 1997, in the aftermath of the South East Asian financial crisis. In Peru watchers emphasize that “counteracting the damage caused by this crisis requires boosting domestic demand by increasing workers’ consumption and protecting national production, as well as suspending free trade agreements (FTAs) that leave the Peruvian market far too open at a time of shrinking international markets.” The Mexican Social Watch coalition also wants a revision of the North American Free Trade Agreement: “the National Movement for Food and Energy Autonomy, Workers’ Rights and Democratic Freedom – in a letter dated 16 April 2009 addressed to Barack Obama, the President of the United States – suggested initiating a dialogue at the highest level on items such as the urgent renegotiation of NAFTA and the safeguarding of labour, social and human rights in the region. This would include establishing an Asymmetrical Compensation Fund for North America, negotiating a bi-national agreement regarding immigration, and the signature of an agreement in order to promote the Treaty for the Economic and Social Development of North America.”

In response to the crisis, more and more account holders in Italy are entering the world of ethical finance. “The ethical finance client cares about how his own money is used, but also about his bank going bankrupt. Many banks today are thus multiplying their efforts to improve their reputations. Returning to the original mandate of the banking system to sustain the real economy has to be a constant reference for finding a way out of the crisis”, argue the Italian watchers. Their conclusion has validity everywhere: “The key words should be ‘fighting poverty and redistributing resources.’”
THEMATIC REPORTS
A human rights-based response to the financial and economic crisis

Although the legacy of the ongoing financial crisis will be gloomy, it may also have another legacy in that crucial ideas about human rights can no longer be dismissed. The crisis presents a historic opportunity – and a generational responsibility – to rethink decision-making in economic policy. A human rights-based approach calls for a reform of governance structures to ensure that all economic policy is carried out in accordance with the human rights regime. This will ensure participation at all levels, subjecting decisions to public scrutiny, transparency and accountability at every step.

At the same time, it is not hard to find support for the notion that the enjoyment of human rights will be significantly affected by the crisis everywhere. For instance, the dramatic decline in aggregate demand globally has resulted in extensive unemployment and destruction of livelihoods. After years of declining unemployment, some 20 million more people will be unemployed in 2009 than in 2007, according to forecasts by the ILO.3 Some 50 million people could be put out of work if the crisis matches the magnitude of unemployment in the 1990s.4 These general figures hide the greater impacts on women and their children, the poor, indigenous groups, ethnic minorities and migrant workers. Alongside increasing unemployment, social protection – conditional in many countries on having a job – is declining. For those who still have a job, more unemployment means greater pressure on their salaries and social coverage. Social security for senior citizens is also being significantly affected by the crisis, with pension funds registering losses of close to 50% in some cases.5 The shift to fewer publicly funded pension systems of the last decades magnifies these impacts. In turn, the public revenues needed to bolster the required support for social and pension coverage have fallen substantially, limiting government options.

Poverty is expected to increase worldwide by as much as 53 million people.6 Even this figure may be optimistic as it is based on the World Bank’s widely questioned definition of poverty and is likely to understate the real number of the poor.7 The decline in nutritional and health status among children who suffer from reduced (or lower quality) food consumption can be irreversible, and estimates suggest that the food crisis has already increased the number of people suffering from malnutrition by 44 million.8

The effects of the crisis are also likely to lead to increasing inequality. The gap between richer and poorer households that has been widening since the 1990s will get bigger. The income gap between the top and bottom 10% of wage earners had increased in 70% of a sample of countries investigated in an ILO report published last year.9

If social unrest and public expressions of desperation and frustration are met, as they have already been in some countries, with violent repression by government forces, then civil and political rights will also be threatened by the economic crisis. The rise in xenophobic or otherwise discriminatory sentiments that is being seen in several places could also jeopardize the rights of migrant workers and minority groups, who are most vulnerable to discrimination.

Looking at these impacts, and accepting the consensus about the sources of the crisis, one has to conclude that choices made on financial regulation may have tangible consequences for the enjoyment of rights. The reverse is also true: an approach that seeks to uphold human rights standards independently of addressing the impacts of financial policy and regulatory choices will prove to be woefully insufficient and ineffective.

The evidence presented by this crisis, however, is not different from that revealed by other financial crises that have periodically hit different parts of the world in the last century, notably East Asia in the late 1990s. They all bring extreme hardships and suffering to ordinary citizens, especially the most vulnerable and marginalized, while those who profited from financial speculation are not held to account for their actions. For instance, the last few years have seen not only a continuation of trends towards increasing income inequality but also a reported increase in the

1 An earlier draft of this article served as the basis for a statement issued by the International Network for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ESCR-Net) in consultation with a large number of human rights organizations. The author is grateful to Nicolas Lusiani, who helped finalize the statement, as well as many human rights organizations that commented on it and provided inputs. Responsibility for any mistakes is, of course, solely that of the author.
2 For a detailed survey of the main official sources (IMF, Bank actors that operate in them and the instruments with
4 Ibid.
7 The World Bank’s arbitrary classification of people living below USD 2 a day as poor, and those living below USD 1 a day as extremely poor, has been repeatedly criticized as failing to capture the reality of poverty in different countries with very different poverty lines, and the basket of goods these incomes could purchase in different countries. In 2008, the Bank updated its long-outdated purchasing power parity (PPP) calculations; on this basis the number of people the Bank defines as extremely poor, now those living under USD 1.25 a day, was revised upwards to 1.4 billion, almost 50% more than the previous estimate of 1 billion (see UN Millennium Development Goals Report 2009: 4-7).
amount of wealth controlled by the “super-rich”. This phenomenon was possible with aggressive investment strategies – read, speculation – facilitated by loose flows of capital. Yet it is low-income groups, not those who profited from the pre-crisis boom, who will be disproportionately affected by the post-crisis bust.

In this regard, the financial crisis also calls into question the belief that the wealth earned on markets would “trickle down” to everyone else. Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz recently stated that financial markets – and indeed GDP growth as currently measured – are not an end in themselves but exist to serve people’s well-being. What is good for finance and what is good for GDP growth alone is not necessarily good for the economic well-being of all. This systemic collapse calls for a new role for national governments in economic policy-making – both domestically and, increasingly, at the international level.

A human rights response: the principles

A response to the financial and economic recession that places human rights norms at its centre is not only necessary as a matter of justice; it will also make reforms of the financial and economic system more sustainable and resilient to future crises.

A human rights-based policy response does not presuppose a certain type of economic system. Yet it does take as its point of departure a clear and universally recognized framework – a set of standards founded in the core instruments of international human rights law – to guide the design and implementation of economic policies and programmes to address the crisis. Human rights do not only set limits to oppression and authoritarianism; they also impose positive obligations on states to uphold economic, social and cultural rights. States have the duty to respect, protect and fulfil human rights at all times, especially in times of crisis.

Governments have a duty to ensure minimum essential levels of enjoyment of social and economic rights as a matter of priority, and they have a specific and continuing obligation to move as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards full implementation. Human rights standards call for governments to ensure that no deliberately retrogressive measures are taken – for example, cutting essential programmes – unless this is fully justified by reference to the totality of the rights provided for in the core human rights treaties and in the context of the full use of the maximum available resources. Even in the face of public revenue limitations, states must marshal the maximum available resources to ensure that full implementation of economic and social rights is progressively realized in the short and longer term.

In addition, the principle of non-discrimination requires that states ensure that all measures adopted in response to the crisis avoid disproportionate effects and that deliberate, targeted measures are put into place to secure substantive equality of access to basic services across countries and population groups. Disadvantaged members of society must be protected as a matter of priority, even in times of severe resource constraints.

While the primary human rights obligations of states rest within their jurisdictions, they are also – in the spirit of the UN Charter and applicable international law – required to contribute to international cooperation in the full realization of human rights. When acting within inter-governmental forums such as the UN, the World Bank and ad hoc meetings of the Group of 20 (G-20), states must guarantee that their policies are consistent and conducive to the realization of human rights. In this regard, those states that have enjoyed a more powerful position in decision-making on global economic policies have had greater responsibility for causing, through their actions and omissions, this global meltdown. This means that they also carry greater responsibility for the mitigation of the consequences and for taking the steps needed to assure a just and sustainable way forward. Under international law, governments must also ensure that human rights standards take primacy over trade, investment or finance commitments.

Basic human rights principles include social participation, transparency, access to information, judicial protection and accountability. People must be able to participate in public life and to meaningfully interact with the decision-making process affecting them, thus rendering the processes affecting their lives open to contest. Additionally, states must ensure that no one is above the law. Individuals whose rights have been affected must enjoy accessible and effective remedies to seek redress. Those responsible for harms, including private actors, must be brought to justice, and future activities affecting human rights must be prevented.

Reform of decision-making processes on economic policy

The crisis facing us today provides a historic opportunity and indeed a generational responsibility to rethink the manner in which decision-making on economic policy has so far taken place. A human rights approach calls for the reform of governance structures to ensure that all economic policy at the domestic and international levels is carried out in accordance with the legal content that the human rights regime offers.

Too often, official decisions on the regulation of financial capital flows, for example – or the need to dispense with them – are made by a few “experts”, often including representatives of the private-sector industries themselves. This process in essence closes avenues for public participation in fundamental policy and legal discussions that affect everyone, with particular impacts on the most vulnerable and marginalized. A human rights-based policy response would transform this process, ensuring participation at all levels and subjecting decisions to public scrutiny, transparency and accountability at every step. Accountability and participation in economic policy-making are also impaired when intrusive policy conditions are demanded by international financial institutions and donors or by inﬂexible rules in trade and investment agreements. States should be empowered to assert that their human rights obligations take priority over economic commitments or investors’ rights.

These same human rights principles must be instilled at the international level, where cooperation in the realization of these rights is an obligation of all states, particularly those responsible for harms. Despite the far-reaching consequences of financial policy measures, the inter-governmental bodies setting the agenda and designing financial reforms, such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the Financial Stability Forum and the G-20, limit participation from the majority of countries. The IMF and the World Bank for their part continue to be ruled by principles regarding decision-making that confine developing countries to a marginal role and limit transparency. Equally important, other international organizations that have the express mandate to protect human rights are excluded from the design of policy responses in these forums.

The UN, as the guardian of the international legal framework, is the most appropriate and most legitimate forum to discuss the reforms that are necessary to restructure the international economic and financial system on a human rights foundation. Its role would be greatly strengthened by the establishment of a Global Economic Coordination Council, as recommended by the UN Commission of Experts. Such a body, operating under the principle of constituency-based representation and at a level equal to the General Assembly and the Security Council.

10 According to a 2007 study by Merrill Lynch and Capgemini, “The number of people with USD 1 million or more to invest grew by 6% to 9.5 million last year, and the wealth they control expanded to USD 37.230 billion. About 35% is in the hands of just 95,000 people with assets of more than USD 30 million.” See Thal Larsen, P. “Super-rich Widens Wealth Gap by Taking More Risks.” Financial Times, 28 June 2007.

11 Thal Larsen (op. cit.), quoting a Merrill Lynch’s executive who said the difference between the rich and super-rich reflected “a willingness by the very rich to take greater risks”.

A human rights-based response

Banking and financial sector regulation

A striking aspect of the crisis is the extent to which financial entities managed to transfer the burden of their irresponsible risk-taking to the most vulnerable in society, and it was specific government policies designed to deregulate the financial system as a whole that enabled this. Governments – domestically and in concert with others – must therefore adopt measures to protect the human rights of their peoples through robust banking and financial sector regulation. They must also strengthen accountability and the rule of law by reining in criminal behaviour. Where certain acts are not currently seen as crimes (e.g., “tax evasion” in certain countries) or as offences that triggers legal liability, then appropriate legislation should be passed and enforced. Furthermore, governments must take serious action to ensure that those individuals and countries affected through no fault of their own find remedy.

Banks are the most regulated of all financial sector entities. Yet their behaviour has increasingly been ruled by principles of supervision that rely on their own internal mechanisms for risk management, rather than externally developed standards shaped by national supervisors. In response to pressure from industrialized countries, many poor countries have progressively adopted these same principles, partly lured by the possibility of attracting international banks. They also accenteded, for the same reason, to the unrestricted movement of capital by such banks. Deregulation to attract foreign banks has often not had the desired payoffs, however. Empirical evidence shows no link between liberalized capital accounts and increased economic growth. Access to credit, especially by the most marginalized groups, has shown little improvement, while large international banks have tended to eliminate the domestic banking sector on which the neediest depend. Today, those countries with the greatest exposure to and dependence on foreign banks are the ones worst affected by the financial crisis, as these institutions retreat back to their home countries and refuse to lend in now fragile economies.

Reforms in the banking sector should include the space for national governments to regulate the services provided by any bank in the interest of ensuring broad access to credit and other key social functions. If state-provided banking services are considered a better option for guaranteeing rights, they should be fully pursued.

Hedge funds, private equity funds and credit rating agencies have been left to self-regulatory schemes. Hedge funds have been allowed to become, in many countries, the mainstream mechanism for ordinary citizens to hold their savings, placing citizens’ access to social security at risk. Hedge funds and private equity funds have also forced sudden unemployment and other labour rights violations through their undue influence on the decision-making processes in the restructuring of companies around the world. Extraordinary profits were also fostered by leverage strategies that relied on tax exemptions on debt financing, thereby putting sources of public revenue at risk. This has limited the fiscal expansion possibilities of many governments just at the time they need it most to spur job creation and strengthen social protection measures.

Recognizing that the activities of these financial actors have profound, measurable impacts on human rights, the state must not abdicate its duty to protect. Governments should work together to adopt all necessary measures to prevent hedge funds, private equity funds, derivative instruments and credit rating agencies from adversely affecting human rights.

The liberalization of capital and the creation of impenetrable tax havens have made it more difficult to engage in progressive taxation of capital flows, and further eroded the tax base in countries of both North and South by facilitating the shifting of profits from where they are earned to other low- or zero-tax regimes. This has negative outcomes on public revenue, which is critical for governments to be able to meet their human rights obligations. Governments must live up to their duties toward their people by protecting public revenue in a transparent and accountable way, closing tax havens and taking appropriate measures to control the movement of capital and strengthen fiscal accounts.

Central banks for their part are public agencies and, as part of the government, have obligations to human rights. The principle of “central bank independence” has too often meant independence from social and human rights interests. It has not meant, however, freedom from interference by private financial interest groups. Central banks must recognize that independence does not mean lack of responsibility in serving the interests of society as a whole. They must balance the need to achieve stable and low inflation with their obligations to battle income inequalities and stabilize peoples’ jobs and livelihoods through various credit and supervisory instruments.

The crisis and human rights in the South

The extent to which the crisis compromises the achievement of human rights commitments may be more dramatically exposed in the South. Developing countries that for a long time were told they must rely on export-led growth and free market policies are now suffering the most due to the drop in external demand caused by the crisis. They should be allowed special flexibility, so they can fully take into account their human rights obligations as they develop trade policies that can deal with the crisis and forestall export-related vulnerabilities in the future. The export profile and strategy chosen by a country, and its balance between exports and domestic market needs, should be carefully guided by its human rights obligations, in particular the need to ensure non-discrimination and progressive realization of rights.

Debt levels are also set to rise in developing countries. Not only will the crisis worsen their trade and financial situations, making more borrowing necessary, but also an effective crisis response that does not resort to deficit spending to expedite recovery is likely to undermine minimum core levels of well-being. However the human rights consequences and impacts for the future of borrowing cannot be ignored. Part of the increase in debt is due to the proliferation of rapid lines of credit by multilateral financial institutions including the World Bank, purportedly to help developing countries cope with the crisis. These lines of credit are disbursing vast amounts of money with little or no opportunity for citizen control and public accountability, with real risks of completely bypassing social and environmental safeguards. Part of the increase in debt levels comes as a result of countries having to refinance debt in stressed private capital markets where funds have become scarce, as developing countries try in

"African-American people and indigenous peoples have a common history of exploitation and conquest, and are disproportionately suffering the impacts of the crisis. Our current American Empire was built on the so-called American dream, but we see that stolen land and stolen labor was also used to construct this country, the wealthiest the world has ever known. From the outset, financial institutions aided and abetted profiteers seeking to build empire by any means necessary. We must reject the neoliberal theology and construct more progressive theological theories.

Jean Rice (Picture the Homeless, New York)"
vain to compete with industrialized countries in order to fix their troubled banking sectors and implement stimulus plans.

While in the short term these lines of credit may be necessary to allow governments to stabilize spending, human rights principles are critical to determine: (1) the strictly necessary borrowing that needs to be undertaken, (2) the demands that should be met through concessional finance rather than borrowing, and (3) the accountability and transparency principles that will ensure new lending is done in a responsible way, with appropriate social control, so as to prevent the generation of more illegitimate debts that future generations will be forced to pay.

Some forecast that the budgetary cuts provoked by the crisis, and the shift of funds to fiscal stimulus packages, will lead donor countries to cut back on their development aid. With the enjoyment of human rights of so many people at stake due to the financial crisis, donor governments must not regress on their obligations to international assistance by cutting development aid in any way.

**Human rights-oriented economic stimulus packages**

The outline of a human rights approach to the crisis would not be complete without reference to the very particular role that human rights standards should play in domestic economic stimulus packages. Particularly relevant in this regard are the aforementioned principles of non-discrimination, transparency, accountability and participation.

Economic stimulus packages must not in any way discriminate. Governments should evaluate the distributional consequences of the packages across society to ensure that equitable benefits are experienced across lines of gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation and class. Extra measures may need to be taken to promote substantive equality for those historically marginalized and especially vulnerable. Gender-sensitive policies, for example, require women’s participation in the design and implementation of stimulus packages. Decisions throughout the life of the stimulus must also be open to question and based on participation and transparency in order to strengthen public accountability.

One particular area of priority for governments in their fiscal stimulus packages should be the stabilization and strengthening of social protection systems for all, especially the most vulnerable. The right to social security is recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in numerous international human rights treaties, and all states have an obligation to immediately establish a basic social protection system and progressively expand it over time according to their available resources. The strengthening of such systems both fulfils the short-term duty to protect people from an economic downturn and contributes to the longer-term economic priority of investing in people.

Yet at present not all countries have the ability to invoke economic stimulus packages in order to avoid regressive measures in the fulfillment of rights and to boost their national economies. While guaranteeing that such packages meet basic human rights standards at home, governments should likewise uphold their obligation to international cooperation by filling the finance gap in the global South.

It is important that, in an effort to stabilize employment and livelihoods, stimulus packages do not expand demand along patterns of consumption that are out-dated and untenable in both rich and poor countries alike. The continuation of a high-carbon economy, by depleting the Earth’s resources and increasing greenhouse gas emissions, will only compound the challenges that many countries already face in their attempts to uphold human rights standards.

**Concluding remarks**

We should expect a gloomy legacy to the ongoing financial crisis, more so than to any other crisis that the current generation has seen. But alongside this, there is a legacy of important ideas that can no longer be dismissed and that should be at the heart of the restructuring of the global economic system. The undeniable relevance to financial and economic policy choices of the human rights commitments that the international community has endorsed since 1948 is one of them. Humanity would be well advised not to forget at what cost the modern human rights instruments were forged.
Gender Equality and the Financial Crisis

Equality between women and men has to be a key element in the development of anti-crisis measures and policies, since the financial crisis is starting to take hold in sectors dominated by female workers and rates of violence against women are increasing. A gendered analysis is required in order to understand the depth and scope of the crisis, as well as to design appropriate responses. However, in addition to the challenges, the economic crisis is also presenting opportunities for women's empowerment and leadership, as has been seen already in countries in which women have emerged as leaders.

The Women’s Working Group on Financing for Development has noted that the financial crisis offers a critical opportunity to change the global financial architecture to adhere to rights-based and equitable principles. The group calls for an alternative to the G-20 decision to replenish the International Monetary Fund. Such a move would only perpetuate failed neoliberal economic policies; reinforce past structural inequalities; and increase the indebtedness of developing countries. This scenario continues the antiquated and unjust approach of a few rich nations working on behalf of many nations of varying circumstances.

The Women’s Working Group calls for solutions and remedies for the financial crisis coming from a broad, consultative, inclusive process, not a process housed in the IMF, but in the United Nations, where women’s human rights are enshrined and where each member state has a voice at the table.2

Government approaches to addressing the economic and financial crisis are not, for the most part, based on human rights or equality principles. Many countries in the global North have negotiated huge bailouts using public monies to prop up major industries. Many are also investing in infrastructure projects, focused primarily on male-dominated trades (construction, transport, etc.) rather than investing in soft infrastructure where women traditionally are the principal beneficiaries (health care, child care, income supports, etc.). Unemployment insurance programmes, where they exist, generally cover only full-time workers and rarely take into account the part-time workforce in which women are traditionally over-represented. Reports of violence against women are increasing: lacking economic and social security, women have a more difficult time escaping violent situations.


2 The Women’s Working Group on Financing for Development is coordinated by Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN) and includes the following networks/organizations: African Women’s Development and Communication Network (REMIWE); Arab NGO Network for Development (ANNED); Association for Women’s Rights in Development (AWID); Feminist Task Force-Global Call to Action against Poverty (FTF-GCAP); Global Policy Forum (GPF); International Council for Adult Education (ICAE); International Gender and Trade Network (IGTN); International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC); Network for Women’s Rights in Ghana (NETRIGHT); Red de Educación Popular entre Mujeres para America Latina y el Caribe (REPEM); Third World Network-Africa (TWN-Africa); Women’s Environment and Development Organization (WEDO), and Women in Development Europe (WIDE).

The financial crisis has definitely affected Benin. Today many households can only afford just one meal a day. Forced marriages have increased, as a way for families to sell their girls and to cope with the crisis. It has set back advances made to stop violence against women. Gender-based impacts of the crisis are on the rise, for example, girls’ enrollment in schools and their presence in the formal job market is decreasing. Women are the first to lose their jobs, and are often left to care for their families without any social assistance.

Sonon Blanche (Social Watch Benin)

“Among other things, the conference concluded that there is a need for additional measures to encourage women to participate in the labour market; equality between women and men must be a key element in the development of anti-crisis measures and policies; the participation of women in private sector leadership positions should be encouraged; businesses must adopt family-friendly policies; and it is essential to invest in women’s education and training. Furthermore, the importance of gender equality laws and mechanisms in time of crisis was outlined.

Strengthening women’s rights during the crisis

An important initiative which was recently announced by the ILO Director-General Juan Somavia is the creation of an emergency global jobs pact designed to promote a coordinated policy response to the global jobs crisis and to the increase in unemployment, working poor and those in vulnerable employment. This response is aimed at avoiding global social recession and mitigating its effects on people. The pact will help both the extraordinary stimulus measures together with other government policies better address the needs of people who need protection and work, in order to accelerate combined economic and employment recovery.

Amnesty International recently launched a Demand Dignity campaign to fight for rights threatened by the economic crisis, and for those neglected in the response to it. The fundamental issue is empowering people living in poverty. The campaign focuses on strengthening their voice along with government transparency and accountability, so that they can hold governments accountable for commitments to gender equality and women’s rights, and can participate in decisions that affect their lives. Special emphasis is put on women’s rights and the participation of women in decisions related to their rights.

Besides these initiatives, special attention is to be payed to the challenges and opportunities that the global crisis presents for women’s empowerment and leadership. We are witnessing positive examples of women emerging as high level leaders as a result of the global economic and financial crisis, most notably in the case of the new Prime Minister of Iceland and the new President of Lithuania, both of whom were elected in large part due to voter frustration with the failed economic policies that contributed to the impact of the crisis in those countries.

According to the Women’s Working Group for Financing for Development, the rights-based response to the crisis requires, inter alia, immediate reform of the global financial architecture to effectively manage liquidity shortages and balance of payments imbalances, and ensure that policy responses do not shift the burden of family welfare and service provision to the care economy. The Women’s Working Group advocates setting in place national, regional and international measures and processes that respect national policy space, and are consistent with internationally agreed standards and commitments, including those regarding women’s rights and gender equality. Trade policies and agreements should enable countries to move away from the imbalances of the WTO regime and the failed Doha round. Moreover, these measures should be accompanied by the cancellation of the illegitimate debts of developing countries and the creation of a debt workout mechanism with the participation of debtor governments, women’s rights groups and other civil society organizations.

At the UN High Level Conference on the Global Financial and Economic Crisis and Its Impact on Development (24-26 June 2009), the Women’s Working Group reminded UN Member States that women cannot wait, and that this is the time to act on fundamental reform of the global financial architecture. Despite the unanimous call to action by civil society organizations, the conference outcome document did not meet expectations. In order to safeguard a fragile consensus, Member States have shown only weak commitment to reforming the financial architecture, while the central role of the UN (the so-called “G-192”), in economic governance nearly vanished.

Women’s rights advocates welcomed language in the document that recognizes women as facing “greater income insecurity and increased burdens of family care” (para. 3) and the recognition that women and children had been particularly impoverished by the crisis (para. 7). The document further recognized that responses to the crisis need to have a gender perspective (para. 10), mitigation measures should take into account gender equality, among others (para. 21), and leadership appointments in the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) should take gender balance into account (para. 49). The big disappointment was the lack of any strong commitment to follow-up. The consistent reference to a “United Nations Development System” throughout the text represents a narrowing of the UN role to a limited arena of humanitarian assistance and development cooperation. The conclusion of civil society groups was that the outcome document represented a clear attempt to keep the G-192 out of the global economic governance system.

Looking forward, however, the Women’s Working Group has stressed that women will continue to demand economic justice and gender justice within the UN arena, despite the continued resistance of the IFIs and the G-20 to put people, instead of profit, at the centre of development. Despite proven failure of their neoliberal policy prescriptions and irresponsible financial governance system, the IMF and the World Bank continue to promote their flawed policies and impose conditionalities on developing countries, acting not as special agencies of the UN, but as if the UN were their special agency. In the UN system, in which all Member States should be equal, some—now widened to 20—are more equal than the remaining 172. The Women’s Working Group statement states its strong opposition to this practice, and demands that all the Member States have equal votes, equal rights and equal obligations at the decision-making table.

ILO projections of working poverty across the world indicate that 200 million workers are at risk of joining the ranks of people living on less than USD 2 per day between 2007 and 2009. See: ILO. Global Employment Trends Update, May 2009.


5 Milena Kadieva (Gender Research Foundation, Bulgaria)
GENDERED IMPACTS OF THE CRISIS IN EASTERN EUROPE

Global trends in the impact of the global crisis on women are characteristic also of countries in Eastern Europe, as seen in the national reports included in this volume. In the Czech Republic, for example, the reforms in public finances, such as lower taxation for the richest and increasing Value Added Tax (VAT) on basic articles, have put the largest share of the burden on the most deprived, women included. The same happens with the introduction of fees for services and the attempts to decrease social insurance taxes, especially for the richest taxpayers. Even before the crisis, unequal pay and discrimination based on gender and age continued to be important issues. Additional gender equality problems in the Czech Republic are due to the Government’s conservative policy and lack of support for childcare institutions. Discrimination against female immigrants, particularly from Asia, has also been exacerbated as a result of the crisis.

In Hungary, one of the Eastern European countries most affected by the crisis, the new Government has agreed to a number of measures, including cutting pensions, public sector bonuses, maternity support, mortgage subsidies, energy subsidies and public transport subsidies as a condition of the IMF rescue package to address the impact of the economic crisis. All of these will negatively impact women and increase their care-giving burden, as will some of the additional measures being planned, including reductions in childcare support and childcare benefits, as well as assistance to young couples with children.

In Poland, the decrease in family incomes resulting from the economic crisis risks the pauperization of whole social groups, particularly among the lower and middle classes. It is very likely that this will in turn have a more significant impact on women, since they are traditionally responsible for the family’s well being. According to some analysts, the crisis is also likely to amplify the grey zone in the Polish economy, as many, especially small entrepreneurs, try to minimize labour costs and avoid taxation and other costs associated with formal employment. Consequently, it seems very likely that the growth of the grey economy will affect women more than men, as they are more often engaged in low-paid jobs, especially in the private service sector (e.g., in retail). Other gender equality issues are: the shrinking of the highly feminized garment sector and the limited labour market mobility due to higher housing rental costs, especially in small towns in economically depressed areas.

In Bulgaria, NGOs and trade unions would not agree with what they saw as a Government policy shift towards accepting the need to reduce social expenditures in times of crisis. These expenditures were already scarce at the beginning of the currency board arrangement and any further reduction could rupture the country’s social peace. Unemployment is increasing (it should be noted that the unregistered unemployed equal – or even exceed – the registered) and will affect mainly young people that lack an employment record, low-skilled workers, elderly workers, people with disabilities and women.

In Serbia, trade unions have accepted the Government’s proposal to postpone the implementation of the General Collective Bargaining Contract, and to delay some of the employers’ financial obligations towards workers, including paying worker benefits, “to assist the private sector to get out of the economic crisis”. Workers’ rights are openly violated under the excuse of maintaining economic stability, while big companies and tycoons are free to refrain from paying taxes, salaries and other benefits. It was recently announced that maintenance of the new stand-by arrangement with the IMF, worth USD 3.96 billion, will lead to cuts in pensions, education and health care, all of which will further deteriorate women’s social position. And in Slovakia, despite initial predictions that the country would not be affected, official estimates of job losses topped 30,000 in April 2009. In these conditions, discrimination against women in the labour market persists.

As a rule, in all the countries of the CEE/CES region, women constitute the majority of temporary, seasonal, and contract labourers as well as low-skilled workers, who are unlikely to be covered by formal unemployment insurance or social protection schemes. As the July 2009 Development & Transition report warns, the crisis seems likely to affect women in such areas as employment and social safety nets, unpaid care work, education, migration and gender based violence. For example, in Kazakhstan, limited access to the financial resources necessary for formal business activities pushes women into self-employment and small-scale commercial activities in the informal sector. Women’s vulnerability could easily deepen as the crisis unfolds. The scale of female labour migration is often under-reported, and with it the impact on families dependent on their wages for survival. On the other hand, women may find themselves in an even more vulnerable position when they return home, rejected by their communities and families and perceived as prostitutes.

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Civil society organizations, including women’s organizations and networks, call for a rights-based approach to development. A review of the implementation of this approach by UN agencies shows that it can be effective in eradicating poverty, developing democracy and human rights, and supporting vulnerable groups, particularly women, to participate in decision-making.6 The application of this concept contributes to the realization of states parties’ commitments derived from the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the Beijing Platform for Action.

However, there is a need to improve this approach in order to address effectively the needs of women and to improve gender equality relations. There are a number of shortcomings that derive from excessive generality, weak implementation mechanisms, and insufficient application of the human rights concept. The rights-based approach to development is grounded in the principles of participation, responsibility, non-discrimination, equality, special attention to vulnerable groups, empowerment, linkage to human rights standards, progressive realization, non-regression, and rule of law. However, this approach to development does not target the dismantling of the social, economic and political relations that are based on discrimination and unequal distribution of wealth, power and resources. The human rights framework is not sufficient by itself to change the neoliberal ideology that significantly undermines the realization of human rights and women’s rights, as the majority of human rights standards are not binding and there is to date no binding mechanism established to oblige states to put their commitments into practice.

A gender analysis shows that such an approach requires developing good analytical tools for understanding the inequalities inherent both in the neoliberal market economy and in gender relations. Feminist economists have analysed gender inequalities in macroeconomic policy-making and have developed such tools as gender-specific indicators, gender-responsive budgeting and gender-sensitive statistics for use along with a rights-based approach to strengthen women’s empowerment in the process of development and demand corporate responsibility of international financial institutions.

The global food price crisis

In developing countries the poor spend upwards of 50% of their income on food – the poorest spend 80% or more. The increase in food prices has increased not just poverty, but also hunger. Some elements that have influenced the rise in agricultural commodity prices are, among others: scarce water supplies, production costs, droughts and climate change. We need a new food system, a system that respects political, social, cultural, and environmental rights as well as the economic importance of agriculture. Governments need to integrate respect for the universal human right to food in all economic policy planning.

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Starting in 2005 and peaking in July 2008, many agricultural commodity prices on world markets reached their highest levels in 30 years. In some cases the prices set new records. From March 2007 to March 2008, the price of rice went up 74%, and most of that in just a few weeks during March 2008. The price of wheat more than doubled, rising 130% during the same one-year period, March 2007 – March 2008. Then, as oil prices collapsed (from peaks of over USD150 a barrel in June 2008 back to USD 40 a few months later), agricultural commodity prices also fell on world markets. Nonetheless, as FAO and others continue to remind us, food prices have hardly fallen in many developing countries, and they remain higher than they were two or three years ago. In 10 countries the latest prices are the highest on record. FAO reports the persistent high prices are most evident in sub-Saharan Africa, where every country considered is facing rice prices far above those of 12 months before. Prices of maize, millet and sorghum are higher in 89% of African countries compared to a year earlier. Other regions, the article notes, are also affected, especially rice prices in Asia and maize and wheat in Central and South America.

The poor spend upwards of 50% of their income on food, while the poorest spend 80% or more. This makes the recent food prices increases unaffordable. The result is not just increased poverty (no money to spend on health care, education, a business venture or anything else), but also increased hunger, which means decreased productivity; stunted physical and mental development of foetuses, babies and children; and, ultimately, death. None of these deaths are inevitable. Consider that in 1966, one in three people faced chronic hunger. Almost 35% of the global population went hungry, day after day. By 2005, the number was closer to one in seven, at around 15%. This dramatic reduction in the incidence of hunger occurred as world population was growing rapidly – the net effect was to save billions of people from lives compromised by poor health and reduced mental capacity.

Chronic hunger is something we – governments, societies, community organizations, and citizens – can eliminate.

Why did it happen?
Price reflects a relationship between supply and demand, complicated by currency values and speculation on what the future holds. There are supply, demand and institutional factors at work.

Supply shortfalls are a normal part of agriculture. Typically, a supply shortfall triggers increased production through higher prices as more farmers are drawn to plant the crop that is fetching the higher prices. There is generally a lag (crops take time to mature) and often the supply response overwhelms the potential demand, so that there is a common pattern in agriculture whereby price spikes usher in periods of high supply and relative price depression, which last much longer than the price rise. This phenomenon is linked to what economists call ‘inelastic demand’: people must eat to survive, but once fed, look to spend their money elsewhere. The richer the people are, the smaller the share of their income they spend on food. This is also known as Engels’ Law, named for the famous 19th century economist who was the first to write about this behaviour.

In the 21st century, some things are a bit different. Not least, there is a new and theoretically unlimited source of demand for agricultural commodities coming from the biofuels sector, together with mounting stress on the quantity and quality of soil and water available and the uncertainty about how climate change will affect growing conditions. There is disturbing evidence to suggest the past 50 years of steadily improving agricultural productivity might be coming to an end.

These are structural changes that have dramatic implications for public policy to ensure food security and future agricultural production. If the food crisis is about short-term or reversible problems (e.g., a bad law, a need to emergency cash flows, a need to subsidize fertilizers) then governments will do very different things, than if the crisis is understood to be about more profound problems in food and agriculture systems.

The following is a quick review of the causes given for the sudden and dramatic increase in agricultural commodity prices. There is ongoing debate about how important each of these elements was and continues to be.

First, supply:

Water
Irrigated agriculture accounts for almost 70% of world water use. Irrigated agriculture produces 40% of global food on 20% of the world’s agricultural land. It is highly productive but the amount of water used is often unsustainable. An estimated 1.4 billion people live in areas with scarce water supplies. A diet rich in meat and dairy products, common in most developed countries and increasingly common in much of the global South, puts a lot more stress on the world’s water supply than a diet based on vegetable protein.

Stocks
World food stocks have halved since 2002. The world is now estimated to have roughly two months reserve, which is the minimum cushion recommended by the FAO in case of supply disruption. Low reserves mean small changes in supply have a big effect on prices. Stocks-to-use ratios for grains have not been this low since 1972-1973; wheat reserves in particular have never been this low. Governments and private firms trusted that low stocks at home could be compensated for by access to a global market under liberalized trade agreements, so falling reserves did not immediately trigger higher prices, as they would once have done. When bad weather hit several of the major global suppliers simultaneously, and several years running, no one was prepared with an adequate cushion and prices started to climb—belatedly but fast. There is some discussion as to whether low stock levels were all that important. For instance, David Dawe at FAO suggests much of the drop was the result of China alone, which decided to run down its very considerable stocks to a more manageable level. Yet it is possible to argue that the more China (which is home to more than 15% of the world’s population) depends on world markets, the more important a strong reserve becomes, because China alone needs so much food to maintain domestic food security. Dawe also points out that stocks of some crops, such as wheat, have been on a downward trend for decades. Here, too, though the question

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1 The price increases were far more dramatic in nominal US dollars than in other currencies. Since 2002, world maize prices have risen 143% in nominal dollars, but only 37% in real (i.e., constant) Euros. The many developing countries that buy their food imports in a currency linked to the US dollar have seen prices jump much more than those that are more independent, or whose currencies are linked to the Euro instead.

Climate change is affecting rainfall and temperatures, both vital to agricultural productivity. Even a 1°C–2°C change (a threshold most experts expect us to exceed) will reduce food production in tropical and sub-tropical regions. Experts predict 75-250 million people in Africa will be affected by climate change, with agricultural production in some rain-fed regions losing half their potential by 2020. In Central, South and Southeast Asia, falling river levels will reduce irrigation and therefore output. The UN’s Food and Agriculture Organisation estimates 65 countries – home to roughly half the world’s people – will see cereal production fall due to climate change.¹

Then, demand:

### Population

Each year, another 78 million people are added to the earth’s total population. Growth is tapering off, but we are expected to reach approximately 9 billion people before the earth’s population stabilizes in 2050.

### Diet

More importantly, what people eat is changing. Each year, more people eat like rich Westerners. In other words, they eat too many calories, especially fat and sugar; and, they eat foods raised, processed and transported using too much water and energy. In developed countries, an estimated one half of food is wasted, much of it thrown out in the household, by supermarkets or in restaurants whose portions are too large.² Western diets create degraded ecosystems and result in bad health. The change in what the rich eat makes the diet of the poor more expensive by reducing the land available for traditional staples, such as cassava, millet, wheat, and local vegetables.

### Biofuels

Biofuels (also called agrofuels) are liquid fuels made from plant material. Most commercial biofuel today is made from sugarcane, corn, canola, palm oil or soy oil. Considerable acreage has also been given to jatropha plantations, which is a plant rich in oil that can be used to make biodiesel. Since 2006, both demand and supply of biofuels have grown exponentially. Biofuels are thought to have consumed over 7% of the global oil seed supply and about 4.5% of the global cereal crop in 2007. Estimates of how this demand has affected world food prices ranges from 10% to more than 70%. The results depend on assumptions. Nonetheless, the expectation of continued growth in biofuel demand, supported by ambitious targets for use in the European Union and the United States, has triggered higher speculative activity, which mediate the relationship between supply and demand. Without a doubt, biofuel demands on foreign companies to reinvest profits in the host country economy. Recently, there has been a pronounced increase in the lease or purchase of land abroad to grow food or fuel for re-export to the investing country or, where private firms are involved, for export to wherever demand dictates. For example, a London-based firm (Central African Mining and Exploration Company) has leased 30,000 hectares in Mozambique to grow sugarcane. In Kenya, the Government has signed a deal with Qatar to lease 40,000 hectares to grow fresh fruit and vegetables for export to Qatar. These deals increase pressure on land, water and infrastructure, and risk crowding out food production for local markets.

### Trade

Global and regional trade agreements have changed the way world prices interact with domestic food markets. As trade barriers are reduced, world prices are more and more directly connected to national prices – they are not necessarily (or even often) the same, but they have a greater impact on domestic prices. Global markets are often promoted as providing access to a global supply pool. The unexamined aspect of this integration, however, is the creation of a global competition among consumers. Without protection, poor consumers inevitably lose the fight, allowing globalization to pull more and more land into producing fuel and animal feed rather than food.

Finally, a third element to consider is markets, which mediate the relationship between supply and demand. The governance of markets has changed considerably in the past 20 years. New trade, investment, and commodity exchange regulations have played their part in the food price crisis.

### Speculation

Most agricultural commodities are traded on international exchanges. Until recently, commodity exchanges (most of which are based in the US or UK) were governed by laws that limited the participation of actors that did not intend to buy or sell physical commodities, but were only interested in price speculation. The laws thereby controlled the level of speculative activity. The laws were gradually changed starting is the late 1980s. In the grain exchange, for example, speculators had been limited to 11 million bushels of grains. In 2008, the two largest index funds had a combined position of more than 1.5 billion bushels. As regulations were relaxed, investment from speculators grew very fast, from USD13 billion in 2003 to USD 260 billion in March 2008. Commodity market prices directly affect how much food governments can afford to import and whether people get enough to eat.

### Investment

Governments worldwide have liberalized investment laws considerably since the advent of structural adjustment programmes and the proliferation of regional and bilateral trade agreements. Many countries have reduced or eliminated laws that prohibited foreign ownership of land; others have reduced demands on foreign companies to reinvest profits in the host country, reducing the potential benefit of the investment for the host country economy. Recently, there has been a pronounced increase in the lease or purchase of land abroad to grow food or fuel for re-export to the investing country or, where private firms are involved, for export to wherever demand dictates. For example, a London-based firm (Central African Mining and Exploration Company) has leased 30,000 hectares in Mozambique to grow sugarcane. In Kenya, the Government has signed a deal with Qatar to lease 40,000 hectares to grow fresh fruit and vegetables for export to Qatar. These deals increase pressure on land, water and infrastructure, and risk crowding out food production for local markets.

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² The Swedish International Water Institute estimates that the developing world also wastes half the food it grows, because it is left in the fields, is poorly stored, or cannot be transported for lack of decent roads and other transport infrastructure.

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60 nine per cent of Sudanese are living under the line of poverty, especially women working in the agricultural sector. In recent years, health services have improved, but the poor are still suffering, due to the increase in food prices. The Sudanese civil society reclaims more financing for development, but from a multidimensional – not just economic – perspective. Development must be strategic, involving the participation of women at the grassroots level.³

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**Structural causes**

It is worth looking further at some of the issues that underlie the crisis. For example, there is widespread agreement on the need to invest on increased productive capacity. The proportion of Official Development Assistance flowing to support agriculture in developing countries dropped from 11.5% in the 1980s to about 3% in recent years. Domestic investment fell, too, especially in developing countries. This trend needs to be reversed and there are promising signs that that is happening. But then the question remains: investment in what kind of productive technologies and systems? The U.S. Government, the Gates Foundation and a number of think tanks and private firms are pushing biotechnology as the way to increase output in developing countries. The slogan they have coined is: ‘A New Green Revolution for Africa.’ Yet the green revolution has already been tried in Africa. It failed. If the problem is seen as only one of technology and inputs, then the new efforts are doomed to fail as well.

The World Bank, among others, has been encouraging countries to liberalize fertilizer markets and even to subsidize (though national and donor resources) access to fertilizer and pesticides. This is not a model for sustainability. The policy also makes small producers dependent on purchased (and often imported) inputs, increasing their dependence on a cash economy and reducing their market power.

There are alternatives. For example, the potential for agro-ecology is enormous, and increasingly well-documented as well. In 1988, floods affected an area northwest of Dhaka in Bangladesh called Tangail. The Bangladesh NGO Unnayan shipment (IAASTD), a four-year project that involved local governments now declared their jurisdiction involved over 170,000 farm households in New Agriculture Movement in Bengali. The movement started on a project to develop an agricultural production system that did not use chemical inputs. The project has grown and is now called “Nayakrishi Andolon,” which means New Agriculture Movement in Bengali. The movement involves over 170,000 farm households in fifteen different districts across Bangladesh. Some local governments have now declared their jurisdictions pesticide-free.8

The International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD), a four-year project that involved over 400 experts and that 58 governments to date have ratified, says, “AKST (agricultural knowledge, science and technology) must address the needs of small-scale farms in diverse ecosystems and to create realistic opportunities for their development where the potential for improved area productivity is low and where climate change may have its most adverse consequences.”9

**Oil and biofuels**

Understanding the importance of oil as a central component of industrial agriculture helps to understand the deeper structural causes of the food crisis. In effect, the Green Revolution used plant breeding and technology to augment photosynthesis—the solar powered agricultural system that has fed humanity, and every other living thing on the planet, for all time—with fossil fuels. The Green Revolution relied on seeds bred to respond to higher levels of inorganic fertilizer and water. And it achieved extraordinary results, with significantly increased yields per plant. An earlier technological revolution had already replaced human and animal labour on farms with oil-driven machines. With the Green Revolution, fossil fuels also started to provide fertilizers, pesticides and electricity for irrigation pumps.

One implication of the growth in oil as a vital ingredient of food production is that agriculture has become a major source of greenhouse gas emissions. Another is that agriculture has become dependent on a finite resource. A third is that on-farm economics have been transformed with the replacement of inputs generated on farm (energy, seeds, fertilizers, pest control) with inputs that must be purchased. For many farmers, North and South, the purchased inputs are importers, making their price less predictable.

Recent numbers from the United States show increases in farm costs in 2007 and 2008 were the largest year-over-year increases on record: USD 20.5 billion in 2007 and USD 36.2 billion in 2008. They are expected to fall to USD 22.7 billion in 2009, but is still 9% higher than in 2007.7 Fuel, feed and fertilizer prices all contributed to the significantly higher costs.

There is still a debate raging about the role of biofuels in the food crisis. No one denies that biofuels demand played a role in higher food prices, but how much and to what effect is still contentious. Higher prices for most farmers are a necessity. At the same time, the interests of poor consumers, including small farmers who are often net consumers of food, must be protected. But higher prices for farmers are only a part of the answer. The challenge is how to ensure a more equitable distribution of the value of commodities among farmers, processors and retailers. The challenge for policy-makers is to redress the disproportionate market power of food corporations.

**Investments in land abroad**

The food crisis has triggered a worrying phenomenon: an explosion of interest among investors in land purchases or leases abroad. The press has dubbed the phenomenon a land grab. The Barcelona-based NGO, GRAIN, listed in October 2008 some 180 proposed deals in their on-line review of the issue entitled, Seized! The 2008 land grab for food and financial security. International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)’s report on the issue, published in April 2009, estimates 20 million hectares of land have been sold since 2006 in some fifty deals, mainly in Africa.8

The two big drivers are food security concerns and demand for biofuels. Net-food importing countries, such as Saudi Arabia and South Korea, do not trust that world markets are a sufficient guarantee of supply. Meanwhile, the mandates and targets for minimum incorporation of biofuels into energy policy, particularly in the EU and the United States, but also in countries around the world, has created a big interest among private investors in growing biofuel feedstocks (including soybeans, palm oil, jatropha for biodiesel; and, sugar cane and maize for bioethanol).

The deals are troubling from a number of angles. The power relationships are asymmetrical, with big firms and (mostly) richer countries dealing with small and often highly impoverished countries, many with weak institutions of governance. The host countries include Sudan, Pakistan, Ethiopia, Madagascar, and Zimbabwe. Some of the countries targeted for investment receive food aid from the World Food Programme, including Cambodia, Niger, Tanzania, Ethiopia, and Burma.10

**The right to food**

The General Comment on the Right to Food says: “the roots of the problem of hunger and malnutrition are not lack of food but lack of access to available food”.11 As a recent Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy (IATP) report says, “The United States is food secure, but the Government fails to protect its people’s right to food. The US Department of Agriculture reports that some 11% of US households (and 18% of US children) lack access to adequate food at some point in the year. That statistic represents 12.6 million people. Yet, even after exports, the domestic supply of food in the US could feed everyone in the country twice over.”12

The report goes on to contrast the United States with Nepal, one of the world’s poorest countries, “Nepal is … taking steps to realize the right to food.

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12 Custodia, L. Dyer, N. and Vermeulen, S. (op. cit.)
A new Government, formed after the end of a decade of civil war, included the right to food sovereignty in their interim constitution. On 25 September 2008, the Supreme Court of Nepal, recognizing this right, ordered the Government of Nepal to immediately supply food to 32 food-short districts.

What is the international community doing?

In April 2008, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon created a High-Level Task Force on the Food Crisis (HLTF). The stated purpose was to “promote a unified response to the challenge of achieving global food security.” The task force was meant to coordinate the UN and Bretton Woods agencies to create a collective response to the food crisis. The task force includes some 15 UN agencies, offices and programmes, as well as the World Bank, IMF and WTO. It lacks resources and it is not yet clear what role it can play.

The HLTF did produce the Comprehensive Framework for Action (CFA) in July 2008. The document reflects the strengths and weaknesses of its complicated composition: it does a good job of setting down the multiple causes that contributed to the crisis, and also makes some important recommendations. On the other hand, it also promotes macroeconomic policies that undermine its own recommendations. For example, it highlights the importance of investing in small-scale farmers. Indeed, if there is one acquired from the food crisis, starting with the World Bank’s World Development Report of 2008, it is the acceptance in multilateral discourse of the importance of a political voice for small farmers. The CFA underlined this point. Yet it went on to urge governments to complete the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations, and supported more Aid for Trade funding. The Doha Agenda has virtually nothing to offer countries facing a food price crisis. The agenda is the product of another time, however recent, and looks increasingly out of place in the changed reality of tight commodity supplies, ambivalence about trade among major food exporters, and a serious credit crunch that is contributing to what the WTO expects will be the biggest contraction in global trade volumes since the Second World War.

French President Nicolas Sarkozy came up with another idea, that of a ‘Global Partnership for Agriculture and Food Security’. First aired during the June 2008 FAO summit on the food crisis, the idea was taken up by the G8 members in subsequent months and given a boost by the Government of Spain, which circulated a document called ‘The Madrid Process: Towards an Inclusive Global Partnership on Agriculture and Food Security’ just before the High Level Meeting on Food Security for All in Madrid in January 2009. This outlined a multi-stakeholder effort to increase the efficiency of the fight against hunger at both local and global levels.

The Global Partnership initiative has potential, but its direction remains unclear. The initial proposal by Sarkozy envisioned a far-reaching policy-oriented initiative which, in addition to generating new funding, would provide a space for governments to design a global strategy for food security based on guidance by an authoritative group of international experts. Discussions about this have tended to focus on increasing donor coordination while sideling the policy discussions. There is also disagreement about whether it would be taken forward primarily by the G8 or within the UN. To date, no corresponding calendar or indication of available financial support to facilitate the process have been identified.

What more could be done?

The failure to eradicate hunger is the result of political choices. We know how to practice more sustainable agriculture. We know how to better regulate markets. We know that food security must be built from a strong local base. New agricultural and food systems should promote environmental integrity, democratic sovereignty, extra-territorial responsibility; they should give priority to local needs; and they should protect equity as well as efficiency in market exchanges.

There is no simple, single path to ending the food crisis and transforming the agricultural sector to protect people from hunger. Short, medium and long-term measures are all needed. Actions need to include a wide range of stakeholders. They need to look at a number of sectors, including agriculture, energy, finance, trade, the environment, and research and development. For quick results, controlling the pressure generated by the demand for biofuels (e.g., by ending biofuel targets or insisting on far tighter criteria where they receive public support), more and better humanitarian aid that gives priority to investment in local and regional productive capacity, regulating speculative demand in agricultural commodities futures markets, reviewing domestic restrictions on agricultural trade, and increasing agricultural production are all important possible actions.

The second set of actions, which will take longer to take effect, is just as important. These must lead the way towards the transformation of industrial agriculture to a fairer, more ecologically sustainable, more locally-controlled model. These slower-acting measures include investment in infrastructure and productive capacity that respects local production and processing, investment in research and extension, a focus on local food culture and consumption patterns, strengthening institutions (including legal procedures and political accountability), a reassessment of agricultural trade policy, much stronger regulation of market power (especially of transnational corporations active in the food system), the establishment of publicly accountable grain reserves, and investment in renewable energy. Ending the colossal waste of food is also critically important. In the South the waste arises because of poor storage, roads and other infrastructure. In the North, it is because of a food system that has excess built in to every phase of the production, processing and distribution of food. In either case, it can and must be curbed.

The food crisis is about more than short-term, reversible problems. Governments need to simultaneously put in place safety nets for the hungry, invest in sustainable agricultural production, and start to tackle the question of access. Access is the heart of the matter from a right to food perspective, and the heart of the real food crisis that plagues our world.
Justice to cool the planet

The current global recession may end up being a blessing in disguise for the world, since less growth implies less stress on the environment and emissions need to be slowed down. It offers a golden opportunity to deliver on social and environmental justice. Only a fairer deal will lead to sustainability, and a bail-out to eradicate world poverty, rehabilitate the environment and stabilize the climate is mandatory for this. It will not be possible, however, until the rich change the way they produce and consume and learn to live within sustainable limits. At the same time, developing countries should avoid the path taken by the industrial ones and shift to clean production and consumption right away.

Isagani R. Serrano

The human signature on current climate change is much clearer now. How to undo what has already been done and avoid catastrophe are what the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its derivative the Kyoto Protocol and accords are all about. However although action needs to be taken, the standoff between developed and developing countries continues with no clear end in sight. Meanwhile even the best scientists seem to beunderestimating how fast the climate is really changing. For example, while the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) projected that the Arctic Ocean would retain some ice year-round until about 2050, it was shown shortly afterwards that this greatly underestimated the extent of sea-ice decline, and the ocean is expected to lose its summer sea ice much sooner.

It is clear something has got to give here, before the threshold is passed where climate change is irreversible. Yet neither side will give way. Not the rich countries because they think that they are being pressured to meet difficult and demanding targets before the poorer countries do anything. And not the poorer countries either because they think they are being asked to adhere to the same targets as rich countries before they have had a chance to catch up.

Game over?

In the 1880s, after we started burning fossil fuels and had built today’s industrial society, the concentration of carbon dioxide (CO₂) in the atmosphere was 280 parts per million (ppm). By the 1950s, it had already reached 315 ppm. When NASA scientist James Hansen first sounded the alarm on climate change in the late 1980s, he established 350 ppm as the highest affordable level “if humanity wishes to preserve a planet similar to that on which civilization developed and to which life on Earth is adapted”.

However we are past that point already. It is 380 ppm now and counting, with CO₂ in the air said to be increasing by about two ppm each year. In fact, there is no consensus yet on the level of safety. Some say 450 ppm. Others say it should be much lower. At the Poznan Conference of the Parties in December 2008, the former Vice-President of the United States, Al Gore, unsuccessfully tried to reach consensus around 350 ppm. Rajendra Pachauri, chairman of the UNFCCC/IPCC has said that, without basic reforms by 2012 we may find the climate system spinning out of control and that global CO₂ emissions must start to decline by 2050.

The IPCC avoids prescription, however, and limits itself to offering policy makers a portfolio of scenarios. Since 1990 it has drawn up 40 such scenarios, built on four major storylines. These scenarios are categorized according to whether the future is focused on economic (denoted A) or environmental (denoted B) development and whether it is oriented on the global (number 1) or regional (number 2) level. So A1 is economic/global, A2 economic/regional, B1 environmental/global and B2 environmental/regional. The A1 scenario is further divided into three different scenarios: fossil fuel intensive (A1F1); balanced between fossil and non-fossil (A1B); and a transition to non-fossil fuels (A1T). Business-as-usual (BAU), the scenario that assumes doing nothing on Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emission reduction, is of course out of the question.

Meanwhile, the signs are mounting that the worst-case scenario may come earlier than imagined. Extreme events such as storms, floods and droughts have devastating impacts on water resources, food security, agriculture, ecosystems, biodiversity and human health. In August 2003 there was a heat wave in Europe that killed nearly 15,000 people in France and 35,000 in nine other European countries. There were recently California and Australian forest infernos alongside unprecedented floods elsewhere. Such events have been anticipated in all IPCC assessments; however they are now common everywhere and happen when least expected. The prolonged droughts in major food-producing countries could cause a 20%–40% decline in food production in 2009. Diseases against which progress was being made, such as TB, malaria and dengue fever, are having a resurgence in many places. Deforestation, which accounts for about 17% of GHG emissions, has recently been exacerbated by the rising demand for biofuels. Primary forests were lost at the rate of 6 million hectares a year between 2000 and 2005, and biodiversity declined steadily along with them.

Justice in climate

A more even-handed world stands a better chance of surviving and adapting to climate change. Setting limits to growth (regardless of whether feared thresholds may have been crossed), and establishing equity between and within nations and communities, between women and men, present and future generations, should make the world more resilient.

The principle of climate justice derives directly from the UNFCCC, whose article 3.1 establishes that countries should act “on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities”. This is complemented by two other principles in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development and Agenda 21 that resulted from the Earth Summit in 1992: precaution and polluters pay. The first says that if you are not sure about the benefit and consequences of what you are going to do, do not do it. The second is self-explanatory. Climate justice is also explicitly stated or implied in many other UN declarations and agreements.

Although climate change spares no one, rich or poor, it has a greater impact on the poor even though they have less to answer for. Developing, or so-called Non-Annex I, countries contributed far less to GHG emissions than developed or Annex I countries, but they are destined to suffer more. The Least Developed Countries (LDCs), who contributed the least in pollution, will suffer the most. Many small island developing states may one day just disappear from the map.

Sharing the effort to stabilize GHG concentrations in the atmosphere at whatever emission

stabilization scenarios may be decided – 350 ppm, 450 ppm, 550 ppm, 650 ppm – must be based on the differentiated share of responsibilities for what has happened and continues to happen, and on the different levels of development. Countries and peoples of the world can be divided into three groups: over-consumers or high emitters; under-consumers or under-emitters; and sustainers or those living within sustainable limits. This classification corresponds respectively to (a) industrial countries – all of the under-emitters; and sustainers or those living within sustainable limits; and (b) developing countries such as Brazil, China, India and some other East and Southeast Asian countries.

In every country, rich or poor, however, there will be some who do not neatly fit these categories: a rich Filipino, for example, has a similar lifestyle to and therefore the same CO2 emission level as – his rich American counterpart. The 600 or so million of non-poor, middle class and rich Chinese and Indians would be a mix of sustainers and high consumers. The excluded under-consumers or under-emitters would be the over 2 billion people who are poorly fed, poorly educated, jobless, voiceless, lacking access to health care, water, sanitation, and living in degraded environments. They must have primacy in the right to development and should be the main beneficiaries of resource transfers between and within countries.

To avert catastrophe the deal is fair and simple: the rich in both rich and poor countries must give up much more so that the poor and all of us may live sustainable lives.

Mitigation, the heart of justice

There are many proposals on the table regarding the “fair share” principle, for example, the green development rights, common but differentiated convergence, contraction and convergence by 2050, etc. They are all basically about climate stabilization.

High-emission countries must commit to drastic, deep and binding cuts on their GHG emissions from their 1990 levels and help developing countries with “soft” money and clean technology. The contraction required from them is huge whatever the agreed emission stabilization scenario. This ranges between a 25%–50% cut or more between 2020 and 2050. The reduction covers all six gases of the Kyoto Protocol: CO2, methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydroflourocarbons (HFC), perfluorocarbon (PFC) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6) – which are translated into CO2 tons equivalent (CO2teq) in each country’s GHG inventory. Developing countries have a right to development, but this right should not be taken as a license to pollute the environment. The right to development under the climate justice principle is not only about growing the economy; more importantly, it is about the satisfaction of basic needs leading to a decent level of security and well-being for all. The Greenhouse Development Rights Framework suggest an income of USD 9,000 per person per year as the level at which all countries could converge.7 This would mean that developing countries, all of them falling below that line, should be entitled to transfers (ODA, technology, etc.) and allowed to increase their emissions as they shoot for that income goal.

What is the equivalent carbon footprint of USD 9,000 GDP per capita? Probably about 9 tons of CO2 per person. Even if rich countries agreed to come down to that level and poor countries succeeded in reaching it, and even if our lives run on a mix of fossil fuels and renewable energy, imagine how much energy and carbon that would mean, especially considering world population projections of 7.6 billion for 2020 and 9.1 billion for 2050.

Against that income level the targets set under the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) look inadequate even if met by 2015 (something that at current pace is not going to happen). Developing countries must avoid the unsustainable path taken by industrial countries. The earlier they shift to production and consumption of clean energy the better for the planet and all of us. With sustainable agriculture and fisheries, conservation of water and forest resources, development of renewable energy and a reduction in poverty and inequality, they stand a chance of adapting to climate change. A truly green revolution in both agriculture and fisheries and avoiding deforestation can contribute to carbon capture and reducing the carbon footprint.

Non-Annex 1 countries are spared from binding mitigation commitments but they can help, for instance, by levying a progressive carbon tax on their own rich over-consumers and by moving early on towards soft energy and low-carbon paths to development. Keeping to its carrying capacity8 should be every nation’s goal. Stabilizing the population at sustainable levels should be a particular concern for countries such as the Philippines, which is projected to grow to over 100 million in 2020 and to nearly 150 million by 2050.

High-emission countries insist that the deck is stacked in favour of the more advanced developing countries, where emission levels are rising fast. At the 13th Conference of the Parties in Bali, Indonesia, in 2007 they suggested that binding emission reduction targets should equally apply to the likes of China and India. This is a tricky and problematic issue and says a lot about the complexities of “negotiating” justice. It is true that China’s emissions are rising fast because of its high growth levels and reliance on dirty coal. But the current carbon concentration in the atmosphere has been the result of a continuous build up over many generations, and China or India had relatively smaller contributions to this (although their carbon imprint, because of their current high growth, will show up later).

Moreover, China’s emission level on average is still way below that of the US on a per person share. China is using up the world’s raw materials, but it is also accepting mountains of waste that other countries do not want to keep in their own backyards. It is recycling the world’s waste and undertaking


8. The number of individuals who can be supported in a given area within natural resource limits and without degrading the natural social, cultural and economic environment for present and future generations. See <www.carryingcapacity.org>.

Jesús Avirama (Regional Indigenous Council of Cauca, Colombia)
sustainable agriculture and massive tree planting. In fact, China probably has the highest carrying capacity anywhere on the planet—taking care of one of every six members of humanity in a comparatively small space. However one might question who is paying for the fact that China produces cheaply for all of us. Another question is why Beijing cannot shift at once to clean production and produce more durable goods. If China can help bail out the global economy with its surplus money, why not spend it in cleaning up its own mess and shift to a low-carbon path of development?

US carbon emissions, a quarter of the world’s total, remain at very high levels. Its per capita CO2 emission level has seen little or no reduction at all since 1990. The World Development Report 2006: Equity and Development put it at 19.8 tons/person that year. Europe, Japan and other industrialized nations may have succeeded in cutting down but their efforts still fall short of the Kyoto Protocol’s minimal standard. Overall, annual global CO2 emissions have not let up since 1990. To some this a sign of prosperity, meaning an indication that economies are continuing to grow. To others it is ominous, as it brings us closer to the point of no return. Contractation and convergence efforts must result in preventing an average global temperature rise of more than 2 degree Centigrade by 2050—the threshold we are advised to respect or die. This is not much time, obviously.

Adapt or perish

Poor countries cannot afford to wait for dramatic mitigation efforts to happen. They might perish before they get justice. With or without assistance, they have to find ways to adjust to climate change before it is too late.

Defined in the IPCC’s Third Assessment Report, but already inherent in the agency’s original mandate from 1988, adaptation refers to adjustments in ecological, social or economic systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli and their effects or impacts.10 It refers to changes in processes, practices, or structures to moderate or offset potential damages or to take advantage of opportunities associated with changes in climate. It involves adjustments to reduce the vulnerability of communities and regions to climate change and variability.

The User’s Guidebook on the Adaptation Policy Framework (APF) of the UNDP-Global Environmental Facility defines adaptation as “a process by which strategies to moderate and cope with the consequences of climate change—including climate variability—are enhanced, developed and implemented.”11 The APF includes seven components: defining project scope; assessing current vulnerability; characterizing future risks; developing an adaptation strategy; continuing the adaptation process; engaging stakeholders; and enhancing adaptive capacity. Decisions about how to use this framework will depend on a country’s prior work, needs, goals and resources.12

According to the IPCC, the requirements that need to be met for a country to have a high adaptive capacity include: a stable and prosperous economy; a high degree of access to technology at all levels; well-delineated roles and responsibilities for implementation of adaptation strategies; systems in place for the national, regional and local dissemination of climate change and adaptation information; and an equitable distribution of access to resources. This basically excludes non–Annex I countries.

Growing concern about adaptation has been addressed by decisions of the Conference of the Parties (COP). The Marrakesh Accords that came out of COP-7 delineated instruments and mechanisms for supporting adaptation, including the creation of three new funds: (a) The Special Climate Change Fund under the UNFCCC for supporting the “implementation of adaptation activities where sufficient information is available”; (b) the LDC Fund dedicated to the preparation and implementation of national adaptation programmes of action (NAPAs), which “will communicate priority activities addressing the urgent and immediate needs and concerns of the LDCs relating to adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change”; and (c) the Adaptation Fund set up under the Kyoto Protocol and getting advice from the Global Environmental Facility on its operations.

Sustainable agriculture and fisheries, sustainable forestry and watershed management, and ecological waste management are adaptation paths that can help cool the planet. Ensuring food security calls for supporting adaptation, including the creation of three new funds: (a) The Special Climate Change Fund under the UNFCCC for supporting the “implementation of adaptation activities where sufficient information is available”; (b) the LDC Fund dedicated to the preparation and implementation of national adaptation programmes of action (NAPAs), which “will communicate priority activities addressing the urgent and immediate needs and concerns of the LDCs relating to adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change”; and (c) the Adaptation Fund set up under the Kyoto Protocol and getting advice from the Global Environmental Facility on its operations.

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Sustainable agriculture and fisheries, sustainable forestry and watershed management, and ecological waste management are adaptation paths that can help cool the planet. Ensuring food security calls for a radical change in the way farming is done, a view that has long been advocated by farmers’ movements worldwide. This got a strong boost from the International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD)
In El Salvador, we have been facing for years now the impact of climate change, suffering floods and droughts, hurricanes, the drying of major rivers, the collapse of communities. Each year the material costs are high, and so is the loss of human lives and the emigration of our people, especially the youth. We must work for a new era in which development is measured by the well-being of humanity and that of Mother Earth, and not just by material wealth."

Marta Benavides, (GCAP Feminist Task Force, El Salvador)

"While industrialized Northern countries are mainly responsible for greenhouse gas emissions causing climate change especially in per capita terms, countries of the South, and the poor and women in particular, will bear a bigger burden of the adverse environmental effects of climate change and its socio-economic impacts. Some of these effects are the displacement of people living in low-lying coastal areas; the loss of sources of livelihood; food insecurity; and reduced access to water. From an ecological debt perspective, rich, industrialized countries do not only have the responsibility of drastically cutting greenhouse gas emissions down, but they also have an ethical and moral obligation to provide compensatory and reparative finance to developing countries to fund climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts."

Athena Peralta, (World Council of Churches)

at a conference held in April 2008 in Johannesburg, South Africa. The IAASTD admitted to the shortcomings of the Green Revolution technology and recognized the critical role of indigenous knowledge and sustainable agriculture in attaining food security. It released a report indicating that modern agriculture will have to change radically from the dominant corporate model if the world is to avoid social breakdown and environmental collapse.13

The report – opposed by Australia, Canada and the US – also criticized genetic modification (GM) and the conversion of farmlands to biofuel production. It said that the so-called GM technology was not the way to feed the world’s poor, and that growing biofuels to feed cars on land that should be used to feed people will surely worsen world hunger and an already very fragile human security situation.14

Although adaptation has emerged as a key policy question in negotiations on climate change, the issue has not yet been addressed forcefully in policy development planning at all levels. Building adaptive capacity, or meeting MDG targets, is very different from growing the economy and working for development as usual. It is about delivering social and environmental justice – a necessary condition for securing the path to sustainability.

Justice in finance and technology transfers

The UNFCCC states that rich countries are duty-bound to make transfers to developing countries, but nobody should be a beggar. If poor peasants shifted to organic farming or municipal fishers managed their coastal resources properly, they would be doing it not only for themselves but for all of us. If a poor country takes care of its biodiversity, it is doing a great service not only to itself but also to humanity. These efforts deserve to be compensated or reciprocated somehow through, for example, a carbon tax on the rich, untied ODA, unconditional debt relief, fairer trade terms, technology or other forms of resource transfers.

Financing climate stabilization requires huge amounts of money. Oxfam International15 has said that the cost of adaptation for developing countries will be at least USD 50 billion a year, in addition to the current ODA level, which already includes funding commitment for the MDGs. However in his presentation of the Fourth Assessment Report in Bali, IPCC chair Pachauri said that “the cost of mitigation is really not all that much” as it is estimated annually to be less than 1% of global GDP. Rich countries are bailing out the big banks that caused the current global financial mess. It is only fair for developing countries to ask for an equivalent bail-out for the eradication of world poverty, rehabilitation of the environment and stabilization of the climate system.

Although Annex 1 parties agree that climate change is the most serious threat to sustainable development, their actions up to now have been simply disappointing. Decisions that truly matter for eradicating poverty and redressing global disparities take too long, often ending up in insufficient or even negative net transfers with heavy strings attached. Moreover, the rich themselves must begin to dramatically change the way they see the world and how they produce and consume. In other words, they must give up on their unsustainable lifestyle.

Slow down, cool the earth

What scenario can cool an overheating planet and spare us from disaster – 350 ppm, 450 ppm? Whatever is the answer, the action should be the same: we all must slow down. Strictly speaking, scenarios are not predictions; they are a range of possibilities that can lead to different alternative futures. As the future is inherently unpredictable, there is no certainty on what will come out of the action of so many. However scenarios are useful because one of the causes of unpredictability and uncertainty is human action – or the possibility of it – to change the course of events. The future is shaped by what we believe it will be and by what we do to make it happen.

Oddly, the current global recession may turn out to be a blessing in disguise. Perhaps the deeper it cuts and the longer it lasts, the better it will be for all of us. Less growth implies less emissions and less stress on the environment. Cleaner production and universal reduction in per capita consumption means less carbon footprint and – maybe – healthier living. Perhaps all these things will happen regardless of what comes out of the climate negotiations in Copenhagen and beyond.

Is there any time to save ourselves? Maybe yes, maybe no. In any case, let it not be said that our generation did not do enough for justice."


The European Union (EU) is a huge consumer of energy. In 2006 the 25 member states consumed 1,722.8 million tonnes of oil equivalent (mtoe). Nearly two-thirds came from hydrocarbons: 706.3 million tonnes of oil (14.9 million barrels per day) and 420.6 mtoe (476.4 billion cubic meters) of natural gas. The remaining 34.6% came from coal, nuclear and renewable sources. Some forecasts suggest that by 2030 EU energy consumption will have increased by 15%.

However, the EU does not have an integrated energy market. The fragmentation of this sector dates back to the 1970s, when member states responded individually to the oil crisis. Some of them, such as Germany, built up strategic gas reserves and invested in infrastructure development; others, such as the UK, proceeded to explore their own reserves.

Russia is the world’s largest gas producer, and it currently supplies around 30% of the EU’s total gas needs. European countries can be divided into three groups, with different levels of dependence on Russian gas imports:

1. Countries with very low dependence – about 15%: Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK.
2. Countries with moderate dependence – 20–40%: France, Italy, and Germany.
3. Countries that are highly dependent – more than 50%: Austria, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Rumania and Slovenia. Some countries – Bulgaria, Croatia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Serbia and Slovakia – rely on Russia for all their gas imports.

The gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine in early January 2009 thus directly affected a total of 17 European countries. In a speech in mid-2009, European Commission President José Manuel Barroso noted the particular vulnerability of several countries, including Bulgaria and Slovakia.

In Bulgaria, the State is the single buyer of energy. During the last decade it signed a number of exclusive contracts with the Russian consortium Gazprom, and as a result the country increased its 90% dependency on Russian gas. On the other hand, since 1956 the Bulgarian Government has favoured the use of nuclear power. Initially a research reactor, the IRT-2000, was commissioned in 1964 and Bulgaria is now the biggest exporter of electricity in South-East Europe. Bulgarian coal power stations (coal, natural gas and oil) have a combined capacity of 5,000 MW and are currently utilising only 3,600 MW, so the country has the potential to increase its energy efficiency.

The consumption of electricity has grown since 1980 and Bulgaria is also a major gas exporter. In 2006, the National Electricity Company (NEK) produced 46 billion kilowatt hours and exported 7.8 of these to Greece, Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey.

In the case of Slovakia, although its market for electric power generation and distribution is small compared to other Central European countries, projections indicate that its power system will need to be broadened to meet growing demand. The generation of electricity is primarily dependent on hydroelectric and nuclear resources, though this is somewhat balanced by thermal power stations (coal, natural gas and oil). The Slovak gas market is characterized by a high level of dependence on Russian supply and the dominance of a predominantly state-owned and vertically integrated company.

Slovakia plays a significant role in the European gas network as it is an important transit country for transporting natural gas to countries in Central and Western Europe. In general, one of the challenges in the energy relations between Russia and the EU is the transport of gas through third countries. Although Europe attributes its “vulnerability” to Russia, part of the problem – as was the case with Belarus in early 2007 and with Ukraine in early 2006 and 2009 – lies in transit countries.

The January 2009 energy crisis highlights the lack of an integrated EU energy policy, even though the need for a policy has been approved by the European Commission and various proposals have been put forward. The lack of such a policy is reflected in the fact that energy from Russia does not flow in equal amounts to the entire region. In addition, the problem of mutual dependence is particularly complex. It is not hard to understand why the European Commission has been unable to coordinate a common vision, nor why some countries, including France, Germany and Italy, have been trying to develop their own relationships of energy dependence. National governments have to decide on the balance between dependence and diversification and on alternatives for the future.

During the last decade the lobby for the renewable energy industry has been gaining leverage in the EU. One of the proposals in the 2007 Energy Policy for Europe was to incorporate a minimum of 10% of biofuels in total transport fuel by 2020, to be accompanied by the introduction of a sustainability scheme for biofuels. The existing regulation fixes the target at 5.75% in 2010. A binding 20% target for the overall share of renewable energy by 2020 has also been proposed, the effort to be shared in an appropriate way between member states.

The main goals to be achieved by implementing a common European strategy to promote biofuels are: 1) to increase energy security, as the increasing price of oil is rapidly affecting the cost of energy and reducing European citizens’ purchasing power; and 2) to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs), the main determinant of climate change. Rises in temperature and changes in precipitation seasons might affect water resources as well as agricultural production.

The future of alternative energy resources raises the question of nutrition and the future of the EU Common Agricultural Policy. Diversification in energy supplies and investment in alternative energy sources are more affordable among old EU member states. There is limited renewable energy potential for newcomers to the EU, amid demands to scale back coal power plants due to environmental reasons and resistance to the development of nuclear power.

In order to tackle the political divisiveness of the EU-Russia gas relationship, and the specific risks to the security of gas supply of states in central and eastern Europe, the EU should make gas market integration the priority of its strategic energy policy. Steps also need to be taken towards the enhancement of energy security development, including energy efficiency, renewable energy sources and demand-side management.

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1. Bulgaria and Romania joined in 2007, for the current total of 27 members.
4. Gas relations date back to 1968, when the Soviet Union first supplied gas to Austria.
Holding transnational corporations accountable for human rights obligations: the role of civil society

Civil society organizations are employing a variety of methods to hold corporations accountable for meeting their human and labour rights obligations. These initiatives and mechanisms aim to protect and promote fundamental human and labour rights, with varying degrees of effectiveness. Although they represent an initial attempt to address weaknesses inherent in the unilateral, voluntary model of Corporate Social Responsibility, the only truly effective solution would be to change the paradigms of both the human rights framework for corporations and the economic model in general.

The financial and economic crisis sweeping the globe is not simply another cyclical downturn endemic to the capitalist system. It represents a spectacular collapse of the neo-liberal economic model. Implementation of this model, which prescribed financial-sector deregulation, trade liberalization, and privatization of state functions and enterprises, led not only to destabilization of the world’s markets but to the creation of an acute global imbalance of power between workers, private enterprises, and states.

During the heyday of neo-liberalism, many companies took advantage of improved communications and transportation infrastructure, lax national regulations, and the auctioning off of lucrative State assets to transform themselves into gigantic transnational conglomerates with a substantial presence around the world, and achieved record profits in the process. Their economic muscle gave them immense political clout among developing countries eager for foreign direct investment. These countries attempted to make their territories more “attractive” to multinationals by strengthening legislation protecting investments and weakening labour and environmental laws. Thus, in addition to its economic consequences, the proliferation of investments by multinational enterprises in developing countries over the last decades has had profound social and environmental impacts, to the point where some multinationals have been complicit in gross violations of fundamental human, social, labour and environmental rights.

Transnational corporations and human rights obligations

Business enterprises, particularly transnational companies, are typically private, non-governmental entities subject only to national laws in either the country where the company has its headquarters or in the host countries where the company has investments. Even though these companies may have significant presence in multiple countries, they are not technically considered to have international legal status, which is limited to states and certain inter-governmental organizations such as the European Union and the UN. This means that by and large they have not been subject to the rights and obligations of international law, including international human rights law.

This interpretation is gradually being revised in practice, however. Some contemporary scholars advocate granting transnational business enterprises neo-feudal or corporate rights. Some international treaties – in particular bilateral and multilateral trade and investment agreements – give transnational enterprises specific rights that can be enforced in either the host country’s courts or in international arbitration tribunals. For example, the Chapter 11 provisions under the North American Free Trade Agreement allow investors to bring claims directly against participating States for presumed violations of the investment provisions in the treaty. Similarly, many bilateral investment treaties include mechanisms that allow companies to bring cases against signatory States in arbitration tribunals, such as the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, on expropriations, losses incurred due to civil disturbances, and restrictions on the repatriation of capital and other matters. The implications of these clauses are profound. Since 1995, more than 370 bilateral and multilateral trade agreements have been signed and more than 1,500 bilateral investment treaties have been concluded, involving virtually all of the world’s major economies. These agreements confer supra-national rights on corporations, without granting corresponding rights to the people who may be adversely affected by their actions.

Today, the obligations of non-state actors such as business enterprises to protect and promote human rights are becoming more explicit in both theory and practice. For instance, the Preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights calls for “every individual and every organ of society” to uphold and promote the principles contained in the Declaration. According to legal scholars, that obligation includes all persons and all legal entities such as companies. Other international standards in the realm of “soft law” that directly impose human rights obligations on companies include the International Labour Organization Tripartite Declaration on Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (formulated in 1977) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (adopted in 1976 and revised in 2000).

In addition, a growing number of corporations are designing and implementing specific human rights policies. More than 240 enterprises have formulated their own guidelines, according to the Business and Human Rights Resource Center, and more than 5200 companies are listed as active members of the UN Global Compact, a multi-stakeholder initiative that commits businesses to respect universal principals relating to human rights, labour rights, environmental issues and anti-corruption practices.

Civil society and corporate social responsibility

The changing relationship between businesses and human rights is intimately linked to the rise of corporate social responsibility, defined by the European Commission as a “concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and in their interactions with stakeholders on a voluntary basis.” Although some companies have implemented philanthropic programmes to benefit their employees, local communities and society in general since at least the 1950s, the current notion is different. It promotes the incorporation of human, social and environmental rights as an integral part of corporate strategies, not to comply with any moral or ethical imperative but simply as a good business practice that can minimise risks and enhance company performance.

2 Ibid
6 See: <www.business-humanrights.org/Documents/Policies>
7 See: <www.unglobalcompact.org/ParticipantsAndStakeholders/search_participant.html>
The impacts of the crisis are evident in the massive lay-offs taking place in foreign banks such as the BBVA, Santander, and HSBC. Our rights as workers have been taken away. Debtors are also feeling the impacts, it’s already happening. They are being evicted because for different reasons they cannot pay anymore. What is worse, essential military forces of the state are being used to carry out the evictions; those forces are there for the security of all, not to throw poor people in the streets because they cannot pay."

Janio Romero (union leader of the Unión Nacional de Empleados Bancarios, Colombia)

This shift in the concept and practice of corporate social responsibility did not arise out of a spontaneous change of heart in the business community. It resulted from the work of journalists and civil society organizations that have exposed gross rights violations committed directly or indirectly by corporate actors, leading to public outcry and a push for stronger social controls on companies. Early initiatives led by civil society to hold companies accountable for rights abuses included the groundbreaking campaigns in the early 1990s related to labour malpractices committed by Nike in Indonesia and other Southeast Asian countries and the complicity of Royal Dutch Shell in the execution of Ken Saro Wiwa and other human rights activists in Nigeria. More recent campaigns have included targeting Coca-Cola for alleged involvement of its bottlers in Colombia in the assassination of trade union leaders.

The typical reaction of companies under scrutiny in such cases has been to try to mitigate damage to their operations and image by establishing principles and practices such as “codes of conduct” and “sustainability reporting” to prevent similar occurrences in the future. Many other companies that have remained relatively unscathed by these types of campaigns have adopted similar measures. For example, more than 1000 companies issued in-depth reports on their social and environmental performance in 2008, applying the “Global Reporting Initiative” guidelines.

Despite the diversity of initiatives that have sprung up in recent years, nearly all have been unilateral and voluntary, lacking binding mechanisms that can be used to invoke real and not just moral sanctions in cases of corporate complicity in rights abuses. For this reason, a wide segment of civil society, including unions, human rights organizations and environmental groups, has tended to regard corporate responsibility initiatives with scepticism, seeing them as mechanisms to improve the public image of companies that do not address the substantive issues that the social and environmental practices of businesses generate. That said, many civil society groups have been using the social responsibility concept to develop more transparent, effective mechanisms to hold companies accountable for human, labour and environmental rights obligations, as spelled out in international norms and national laws.

One of the fundamental challenges that civil society organizations face when trying to seek remedies for human rights violations aided or abetted by multinational corporations is a lack of legal remedies in host country jurisdictions with lax national laws, inefficient justice systems, lack of political will to prosecute investors, or a combination of these obstacles. However, since 1992 a number of civil lawsuits have been filed against transnational corporations under a little-used provision in US law called the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), which was invoked and reaffirmed in the 1980s in a case involving individuals, and the subsequent passage of the Torture Victim Protection Act. Based on the precept of universal jurisdiction for crimes involving the “law of nations”, this legislation entitles US courts to rule on cases involving gross violations of human rights regardless of the location and nationality of the perpetrators and their victims. Between 1993 and 2006, NGOs such as the International Labor Rights Fund, Earthrights International, and the Center for Constitutional Rights filed 36 lawsuits against multinational companies in US District Courts under ATCA, bringing to light alleged corporate complicity in human rights abuses.

To date, however, no companies have been found guilty under ACTA. Of the 36 cases presented, 20 were dismissed, some on the grounds that the crimes committed did not fall within the scope of the law (which only applies to violations of “specific, universal and obligatory” norms such as those against torture, genocide, crimes against humanity, and summary executions), others for reasons related to an applicable statute of limitations or a failure to provide sufficient evidence linking the company to the crime committed. Several companies that were brought to trial under ATCA, such as Drummond Mining and Chevron, were found not guilty by juries. The remaining cases were either settled out of court by the companies or are still pending.

On the positive side, the out-of-court settlements in cases such as the lawsuit against Shell for the murder of Nigerian activists mentioned above have been exemplary, with the company agreeing to a USD 15.5 million payment to the victims. Overall, although ATCA has not yet created a strong deterrent effect among corporations potentially implicated in human rights abuses, the important precedent it has set for the use of innovative legal mechanisms based on extraterritorial jurisdiction could pave the way for the creation of new forums such as an “International Criminal Court” that would provide legally binding remedies for victims of grave human rights violations committed by business enterprises.

Trade unions and corporate social responsibility instruments

The experience of trade unions in the use of corporate social responsibility instruments is based on a strategy that was previously defined in the international arena by the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC). This strategy asserts that companies have an “internal responsibility” for their workers that should be regulated and enforceable. Mechanisms for accomplishing this include the Tripartite Declaration of the ILO and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and bilateral global framework agreements (GFAs) negotiated between Global Unions and multinational corporations.

It is estimated that the Global Unions have signed close to 70 general framework agreements; although no centralized, up-to-date register exists. These agreements are based on the companies’ “internal social responsibility”, and clearly linked to ILO norms. The metalworkers federation (IMF), service-sector workers federation (UNI), chemical and oil workers federation (ICEM) and construction workers federation (BWI) are especially active in


Thematic reports 32 Social Watch
negotiating these agreements, accounting for 80 per cent of the total. The Global Unions participate in other kinds of work with businesses and institutes co-sponsored with business organizations, such as the one involving the International Federation of Journalists, and multi-stakeholder forums, such as one related to coffee production in which the International Union of Farmworkers participates. Other framework agreements have been organized on a sub-regional basis.

Once GFAs are signed, they can be used in various ways. Companies tend to use them as evidence of their commitment to corporate responsibility, as their signing and implementation are voluntary. This perspective is being challenged by the union movement and by European academics, with the goal of constructing a strategy to make the contents of framework agreements legally binding. In the meantime, union denunciations of corporate practices violating clauses of a framework agreement have sometimes compelled multinational companies to change their policies; for example, by agreeing that unions can be established in their foreign subsidiaries.

The OECD Guidelines have been adopted by its 30 member countries as well as nine observer countries, including Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru in Latin America. This instrument includes an explicit complaints mechanism that can be activated when a violation of the spirit and letter of a Guideline clause is identified. The thematic scope of the Guidelines is quite broad. In addition to labour rights, clauses cover the environment, consumer rights, science and technology, and competition. Complaints are directed to “national contact points” that governments are obligated to create. The Guidelines call for voluntary compliance by companies, which means that they can ignore the mediation efforts of governments with respect to the complaints presented by an interested party. However, once the process is completed, the national contact point can publically reveal the negative actions of the company and publicize critical opinions. As a result, resort to the Guidelines complaints mechanism tends to have consequences similar to the rulings of the Commission of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations of the ILO. Although employers frequently assert that this mechanism goes beyond their concept of CSR, it has been widely acknowledged not just by civil society organizations but also by governments of countries that belong to the OECD.

To date, approximately 200 complaints have been brought to national contact points, of which 80 per cent were lodged by trade unions. According to the Trade Union Advisory Committee (TUAC), complainants achieved satisfactory results around half the time. At the end of 2008, 24 union-based work agreements were presented in Latin America, and 10 others were brought by NGOs. The proportion of complainants that had a positive result was similar to those at the global level.

The Trade Union Confederation of the Americas (TUCA), created in March 2008 and headquartered in Sao Paulo, has developed an explicit strategy regarding corporate social responsibility, based on that of the ITUC. It is working with the Global Union federations and the TUAC on issues related to global framework agreements and the OECD Guidelines, particularly to assist union organizations in testing the complaints mechanisms of these instruments. It has also extended an invitation to OECD Watch to coordinate work related to the Guidelines. Additionally, it has organized campaigns to counter the concept of social responsibility promoted by the Inter-American Development Bank. TUCA, in collaboration with the Global Union federations and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Latin America as well as with like-minded NGOs, has created a Working Group on Transnational Companies to further develop concepts and strategies relating to trade union perspectives.

The need for a paradigm shift

Although not all of the mechanisms profiled above have been equally effective in protecting and promoting the fundamental human and labor rights that companies are obligated to uphold, they at least begin to address the weaknesses inherent in the unilateral, voluntary model of corporate social responsibility. Although it can be argued that the generation of business initiatives linked to this model has helped to introduce human rights issues into corporate culture, from the point of view of civil society, these measures are no substitute for enforceable human rights laws on the national level that are consistent with international norms and accompanied by strong, independent judiciary systems that provide concrete remedies for victims. Unfortunately, many governments choose not to take forceful action to hold companies accountable for violations of their human rights obligations, as they are fearful of losing foreign investment to countries that enforce rights less stringently. This creates a deplorable “race to the bottom” regarding the promotion and protection of human rights and labor standards, among countries as well as companies.

This tendency notwithstanding, human rights protection need not be a zero-sum game. The solution is to change the paradigms of both the human rights framework for corporations and of the economic model in general. A comprehensive international treaty formulated within the UN human rights system could clarify the human rights obligations of businesses, which have been obscured by the literally hundreds of CSR initiatives that have sprung up over the last two decades, and establish binding mechanisms that can provide remedies for victims in cases where it is impossible to prosecute victimizing companies in domestic jurisdictions. A conceptual framework proposed in 2008 by John Ruggie, Special Representative to the UN Secretary on Business and Human Rights, based on the governmental obligation to respect rights, business responsibility to protect rights, and the need for victims access to effective remedies in cases where abuses have occurred, is a step forward. However, this framework needs effective mechanisms to instrumentalize it.

In addition, a wider transformation is necessary to reverse the negative impact of the neo-liberal economic model that has been imposed upon developing countries in recent years. The role of the state as an active shaper and regulator of economic and social policy must be revived, along with endogenous paths to development based on strengthening internal markets and national productive capacity. This would break the cycle of dependence on investments by unscrupulous multinationals. The current economic and financial crisis has raised real questions about the “benevolence” of the private sector and highlighted the flaws inherent in the neo-liberal model. This provides a historic opportunity to establish a social compact between businesses, workers, consumers and the state that can generate a new economic model based on human rights and sustainable development. We should not squander this opportunity.

Young woman from Buenos Aires

I began working with a major Spanish advertising and film producing company, which opened a division here in Argentina in 2007. When the crisis broke in earnest, everything started to get complicated. Work decreased a lot, and we spent up to a month without filming. In January they told me that they had to fire me. I received the severance pay and started looking for work. Since then up until today, I haven’t been able to find any decent job. What little work exists is practically slave labour: 8 or 9 hours, with very poor salaries. I have almost spent all my savings and I live alone in a rented flat, so I need to get something urgently. What else am I going to do?

Young woman from Buenos Aires

Social Watch 33 Holding Transnational Corporations Accountable for Human Rights Obligations
The global economic crisis and the least developed countries: citizen’s concerns

The Least Developed Countries (LDCs) are in the forefront of those bearing the brunt of the global economic crisis. In LDC countries the economic crisis translates into food, fuel, climate, debt, development and political crises. A fundamental transformation of the global financial architecture is needed: for many people living in poverty in LDCs, the current model of economic growth has brought little benefit, if any. The global economic crisis must be used as an opportunity to bring about real transformation in the global system so that everyone on this planet is offered better opportunities to lead meaningful and secure lives.

The current global economic crisis has not only shaken the foundations of the largest economies, stock markets and the most influential financial institutions around the globe, but has also put the already fragile small economies of the LDCs into peril, pushing millions of poor women, men and children into poverty and hardship. While the economic crisis resulted from the fallibility of the rich, industrialized and developed countries, the LDCs are in the forefront of those bearing the brunt of it. In LDC countries, the economic crisis has also fed into the current food, fuel, climate, debt, development and political crises.

Food crisis

Unprecedented food crises, triggered by soaring food prices and leading to “food riots”, have shaken over 30 LDCs, where workers and peasants have become unable to afford food items basic for survival. Protests over grain prices in Haiti, Cameroon, Senegal, the Ivory Coast, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mauritania and other parts of Africa and a hungry children’s march in Yemen are some examples. According to the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), 22 countries are particularly vulnerable to the recent food price increases, because they are not only very poor but also highly dependent on food imports. In 2008-2009 Eritrea has produced only about 30% of its food requirements. UNICEF warned that higher global food prices could be affecting up to 2 million Eritreans, more than half the population. UN agencies have projected that the 1.3 million people living below the poverty line would suffer most. The FAO has warned that increasing prices have “triggered a food crisis” in 36 countries. According to the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), 12 out of the 16 “hunger hotspot countries” are in the LDCs (Afghanistan, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Guinea, Haiti, Liberia, Mauritania, Nepal, Senegal, Somalia, Uganda, Yemen).

Because the majority of poor people in LDCs spend 70%-80% of their income on food, they are very hard hit by the sharp increases in domestic food prices. The consequences of the food crisis, which the head of WFP has called ‘a silent tsunami’, include widespread misery and malnutrition for millions of people. The food crisis shows that the existing agro-industrial and market-led approach to food security has totally failed to feed hungry people living in LDCs. A variety of other factors, such as the promotion of corporate farming and the introduction of extreme dependence on external food supplies, lack of productive investments in local agricultural systems, global warming, trade imbalances and trade liberalization are also to blame for food insecurity in developing countries. These factors have led to the present crisis, forcing a billion people to go hungry, drastically reducing biodiversity, and nearly ruining the ecosystem.

Food has been declared a basic human right in a series of World Food Summits and international agreements, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the Preamble of the FAO Constitution, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. For nearly two decades, the international community at high-level meetings attended by heads of state and government has repeatedly reaffirmed its commitment to eradicating malnutrition and assuring food security for all. The Rome Declaration on Food Security in 1992, the World Food Summit Plan of Action adopted in 1996 and affirmed at the five-year review conference in 2002 pledged concerted efforts towards eradicating hunger as an essential first step and set a target of halving the number of hungry people by 2015.

The Millennium Summit (2000) and a series of follow-up meetings have reaffirmed commitments to achieving food security and good nutrition for all. Despite the repeated commitments by the world’s leaders on the urgent need to reduce hunger and malnutrition, progress in achieving the targets and indicators under the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) has been extremely disappointing, notwithstanding the great strides that have been made in a number of individual countries. To
date, the human right to food has been continually denied; food is considered more as an item for trade than as an essential good for survival.

Climate crisis

The concerns of LDCs about food, water and energy security are deepened by the climate crisis that challenges the goals of inclusive and environmentally sustainable economic growth. The LDCs, already plagued by poverty, natural disasters, conflicts and geo-political constraints, are now at risk of further devastating impacts of climate change, including increased desertification, rising sea levels, increased rainfall and risk of flooding and hurricanes, which will perpetuate the cycles of poverty, food and fuel crises, conflict, inequality, indebtedness and underdevelopment. Even though the people living in the LDCs are the hardest hit by increased climate change, their concerns are rarely heard and addressed in the official negotiation processes at any level. It is, therefore, important to raise the voice of the climate change victims from the LDCs in the upcoming climate negotiations, including UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen in December 2009 (CoP 15), where it is hoped that agreements can be reached on the principles for a new treaty to replace the Kyoto Protocol.

Official Development Assistance (ODA)

Official Development Assistance (ODA) flows in the LDCs are also predicted to decline as governments in developed countries use resources to provide stimulus to their own economies and continue to bail out financial institutions that have been at the centre of the financial crisis. Since most LDCs continue to be highly indebted, the prospect of reduced aid flows has put pressure on LDC governments to maintain a balance between investing for development and paying back loans, resulting in less resources being directed to development needs. As a result, the LDCs are increasingly facing difficulty in fulfilling the basic economic needs as well as the social and cultural rights of their people.

Remittances and foreign employment

Remittances to the LDCs from people working in other countries are also declining, as migrant workers lose their jobs due to the economic recession in the countries that provided employment. The IMF predicts a drop of between 4% and 8% in 2009. Remittances are particularly important for countries such as Haiti, Lesotho, and Nepal – where they amount to more than 15% of gross national income (GNI). Similarly, the export-oriented industries in LDCs such as garments are scaling down or even stopping production due to the economic downturn.

Declines in remittances have also been felt in Pacific LDCs such as Samoa, Tuvalu and Kiribati due to the effects of slowdown in the labour markets and high unemployment in the source nations, particularly in the USA, New Zealand and Australia. The already high rates of unemployment in the LDCs are likely to increase further in near future, with a subsequent increase in socio-economic conflicts and political unrest. For LDCs that have invested in the establishment of offshore financial markets as a source of government revenue, such as Tuvalu and Kiribati, the value of the investment trust funds they set up is expected to decline as world stock markets remain highly unsettled.

In Senegal, one of the LDCs in Africa, remittances account for up to 10% of GDP. In 2008, they were estimated at close to EUR 1 billion, which is more than 11% of that year’s GDP. The decline in remittances reduces household consumption in many regions along with the level of public works and construction projects. This, together with cuts in government services, has resulted in more hardship and drudgery for women and children, particularly in terms of health, education, livelihood and food security.

Exports

In Afghanistan, major export items such as carpets and lamb skin are now being badly hit by the financial crisis. Exports of carpets fell 25% and exports of the silky lamb skin known as Karakul fell by 20%, according to the Afghanistan Investment Support Agency (export promotion agency). The livelihoods of more than 50% of the people in the Northern provinces depend on the carpet sector. The lamb skin industry has already been badly affected by a year of drought; now the financial burden on farmers is increasing with falling demand for this commodity at the international level.

In Ethiopia, it is reported that this year’s import revenue has declined by USD 803 billion. The Trade and Industry Ministry claimed the current world economic crisis has affected the export market for Ethiopian produce, especially coffee and oil seeds. In many cases, the major producers are the small holding farmers that will directly be affected.

The way forward

The above situation, which is pushing millions of people in the LDCs towards increased poverty and vulnerability, demands immediate and urgent action. In order to overcome the global economic crisis and create an enabling environment for development in the LDCs, it is crucial that the international community and the LDC governments come together to combat the impacts of economic crisis in the LDCs.

This will only be achieved with a fundamental transformation of the global financial architecture. The dramatic failure of the current system not only exposes its inadequacies, but also shines a spotlight on the failure of current approaches to development. For many people living in poverty in LDCs, the current model of economic growth has brought little benefit, if any. In seeking solutions to the problems created as a result of the economic crisis, the following actions are crucial.

- Opening developed country markets to LDC exports without any conditionality is necessary to promote fair trade and support the LDC economies to regenerate and grow. Only 79% of LDC exports enjoy duty-free access to developed country markets as per the 2008 UN MDG Gap taskforce report. Duty-free treatment to 97% of tariff lines of LDC exports (arms and oil excluded), as committed by the 2005 WTO Ministerial Declaration, must be honoured.

- There is an urgent need to transform and restructure the governance of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) in order to promote public accountability and transparency, which must take place in accordance to the needs of the LDCs. Additionally, democratic participation of all countries in the negotiation with the IFIs and monetary institutions, with the UN at the centre, is critical to ensuring a more equitable, democratic and sustainable financial system.

- In order to cope with the economic crisis in the LDCs, all debts must be cancelled immediately, unconditionally and irreversibly. To facilitate this process, there is an urgent need...
to establish a comprehensive process mechanism, which is internationally applicable, transparent and impartial.

- Similarly, equitable mobilization of both domestic and international financial resources is essential in order to achieve sustainable development in the LDCs, particularly focusing on access to basic economic and social infrastructure and social protection. Implementation of the 2001 OECD-DAC recommendations to untie aid to LDCs must not be delayed.\(^5\)

- It is urgent to increase aid flows to the LDCs in order to enable them to cope with the economic crisis and promote development. Despite the 2002 Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development, which urged developed countries to make ‘concrete efforts towards meeting the target of 0.7% of gross national product (GNP) as ODA to developing countries’, and 0.15% to 0.20% of GNP of developed countries to LDCs by 2010 as agreed in the Beijing Platform for Action, several countries seem to have ignored these targets.

- The LDCs need a special stimulus package in the form of grants to combat the impacts of the economic crisis. Failure to introduce such a package will result in a high risk of increased atrocities and gross violations of human rights in the LDCs. In this context, the recommendations advanced by the Commission of Experts set up by the President of the UN General Assembly (known as the ‘Stiglitz Commission’) on reforming the international monetary and financial system are welcome. Additionally, there is a need to create a global reserve system and a global economic coordination council under the UN as part of the fundamental reform of the international financial architecture. Similarly, international commitments must be put into action with immediate effect in order to address the underlying causes of the global economic crisis, and achieve internationally agreed development goals, including the Brussels Programme of Action (BPoA), the MDGs and the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) on Aid Effectiveness in the LDCs. It is pertinent to highlight and draw the attention of international community to the fact that failure to achieve MDGs in the LDCs will result in their overall failure.

**Conclusion**

The globalized world we live in demands new global approaches. If we are to achieve the goals to which we all claim to aspire, we need to make sure that, as we work to mitigate the devastating consequences of this global economic crisis, we use it as an opportunity to bring about real transformation in the global system so that everyone on this planet gets better opportunities to lead meaningful and secure lives. Success will depend on how we address the needs of those amongst us, particularly those living in LDCs, who are facing the greatest challenges.  

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\(^5\) The 2001 DAC Recommendation to untie ODA to LDCs was amended on 15 March 2006, and more recently in July 2008, extending the Recommendation to include non-LDC HIPCs. See: <www.oecd.org/dac/untiedaid>.
Mounting development challenges posed by the world economic crisis: policy options in the Arab region

The global economic crisis comes at a time when countries and citizens in the Arab region have been trying to adjust to wildly fluctuating food and fuel prices. Like other parts of the world, the Arab region is experiencing shrinking economic activity, higher rates of poverty and unemployment, growing demands on social services, further economic insecurity and increasing violations of economic and social rights.

Past economic crises have had disproportionate impacts on the poor, and this one will be no different in that regard. This means further stress on communities that have already been suffering due to climate change and fluctuations in food and energy prices. Arab countries are particularly vulnerable to the fallout from the global crisis since recent gains in human development indicators are fragile and not built on long-term Government policies that would help safeguard their sustainability. Moreover, conflict and political instability are widespread and likely to worsen due to the economic downturn.

Key development challenges facing the region

Rising numbers of people living in poverty

The Arab region witnessed a noticeable reduction in poverty levels from the 1980s to the early 1990s. During the mid 1990s, however, the proportion of people living in poverty – at the most basic USD 1 and USD 2 per day benchmarks – rose and essentially remained stagnant into the 21st century, with only a very gradual decline. Since the population of the region has been steadily growing, the total number of people living in extreme poverty has actually increased.

Moreover, if the poverty threshold is raised a little – for example from USD 1 to USD 2 a day or from USD 2 to USD 3 or 4 a day – the numbers rise substantially. Indeed, raising the poverty line from USD 2 a day to USD 3 a day more than doubles the total number of people living in poverty from 45 million to 92 million. In Egypt, over 70% of the population lives on USD 3 a day or less; this proportion rises to over four out of five if the line is raised to USD 4 a day.2

Measurements related to higher poverty lines do matter, particularly at a time when families across the region have recently had to absorb much higher costs for basic goods, including both food and fuel, which account for a large proportion of their expenditures. UN sources note that, as a result of the food crisis, around 31 million people in the Arab region are hungry (about 10% of the total population). This reflects an increase of 6 million hungry people compared to 1992, including record numbers in Sudan and Yemen, precisely during a period in which overall human development indicators showed continuing improvements. Indeed, the food prices crisis has exposed the vulnerabilities in a region that imports more than 50% of food consumed.

Arab governments implemented a variety of measures in response to the food crisis, often including direct provision of basic foods or increasing subsidies for them. These measures – together with controls on exports – have done little to ensure that prices will not rise considerably in the future or that, more fundamentally, supplies of basic foods will be sufficient. Core issues such as increasing food production, supporting small farmers in selling their products and accessing markets, ensuring poor consumers have access to affordable food and addressing the imbalances in the global trade system and agreements on agriculture have not been adequately addressed.

Persistent and rising inequalities

The high degree of inequalities between countries, as well as sustained inequalities within many countries, is another notable feature of the region that has to be taken into consideration. The increase in wealth in recent years has not translated into equity and, as the privileged have not shared, a good part of the region’s population is currently living in poverty or in poverty’s threshold. Moreover, countries in conflict such as Iraq, Lebanon, the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Sudan have not experienced the consistent growth trends witnessed by many of the other countries in the region.

Chronic unemployment

One of the reasons for the persistent proportion of people living in poverty in the region is chronic unemployment. In fact, even during those years in which economies were growing and individual incomes also seemed to be on the rise, unemployment was high and increasing. Other factors make this one of the major concerns in light of the global crisis, including: (1) the high birth rate and relatively young populations of the region, which means that many new graduates and school leavers enter the labour force with diminishing prospects for work; and (2) the concentration of economic activity in sectors with low job creation capacities, such as real estate and finance.4

At a time of falling output across the globe, the gap between available jobs and numbers in the labour force is likely to increase sharply. The return of nationals who had been working abroad as economic migrants will further swell labour markets, with cutbacks in economic activity in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries having serious repercussions in poorer countries.5 It is therefore important that Governments and other institutions on which poor and vulnerable communities rely – such as families over-
The World Bank has indicated in several of its reports that governments continued to focus on rent from oil exports. How have foreign direct investment (FDI), trade liberalization and privatization as well as liberalization of policy recommendations, cutbacks in government programmes prescribed by institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank that focused on pro-cyclical policy recommendations, cutbacks in government spending, privatization, as well as liberalization of trade, interest policy and exchange rates. At the same time, social policies were increasingly marginalized. In undertaking policy choices and designing measures, governments in non-oil producing countries have increasingly given weight to aid flows, privatization, as well as liberalization of trade, interest policy and exchange rates. The crisis has exposed the fluctuating nature of aid and remittances as well as the limited returns from trade liberalization. These policy options cannot be considered factors of a stable nature on which long-term sustained growth policy is built. Such policy tools should be considered complementary to a more stable policy that needs to be developed in the region, with significant orientation towards giving primacy to supporting intra-regional production cycles and intra-regional trade as well as domestic consumption and production.

**Thematic reports 40 Social Watch**

**We should form an international watchdog coalition to monitor what is going on with the stimulus packages, and be able to have rapid responses if governments do not use this money properly. Rights based approaches to trade and finance must be constructed in order to end the crisis, above all by reconstructing safety nets in the North and South. We don’t want to just “tweak” the economic model in order to fix it, but instead to reconstruct it completely. In order to advocate for this, political moments such as the UN Conference and the World Social Forum must be taken advantage of, in order to bring people and social movements together at this critical time.”**

Tanya Dawkins (Global-Local Links Project, Miami)

**Governments’ economic policy tools and sources of revenue**

Economies in the Arab region have been growing based on rentier and semi-rentier models. They include oil producing countries, where the bulk of GDP and government revenue comes from exports of oil products, and non-oil producing countries, heavily dependent on different kinds of income, mainly remittances, foreign aid and bilateral and multilateral loans.

Since the mid 1980s, Arab governments have enhanced economic reforms triggered by the decline in income due to fluctuating oil prices and related shrinking remittances. Reform measures have also been externally driven, focusing on programmes prescribed by institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank that focused on pro-cyclical policy recommendations, cutbacks in government spending, privatization, as well as liberalization of trade, interest policy and exchange rates. At the same time, social policies were increasingly marginalized. In undertaking policy choices and designing measures, governments in non-oil producing countries have increasingly given weight to aid flows, foreign direct investment (FDI), trade liberalization and remittances, while oil producing countries continued to focus on rent from oil exports. However they have seen increasing budget deficits, and current account deficits in 2008 amounted to 1% of GDP in Egypt, 2.7% in Syria, 13.5% in Lebanon, and 18% in Jordan. The IMF reported a 1-2.6% current account deficit for the Maghreb countries in 2008, which is expected to worsen by 2012. With export opportunities shrinking, budget deficits are expected to increase – especially due to decreasing demand in the European market, which absorbed the highest proportion of exports from the Arab region, and limitations on demand by Gulf countries that absorbed exports from other labour-abundant Arab countries. In addition, revenues from taxes are expected to fall as a result of the crisis, with further falls expected in wages, remittances and government transfers. The resulting diminution in public and private resources puts recent development gains at serious risk, leading to a possible rise in the incidence and depth of poverty and unemployment, unless targeted measures and decisive actions are undertaken.

The crisis has exposed the fluctuating nature of aid and remittances as well as the limited returns from trade liberalization. These policy options cannot be considered factors of a stable nature on which long-term sustained growth policy is built. Such policy tools should be considered complementary to a more stable policy that needs to be developed in the region, with significant orientation towards giving primacy to supporting intra-regional production cycles and intra-regional trade as well as domestic consumption and production.

**Aid and foreign direct investment (FDI)**

For some Arab countries, aid has become a significant proportion of GDP, particularly in countries affected by conflict such as Iraq, Lebanon and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, though amounts fluctuate greatly. The net official development assistance (ODA) given to 22 Arab countries by all donors reached USD 17.1 billion in 2006. This was almost 20% of the total ODA donated by donors to developing countries.

However, this increase has been concentrated in a few countries and tends to reflect the geopolitical and military events in the region and the underlying strategies of the main international actors. Indeed the less developed countries in the region (including Comoros, Djibouti, Mauritania, Somalia and Yemen) received only 25.3% of the ODA received between 2000 and 2006. On the other hand, 46% of the assistance in that period went to Iraq. Overall, Iraq, the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Sudan received 63% of the total assistance. It is evident that there is a clear gap between the orientation of assistance flowing to the region and human development priorities.

With regard to overall FDI, the Arab share during the decade between 1990 and 2000 was only 2.1% (1% between 1990 and 1999). It then increased dramatically from USD 6 billion between 1995 and 1999 to more than USD 24 billion in 2006. Around 34% of countries’ FDI comes from other Arab countries. Between 1996 and 2006, the share of FDI as a percentage of GDP rose from 1% to 1.7% for the whole region (excluding Iraq). In resource-poor and labour-abundant countries, it rose significantly from 2.4% to 8%; in resource-rich, labour-abundant countries it went from 0.2% to 0.9%; and in resource-rich, labour-importing countries it decreased from 0.7% to 0.3%.

These inflows – concentrated in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia, as well as the United Arab Emirates – are being fuelled by the completion of major privatization deals and increased investments in the energy sector. For example, FDI in Egypt increased to USD 6.1 billion in 2006 due to a telecommunications license and privatization in the banking sector. This suggests that FDI flows were not designed according to human development priorities and did not prioritise social added value.

It is reasonable to assume that both ODA and FDI may not be delivered according to previous projections due to the global tightening in budgets. This will mean less investment per person at a time when falling incomes from hydrocarbons and taxes have already resulted in tight budgets. It will also put greater pressure on budgets in poorly resourced and

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8 The World Bank has indicated in several of its reports that the GDP growth in resource-poor and labour-abundant Arab countries has been driven by strong flows of tourism revenues, remittances and increasing FDI.


11 Another large recipient of aid in the region is Egypt: between 2000 and 2006 it received 10% of the ODA to Arab countries from the Development Assistance Committee.

12 ibid.

Trade
Trade liberalization has been one of the major policy recommendations promoted and adopted within the region as a tool for further growth and attraction of FDI. Arab countries have been very active in expanding and deepening trade agreements among themselves and have significantly opened their economies to trade, investment and capital flows with countries in other regions. Yet, despite the many reforms, total trade in 2005 in Arab countries represented only 4% of world trade. Furthermore, despite massive hydrocarbon exports and trade liberalization, the region accounts for only 5.5% of global exports, of which 90% is oil.\(^{14}\)

On the regional front, despite the launch of the Pan-Arab Free Trade Area (PAFTA) in 1997 and the removal of tariffs for the movement of goods between 19 out of 22 Arab countries so far, intra-Arab trade today ranges between 10% and 13% of their overall trade volumes. This is a slight increase from the 9% achieved in 1997. The lack of agreement regarding rules of origin for products that are imported from Bloc 2 to the region is a major obstacle PAFTA currently faces.

As regional and bilateral trade agreements proliferate,\(^{15}\) trade policy tariffs have been significantly reduced in almost all the region’s countries, with most non-tariff barriers eliminated or significantly reduced. Overall, the region ranks second among developing regions on tariff reforms carried out since 2000, trailing behind only Europe and Central Asia.\(^{16}\)

All Arab countries – both oil-exporting and not – will see a shock to trade accounts as a result of the crisis. While the former have been hit by oil price fluctuations and the fall in demand, the latter will see their exports to Europe and countries of the Gulf decreasing due to shrinking demand, and all of them will be forced to limit imports. Together with the higher relative costs of most needed imports such as foodstuffs, the impact on the region’s trade balance will be dramatic.

Remittances
At more than USD 30 billion, remittances constitute a greater inflow than aid to the Arab region, having a huge impact on families and communities. A substantial proportion of low-income households are dependent on them. Resource-poor and labour-abundant countries – including Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Tunisia – saw remittances increase from USD 8 billion in 1996–99 to USD 13.9 billion in 2006.\(^{17}\) Similarly in resource-rich, labour-abundant countries such as Algeria and Syria, remittances increased from USD 1 billion to USD 2.5 billion and USD 0.5 to USD 0.9 billion respectively over the same period.\(^{18}\) In 2007, remittance inflows made up around 9% of GDP in Morocco, 5% in Tunisia and 2.2% in Algeria.\(^{19}\)

The World Bank predicts that remittances, having risen almost 8% in the previous year, will fall in 2009. The size of the fall is hard to gauge, although the worst-case scenario modelled last year predicts a 5% drop in 2009 compared to 2008 and a further fall for 2010.

Social policies
The Arab countries suffer a consistent deficiency in terms of social policies. This is in part a reflection of the lack of satisfactory levels of participation in the process of developing policy responses or rescue schemes by different stakeholders, including civil society organizations. In addition, it reflects the limited capacities official institutions have in developing comprehensive economic and social policies. Affordable, quality social services are lacking, as is access to these services, and the scope of social protection measures that are available for various social groups is limited.\(^{19}\)

Social policy problems in the labour market relate to making available quality social services that are affordable. Another problem is the scope of social protection measures that are available for the different social groups. Comprehensive social policies are necessary to cushion against possible social unrest, especially as governmental responses fall short in curaling the negative impacts of the crisis. Such policies need to extend beyond the regular social safety nets that existed before the crisis, which were often limited to food subsidies, energy subsidies, cash transfers and support for microfinance schemes. Comprehensive social policies also need to encompass the informal sector, which already employs a large segment of the population in the Arab countries and is expected to expand further in light of the crisis.

A persistent lack of coordination and comprehensive policy-making
The diverse capacities and nature of the Arab countries’ economies imply that the responses to the crisis will vary, as well as the timeframes. No cooperation or common responses have been undertaken at the regional level. Overall, there has been no sense of urgency, and a comprehensive vision that pays careful attention to social policies has been lacking.

\(^{14}\) Arab Monetary Fund. Joint Arab Economic Report 2006. Available (in Arabic only) from: <www.amf.org.ae>

\(^{15}\) Currently, six Arab countries are in the accession process to the WTO. While there are obvious advantages to membership in terms of multilateral market access and rules-based protection, terms of accession currently under negotiation undermine development prospects. Most acceding countries are being asked for greater liberalization and implementation commitments than original WTO members had to make.

\(^{16}\) World Bank. op. cit.

\(^{17}\) Ibid.

\(^{18}\) Saif and Choucair. op. cit.

\(^{19}\) Even in a country such as Tunisia, where the social security fund is considered a model one, the Government is facing problems responding to the needs of the newly unemployed as a result of the crisis (Saif and Choucair 2009).
The GCC countries’ responses came more quickly and were more extensive. At the sub-regional level, they agreed to coordinate their fiscal, monetary and financial policies and set in place measures to help ease inter-bank lending rates and add new regulations to their stock markets. At the national level, they relaxed monetary policy and led expansionary fiscal policies in a few sectors. In other countries of the region, responses were sluggish; many governments insisted, at the early stages of the crisis, that their countries were isolated from its impacts. As their fiscal policies gave little room for manoeuvre, these countries were cautious about taking any expansionary policy decisions, and their interventions lacked planning and focused on short-term stabilization.

Moving forward: policy considerations to face the crises

It is evident that Arab governments need to prioritize long-term structural changes while addressing short-term needs in light of the crisis. In doing so, they can add value by (1) working together and capitalizing on their regional capacities and cooperation in facing the crisis; (2) providing the poor and vulnerable communities with greater protection of their economic and social rights; and (3) providing spaces for the active participation of different social partners, including civil society and women’s groups, in drawing up economic and governance frameworks.

This should be an opportunity for Arab governments to review the assumptions behind policy-making processes related to social and economic reform, including revising relations between economy, finance and production and consumption patterns. This requires giving priority to building sustainable development and prioritizing social equity, decent work, gender equality and environmental sustainability. It includes as well supporting stable long-term growth in the productive sectors and developing comprehensive policies to address poverty eradication. Employment creation should be central to short-term and long-term policies, with an emphasis on decent work opportunities in sustainable productive sectors.

As the economic crisis is intertwined with the food and climate crises, responses must address all of them. In the run-up to the Copenhagen negotiations of December 2009, Arab governments should take an effective, more proactive role coordinated with other developing countries. New ways of production and consumption, and trading in an environmentally sustainable way, should be at the core of discussions for reforming the development system.

On social policies

Social priorities, including strengthening automatic macroeconomic stabilizers and social insurance systems, should be determined through the participation and representation of multiple stakeholders, including civil society organizations. Social insurance systems should encourage individuals to work or be recognized for their role in households, families and communities. Furthermore, properly targeted social policy packages should be employed to limit the impacts of rising unemployment and the related incidence and depth of poverty in many communities.

On trade

There is need for assessment and, where necessary, revision of the outcomes from the liberalization undertaken as part of World Trade Organization (WTO) memberships and regional and bilateral free trade agreements. Trade policies should be undertaken within the context of comprehensive development strategies, built on assessments of their sustainability and human rights impacts. Governments should ensure that any continuation of the WTO Doha round guarantees true special and differential treatment for developing countries, including greater access to markets in developed countries by reducing subsidies.

Furthermore, the Arab governments should consider steps to review trade and investment agreements that limit policy space and may be impeding their ability to effectively respond to the crisis, especially in the area of capital flows and the liberalization of financial services.

Intra-regional trade and economic cooperation in general should be conducted on the basis of special and differential treatment and choice by countries; limitations and barriers to enhancing inter-Arab trade and economic cooperation resulting from the overlapping membership of Arab countries in multiple regional economic blocks should be addressed. This includes urgently needed coordination and harmonization of economic integration policies.

On Aid and FDI

Governments should set in place clear policies that allow for directing aid and FDI to areas and sectors that directly contribute to poverty eradication, increased employment opportunities, gender equality and human development priorities.

Furthermore, regional financial resources need to be mobilized towards sustainable development, particularly access to quality basic economic and social infrastructure. Accordingly, Arab countries should work to augment liquidity through regional channels. Regional cooperation arrangements can be particularly effective because of a greater recognition of cross-border externalities and greater sensitivities to the distinctive conditions in neighbouring countries.

On addressing falling government revenues

Arab governments could increase their stable sources of revenues through enhancing a fair, effective and progressive means of taxation. This needs to be complemented by efficient, effective, transparent and accountable public finance management systems and practices through participatory mechanisms. Tax avoidance should be addressed through supporting greater transparency in tax payments, a country-by-country reporting standard for multinational corporations, and a truly multilateral agreement on the automatic exchange of tax information.

On regional cooperation

As the crisis is global in nature, no single country can face its ramifications alone; hence a more collective effort should be pursued in the region, at both governmental and private levels. Re-thinking regional cooperation as a solution to the crisis can give a powerful impulse to building an alternative development project that is more sustainable and equitable. Such cooperation would enable an enhanced coordination of labour policies, amongst other priorities. Within this context, there is need to establish time-bound implementation mechanisms for decisions undertaken at the Arab Economic, Social and Development Summit.20

In light of such orientation, there is a need to revise and reform the mandates and mechanisms of existing regional institutions, including the regional development banks. Such reform should serve towards achieving stronger links between finance and the needs of the real economy.

In conclusion, governments in the Arab region should strengthen their co-ordination, enable citizens to participate in setting development priorities, and orient their social policies to reducing poverty in a sustainable and equitable way. The current convergence of crises presents an opportunity to revise outdated policies and instigate action that will prevent the current crisis from becoming a human catastrophe in the region.

20 This includes implementation of agreed projects, such as the emergency programme on food security and programmes on common railways, water security, a common electricity project, limiting unemployment, implementing the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in the least developed countries in the region, and education and health care.
Europe’s response to the global financial and economic crisis

To be a global player in the response to the crisis, Europe should advocate and work towards an inclusive partnership with all countries, not only the most powerful ones. It should ensure that the measures it puts in place seek to address the needs of all, particularly those most vulnerable to the effects of the crisis, both within Europe and in developing countries. These are the challenges of the new European Parliament and Commission whose mandate coincides with the period between now and 2015, the date for achieving the Millennium Development Goals.

Since the outset of the financial and economic crisis, the European Union has consistently presented itself as a key player in the global response to the crisis and in any reshaping of the global financial architecture. European leaders cite the EU’s achievements of the past 50 years, and its commitment to social justice and solidarity to justify its leading position on the world stage. As Britain’s Prime Minister Gordon Brown argued in the European Parliament on 24 March 2009, the EU is “uniquely placed” to take a lead in the effort to “build a truly global society sustainable for all, secure for all and fair to all”. These words are echoed by other leaders, all of whom accept that the global financial crisis has social and human impacts in all parts of the world, not least in developing countries. Their responses, they say, will fully recognize the needs and realities of developing countries. What this means in practice is already being seen in the way that the EU and its Member State Governments are addressing the crisis and its impact. Despite the clear signs of the systemic failings of current approaches to promoting equitable and sustainable development, there is little sign so far of any commitment to seeking any real change.

Europe’s position towards the global financial architecture

Europe’s leaders readily recognize that there have been failures in the global financial system. It appears, however, that the measures they envisage to address these failures fall far short of a radical transformation of the system. While not all of the EU’s leaders are part of the G-20, there is broad acceptance of the G-20’s leadership in responding to the crisis. The measures adopted at the G-20’s London Summit in April 2009 reflect the EU approach to addressing the economic crisis and reforming the global financial system in order to prevent future crises. These include the recommendation of USD 1.1 trillion in additional funds for the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), of which just a small proportion (USD 50 billion) was designated to “safeguard development in low-income countries.” The USD 1.1 trillion comprises USD 750 billion to the IMF, USD 100 billion to the World Bank and USD 250 billion to shore up global trade. Europe’s leaders, along with others in the G-20, agreed to inject some USD 5 trillion into their economies by the end of 2010 in order to boost their economies and safeguard employment.

The EU position certainly includes a commitment to strengthening financial supervision and regulation, with various levels of support going towards improved monitoring of credit rating agencies, the establishment of regulatory standards to end tax heavens and banking secrecy, the need for new accounting norms for placing bonuses under guardianship.

While some of these measures are welcome – as long as they are sufficiently comprehensive – they do not reflect a commitment to transforming the global financial architecture. On the contrary, they reflect a determination to maintain current structures and approaches intact, and restore stability through better management of current global economic and financial models. It is a response which seeks to ensure that control of any changes rests with the world’s principal economic actors – which includes Europe. Since the G-20 membership is comprised of countries which have substantially gained from the current global system, there is little real incentive for fundamental transformation. And, since the global financial architecture has not only failed to tackle inequalities, but often increased them, there can be little confidence that maintaining the current model will bring the result that Gordon Brown and other European leaders claim.

A truly global and effective response to the crisis should not only involve the most powerful states and large emerging economies, but the global community as a whole, including all developing countries. As argued by the Commission of experts on reforms of the international monetary and financial system, chaired by the economist Joseph Stiglitz, “the welfare of developed and developing countries is mutually interdependent in an increasing integrated economy.” Therefore, “without a truly inclusive response, recognizing the importance of all countries in the reform process, global economic stability cannot be restored, and economic growth, as well as poverty reduction worldwide will be threatened.”

Europe’s lack of willingness to effectively include developing countries in the global effort to address the crisis is reflected in its commitment to the G-20 process rather than to other international fora, notably the United Nations. In general, Europe’s approach has been to confine the role of the UN to addressing the impact of the crisis on developing countries. For European governments the G-20 is the forum in which any changes to the global system will best reflect their interests. The UN Conference on the World and Economic Crisis and its Impact on Development was a conference that most of them did not want.

This preference can also be seen in the lack of any real commitment by European leaders to increase the representation of developing countries in the structures of the IFIs. Despite their agreement, in the framework of the G-20, to allocate USD 750 billion to the IMF to help countries affected by the crisis, this has not been accompanied by a strong commitment to transform the governance system of the IFIs and address their democratic deficit. The G-20 communicated for the reform of the IFI “mandates, scope and governance to reflect changes in the world economy and the new challenges of globalisation”, adding that “emerging and developing economies, including the poorest, should have a greater voice and representation”. Its members reiterated their commitment to implement the package of voice reforms agreed by the IMF board in April 2008, and agreed that “the heads and senior leadership” of the IFIs should be appointed through an “open, transparent, and merit-based selection process”. This is however, far from a commitment to changing the institution towards stronger representation and involvement of developing countries in decision-making.

The majority of public comments and proposals for IMF governance reform are raised by governments from regions of the world that have little real representation. European leaders have been arguing in favour of the status quo. Belgian Finance Minister Didier Reynders told a Reuters interviewer that “for the moment the representation around the table is attractive. European countries are having to finance the Fund very strongly, so we have to take into account the size of each country’s participation in the Fund.” In other words the principle that voting rights should reflect financial contributions should be retained. Changes in governance should only reflect changes in global wealth – if the emerging economies

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contribute financially they can have a say. The poor will remain excluded.

The European position on IMF governance as well as the role of the UN clearly indicates a desire to maintain the architecture of the global financial system almost intact. Governments are certainly using the opportunity to implement changes that strengthen their own economies’ respective positions in the financial system, such as reducing tax havens and banking secrecy, which at the same time allow them to avoid more comprehensive change.

Social impacts of the crisis in Europe

Since its creation in 1957, the European Economic Community (EEC) has brought greater prosperity and improved living conditions to the majority of its citizens. Founded with the integration of the economies of Member States as a central objective, it has progressively evolved into a common European market, involving free flow of goods, services and people.

Parallel to the growth of the market economy, the EEC sought to decrease economic inequalities among regions through subsidies and other forms of aid, promoting social justice and solidarity. European countries generally share a common vision of how to improve the welfare of their citizens; this vision, which has come to be known as the ‘European Social Model’, implies the promotion of full employment, decent work, equality of opportunities, universal social protection and social inclusion.

In recent years, increasing financial deregulation and privatization has put the European Social Model under threat. In this new paradigm the welfare of citizens is increasingly provided by the market rather than the State, resulting in a progressive retreat of the state from several social and economic spheres. Although the market economy has successfully contributed to improved living conditions for the majority of European citizens, it has also brought problems. This is well illustrated by the deregulation and privatization of the pension systems. To address the increased strains in the public pension system, many European states resorted to privatization and liberalization. Citizens were encouraged to rely more on private pension funds, which, in turn, depend on the vicissitudes of the market. Before the crisis, pension funds were doing well, as the value of their assets steadily increased. Collectively pension funds have become substantial players in the equity market. However, the current economic and financial crisis has substantially reduced the value of many pension funds, jeopardizing the future pensions of many Europeans.

The economic recession resulting from the crisis further threatens Europe’s approach to social welfare. The EU has forecast a 4% recession in 2009 in the Euro zone and estimates indicate that 8.5 million people in the EU will lose their jobs in 2009–10. This translates into an unemployment rate of 11.5% in 2010, its highest level since the Second World War. The crisis also has a significant impact on public budgets. Public deficits in the Euro zone are expected to reach 5.3% in 2009 and 6.5% in 2010. 2

What is Europe’s response? From the outset of the crisis the European Commission and its Member States have taken a variety of measures to counter the effects of the economic downturn, largely through recovery plans and rescue packages. The bulk of these have focused on the financial sector. In April 2009 the EU indicated that the cost of measures approved by the Commission to support financial institutions amounts to an estimated EUR 3 trillion. This figure encompasses the overall amount of guarantees (up to EUR 2.3 trillion), recapitalization schemes (EUR 300 billion) and rescue and restructuring support for individual banks and financial institutions (about EUR 400 billion). 3

The logic of support to the financial sector is that state guarantees and recapitalizations will allow banks to make more loans available, thus stimulating an increase in investment, which is expected to create and maintain jobs. It is by no means clear, however, that devoting such large amounts of public resources to support the banking system will serve the needs of the majority of citizens. There are many reasons for scepticism. First, banks are being funded and supported by contributions from taxpayers, who are themselves less secure due to the economic downturn. Second, most of the measures seek to increase the availability of credit, through the provision of EUR 2.3 trillion of state guarantees. With the same objective, the European Central Bank has lowered its interest rate to a historically low level of less than 1%. Yet loose credit policy helped create the conditions for the financial breakdown in the first place. It is ironic that taxpayers, many of whom are suffering heavily from the crisis, are providing money to failing institutions, and to many of the senior managers within them, that contributed to the collapse of the system.

The growing unemployment crisis argues that more emphasis be given to addressing the social impacts of the crisis. Measures to integrate those who are excluded from the labour market, invest in social and health services and improve social protection systems are needed. Yet the scale of the state-funded stimulus packages and the substantially increased public budget deficits of European governments severely reduce the ability to fund social welfare schemes and investments in social services, not just in the short term but for the foreseeable future.

One casualty of the crisis was an extraordinary European Council Meeting on employment that would have involved labour ministers of all EU Member States, replaced by a meeting of the so-called “social troika” (Czech Republic, Sweden and Spain), the EC and social partners. This “downgrading” of the employment summit was not seen as a positive message to those losing their jobs as a direct consequence of the crisis. As John Monks, President of the European Trade Union Confederation, stated, the renunciation “gives the impression that European policy-makers are not sufficiently concerned about unemployment.” 4

The crisis has triggered unexpected reactions among European policy makers. Those who were promoting unfettered free market policies before the crisis are now actively seeking to secure State bailouts. Competition Commissioner Neelie Kroes, known as a fervent promoter of free market policies, said that “the past six months have shown that State aid control plays a key role in tackling the challenges of the economic crisis in a coordinated way across Europe (…). The responsibility now lies with the financial sector to clean up their balance sheets and restructure to ensure a viable future”. In this framework, state intervention is no longer considered an obstacle to development and economic growth. On the contrary, it is largely agreed that States have the responsibility to address the current recession through active intervention in the market. This paradigm shift suggests that when benefits and growth are secure, the State is encouraged to retreat, while in recessions, State intervention is encouraged as the necessary solution. In other words, profits remain private and losses are socialized. This is in clear contradiction to the principles of social justice and solidarity based on the idea that profits and losses should be shared equally.

At another level, the crisis may have triggered increased “Europeanism”. An EC poll from mid-January to mid-February 2009 indicates that nearly two-thirds of the EU population believed that Europeans would be better protected if Member States adopted a coordinated approach, while only 39% believed that existing coordination was sufficient. 5 This suggests broad agreement that cooperation at EU level is necessary to tackle the financial crisis.

Recent electoral results in Iceland suggest that feelings of greater Europeanism are not limited to EU citizens. After the country was nearly bankrupt, Icelanders elected a wide margin a president who favours joining the EU. Commission President Barroso argues that acting alone, countries like Ireland, Britain, France or Germany have much fewer instruments to cope with the crisis than if they act together:

2 The EEC was created in 1957 to bring about economic integration (including a single market) among Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. It was enlarged later to include six additional states and, from 1967, its institutions also governed the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom or Euratom) under the term European Communities. When the European Union (EU) was created in 1993, the EEC was transformed into the European Community; one of the EU’s three pillars, with EEC institutions continuing as those of the EU.


Europe’s role in promoting development

The EU is also claiming leadership in efforts to mitigate the social effects of the crisis in developing countries. As EC President Barroso argued, “Europe has taken the lead in ensuring that the G-20 lays foundations for a fair and sustainable recovery for all, including developing countries.” However, there is an asymmetry between EU measures to address the effects of the crisis internally and those to help developing countries to do so, as shown by the funds injected into European economies compared to funds available to help developing countries. This asymmetry is also seen in its support to the IMF, which has imposed strong conditionality on loans to poor countries, preventing them from implementing counter-cyclical economic policies to address the crisis.

As export revenues, foreign investment flows and remittances fall sharply, developing countries are hard hit by the global financial and economic crisis. The World Bank estimates that developing countries may face a financing gap of USD 270 to USD 700 billion and as many as 53 million people are likely to fall into poverty in 2009. Bank president Robert Zoellick, speaking in London on the eve of the G-20 meeting, said that an estimated “200,000 to 400,000 babies will die this year because of the drop in growth”.

The UN estimates that funding necessary to mitigate the effects of the crisis might be as much as USD 1 trillion. Yet many developing countries have limited fiscal space to react to the crisis, making external support critical.

Although Europe recognizes that developing countries will face a crippling financing gap, its commitments to official development assistance (ODA) remains insufficient. With almost EUR 50 billion disbursed in 2008, aid volumes are meagre compared to resources injected into European economies to safeguard banks and boost growth. In April 2009, EU governments had committed EUR 3 trillion to support financial institutions through guarantees or cash injections. If this level of finance can be made available so quickly to support financial institutions, it is difficult to understand why European governments are unable to increase their aid budgets.

In May 2009, EU Member States confirmed their intention to meet their collective promise to allocate 0.56% of EU GNP in 2010 and 0.70% of EU GNI in 2015 in ODA. Yet Ireland, Italy, Latvia and Estonia have already slashed their aid budgets as an outcome of the crisis.

At the same time the EC has proposed speeding up aid delivery by “frontloading” a significant portion of financial transfers to developing countries, amounting to EUR 4.3 billion in 2009. This includes EUR 3 billion delivered in the form of budget support, EUR 800 million for the food facility and EUR 500 million through an ad hoc FLEX mechanism designed to help the most vulnerable countries. However, this would not consist of new finance, suggesting that if agreed, there would be less funding available in future years. In addition, Member States who will have to provide the resources are already resisting.

Parallel to their aid commitments, European countries have contributed some USD 100 billion to the USD 1.1 trillion extra money for the IFIs. The USD 50 billion provided to safeguard development in low-income countries does not appear to be accompanied by any greater flexibility in fiscal and monetary policies to access IMF loans. Despite the recent “modernization” of IMF conditionality policies, the same old recipes of tight fiscal discipline and cuts in government spending seem to apply. In that context the ability to invest in the social sector remains low.

Once again there is a clear contradiction between the counter-cyclical policies applied within Europe and the fiscal constraint imposed on developing countries. If Europeans think that expansionary financial and monetary policies are the way out of the crisis, why do they promote the exact opposite policies in poorer countries?

The crisis, a means to further Europe’s interest?

Another impact of the crisis on Europe’s relation with developing countries appears to be the acceleration of controversial measures such as budget support and the conclusion of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs).

Budget support

Recognizing that poorer economies are in urgent need of external finance as a result of the crisis, the EC ‘frontloading’ proposals envisages increased use of budget support, including some USD 500 million from the 10th European Development Fund to support African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries hardest hit by the crisis. The EC also indicated it would review ongoing budget support operations in most vulnerable countries in order to assess possibilities for frontloading disbursements. The Commission’s argument in favour of budget support is that it is a quick impact instrument allowing long-term predictable financing for government expenditure including in social sectors such as education and health.

However, budget support raises a number of concerns. First, internal capacity and opportunity to monitor budgets and resource allocation, which is critical for democratic accountability, is lacking in most countries. The use of international accountancy firms to monitor implementation increases the tendency for budget support to increase governments’ accountability externally, undermining internal “ownership” and democratic accountability through national parliaments. Second, the EC has identified a number of conditions that should be met before budget support is considered, including democracy and respect for human rights. However, studies of a number of budget support agreements find little evidence of any comprehensive assessment being made of these conditions being in place.

Finally, the EC includes budget support in its calculations to meet a legal requirement established on the insistence of the European Parliament to use 20% of its aid for basic health and education, even though the OECD/DAC, which manages the classification system of development aid, considers that budget support should be classified separately from allocations to the health and education sectors.

Verena Winkler (Eurostep, Belgium)

“...When we look at the welfare state and social protection systems the capacity of the EU Member States to address the rising demand for social security varies greatly. Thus in some cases we have increased social and unemployment benefits, extension of coverage for unemployment as well as social benefits, tax rebates or exemptions for specific groups including pensioners. On the other hand, other States are cutting back benefits. Hungary is reducing subsidies and private sector wages, as well as cancelling pension expenditure plans, and Finland is also expecting a reduction in social service spending. To offset the effect on the labor market, some countries also try to pursue active employment policies by maintaining workers through flex time, but despite these efforts the effects are still very drastic.”

Verena Winkler (Eurostep, Belgium)
**EPAs**

The establishment of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), creating free trade regimes between the EU and ACP countries, is one of the major controversial elements of the Cotonou agreement. EPAs are intended to replace preferential trade agreements under the Lomé conventions which were held to be incompatible with WTO rules on barriers to trade. Originally EPAs were due to have been in place by the beginning of 2008, but in mid-2009 they remain a source of considerable contention.\(^\text{16}\)

The EC has always portrayed EPAs as development agreements, a claim that their terms belie. First, they are likely to result in an important loss of custom tariffs for many ACP countries, for which the EU is often the main trade partner. Second, ACP countries often lack the infrastructure needed to compete in an open market economy. Aid for adjusting to EPAs or ‘aid for trade’ has been projected as an addition to the original financial envelope provided by the Commission, but analysis indicates that much of this will not be additional. Third, the inclusion of areas of trade on which there is no agreement, such as services and procurement, will open up areas of the economy of ACP countries to EU companies.

Despite these concerns, the EC argues that in the current crisis, EPAs will contribute to promoting economic growth and development in partner countries. João Aguiar Machado, one of the Commission’s chief EPA negotiators, explains that the agreements would support development by creating a predictable trade environment which, in turn, would spur investment and create employment. In order to reassure distrusting ACP governments, Trade Commissioner Catherine Ashton recognized the need for greater flexibility in the negotiations and promised that the negotiation of full EPAs will reflect and respect the regional specificity of the parties to that agreement. However, in her speech to the Joint Parliamentary Assembly in Prague in April 2009, she expressed her wish that an agreement acceptable to all parties would be reached quickly and that all interim EPAs would be signed before the end of the current Commission in October 2009. With EPA negotiations having been deadlocked for so long, it seems that the urgency to address the effects of the financial and economic crisis is being used as an opportunity to accelerate the process and increase pressure on ACP governments to concede.

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\(^{16}\) In June 2009, only the CARIFORUM countries (15 countries in the Caribbean) have signed a full EPA, and only Botswana, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Lesotho and Swaziland have signed interim EPAs.
Peoples’ Voices on the Crisis*

On 20 June 2009, at the Church of the Holy Trinity in New York, the “Peoples’ Voices on the Crisis” initiative, brought together activists from over 30 civil society organizations, trade unions and grassroots groups on a local, national and international level to discuss the social and environmental consequences of the financial and economic crisis for working and unemployed women and men all over the world. At the event, advocates for social, economic, gender, labor and environmental rights offered testimonials on how the crisis is impacting local communities from Sudan to San Salvador to the South Bronx.

This forum was also an opportunity for civil society leaders to share ideas and experiences on how to construct a global movement with local roots that can push for a new economic system based on human rights and environmental sustainability. “Peoples’ Voices on the Crisis” was held in the context of the landmark UN Conference on the Financial and Economic Crisis and its Impacts on Development, which was the first truly multilateral forum to address the social impacts of the current financial meltdown. The keynote speaker of the “Peoples’ Voices” event was Father Miguel D’Escoto Brockmann, President of the 63rd Session of the UN General Assembly, who welcomed civil society’s support for the solutions to the crisis taking shape in the heart of the UN, and exhorted the participants to “inject a new spirit of responsibility and solidarity” with the people who are being disproportionately impacted by the crisis. The event concluded with a call by Social Watch Coordinator Roberto Bissio to advocate for reforms to the current global financial architecture that would help lift people out of poverty, instead of reinforcing current economic and social inequalities both within and across borders.

Disseminated throughout the Thematic Chapter of the Social Watch Report 2009 you have been reading key interventions from participants in this activity, together with some testimonials of the impact of the crisis in ordinary people the Social Watch network gathered in countries of the South.


Video clips from “Peoples’ Voices on the Crisis” are available from the Social Watch YouTube channel: <www.youtube.com/SocWatch>.
NATIONAL REPORTS
**Outside the system but, safe from the crisis?**

The weakest aspect of Algeria’s economy is its heavy dependence on the production and export of hydrocarbons. Although this sector is highly developed, the financial sector has lagged far behind and become disconnected from global finance. Paradoxically, this backwardness prevented the banking system from becoming ensnared in the international financial crisis. Even so, the crisis will infect the country through imports of goods and services.

The breakdown of the US financial markets began during the summer of 2007. By autumn of 2008, the world was in the throes of a full-fledged financial crisis, with credit access drying up, stock markets plunging, and the entire international financial system threatened with collapse. Directly or indirectly, every country in the world has felt the impact, including Algeria.

The President blames the global economic crisis partly on the absence of financial regulation and inadequate efforts to clean up the economic environment, which had been abandoned to the law of the markets. In highlighting financial and economic traps to be avoided, the worldwide financial crisis should constitute a lesson for Algeria. Whether based on economic foresight or other considerations, Government directives have protected the national interest and limited the exposure of Algeria’s economy and finances to the dangerous imbalances that the imposition of neo-liberalism has created in the global financial system.

This strong position is partly the result of the country’s oil wealth, the mainstay of its economy. Chakib Khelil, Minister of Energy and Mining and current President of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) has observed that the oil market has experienced a spectacular evolution, influenced by structural volatility that is heightened by speculators.¹ The price of a barrel of oil in the OPEC basket rose beyond USD 140 in July 2008, and has since then tumbled to USD 59. The annual average price for 2008 up to 4 November was USD 103.56, compared to USD 65 in 2007. An Algerian barrel fetched USD 108.28, up from USD 71.13 in 2007.

As the table indicates, Algeria’s economy is well positioned to withstand the global financial and economic crisis, at least for the next two years. This cushion can be credited to the country’s limited exposure to international financial markets, prudent management of foreign exchange reserves (realized profit reached 4.6% in 2007), husbanding of a substantial proportion of revenue growth (an average of 20% of GDP in 2005-2007), and use of a structural surplus in domestic liquidity to finance the economy in local currency.

The need for reform

After a brief inter-governmental debate, efforts to transfer control of Crédit Populaire and the Bank for Local Development (BDL) to financial institutions in the US or France were dropped because officials decided the country was not prepared for a foreign takeover. To the extent that the economy has been liberalized and privatized, the anticipated benefits have not materialized.²

In September 2008 Sid Saïd, a leader of the General Union of Algerian Workers, announced that the Government had abandoned its “everything can be privatized” policy. The 220 public enterprises awaiting privatization as soon as new regulatory measures were implemented were cut from the list of companies to be sold. In addition, the Government’s inter-ministerial council applied in January 2008 on bank credit and financial clean-up of public economic institutions by erasing the debts owed them by viable companies. The Government has given responsibility for supervising these clean-up measures to an inter-ministerial working group for the finance industry and investment promotion among small and medium enterprises.

Rural revitalization

Thanks to natural population growth averaging 1.62%, annually — up considerably from an already high 1.48% in 2000 — the number of the country’s inhabitants swelled by 4.6 million between July 1998 and 1 July 2007. By the end of 2010, the population will reach 35.7 million. To feed this young and rapidly growing population, Algeria needs more food.

Algeria’s waters have a biomass of 600,000 tonnes, which would allow an annual catch of 220,000 tonnes; however, a lack of material resources has limited the annual harvest to 170,000 tonnes.³

The country has a negative agricultural trade balance, and is one of the world’s top ten food importers. Farm produce accounts for more than 20% of the country’s total imports. By value, the three main components are cereals and their by-products (40%), milk and other dairy products (14.3%) and oils and fats (10.5%).⁴

Spending on imported cereals and their by-products, drugs, milk and dairy products jumped to USD 2,600 million during the first half of 2008, up from a bit over USD 2,000 a year earlier. Spurred primarily by a 9.2% increase in the price of food, inflation reached 4.9% in the first half of 2008, though it was up only 2.5% for the entire year (June 2007–June 2008). In an attempt to temper price volatility, the Government launched

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1. Chakib Khelil, Minister of Energy and Mining, President of OPEC, during a forum organised by El-Moudjahid 3 March 2009.


a regulatory system in July 2008. Since then, it has stored about 51,700 tonnes of potatoes.

To revitalize rural areas, which house a substantial proportion of the population, the Government has launched a multi-pronged development plan based on the following three elements:

- Improvements in the living conditions of the rural population, including the rehabilitation and modernization of villages and ksours (Berber villages throughout the oases).
- Diversification of rural economic activity to increase incomes, while protecting and increasing the value of natural resources, as well as both material and nonmaterial aspects of rural heritage.
- Building human resources through technical assistance. Almost all farming is private, with various forms of ownership. Traditionally, most farmers have been engaged in cultivating dry cereals and breeding small ruminants, however in recent years, some have begun sowing crops with higher value added, such as fruits and vegetables. With the exception of industrial tomatoes and olive oil, production of industrial crops remains limited.

In another effort to stimulate rural revitalization, the Government has initiated more than 5,000 local development projects benefiting more than 2 million households – which amount to nearly 8 million people.

The national highway plan for 2005-2025 produced by the Ministry of Public Works includes a 1,216 km-long network of east-west motorways connecting Annaba and Tlemcen. This will benefit 24 wilayas (provinces) and generate 100,000 construction jobs. The project is scheduled to begin in 2009.5

**Conclusion**

For at least a decade, two factors have had a powerful impact on Algeria’s economy and finance. One is a hydrocarbon policy that has promoted development of the country’s resources, leading to an increase in production capacity — oil production jumped from 0.9 million barrels a day in 2000 to 1.4 million in 2008, of which 1.2 million barrels were exported.6 The other is unprecedented State support for public banks — 2.6% of the average annual GDP for the 1991-2002 period and 1.7% for 2005-2006 — within a context of monetary and financial reform.7 These two polices brought a massive increase in foreign exchange reserves, robust income regulation funds, a surfeit of bank liquidity and a low level of foreign debt.

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7 Intervention by Prof. Farid Yaciri: “The effects of the crisis on the Algerian economy”, Seminar organized in collaboration with the Ministry of Industry and Investment Promotion.
ARGENTINA

New context, old policies

Inflation, poverty and indigence levels are far higher than official statistics indicate. Measures taken to combat the imminent economic crisis should be designed to diminish the concentration of resources and inequality. This would require an agenda that includes social policies that reverse the dynamics of exclusion the country has endured in recent decades and create a citizenship based on individual and social rights. Sustaining these social policies will require ensuring access to reliable official information – a significant change from what has been provided lately.

Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales (CELS)

Without a doubt, the global financial crisis will soon hit Argentina, raising several questions: What policies are being proposed to mitigate the impending increase in poverty? Are the post-crisis policies of 2001, which have been sustained in a context of economic growth, still in effect? And, finally, what are the chances that current narrowly targeted national programmes to ameliorate exclusion, poverty and indigence (income transfers, for example) will be abandoned in favour of universal policies?

The 1990s were a period of economic, political and social transformation in Latin America. This was particularly true in Argentina, which implemented the policies dictated by international credit institutions more rigorously than any other country. At the same time, in the space of a few years the country transformed its economic system, regulatory framework and social security coverage; privatised its public services; abandoned State responsibility for a number of concerns and services; and adopted a concept of social policy that ignored human rights.

Contrary to the expectations of the initiators of these policies, unemployment, poverty, indigence and inequity rose steeply. In late 2001, in the midst of an acute institutional and economic crisis the Government fell; the country abandoned currency convertibility, which had been maintained for a decade. In October 2002 57.2% of the population was living in poverty; this includes 27.5% who were indigent.2

Although signs of economic recovery emerged after 2003, according to government figures (which are currently unreliable), 17.8% of the population was still below the poverty line in the first half of 2008, and 5.1% was indigent.3 Private and independent reports estimate that more than 30% of the population remained below the poverty line in 2008 – about 12 million people; while 10% (about 4 million) were indigent.4

The elevated level of poverty is particularly alarming at a time when the era of economic growth appears to be ending and the international crisis is making its way to Argentina. Social vulnerability is high. The greatest threat is inflation – which unofficial estimates calculate at four times the official figure. If the cost of the basic food basket outpaces wage increases, the narrow margin that separates many households from poverty will quickly disappear.

Unemployment

Between 2003 and 2007 the unemployment rate dropped by more than a third; during the fourth quarter of 2008 it was 7.5%.5 Underemployment also fell significantly, to 9.1%. While welcome, these improvements are less heartening than they might appear at first glance. Many of the newly employed work in the informal sector; although unregistered employment has fallen from 47% of the workforce in the first quarter of 2003 to 37.8% in the final quarter of 2008, this is still an extremely high level. It means that four out of ten wage earners are excluded from labour regulations and public policies that promote indirect wage payments (such as increases in family allowances, regulations on benevolent funds, retirement schemes, etc.). Independent researchers estimate that only 125,000 people are collecting unemployment insurance out of the 1,200,000 who the Government officially reports are unemployed. The majority are discouraged, among other things, by the low benefit rate, which barely equals 20% of the average current salary. It should also be noted that gender inequities in the labour market persist, and the Government has done nothing to remove them.6

Access to information

The country’s economic distress is exacerbated by the failure of the Government’s National Institute of Statistics and Surveys (INDEC) to produce and disseminate reliable information on employment, poverty and inflation and other sensitive topics. This makes it difficult to develop a realistic analysis of the social situation and to design appropriate policies. The statistical user bases for the Permanent Household Survey and the Household Expenditure Survey, which are essential for analysing inequalities in household income, as well as the socioeconomic characteristics of households, are no longer made public. Other Government agencies are similarly unhelpful. The website of the Information, Monitoring and Evaluation System for Social Programmes (SIEMPRO) was suspended for a lengthy period; the relaunched site does not contain complete information. Other official websites do not provide current data, which makes it difficult to analyse social policies.

Inevitably, in the absence of good official data, alternative measurements have proliferated. They reveal, among other things, that levels of inflation, poverty and indigence are far higher than the official statistics indicate.

Government solutions

Since the 2002 crisis, Argentina’s social policies can be grouped in two broad categories: policies aimed at workers in the formal labour market and policies designed to assist the rest of the population through social programmes that transfer income.

Aside from wage increases, the policies targeting workers in the formal labour market have also included reforms of social security and family

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1 Written by Pilar Arcáducono and Laura Rojo, director and member of the Programme for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights at the Centre for Legal and Social Studies (CELS), and Facundo Capurro Robles, member of CELS. Our thanks to Gustavo Gammali (University of Buenos Aires).
3 INDEC (2008).
4 La Nación, 4 March 2008.
5 “Seguro de desempleo: lo piden pocos y está desactualizado”. Clarín, 9 March 2009.
6 Ibid.
allowances, along with incentives for employment registration and other measures. This approach appears to be grounded in a growing confidence in the market as a focal point for integration and the preferred mechanism for meeting individual and social needs, supplemented by a series of “temporary” policies.

Income transfer programmes for sectors outside the formal labour market experiencing various types of “vulnerability” include the Unemployed Heads of Household Plan (PJJHD), established in response to the economic crisis and high level of social conflict during final years of currency convertibility. This programme focuses on providing direct monetary aid (about USD 40 per beneficiary). It is billed as “guaranteeing the family right to social inclusion”, which is understood to mean ensuring that children attend school, that people can get health care, that recipients participate in the formal education system and/or labour training activities that will contribute to their future employment, and that they have an opportunity to participate in productive projects or community service, in accordance with the method of “compensation”.  

One of the plan’s major achievements has doubtless been its success in assisting large numbers of people within a short period of time. The PJJHD began operations in June 2003, and reached 1,992,497 people. In November 2007 it had 795,274 recipients on its rolls. Since then, the number of beneficiaries has dropped, due to rising employment, young people aging out as they passed their 19th birthday, and the transfer of many beneficiaries to other social programmes, such as the Families for Social Inclusion Programme (PF).

In March 2006, during the period of economic growth, the Government introduced a training and employment insurance plan for recipients of PJJHD aid who were considered “employable” or on the way to becoming so, however only 32,000 recipients joined the programme in its first 12 months. The PF was created within the orbit of the Ministry of Social Development to provide for people considered “unemployable”, particularly women with children or who might give birth. According to official data, 504,784 families were in the programme by August 2007. Benefits to these families varied according to the number of children in the household below the age of 19, and disabled people of any age in their care. The basic benefit is 155 Argentine pesos (USD 42) and may be as much as 305 pesos (USD 82) if the family includes six minors. Mothers with seven or more children are eligible for a pension of 390 pesos (USD 105).

Despite the scale of these programmes, they are hardly responsible for the drop in poverty and indigence percentages between 2002 and 2007. Their contributions can at best be characterized as “relief”, rather than a strategy to “overcome” poverty. Above all, in the shadow of the international crisis, the persistent and intractable nature of the situation makes it truly alarming. Although PJJHD has far fewer recipients than it did during 2001-02 crisis, their numbers are still significant for a country that has experienced considerable economic growth. Furthermore, at this point access to both PJJHD and PF is only available to people who obtain a court order. For many sectors, universal coverage is only a dream.

Need for universal social policies

Increases in employment and income have been largely confined to the formal labour market. The State has created and maintained macroeconomic conditions that have spurred an economic revival and supplemented this resurgence by introducing a variety of policies and actions such as a minimum wage, aimed at boosting the incomes of wage-earners in the formal sector. The position of these workers has improved over what it was under the policies pursued in the 1990s. However the persistence of a high level of unregistered employment, poverty and indigence diminishes the impact of measures aimed at formal workers and increases the disparity between the two sectors.

This gap is accentuated by income transfer programmes. For example, workers within the formal labour market receive a family allowance (AARF) per child. Those not eligible include workers in the informal economy, self-employed workers, unemployed workers who are not unemployment insurance beneficiaries (such as those who benefit from social plans), domestic workers, migrants, persons deprived of their freedom or persons who are institutionalized due to mental health problems. Thus, the 2001 National Population Census found that 70% of all children were excluded. Although it should be noted that the aim of the family allowance was not to cover each child directly, but to encourage family growth and promote an increase in the number of formal wage earners. A child whose father or mother is outside the formal labour market, as a self-employed worker or as a beneficiary of a social programme, should benefit from these programmes as well.

Similar discrimination is evident in income transfer social programmes. The PF provides mothers with 45 pesos (USD 12) per child, while a child who is lucky enough to have two parents in the formal work sector may receive as much as 100 pesos (USD 27) through the family allowance system.

The new scenario

It is possible that the international crisis may be sparking a “rediscovery” of poverty and open a window of opportunity for discussion of universality. In an encouraging sign, a range of political sectors have proposed income transfer plans for children, with a variety of benefit levels and various degrees of “universal”. So far, they have been discussed only in parliamentary committees; none have reached the full Congress. However, the province of Buenos Aires, the most significant in the country in terms of both political influence and population, is gradually implementing a “universal” benefit policy.

Although the universal policies suggested so far will not solve the problem of poverty and exclusion, they could generate a social policy appropriate to the socio-economic context and the changes in the labour market. This will only happen if policymakers pay attention to the transformations the economy has undergone in recent years and avoid policies appropriate to other contexts, such as a full-employment economy.

The conclusion is obvious: during the economic recovery, the State has not substantially modified the country’s high concentration of income and extreme inequality. A transformation agenda should be based on the principle that social policy is essential to the construction of citizenship based on respect and the enhancement of individual and social rights. Universal policies could provide an effective strategy for overcoming the exclusionary dynamics of recent decades. Formulating them will only be possible if the public has access to reliable and extensive government data on socio-economic conditions.

7 Decree Nº 565/02 2002.
8 According to Ministry of Labour, Employment and Social Security information, in December 2008 the total number of employment programme beneficiaries amounted to 970,000. However, in establishing a non-differentiated benefit for every unemployed head of household, the PJJHD did not make any distinction regarding the composition of the family group. Thus, the larger number of people in the household, the smaller the impact of the benefit. It also lacked any administrative and/or judicial means of making claims. Although many appeals on the grounds of unconstitutionality have been submitted, the results are not encouraging, either with regard to changing public policy, or in terms of promoting dialogue and interaction. See: Pilar Arcidiácono and Laura Royo, “More market and fewer rights: the State’s response to the housing crisis”. Social Watch Report 2007.

10 INDEC (2007).
The impact of globalization on Bahraini people

The Bahrain’s economy is growing, along with per capita income. However, along with the increasing numbers of millionaires the middle class is shrinking and the lower class is becoming impoverished. There are increasing confrontations and tension between the impoverished groups and security forces. A strategy to shield society from the negative impacts of globalization is urgently needed.

Bahrain traditionally has had an open economy for trade, investment and exchange. Since its independence in 1971, the country has been a financial hub for international banks and financial institutions, joint Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) ventures and a transit spot for trade and commodities. It has been a member of the World Trade Organisation since 1997, removing barriers to trade and investment and the movement of labour. Bahrain signed a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the US which facilitates trade, investment and labour movement between the two countries. As a member of the GCC, Bahrain is negotiating with the European Union (EU) regarding a FTA and recently hosted an ASEAN-GCC conference which debated the prospects of concluding an FTA between the two economic groups.

Like many other countries, Bahrain has been influenced positively and negatively by globalization. This report will concentrate on the impact of globalization on the well-being of Bahraini residents and consider this from a number of angles:

Liberalization of the economy
The Government has been steadily pursuing economic liberalization, which means less and less state involvement in running the economy. This has in inevitably led to the State abandoning certain essential services it previously rendered to its citizens. It has also led to the opening of the market to competition between local and foreign companies. Furthermore, the reduction of restrictions on foreign residents has resulted in their occupying jobs traditionally limited to Bahrainis, such as legal counselors and auditors.

Privatization
In attempting to maintain pace with globalization and to be able to compete in an open market, the Government has resorted to privatizing a number of state institutions and services, including electricity and public transport. In addition, it has increasingly opened other sectors to private control, such as education, health care services, municipal services, administration of ports and air transportation.

Housing
The Government has increasingly lifted restrictions on the acquisition of real estate by foreign residents, especially for GCC citizens, which has led to a rise in ownership of land and property in residential areas. Bahrainis now find themselves at a disadvantage in terms of purchasing power compared to other GCC citizens. This has led to an acute housing crisis: the demand for state-subsidized housing is surpassing supply and there is currently a backlog of some 60,000 applications. As a result, many families have been obliged to move back into extended family accommodations, many of them congested and poorly equipped to deal with overcrowding.

Employment
Due to the lax policy control on the flow of foreign workers, especially cheap labour, Bahraini job seekers are in a weak position when competing for jobs that require specific educational backgrounds and skills. Foreign workers are also more willing to accept lower salaries and tougher working conditions. So, despite increased employment opportunities generated by a growing economy, unemployment is growing among Bahraini citizens, especially among women and those whose educational qualifications (e.g., liberal arts or sociology degrees) are not well matched with the new jobs.

Inflation
The inflation rate has increased steadily, exceeding 7% annually for the last few years. There has been no substantial concurrent increase in salaries, especially in the public sector. In view of this, Parliament agreed in December 2008 to a BD50 (USD 133) allowance/bonus to Bahraini families annually, for the next two years. However, this does little to alleviate the impact of inflation for most workers, including the low-income foreign residents who are in the same situation, with wages falling to keep pace with inflation. The disparity between a minority with very high incomes and a majority with very low incomes is increasing. There are some Bahraini families who are living on BD 120 per month (USD 319). Although the Government denies that they are facing difficulties, many families have been obliged to move back into extended family accommodations, many of them congested and poorly equipped to deal with overcrowding.

Changing social fabric
The steady increase in foreign workers, especially from Asia, over the last decade has resulted in the growth of the expatriate population from 37% of the total in 2001 to 50% in 2007, altering the fabric of society. Foreign workers tend to live in work camps, isolated from indigenous communities, in derelict areas of town and in small groups adjacent to indigenous communities. There is, in general, little integration of these workers into the public arena, in social activities and in NGOs. Moreover, the majority of these workers live alone, with no family, which
is viewed as a departure from the social norm and has caused friction between the two communities, especially those adjacent to each other. In general, the lower standard of living and lack of social life among these workers generates an environment conducive to crime, especially sexual assault, burglary, theft, and physical abuse/assaults. Poor living conditions, mistreatment from employers, such as the withholding of payment, often for months, has led many foreign workers to suicide, since they find themselves in debt and unable to send money back to families in their countries of origin.

**Conclusion**

Despite the fact that the Bahraini economy is booming with a high growth rate and increasing per capita income, the benefits of globalization have not extended to the population as a whole. There are increasing numbers of millionaires, and a shrinking middle class and impoverished lower class. The country has been witnessing repeated confrontations and tension between impoverished communities and security forces, especially in the villages, which is why the World Bank now ranks Bahrain low in political stability. There is need for a strategy to shield society from the negative impacts of globalization.

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BANGLADESH

More poverty, vulnerability and food insecurity

Poverty, vulnerability and food insecurity have increased in Bangladesh. The high price of food grains and the high level of inflation have led an additional 12.1 million people into poverty. There is increased frequency and severity of natural disasters. Two consecutive floods, plus Cyclone Sidr, together with the global price of food have led to food supply problems. It is the poorest and the female-headed households who are worst hit by the hike in prices for basic goods.

Since its independence in 1971, Bangladesh pursued an inward looking development strategy with excessive government intervention in every aspect of economic activity. With the vision of a socialist type of agriculture, cooperative farming was encouraged while the procurement and distribution of seed, fertilizers, pesticides and all sorts of agricultural equipment was controlled by the Government. A series of measures, quantitative restrictions, highly differentiated tariff rates (ranging from 0% to 400%), and huge subsidies, along with an overvalued exchange rate, were put in place to protect domestic farms from competition. This restrictive environment was reinforced by domestic market policy interventions in the form of credit ceilings, arbitrary licensing and price controls.

These policies did not result in a sustained increase of production and productive efficiency; on the contrary, the gap between demand for and supply of agricultural products widened over the years. To find a way out of this crisis in the 1980s, the country pursued a policy shift away from state interventionism to more market-oriented policies which translated into sectoral policies that supported macroeconomic liberalization. Reform measures adopted included the rationalization of tariffs, the liberalization of investment in irrigation, the privatization of trade in fertilizers, agricultural machinery imports, seed delivery and food distribution systems, as well as management of agricultural research and extension systems. Moreover, reforms in farming led to a shrinking role of the Government; this was reflected in the distribution of goods, the reduction of subsidies, the liberalization of markets with producers’ price incentives, the gradual elimination and narrowing down of the public grain distribution system, price stabilization through open tender procurement policies and the liberalization of food grain imports by the private sector.

The liberalization efforts were not confined to the agricultural sector. The whole economy began to go through all-out liberalization, particularly after the early 1990s, and became one of the most rapidly liberalized in the world. Although some claim that this was done too rapidly, the World Bank observed, “While trade liberalization occurred in fits and starts in Bangladesh, stronger and more decisive commitment to trade liberalization was seen in the majority of the rest of the world. As a result Bangladesh lags behind on most measures of trade openness. Even after the reduction in nominal protection in the financial year 2007 budget, Bangladesh has the highest level of trade protection in the region, which itself is the most trade restrictive region in the world”.

Despite mounting pressure for more liberalization, the results of past liberalization measures must also be assessed. Did common people benefit from the process of liberalization or were the only beneficiaries some booming multinational giants? One of the major consequences of the all-out reforms has been increased dependency on imports, including agricultural products. As a result, despite being an agricultural nation, the country has been losing control of the prices of many ordinary products that people need every day.

The impact of the global crises

The diagram in the opposite page illustrates the impact of the inter-related global crises in climate change, commodity prices and economic and financial crises on poverty and food insecurity.


Climate change

Bangladesh tops the list of countries worst affected by climate change. One of the recent changes that the country is facing is the increased frequency and severity of natural disasters. Cyclone Sidr, which hit the Bangladesh coastal belt in 2007, was one of the most devastating disasters in the history of the country, resulting in a huge loss in natural resources and, more importantly, contributing to one of the major food shortages since the 1974 famine. This coincided with peaking global food and commodity prices and an unprecedented shortage of food supplies around the world.

Sidr and its impact on food insecurity constitute only one example of the many problems Bangladesh faces as a result of climate change. The changes in seasonal patterns and temperature have a negative impact on agricultural yields and on production costs. On the one hand the country is struggling to produce the food it requires, and on the other the price of food remains high due to the increased costs of production.

Climate change is particularly impacting some poverty pockets in Bangladesh, which are now being considered also as ‘climate change hotspots’. The poor and extremely poor people living in these ecologically vulnerable pockets are facing increasingly harder realities due to changed patterns of nature. For example, in the northwest region the severity of soil erosion caused by river flows has increased substantially making poor inhabitants much more vulnerable to poverty and hunger. Similarly, in the northeast water basins, the changed timings of emergence and retreat of water are having significant negative impacts on agriculture and food production.

Food prices

In addition to the massive loss in domestic production in 2007 and 2008 following two devastating floods and cyclone Sidr, another major contributor was the global rise in food and commodity prices. The food inflation rate for the poor was much higher, exceeding 20% towards the end of 2007. Chart 2 presents the official food inflation rates, including the overall rate and the rate estimated for the poverty line food basket. It is worth to mention that although the bumper crops in 2008 and 2009 led to aggregate food supply and that, as a result of close monitoring by the Government, food prices, particularly those of rice and edible oil went down significantly, the problem remains in distribution. The level of food insecurity among the poorest households, particularly in the ecologically vulnerable areas, has not been solved. Moreover, the high costs of production have lowered the farmers’ margin. A study by the Dhaka-based think tank Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD) indicates that 48.5% of people in Bangladesh do not have enough money to buy basic food items such as rice, compared to 40% in 2005. The CPD report stresses that, “as a consequence of high prices of food grains and high level of general Inflation, an additional 12.1 million people (8.5% of total population) became poor between January 2005 and March 2008”.

Inflation

Starting in late 2007, the inflation rate in Bangladesh, which had been practically unseen during the last decade, reached double digits – hitting 11.21% in November, according to the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics. The burden of inflation fell disproportionately on the poorer sectors of society. Some studies have showed that it was the poorest and the female-headed households who were hit the most from the hike in prices of essential goods.

The net result of all this is that the extent of extreme poverty, vulnerability and food insecurity might have increased. It is feared that the rate of extreme poverty may have actually increased, aggravated by continuing food insecurity, especially in the pockets of extreme poverty and vulnerability.

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3 See: <www.idsa.in/publications/studcomments/AnandKumar300708.htm>.

**BELGIUM**

**The high cost of the bank rescue**

When the shares of banks and the principal enterprises in the country collapsed, the Government went to the rescue of the banks and provided deposit guarantees. The crisis is still causing unemployment to rise, while the cost of the bank rescue is making itself felt in the drastic increase of public debt, with serious repercussions in the provision of social security.

In 2008, two of the largest banks in Belgium, Fortis and Dexia, began to experience serious problems, worsened by the financial crisis which other banks in the world were suffering. The shares of Fortis and Dexia, like most of the shares in Belgian companies, collapsed. The Government’s reaction was to go to the rescue of the banks and guarantee deposits, but the cost of the financial collapse has still been particularly serious, not because of the bail-out funds paid out by the State, but because of the vast increase in the level of public debt which the country had been attempting to reduce for about fifteen years.

The State has spent almost EUR 20 billion (USD 28 billion) in providing a capital increase for the banking sector. To this sum should be added EUR 25 billion (USD 35 billion) offered by the State in the form of guarantees, due to which the total bill for public aid given to banks is close to EUR 45 billion (USD 63 billion). In addition to debt, the consequences of the rescue also include budget problems, rising unemployment and uncertainty regarding the State’s capacity to continue to finance its social model.

**The cost of rescuing the banks**

The rescue operations carried out by the Federal Government and the federated bodies led to the nationalization of Fortis Banque, as well as a capital increase for the Dexia Banque, the KBC group and Ethias, an insurance company. Within a term of three months, public authorities reappeared in the Belgian banking sector, after having abandoning it almost two decades earlier. However, conditions for the financial institutions’ plans for a capital increase have been to a large extent, weak and obscure. Thus, rescue measures have adapted perfectly to the old liberal age: “socialize losses, privatize profit”.

Dexia, a Franco-Belgian-Luxembourg bank, received a capital increase of EUR 3 billion (USD 4.2 billion), from Belgian public authorities (the federal State and federated bodies). The French supplied an equivalent sum of EUR 2 billion (USD 2.8 billion) through the French state financial institution Caisse des Depots, and 1 billion (USD 1.4 billion) from the State. This investment has increased French participation from 11.5% to close to 28% of the bank's capital and, as a result, made it possible for the French share to achieve a minority with blocking capacity in the banking group. The KBC bank, for its part, has benefited from three successive rescue plans to date. First, in October 2008 the Federal State intervened providing EUR 3.5 billion (USD 4.9 billion). Then, in January 2009 the Flemish Region paid out EUR 2 billion (USD 2.8 billion) and lastly, in May it again issued State bonds for a total of EUR 2 billion (USD 2.8 billion) in order to finance the KBC group. In all, to date KBC has received close to EUR 7.5 billion (USD 10.5 billion) from Belgian tax-payers.

Regarding the bail-out of Fortis, the Belgian-Dutch group, capital participation of the Belgian State reached 99.93% in October 2008, which constitutes a total of EUR 9.4 billion (USD 13.16 billion). However, it has shown from the start a willingness to sell 75% of its holdings in Fortis to the French group BNP Paribas. Nevertheless, the opposition of Fortis Holding shareholders to the dismantling of their group has twice forced the Government and BNP to revise their agreement for the transfer of Fortis Banque. The third version was finally approved by the shareholders in two general assemblies held on 28 and 29 April 2009 in Gand (Belgium) and Utrecht (Netherlands). In short, in exchange for transferring its holdings in Fortis Banque to BNP Paribas, the Belgian State has received 11.6% of the French banking group’s capital.

**Public debt soars**

When Belgium applied for inclusion in the European single currency in the early 1990s, a serious problem arose: the weight of the public debt. Although Maastricht convergence criteria stipulated that a member state’s debt should not exceed 60% of its GDP, Belgian public debt exceeded it by 130% in 1993 and 1994.

Because of this, an austerity plan was implemented with painful results for the levels of public spending but it made possible to reduce the country’s debt, which had descended to 84% of its GDP in 2007.

Today, the cost of the bank bail-outs and the impact of the financial crisis on public finance have resulted in a sharp increase in the rate of debt, reaching 89.7% in 2008, while the Belgian National Bank forecasts a rise to 103% in 2010. This constitutes a debt of over EUR 30,000 (USD 42,000) per inhabitant. The Government deficit has naturally followed the same curve: from 1.2% of the GDP in 2008 it is expected to soar to 5.5% in 2009.

**Social security and unemployment**

Due to the Government deficit, financing for social security has also been affected, with a deficit of EUR 2.45 billion (USD 3.43 billion) in 2009 due to the drop in revenue from social security contributions and VAT. The Government forecasts a deficit increase for social security of EUR 5.3 billion (USD 7.42 billion) in 2010.

Lastly, unemployment is still on the rise due to the recession of the economy. In June 2009, 443,574 people were unemployed, which means that there are 43,433 new unemployed persons over the past year.

In June 2009, the High Council for Employment, which answers to the Ministry of Employment and Equal Opportunities, published a report...
According to this document, activity regressed 1.7% in the first quarter of 2009, as compared to the same period in 2008. After a zero-growth period for employment during the fourth quarter of 2008, close to 10,000 jobs disappeared in the first quarter of 2009. The number of hours worked in temporary jobs had not ceased to drop after the second quarter of 2008. This tendency became more marked in April with a 28% drop compared to the previous year. Belgium’s National Bank forecasts the disappearance of 36,000 jobs in 2009 and a further 80,000 in 2010. Bearing in mind the continuous growth of the active population, the number of persons seeking employment will increase in 2009 to 68,000 and to 111,000 in 2010. The unemployment rate will therefore rise from 7% in 2008 to 9.2% in 2010.

Civil society to the fore

The multiple global crises have had a varied impact on Benin’s economy and the population as a whole has become more vulnerable, especially the poorer members. Civil society has worked both as a partner and in liaison with Government in promoting ways to combat the crisis, develop a new green revolution and provide school food programmes. It has also encouraged investment in agriculture and combating climate change, as well as technological exchange.

Financial and food crises

In Benin, the basic family basket is now beyond reach. Shipments of foodstuffs from rural areas to the cities have declined and the cost of building materials has increased. A number of construction projects have been halted, including some Government work. The State has had to use its power to requisition building materials for its most important projects. Rural villages, particularly the poorer ones, have been compelled to exhaust their economic resources; they can no longer invest in education and family health.

The increase in the cost of a barrel of oil, the development of agro-fuels and international speculation pushed the entire world, especially Africa, into an unprecedented crisis in 2008. Benin was hit by a general increase in the price of basic products. The price of maize, the most widely consumed product, soared 220%. Shortages exacerbated the hardships, as low farm productivity and growing demand led to the over-purchase of locally produced foodstuffs and reduced distribution to consumers, especially the more vulnerable ones.

State measures

As it did in 2008, the Government has responded to the food crisis this year by cutting taxes and creating temporary food reserves through the National Bureau for Food Security. These measures partially eased the effects of the 2008 crisis. The chief beneficiaries, however, were traders, who continued to sell at high prices and made large profits at the expense of consumers and the State.

In other measures, the Government suspended the Value Added Tax and introduced subsidies for some foodstuffs (e.g., 25% for rice, milk and sugar) as well as price controls. To help enforce these, it launched a nationwide public awareness campaign and directed the National Bureau for Food Security to open offices in the country’s 77 municipalities to monitor prices. The Government also established a national effort to control rises in the cost of living, decentralized through departmental and communal committees. The country also benefited from large donations of rice, maize and sugar from Libya and the Gulf states.

Despite these measures, poorer and more vulnerable consumers derive little benefit from the subsidies and continue to have great difficulty obtaining food. The Government has failed to provide promised funding for the committees, which are largely ineffectual. Two long term programmes to alleviate the food crisis are now being implemented: the Urgent Programme to Support Food Security, budgeted at USD 128 million, and the Agricultural Diversification Programme for the Increase in Value of the Valleys, estimated to cost USD 20.5 million.

The role of civil society

Government campaigns to minimize cost of living increases were supported by civil society organizations. Consumer associations collaborated with the State in supervising prices and helped formulate proposals through their participation in the work of the committees monitoring the cost of living, the publication of press releases and the organization of press conferences.

The energy crisis

In response to the sharp rise in the price of oil on the international market, the population is using more adulterated fuel, known as ɛpɛyo. Official service stations selling oil products are rarely visited, which reduces State income.

The high price of fuel is particularly onerous in a country where barely one household in five (22.4%) has had access to a public source of electricity, according to the 2002 general census of population and habitat (RGPH-3). The remaining 77% relied on oil-based lighting. As far as the provision of electricity goes, Benin appears to have learnt nothing from the previous crisis. After waiting nearly a year for a solution to come from abroad – principally from a hookup between the Transmission Company of Nigeria and the Electrical Community of Benin – the country belatedly decided to acquire gas turbines. This is taking a considerable amount of time.

In the meantime, much of the economy has been paralyzed, in particular major industries and microenterprises. Consequences have included an increase in the price of cement, interruptions in the supply of drinking water and repeated disruptions of appliances (electrical household appliances, computers, etc.) in villages and towns. This has damaged both public and private enterprises. Businessmen
are finding it impossible to meet their commitments with financial institutions.

The State subsidized the price of oil for a considerable period of time, until it declared this had become financially impossible. When international oil prices fell, to discourage the informal sale of kpyo, which causes numerous problems for the population, the Government announced that it would sell oil at cost.

In response to Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) agreements at summit conferences in December 2001 and January 2006 to institute a system for exchanging electric power to meet growing demand in the region, member states created the Ghana-Togo-Benin 330kV Power Interconnection Project. This project, which requires a huge financial investment, is designed to encourage commercialization of electricity, improve distribution, help to reduce the cost of production and cover the shortfalls in hydroelectric power stations during periods of drought.

In addition, within the framework of its Strategy for Growth and to Reduce Poverty (SGRP), the Government has initiated reforms in the electrical power sector to a long-term increase in efficiency and provide a level of distribution that is satisfactory in both quantity and quality. It has also introduced tax incentives to encourage private operators to acquire electricity generation resources from the Beninese Society for Electric Energy.

The climate crisis

The climate crisis in Benin takes the form of increased variations in rainfall, a reduction in annual rainfall (projected to drop 15% by 2025) in the northeast of the country, an increase in extreme phenomena such as heavy rainfall and storms, a shorter rainy season, delays and irregularity in the commencement of the rains, and a long-term increase in the average temperature (up 1 to 2 degrees by the end of the 21st century). These changes will have a negative effect on agriculture, water reserves, and the lake ecosystems of lower Benin, as well as the country’s coast, parks and natural reserves. Three-quarters of the port city of Grand-Popo is already submerged.

Cotonou, the capital, to the east of the port, is being totally eroded. Some scenarios for 2035-2050 predict erosion will reach 40 cm.

The country’s biodiversity is also expected to suffer. A major decrease in rainfall north of the 8th parallel will reduce the exchange of layers by 20% to 40%. In addition, it will lead to excessive exploitation of the water reserves on the Calavi Plateau, which will increase saline intrusion.

Forecasts indicate that by 2025, the proportion of the population living in cities will rise from 37% to 52%. The country urgently needs to review its urban transport system and the use of energy to reduce pollution. Climate change will have a direct impact on farm production. The rice yield is expected to fall 25% by 2050 and pole beans 15%, while production of yams, the basic food in central Benin, will increase by 4%. If these scenarios prove accurate, between 50% and 60% of the population of southern Benin will be facing food insufficiency, along with between 25.9% and 33% of inhabitants in the central areas of the country.

To secure sustainable exploitation of the basins in the Northwest despite climate change, the Government, with the support of German Technical Cooperation, has launched ProCGRNM, a pilot project to conserve and manage natural resources. It focuses on 4 main areas:

- Raising awareness of the effect of climate change on living conditions amongst target groups and means of adaptation;
- Promoting integrated management of river basins to reduce erosion and improve water infiltration;
- Increasing the availability of drinking water and water resources for farming; and
- Disseminating the results achieved.

In addition, Benin prepared a National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) for climate change, and has received USD 3.1 million from the World Environment Fund to implement it.

Climate change was discussed at the meeting of experts from Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in March 2009. The experts called for guarantees that the principal measures of an immediate and urgent nature contained in the NAPAs for climate change would be implemented. It was noted that by December 2008, 39 of the 48 LDCs had completed their NAPAs but only Bhutan had begun to implement its programme. This is an indication of the difficulty and complexity of applying the principal measures of adaptation. According to the Minister for the Environment and Protection of Nature, Justin Adanmayi, one of the critical points when applying a NAPA is access to LDC funds and the mobilization of the necessary complementary financial resources, especially the national contribution guaranteeing the realization of adaptation measures in situ.

Civil society groups have carried out awareness-raising campaigns in several populated areas regarding the degradation of the mangrove swamps, which reduces the productivity of lagoons considerably and threatens their ecosystem.

Recommendations

The food crisis

- Immediately respond to the urgent need for food to prevent malnutrition;
- Implement a new green revolution that greatly increases farm yield without depleting the soil, support small farmers as essential to sustained economic growth and the elimination of hunger;
- Introduce a national food programme for schools using locally produced foodstuffs and ensure that nutritional needs are met through national nutritional programmes;
- Greatly increase investment in farm research, in particular in the areas of high-yield crops and livestock, as well as sustainable farming techniques, water control, with particular attention to the likely effects of climate change;
- Promote the production, transformation and consumption of appetizing local foods; and
- Encourage disadvantaged members of the population to become economically active through Income-generating Activities (AGR, in French) and the development of micro-finance initiatives.

The climate crisis

- Strengthen the powers of leading actors in the issue and those with responsibilities relating to climate change at national, departmental and communal levels;
- Create a comprehensive strategy for dealing with the problems generated by climate change that includes plans of action at each level of the State;
- Integrate the theme of climate change into primary, secondary and tertiary curricula;
- Support NGOs, which are the real link between government and local communities;
- Initiate in-depth research regarding technological transfer and local knowledge that could facilitate adaptation to the negative effects of climate change.
The moment of truth

As a cycle of world growth roared past, Bolivia stood by and watched, unable to take advantage of the opportunity to establish its own rhythm of development. Its economy was just beginning to pick up speed, when the global boom began to stall and then go into reverse. In recent years, distributive tendencies in the world economy have been weak. Bolivian entrepreneurs are part of this trend, responding to the severe global downturn through unequal negotiations that shift the burden of the crisis onto the shoulders of their workers through layoffs and reductions in benefits and wages.

The crisis

The current world economic crisis is not just one more “serious episode” caused by a lack of regulation in financial markets; it is a crisis throughout the global capitalist system, sending tremors through all spheres of production (energy, food, ecology, social and cultural). This earthquake has revealed the internal contradictions of over-production, the structural tendency for profit rates to fall and a general depression in consumption – all consequences of the pursuit of ever-greater profits through constantly increasing exploitation of the workforce. From this perspective, it is easier to understand the “irrationality” of financial speculation in monopolistic capitalism; the drive to scurvily liberalized financial markets throughout the world in search of extraordinary profits derived from the circulation of capital.

This is a serious crisis, and one that will be with us for a long time. Already, it has again exposed the extreme fragility of less developed economies. This fragility reflects the nature of capitalist development, which is based on realizing profits and in the process of doing that generates massive inequalities among and within countries.

1 Javier Gómez is an economist and executive director of CEDLA. Gustavo Luna is a commentator and general coordinator of CEDLA.

2 Central Bank, Bolivia. In 2009, remittances reached USD 1.097 billion, an increase of 7.5% compared to 2008. This figure was 6.4% of the GDP.

3 According to the National Statistics Institute, in 2007, the incidence of households final consumption expenditure was 2.98% of the GNP, an increase of 3.91% compared to 2008. This was a larger figure than the one reached in the previous decade (1998).

poverty actually increased, from 36.7% to 37.7%. In rural areas, where poverty is pervasive, the Gini Index climbed from an already high 0.62 to reach 0.64. These trends reveal that recent economic policies and expansion have had a negligible effect on income distribution. Once again, the trickle-down effect has been exposed as a fallacy; economic prosperity for the majority requires effective public policies that generate greater access to productive resources and good jobs while raising wages and other income derived from work.

Although production expanded at a modest rate of 3.1% per year from 2001 to 2004, employment grew at a similar pace, indicating that productivity did not increase at all. This trend was evident in urban as well as rural areas. During the 2004 to 2007 period, production climbed steadily, with an average annual increase of 4.5%. Employment growth also accelerated, to 3.9% per year, but its lower rate of expansion reflects an annual productivity increase of 0.7%. In other words, although the economy generated new employment, most of the gains continued to be concentrated in low-quality jobs. Again, this was true in urban as well as rural areas.

Another mining boom

According to the National Statistics Institute (INE), in 2008 Bolivia’s GDP jumped 6.15%, breaking the 1976 record of 6.1%. Most of this expansion was fueled by the explosion in world demand and prices for hydrocarbons and minerals. Bolivia’s mining GDP was up 9.98% in 2007 and a spectacular 56.26% in 2008. This far outpaced the rate in other economic activities, which averaged only 4.33% growth. In consequence, mining’s incidence rose from 0.41% to 2.41%, and its share in GDP rose from 5.81% to 8.55%.

The boom in mining was not the fruit of a robust sector with several enterprises competing to export more. Quite the contrary, it was generated by a single enterprise, the San Cristóbal Mining Project (PMSC), operating with transnational capital. This company accounted for 40.7% of the total production value of minerals in the country. Without the PMSC, Bolivian GDP growth would have been only 5.13%, well below the level achieved in 1976. Another problem is that only a very small proportion of the wealth generated by the extraction of minerals remains in the country through taxation. In 2008, the aggregate value of mining production was around USD 2 billion; only USD 94.14 million of this (4.64%), flowed into state coffers.

Now that the crisis has hit and world prices for minerals have fallen, the mining operations hardest hit are not giants such as the PMSC, but small-scale cooperatives. These enterprises provide most of the employment, but rely on primitive forms of work organization, perpetuating the vicious circle of low salaries and precarious existence.

Conclusion

The moment of truth has come. While the world enjoyed a cycle of economic expansion, Bolivia let it pass by. Mired in inertia, it failed to develop an internal capacity for growth. But that opportunity was just a chimera. Under the reign of capitalism booms merely reproduce the established order, with its built-in inequalities. And now that the worst global crisis in recent history has struck, the Bolivian economy is just waking up to what it missed out on.

The entrepreneurial class has reacted to the global downturn and the end of its run of extraordinary profits by taking advantage of worker vulnerability to insist on reductions in benefits and wages, as well as layoffs. While they are shifting the weight of the crisis onto workers’ shoulders, they are also making sure that fees, bonuses and other subsidies to business owners remain untouched, or are increased.

The seasonal workers and so-called self-employed who make up the overwhelming majority of the labour force can do little except wait for the Government to offer another bond issue that might provide sufficient funds to somehow help them meet their basic needs.

5 In 2006 the Gini Index was 0.519 in Argentina, and 0.517 in Chile. Only Brazil, with a level of 0.590, exceeded the figure estimated for Bolivia. Based on per capita income, these are all middle-income countries.


7 Ibid.
Swimming through a tsunami?

Brazil has paid the price of being “integrated” into the global economy. As foreign investors and speculators pulled out, the securities markets slumped and the currency was sharply devalued. The Government’s response has been somewhat timid, with expenditure lower and slower than needed. Brazil still may be able to ride out the crisis if the Government rises to the challenge, however. Meanwhile, the world economy has a unique opportunity to promote environmentally sustainable growth strategies and new rules for making financial systems work for development and the redistribution of income and wealth.

The Government’s timid response

The Brazilian version of the international crisis has specific roots. The domestic banking system was not exposed to the kind of speculative investments that ruined the financial systems of the United States, Europe and parts of Asia. As a result of the high interest rates paid on domestic public debt, banks operating in Brazil preferred to invest in these securities instead of trying their luck with the “financial innovations” created in the United States. Nevertheless, the country could not avoid the consequences of becoming “integrated” into the global economy.

In recent years, the Brazilian economy has received a large amount of foreign capital, both in the form of direct investment and as speculative portfolio capital. The São Paulo Stock Exchange soared and large amounts of debt securities were placed on the market. When the crisis exploded in the United States and soon after in Western Europe, many of these investors and speculators took their money out, in many cases to cover their losses at home. As a result, not only did the Brazilian domestic securities markets slump but also the national currency, the real, went through a rapid and sharp process of devaluation.

The results were not as catastrophic as they had been in past crises, largely because the turmoil did not induce capital flight by residents. Domestic financial speculators, in fact, had no reason to flee since the Government was still paying the highest interest rates in the world. Besides, there was no safe place to go. In addition, Brazil holds a relatively large amount of international reserves. Thus, while foreign investors generally had little choice but to leave, Brazilian investors preferred to stay. As a result, the problems with the balance of payments did not become as serious and paralyzing as they had been in the recent past.

Many observers saw the relatively low level of contagion by emerging economies of the financial panic, that began in the United States in 2007, as a sign that these countries could successfully “decouple” their destiny from that of developed countries. Brazil was expected to be among the lucky ones – that is, those countries that could avoid being swallowed by the shock waves of the financial crisis, sustaining some degree of prosperity and reining in unemployment by redirecting productive activities to domestic markets.

This view seemed to be vindicated by the vigorous growth of the Brazilian economy in the first three quarters of 2008. It did not grow at “Chinese rates”, of course, but it grew fast enough not only to expand employment but also to move a growing share of the workforce from informal jobs to the better paid and more secure formal sector. Household consumption led overall growth, fed by the increase in real wages (particularly the minimum wage) and employment, as well as by the social policies that increased the purchasing power of the lowest income groups.

The Federal Government, with President Lula at its head, mounted a strong public campaign to keep up business and consumer morale so that demand would remain high, stimulating firms to keep producing and expand investment. The President frequently reminded the population that his Growth Acceleration Plan (PAC) should act as a lever to keep up demand, so that consumers should not fear unemployment and firms would not face idle capacity.

The strategy seemed to be successful until the virtuous path was abruptly interrupted in the last quarter of 2008, when GDP fell 3.6% in comparison with the previous quarter. All sectors of the economy actually contracted, but the manufacturing sector was by far the hardest hit, falling more than 7%. Investments, which had been growing at healthy rates, fell almost 10%. Consumers and investors could not sustain their previous spending, so the economy as a whole contracted significantly.

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More surprising, perhaps, is the timidity of governmental spending policies. The President’s calls for bold action seem to have fallen on deaf ears among his own Cabinet ministers. The Government has persisted with PAC, which was defined for normal times and is obviously insufficient to fight a recession that may end up longer and deeper than it seemed at first. However, even PAC has been implemented in an uncertain and timid way. Spending plans are delayed by bureaucratic obstacles, resulting in public expenditure that is lower and slower than required. The hesitant behaviour of leading authorities in the Government’s economic team betrays a worrying lack of understanding of the potential damage that a crisis such as the one currently unfolding can cause to a developing country such as Brazil.

As the Brazilian economy continued to decline in the first quarter of 2009, however, more forceful policies were implemented, although still far from what is necessary to make up for the contractionary impulses coming from abroad. Public banks increased their supply of credit, at lower interest rates. Income transference to the poor, through the Family Grants program, sustained consumption in the lower income groups. The overall improvement of expectations, after what seemed to be an overreaction in the last quarter of 2008, led to a still tentative and timid recovery, which is presently going on. All things considered, all indications point to the same direction: a small recovery, which in itself, given the international context, is still a relief.

At a moment like this, one of the biggest risks a country can expose itself to is confusing the inability to act with financial and fiscal prudence. Afraid of increasing spending, governments can resign themselves to watching private demand fall and, as a result, production and employment fall too. In such a situation, tax revenues go down while social security spending rises. Fiscal deficits then rise precisely because governments were not bold enough to act against the contraction of the economy. Paradoxically, the attempt to look prudent puts a country in an uncertain and timid way. Spending plans are delayed by bureaucratic obstacles, resulting in public expenditure that is lower and slower than required. The hesitant behaviour of leading authorities in the Government’s economic team betrays a worrying lack of understanding of the potential damage that a crisis such as the one currently unfolding can cause to a developing country such as Brazil.

An opportunity to reset the world economy

The current international financial crisis represents the most serious disruption faced by the global economy since the Great Depression of the 1930s.

1 Specialist on food security and co-Director of Ibase.
3 In fact, this is precisely the goal of the project “Financial liberalization and global governance: the role of international entities”, coordinated by Fernando J.C. Carvalho and Jan Kregel, developed by Ibase and sponsored by the Ford Foundation. See “Financial Crisis and Democratic Deficit”. Available from <www.ibase.br/modules.php?name=Conteudo&pid=1686>.
Bulgaria, the poorest country in the European Union, has been enjoying some economic benefits from joining the EU. However, Government assurances that the economy is solid notwithstanding, investment and exports are dropping and the GDP will soon contract. Government measures to mitigate the impact of the global crisis will probably not be sufficient. NGOs are demanding that both employers and the Government adopt emergency measures to rein in inflation, agree to wage settlements that increase real income and assess the impact of the crisis on the most vulnerable sectors of society.

Although Bulgaria, the poorest EU country, has yet to feel the full impact of the global economic crisis, social protests have already erupted in response to the European Commission’s decision to cut the country’s pre-accession funding due to rampant corruption. Bulgarians demonstrated in front of the Parliament building in January 2009 to demand economic reforms, calling on the Government to act or step down. In the same month, farmers demonstrated throughout the country and blocked the only bridge to Romania, demanding that the Government set a minimum price for milk and stop imports of cheap foreign dairy products. Police officers, banned by law from striking, have been holding “silent” protests since December to obtain a 50% pay hike and better working conditions.

Despite this social unrest, as well as a global financial crisis that has inspired a re-examination of current economic policies all over the world, widespread questioning of the neo-liberal model and calls for stricter government regulation, the neo-liberal model remains fashionable in Bulgaria. Prime Minister Sergey Stanishev acknowledges that Bulgaria is experiencing its first economic crisis as a capitalist country and is not immune to the difficulties facing its economic partners. However, he continues to insist that the country’s problems are less severe than those of other European Union members.

Boom and crunch
A currency board was introduced in 1997 after a severe crisis in the national bank system led to hyperinflation, bank closures, acute political crisis and mass impoverishment. Since then every governance, whatever its political orientation, has favoured retaining it in order to avoid another massive crisis. The currency board’s strategy has been to stabilize the macroeconomic environment while barring any increases in pay, even though Bulgaria has the lowest wages in the EU.

Since 2004, when agreement was reached on accession to the EU, Bulgaria has experienced a surge in capital inflows and a credit boom. The influx of capital was stimulated by expectations of rapid convergence with the EU, and further boosted by the presence of the currency board and a strong fiscal policy. The ratio of credit to GDP exploded from 36% in 2004 to 67% in 2007. By 2008, inflows made up about 30% of GDP.¹

The surge in outside capital generated strong GDP growth, but sharply widened external and internal imbalances. GDP grew by more than 6% annually, one of the fastest rates in Europe.² Growth remained a strong 6.25% in 2008. However, the growth of domestic demand outpaced GDP growth, widening the current account deficit from 5% of GDP in 2003 to over 24% in 2008. This gap was accentuated by the concentration of growth in construction, real estate, and financial services according to the National Statistics Institute.

As unemployment dropped and the labour market tightened, wage growth accelerated to 24% in June 2008. The overheating of the economy, together with rising food and oil prices, accelerated inflation to a peak of 14.7% in June 2008, with food prices soaring more than 25%. Escalating prices of natural gas, electricity, central heating, road and railroad transport, water, and so on will push the cost of living up around 17% on an annual basis, while inflation for the full year will probably surpass 12%. The inflation forecast for 2009 is around 4 %.³ However, Centre for Economic Development experts are warning that the real danger ahead is deflation, not inflation.

Global financial turmoil and risk aversion by investors is likely to reduce capital flows to Central and Eastern Europe, including Bulgaria. Local bank subsidiaries are unlikely to continue receiving the large capital transfers from their parent banks that have funded credit growth. Without this financing, enterprises will reduce their production and services or shut down entirely, causing an increase in unemployment. Metalurgy and construction have already shrunk. In January 2009 industrial production plunged 19% from the previous month, according to the official Statistical Institute.

At the same time, shrinking foreign demand and declining commodity prices might lead to a drop in Bulgarian exports and a decline in tourism. The latest IMF projections show a contraction of more than 0.5% in 2009 GDP, which would squeeze Eastern Europe’s growth and exports. In Bulgaria, exports have been hard hit by a decline in orders and metal prices.

Economic outlook
GDP growth in 2009 is likely to slow to about 2%, or even 0%, according to one recent forecast.⁴ With slower growth, the current account deficit is projected to shrink to 15% of GDP, while a sharp drop in global commodity prices should temper inflation. However, there is significant risk that growth will slow even more. Fortunately, the country’s public finances are in good shape, with one of the highest fiscal surpluses in Europe. Nevertheless, the dramatic shift in the balance of payments shows the severe shock the country is experiencing.

In the five months since October, net capital inflows totaled only EUR 800 million, down from EUR 6.1 billion in the previous five months and EUR 5.6 billion in the same period a year ago. Exports in the

¹ IMF. Bulgaria. Article IV Consultation—Staff Report. Staff Statement; Public Information Notice on the Executive Board Discussion; and Statement by the Executive Director for Bulgaria February 2009. p. 25.
first two months of 2009 were 27% lower than in the first two months of 2008, while the drop in imports was even sharper (32%), suggesting that domestic demand has contracted rapidly. As a result, the current account deficit declined from an annualized rate of 25.8% of GDP in the first two months of 2008 to 11.6% in the first two months of 2009.1 Indeed, leading indicators of economic activity suggest that the economy may already be contracting. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) recently predicted that the Bulgarian economy will shrink by around 3.5% in 2009 and 1% in 2010, down 2% from its April 2009 projection.2

An international gas crisis in January 2009 practically erased whatever positive momentum remained from 2008. When the dispute between Russia and Ukraine cut gas supplies to Europe, Bulgaria was among the most unprepared countries, with no real alternative sources of gas. The cost in lost production is estimated at more than EUR 250 million (about USD 333 million). The Government officially requested compensation from Russia, but even if some compensation is provided, the long-term effects of the halt in production could pose risks to the entire economy.

Government priorities in fiscal policy
In this difficult environment, maintaining confidence in both the currency board and the financial system is crucial. The two are mutually dependent: a strong and resilient financial system is needed to sustain the currency board; and confidence in it bolsters the financial system. The IMF believes that the currency board can enable the country to cope with the turbulence, since Bulgaria has adequate fiscal and currency reserves. The IMF didn’t even consider alternative measures to compensate for negative balance of payments, such as currency devaluation or adoption of the Euro.

Recommendations
Maintain surpluses
Fiscal policy should aim at maintaining large surpluses, not only because they have been a pillar for the currency board, but also to preserve balances in the fiscal reserve account – an important cushion in the event that problems emerge. For 2008, the Government targeted a surplus equal to 3.5% of GDP. Preserving the surpluses in a time of slow revenue increases will require a significant slowdown in the growth of expenditures. However, neither revenues nor expenditures projected in the current budget reflect the expected decline in GDP growth.

Make implementation of the 10% budget rule transparent
The Government plans to contain expenditure growth by restricting spending to 90% of what was originally budgeted for 2009, rather than by revising the budget. The remaining 10% is to be released based on budget developments.7 This solution could be pragmatic, but it is far from transparent. Indeed, foreign observers, probably not aware of the 10% rule, perceive a budget based on unrealistic revenues.

It is important to ensure that mechanisms to implement the 10% rule are clearly understood. Some plans and programmes may need to be postponed. Ministries should signal their spending priorities early on and make sure they are clearly communicated to the public. Strict budget execution is also essential. Implementation of the 10% rule would only slow spending growth from a budgeted 17% to 11% in real terms. If GDP growth slows to the projected 2%, the fiscal surplus is likely to fall to 2% of GDP.8

Accelerate reforms
Fiscal and structural reforms should be accelerated, notwithstanding the election cycle. Problems regarding the disbursement of EU funds underscore the need to further upgrade control systems. The Government has introduced several changes to social security contributions and social policy – e.g., a decrease in social insurance contribution rates paid by employers and an increase in maternity benefits. In making further reforms, maintaining fiscal neutrality is essential to ensuring the long-term sustainability of the public finances. To accelerate convergence to EU standards, the State has to complete the reform of education, make progress in health care reform and improve the efficiency of the public and private sectors.

Increase wages as productivity increases
The Government is aware that the high growth rate in wages during 2008 cannot be sustained. Although wages are still low compared to those in Western Europe, further increases must be accompanied by improvements in productivity. According to the IMF, the current pace of wage growth is far too rapid for Bulgaria’s relatively small productivity growth. Moreover, as the experience of other countries has demonstrated during the downturn, the faster wages grow, the more unemployment is likely to increase.9

Moderation in unit labour cost increases is essential given that resources will need to be shifted to export-oriented sectors. As domestic-market sector growth slows, GDP growth can be maintained only if exports take up the slack, but both sectors must remain competitive. Whether they are is a matter of dispute. Although the Government expresses confidence in corporate profitability, NGOs are less certain due to the paucity of data available.

The financial sector
Strong policies will also help the financial sector, which is currently well capitalized and profitable. In the period ahead profitability is likely to decline, as foreign funding is becoming scarce, strong competition for domestic deposits has raised the cost of funds, and lending growth is expected to slow. At the same time, the reliance of banks on foreign funding for new lending makes them vulnerable to the current disruption in international financial markets. Nevertheless, banks are well positioned for a slowdown, and have strong capital and liquidity cushions.

Unemployment will probably not reach double digits. Those most likely to be jobless are young people who lack an employment history, low-skilled workers, elderly workers, people with disabilities and women. It should be noted that the number of unregistered unemployed is at least equal to the number registered, and may be higher. Migrant workers are also returning, which ends the remittances they were sending home to their families. Some projections estimate that some 20% of short-term emigrants may come back – mainly from Greece, Spain and several other EU countries where unemployment is rising sharply.

The civil society perspective
NGOs and trade unions do not agree that reducing social expenditures is acceptable in times of crisis. They have been meager expenses since the establishment of the currency board. Any further reduction could shatter the country’s social peace. Although NGO experts support the increase in the share of investment going to transport infrastructure, they are sharply critical of the Government’s failure to use EU structural funds allocated to Bulgaria during its first two years of full membership. Only 0.6% of the EUR 2.2 billion had been spent by the end of 2008. Lack of financial capacity, excessive bureaucracy and scarcely transparent procedures have all prevented the funds from reaching their intended beneficiaries.

NGOs insist that both employers and the Government take emergency measures to rein in inflation, negotiate compensation for decreases in real income, guarantee wages, assess the impact of the crisis on the most vulnerable groups in society and take measures to protect basic social and economic rights.

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2 International Monetary Fund. World Economic Outlook, April 2009.
5 Confederation of Independent Trade Union, op. cit.
6 Bulgarian workers and employees continue to receive the lowest remuneration in Europe, while the level of prices remains comparatively high – with an average monthly salary of EUR 255 (USD 339). This means that with 20% of the average European salary one must cope with price levels that come up to approximately 46% of the average European price levels. – This is one of the main claims of the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions (KNSB) for a just and decent pay. May 2008.

Social Watch Bulgaria 67
Many crises, no response

Under the ruling Military Junta, the Burmese people live with perpetual crises, whether related to the economy, politics, food or the environment. These have combined to create a situation of extreme poverty, lack of basic rights and increasingly deteriorating social conditions. People’s organizations, which may constitute a part of civil society in the future, are underdeveloped, banned or persecuted by the Government. Rights are reserved only for the military elite and their cronies, while the most vulnerable citizens are disproportionately affected by crises and disaster.

As a result of 47 years of misguided policies, oppression and corruption by the ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), the current global crises that are affecting financial markets, the availability of basic goods and the environment have hit the Burmese faster and harder than other peoples around the world.

Late in 2006, with the annual per capita income at around USD 300, the cost of basic food commodities rose in Burma between 30 and 40% — a tremendous threat for people who spend 70% of their income on food.1 In August 2007, the Government reduced fuel subsidies, leading to gas price increases. Many people could not even travel to work. As the price of basic goods increased another four to five times, widespread peaceful protests led by Buddhist monks and the vestiges of Burmese civil society broke out across the country. In response, the Government brutally cracked down, firing into unarmed crowds and ransacking monasteries at night. Nearly 2,000 civilians were taken as political prisoners.2 Participants were sentenced to long prison terms.

Then, in May 2008, the Government failed to provide warning about the impending landfall of Cyclone Nargis, which struck the Irrawaddy Delta with devastating force. An estimated 140,000 people died in the immediate aftermath, while the disaster directly affected at least 3.4 million. The Government refused aid workers entry into the most devastated regions and closed aid camps for displaced citizens, forcing them to return to flood-stricken areas without food, water, shelter or medical care.3 The SPDC also repackaged foreign aid deliveries to make it seem that the Government was the donor. Amnesty International expressed concern that the Government was using its citizens’ suffering in the wake of the cyclone to tighten its grip and expand the reach of its forced labour programmes among a population lacking basic necessities.4

In the same month, the Government held a discounted referendum on the new Constitution, taking advantage of the displacement of cyclone victim. Many of the victims could not vote either in the originally scheduled 10 May balloting or in the additional voting held on 24 May, on the pretext of accommodating displaced voters. Reports also note that Government officials exchanged foreign aid packages for votes and labour.5 The current global financial, environmental and food crises have intensified the hardships that the Burmese were already suffering. In the face of this dire situation, however, the SPDC has shown no willingness to change its policies or system of governance.

The financial crisis

Burma has long suffered internal domestic financial crises. Inflation in basic commodity prices, including food and fuel, led to widespread protests because individuals could no longer afford these goods and because the price increases translated into job losses. Furthermore, the credit crunch has indirectly affected workers by depressing investment in domestic industries. The market for consumer or small business credit is functionally non-existent. At its heart, the development of a free market economy in the country is a myth, and the right to develop industries is reserved for the ruling Military Junta, their families and their cronies.5

Additionally, the SPDC’s misuse of the nation’s funds for increased military spending continues to have serious consequences for the poorest and most desperate. While the Government was unable to support its citizens in the aftermath of the cyclone without significant foreign aid, it spends nearly half of its budget on the military.

The global financial crisis has worsened the economic reality of the country. The fishing, mining, garment, food processing and advertising industries, for instance, have all suffered.6 Burmese living abroad are also financially distressed and thus unable to send as much money back to their families as they did before. Developed countries’ demand for goods from factories where Burmese migrants work has decreased, both lowering the availability of jobs for migrant workers and increasing abuse as employers attempt to maximize profit margins.7

The environmental crisis

There is increasing environmental degradation as the SPDC is putting on sale the rights to domestic resources, both mineral and biological. Burma’s neighbours, along with a compliant Government, exploit the country’s natural resources without attention to the environmental and cultural consequences. In Kachin state, Chinese loggers are currently extracting wood without considering either the short- or long-term impact, without employing Burmese workers and without providing any stimulus to the

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1. There are no available data on GEI.
8. Interviews with Mae Soi, Thailand area factory workers by Burma Lawyers’ Council staff, June 2008.
local economy. Similarly, the SPDC has long sold rights to Burma’s rich mineral reserves, including gold and gems, without any regulatory oversight of the effects on the environment.

Over the past two decades, Burma has suffered from one of the highest rates of deforestation, losing close to 20% of its forests. This has occurred despite warnings of widespread environmental damage when development ignores the interdependence of ecosystems. A number of large dams that are currently being planned and constructed on Burma’s major rivers by Chinese, Indian and Thai corporations and governments threaten the country’s biodiversity. The financial benefit goes to the military leaders, while the harm is suffered by the people.

The food crisis

The global food crisis has directly affected Burma, where for decades people have been suffering a localized, domestic alimentary crisis, including a dramatic reduction in protein. While Burma is technically a “food surplus” country because it produces much more food than it consumes, inadequate distribution schemes have left the population severely malnourished, with 32% of children underweight. Much of the population is at high risk of food shortages when natural disasters and environmental incidents are poorly managed, illustrated by the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis. In Chin state, a recent plague of rats placed 100,000 people at risk of starvation, yet the Government provided no aid.

Crisis in education

Burmese funding for education, both as a percentage of GDP and in absolute numbers, ranks towards the very bottom globally at a mere 1.2% of GDP. Nationally, only about one-third of students who enter primary or secondary schools finish the full curriculum.

Political crisis

Overarching all the other factors is the broken political system. The SPDC and its predecessor dictators have refused to allow a true transition to democracy, despite the steep decline of the country since the military seized power. The regime’s “Seven-Step Road to Democracy” is widely viewed as a seven-step road to permanent military entrenchment. Among other points, the new Constitution reinforces the military’s unlimited control over government operations, fails to provide for an independent judiciary and lacks meaningful human rights protections. A number of prominent political groups, such as the National League for Democracy (NLD), the New Mon State Party, the Mon National Democratic Front, and the Kachin Independence Organization, refused to participate in the constitutional referendum. Key opposition groups, led by the NLD, plan to boycott the upcoming 2010 election.

In addition, among military ranks a potential crisis is brewing between the SPDC and the United Wa state Army (USWA), which controls part of the Shan State. Although the groups agreed on a ceasefire in 1989, the USWA rejected the order to disarm and become a government-controlled militia. The USWA has been printing official documents as “Government of Wa State, Special Autonomous Region, Union of Myanmar”, and have stated that it will neither disarm nor participate in the 2010 elections unless this status is granted.

The SPDC’s continued arrests and detention of anyone who dares to criticize Government policy is a clear indicator of its unwillingness to allow meaningful change in the political sphere. In the past year, the house arrest of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, Nobel Laureate and democratically elected leader, was extended. The popular Burmese comedian and social commentator Zaganar was sentenced to 45 years in prison for his criticism of the Government’s response to Cyclone Nargis. Currently, there are an estimated 2,100 political prisoners.

Civil society under suspicion

In times of crisis, civil society organizations are crucial in providing relief and an alternative voice to help solve a nation’s most pressing problems. In Burma, however, such organizations are underdeveloped, banned or persecuted by the SPDC. The prominent groups that are allowed to exist merely help to prop up the military. For example, the Auxiliary Fire Squad primarily serves as an anti-riot force. Likewise, government-sanctioned women’s groups promote government policy rather than lobby to change it. While some community-based organizations do exist, they must receive Government permission to undertake any activity. Furthermore, members of organizations found to have done something “unlawful”, which often merely means opposing the Government, are often punished.

Conclusion

Under the ruling Junta, the Burmese people live with perpetual crises, whether economic, political or environmental. In recent years, these crises have frequently served to fuel one another and to perpetuate a harmful status quo. In response, the Government increases its crackdowns and arrests and refuses to provide any form of safety net to its citizens. It has created a country with rights reserved only for its military elite and their cronies, while the most vulnerable citizens are disproportionately affected by crises and disaster.
CAMBODIA

Economic growth must be re-directed

After two decades of war, Cambodia is rebuilding its State institutions. Economic growth has been high, but the country needs significant investment in human resources, especially in areas such as education and health. The global economic crisis is having a devastating impact, jeopardizing the realization of some national development programmes. Some NGOs are defending the rights of indigenous peoples, which have been threatened by government land concessions for plantations and development infrastructure. Other NGOs are demanding greater budget transparency.

From 1997 to 2007, Cambodia enjoyed an average economic growth of 8.6% annually, including a double-digit increase during the years 2005-2007. Although the gross domestic product (GDP) continued to climb quickly in the first half of 2008, in the final months of the year the economy was crippled by the global meltdown. The collapse of the local real estate market, along with a slowdown in garment exports and foreign tourism, dragged 2008 growth down to 5.5%. For 2009, the Government has predicted a 6% increase in GDP but international institutions are much gloomier about the country’s prospects. The Asian Development Bank expects 2.5% growth; the International Monetary Fund a meagre 0.5%; and the World Bank predicts a contraction of -1%.

Cambodia’s economy relies heavily on tourism, garment exports, construction and agriculture, all industries extremely vulnerable to the global meltdown. Services industries, mainly tourism, have been the main source of income, and the recent decline in foreign visitors – down 2% in January 2009 from a year earlier – is expected to worsen over the next two to three years.1

Cambodia also relies on remittances from exporting labour abroad, primarily to Thailand, Malaysia and South Korea. As of the first quarter of 2009, Thailand and Malaysia had cancelled all imports of labour, and Korea had cut the quota for Cambodian workers for 2009 to 1,000, one-quarter of the 2008 rate.2 Employment has also plunged in the garment industry. By March 2009, 51,000 of 400,000 total jobs had disappeared. More than 90% of the workers laid off were women from rural communities, who typically send much of their income home to support siblings in school. Garment factories are operating at only 40%-50% of capacity, and more than 80 factories have shut down entirely. The Government has given garment manufacturers generous incentives to keep them in business, but has not provided significant support to the garment workers. Unable to survive on a minimum wage too meagre to cover living expenses, many of them have gone home to farm.

The cost of food and oil skyrocketed in the first half of 2008, accelerating a rise in the consumer price index (CPI) from 13.7% in January 2008 to 25.7% in May. However prices of basic commodities eased during the second half of the year, and CPI inflation slowly followed, hovering at 13.5% in December.

The sudden increase in the global price of rice provided a handsome profit for rice surplus traders, but cut deeply into the food security of 31% of the population – nearly 4 million people who do not produce enough rice to meet their own needs.4 People living around Tonle Sap, the country’s major lake, are especially vulnerable, since they had already gone into debt to make ends meet. Last year they had to sell productive assets and pull their children out of school to go to work. The Government has responded with a USD 40 million food emergency programme for vulnerable populations in these provinces. 

Real estate prices went through the roof from 2005 to 2008, and the Government responded by jacking up the bank security rate, from 8% to 16% (later reduced to 12% as the global financial crisis began to bite) and introduced monetary measures to deter banks from extending credit for property development. Since 2008, real estate in Phnom Penh has been plunging, and is already down 30%-40% from its 2008 peak, causing heavy losses among investors.5

Compared to financial institutions in other parts of the region and in the West, Cambodian banks appear to be functioning quite well. Their interest rates range between 3% and 7%, depending on the amount and duration of the investment. However, some economists have expressed concerns about non-performing loans (those in or close to default), which have reached 3.4% in Cambodia, compared to 5.7% in the Asian Pacific and 1.8% in developed countries,6 as well as about the inadequacy of the infrastructure for extending credit to agribusiness.

The challenge to human development

Notwithstanding recent socio-economic progress, Cambodia remains one of the poorest countries in Asia. In the decade ending in 2007, the national poverty rate edged down from 34.8% to 30.1%, but given the high and rising levels of inequality and vulnerability, it is likely the food and energy crises of 2008 have set back efforts to alleviate poverty.

Due to the weakness of public health services, even families of modest means can fall into poverty when a member gets sick. The Government has introduced programmes to provide free

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1 Tith Chenda, Director General at the Ministry of Tourism, 12 March 2009.
2 Ministry of Labor and Vocational Training, via Free Asia Radio, 7 April 2009.
4 In the nine villages studied by CSRI in 2001 and 2004, up to 65% of households did not cultivate enough rice for their own consumption.
6 Ibid.
medical care to poor families, but these tend to be inadequate and unreliable. Policy makers have been considering several safety net options for the general population, but none have been implemented.

Other development indicators are distressing, especially the maternal mortality rate. According to the Cambodia Demographic and Health Survey, it has remained stagnant at a high level: 432 per 10,000 live births in 2000 to 472 per 10,000 in 2005. Five women per day die giving birth, the same number as 9 years ago. Dr. Te Kuy Seang, Secretary of State of the Ministry of Health, declared that his office does not have the funds to implement its plan to increase the number of midwives by 300, from the current 3,000, and build facilities for expectant mothers in rural communities.

Girls still experience discrimination within both their families and the public educational system. In 2007, girls made up 47% of the enrolment in primary school, 46% in lower secondary school, 40% in upper secondary school and only 35% in higher education. To address this inequality, the Government and international organizations have been introducing programmes to provide school meals, free boarding for girls, scholarship awards and other incentives for girls, however these programmes have yet to reach the entire population.

At projected growth rates for 2009, the likelihood of raising sufficient revenues to finance the planned social programmes appears limited. For a variety of reasons, ranging from natural disasters to inadequate agricultural policies, both the distribution of food and access to it are becoming problems for a significant and growing portion of the population. The Government is providing food to the World Food Programme, which is currently assisting more than 1 million Cambodians. It is also altering the current budget to increase the allocation to the Rural Development Bank for farm credits. So far, however, it has provided little information on how much money will be provided and how it will ensure the benefit of those in need.

Indigenous communities and NGO work

Government land concessions for rubber plantations have usurped the ancestral land of indigenous communities in the provinces of Stung Treng, Rattanakiri and Mondulkiri. Despite a communal land law passed in 2001, none of these communities were able to register their communal land. The seizure violates these communities’ right to their only source of survival and identity. Plans for hydropower plants are also threatening the livelihood of many indigenous communities across the country, which were not consulted on most of these plans. Local NGOs and international organizations are working with these communities to help them learn about their rights and land ownership legislation.

While some civil society organizations are providing information to protect vulnerable populations, others are monitoring land grabbing and dislocations of rural communities that violate human rights. Some NGOs are monitoring the national budget, identifying discrepancies between policy priorities and budget allocations and demanding more transparency. Others are concentrating on building the capacity of civil society organizations to promote citizen engagement in local and national governance. A group of civil society organizations has demanded that oil, gas and mining be managed more effectively to ensure the transparency of revenues and sustainability for future generations.

Cambodia is still rebuilding its economic and political institutions, which have been shattered by two decades of war. The country achieved high economic growth but failed to diversify economic investments or make urgently needed investments in education and health services. Despite some slow progress in reducing poverty, a lack of transparency in decision-making and mismanagement of state affairs continue to be issues of concern.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHART 1. Share of Labour and Economic Contribution</th>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<tr>
<td>% in the total economy</td>
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<tr>
<td>% total labor</td>
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Source: Heng Sour, Director General of Administration and Finance, Ministry of Labour and Vocational Training; *Human Rights, development and the impacts of the global economic crisis,* 12 March 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHART 2. Increase in basic food prices (USD 1 = KHR 4,100)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Food</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rice No. 2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pork Quality 2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chicken</td>
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<td>Mud fish</td>
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Economic stimulus 2009: opportunity lost

Budget 2009 was an opportunity for the Government to lessen the blow of the recession by focusing on the most vulnerable citizens, but political jockeying led to a short-sighted economic stimulus plan that does not meet the needs of the thousands of citizens feeling the brunt of the crisis. Jobs being created by Government investments are in male-dominated industries, while women are over-represented in part-time and precarious work and are often the first to be laid off. Civil society organizations are concerned that, as Canada focuses on reversing the economic downturn, environmental and sustainability standards will drop.

During the October 2008 General Election, which coincided with a growing awareness that Canada could face a possible recession, Prime Minister Stephen Harper assured voters that the economy would be immune to the global difficulties, that their savings, pensions and assets would be secure and that his Government would never go into deficit. He asserted this on the basis that Canada’s banking system is well regulated and stable, and largely ignored the fact that the country would be heavily affected as the United States is, by far, the country’s largest trade partner.

What the Prime Minister did not say was that the unemployment rates would likely skyrocket, or that low-income Canadians would feel the brunt of a weakened economy, especially since there had been so little investment in social programmes in the previous decade. He also said very little about the choices his Government – if elected – would make to head off the worst effects of a possible recession. Despite the fact that many Canadians were worried about this “head in the sand” approach, the governing Conservative Party was re-elected with 37.6% of the vote (on the basis of less than 60% of the eligible vote, the lowest turnout in history).1

When the newly elected Government set out its priorities, Canadians were expecting a solid economic stimulus package in order to protect jobs, invest in a strengthened social safety net for low-income citizens and make strategic investments to lessen the blow of the recession. Instead, it delivered a highly partisan and ideological agenda that would, among other things, delay financial support for political parties and no longer uphold pay equity in the public service as a human right, leaving it to unions to negotiate this through the collective bargaining process.

Parliamentary response

In an unprecedented step, the three elected opposition parties then negotiated an agreement to form a coalition government. Many civil society organizations were supportive of this move to replace the Conservative government with a more progressive one that would represent the majority of Canadians. However, as the proposed coalition government gathered momentum and threatened to take power through a vote of no confidence in Parliament, the Prime Minister requested and was granted prorogation (essentially an extended parliamentary break) from the Governor General, Canada’s head of State. The Government committed to reconvening Parliament six weeks later with a full budget outlining an economic stimulus plan. During the six weeks of prorogation, the leader of the official opposition party resigned, a new leader was named, and the coalition alternative was taken off the table.

Budget 2009 and civil society

During the prorogation of Parliament, individuals and organizations were invited to make submissions to the Department of Finance consultations regarding what should be included in the budget. During this period, the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives (CCPA) released their annual Alternative Federal Budget (AFB), a participatory budget created by civil society with a heavy focus on creating and sustaining green jobs, investing in social and physical infrastructure, strengthening employment insurance and supporting low-income Canadians. Participants proposed five tests for the efficacy of the federal budget:2

- Does it help the hundreds of thousands of newly unemployed Canadians by increasing employment insurance benefits from 55% to 60% of insured earnings and extending the period for receiving those benefits to 50 weeks?
- Does it support those who need it most, such as unemployed, low-income Canadians and hard hit communities, by making a commitment to reduce poverty by 25% in the next five years?
- Does it implement an ambitious social, physical and green public infrastructure programme, creating jobs in both male- and female-dominated professions?
- Does it support key value-added sectors with restructuring criteria to ensure they become green and sustainable?
- Does it emphasize spending over tax cuts?

Budget 2009 failed all five tests.

Support for unemployed workers

In terms of employment insurance, Budget 2009 announced changes that allow claimants five additional weeks of benefits over the next two years. This is not sufficient given the record job losses being reported. Moreover, relatively few Canadians are eligible to receive these benefits despite all workers earning taxable income making mandatory payments into the programme. Some 44% of those who are currently unemployed are drawing insurance benefits. In 1990 that figure was 83%.3

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The employment insurance programme was greatly weakened by deep government spending cuts made in the 1990s. Although before the recession Canada saw nearly a decade of economic growth and government surpluses, spending to social programmes was never restored. There is almost universal agreement across the political spectrum and among analysts that employment insurance needs to be fixed to improve access to jobless benefits. The opposition parties unanimously supported a motion in the House of Commons calling for reform in the programme. It is only the minority Conservatives who are opposed.

**Canada’s weakened social safety net**

Although touted as the Government’s economic stimulus package, Budget 2009 saw no commitment to reduce poverty or any measures to help Canada’s most vulnerable. In November 2008, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women called on Canada to act immediately to address inadequate and impoverishing social assistance rates. As jobs are lost and people are not qualifying for insurance benefits, more and more Canadians will need to turn to social assistance. Deep cuts to these programs in the 1990s means that that form of income support will not be available to hundreds of thousands of unemployed Canadians. Substantial investments are needed to improve the rates as well as undertake welfare system reform so that eligibility requirements are broadened, clawbacks of Government benefits for recipients are eliminated and recipients can earn more income. This would enable more low-income Canadians to lift themselves out of the poverty trap that the current welfare system has become since the spending cuts mentioned above.

**Budget 2009 and infrastructure**

Budget 2009 saw some investment in physical infrastructure projects. Canada has an estimated USD 105 billion municipal infrastructure deficit due to years of under-funding and the amount announced is a drop in the bucket. Further, it relies heavily on Government partnership with private industry. In most cases, municipalities have to match federal funding in order to access these infrastructure monies. The budget made some investments in key sectors, although many sector representatives argue that these are not strategic and do not foster the growth of a sustainable, green economy. Civil society organizations are concerned that, as Canada focuses on reversing the economic downturn, environmental and sustainability standards will drop. Further, jobs that are being created are in male-dominated industries such as bridge building and road repair. Women continue to bear the brunt of this economic crisis. They are over-represented in part-time and precarious work and are often the first to be laid off. Because of this work pattern, women are more likely to be ineligible for employment insurance benefits.

**ODA: good news and bad**

One of the most significant advances in 2008 was the passage of the Official Development Assistance Accountability Act, which requires the Government to report to Parliament on how Canada’s aid coincides with official human rights commitments, relieves poverty and meets needs expressed by the poor. All parties supported the motion. However, later in the year, the Government announced that it was removing a number of African countries from priority focus (including Cameroon, Kenya, Malawi and Zambia) and focusing instead on a number of Western Hemisphere countries including Bolivia, Colombia, Haiti, Honduras and Peru. The full implications of that change are not yet visible, but in such fields as HIV and AIDS and poverty relief, it means a switch from high-incidence countries to low. The Government assures Canadians that the long-standing commitment to increase aid to Africa, overall, remains.

**Tax cuts for the wealthy over social investment**

While civil society groups have long called on the Government to make lasting social investments that would be of most benefit to low-income Canadians, Budget 2009 continued a trend of tax cuts and credits targeted to high-income Canadians and corporations. Before Budget 2009, the Government had introduced $184 billion in tax cuts. The “stimulus” budget added another $20 billion in permanent tax cuts. Nearly 40% of women in Canada and 24% of men earned so little income in 2007 that they do not pay income taxes, and thus do not benefit from any of the proposed tax credits and cuts aimed at stimulating the economy (all of the tax cuts are permanent, except for one temporary capital cost allowance for computers purchased between 27 January 2009 and 11 February 2011). In contrast, every single spending measure is temporary, with a “best before” date stamped on each measure of no longer than two years from the adoption of the budget.

Canada’s fiscal situation going into the recession was increasingly precarious due to aggressive tax cutting, with budget balances so razor thin that spending cuts were all but assured by 2010. The economic crisis was an opportunity to use government stimulus to start to address a number of unsustainable features of the economy such as inequality, climate change and overstretched public infrastructure, including soft infrastructure such as health care and child care. The Government chose to deal with the circumstances by consistently underplaying both the severity and potential duration of the downturn, and by treating the stimulus plan as something for getting the economy “back to normal”. This is short sighted and does not do enough to meet the needs of the thousands of Canadians feeling the brunt of the economic crisis.

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Social Watch 73 Canada
Instead of diminishing, poverty has increased significantly in the Central African Republic since 1990. The disturbances, looting and destruction that accompanied the rebellion that placed General François Bozizé in the presidency ruined the already weak economy. While the Government is proposing a strategy for poverty reduction, it is unlikely that this will succeed in reducing poverty in half unless the country is able to chart an immediate and lasting change of direction towards peace and security, accompanied by an exceptionally high level of growth benefitting the poor.

The strategy has four main objectives:

• Creating wealth by strengthening human and institutional capabilities within the productive system, including those of the poorest inhabitants, through good governance and the re-establishment of security.
• Improving and expanding basic social services through a participatory approach to implementation and control/evaluation of the country’s Poverty Reduction Strategy.

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Analysing poverty

The current analysis of poverty in the Central African Republic is based on two studies conducted by the Ministry of Planning on living conditions in urban and rural settings. They were carried out in 2003 with technical and financial support from the UNDP, and supplemented in 2006 with a participatory research study financed by the World Bank.

These studies identified 10 major problems: bad governance, insecurity, low income, inefficient education and training, poor health, corruption, lack of employment and the absence of opportunities, lack of drinking water, the absence of a policy for strengthening of national capabilities and environmental issues. Amongst these 10, group or individual statements of participants in every region singled out three as most pressing: poor governance, insecurity and lack of peace.

Poor conditions are prevalent throughout the country. Some neighbourhoods of Bangui, the capital city, have electricity only four days out of seven; most neighbourhoods have no access to drinking water. Faced with a sharp drop in income, many Central Africans are invading green space in cities and forested areas. With inflation rapidly eroding already meagre incomes, selling wood for fuel is often the only alternative to the more precarious, badly-paid and illicit ways of earning an income that have also proliferated. As a result, the savannah is advancing at a rate of nearly 500 meters a year on each side of the Bangui-Boal axis; it has already moved almost 30 kilometers toward the south and southwest.

Overall, the poverty rate is 73% in cities and 69% in rural areas. This deprivation is heightened by huge disparities in income and domestic expenses.

The consumption level of the poorest 10% of households is barely one-tenth that of the wealthiest 10%. It is highly unlikely that the objective of reducing poverty to 31% by 2015 will be attained unless the country achieves a rapid and lasting return to peace and security throughout its territory, as well as an exceptionally high level of growth that benefits the poor, particularly in rural areas.

CHART 1. Progress towards achieving the MDGs between 1990 and 2003

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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Incidence of poverty (%)</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>67</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Percentage of children with insufficient weight (below the weight considered healthy) (%)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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| GOAL 2. Achieve Universal Primary Education | |
|--------------------------------------------|--|--|
| Net school enrolment rate (%)              | 47  | 62  | 40  |
| Literacy rate between 15 and 24 years of age (%) | 26  | 39.1| 46.7|

| GOAL 3. Promote Gender Equality & Empower Women | |
|-----------------------------------------------|--|--|
| Girl/boy ratio in primary school (%)          | 64  | 69  | |
| Girl/boy ratio in secondary school (%)        | 39  | 41  | 60  |

| GOAL 4. Reduce Child Mortality Below Age 5 | |
|-------------------------------------------|--|--|
| Child mortality rate (per 1000 births)    | 212 | 157 | 220 |
| Child mortality rate (per 1000 live births) | 97  | 132 | |
| Measles immunization rate (%)             | 83  | 46  | 35  |

| GOAL 5. Improve Maternal Health | |
|----------------------------------|--|--|
| Maternal mortality rate (per 100,000 live births) | 683 | 948 | 1,355 |
| Rate of births assisted by skilled health personnel (%) | 50  | 44  | |

| GOAL 6. Combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria And Other Diseases | |
|-----------------------------------------------------|--|--|
| People living with AIDS (% women 15-49 years)       | 2   | 10.7 |
| People living with malaria (%)                       |     |      |

| GOAL 7. Ensure Environmental Sustainability | |
|---------------------------------------------|--|--|
| Area of protected land (km²)                | 67,615 | |
| % of the population with access to an improved water source (%) | 52 | 75 |
| % of the population with access to drinking water (%) | 17.5 | 26.1 |
| % of the population with access to sanitation (%) | 30 | |

The social impact of the crisis and the people’s response

While recession and unemployment advance, pension funds are depleted and income drops, the Government puts pressure on wages in order to expand the economy. The unions and civil society propose other solutions: workers defend their wages, rights, funds and the right to decent work for all, and NGOs stress the need to build together an economy that prioritizes people and the planet.

In 2009 Chile is being hit hard by the economic crisis, which started in mid 2007 due to the collapse of the sub-prime market in the United States and rapidly became global. The Chilean economy is extraordinarily open and therefore external phenomena can have major impacts. The fall in the international price of commodities, which began in 2008, has been felt acutely since the country’s economic and trade structure is heavily dependent on the export of a limited range of primary products with low added value.

For example, the price of a pound of copper reached its highest nominal level in July 2008 when it surpassed USD 4. By the end of the year it was averaging USD 1.40, although it recovered slightly in the first months of 2009. The drop in the price of copper affects, among other things, the rate of exchange, the terms of trade, the balance of payments and general economic activity, all of which in turn have negative social repercussions.

In the fourth quarter of 2008 the Chilean economy entered a recession. Economic activity declined dramatically, in step with similar worldwide tendencies and clearly highlighting the strong relationship between the national reality and the general trend of the crisis. During October–December the seasonally adjusted and annualized figures fell for the second consecutive quarter, when compared to the three preceding months. In the third quarter, the reduction, according to National Accounts fell by 0.1%. In the fourth quarter, on the same basis, it is estimated to have contracted by 5%.

Industrial production declined over a period of 12 months; during the fourth quarter it fell by 3.6%, the largest drop since 1999. In December the annually adjusted figures showed an even steeper decline: 4.3%. In the fourth quarter, in comparison with the same period in 2007, total sales fell by 4%, while those on the internal market fell by 4.7%.

Consumption and inflation

During the fourth quarter there was a considerable reduction in consumption, mostly caused by reduced spending by the poorer sections of the population, which continued to decline and reached 9% over 12 months. At the same time, the fall in the price of commodities led to the attenuation of one of the main social problems of 2008 – the high rate of inflation, which also mainly affected the poor. In October 2008 the annually adjusted rate of inflation reached 9.9%. This percentage was higher for the poorer two-fifths of the population due to a higher-than-average increase in the price of foodstuffs. As internal demand fell, inflationary pressure was reduced and, partly for this reason, the Consumer Price Index (CPI) began to fall in November and is expected to continue to do so during the year.

Another major reason for the drop in inflation is the reduction in the international price of oil, which is the country’s main import. On the other hand, due to the Government’s policy of stimulating investment in certain sectors at the expense of consumers, the price of electricity continues to be high. This is also the case for water rates and sanitation.

Unemployment

One of the major social costs of the recession is the increase in unemployment. According to the statistics of the Department of Economics at the University of Chile, unemployment in Greater Santiago (the capital and the metropolitan area) began to approach double figures for the three-month period from December to February, increasing two percentage points from 7.7% of the work force to 9.7%, despite the fact that seasonal employment increases in the summer. The recent official figure for national unemployment for the same quarter is 8.5%, which is 0.5 percentage points higher than the previous quarter.

Pension funds

Another noticeable impact of the crisis is the fall in pension fund holdings, which are invested in Chilean and foreign financial assets. The collapse of financial markets during the crisis caused a considerable reduction in retirement savings, amounting to a loss of USD 27 billion, more than 26% of the total funds, by the end of 2008. A study by the Asian Development Bank analysing the events of 2008 lists Chile as the Latin American country in which household wealth suffered the greatest losses, due largely to the influence of the pension funds. Despite repeated protests from the people who have been affected, neither the private funds nor the Government have taken any action to compensate them.

Remuneration

Official policy to confront the contraction of the economy has been to lobby for the reduction of real wages – unfortunately with success. The concept of wage adjustment is based on the Government’s estimates of future inflation – as has been the practice during the governments of the “Concertación” (a coalition of political parties) since 1990 – and not on the loss in value of real wages. This has an adverse effect on workers’ incomes, and official attempts to apply this policy were met at the end of 2008 with mass protests organized by civil servants.

An assessment of the variations in the general index of wages per hour and the cost of staff power, prepared monthly by the National Statistics Institute, shows the consequences. Wages were negative as from June 2008, having experienced no changes during May, but lower than the second index, which considers wages from the employer’s perspective.
To the reduction reflected in the wage charts one must add the reduction in credit that affects the general population, in particular the poorest, and small and medium-sized enterprises.

**Non-governmental proposals**

During this period of crisis, the Chilean Unitarian Workers’ Centre has combined proposals for Un Chile Justo [A Fair Chile] into five main demands: (i) prevent using the crisis as an excuse to abandon workers’ rights; (ii) defend jobs; (iii) defend wages; (iv) defend pension funds affected by the crisis and ask for government intervention in the pension system; and (v) defend decent employment.

In a broader social and transnational context, ACCIÓN, the Chilean association of NGOs consisting of over 70 development organizations, has sent a letter to the world leaders that constitute the G-20 with four major proposals regarding the current world crisis:

- **Guarantee democratic governance of the economy**, regulating financial activities, creating new fiscal instruments, creating barriers and restrictions to speculation, forbidding ‘casino’ financial products and ensuring that the resources from private and public savings are effectively routed towards productive activities. World leaders must insist on reforms regarding the governance of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in order to make them more democratic, and ensure that all financial institutions, financial products and multinational enterprises operate with transparency and are publicly accountable for their activities. This should include the elimination of bank secrecy and tax havens, as well as the introduction of public control in all countries by means of international standards of accountability.

- **Generate decent jobs and public services for all**, guaranteeing massive investment in a “green new deal”, in order to create a green economy based on decent jobs and fair wages, investing in and strengthening the provision of essential public services, and working in favour of financing the development of all those countries that need it, without restrictive conditions attached.

- **Put an end to world poverty and inequality**, dedicating 0.7% of national income to development by 2013, making these resources more effective and lobbying for the cancellation of all the illegitimate and unpayable debts of developing countries.

- **Build a green economy**, pressing world leaders at the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference to agree to substantial and verifiable reductions of greenhouse gases and to undertake new and substantial transfers of resources from the North to the South in order to support the adaptation and sustainable development of poor countries. There is an urgent need to implement policies that set aside the liberalization and deregulation measures that characterized the 1990s. The letter calls on the governments of the G-20 as well as other countries to take advantage of this opportunity to begin to build an economy that places people and the planet in the forefront, in order to achieve a fairer and more equitable society.

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**CHART 1: Monthly variations in 2008 in the indices for wages and staff power costs per hour**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Wages per hour</th>
<th>Staff power costs per hour</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>-1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
<td>-1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>-1.3</td>
<td>-2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
<td>-1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Annual average:**

- Wages per hour: -0.2
- Staff power costs per hour: -1.3

*Source: INE, a percentage comparison with the same month in 2007.*
COSTA RICA

One crisis, two country visions

Costa Rican society has been witnessing the confrontation between two opposing ways of perceiving and projecting the country. While some sectors advocate a market model, others expect the Welfare State to deal with matters such as the social, economic and cultural rights of the population. The crisis and the possible ways out of it constitute the new arena in which these two visions collide. While the Government proposes a package of measures which seems diffident and overdue, civil society stands behind stronger social and productive intervention.

Programa de Participación Ciudadana
CEP-Altoja
Mario Céspedes and Carmen Chacón

The impact of the world crisis began to make itself felt in Costa Rica as from the second half of 2008. Some of the relevant data includes the decrease (year-to-year) of the Monthly Index of Economic Activity (MIEA) given as -1.0% in October 2008, -2.5% in November, -3.7% in December and -4.5% in January 2009. According to some opinions, “a sector-by-sector analysis based on the MIEA itself would show that the agricultural, manufacturing industry, commercial and hotel sectors are already in a recession, since the MIEA rate for December 2008 is lower than the rate for December 2007”.2

In July 2008 the Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social (CCSS, the Costa Rican social security bank), reported 1,376,667 insured workers; six months later it reported 1,385,350, which represents an increase of only 0.1% of the monthly average. There were in all 18,683 new workers. This means that the reduction of productive growth had already affected the generation of sources of employment during the second half of 2008.3

There are two specific examples related to migrants and women which illustrate this last point. CCSS’s report specifies that there were just under 90,000 insured construction workers, but that in January 2009 barely 74,000 were employed; 4 that is, a loss of 16,000 jobs in six months. This fact is particularly significant as it involves the most affected sector of the population: migrants; above all, Nicaraguans.

A study carried out by the Ministry of Labour and Social Security concludes, in its section on migrants, that two years ago 65% of some 150,000 construction workers were Nicaraguans.5 It should be noted that figures reported by the CCSS are far lower than the real numbers, since most of the migrant population hired in construction do not contribute to the CCSS, which puts them in an extremely vulnerable position and deprives them of multiple benefits.

Gender and the crisis

The consequences of the impact on women lead to an increase in unemployment and a widening pay gap between men and women. An ILO report published on 8 May 2009 states with regard to the first outcome that nearly half a million people – most of them women – will lose their jobs in Central America during 2009. This means that the unemployment rate for women will rise 3.5 percentage points to 14%.

Women’s average hourly wages – as compared to men’s – have fallen from 99.1% in 1999 to 83.9% in 2007. The pay gap is even wider in agriculture and fishing – in which they devote 13 hours more to non-remunerated labour – followed by professional activities and unqualified workers, with a difference of 10 hours. Although the time women actually devote to remunerated work is comparable to the time men devote to it, and despite their increasing participation in the labour market, the non-remunerated dimension of the work which is socially necessary in order to reproduce and care for not only the labour force but also the old and the sick, still falls to women to a disproportionate degree. Women devote an additional working day plus one further hour to dealing with these social demands.6

The Government’s response

In January 2009 President Oscar Arias launched the so-called Plan Escudo (“Shield Plan”) in response to the crisis – a response which is overdue and insufficient. The project, which aims to support families, workers, enterprises and the financial sector, consists in the implementation of new measures – such as the Law for the Protection of Employment in Times of Crisis – and in the continuation of others which are already in place. Amongst these are a 15% increase in the CCSS’s non-contributive pensions, a food programme for more vulnerable children on weekends, the Avances (“Moving Forward”) Programme,7 a housing subsidy and the write-off of overdue debts for 2,100 underprivileged families.

Some of these proposals reinforce strategies which focus on dealing with poverty, thus consolidating the welfare system and running the risk of becoming pork-barrel handouts during the electoral campaign which has already begun. The Plan’s omissions regarding specific measures to cover the needs of women are particularly serious. In fact, there is no mention of any steps to eliminate gender discrimination in the labour market and the exploitation of women in the area of reproductive and care labour, or to improve the quality of their jobs.8

The draft Law for the Protection of Employment in Times of Crisis, which will require enterprises to undertake to reduce the working day without reducing wages or firing personnel, deserves a special mention. Other measures involve the promotion of micro, small and medium enterprises and capital increases for state banks and investments in public infrastructure, particularly education and the national road network, for which loans are being negotiated with the Inter-American Development Bank and other international financial organizations.

1 This article is derived from Dialogue Series: Global Crisis and its Impacts on Costa Rica, organized by the Altorfa Studies and Publications Centre and the Citizen Control Network in March 2009.
3 La Nación, 5 March 2009.
5 El Centroamericano, 9 March 2009.
6 Ibidem.
7 A government programme for economic transfers on condition that families keep their children within the educational system.
According to Dr. Luis Paulino Vargas,9 foreign debt contracted in order to confront the crisis in compliance with the Plan, will amount to USD 1.4 billion, merely to cover expenditure on public works. “This implies an increase in the foreign debt of approximately 25% in one go, which is no small thing. At the very least, this demands meticulous planning for the use of such resources”. A further problem is the contrast between the urgency with which these resources are needed and the complexity and slowness of the loan negotiation process, parliamentary approval and the concession of public works contracts.

Social, political and entrepreneurial sectors – possibly dissatisfied with how the initiative was presented by the Government – state that so far the results of the Plan Escudo do not fulfill expectations. President Arias did not instigate national dialogue processes in order to construct a wide social consensus. Furthermore, the initiative was launched during a pre-electoral year, which makes the execution of measures more complex, distorts parliamentary debate and deepens citizens' distrust regarding the “good intentions” of the president and his party.

A proposal made by social organizations

Three months after the presentation of the Plan Escudo, several social organizations submitted to national public opinion a proposal called “Ten Steps to Confront the Crisis through Social and Productive Inclusion”.

This proposal is included within a context in which social organizations have been able to strengthen their resistance to the neo-liberal model; for example, regarding the Free Trade Agreement with the United States, greater influence in national debates on the country’s position and a greater capacity for the submission of proposals. Its points are:

- Recovering the socio-productive function of the financial system. Redirecting the financial system towards the national productive sector through the flexibilization of financial indicators and the establishment of social and productive performance requirements.

- Guaranteeing food security and autonomy as well as agricultural employment. The reactivation of agriculture and guarantees for the provision of basic food items through price stability, the promotion of production and the marketing of small food-producing crop and cattle undertakings.

- PROWORK / A conditioned transfer system to promote decent work. In the face of proposals to reduce the cost of production, either in fact or by law (labour flexibilization and reduction of the working day and wages), we propose a “rewards and punishments” system in order to promote the protection and creation of jobs and decent work, complying with basic standards, minimizing layoffs for economic reasons, discouraging the unfair competition of informal labour and encouraging social, labour and environmental investment.

- Joint social responsibility and decent work through infrastructure for social care. Confronted with the Government’s exclusively compensatory proposal in the matter of social investment, we suggest generating jobs and overcoming barriers to women’s access to the labour market by widening and creating a social care infrastructure which will increase the income of households and reduce school dropout rates.

- Towards a new role for the Central Bank: redefining exchange and balance of payments policy. Efforts should be made to achieve a transparent monetary policy which is subject to accountability, which contemplates the objectives of price stability and the achievement of full employment in a balanced manner and which makes it possible to return to the mini-devaluation system.

- A humanitarian plan for the rescue of heavily indebted persons. It is urgent to have a financial rescue plan in place for persons who are heavily indebted, which will guarantee the restructuring of their debt, the recovery of their self-esteem, training with regard to responsible consumption and family budget management. Credit card limits should be fixed, at least in terms of a passive basic rate plus a predefined percentage of 10%. These criteria should apply for a period of at least two years, after which they may be flexibilized to a certain extent.

- “Home-made” consumption. The promotion of the responsible consumption of national products and the promotion of equitable local markets. Since all national goods and services involve hundreds and thousands of jobs, we should aim at consuming national goods and services. In addition, it is essential to develop local markets, social economic systems, fair trade and social commercialization strategies, understood and declared to be public interest activities, and which enable the coordination of the supply of national production, particularly in the case of small producers, by means of short commercialization chains.

- Public employment stability. At this juncture it is essential to ensure the availability of public and private employment. In the case of public employment, central and decentralized government should provide security through a massive process of tenure appointments, both by means of appropriate civil service examinations, and through competition-free appointments according to the terms stipulated by law. In addition, dismissals for economic reasons or due to institutional restructuring should be frozen for a prudential period.

- A policy for the recovery of purchasing power and the progressive increase of salaries. It is essential to deal with the depressed salaries of non-professional personnel in the public sector. Furthermore, both in the public and in the private sectors the purchasing power of the working population in general – and the population with the lowest salaries in particular – should be maintained.

- Community property in coastal communities and other forms of gaining access to property. In coastal communities, the sustainability of families depends on avoiding eviction under the pretext of the construction of mega-projects which are now paralyzed because of the crisis. The social impact of mega-projects – ongoing or paralyzed – is enormous. This is why a community property system must be promoted which will allow families who live on the coastal fringe to remain there, and also foster sustainable forms of production, including sustainable tourism, and the improvement of the capacity for responsible consumption. In addition to the coastal communities, it is necessary to generate forms of gaining access to land through rentals or the use of idle land.

In expectation of national dialogue

Costa Rican society is split into two visions of the country which have been confronting each other for some time. For example, in resistance and mobilization against the ICE11 Combo (2000), in the 2006 elections and in the fight against the FTA through the 2007 referendum. On the one hand are the sectors which promote the free trade model. On the other, those promoting the Welfare State model but who also wish to see progress in the increase of social, economic and cultural rights, and a higher degree of democracy.

Regarding the Government's timid responses, social organizations warn that “…if these challenges are not dealt with on the basis of social dialogue and by means of a firm change of course, the persistence of traditional solutions (one-time cash handouts and cuts in public spending, as well as the reduction of rights) will doubtless lead to greater inequality and poverty and to the risk we have already pointed out of turning conjunctural poverty due to the loss of income, into structural poverty, and increasing violence against women, children and the elderly”.12 It remains to be seen whether the proposals of the social organizations are capable of overcoming the economist interpretations of the crisis, focusing on people’s lives, on how they are situated and how they are recognized in production, labour, recreation or household administration, amongst other areas. If such an approach is not included, the so-called alternative vision would remain in accord with the prevalent economic paradigms which exclude a variety of activities traditionally considered typical of the “private sphere”. In those, women are persistently made to appear invisible in their role as subjects in the development and reproduction of life, their exclusion and subordination increases and their productive and reproductive labour put to use for the operation of the system itself.

9 Vargas, Luis. “Plan Escudo”. Extract from the article submitted during “Global Crisis and its Impacts on Costa Rica”, a series organized by the Alforja Studies and Publications Centre and the Citizen Control Network in March 2009.

10 Ibidem.

11 An attempt at legislation to privatize telecommunications in Costa Rica, which are under a monopoly held by the Costa Rican Electricity Institute (ICE) with a social projection.

12 Several authors. Diez medidas para enfrentar la crisis económica con inclusión social y productiva (“Ten Steps to Confront the Economic Crisis through Social and Productive Inclusion”), 2009.
The global economic crisis will damage tourism and real estate, two of the country’s major industries, and raise unemployment levels. Government measures taken to alleviate the crisis will not benefit some of the most vulnerable sectors of society. The Government should open the way for civil society to provide assistance, specifically NGOs that are in close contact with all sectors of society. This would require reform of the legal and regulatory framework regulating NGOs.

Impact of the crisis
Unavoidably, Cyprus will have to cope with unemployment, which is expected to rise to 4.5% in 2009, from 3.9% in 2008. The growth rate is expected to remain positive in 2009, at around 2.1%. 4 This is a much stronger performance than in the EU as a whole, where unemployment is expected to reach 8% and economic growth in most countries will be negative. 5

Tourism and real estate, two of the most important industries, are already reeling from the global crisis. Predictions for tourism, which contributes 20% of the country’s GDP, range from pessimistic to dire. 6 The construction and real estate sector has been hit hard as well. Both sectors employ substantial numbers of migrants and women. 7 As a result, these vulnerable groups will suffer more than the population as a whole.

Women are traditionally marginalized in the country’s socio-economic life and, absent from decision making bodies, a situation that is unlikely to improve during the economic crisis. 8 As a service-based sector employing seasonal workers, tourism relies primarily on female workers, many of whom are likely to lose their jobs. 9 Even before the downturn, only 62.4% of the female workforce was employed, versus 80% of the adult male workforce. In addition, the 20% wage gap between male and female workers is one of the largest in Europe. 10

Over the last decade, the immigrant population has climbed by 15% a year. By 2007, non-citizens made up 25% of the country’s labour force. 11 Along with gradually increasing economic disparities, this has contributed to increasing mistrust of immigrants among Cypriots. Employers tend to hire undocumented immigrants to reduce their costs, and migrant workers endure the worst employment conditions. To discourage applications for asylum, the Government has adopted policies such as limiting immigrants and asylum seekers to employment in sectors such as house cleaning, farming and agriculture. Although schools have made some progress in integrating migrant children, opportunities for learning are limited.

On many occasions, the media have used immigrants as scapegoats, holding them responsible for economic and social problems. 12 Stereotypes attract readers and viewers, and in Cyprus the media often present one-sided reports on incidents involving immigrants, and rarely give exposure to their point of view. Despite their contribution to the national economy, migrant workers remain excluded from economic activity. 13

The collapse of markets around the world has hit emerging markets hard. Governments are faced with the complex task of ensuring equal access to basic needs while securing human rights for all individuals living within their borders. The economic crisis is just beginning to buffet Cyprus; its effects are expected to grow more severe by the end of 2009. The most marginalized sectors of society will bear the brunt of the downturn.

Cyprus has always had a mixed economy with a strong State role, especially in basic services such as electricity, water, telecommunications, health care, education and transport. In recent years growth has been strong, and the Ministry of Finance announced that the 2009 state budget will run a surplus that will be invested in public services. 8 However it is becoming clear that the value added tax and other indirect taxes, the major sources of government revenue, are falling as the economy falters, which will restrict the Government’s ability to fund public investments and programmes to help mitigate the impact of the crisis. 9 Chronic low productivity in the public sector will also restrict the Government’s ability to respond to the rapidly escalating economic crisis quickly, effectively and efficiently. 10

1 “Birth attended...” estimated following procedure “1” in p. 209.

National reports 80 Social Watch
public benefits. They have limited labour and social rights, and no political rights whatsoever. During the last five years, 700 cases of racism and xenophobia have been reported.13 Although in recent years the Government has attempted to enforce several European directives on immigration, so far these policies have not been fully effective.14

Response to the crisis

The Government has announced several measures designed to boost the economy. In a classic Keynesian economic move,15 it has attempted to speed up several development projects for new buildings, roads, and infrastructure. It has also spent EUR 470 million (about USD 622 million) to support the tourism industry. These measures are expected to keep the unemployment rate low and ensure GDP growth of 2%. A fair amount of this countercyclical spending is designed to assist vulnerable and marginalized Cypriots, including increases in pensions, financial aid for university students and financial housing support for low-income couples. In addition, a new law has been adopted that increases the social security contributions of both employers and employees by 1.3% for the next five years.

Government, trade unions and the federation of employers have also recently agreed on a programme to combat hiring illegal workers, including a hotline for reporting illegal immigrants and employers who offer them jobs. This opens up opportunities for further discrimination and exploitation of “cheap” labour, however, as employers seeking to maximize profits will adhere to the agreement selectively to suit their interests.

Critics argue that the measures proposed so far are inadequate and will not be sufficient to boost the economy, nor will they protect the rights of everyone who lives and works within the country’s borders. For example, the measure to provide financial support to university students excludes foreign students and migrants. Foreign students are only allowed to work 20 hours a week, and are restricted to employment in areas such as agriculture, cleaning, construction and restaurant work.

Role of civil society

Given the multifaceted nature of the current crisis, the Governments should re-evaluate all policies and practices to ensure that they help protect the civil and human rights of all residents. One immediate measure to achieve this should be to invite all civil society actors to participate in a public debate on the economic crisis and appropriate responses. Because their specialized grassroots work keeps NGOs in touch with social needs, they are more flexible than Government and can be more effective in reaching marginalized groups. Their expertise could be indirectly employed by State institutions to accomplish strategic goals. Furthermore, NGOs could recommend innovative and creative practices for promoting the education, empowerment, gender equality, and human and labour rights of those who are currently disempowered.

Empowering civil society is crucial to cushioning the impact of the economic crisis. One of the primary challenges confronting NGOs in Cyprus is to make their voice heard in society. Despite substantial progress in recent years, NGOs that support marginalized groups must still overcome mistrust and prejudice. The absence of a coherent and transparent framework of cooperation between civil society actors and public institutions significantly reduces the efficacy of national policies.

Expert reviews of the current legal and regulatory framework affecting NGOs have concluded that it needs to be reformed and modernized to meet European best-practice requirements and to be consistent with international law. The Planning Bureau, through CyprusAid, initiated this process in 2008, when NGOs were invited to participate and voice their opinions. They have urged the State to create a coherent legal and political framework for cooperation, arguing that this would allow civil society to empower itself and make it possible for the State to implement national policies more efficiently and effectively.

Particularly in this time of economic crisis, the Government must engage all stakeholders in developing and implementing ameliorative measures. The absence of a legal framework makes it difficult for NGOs to take action to secure the rights of the entire population. NGOs and the Government need to establish better channels of communication and information exchange so that NGOs can become vehicles for implementing national policies in every corner of the island. In addition, as the crisis generates increased xenophobia in European countries, it is essential for the Government and NGOs to engage in an information and education campaign to raise awareness about the causes of unemployment and the effects of the crisis in order to help reduce bias against immigrants.

References


CZECH REPUBLIC

Democracy at a dead end

Last year President Vaclav Klaus proclaimed that the country was living in its prime, with a “faith in today”. That euphoria is now evaporating as the economy begins showing signs of weakness. Reforms in public finances, such as lower taxation for the wealthiest and increasing the value added tax (VAT) on basic articles, have created new burdens for poor. Conditions of some marginalized groups such as the Roma have become so difficult that they are emigrating. On a positive note, the country has made some progress – though not enough – in bridging the gender gap.

President Vaclav Klaus began the year 2008 by declaring this the best period in Czech history, noting that the enormous increase in loans and mortgages was a symptom of “faith in today”. He also boasted of the country’s robust national currency, asserting that it was evidence of a strengthening economy. In fact, the Czech Crone (CZK) was being artificially bolstered by speculation. The right-wing Government, in tune with the President, remained in denial, refusing to acknowledge that the global economic crisis would affect the Czech Republic. This optimism began to evaporate only when statistics and the daily reality experienced by the most of the population made it impossible to deny that production was plummeting at an unprecedented rate, the fifth worst performance in the EU.¹

The impact of government reforms and the financial crisis

In 2007, the Government initiated a reform of public finances, lowering taxes on earners in the highest income bracket and increasing the value added tax on basic articles, which increased the tax burden on multi-member and low-income households. While the Ministry of Finance predicted 3.8% inflation for 2008, the consumer price index jumped 6.3%² and real incomes declined by -2.7%³ year-on-year by the third quarter of 2008. Even before the impact of the world economic crisis became evident in the Czech Republic, predictions that reforms would hurt most of the population became reality.

The global economic crisis, only now beginning to hit the country, is lowering the standard of living even further. In the third quarter of 2008, the number of unemployed workers was higher than in the previous quarter, the first time this had happened since 2005. By the end of 2008, the official unemployment rate hit 4.4%. However, the official figure omitted 178,000 people who were considered to be not actively seeking employment; adding this group would have pushed the unemployment rate 50% higher.⁴ Foreign workers, particularly those from Asia, are typically the first to be dismissed and are suffering the most. Their legislative protection is inadequate; most are dependent on job agencies, which makes their work status precarious, and the majority borrowed money to immigrate. In addition to being a personal economic disaster, returning home would jeopardize the livelihoods of their families.

Since the impact of the crisis began to be felt, every second small or medium size company has already dismissed employees and cut working hours or is preparing to do so in the immediate future.⁵ Stock exchange indices are down more than 50% from their 2007 peaks. Nevertheless, the Government has not abandoned its plans to privatize the pension system.⁶ By late 2008, it began to consider anti-crisis measures, largely in response to growing global concern as well as pressure from domestic industry.

The huge increase in household debt has put the financial industry in a precarious position. Until recently, personal borrowing was increasing by one-third every year. The bulk of this was mortgage debt, but nearly 20% consisted of loans from non-banking institutions, mainly for instalment purchases. In some cases, these loans come with an effective annual interest rate greater than 200%. The state is supporting this usury, for instance by introducing mechanisms to facilitate debt collection. A 2008 insolvency law includes a bankruptcy option for private individuals, however using it is very difficult.

Health system reform

Since the Minister of Health declared, “I want capitalism to be in the health system”, he has done his best to achieve this goal.⁷ Several regional hospitals have been privatized; they have reduced so-called non-lucrative services, primarily treatment of difficult or long-term cases. Responsibility for these cases is being shifted to large state hospitals and teaching hospitals. In 2008, government health care expenditures fell to less than 7% of GDP, one of the lowest proportions in the EU, and about 20,000 employees (8%) left the health care system.⁸ The introduction of fees for services and attempts to decrease social insurance taxes, especially for the wealthiest taxpayers, are key components of the Government’s regressive taxation strategy.

The Roma and social exclusion

Antisocial reforms and the onset of the economic crisis have been most harmful to those already excluded, such as old age pensioners, single mothers and other vulnerable groups. Not all Roma are socially excluded, however most of the 250,000 in the Czech Republic have been directly affected by the declining economy. In 2006, when the most recent data were compiled, 80,000 Roma lived in some 300 socially excluded localities⁹. This was mainly due to

¹ See <www.czso.cz/csu/redakce.nsf/i/mira_inflace>
² See <www.czso.cz/csu/redakce.nsf/I/1-34782529-temer-polovina>
³ See <www.czso.cz/csu/redakce.nsf/informace/cpmr130108.doc>
⁴ See <www.czso.cz/csu/redakce.nsf/informace/czam020209.doc>
⁵ See <www.cso.cz/csu/redakce.nsf/informace/czam020209.doc>
⁶ See <www.czso.cz/csu/redakce.nsf/informace/czam020209.doc>
⁷ See <www.czso.cz/csu/redakce.nsf/informace/czam020209.doc>
⁸ See <www.czso.cz/csu/redakce.nsf/informace/czam020209.doc>
⁹ See <www.czso.cz/csu/redakce.nsf/informace/czam020209.doc>

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1. See <www.czso.cz/csu/redakce.nsf/i/mira_inflace>
2. See <www.czso.cz/csu/redakce.nsf/informace/cpmr130108.doc>
5. See <www.czso.cz/csu/redakce.nsf/informace/czam020209.doc>
7. See <www.czso.cz/csu/redakce.nsf/informace/czam020209.doc>
8. See <www.czso.cz/csu/redakce.nsf/informace/czam020209.doc>
institutionalized discrimination and a lack of Government interest in resolving Roma problems.

In January 2008, the Agency for Social Inclusion in Romania localized its doors,¹⁰ with a mission of raising the standard of living of socially excluded Romania and facilitating their inclusion in Czech society. The main vehicle for accomplishing this was supposed to be providing funding for immediate purchase of services. However, the Government ordered the agency to establish a framework for cooperation with interested parties in each region before ordering any services. The staff spent the entire year on this task, after which an internal audit concluded that the agency’s approach violated Cabinet policies.

The agency has been a disappointment. Its mandate is weak. Instead of money, it offers only advice. The State’s long-standing neglect and extensive economic problems have made some groups of Roma in socially excluded localities targets of racial hatred. In one extreme example, in 2008 neo-Nazis and other inhabitants held mass anti-Roma demonstrations in Litvinov.¹¹ In April 2009, a two-year-old girl was severely burned in a petrol bomb attack on the house of a Roma family in Vítkov; her parents and other family members were wounded.

During 2008, the Government ascribed the increase in the number of Roma applying for asylum in Canada to economic difficulties.¹² It is true that the Roma face severe economic hardship; however this is only one factor among many driving them to emigrate. They do not feel welcome in the Czech Republic and fear the country’s rising fascist tide.¹³

The status of women

Participation of women in public life and decision-making remains minimal. Even so, the Government has not adopted any measures to bridge the gender gap in political and decision-making positions. The proportion of women in the lower chamber of parliament stands at 15.5%, putting the country at 80 among 88 countries. Women are 30.3% of district court judges and 60.4% of regional court judges are women, they hold less than 25% of most legislative and executive positions. Even in the judiciary, the higher the court, the lower the proportion of women.¹⁴

In recent years, the country has made significant progress with regard to violence against women, enacting legislation to prevent domestic violence and making stalking a criminal offence. However, these measures are still insufficient to constrain all forms of gender-based violence. Regrettably, women’s groups have a hard time getting funding, in part due to their exclusion from the Ministry of Work and Social Affairs 2008 grant competition which stipulates that projects “may not have political elements and cannot promote any political or ideological causes, including feminist ideology.”¹⁵ As a result, many of these groups have had to terminate their activities.

The Czech legal system does not have laws that prohibit discrimination. The President vetoed anti-discrimination legislation that would have brought the Czech Republic into conformity with European law; an absolute majority in parliament is required to override his veto. Until it does, the Czech Republic will be in breach of its commitments as a member of the EU. Serious gaps remain in the protection of individual rights. These are particularly egregious in the labour code, which had been amended in the legislation vetoed by the President.

In the economic sphere, statistics show that far more men than women between the ages of 20 to 35 are economically active,¹⁶ primarily because raising children is still considered to be mainly women’s responsibility. This is only one of the many gender stereotypes linked to maternity that place women at a disadvantage in the labour market—during the hiring process, on the career ladder and in their access to further education.

The gender gap in income is another discrimination issue. In 2007, this was 19.8%, higher than the European average.¹⁷ The public considers this a significant concern. Nearly two-fifths of women (39%) and a quarter of men (25%) think that women receive less pay than men do when they perform the same tasks. According to opinion polls, the Czech public regards age (64%) and gender (45%) as the most prevalent barriers to success in the labour market.¹⁸

In January 2008, the Government adopted a new policy on parental allowances, known as “three speed” parental leave. Parents can now choose the amount of time they will get a parental allowance. The duration determines the monthly benefit. Women with high incomes get the most, while women with low income receive the least. The Ministry of Work and Social Issues, which is extremely conservative on gender issues, refuses to support and develop childcare institutions and is moving to abolish crèches, of which there are only about 40 in the country. The Government’s so-called pro-family package does not include comprehensive support for childcare institutions.

Another problem is the lack of support for policies that combine childcare and family programmes with activities that promote integration of female immigrants. Entering the labour market, these women are also at a disadvantage due to their lack of academic credentials and skills. Job opportunities for single mothers are severely limited as well. Immigrants of both sexes are generally limited to less attractive, poorly paid jobs, but immigrant women frequently endure unequal treatment. These conditions are partly the result of their ethnicity or nationality, but also due to gender discrimination in the recruitment process, as well as inequities in working conditions and remuneration.¹⁹

Development cooperation

Czech Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) is largely devoted to transformation cooperation. Its aim is to promote the so-called Western-style democracy in the countries of the former Soviet Union, Cuba, Burma and Iraq. According to the Government, this focus is justified primarily by the Czech Republic’s experience in post-communist transformation. Nevertheless, the Government has given up on fulfilling its EU commitment to increase ODA. Growth ceased in 2007 and aid actually decreased for the first time as a proportion of gross national income (GNI) – from 0.12% to 0.11%, despite pressure from NGOs and other parties. Ministerial representatives told a parliamentary foreign affairs committee meeting that the percentage contribution will increase, primarily due to a decrease in GNI. The programme is not transparent – the 2008 tender process for the transformational project in Cuba was not made public. Projects that obtained funding were co-financed by neo-liberal institutions such as the National Endowment for Democracy in the US.

Non-governmental organisations and the media

Czech NGOs are under huge financial pressure; their financing has gradually become dependent on the State or on foreign foundations, few of which provide significant support for independent civic initiatives. Successful grant applicants must fulfill political criteria and their activities must be in conformity with the donor policies. To avoid criticism and exclusion, most organizations are eschewing advocacy work and focusing on service work. The least restrictive financial support comes from the European Commission, particularly those administered directly by the Government. The largest civic campaign remains Czechs Against Poverty, which participates in the Global Call to Action Against Poverty and focuses on advocacy and fulfilling the Millennium Development Goals.

Independent journalism is practically nonexistent. Exposure of political scandals very frequently appears to be generated by political directives, rather than independent investigative work. The media provide information that is selective and incomplete; their objective often seems to be providing support for the interests of particular economic and political groups. In this environment, democracy in the Czech Republic is at a dead end.²²

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¹⁰ See: <www.sociakalizeczenovani.cz/>
An unprotected economy

The food price crisis in 2008 showed that after decades of paying no attention to its agricultural sector, Egypt lacks food sovereignty. Today the Egyptian economy is beginning to feel the impact of the global crisis. The drop in remittances and the return of émigrés has put pressure on a labour market badly prepared to absorb more unemployed workers. The Government has adopted measures to promote investment and economic recovery. While these are long overdue, it remains to be seen whether they can deliver the needed stimulus before rising unemployment and lack of food security lead to widespread social unrest.

Although the Egyptian economy has experienced rapid growth over the last five years, the fact that the country imports two-thirds of its food has put it in a vulnerable position. As a consequence of the soaring increase in international food prices in 2008, a great part of the population had difficulties in feeding their families, and social tensions grew. On the other hand, the global food crisis revealed the importance of food self-sufficiency for developing countries such as Egypt, most of which have neglected investment in agriculture during the last 25 years due to low prices for food commodities in international markets.

In addition, with the constant deterioration of land fertility, climate change and water scarcity, crop yields in Egypt are declining each year while, at the same time, imports of agricultural products have increased to meet the demands of a growing population. All of these contributed to the overall loss of food sovereignty.

A slowdown in growth

Since 2004, following the election of Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif, the Government has promoted a highly open market economy. An inflow of foreign investment and record income from tourism, shipping and other activities related to the Suez Canal allowed the country to experience the most rapid economic growth in decades. Nevertheless, since the last quarter of the fiscal year 2007-08, this growth has started to slow down. According to the Minister of Economic Development, Osman Mohamed Osman, growth slowed by 5.8 per cent in the first quarter of the fiscal year 2008-09. At the same time, the rise in food prices, which led to an index of inflation of over 20 per cent, has had a negative impact on consumption.

The Government anticipates a continued drop in exports for 2009, together with declining foreign investment and reduced income from the Suez Canal and tourism—all due to the global slowdown.

The same will happen with the indexes of growth. As 70 per cent of the country’s currency revenue comes from the services sector and the crisis has hit the global demand for tourism particularly hard, the Egyptian economy during the present fiscal year is expected to have its slowest annual growth in five years.

At a luncheon of the American Chamber of Commerce held in Cairo in October 2008, Minister of Trade and Industry Rachid Mohamed Rachid stated that additional measures were needed if the country wanted to maintain the same level of growth. “If we keep on doing what we have been doing to reach a 7 per cent growth,” he stated, “it is very clear we will not be achieving that 7 per cent, neither in 2008 nor in 2009”. He noted that reassuring the viability of the financial sector was as important as supporting the most vulnerable sectors in order to keep on growing. He also pointed out that the fact that the banking sector was healthy and had enough liquidity was good news, and that this liquidity should be assigned to the export sector, investment and consumption.2

Impacts on agriculture

The lack of investment in agriculture will result in an inevitable increase in the unemployment rate and, as consequence, an increase of the number of people living in poverty along with the level of out-migration—especially in Upper Egypt. Comprehensive development of the agricultural sector, enhanced support for farmers and the adoption of alternative agricultural policies are needed to provide food safety and to dignify the life of Egyptians by means of a system that addresses their social, economic and political rights.

Unemployment

The Executive Director of the Centre for Industrial Modernization, Adham Nadim, announced the loss of 45 per cent of existing jobs, due to the fact that they were not professional jobs. Thirty-five per cent of the 2 million people in the industrial workforce have no labour protection. According to Nadim, immediate measures are needed to correct the situation.

In March 2009, the Minister of Economic Development declared that the social development plan for 2009-10 will be difficult to implement due to the global crisis and its impact on the Egyptian economy. He estimated that growth slowdown would lead to an increase in unemployment, with the loss of about 150,000 jobs.

A survey carried out by the Centre for Trade Union and Workers Services (CTUWS) in April 2009 showed that 6,100 workers had been laid off in several sectors, including 3,100 in the textile sector and 270 in tourism, both of which employ predominantly women. A tourism company in Hurghada dismissed 200 of its 890 personnel. In other tourist cities, 25 per cent of workers’ benefits have been cut off.

In addition, some 1,400 workers have been laid off in construction, 700 in the food sector and 550 in the mining sector. When the Assiut Cement company, which belongs to French Siemens, decided to stop production to carry out ‘maintenance’ work, only 680 of a total of 4,400 employees had work contracts, while the rest worked on a daily or temporary basis. In addition, Orascom Construction dismissed 400 temporary employees in March 2009, and the building company CEAC

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1 This report draws on reports from the Land Center for Human Rights (LCHR) and Center for Trade Unions & Workers Services (CTUWS).

dismissed 150 in January. The banking sector has also announced staff retrenchments in the coming months.

**Investment and savings**

According to the Economic Development minister, reduced growth along with increased public investment—in human development, infrastructure, education and health programmes, among others—will produce a deficit between investment and domestic savings that could reach EGP 85 billion (just over USD 13 billion). As for remittances, EGP 40 billion (some USD 7.2 billion) are expected in 2009-10, some USD 180 million less than the previous year. The same will happen with the share of private investment in total investment—it is expected that this will reach 57%, compared to 67% in the previous period.

The loss of jobs among Egyptians living abroad is estimated to result in the return of approximately 250,000 out of a total of 6 million, which will further stress the labour market. On the one hand, the Government is in no condition to absorb the returning workers; on the other, private companies increasingly demand better qualifications and expertise when hiring new employees. This situation can only serve to increase unemployment dramatically.

**The Government’s response**

In response to the crisis, the Government has implemented a series of measures to strengthen sectors of the economy that are likely to stimulate renewed growth. These measures include:

- Increased expenditure on public investment, including the implementation of urgent labour-intensive projects to boost consumption and revitalize the economic cycle.
- Reduced tariffs on intermediate goods and capital to help companies compete abroad and to encourage investment.
- Lifting of taxes on imports of capital goods for one year, in order to promote investment.
- Investment of some EGP 15 billion in projects with public and private participation.
- Plans to attract foreign investment, particularly from the Arab region, amounting to USD 10 billion annually.
- New investment opportunities in feasible projects such as oil, irrigation, civil aviation, free trade zones, tourism, urban development, housing, agriculture, trade and information technologies, among others.
- The establishment of investment promotion bodies at local government level.
- Efforts to solve problems and simplify investment procedures, especially in labour-intensive sectors, such as agriculture, industry and services.
- Efforts to achieve price stability of energy for industries.
- Increased support to the productive and exporting sectors.
- Provision of land needed for infrastructure projects and productive activities.
- Improved coordination with the Central Bank in order to provide credit to small and medium enterprises and to develop big surpluses of liquidity to finance productive projects.

In addition, a number of long-overdue banking reforms have also been announced. At this point, however, it remains to be seen what sort of impact these measures will have in terms of renewed growth. In the meantime, it is increasingly urgent to provide measures to mitigate the impact of the economic crisis on the population, particularly those who have lost their jobs and can no longer pay for basic food items. Without such measures, social unrest is likely to escalate dramatically, and it is only a matter of time before people take to the streets.
EL SALVADOR

The crisis and some encouraging changes

Two decades of neoliberal economic policies have left the country in an extremely vulnerable situation in the face of the global economic crisis. Deteriorating social, economic, political and environmental conditions, social and labour market exclusion, falling remittances and rising prices of basic goods are just some of the devastating effects. Although part of the problem has been the high degree of dependency on the United States, political changes in both countries could make this very dependency conducive to finding a way out.

El Salvador has experienced 20 years of neoliberal government that infringed the economic, social, cultural and environmental rights of broad sections of the population. This situation is further complicated by the fact that no provision has been made to counteract the effects of the recession in the United States, the crisis in food and fuel prices or the environmental crisis.

Deteriorating public services and conditions of employment

There has been a deterioration in the quality and scope of public services due to the erosion of the role of the State. The proportion of the budget assigned to provide these services has been reduced and a market approach has been imposed involving privatization of state-owned companies and the sale of state assets. Housing, health care, education and water are increasingly under pressure and, if the economic crisis becomes prolonged, this is likely to provoke further social tensions, weakening the State and increasing the likelihood of instability and violence. Amongst the most vulnerable populations there is concern over the increase in the number of working children, in gastrointestinal and respiratory diseases, in people with HIV, and in insecurity, as well as in children and teenagers joining urban gangs.

In addition, flexibilization of the labour market as a “business incentive” for reducing labour costs has led to a deterioration in working conditions, the loss of purchasing power of salaries, and the creation of low-productivity jobs and productive jobs carried out in precarious conditions. Apart from limited access to public services and livelihoods for the unemployed, there is a lack of access to productive, quality jobs that are sufficiently attractive to retain the employed population. While for the last five-year period the unemployed population is estimated to be less than 7% of the economically active population (EAP), UNDP reports that only 20% of the EAP has a permanent, well-paid job with all social benefits.

An economy dependent on the United States

Although various global financial institutions have noted that El Salvador’s economy is one of the most sound in Central America, it is highly dependent on trade with the United States and the effects of the crisis were soon felt. According to the Central Reserve Bank (BCR), 51% of Salvadoran exports went to the United States in 2007. In October 2008 banks began increasing interest rates and restricting access to credit, leading to uncertainty. Exports, tourism and family remittances began to fall.

More than 300,000 families – 26.7% of the population – receive money from abroad, which helps defray the cost of food, clothing and basic services. The BCR reported that between 1998 and 2008 remittances had trebled to reach nearly USD 3.8 million, most of it from the United States. Flows of remittances went up 2.5% in 2008 over 2007, but this was a notable decline compared with 2004 when there had increased 17% over the previous year. There are signs that in 2009 and 2010 remittances will fall by around 3% of the total received so far. One of the sectors most affected by the deceleration in the United States has been the building trade, which employs a considerable proportion of the Salvadoran population resident there, and this will have a significant impact.

The food and fuel crisis

Privatization schemes put in place by the Government turned away from agricultural production focused on guaranteeing food security, to focus on the import of basic grains. Free trade led to inflation and a lack of purchasing power by the population due to the absence of any State regulation of the market. Estimates by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) show that for every 15% rise in food prices, there is a 2.8% increase in poverty in the region. Since El Salvador has seen the greatest price increases, chances are that it has also suffered the greatest increase in poverty.

The impact of the increase in oil prices can be seen in the higher cost of the basic shopping basket, producing a rapid decrease in purchasing power and subsequent impoverishment of broad sections of the population. Since 2007 the price of food has been continuously increasing. Average inflation over the last four years was 4.9%, and in April 2008 it hit 6.8%. Cumulative inflation in this period is...

1 Members of the organizations that make up Social Watch El Salvador are APSAL, CIDEP, CODEFAM, FUMA and MEC. Thanks to Yvette Aguilar, Ana Elia Gómez, Carolina Constanza, Jeannette Alvarado, Ana Maria Galdámez and Maria Martínez for their support.

2 The Mesa de Concretación para la Lucha contra la Pobreza (Coalition for Fighting Poverty) (MCLCP) and Save the Children, which jointly organized a forum on the impact of the crisis on Peruvian and other Latin American children, warn about the increase in child labour in the region.


5 Ibid.


period was 19.5%. The minimum monthly salary is between SVC 85.58 (USD 10) and SVC 183 (USD 21). In February 2008 the basic food basket (BFB) cost SVC 163 (USD 19), while the basket of goods and services, which includes all the average family’s needs (food, health, education, housing, clothing), cost SVC 703 (USD 82).4

According to the 2006 National Income and Expenditure Survey, food represents some 30% of the budget in lower-income homes. In June 2008 the cost of the urban BFB increased around 22% compared to June 2007, while the rural BFB has in recent months seen increases close to 25% compared with the same period a year earlier. This seems to be leading to a rapid increase in national poverty and extreme poverty rates.5

It is worth noting that although the impact of the price increases for basic products is greater and more dramatic in lower-income homes, it is also having a considerable effect on middle-income homes. Food, electricity and transport – the three areas most affected by changes at the international level – account for around 50% of the average monthly expenditure of Salvadoran families.6

Given this situation, social and economic policies are required to stimulate national production, particularly farming. This means price regulation, productive investment, higher salaries, job creation and the intervention of the State to control flaws in the market. Food security should be at the centre of Government action.

Inequalities heightened by the crisis

The climate crisis – higher temperatures, changes in the pattern of rainfall and greater frequency and intensity of droughts, floods, landslides and hurricane-force winds – has increased economic, gender, ethnic and other inequalities. It has also heightened existing fragilities associated with the most vulnerable population groups, such as women, children, the elderly, indigenous peoples and the rural and urban poor.

Year after year rural families lose their crops and smallholdings, which reduces their access to land and water for human consumption. As a result, their income falls and they abandon their places of origin, emigrating to major cities or abroad. The country’s economic system multiplies the effects of environmental vulnerability on poor populations.

Phenomena such as deforestation, forest degradation and pollution of rivers and other water courses paved the way for abandoning rural agriculture in the face of an adverse economic climate, leading to a shortage of housing and basic services for both the rural and urban poor, thus putting them at permanent risk. Infectious and vector-transmitted diseases are on the increase.

Given the environmental situation it is estimated that the target under Goal 7 of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), “To reduce by half the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation by 2015”, will be almost impossible to achieve, like most other MDG targets. However, lack of clear, objective information on MDG indicators related to drinking water and sanitation make it difficult to gauge advances and backward steps in this field. Official statistics for the scope, quality and availability of drinking water and sanitation differ from those given by environmental institutions and fail to recognize that simply having a standpipe is no guarantee of access to good-quality water.

For example, the Multipurpose Household Survey (EHPM) reports that by 2007 the total proportion of homes with private running water was 74%,7 while the National Administration of Waterways and Drainage Systems (ANDA) reports that it was 54.2%.8 The EHPM gives the coverage by public fountains or standpipes as 4.2%, but ANDA reports it as 6.2%. In either case these figures are alarming and indicate the shortages in drinking water that working class areas have to put up with.

The MDG progress report prepared by UNDP in 2007 highlights advances in achieving the MDG target on water and sanitation but environmental and consumer organizations find this questionable when the Government has used provision of domestic connections, standpipes, water wells, springs and rainwater reservoirs as indicators of progress in sustainable access to improved water sources. There is no reliable information to indicate whether these resources are really protected and comply with quality standards for water fit for human consumption.

Conclusions

Changes in the political leadership of the United States and El Salvador bring hope that a way will be found to overcome the effects of the crisis, given the close trading links between the two countries. It is imperative that a new relationship is based on autonomy, respect, equity and solidarity. The Salvadoran electoral results of March 2009, granting executive power to the democratic opposition, make possible a new direction and lay the foundations for a model of development that will rebuild agricultural and industrial capacity and generate social welfare.

Social Watch El Salvador will be playing a vigilant role on the country’s new political stage from 2009 regarding compliance with Economic, Social, Cultural and Environmental Rights and MDGs, not only resulting from the change of government, but also because there is a debt owing from previous governments in this respect, already seen to have been due to the lack of any will to comply with them.9

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8 Goitia, A., Crisis alimentaria y crisis del modelo neoliberal en El Salvador [Food crisis and crisis of the neoliberal model in El Salvador].
10 Goitia, A., op. cit.
With no working constitution, functioning parliament, independent judiciary, free press, bureaucratic accountability or officially published national budget, Eritrea, the most militarized country in the world, lacks the mechanisms required to tackle the current global crisis. The shrinking global economy has drained remittances to Eritrea, while prices of food and fuel have skyrocketed. The country needs an immediate transition to a democratic system of governance that has the support of the international community. Humanitarian aid monitored by independent international NGOs appears to be the most effective emergency plan to save the lives of helpless Eritreans.

An open-air prison
An independent state since 1991, Eritrea has yet to offer its citizens true freedom. In fact, conventional features of a free and democratic government are barely visible.1 Virtually all countries in the world have an enforceable national constitution, and most also have functioning parliaments. They conduct regular and periodic elections, irrespective of whether they are free or fair in real terms. They allow private media outlets, even if regulations become so restrictive that they give zero freedom to the press. In Eritrea, the Government adopted a Constitution in 1997, but has never implemented it. The nominal parliament ceased functioning in February 2002. Private media (radio, TV, print and electronic) disappeared between 1997 and 2001; only Government-owned outlets remain, and their allegiance has always been to the ruling elite rather than to the truth. Worst of all, since it gained independence, the country has never enjoyed free and fair elections.

Today, as bread queues spread in the streets of Asmara, the capital city, life has become extremely difficult for Eritreans. Like the former occupation authorities of the Derg (a coordinating committee of the armed forces, police and territorial army) in the 1970s, the Government seems to have declared war against its own people. Today, a common adage among Eritreans is that the only difference between the Derg regime and the current rule of the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) is that the officials of the Derg used to speak in Amharic (the Ethiopian official language) while the PFDJ officials converse in Tigrinya, a vernacular dialect with de facto official status.

Individuals who do not subscribe to state ideology or followers of religious beliefs not officially sanctioned by the Government are systematically targeted and severely punished by the security and military apparatus. As a result, human rights violations are rampant; violation is the norm and protection the exception. Some conservative estimates suggest that more than 20,000 people are in detention without trial or any contact with the outside in more than 300 formal and informal sites all over the country. Most of these sites are administered by army generals, who are not accountable to either the police or ordinary courts. In short, the country has been transformed into an open-air prison where all fundamental rights and freedoms are completely muzzled by nightmarish, Kafkaesque, pervasive and abusive practices.

Social and development indicators
Developments indicators are contradictory. Reports from some sources indicate “progress” in certain areas, such as infant mortality and maternal morbidity. However, the extremely repressive political atmosphere and the impossibility of obtaining reliable data make it difficult to take these accounts at face value. In truth, the flawed economic policies of the authoritarian PFDJ totally depleted the national and local economies long before the global financial crisis hit in late 2008.


The numerous abhorrent violations of human rights perpetrated under the NMSP include rape and other sexual violence against female conscripts. In recent years, military commanders have been in effective control of all senior academic institutions. In 2003, the country ranked as the most militarized state in the world and third highest, after North Korea and Angola, in percentage of Gross National Product going to the military.\(^6\) By mid-2000, Eritrea military had 300,000 people in its ranks, more than at any other time in its history. Since then the number of personnel is believed to have increased exponentially. Female conscripts make up 45.27% of the total national army, and their vulnerability is proportional to their number.

The country’s pervasive crisis has been exacerbated by the shrinking global economy, which has choked off remittances from abroad. The cost of food and fuel has skyrocketed. Prices at fuel pumps, strictly regulated by the Government, are said to be the highest in the world. Actually, fuel is hardly available. Food can be purchased legally only at Government-owned outlets, and farmers have to sell their grain to these stores at a fixed price. Sale of grain in public markets has been effectively criminalized, as regulation of the food and fuel has skyrocketed. Prices at fuel pumps, strictly regulated by the Government, are said to be the highest in the world. Actually, fuel is hardly available. Food can be purchased legally only at Government-owned outlets, and farmers have to sell their grain to these stores at a fixed price. Sale of grain in local markets has been effectively criminalized, as the President himself stated in an extensive media briefing in January 2009.

**Governmental response**

The Government categorically dismisses reports of economic deprivation, as well as reports on political repression, as “enemy propaganda”. In fact, the President quipped that accounts of pervasive economic hardship represent nothing more than the frustrations of “overfed and spilt people” who do not know how to spend their resources. In reality, people are literally dying on their knees of hunger – in a famine caused by the PFDJ. With no working constitution, functioning parliament, independent judiciary, free press, bureaucratic accountability or even an officially published national budget, Eritrea acutely lacks the legislative, administrative and institutional mechanisms required to respond to the current global crisis. Moreover, traditional mechanisms for coping with crises such as emigration are hardly available. Under the suffocating martial law, exit and entry points are closed tight. After depleting whatever meagre resources they may have, the starving masses, particularly women, the elderly and children, are unable to go anywhere and have to resign themselves to dying in their villages. The Government has yet to adopt any programmes to protect the most vulnerable population.

**GONGOs (Government-operated NGOs)**

A sound development agenda driven by a rights-based approach gives strategic preference to empowerment of local communities and accountability. This approach endows people with the power and capacity to become the major actors in their own lives. One way to achieve this is through the involvement of independent civil society organizations and local NGOs representing the interests of their communities. Sadly, the repressive atmosphere renders impossible the work of independent civil society. The country has only three active local organizations engaged in the national development agenda purported to benefit the general population: the National Union of Eritrean Women (NUEW), the National Union of Eritrean Youth and Students (NUYES) and the National Confederation of Eritrean Workers (NCEW). Other “civil society organizations” are timorous and exist in name only.

Even the three active organizations are not genuine or independent enough to represent the interests of their constituencies, as is widely known. They function as the women’s, the youth’s and the workers’ leagues (branches) of the ruling party, which picks their leaders and commands their allegiance. In other words, they are typical examples of Government-operated NGOs (GONGOs), designed to conceal the country’s dependency on foreign aid and pay lip service to civil society participation.\(^7\) The only independent civil society organizations, such as the Eritrean Movement for Democracy and Human Rights, work in exile, excoriated by the Government as “enemy stooges”; if caught inside the country, their members are jailed and tortured.

**International cooperation**

International cooperation is crucial in resolving the multiple global crises disproportionately scourging people in developing countries. For many years, Eritrea’s food deficit has been covered by food aid donated by the international community (although the Government does not acknowledge this). International aid organizations and NGOs have played a pivotal role in this regard. Nonetheless, many of them were expelled as a result of the Government’s illusory policy of “self reliance”. When not refusing food aid, the Government makes it difficult for this assistance to enter into the country. It prefers international aid in the form of cash.

The European Union (EU) remains one of the leading international providers of food and development aid to Eritrea. It is currently debating the release of development aid worth EUR 122 million (about USD 161 million) from the 10th European Development Fund, but has legitimate concerns regarding the Eritrean Government’s contempt for the legal requirements attached to any responsible development aid plan. These include commitment to the principles of good governance, accountability, and respect for human rights and the rule of law, none of which exist in Eritrea. The country has neither the political will nor the means to ensure a genuine development policy, and lacks a transparent decision-making process for formulating and implementing state policies to overcome the current global crisis.

Eritrea needs an immediate transition to a democratic system of governance that has the support of the international community. Until that occurs, humanitarian aid monitored by independent international NGOs appears to be the most effective emergency approach to saving the lives of the helpless population, suffocated by severe political repression as well as an economic meltdown.

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Unemployment, exclusion and ineffective aid

In France the world crisis has had a direct impact on the people, as it has in all the developed countries – which is where it began. The most obvious effects have been rising unemployment and increased social exclusion, and sectors that not long ago were in a comfortable situation are even suffering food shortages. In addition, because of the crisis and the country’s inability to create new resources for Official Development Assistance, this aid has been cut back sharply and France will not fulfil its commitments in this area.

Unemployment and exclusion: the face of the crisis

France’s socio-economic structure has been tottering since the last quarter of 2008, and social plans in enterprises have multiplied. In December the Natixis Bank announced the loss of 450 jobs on top of the 850 layoffs that occurred in May. In November 2008, PSA Peugeot Citroën implemented the ‘voluntary retirement’ of 3,550 employees. In October, the computer supplies group Hewlett-Packard announced 580 redundancies, and in December the automobile equipment manufacturer Valeo reported the loss of 1,800 jobs.

In the first six months of 2009, Sanofi-Aventis, the leading pharmaceutical group in France, announced the first phase of a ‘voluntary retirement’ scheme affecting approximately 1,300 employees, and it plans to close down four research centres in the country. In February 2009, the specialist telecommunications group Alcatel-Lucent laid off 200 direct employees, and a further 400 sub-contractors lost their jobs too. According to the French Economic Observatory (OFCE), “The French economy could lose approximately 800,000 jobs in 2009 and 2010”.

According to Caritas France, a total of “...492,000 euros in supplementary aid was allocated in the first eight months of 2008. In Savoy (in the south-east), unemployed day labourers are coming in to our refuge centres. In the Eure (in the west), a rural area, temporary employment agencies are overwhelmed and are having to refuse new registrations. In the so-called Gold Coast (south-east of Paris), the high cost of petrol and food have had a severe impact since the start of the year. In this sector, people in need are coming to us more and more frequently just to try to survive to the end of the month. (...) In the Val-de-Marne, the Paris region itself, there has been a big increase in the number of food parcels distributed”.

In January 2009, the Research Centre for the Study of the Conditions of Life (CREDOC) presented evidence of the economic crisis is having on the supply of food: some 66% of households that are below the poverty threshold (880 euros per month per person) have had to reduce their consumption of meat, fish, fruit and vegetables, and in some homes people even skip lunch or dinner.

Nothing left but self-respect

The numbers of people soliciting food, the unemployed, people in debt and/or who are denied access to support, have multiplied. In 2009, according to the Bank of France over-indebtedness barometer, some 20,225 people filed in February and 21,247 in March, which is 16% more than during the same period in 2008. Some 85% of these involve renewable credits, and these open-ended loans are very costly and cannot be controlled by the lenders.

We hear a similar diagnosis from the Doctors of the World association: “Poor workers are coming into our centres again, in many cases undocumented workers, the beneficiaries of social assistance, and people who do not have the means to pay health insurance. Most people with economic problems delay seeking assistance ...When people who are socially included but cannot get to the end of the month come to us, they’ve got to set their self-respect aside”, said one director of a charity organization. “Many of them tell us that”.

The response

Action is urgently needed to cope with this continuing or even worsening fracture in the social structure. What is needed is to deal as closely as possible with people who are excluded and give them clear priorities in policy. Are government initiatives doing this? In the spring, the authorities launched an emergency plan to help the 434,300 young people under 25 who are unemployed. This involved creating around 100,000 supplementary alternative contracts in the private sector (for learning, for vocational training), and there are special premiums whereby enterprises are paid between EUR 1,000 and 2,000 for each contract created. The most important measure, the Active Solidarity Income scheme (RSA) began to be implemented last June. Poor workers (some 800,000) receive a supplementary wage – and an acceptable level of income – when they resume an activity.

However, the RSA only really serves to help people who are close to the labour market and have some minimum level of skills, but it does not have the same results for those who have been most affected by years of exclusion from the system.

The crisis and ODA

France has reiterated its commitment to increasing Official Development Assistance (ODA) at every international summit – most recently at the last meeting of the G8 – but there is serious doubt about the credibility of these promises. There was a considerable fall in French ODA in 2007 but in 2008 it increased slightly, and according to the 2009-2012 public finances programming law, France will not fulfil its European commitments in 2010.1 With an ODA level of around 0.41% of Gross National Income (GNI) in 2010, France will fall far short of the 0.51% that it has committed itself to in the European Union.

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1 The countries belonging to the European Union have made a collective commitment to allocate 0.56% of their GNI to ODA, which translates into an objective of 0.31% for France and 14 other older members.
If France is to make good on its commitment to allocate 0.7% of GNI to ODA by 2015, it will have to increase the amount it donates by EUR 1,500 million per year. However, bearing in mind the financial restrictions the country is labouring under, which are further aggravated by the world crisis, it is most unlikely that this will happen if there is no strong political move to support it. French cooperation policy does not have an overall strategy, so ODA is dependent on the priorities of the government of the day. In addition, a large proportion of French assistance does not create fresh resources to finance development.

An illusory increase

France is one of the leading countries in the world in terms of ODA contributions. In 2008, its contribution was EUR 7,600 million, and the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (CAD) ranked it fourth for its net amount of ODA and 13th for the percentage of GNI it allocated to assistance (0.39%). There was a big drop in its 2007 level (-16%), but French assistance has still increased markedly since 2002.

However, a considerable portion of this increase is due to an artificial inflation of the statistics and not to the creation of fresh resources to finance development, which in fact hardly occurred at all. This accounting manoeuvre mainly involves implementing multilateral debt cancellation plans. Leaving the 2007 ODA fall of more than 50% aside, in the 2001 to 2007 period debt reductions accounted for an average of 27% of French ODA.

In fact, for the most part these debt cancellations were no more than a bookkeeping exercise to tidy up unpaid credits, so the impact in the beneficiary countries was extremely limited. These countries are very poor, they had fallen into a spiral of overindebtedness and were hardly able to pay their debt. What is more, a large proportion of the cancelled debt was generated by an active French policy to support its exports by providing state guarantees to underpin sales abroad, a scheme that is managed by the Compagnie Française pour le Commerce Extérieur (COFACE – the French Company for Foreign Trade). This system to promote exports is clearly a different thing altogether from the promotion of development, and there is nothing to justify its inclusion in the accounting of ODA.

To evaluate ‘real’ French ODA, Coordination SUD has recourse to a procedure recommended by Daniel Cohen. Since most of the total debt reductions were in fact liquidations in the accounting of unpaid credits, he recommends that only 10% of these cancellations should figure as ODA, and the remaining 90% should appear as losses from debt reductions.

Quite apart from the cancellation of debt, for some years French ODA accounting has included the fast growth of certain ex post statistical additions that do not correspond to new resources for development – such as the “reception of refugees” (EUR 275 million in 2007) or expenditure for foreign students in France (EUR 879 million). Besides this, some expenditure (EUR 345 million) that is included does not go to foreign countries at all but to two French overseas territories (Mayotte – the top beneficiary of French assistance apart from the debt cancellation countries – and Wallis and Futuna) and to provide credits to promote French cultural influence and the diffusion of the French language abroad.

When the main components of all this ‘artificial’ ODA are eliminated from the statistics, the extent of France’s real contribution to financing development is revealed, and it is considerably lower than what is claimed. In 2007, according to the Government, ODA amounted to EUR 7,279 million (0.38% of GNI), but the ‘real’ figure was only EUR 4,700 million (0.25% of GNI).

ODA at the service of French commercial and strategic interests

Even in the realm of ODA that is considered ‘real’ there is a certain amount of expenditure that is geared to objectives that are not connected to the fight against poverty and inequality. In particular, as part of its assistance policy, France is lending more and more to emerging countries in pursuit of diplomatic objectives to promote its influence and disseminate its culture.4

In order to develop its activities in a context in which budget resources are limited, the French Development Agency (AFD), the country’s main instrument for implementing its cooperation for development policy, has oriented its activities to fostering loans, especially to private parties, at a lower cost for the State. The amount of these loans included in ODA statistics increased by 98% from 2008 to 2009 (from EUR 469 to 927 million).

In order to reduce its costs for these loans, the State, which participates with an allowance geared to lowering the interest rate on financial resources proposed by the AFD for developing countries, is seeking to maximise its leverage.5 Thus, more loans are granted, they carry interest rates as close as possible to those pertaining in the market, and while it is true they go to emerging and middle income countries it is mainly the private sector that receives them.

The CAD stresses that “the objective of the fight against poverty that is being pursued in the poorest countries in the Priority Solidarity Area is therefore limited by resources in the form of donations, whereas the objective of preserving world public goods that is pursued in the emerging and middle income countries can take advantage of loan instruments for which authorisations for commitments are much higher”.6 However, as the CAD has emphasised, the allocation of assistance in terms of geography and sectors should be based on a strategic vision and not on the suitability of instruments. The expansion of loans to emerging and middle income countries is built around the logic of economic cooperation, so there is no reason at all why it should be counted as part of French ODA.

In France the creation of the Ministry of Immigration, National Identity, Integration and Solidarity Development (MIIDS) has consecrated the increasing interconnectedness between cooperation to promote development in the countries of the South and the control of migratory flows – a trend which is beginning to make itself felt not only in France but throughout Europe. This translates in particular into MIIDS participation in the various spheres of decision-making about development cooperation policies and the negotiation of agreements for the ‘concerted’ management of migratory flows, which includes a rather opaque MIIDS programme of assistance for development which has not been coordinated in any way with the Foreign Ministry.7

The poorer countries in the world are also those that have been hardest hit by the food, climate, financial and economic crises, but today a large proportion of French assistance does not respond to the fundamental objective, which is to fight poverty and inequality. Moreover, although France has been able to mobilise considerable resources to cope with the economic and financial consequences of the crisis at home, it has already confirmed that it will not fulfil its European ODA commitment in 2010. While budgetary allocations for ODA have not been reduced in 2009, they are simply not sufficient for France to meet the challenges that the various world crises have brought about in the poor countries. 

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2 The CAD is made up of twenty-three of the main ‘traditional’ donors of bilateral funds. Emerging donors like China or India are not members of the CAD. Neither are the new members of the European Union, and for them cooperation for development is in most cases a recent policy.


5 The amount of loan generated by one euro of state subsidy.

6 CAD/OCDE, op. cit. p.48.

7 For further information on this subject see the France section in the Social Watch Europe report on migration.
Before the storm: social impacts of the financial crisis

The German Government’s crisis management strategy does not include social or indeed ecological goals. Its stimulus packages and tax cuts are socially inequitable; layoffs and the rise in part-time workers are revealing the ugly face of deregulation. Although German ODA has increased and commitments for the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in 2009 are higher than ever before, they are still insufficient. Declarations of Chancellor Angela Merkel may promise a new approach in international relations, but in practice, the Government’s crisis management policies have been focused on the G20.

**Government response**

Government measures to ease the crisis include the following:

- EUR 480 billion earmarked for a special Financial Markets Stabilization Fund, to bail out troubled banks. An additional EUR 80 billion is available for recapitalization and absorbing toxic assets.
- EUR 100 billion for liquidity guarantees and credit facilities/loans for industry, with a strong focus on the car industry.
- EUR 11 billion for a first stimulus package (Konjunkturpaket I), which offers tax breaks and provides funding for infrastructure projects, with a focus on transport.
- EUR 50 billion for a second stimulus package (Konjunkturpaket II). In addition to a one-time extra child benefit, known as the Kinderbonus, and investments in infrastructure, this package includes tax cuts and a "scrapping premium" that gives Germans who buy a new car an extra EUR 2,500 for their old one.

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**Figures on economic stimulus allocations from the ministries concerned are in some cases far higher than those stated above. For example, in November 2008 the Ministry of Economics and Technology and the Ministry of Finance announced that the first economic stimulus package would cost a total of EUR 32 billion through 2010. However, the Government is pouring 9-10 times more cash into private debt (the “bailout”) than it is spending to promote economic activity. As these packages also include tax breaks, investments that have a direct effect on the economy are likely to be relatively small. Indeed, according to some calculations, the second stimulus package is likely to provide only EUR 9 billion per year in extra investment—certainly not enough to break the public investment bottleneck. Just to match the European average, Germany would have to spend an additional EUR 25 billion—and the emphasis on road-building projects, the “scrapping premium” for cars and the renovation of military barracks hardly inspires confidence.**

Not only will tax cuts undermine impact of the stimulus programmes; they are also socially inequitable, as the following examples indicate:

- According to calculations by the DGB, municipalities are supposed to receive EUR 11.51 billion from the two economic stimulus packages. However, tax cuts implemented at the same time will reduce municipal budgets by EUR 6 billion. “Ultimately, not even half the amount pledged will be available (…) it’s debatable whether this can actually save jobs”, says the DGB.

- The tax cuts for households are structured in a way that is socially inequitable. Earners with annual incomes up to EUR 10,000 will receive tax cuts totalling EUR 0.15 billion, whereas those with annual incomes above EUR 53,000 will get nearly 10 times as much. As one analysis concluded, “Other than raising the subsistence level for children from low-income families with the kinderbonus (…), no other measures are included.”

This depressing trend will be reinforced by the “debt brake” unveiled to the German Bundestag, which is intended to limit annual net borrowing.
to 0.35% of gross national income (GNI).

Critics expect that austerity policies being pursued in the social sector will continue unabated in the wake of the massive bank bailout. Hendrik Auhagen, a member of ATTAC Germany’s Coordinating Council, has warned that “public debt to serve the interests of the banks and corporations, tax cuts for the affluent, plus a debt brake in future all set the course for a further dismantling of the welfare state (...) and for mass poverty and rising crime”.

**Development policy**

German ODA increased to USD 13.91 billion in 2008, up from USD 9 billion in 2007. In absolute terms, this makes Germany the world’s second largest donor of ODA. However, if ODA is measured as a share of Gross National Product (GNP), its ratio of 0.38% gives it a rank of 14th amongst the lead donor nations. It is also noteworthy that in 2008 around one-fifth of German ODA consisted of debt relief. The 2009 ODA budget, however, contains some good news: commitments for less developed countries (LDCs) are higher than ever before, at EUR 827 million (USD 1.09 billion); they make up more than half of country’s total aid commitments.

As part of the second economic stimulus package, the Government made an extra-budgetary allocation of EUR 100 million (USD 132 million) to the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development in order to ‘support’ World Bank infrastructure projects. The Association of German Development Non-Governmental Organizations (VENRO, in German) applauded this as a step in the right direction, but characterized this “economic stimulus package for developing countries” as inadequate: “The poorest of the poor are being fobbed off with charity despite being hardest hit by the impacts of the crisis”, objected Claudia Warning, chairperson of the VENRO Board.

Development Minister Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul maintains that “the financial plan for the period 2008-2012 includes further measures to stimulate growth”, but the prospects for fulfilling this pledge appear poor. To reach the European Union target of development spending equal to 0.51% of GNP by 2010, Germany would have to increase its ODA to EUR 13.1 billion (USD 17.33 billion).

**A new approach in international relations?**

German Chancellor Angela Merkel raised some eyebrows with her recent proposal to create a UN World Economic Council. “The G20 is a step forward, of course, but it certainly does not represent a complete picture of the world”, she declared at a Christian Democratic Union party conference in December 2008. “I am firmly convinced that we need a world economic council to deal with economic issues, just as we have (...) the UN Security Council.” Chancellor Merkel followed this up at the G20 financial summit in February 2009 by calling for a global “charter for sustainable economic governance” that would establish principles for a future world financial architecture.

How serious the Chancellor is about these initiatives remains to be seen. So far, the Government’s crisis management policies have remained firmly focused on the G20.

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12 See: <www.venro.org/404.html>.
14 See: <www.tdh.de/content/materialen/download/download_wrapper.php?id=294>.
16 See: <www.netzeitung.de/wirtschaft/wirtschaftspolitik/1282337.html>.
The global crisis has already wounded Ghana’s economy severely. Initial damage has included decreasing exports and remittances from abroad and galloping devaluation. The crisis is threatening to hamper efforts to reduce poverty, which had been registering successes. Government efforts to mitigate the impact of the crisis appear insufficient. The biggest challenge is to improve income distribution, since poverty is deeper in rural areas. Policies are urgently needed to strengthen agriculture, a sector that had been contributing almost 40% of the GDP.


2 The squeeze on remittances will put additional pressure on the cedi, which has dropped due to greater demand for foreign currency to meet higher oil bills and food prices, infrastructural development needs and payments on external debts. The cedi lost ground against all the major currencies in the second quarter of 2008, at an annual rate of 31%. In the first quarter of 2009, actual depreciation reached 10%. This is expected to accelerate inflation, already running far above projections as a result of higher international food and crude oil prices. In 2008, instead of climbing between 6% and 8% as predicted, prices jumped between 16.5% and 18.1%. Currency depreciation helped boost the rate to 20.53% in March 2009. The rising price of fuel imports could make transportation one of the main drivers of inflation by April 2009.3

The 2009 budget
In response to the deceleration of growth and its unequal benefits, the Government is likely to adopt a “distribution-with-growth and stability development strategy,” which would target disadvantaged groups and regions. Whether it will actually fulfill this goal is

1 Daily Graphic, 23 April 2009.
uncertain; so far there is no clear indication about the direction of its economic policy.

The 2009 budget has three major goals: it is an initial effort to put into practice the ideas contained in the ruling National Democratic Congress (NDC) party manifesto; to respond to the global financial, fuel and food crises; and to tackle current socio-economic challenges. The driving force is the four main themes espoused in the NDC manifesto: transparent governance, a strong economy creating real jobs, investing in people and expanding infrastructure for growth.

Even though the Government has outlined some policy initiatives to try to mitigate the effects of the global crisis, they do not seem adequate. Moreover, it should be noted that government measures to stimulate and subsidize farming production are minimal. According to the IMF, agriculture contributes nearly 40% of the country’s GDP and employs more than half of the active labour force, but this is the sector with the highest incidence of poverty. About 70% of the rural population is actively involved in agriculture. Even so, the country imports more than 40% of its food. This could be turned around: Ghana has the capability to lead a “green revolution” in Africa. Only some 16% of the country’s arable land is used for farming. To boost agriculture and contribute to job creation, economic growth, and the general well-being of the population, farmers need the supported of investments in inputs, fertilizer, training and access to markets. However at this critical moment, the 2009 budget allocates only 10% of its funds to agriculture.

The biggest challenge

Drastically reducing poverty will require more equitable distribution as well as higher growth. At the moment, the country is experiencing rising inequality, growing regional disparities and deep poverty. In the rural savannah, for example, a staggering 60% of the population remains poor, and poverty is declining at a slower rate than elsewhere in the country. In the Upper East and Upper West regions, the poverty rate did not decline at all between 1991/92 and 2005/06, and in the Greater Accra and Upper West Regions, it actually increased.

4 Farming continues to dominate the economy with a 33.59% share of total GDP in 2008. Growth in the sector was 5.1% driven by crops and livestock sub-sectors which went up by 5.82%.

GUATEMALA

Rich country, poor people

The relentless food crisis affecting the country, with 121 of 333 municipalities beset by famine, indicates that the current feudal system of agricultural production urgently needs to be changed. Putting an end to the displacement of the farming communities and allowing them to own their land would not only make landholding fairer but also enable a return to food self-sufficiency. The promised Comprehensive Agrarian Reform must be implemented without delay.

Less than 2% of the farmers in Guatemala own almost 57% of the productive land. Of the 18,937 km² suitable for the cultivation of maize, 7,235 km² are owned by large private farms that underutilize the land, much of which is covered by scrubland, shrubs and cultivated and natural grasses. This situation, added to the policies of structural adjustment and trade liberalization of the 1980s, has meant that the country has gone from being self-sufficient in food to importing 70% of the food it needs.

Structural inequality in farming and food insecurity

Prior to 2007, state action designed to meet Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 1st target (the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger) was showing modest progress. However, the achievement of this objective is in serious doubt in view of the current food crisis. The World Food Programme estimates that poverty and extreme poverty affect more than half of the population. Approximately 6 million, out of a total population of 13 million, have fallen below the poverty line. Between 2007 and 2008, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) estimated that 700,000 more people were pushed into poverty. Of the 1.3 million poor households in rural areas, 51% lack land or own less than one hectare.

The minimum wage is the equivalent of USD 6.50 per day. However, the National Coordinator of Peasant Organizations calculates that a peasant in the countryside actually receives USD 3–5 for an 8–10 hour working day, depending on the locality and the crop. Poverty is mainly concentrated among the indigenous peasant population. The 2006 National Survey of Living Conditions (ENCovi) indicated that the tendency for general poverty (living on less than USD 2 a day) to be twice as high for the indigenous population has become consolidated; moreover, extreme poverty (living on less than USD 1 a day) was three times higher than it is for the non-indigenous population. During the first half of 2008, the prices of the goods that make up the basic food basket have risen steeply, which has forced the poor to reduce consumption. This situation is also affecting the middle class.

Dismantling the system of production

Until the 1970s the public farming system provided extension services, credit, land allocation, research and technological information for peasants and small producers, with programmes and promotion projects for basic grain cultivation, forest protection and cattle raising. This, combined with the non-importation of foodstuffs, ensured that the country could continue to produce its own food. However, structural adjustments had brought about the closure of all extension services by the beginning of the 21st century, dismantling the public farm system, which went from 18,000 workers to 1,200.

Simultaneously the management of the storage of basic grains in the country’s silos was granted to private enterprises, depriving the country of food reserves in the case of catastrophes or shortages. Since the State also ceased to intervene in the grain trade, the borders were opened to grains produced in the north of the continent at subsidized prices, thereby suppressing the national system of production. One of the most disturbing results is that 49% of children suffer from chronic malnutrition and 24% of the population is undernourished, which is detrimental in terms of virtually all indicators of individual physiological development.

The importance of maize

In the high plateau area (where 90% of the indigenous population lives and which is the poorest part of the country), 100% of the population consumes maize as part of the daily diet, averaging 310 grams per capita (a total of 110 kilograms per year). National consumption is almost 3 million metric tons, giving rise to a deficit of about 1.5 million metric tons that is covered by purchases on the international market, mainly the United States, of more than USD 73 million for 2002.

There were massive price increases internationally between January 2006 and January 2009 of 62% for yellow maize, 70% for rice and 39% for wheat flour. Although these prices on the world market came down in 2007 and 2008, they are still in force in Guatemala (except for rice, which returned to the 2006 level).

New threats for the rural population

Since the reform of the mining law of 1996, carried out at the behest of the World Bank, this industry has grown. Seventeen of the country’s departments are the object of exploration and/or extraction. Tourism also threatens peasant and indigenous land ownership in the north and south of the country. Urbanization and the building of commercial centres reduce farmland, displacing inhabitants and weakening productive capacity especially with regard to food. The extensive rearing of cattle wears out productive land and produces large-scale deforestation, and peasants and indigenous inhabitants are expelled

1 The 2006 ENCovi defines extreme poverty as the level people find themselves at when they cannot cover the minimum cost of food.

2 According to the Popol Vuh – the sacred book of the Maya – “Of yellow maize and white were made their bodies, of maize dough their arms, and their legs, only maize dough was used to form the flesh of our fathers.”

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Coordinación de ONG y Cooperativas de Guatemala
CONCOOP
Zully Morales
Helmer Velásquez

National reports 96 Social Watch
either by means of “legal procedures” or by armed force. This even happens in the so-called protected areas (for the protection and maintenance of biological diversity and natural resources) in connivance with bureaucrats.

The installation and expansion of large-scale agricultural monocultures – such as sugar cane, African palm and pine kernels – aimed at the export market also means the expulsion of the peasant population. The land surface sown with sugar cane was 6% of the total in 1995 and 11% in 2007. The annual growth of the area dedicated to growing cane was 3.6% between 1990 and 2005 but 17.7% between 2005 and 2007. The Gremial de Aceites [Oil Chamber of Commerce] estimates that by 2012, 150 thousand hectares will have been planted, with an investment in land purchases amounting to USD 32.5 million. The amount of land involved might easily exceed these estimates. Turning more land over to exports devastates vast areas that were producing foodstuffs and causes the removal of hundreds of peasant families, since these farms do not generate mass employment. Destruction of the cultural patterns of the displaced population causes not only economic poverty but also social, cultural and spiritual poverty, as well as despair and violence.

The growing drug trade is another threat. This is sometimes related to lack of livelihood options following extensive cattle-raising which relies on the protection of the State in order to expel peasants and exploit their lands. Peasant families are defenseless in the face of the purchasing power of the drug trade and the owners of large single-crop estates.

The State’s response

The policies and actions proposed by the Government within the framework of its Emergency Programme for Economic Recovery includes a counter-cyclical fiscal policy, a policy of social protection and other sectoral policies (rural development, programmes for broader competitive agriculture, agricultural development and food assistance, sustainability of natural resources and the strengthening of land leasing).

Macroeconomic stability is to be maintained, whatever the cost. This implies, among other policies, high international reserves, low salaries and the attraction of industries by means of the elimination of taxes. The fundamental paradigm for the State and the ruling classes is the enlargement of the area of free trade agreements, two of which are considered to be of prime importance: the Free Trade Agreement with North America, which has been in force for three years; and the Economic Partnership Agreement with the European Union, which is being negotiated. Neither of these systems proposes benefits for the small producer.

One of the Government measures to tackle the crisis was to increase zero tariff import quotas for products such as yellow maize, wheat flour and common rice. However, one group of importers, the Buena Group, obtained 82% of the import quotas. This did not lead to lower prices and in practice constituted a subsidy for this company since it did not transfer the reduction in duties to consumers. Furthermore, there is 20% direct taxation and 80% indirect taxation. The Government’s promise to initiate a process of fiscal reform in order to change the current model is not being kept. The planned reform, within the context of the present crisis, has been reduced to making improvements in the macroeconomic cycle and providing aid programmes for people suffering extreme poverty.

As regards farming, there are programmes to assist in the leasing of land, but not for access to ownership or farming credit for peasants. The new Government has increased the number of forcible evictions of peasants (50 by 31 March 2009). This has generated instability and discontent in the indigenous and peasant organizations, which had looked forward to the approval and implementation of the promised Agrarian Policy for Rural Development. Community leadership is being taken over by the Government and multinational mining companies, which are generating their own parallel social movements based on patronage and on financing questionable representatives of the social base. The substitution of traditional leadership by financed leadership has led to confrontations between peasant movements. The criminalization and persecution of peasant leaders, who are fighting for access to land in order to produce food, has also occurred.

Social alternatives

According to the Political Constitution of the Republic of Guatemala, “private property is an inherent human right”. In other words, all Guatemalans have the right to be owners of property. To this end “in specific cases property can be expropriated for reasons of collective use, social benefit or duly proven public interest”. Malnutrition, poverty, extreme poverty, unemployment and now the intensification of the recurrent food crisis all have their origin in the inability of the population to provide themselves with the necessary means of livelihood, since they lack the assets required for that purpose, especially land. This is a clear case of “collective use” and “proven public interest”; in other words, the situation is covered by the Constitution.

Opening up agriculture can ameliorate the current situation and offer a path to development; it is therefore necessary to destroy the feudal system of production. The equitable distribution of land is a practical way to foster rural employment and increase farm productivity while also contributing to the growth of the economy, the capacity to save and the provision of food. Agrarian reform cannot be put off. It is a means to social peace and governance and will put an end to the conflicts rooted in the usurpation of peasant and indigenous land. It will also prevent the destruction of forests and encourage the emergence of sectors with the capacity to produce and invest. Future generations will have more and better means of self-fulfilment and the capacity to consume will increase, which in turn will invigorate the chain of production. 3

3 Data and analyses from the Coordination between NGOs and Cooperatives of Guatemala, via its two analysis institutes: the Studies for Democracy Institute, which is being established, and the Institute for Agricultural Studies and Rural Development, Guatemala, 2009.
Honduras is one of the poorest countries in Latin America. The international financial crisis already predicted that life would be even more difficult for the Honduran population, but the coup d’état, supported by the most reactionary sectors of society – in particular the defenders of the patriarchal culture – has exacerbated the situation. Social organizations, in particular women’s movements, are organizing the resistance against the de facto regime.

First the crisis, then dictatorship

Honduras is the third poorest country in Latin America, after Haiti and Nicaragua. Although poverty was reduced from 63.7% in 2005 to 59.2% in 2008 and extreme poverty from 46% to 36.2% in the same period,1 these figures do not represent any great progress. Despite 73,831 households no longer being classified as in extreme poverty, there are now 121,390 new households in relative poverty (i.e., many households moved from extreme poverty to relative poverty while some are newly poor).2

The aim of the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) – developed in order to reach the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015 – is that relative poverty should drop to 42% and extreme poverty to 19%.3 Clearly this goal will not be reached; added to the country’s existing problems are the consequences of the current worldwide crisis. The Ministry of Labour has reported that over 10,745 people were laid off between late 2008 and early 2009. Moreover, it is estimated that inflation exceeded 11% in 2008.

Family remittances from the United States and Spain have begun to slow down. Their contribution to GDP decreased from 21% in 2007 to 20% in 2008 and is expected to fall again to 18% in 2009.4

The Zelaya plan

The Government of Manuel Zelaya Rosales has retained its populist welfare policies which, according to the World Bank, have limited coverage, most of them lacking in control and evaluation. It has also continued the confrontation between the three state powers, with the Executive on one side and the Legislative and Judicial bodies on the other. For example,

1 National Statistics Institute (INE) database.
2 See Mauricio Díaz Burdett. “Honduras: ¿Cómo afrontar la crisis financiera internacional?”

actions taken by the Executive to promote fuel saving have been challenged as unconstitutional and the Supreme Court of Justice has accepted the appeal. In addition, the signing of the Alternativa Bolivariana para América Latina y El Caribe (ALBA) [Bolivian Alternative for Latin America and the Caribbean] – an agreement promoted by Venezuela – was endorsed by the Executive without the support of the Legislature. This has led to an escalation of the country’s principal problems, such as the energy crisis and the lack of citizen security.

Since the PRS was approved in 1999 after Hurricane Mitch, each government has carried out its own modifications to the document. For his part, President Zelaya has weakened its institutional framework. On his own initiative he created the Ministry of Social Development and the Red Solidaria [Solidarity Network], which automatically reduced the standing of the PRS Consultative Council in which civil society and government organizations were represented.

Some expectations but further regression

Over the strong opposition of private enterprises, the Government increased the minimum wage to HNL 5,500 (USD 297), though it exempted bonded assembly plants and domestic work from the increase. In addition, the signing of ALBA in August 2008 gave rise to a great deal of expectation in the population, particularly among the more vulnerable. The agreement includes medical and educational aid, donations of machinery and equipment and the “Petrocaribe” initiative, which will make it possible to purchase oil with long-term financing and very low interest.5 The savings generated by this transaction are to be put into a trust fund that will be used to finance social development projects.

Although the Ministry of Security’s budget rose from USD 140.6 million to USD 156.6 million, drug trafficking and corruption are on the increase. In March 2008 human rights organizations, women’s and feminist movements, churches and popular movements gave their support to a group of public prosecutors who went on a hunger strike as a way of denouncing the corruption prevalent in the Public Prosecutor’s Office. This event triggered a series of similar allegations regarding the State Attorney General, magistrates of the Supreme Court of Justice, the National Human Rights Commissioner and magistrates of the Supreme Electoral Court.

Furthermore, delay in submitting the general budget for 2007, which was sent to the National Congress in April 2008 – while the 2008 budget had not yet been submitted in April 2009 – makes it possible to use public funds unlawfully and delays the implementation of anti-crisis projects.

The impact of the crisis and mitigating measures

The recession resulting from the global crisis makes existing problems even worse.

The energy crisis

The increase by over 100% of the international price of crude oil and oil products during 2008 caused the cost of transport and the production of goods and food to shoot up. This in turn led to a dramatic increase in the basic food basket and a drop in the purchasing power of the population. The cost of producing electricity also increased – at present over 70% of the energy consumed in the country is generated by plants that operate on fuel oil – and rates have

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5 Report by the Committee for the Administration of Oil. November 2008.
shot up 30%, affecting the poorer sectors, the middle class, small businesses and small producers in particular. The Government tried to contain the impact by granting around USD 6 million in subsidies, but this only benefited 3.3% of the poorest quintile of the population – some 100 thousand families. Despite the subsequent drop in the price of crude oil on the world market, the electricity rates in Honduras remain as high as at the worst moment of the energy crisis.

In early 2009 the President of the National Congress submitted a bill aimed at dramatically cutting the electricity rates. However, this measure, which did not stipulate any means of control, would aggravate the already critical situation of the National Electric Energy Company while substantially benefiting private plants. In response, social and popular organizations carried out a series of marches and public demonstrations in order to demand that the Government nationalize all of the energy generation plants.

The financial crisis

The Honduran economy is very dependent on the United States; over 85% of the goods produced are exported to that market. One of the sectors that has been directly affected by the crisis is the free zone area or bonded assembly plants. The National Association of Bonded Assembly Plants announced in November 2008 the loss of 25,000 jobs – 85% of them held by women – due to factory closures. As part of its anti-crisis plan, the Government has announced that a large number of jobs will be generated all over the country in the short term. One of the principal sources of employment will be the Caminos por Mano de Obra [Roads for Labour] programme, which will carry out projects involving the construction of local roads. This is not going to be easy to put into practice, however, as 2009 is Zelaya’s last year in office and past experience shows that when a new government assumes power, it ignores the previous one’s plans.

With regard to the banking sector, the companies exporting goods are not requesting financing from the commercial banks. This has led to a lack of liquidity in the system. Another problem is the cornering of the capital by the banks’ partners, who do not wish to risk their capital and prefer that the Government make the investments. This practice was made clear when the largest shareholders in banks sent an average of USD 200 million abroad in a period of about a month. The situation was reported to the National Banks and Insurance Committee, whose president was fired. In order to generate liquidity, the Government reduced the banks’ reserves and increased financing for productive sectors at a borrowing rate of interest not greater than 10%.

The food crisis

The global rise in the price of wheat led to a 40% rise in the cost of wheat flour in Honduras, which in turn led to an increase in the price of bread. Products that the population consumes daily, such as rice and cornflour, underwent an increase of 110% during the months of 2009. In order to mitigate the impact of the crisis, the Government submitted a bill aimed at dramatically cutting agricultural supplies, which went up 80%.

AGAINST BLOWS TO DEMOCRACY AND BLOWS TO WOMEN

On 28 June 2009 the Honduran army staged a coup d’état against the constitutionally elected president Manuel Zelaya Rosales, sending him into exile and naming Roberto Micheletti, until then president of the National Congress, as his successor or “provisional president”. This coup was carried out with the support of the traditional political parties, the business sector, the Supreme Court, the Catholic Church and most of the mass media, among others.

The coup has also been a blow to the Honduran social organizations. The de facto Government’s repression has resulted in deaths, hundreds of injured and displaced people, and the violation of fundamental rights.

Traditionally, Honduran women suffer great disadvantages. Although their educational level is higher than men’s and they represent 52.6% of the population of working age, only 34.3% of them is part of the economically active population. Poverty in women-led households (64.1%) is proportionally greater than those headed by men (58.8%). This gap is deeper with regards to extreme poverty, where 38.8% are women and 34.9% are men.

Between the end of 2008 and the first months of 2009 the National Congress passed several decrees that violated women’s right to decide over their own body. Such is the case of decree number 54-2009 that penalizes the selling, use and promotion of emergency contraception pills. In January 2009 a reform bill of the penal code was introduced in order to recognize the right to life since conception, although it was still under discussion when the reactionary forces took power.

The international crisis has favoured the increase of crimes, sexual violence against women and girls (over 540 cases annually), femicides (64.1%) is proportionally greater than those headed by men (58.8%). This gap is deeper with regards to extreme poverty, where 38.8% are women and 34.9% are men.

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The international crisis has favoured the increase of crimes, sexual violence against women and girls (over 540 cases annually) and femicides (64.1%) is proportionally greater than those headed by men (58.8%). In addition, the advance of religious fundamentalisms, with the access to the legislator, has catalyzed by the patriarchal culture that considers the female body as its property. Women in the popular resistance and also other women who, by chance, and without participating in it, were involved in resistance scenarios, have experienced first hand the repression of the police and the army. Since the first days of the new de facto regime, the women’s movement and the feminists are opposed to it, and have joined the resistance along with the popular sectors throughout the country.

Feminists in Resistance – a coordination of women’s organizations, and organized and independent feminists – emerged in the frame of the different actions of resistance. Its work focuses on defending and highlighting the rights and struggles of women. With messages such as “Against blows to democracy and blows to women” they have managed to link two major national problems, thus contributing to a more comprehensive vision of current issues.

Feminists in Resistance of Honduras have planned and carried out different actions together with the feminists in resistance of Costa Rica, Guatemala and other organizations of Central America and other countries. The different organizations that make up the national coalition of Social Watch in Honduras, including the Centro de Estudios de la Mujer and the Centro de Estudios y Acción para el Desarrollo de Honduras are involved in this initiative.

1 Social Watch 99 Honduras
The global crisis has pushed Hungary into the worst economic decline in almost two decades. It was partially responsible for the resignation of Premier Ferenc Gyurcsany earlier this year. The export-dependent economy has suffered from the slowdown of its main commercial partners. The social system is crippled by corruption, the national currency has plunged and public finances are heavily burdened by pension obligations. The new Premier plans to cut pensions, public sector bonuses and maternity support; to mortgage energy and transport subsidies; and to raise the age for retirement.

Government structure being revised

Until a few years ago, Hungary had one of the largest budget deficits in the European Union, more than 9% of GDP. Austerity measures introduced in 2006 cut it to one of the lowest in the EU (below 3% of GDP). However, years of mismanagement left the economy on the brink of meltdown, and since September 2008 the situation has grown progressively worse. The effects of the global financial crisis on the real economy became especially severe in the last quarter of 2008 as the collapse of internal and external demand dragged down production, consumption, investment and employment. At the same time, speculative attacks against the forint, Hungary’s currency, knocked it down 19% against the U.S. dollar and 13% against the Euro, causing inflation to soar. To avert total collapse, the Government obtained a USD 25.1 billion bailout from the EU and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 1

Economic performance

Following slow growth of 1.1% in 2007, Hungary’s economy perked up in the first half of 2008, only to be dragged down as its major economic partners stumbled. GDP growth ran at about 2% in the first half of 2008 and 0.8% in the third quarter. In the final quarter, it fell 2.3%. This is the worst performance since the 1990s, when the transition to a market economy brought considerable economic turmoil.

In February 2009, industrial gross output was down 28.9% from a year earlier (25.4% after adjustment for actual working days). The volume of production was 26.1% lower in the first two months of 2009 than in the same period of 2008. The volume of industrial production in February plunged 4.1% from the previous month adjusted for season and working days.

The global slump cut the growth in industrial exports, which had been going from strength to strength. In January 2009, the volume of exports and imports fell by 28% and 27%, respectively, compared to January 2008. Industrial export sales tumbled 30.4% in the first two months of 2009; in February it was 31.1% below February 2008. From December 2008 through February 2009, unemployment jumped 1.1%, to 9.1%, leaving a total of 378,000 people without jobs.

The political and economic crisis

Former Premier Gyurcsany never recovered from the riots that erupted in Autumn 2006 after he confessed that his administration had lied repeatedly about the state of the economy to win the country’s elections. Although he remained in office and cut the deficit from more than 9% of GDP in 2006 to 3.3% in 2008 through tax increases and spending cuts, he failed to win public support for wider economic reforms. As the economic crisis hit, his Government winched its austerity programme ever tighter, solidifying his position as the most unpopular premier in the country’s era of electoral democracy and a market economy. In addition, financial circles were unhappy with the Cabinet’s hesitation to take decisive action in response to the economic downturn. Beset on every side, Gyurcsany announced his resignation at a convention of his ruling Socialist Party (MSZP) in March 2009.

Hungary’s budget deficit makes tax reform difficult. While many other countries are pumping stimulus funds into their economies, Hungary is concentrating on cutting costs. Although they quarrel with each other, under pressure from the IMF, both the bourgeois left and the rightwing parties are advocating neo-liberal economic policies—lowering taxes on capital but reducing the budget deficit by drastically curtailing social expenditures.

Despite an IMF rescue package, the forint hit a record low in March 2009. According to the latest Eurostat figures, Hungary’s GDP decreased by 1% quarter over quarter.1 Government forecasts that it will shrink by 3.5% this year, but others predict a fall of 5-6%. Compounding the crisis, Hungary remains crippled by corruption, heavy debt and a black economy that may account for one-fifth of GDP. Politically, it is in denial. Nationalist intellectuals use the language of the 1930s to rail against foreign capital and “cosmopolitan” influences. Viktor Orbán, leader of the right-wing Fidesz, laments that more than 80% of the financial system is “in foreigners’ hands”. His party now boasts the widest support.

The plunge of the forint is particularly devastating to households. About 60% of all loans are denominated in foreign currencies, mainly Swiss francs. Continuing pressure on the forint heightens the danger of growing defaults on these personal loans and mortgages. Rising defaults may intensify pressure on the banking system and the credit crunch.

Whatever mistakes Hungary might have made, the country is also a victim of the global capitalist system. The slowdown in Germany and other markets for Hungary’s exports is much deeper and is likely to last much longer than originally anticipated.2 European banks are facing their own sub-prime crisis, as they hold most of Central and Eastern Europe’s debt. Across Eastern and Central Europe, Austrian banks are blamed for the financial debacle.

Impacts of the crisis

After the fall of the Soviet Union, the former Socialist Republics were keen to dismantle their State system. Hungary enthusiastically embraced capitalism and privatized championed privatisation of assets. Even so, successive governments attempted to retain the social safety net. MSZP Governments have been particularly protective of pensioners, wary
that any cuts could cause hardship among older Hungarians, who form a key Socialist voting bloc. The number of beneficiaries swelled in the early 1990s as newly privatized companies dumped workers who had been on the state payroll. Drawing a pension became an attractive alternative to unemployment as the pensions of higher-income workers give them a larger share of their wages than in many other countries. The average pension runs about USD 350 a month, untaxed. This goes a long way in a country where the average after-tax wage amounts to just over USD 500 a month. Men reach full retirement at 62, but can take a pension earlier if they have 40 years of service, and have little financial incentive to continue working. The average Hungarian retires at the age of 58, and just 1% of Hungarians between 60 and 64 years old are currently working. The OECD estimates that Hungary’s pension outlays will be among the fastest growing in Europe in the coming decades. The country already has 3 million pensioners, out of a total population of about 10 million.

Both employers and employees pay into the State pension program, but their contributions do not cover all the benefits paid. Government makes up the difference out of the central budget. For years, Hungary has run fiscal deficits to pay for social programmes; the annual tab for pensions alone surpasses 10% of GDP. To finance these outlays, the Government sold bonds. In October 2008, investors stopped buying those bonds. Although the IMF provided an emergency bailout so Hungary could pay its bills, many international investors pulled out, sending the Hungarian currency tumbling and darkening its economic outlook.

Critics say the country cannot afford a pension system that gives wage earners an incentive to retire young or leave the work force when they have relatively minor ailments. The IMF, backed by Hungarian reformers, is pressuring particularly hard for cuts in the “13th month,” a bonus monthly payment made to all retirees introduced in 2003 by Gyurcsany’s predecessor.

After his re-election in 2006, Gyurcsany proposed a reform of the pension system that included eliminating the 13th-month bonus, but he wanted current retirees to get the same amount as before, spread over 12 months. He also proposed gradually raising the retirement age to 65 by 2020 for women and to 68-69 by 2050 for men. Gordon Bajnai, the new premier, will probably be compelled to propose deeper cuts that could prove devastating for older Hungarians. Aging retirees are already accusing politicians of dismantling the promises of a previous generation, leaving them dangling in the wind.

In 2003, social protection expenditures accounted for 21.4% of GDP in 2003, less than the EU average of 28%. Services related to family support accounted for 2.7% of GDP, and came to only one-fourth of the EU average per capita. The social system is diversified, and includes social assistance, family support, benefits provided to people living with disabilities or health injuries, the pension system and social services.

In 2006, the system was standardized, streamlined and its targeting was improved. The real value of means-tested benefits had decreased until 2004, but the disbursement systems for regular social assistance and old-age allowance were amended in 2005-06. Since then, benefits for the poorest groups have become more generous.

The basic and specialized social and child welfare system established over the last two decades is complex. Programmes for individual services leave significant gaps in capacity and accessibility, primarily in smaller communities.

The child poverty rate is approximately one and half times the EU average. Nearly one-fifth of Hungarian children live in households with per capita income below 60% of the median. Child poverty is usually the result of parental unemployment and geographical disadvantages. In addition, the selection mechanisms in the education and training system intensify the impact of family background on the performance of children, rather than counteract it. When parents have low education levels and a poor labour market position and live in isolation, they typically transmit these disadvantages to their children.

The Bajnai austerity program
Premier Bajnai has assumed office in the midst of the country’s worst economic decline in almost two decades. To rescue the budget, keep it within IMF guidelines and regain investors’ confidence, he plans to cut pensions, public sector bonuses, maternity support, mortgage subsidies and energy and public transport subsidies.

The most striking feature of Bajnai’s initial memorandum – which has been termed his “Political Manifesto” – is his insistence that the urgency of the situation demands “immediate and determined action”. He warns that in July he will introduce “unavoidable, painful measures”. His main goal is to save as many jobs as possible, in an effort to avoid social unrest and further division of Hungarian society into haves and have-nots. He also wants to achieve relative stability for the forint, reduce the deficit and join the Eurozone as soon as possible. To achieve these goals, he states, “the whole government structure must be revised in order to spend less on administration”. This would include freezing the salaries of public employees for two years and eliminating 13th month bonuses for public employees beginning in 2010. He would also cut national allocations to local governments.

Other points in his memorandum include:

- Increasing the age of retirement. At the moment it is age 62, but the actual average is around 58. Bajnai would begin reforms in 2010, including elimination of the “13th month”.
- Reducing sickness benefits. Currently, if a doctor certifies that people are too sick to work, they get 70% of their pay for six months. Half of this is paid by the employer.
- Freezing child support. For years, it has been going up. Bajnai plans to reduce childcare support for three years and childcare benefits for two.
- Cutting subsidies. Bajnai seeks to end financial assistance temporarily for young couples with children who are buying a first home and decrease subsidies on gas consumption and heating. After 2010, all subsidies would be terminated. In addition, he plans to cut allocations for public transportation, especially to the Hungarian railroads and public radio and television. Government payments to the farmers will shrink significantly as well.

While he tightens government spending, Bajnai wants to give “first aid to mid-sized and small Hungarian businesses that provide two-thirds of the country’s jobs” by reducing the tax burden on both employers and employees. Last but not least, he envisions a stimulus package funded by EU subsidies to help the country ease the crisis and eventually make its way out.
Breaks in the road and missed milestones

Although several indicators show that India’s situation is not among the worst, many sectors have declined due to the downturn in the global economy while others have not been able to regain or maintain their growth trends. Thus, for instance, there has been drastically reduced growth in personal and consumer loans and industrial production. Inflation, increasing unemployment and decline in foreign institutional investment are some additional impacts. The Government must find a balance between economic reforms to stimulate growth and the necessary relief for 250 million Indians living in extreme poverty.

Contrary to the “decoupling” hypothesis, according to which emerging economies would be relatively untouched by the global financial crisis owing to their substantial foreign exchange reserves, robust corporate balance sheets and relatively healthy banking sectors, many are already feeling the impact. This includes India, which has experienced a significant decline in economic growth—from a healthy 9.3% in 2007 to 7.3% in 2008. For 2009, the IMF forecasts a growth of 4.5%.

The collapse of the stock market in 2008 was an indication of a further deepening of the crisis, and the markets have not been able to regain their health. Although it is hard to predict how things will turn out, it is clear that the Government’s initial prediction that the country would emerge unscathed, was shortsighted. It is important to explore the impact on India’s poor and marginalized populations as well as the effectiveness of the Government’s responses so far.

Impacts of the economic crisis

The downturn can be seen in lower industrial growth, inflation, widening of the current account deficit, a plummeting stock market and a depreciation in the value of the national currency, the rupee. The financial crisis has also been accompanied by a rise in food prices. According to the Wholesale Price Index (WPI), rice cost 12.8% more in March 2009 than in March 2008, as compared to a global increase of -1.0, while wheat went up 5.2 compared to a global drop of -47.5%. Inflation went from 7.7% in March 2008 to peak at 12.9% in August 2008 (it may be noted that the WPI fell sharply to 0.3% that March). The annual inflation in key commodity prices highlights the severity of the problem. Consumer price inflation reached 9.6–10.8% during January/February 2009 compared to 7.3–8.8% in June 2008 and 5.2–6.4% in February 2008.

The most immediate impact of the crisis was on foreign institutional investment (FII). An outflow of USD 15 billion from the equity market was recorded between April 2008 and March 2009 as compared to an inflow of USD 20.3 billion in the same period in 2007–08. Other portfolio investments such as American Depository Receipts/Global Depository Receipts registered the same trend.

The pullout of FII, which had reached USD 66.5 billion at the beginning of 2008, triggered a collapse in the stock market and as a result the Sensex, an index of the country’s biggest enterprises, “fell from its closing peak of 20,873 on 8 January 2008 to less than 10,000 by 17 October 2008”. FII outflows also resulted in a dramatic devaluation of the rupee, which fell from 39.99 against the US dollar in March 2008 to 52.09 per dollar in March 2009. The rupee also fell against other currencies including the euro (6.5%), yen (22.8%) and yuan (23.3%). Although this might sound like good news for Indian exports, the downturn in the US, EU and Middle East economies – which constitute three quarters of India’s goods and services trade – translated into a lack of demand. From a 24.5% growth between April 2007 and November 2008, exports have declined to 17.6% in the same months between 2008 and 2009.

There is also a likelihood that the slowdown in the export of services will intensify “as the recession deepens and financial firms – traditionally large users of outsourcing services – are restructured”. On the other hand, for those who have accumulated foreign exchange payment commitments, the depreciation of the rupee is not good news, nor does it assist in Government’s efforts to rein in inflation.

The slower growth of industrial production is evident from the fact that the yearly rate of expansion was 8.8% between April 2007 and February 2008 but came down drastically to 2.8% in 2008–09. The Index of Industrial Production (IIP) registered an average growth of 5.6% during April to July 2008, slipped to a low of 1.7% in August, but recovered to a comparatively healthy 6% in September. However, the IIP registered negative growth again between December 2008 and February 2009. The growth rate of the manufacturing sector declined from 9.3% in 2007-2008 (April to February) to a projected 2.8% in the same period in 2008-2009. The core sector of infrastructure grew at a rate of 3% in 2008-2009 (April to February), down from 5.8% during the same period in 2007-2008.

In addition, banks are cutting back on their credit. Between February 2008 and February 2009, the rate of growth declined substantially from 12% to 7.5% in housing, from 13.2% to 8.5% in personal loans and from 5.9% to -14.5% in consumer durables.

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4. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
8. Subbarao, D., op. cit.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
Interventions to check the downturn
Following the G-20 Summit in November 2008, the Prime Minister set up a group under his chairmanship to work out a detailed plan for appropriate and timely state intervention. The Finance Minister, Industry and Commerce Minister, Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission and Governor of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) were the other members of this group. Remedies came in the shape of “stimulus packages,” the first announced in December 2008 and the second in January 2009.13 Measures included an additional expenditure of INR 200 billion (USD 4.15 billion) covering critical rural infrastructure and social security schemes, a reduction in central value added taxes (CENVAT) by 4% across the board, specific measures on customs duties in sectors such as steel and cement, and tax concessions and enhancement of drawback rates for exports.

Some additional measures were also adopted, including: subvention of interest rates and pre and post shipment credit for labour-intensive exports; refinancing facilities of INR 40 billion (USD 831 million) for the National Housing Bank for the housing sector, and INR 70 billion (USD 1.5 billion) to the Small Industry Development Bank of India for micro, small and medium enterprises, as well as authorizing the India Infrastructure Finance Company Limited to raise INR 100 billion (USD 2.1 billion) through tax-free bonds.14 Some monetary measures were also adopted by the RBI, such as the reduction in repo rates (the rate at which Indian banks borrow rupees from the RBI) from 9% in August 2008 to 5% in January 2009. Measures included a reduction in CENVAT by 4% means that this will only apply to products with a duty of more than 4%, which entails a boost to consumer demand mainly for durable and luxury goods. In addition, it has been pointed out that this “will have an impact in terms of supporting economic activity only if producers respond by cutting prices and such price cuts generate demand responses”.15 This does not seem to work. For instance, in the aviation industry, the cut in fuel prices did not translate into the reduction of prices to consumers as expected.

There have been numerous demands for a massive public investment programme spent on social and economic infrastructure, providing employment and expanding domestic demand.

Job losses and the social security challenge
Loss of employment in many of the key sectors poses a serious challenge to an already minimalist social security policy. A sample survey of export-related industries carried out by the Department of Commerce reveals some 108,513 job losses during the period August 2008–January 2009. Similarly, the Ministry of Employment carried out a survey of important sectors such as automobile manufacturing, mining, textiles, metals, gems and jewellery, which together contributed to more than 60% of GDP in 2007–2008, revealing that about half a million workers lost their jobs during October–December 2008. This poses a serious social security challenge since out of the total workforce of 457.5 million, 422.6 million are categorized as unorganized or unprotected. Of these, 339.5 million are in the informal sector and merely 29.2 million are in the formal sector. Around 38% of this unprotected workforce is made up of women.16

Central budget allocations for development declined from 7.5% in 2002–03 to 6.0% in 2007–08 under the rules of the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act. The budget allocation for development in 2008–09 is about 6.8% of GDP; it has to be raised to at least 7.5% to have an overall impact, which means that “additional expenditure should be in the tune of around INR 400 billion (USD 8.3 billion) instead of INR 200 billion (USD 4.1 billion)”.17

Reduction in CENVAT by 4% means that this will only apply to products with a duty of more than 4%, which entails a boost to consumer demand mainly for durable and luxury goods. In addition, it has been pointed out that this “will have an impact in terms of supporting economic activity only if producers respond by cutting prices and such price cuts generate demand responses”. This does not seem to work. For instance, in the aviation industry, the cut in fuel prices did not translate into the reduction of prices to consumers as expected.

There have been numerous demands for a massive public investment programme spent on social and economic infrastructure, providing employment and expanding domestic demand.

Job losses and the social security challenge
Loss of employment in many of the key sectors poses a serious challenge to an already minimalist social security policy. A sample survey of export-related industries carried out by the Department of Commerce reveals some 108,513 job losses during the period August 2008–January 2009. Similarly, the Ministry of Employment carried out a survey of important sectors such as automobile manufacturing, mining, textiles, metals, gems and jewellery, which together contributed to more than 60% of GDP in 2007–2008, revealing that about half a million workers lost their jobs during October–December 2008. This poses a serious social security challenge since out of the total workforce of 457.5 million, 422.6 million are categorized as unorganized or unprotected. Of these, 339.5 million are in the informal sector and merely 29.2 million are in the formal sector. Around 38% of this unprotected workforce is made up of women.16

14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
21 According to IPFR (2008), India is home to the world’s largest food insecure population, with more than 200 million people who are hungry. The report shows that strong economic growth has not translated into lower hunger levels.
Women’s empowerment: a misunderstood process

The 2005 Iraqi Constitution strove to include a number of positive measures for women’s empowerment; however, a culture of equality of access and opportunity is needed in addition to legislation. During this transition period, women have not only lost most of the benefits hitherto provided by the State; they are disproportionately affected by the shrinking of the State’s power, the insecurity arising from political instability, the breakdown of economic activities due to the war; and the deterioration of social structures. Increased violence against women requires urgent intervention from all actors in society.

Experience in many countries has shown that transition to democratic rule can help remove institutional and cultural obstacles to women’s empowerment. For this to happen, however, women must themselves advocate for equal rights. Moreover, while emerging democracies have the opportunity to reform societies by establishing basic freedoms, democratic government, free markets and human rights, the insecurity associated with conflict can undermine such important outcomes. When transition takes place in the midst of a conflict, the need for a stable democratic system becomes the main priority and can eclipse the imperative of equality. If that happens, the transitional phase may increase, rather than decrease, the prevalence of gender inequality.

The State’s role and transition

Since the establishment of modern Iraq, the State has created opportunities for the institutional empowerment of women through wider access to education, health services and job training. Their professional levels have risen, especially in the more socially accepted fields of education and health services. For instance, in the period 1997–2004, 68% of teachers were women, and the overall rate of women’s participation as medical staff was 30–60%. Before 2003, women represented 46% of public sector employees, and were the main providers of services and social benefits in health and education, especially in areas benefiting women. Yet the State has shown no real awareness that empowerment is not achieved solely through enacting legislation but comes about only when society puts these laws into practice – which in turn demands cultural changes. Women’s empowerment requires a culture of equality of access and opportunity.

Transitional stages often entail a review of the role of state institutions and mechanisms in order to better adjust to realities and enhance equality among citizens. However, reforms in Iraq have been accompanied by the dismantling of the State, which could then no longer fulfil its responsibilities or provide key services in the transitional economy. Neither the private sector nor civil society has been able to step in to provide such services, and women have lost most of their social benefits, including state-sponsored childcare.

Development indicators, employment and assets

The imposition of sanctions and the growing political and economic crisis, with the insecurity and conflict it has bred since 1990, have meant that women have not fared well compared to men in recent decades. They are worse off on several key human development indicators. In 2007, although women’s life expectancy (62) was much higher than that of men (55), 30% of women aged 15 and up were illiterate compared to 14% of men. Combined school enrolment rates (primary, intermediate and secondary) were 55% for females and 68% for males. Unemployment rates were also higher among women: 23% compared to 16%. Women’s earned income is only 11% of men’s. Agricultural work constitutes 60% of total working hours per week for women and only 22% for men. This helps explain their low income, as agricultural work for women is known to be mostly unpaid and of lower productivity. In 2007 the Human Development Index for Iraq was 0.627, while the Gender Development Index was 0.584.

In general, the rate of women’s participation in Iraqi economic activity is considerably lower than men’s participation (21% compared to 79% in 2004). The transition towards an open market economy may provide both more opportunities and more challenges for Iraqi women. The opening of the market may provide new opportunities in the private sector, but it will also increase competition for jobs and require skills that the education system imparts unequally. In addition, there will be fewer jobs for women in the public sector. Article 23 of the 2005 Constitution guarantees “the right of the Iraqi to ownership” without any discrimination based on gender. Although no data exist to measure ownership of such assets as land, property and businesses, it is safe to say that women in general possess fewer financial assets than men. For example, the vast majority of land and housing units are registered in the names of men, and men clearly dominate in private sector ownership and management. Female heads of household – this is 11% of the total households – also own fewer assets than other women.

Women’s personal status

The new Constitution of 2005 strove to include a number of positive measures for women. Women may pass now on their nationality to their children, for example (Article 18). However it contains a number of articles, clauses and implications that could be considered discriminatory. For instance, Article 41 states that “Iraqis are free to abide by their personal status according to their religion, beliefs, doctrines or choices”, which may allow for different interpretations of Islamic Sharia, resulting in barriers to legal equality, especially in matters of civil code such as marriage and divorce. Varying interpretations could set up different practices in different provinces, in rural and urban populations or among members of different religions. These provisions are seen as a step backwards when compared with the provisions of Law No. 188/1959, which regulate all matters relating to marriage, divorce, inheritance, guardianship and custody of children for all Iraqis, regardless of sect. Indeed, Article 41 of the Constitution contradicts the fundamental guarantee found in Article 14 of the Law that “Iraqis are equal before the law with no discrimination because of gender or...”

* There are no available data on GII.
1 Lead author of “Iraq: National Report on the Status of Human Development 2008.” This article is based on facts and analysis of that report, which is available at <www.ualr. org/reports/NRSHD-English.pdf>.

** This law – which included the right to retain the marital home after the divorce for a period of three years, equal marriage age for female and male, equating the dowry of women in divorce with the price of gold at the time of divorce, and requiring the husband to prove financial ability to maintain a second wife before contracting a polygamous marriage – was subjected to diverse amendments over the years, mostly detrimental to women.
race". Such a contradiction compromises the unity of universally applicable legislation.

When it comes to providing protection for, and prohibiting violence against, women, constitutional and legal provisions alike may be inadequate. The Constitution, for example, does not refer specifically to women when it addresses the issue of violence in the chapter on rights. Article 4 does not consider marital violence as a specific crime. Article 44 states that "the Iraqi is free to move, travel and reside inside or outside Iraq", but in practice the law does not allow a woman under 40 to obtain a passport without the permission of a guardian. Another example is that women have the right to equal wages, but the law does not provide binding provisions to guarantee equal promotion. Thus, even where the Constitution provides for de jure non-discrimination against women, legal, social and cultural factors often represent de facto obstacles in the way. The legal and legislative climate in the Kurdistan Region seems to be more positive towards women. For example, the Personal Status Act No. 198, drafted in 1959 but considered progressive for its time, is being applied there, and the Commission on Women's Affairs has succeeded in introducing some amendments. In 2007, additional conditions were imposed in cases of polygamy; female circumcision was prohibited and regulations concerning divorce were changed to make them more favourable to women.

In 1986, Iraq ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), with reservations to Articles 2, 9 and 29. Those reservations effectively nullify the Convention's provisions for equality between women and men. Since the beginning of the transition in 2003, women's organizations have tried without success to have these reservations withdrawn. The Constitution further does not include any article acknowledging the ratification of international conventions as binding. In any case, the new regime has rejected commitments to international conventions ratified by its predecessor, in particular CEDAW, on the basis of contradiction with the Sharia.3

**Bringing women into decision-making**

A quota system for women in political life was introduced in 2003 and the new Constitution also provides for affirmative action, granting in Article 49 a quota for women of no less than 25% of the seats in Parliament. Electoral Law No. 6 of 2005 also stipulates that election candidate lists should abide by this quota. In the 2005 elections, women gained 87 out of 275 seats in the National Assembly (31%). In local council elections from closed electoral lists they gained 28% of seats. Additionally, adherence to the quota system significantly raised the number of women elected to governing councils. Since 2003, the number of women in administrative decision-making positions has increased from 12.7% to 22.4%. Although they represented only 2% of the judiciary in 2006, they fared better in the executive. In 2006, there were four female cabinet ministers, and 342 high-ranking officials, including 8 under-secretaries, 33 counsellors and inspectors general, 86 directors general, and 215 assistant directors general. However it should be noted that the hurdles women have to surmount to reach and retain these opportunities are higher and more numerous.

**A legacy of cultural restrictions**

For women, cultural heritage—which is formed by tradition rather than by religion—is one of the basic references in forming notions of acceptable conduct. A stereotypical image of women has lasted for centuries due to the State, throughout its history, has helped perpetuate it to avoid entering into conflict with society and its religious and cultural leaders. So ingrained has this image become that, as several studies have shown, the view some women hold of their own sex is not altogether different from that held by men.

Women’s acceptance of this false image provides the State with the rationale to delay enacting legislation that would improve their situation. Their exclusion is also justified by society as a means of ensuring their protection. In this way, the family remains the most resistant pocket of cultural bigotry against women, where male violence is accepted as a disciplinary or preventive right. For instance, a report by the Ministry of Human Rights in the Kurdistan Region indicates that 239 women were driven to set fire to themselves during the first 8 months of 2006. This situation is not very different in other areas, and honour-related murders are common in the centre and south of Iraq. It is probable that such practices have been under-reported owing to the undeveloped monitoring capabilities of women's organizations as well as to media biases.

**Conclusions**

The empowerment of Iraqi women should be an overarching goal, not a side objective, as women have an equal part to play in overall economic, political and social development. Yet evidence shows that Iraqi women are disproportionately affected by the shrinking of the State’s power, the insecurity arising from political instability, the breakdown of economic activities and the deterioration of social structures, all resulting from ongoing conflicts. Increased violence against women is currently the most dangerous consequence of the transition and requires urgent intervention from all actors in society. Seeking protection, women have retreated to their community, sect or tribe, thus reversing the gains of almost a century of modernization undertaken by the State itself.

Lack of security has hampered progress in human development and damaged mechanisms for genuine empowerment. But there is still an opportunity to improve the situation of women. The specific responsibilities of the State include to:

- Amend laws (and the Constitution) to eliminate provisions, omissions and contradictions that perpetuate discrimination.
- Ensure freedom of opinion to encourage public debate and dialogue; there is a need for public consciousness-raising campaigns and deep changes in media stereotypes of women.
- Create a new labour environment that sets aside the present division of labour based on limited roles for women and their restriction as workers to sectors of weak productivity.
- Confront the culture of domination and marginalization and disseminate a culture of peace and tolerance to eliminate violence against women in all its forms and put an end to its perpetuation as part of accepted culture.
- Open up new opportunities through reform of the lending system in public banks, by lifting the requirement for real estate as collateral and by encouraging women-friendly banking services.
- Reform educational systems and curricula to change society’s perceptions of violence against women, and instil a sense of common responsibility for ending it.
- Expand access to micro-credit projects and home-based work for women with limited education and training, rural women, the elderly, and widows supporting families.

By taking a firm stand on a culture of human rights, equal opportunities and gender equality, the Government could dispatch the centuries-old culture of discrimination against women in Iraq for good.
Government intervention to support those financial institutions exposed to the fluctuations in international markets confirms that Italian banks have been in difficulties since the beginning of the global financial crisis. The worst consequence of the crisis so far is the shrinking of the credit market. In a country where 90% of businesses are of medium or small size, the Government’s response has been quantitatively and qualitatively insufficient. There is a need for different policies that adequately distribute the resources to fight poverty and protect workers.

Although the Italian Government has tried to instill confidence by claiming that the country will not only remain untouched by the crisis but even come out of it stronger, the evidence to the contrary is undeniable. While the Government has not yet needed to save any banks, this has not prevented the credit crunch from harming families and enterprises. Figures from Istat, the National Institute for Statistics, show that during 2008 unemployment reached 7.1% up from 6.4% the previous year, and that between January and February 2009, 370,561 workers lost their jobs – an increase of 46% compared to the same period in 2008.

With regards to the industrial sector, the Italian Confederation of Workers Unions (CISL) 2008 report highlights that there are 900,000 jobs at risk, while studies done by the Italian Labour General Confederation (CGIL) project an unemployment rate of 9% at the end of 2009 and up to 10.1% in 2010. Another significant indicator of the impact of the crisis is that, for the first time in Italy, immigrants are facing problems getting work, particularly in the north-east. According to the CGIL (the association of artisans and small industrialists) in the Veneto Region, 24% of those unemployed during January 2009 were immigrants from outside the EU.

The cracks in the financial system

The message that politicians and financial agents have been repeating for months in order to reassure savers and markets is that Italian banks and the financial system are healthy and not subject to the risks of failure and collapse that hit some other countries. A closer look, however, reveals that the situation is more complex. In 2008, the Italian stock exchange lost 49% of its value, and it kept going down in 2009. Credit institutions, representing nearly 30% of Italian stock exchange capitalization, have been hit the hardest.

Even though the Italian financial system was not as deep immersed in speculative activities as those of the United States and Great Britain, Italian banks pursued aggressive expansion policies, in particular buying other financial institutions in Eastern Europe. And the difficulties they currently experience have been confirmed by the intervention of the Government in support of those major banking groups most exposed to international markets. During the past few years there has been a continuous shifting of the pension system to one managed by private pension funds. Due to the financial crisis, 5.9% of savings managed by pension funds were cancelled in 2008. Open-end funds, usually riskier, registered a loss of 8.6%. In most cases, these workers’ savings simply disappeared.

Shrinking credit

The worst consequence of the financial crisis so far has been the reduction in the availability of credit. Several banks have significantly reduced access to credit, particularly for small enterprises, the most important part of the Italian system of production. The situation is aggravated by the fact that many banks have been progressively shifting their business from the traditional activity of collecting savings to fund productive activities towards financial operations. Only half of their revenues now come from credit activity, while commissions and financial deals constitute the other half.

The most severely hit by this crunch are immigrants, precarious workers, young people and other sectors of society that were already considered non-bankable prior to the crisis. It is also affecting families. The result is a dramatic increase in non-bank borrowing at high levels of interest, particularly in the south, where the number of over-indebted families has increased by 69.4% in the last year and recourse to such loans increased by 48.2%.

Government measures to revitalize the lending system do not seem to have had any effect. Banks are using the new measures to improve their bottom line and assets without broadening lending channels. Similarly, the reduction in interest rates by the European Central Bank has translated into increased profits for the Italian banks rather than improved access to credit for their clients.

Italy is a country in which the transfer of income from labour to profits has been most evident. This trend, common to most Western economies, has meant a shift of 8 points of GDP (EUR 120 billion) in Italy from workers to enterprise profits, leading to a progressive “financialization” of the economy.

Government responses

After a brief parliamentary discussion, an “anti-crisis decree” was made law on 28 January 2009. The measures adopted to deal with the recession are completely deficient for two reasons. First, the allocated resources are insufficient, especially when compared with other European countries (EUR 5 billion in Italy versus EUR 60 billion in Germany, EUR 38 billion in Spain, EUR 26 billion in France and...
EUR 22 billion in Great Britain). Second, they will not strengthen the system of production. Especially problematic is the downplaying of the fight against tax evasion – a phenomenon with disturbing dimensions in Italy at approximately 18% of GDP, which means that more than EUR 100 billion in revenue is lost every year.8

**Families**

The most important measures are single payments and cheques for low-income families. Additions to family income are welcome by those who receive them, but 40 euros per month (the value of the so-called “social card”) can neither cover their expenses nor protect them from present and future problems.

**Labour**

Measures proposed by the Government are credit aids and redundancy funds for the largest enterprises. As about 90% of Italian businesses are of medium or small size, however, most enterprises and workers will not be able to access this support. Moreover, the sector that benefits the most is the automobile industry. Around the world, most countries help this sector and Italy is no different; however, the Government should have tied the transfers to investments in environmental sustainability and innovation. Besides, there are other sectors, such as garments, that need urgent help (in particular to support their exports and the internal demand) for them to remain competitive.

**Welfare**

Welfare money transfers have not been set out as policy. This means that the Government is giving out money without implementing safety nets, active labour policies, social inclusion, promotion, vocational training, etc. In the near future, there will be scores of unemployed workers lacking structures that could guarantee basic services for a decent life. At the same time, in order not to face budgetary problems, the Government has reduced specific funds for social policies, self-sufficiency, local public transport and the inclusion of migrants.

**Finance**

The so-called Tremonti bonds, named after the Minister of Economy and Finance, are in essence public loans that can be used by the banks in order to strengthen their financial statements. The goal is to re-launch the credit system, particularly for medium and small enterprises. The effects of this have yet to be seen.

**Other measures**

The Government’s plans for the future include cutting resources for research and development and investing in nuclear power. Measures supposed to stimulate demand are investments in high-speed transport and the huge Bridge on the Straits of Messina, as well as loosening environmental legislation and permits for the private building industry. No attention is given to renewable energy, emission reduction or the hundreds of small infrastructure projects the country urgently needs.

Apart from anti-crisis measures, the Government is proposing a very short consultation on the welfare model. The agenda includes some worrying proposals, such as pushing for further labour flexibility; a shift towards “workfare” models; the treatment of immigration as a problem, and not as a resource; and lack of recognition for the non-profit sector as a key actor in the Italian welfare system, making reference only to volunteers and ignoring the role of thousands of social enterprises.

**Proposals from the Italian Social Watch Coalition**

In order to offer a different response to the crisis and re-launch the Italian economy from the starting point of those who are most affected by it, the Social Watch Italian Coalition is proposing a number of measures:

**Family and welfare**

The key words should be “fighting poverty and redistributing resources”. A real welfare policy through public services benefits for those who really need help, rather than direct money transfers, is the main tool to guarantee redistribution of resources within society. The Government, at the central and local level, has to improve basic services, health, assistance, day nurseries, public schools, migrant inclusion and housing policies since these measures represent the real struggle against poverty and vulnerability, as well as a counter-cyclical economic policy to work against the effects of the crisis.

**Labour**

The moral imperative for every government is to prevent the main consequences of the crisis falling on the workers. Priority measures include defending the less protected workers from a contractual point of view, through the activation of both a social security cushion plan for precarious workers and incentives for companies that decide to retain their employees.

To shape a different economy, support is urgently needed to enable the public and private research sectors to embark on innovative processes. Moreover, a massive investment plan on renewable energies is essential in order to reduce dependency on fossil fuels, fight against climate change and support those sustainable economic sectors that look to the future.

In response to the crisis, more and more account holders in Italy are entering the world of ethical finance. The ethical finance client cares about how his own money is used, but also about his bank going bankrupt. Many banks today are thus multiplying their efforts to improve their reputations. Returning to the original mandate of the banking system to sustain the real economy has to be a constant reference for finding a way out of the crisis.

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**Social Watch**

107 **Italy**

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10 See: <www.giilt.iubis09.it>.


KENYA

Neo-liberal orthodoxy and the ostrich game

Neo-liberal capitalism has lost its reason to exist. It is a structural crisis of liberal democracy, but in Kenya the Government is in denial, playing the game of the ostrich, burying its head in the sand. The governing elite argues that the crisis is circumstantial and that the national economy is sheltered enough by its weak ties with international capital. Kenyan civil society keeps warning that, contrary to the Government’s predictions, the country is about to sink in the turbulent waters of neo-liberalism.

Thirty years of unfettered, free-market capitalism, based on the neo-liberal model, can no longer obscure the systemic faults lines of a system whose time has run out.

Commodification and privatization of public assets hitherto considered essential to prosperity has led to the transfer of assets from the public and popular realms to the private and class-privileged domains. The resultant predatory and speculative financialisation of trade transactions has led to the steep rise in the daily turnover of financial transactions in international markets, which rose from USD 2.3 billion in 1983 to USD 130 billion in 2001. No wonder, the accompanying deregulation allowed financial systems to assume centre stage in redistributive activity through speculation, predation, outright fraud and thievery. Stimulus plans may be technical steps in the right direction, particularly if they have the virtues of working bottom-up rather than top-down through the inert banking system. Essentially, however, they remain technical fixes designed to pump up demand and get consumers shopping again instead of empowering them to question the much-touted efficiency of neo-liberal capitalism.

Kenya is more than familiar with stock promotions, Ponzi schemes, structured asset destruction through inflation that has had a lot to do with asset-stripping through fraudulent privatization, debt peonage, corporate commanship and blatant dispossession of assets, as the case of rampant raiding of the National Social Security Fund (NSSF) demonstrates. This eventually led to parastatal collapses and decimation of stock through credit and share manipulation by unscrupulous capital market insiders, like Suntra Investments, Nyaga Brokers Ltd, Francis Thuo Ltd and others.

The NSSF was established in 1966 as a mandatory provident fund for employees in Kenya. Although both employees and employers each contribute only KES 400 (USD 5.4) monthly, the Fund has, by dint of its sheer size, chalked up a cumulative portfolio of more than KES 80 billion (USD 1.08 billion) or about 8.2% of the country’s GDP. It continues to be used by the Government as a gravy train for its close associates, forgetting that it is a contractual savings and investment support scheme for supporting old-age retirement. Originally a department in the Ministry of Labour, the NSSF was elevated to a stand-alone parastatal in 1987. Since then the pensioners have known nothing but melancholy.

In the run up to the first multiparty elections in 1991-92, the NSSF was used as the main source of slush funds for oiling the campaign machinery for the then ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU) party. Pensioners’ money was funneled out of the Fund in order to fund dubious real estate deals that created instant billionaires among youngsters then known as “Youth for KANU ‘92.” It continued to be a cash cow for the politically connected and got to the headlines only 10 years later, when in a pre-election deal in 2002 it lost KES 256 million (USD 3.45 million) through a Euro Bank scam to finance the presidential campaign.

In a new election the NSSF, true to character, regained its notorious profile. A commercial plot adjacent to the equally scandal-ridden Laico (formerly Grand) Regency Hotel was sold to a lower bidder. It was reported that the NSSF rejected an offer of KES 1.4 billion (USD 18.88 million) for the plot and accepted that of KES 1.3 billion (USD 17.53 million) after the lower bidder offered a kickback to trustees to the tune of KES 650 million (USD 8.77 million). The Fund’s management denied this but in July 2008 the Minister for Labour dissolved the Board and fired the Managing Trustee to pave way for investigations into this and other scandals. In September 2008 it was disclosed that NSSF was at risk of losing KES 1 billion (USD 13.49 million) in Discount Security – a stock brokerage firm that collapsed and was associated with a former Managing Trustee of NSSF. The lie that the neo-liberal state must, as a matter of strategic efficacy, give the market a wide berth has been laid bare by the fact that instead of maximizing its effectiveness away from the market, it has been assigned the role of a prime agent of redistributive policies, reversing the flow of resources from upper to lower classes that can only be associated with the era of embedded liberalism; effectively subsidizing the rich in society through confiscatory deflation practices.¹

Velvet glove treatment for criminals

Nowhere is this more starkly demonstrated than in the public fraud that was the Initial Public Offer (IPO)
Thuo has to date faced any criminal charges. The NSE feigned surprise and quickly moved to create a loss of clients' shares to prop up its operating capital; the firm had been using gains made from illegally trading to cover its losses. The matter was then swept under the carpet. Nobody at Nyaga or Francis Thuo brokers were suspended, several complaints were raised about another firm – Nyaga Stock Brokers – to the Capital Markets Authority (CMA), the regulatory body. But nothing was done. Finally, the local press in March 2008 published that Nyaga's operating capital was not only negative but also the firm had been using gains made from illegally trading in clients' shares to prop up its operating capital; the NSE feigned surprise and quickly moved to create a KES 100 million (USD 1.4 million) bailout package to cushion the affected clients. The matter was then swept under the carpet. Nobody at Nyaga or Francis Thuo has to date faced any criminal charges.

In quick succession, Discount Securities and Suntra Investments have followed suit. The velvet glove treatment accorded these criminal firms not only attests to the nature of the rampant practices in the NSE but, more importantly, to abuse of the oftued free and efficient market. A section of civil society has consistently demanded that a market dealing in public funds of this magnitude needs a strong, efficient and independent regulator. The CMA does not qualify: it is obsessed with maintaining status quo, leaving rogue brokers to rule the roost with their perpetual power plays and manipulations.

In the last 20 years, no less than 20 private commercial banks have gone under with depositors' fortunes – mainly those of pensioners and informal sector savers – estimated at KES 70 billion (USD 944 million). Among the private banks and financial institutions that collapsed with depositors' funds are Rural Urban Finance Company, Jimba Credit Finance (owned by the Nairobi Stock Exchange, Jimma Mbaru), Trade Bank, Trust Bank, Continental Bank (owned by close associates of President Kibaki) and Euro Bank. In Kenya, the perpetrators continue to be appointed to high public office. On 16 December 2008 – amid a growing global financial crisis – the Cabinet agreed to privatize more financial institutions, including the National Bank of Kenya and Consolidated Bank.

The ostrich game

As widespread doubt about the immutable efficiency of market forces grows in the leading capitalist economies, their client economies in the South are still in denial, sustained by naive faith in the cyclical nature of capitalist crises. As the economic principles informing free-market economies began to crumble, the Kenyan political elite, like the legendary desert ostrich, buried its head in the sand; hoping that the crisis would pass. Against this silence, civil society organizations warn that Kenya's economic boat is leaking and rescue measures are urgent.

Opportunities for mobilizing dissent are growing, and these must be taken lest the country experience a neo-conservative resurgence. In the meantime it is important to reject the illusion that Southern economies will be shielded from the meltdown, owing to not being fully integrated into the global capitalist economy and may even benefit through the escalation of domestic demand. They confuse a cyclical (if severe) downturn in the historical fortunes of capitalism with its fundamental crisis. The Kenyan ruling elite remains oblivious to the looming disaster: massive food insecurity, impending environmental disaster (in the Maus Forest, in Mount Kenya, in Lake Victoria, etc.), unemployment/underemployment, spiraling crime and disparity between the wealthy and the poor, declining tourist arrivals and volume of remittances from overseas.

Instead of taking heed, the recent National conference on “The Kenya We Want”, like the current policy instrument for turning Kenya into a middle income economy by 2030 (“Vision 2030”), continue to adhere to the thoroughly discredited Washington Consensus. Even as Western economies inject massive new bailout funds into their financial institutions, and in some cases re-nationalize their banks, the Kenyan Parliament is legislating the privatization of the few remaining strategic public assets in order to provide a one-time government revenue injection.2

The stimulus and bailout packages preferred by Western governments are unlikely to make a significant difference beyond harmonizing government and business responses to the crisis. As stop-gap measures, such packages can only delay the inevitable. Without democratizing the ownership of the means of production and strengthening internal mechanisms of the domestic economy, Klaus Schwab's global redesign initiative, launched in Davos in February 2009, will do little to resolve the crisis. In the face of such a situation, even the trade agreements currently under discussion, such as the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) must be re-negotiated.

Often, an epic moment in the history of a social praxis is catalyzed by catastrophes like the one we are experiencing, particularly those that permit fundamental changes in attitudes and social behaviour. The signs of capitalism's distress have been showing for a long time, but in gradual installments. Now they are obvious. The global capitalist system no longer merits any retrofitting. It calls for a re-construction by new actors favoured by history. This is the crisis of liberal democracy, which has failed to deliver economic justice and equity. ■

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2 Organizations set for privatization: Kenya Electricity Generation Company (KENGEN); Kenya Pipeline Company; Chemell Sugar Company; Sony Sugar Company; Nicola Sugar Company; Mifwani Sugar Company; Muhoroni Sugar Company; Kenya Tourism Development Authority and some hotels: National Bank of Kenya; Consolidated Bank; Development Bank of Kenya; Kenya Wine Agencies Ltd. East African Portland Cement Company; Kenya Meat Commission; New Kenya Cooperative Creameries; Kenya Ports Authority by way of a container terminal at Eldoret and outsourcing of stevedoring services and development of new berths.

Kenya

Social Watch  189  Kenya
LEBANON

No dialogue on the crisis

The global economic and financial crisis is receiving increasing attention in official discourse as the Government has realized that, unless it is responsibly and seriously tackled, the impact will be severe. While the direct effects of the crisis have yet to be felt in the country, the nature of the economy renders it extremely vulnerable. However, although a national dialogue is needed, the Government has not held consultations with NGOs and other concerned parties.

Positive indicators marked the end of 2008 in Lebanon despite the global financial crisis. In fact, according to the Lebanese Central Bank and the International Finance Corporation, the country witnessed 8% growth mainly fueled by the real estate, construction, tourism and financial services (banking) sectors. The main contributing factor remained workers’ remittances, which at close to USD 8 billion were equivalent to more than 10% of the total deposits in Lebanese commercial and investment banks. Furthermore, debt-to-GDP ratio dropped from 180% to 162%.2

Other reasons why Lebanon has so far been only slightly affected by the crisis include the small size of its economy, financial sector and operations; the modest growth rates registered in previous years; the resilience of the banking sector, which enjoys solvency of USD 95 billion or 322% of GDP and is actively regulated by the Central Bank; and foreign aid, which helps the country overcome economic and financial challenges. However, the economy presents multiple structural imbalances that render it vulnerable to the repercussions of the crisis, including a 30% budget deficit, a two-thirds balance of payments deficit, the 162% debt-to-GDP ratio mentioned above and an inflation rate that exceeds 10%. In the coming year, remittances are expected to drop, at the same time that reverse migration leads to higher demand for jobs. This has already started as the global crisis hits the Gulf countries, particularly the United Arab Emirates.

Given this context, the most optimistic predictions – by the International Monetary Fund and the Ministry of Finance – do not expect a growth of more than 5% for 2009. They also expect the debt-to-GDP ratio to increase due to the budget deficit and the need for borrowing to cover expenditures. The Ministry of Finance estimates an increase in public debt of USD 4 billion.

Furthermore, a deepening global crisis will bring about a decline in inter-Arab investments and foreign direct investment (FDI), as well as a reduction in the aid monies pledged at the Paris donors’ conference of January 2007 (known as Paris III).3 Although the banking sector is the main engine of the Lebanese economy, it may lose its resilience due to the crisis of confidence in financial markets and its relationships with international and regional banks.4

Economic and social setting

The UNDP report “Poverty Growth and Income Distribution in Lebanon” indicates that 28.5% of residents live below the upper poverty line and 8.1% live below the lower poverty line.5 It also reveals major imbalances in the geographic distribution of poverty, which is concentrated in rural areas and clusters surrounding major cities. The 0.375 Gini coefficient registered by Lebanon further confirms this. The root causes are the economic policies adopted by successive governments, most significantly the search for growth through attracting FDI and creating a tax haven, while policies aimed at fairly redistributing growth returns through a balanced tax structure and the provision of basic services were overlooked.

Lebanese officials, including the Prime Minister, promote the market system without mentioning the role of Government in monitoring market mechanisms and encouraging investments in productive or employment-generating sectors.6 Investors focused on construction, real estate and finance while industry and agriculture were neglected.

It should be mentioned that the late Lebanese Minister of Industry, Pierre El Gemayel,7 submitted a proposal to the Cabinet in 2006 on “Industry for the Youth 2010”. This 10-year plan was intended to encourage and strengthen the sector, focusing on its important role in promoting economic growth and job creation. He stressed the necessity of a national commitment to developing industry and highlighted the lack of coherence in national policies. The Government, however, did not implement the plan. As a result, the economy became increasingly oriented towards financial and banking services and a rentier economy, while investments in the productive sectors were lacking.

The Government’s plan

Several months after the financial crisis began – and with many voices warning of its impacts globally, regionally and nationally – the Lebanese Government finally realized the magnitude of the problem and presented a preventive two-year plan to cushion the

1 Ziad Abdel-Samad is Executive Director of the Arab NGO Network for Development (ANND).
3 Paris III is the third of the “Friends of Lebanon Conferences for Investment and Finance” held in Paris in February 2001, November 2002 and January 2007. The last one took place a few months after the Israeli war against Lebanon of 2006; its programme was articulated around three main objectives: (1) to respond to the results of the Israeli war in terms of rehabilitation and reconstruction, (2) to respond to the economic and financial crisis that Lebanon was facing, (3) to adopt the Social Action Plan presented by the Lebanese Government. ANND discussed the Paris III document in the national report included in Social Watch 2007.

6 Most recently, in his opening speech during the 17th Arab economic forum held in Beirut in 2 and 3 April 2009, Prime Minister Fouad Siniora underlined the absence of alternatives to the market economy.
7 Gemayel was assassinated in November 2006 in Beirut.
national economy from its effects. The plan revolves around three main points: (1) injecting liquidity into the markets through increasing wages in the public and private sectors and launching construction and infrastructure projects through the Council for Development and Reconstruction (COR) and other government agencies; (2) activating the projects needed to obtain the funds pledged at the Paris III conference; and (3) encouraging investments and stimulating the private sector through cuts in taxes and fees and the establishment of three free zones in different regions of the country.

However, this set of measures fails to make up a comprehensive national plan that a challenge of this magnitude requires. The Government’s plans to inject liquidity into the economy amount to 10% of GDP, on par with what industrial countries adopted to address the crisis, but the accumulated budget deficit limits its ability to spend. Accordingly, it will have to resort to borrowing, thus increasing public debt and debt service.

Furthermore, although the Government’s plans include an increase in wages and the waiving of social security charges for new investors as an incentive, these measures do not indicate that it is willing to play a role in stimulating the economy. The increase merely removes a more than decade-long wage freeze. The plan also relies on a drop in oil prices, which would result in reduced costs in electricity production and public transportation. Furthermore, the waiving of social security charges comes at the expense of workers’ rights to social protection, especially as the budget deficit of the National Social Security Fund threatens its ability to meet beneficiaries’ needs. The injected liquidity, the increased public debt and the reduction in remittances will all lead to greater pressure on the economy and on public finances.

Moreover, while the Government relies on the Paris III Agenda as a basis to its work plan, this was initially formulated as a series of measures to reduce debt through curbing expenditures and increasing revenues on the one hand, and reducing debt service through privatization in the telecom and energy sectors on the other. In order to increase revenues, the plan seeks to increase VAT and taxes on other consumable commodities. At the level of basic services, Paris III was the first of the “Friends of Lebanon” conferences to address social aspects; however, the proposed remedies are confined to a few programmes that are based on social safety nets and not on a national strategy for social development. It is worth noting that Paris III did mention the need for administrative reforms in public administrations and ministries.

Both the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance have acknowledged the negative impacts expected from the global crisis and the need to protect the national economy. However, as their answer, they restate their commitment to implementing the Paris III Agenda without addressing any revision or reconsideration of the measures it promoted. Although theoretically designed to meet Lebanese financial and economic challenges, in practice the Agenda speeds up the procedures needed for the country to join the World Trade Organization (WTO), especially as it reaches the final stages of the bilateral and multilateral round of negotiations on non-agricultural and agricultural goods as well as services.

The Government will need to reassess the Paris III Agenda, including the scope of deregulatory measures it is undertaking and the requirements related to the WTO. It should consider revising and expanding the social considerations in its plan and the mechanisms for supporting the economy, investing in productive sectors and addressing the level of monopolization of the national market that hinders the emergence of new entrepreneurs and small and medium businesses.

The role of civil society

The High Level Forum III on Aid Effectiveness, held in Accra in 2008, stressed the principle of “democratic ownership”. This should be reflected in national consultation processes that include civil society representatives in the formulation of national strategies and in the definition of priorities to meet national economic and financial challenges and social needs.

Moreover, the Financing for Development conference held in Doha in November 2008 stressed the need for input from civil society during the formulation and adoption of national policies for economic and social development. It underscored the important link between democracy, social development and civil society’s active participation. It also concluded that developing countries would be especially vulnerable to the global crisis without a reassessment of current policies, the setting of goals and the launching of collective and responsible action to reach them.

Civil society organizations (CSOs) play an important role in formulating sound development strategies that answer to the priorities and rights of local communities. Their advocacy efforts bring added value to the process of adopting adequate economic, financial and social policies and monitoring their impact. They advocate for laws that preserve citizens’ economic, social and cultural rights. Their continued struggle, for instance, to monitor the implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) has scored successes. In addition, and among many other successful examples, CSOs have provided important inputs in reforming parliamentary and municipal electoral laws and in formulating many anti-corruption laws.

In Lebanon, the mechanisms for consultation in policy formulation between the Government and CSOs are not effective. However, CSOs represent solid partners in social service delivery, either by individually providing services through centres spread across the country or in partnership with public sector institutions. Regarding lobbying activities for economic and financial reforms, however, CSOs are not very active mainly because of their lack of experience in this field. Since this is becoming a very important process, CSOs have to engage more and develop clear strategies and objectives for successful advocacy.

At a time when meeting the challenges requires the convergence of efforts to establish national and regional partnerships, some CSOs have attempted to start a dialogue on the crisis, its roots, its consequences and ways to address it. However, the Government persists in ignoring these efforts and in making decisions without effective consultation with concerned parties.

9 CDR is an autonomous structure responsible for the planning and implementation of master infrastructure projects all around the country. It functions under the direct supervision of the Prime Minister.
11 The Ministry of Finance estimates the cost of this policy will be an increase in public debts of USD 4 billion.
12 The current Prime Minister was Minister of Finance in 1992–1998 and 2000–2004. The current Minister of Finance worked at the IMF before he became the Prime Minister’s main advisor in 2005; he was appointed as Minister in June 2008.
Malaysia, which relies heavily on exports for economic growth and imports most of its food, will have to brace for years of economic difficulties. There is a sharp fall in industrial production, the unemployment rate is soaring and analysts warn that the coming recession could be worse than that of 1997. The Government has been criticized for acting too late and for focusing on bailing out companies. Civil society organizations are holding protests and public fora to raise public awareness of the negative impacts of these crises, especially to the vulnerable groups in society.

Riding on the economic slowdown
For much of the year, Malaysia was in denial of the possibility that the country could be negatively affected by the financial and economic turbulence that was rocking much of the world, even though countries after country, including its neighbour Singapore, were declaring that recession had hit their shores. Malaysian leaders maintained that the country’s fundamentals were strong and therefore there was no need to take action. This may have been true at the early stages of the financial crisis – which began in the US and Europe in 2007 and worsened in the first half of 2008 with as yet little effect on Malaysia. But when the financial crisis began to affect the Western countries’ real economy of production and incomes in the second part of 2008, this was increasingly transmitted to Malaysia towards the end of the year. This prompted many to believe that the USD 2 billion stimulus package unveiled by the Government in November, most of which has yet to be spent, may be too little too late. (Out of the USD 1.8 billion that has been channeled out, only USD 400 million worth of projects have been implemented).

According to official statistics the recessionary conditions that affected Western countries seriously hit countries like Malaysia in the last months of 2008. The falls in key figures have been surprisingly steep, showing that the Malaysian economy started stagnating, and then falling, in the last three to four months of the year and into the first few months of 2009.

The outlook does not look too good, with a recession likely to happen sooner than later. Besides revising its global projection to below 0% this year, the IMF has termed the present crisis as the “great recession” and “the worst performance in most of our lifetimes.” As recovery in the US economy is expected to take place only in 2011 or 2012, export-dependent countries like Malaysia will have to brace themselves for three to four years of economic difficulties.

There is no doubt that the downturn was caused by the global crisis, since Malaysia is one of Asia’s most open economies in terms of trade, with exports accounting for over 90% of GDP in 2007, compared with 14% for India, 16% for Japan, 36% for China and around 60% for Thailand and Taiwan. Only Singapore (186%) and Hong Kong (166%) exceed Malaysia’s export-to-GDP ratio.

The toll exerted by the economic slowdowns of its major trading partners is seen in the drastic drop in external demand. Although Malaysia’s exports are well diversified with many commodities plus manufactures, the problem is that almost all export items are affected at the same rate. Gross exports fell 18% in the last quarter of 2008 over the previous quarter, with the most worrying fall seen in manufacturing exports, especially electronics, electrical machinery and appliances, which make up the bulk of overall manufacturing exports or about 35%-40% of total exports. Commodities, which experienced a good run earlier in the year before the price bubble burst, were also not spared as exports in petroleum, palm oil and rubber fell in the same period. As such, the export engines of growth are stalled or in reverse gear. Another sign of bad times is the consistent sharp fall in industrial production since July 2008; the latest available figure shows that in January 2009 production fell 20% compared to a year ago.

Unemployment
With the slowdown in international trade, the jobs outlook is increasingly bearish. Malaysia’s unemployment rate in 2009 is expected to reach 4.5% compared to 3.8% in 2008. About 33,000 jobs were lost in 2008, the bulk of which in the last few months of the year as the global crisis took a turn for the worse as Asia’s key export markets slipped into recession. Of the nearly 26,000 jobs lost since October 2008, 85% were in the manufacturing sector with the electronics and electrical industries particularly hard hit. Exports in this sector fell by 34% in January 2009 from a year ago. The most severe projection comes from the Malaysian Employers’ Federation. It projects the number of job losses to peak at 200,000, far surpassing the 85,000 jobs lost during the financial crisis in 1997/98.

This negative trend has not escaped the radar of analysts such as the Swiss investment bank Credit Suisse which said that Malaysia’s downside risks are “the highest in Asia, after Hong Kong and Singapore, especially given the big drop in commodity prices.” These events have prompted some to suggest that it is imperative that the country reevaluate its industrial and export-oriented policies if not its entire economic makeup. There is a strong sentiment that the country should seriously reduce its dependency on exports and harness the domestic market for growth.

Recognizing the severity of the crisis, the Government in March 2009 announced a second and larger stimulus package to be distributed over the next two years in an effort to stall the slowdown and prevent the country slipping into a serious recession, which if not addressed will have serious repercussions on social and political stability. The USD 17 billion plan will allocate money for fiscal injection, guarantee funds and other assistance for industry, equity investments and tax incentives. The four main...
goals of the package are to protect and create jobs, ease the burden of the crisis on the population, assist the private sector and build capacity for the future.

With the growing job losses and expectation of more lay-offs to come, the Government has begun to review its policy on foreign workers who have been a major lifeline in many sectors. Worried about the steady rate of retrenchment, it announced that employers who wish to downsize their workforce should lay off foreign workers first before they retrench locals.

Malaysia — one of Asia’s largest importers of labour — has an estimated 2 million foreign workers (predominantly from neighbouring Indonesia — 66%—followed by Nepal and India) who are the mainstay of the plantation and manufacturing sectors. But now with unemployment mounting the government has banned the hiring of new foreign workers in the manufacturing and services sectors. It has reportedly slashed its work permit approvals by over 70% this year. It has also approved a proposal to double the foreign workers’ levy imposed on employers to discourage the hiring of foreign workers.

However, activists worry that employers could pass down these higher charges to their foreign workers to absorb, further burdening the latter who are already saddled with hefty agent fees. Instead, it was proposed by some that minimum wages be imposed to curb the intake of foreign workers as employers tend to turn to foreigners because they are cheaper to hire than locals, often receiving wages below the poverty line.

The stimulus package and its uncertain outcome

While there are some medium to longer term measures committed in the Government’s mini-budget, some observers noticed a lack of initiatives to deal with the immediate and urgent need to stall the continued economic decline, stimulate demand and raise business activities, considered critical in any crisis-driven “stimulus budget”. Instead, it was criticized for focusing on what appeared to be the bailing out of companies, given that nearly half of the money will go to assisting the private sector. In comparison, only 17% was budgeted towards easing the burden of the people, the majority of whom are suffering from high costs of living. There was also concern that the specific needs of women, with the exception of single mothers, during the economic crisis have been overlooked, as only 1.4% was allocated for the less fortunate.

The success of the stimulus package will depend on the execution, implementation and transparency in the disbursement of the stimulus funds. This will determine if the trickle-down and multiplier effect of the package is felt across a large section of the population and that it will only benefit the well-connected companies and individuals as often happened before.

In responding to calls for transparency and accountability, the Government said it will launch a special website to monitor how funds under the government’s two economic stimulus packages are spent. The website will provide information to the public on the allocations and the amount spent, the programmes and projects that are implemented and their progress. Such an initiative is relatively new and a reflection of the need to respond to growing pressure for greater public accountability in a government that is often viewed as mired in corruption and political patronage. But as with all government policies, their implementation remains to be seen.

An unknown scenario

Despite the gloomy outlook, economists often point to Malaysia’s strong economic fundamentals and its experience from the previous Asian financial crisis in 1997 which they believe will allow it to weather the current crisis. But the nature of the present global crisis is still unfolding and no one really knows how deep and how long the crisis will play out. While the banking sector is still resilient for now, it will eventually be affected as businesses face difficulties in repaying loans. And while non-performing loans may be manageable now, this may not continue, as some analysts warn that the coming recession could be worse than that sparked by the 1997 Asian crisis.

There are fears of social problems caused by unemployment, including a higher crime rate coupled with the deterioration of poverty values and greater income inequality as many low- and middle-income workers lose jobs in manufacturing. With the experience of the recession of the mid to late 1980s in mind, there has been a proposal for a comprehensive social security plan. Increasingly, calls are being heard for a national retrenchment fund to protect workers in anticipation of possible job losses which the Government has said it is considering.

Food crisis and food insecurity

While high commodities prices brought benefits to some, simultaneous high food prices were a bane to most Malaysians already struggling with the high cost of food and other basic necessities brought on by the sharp increases in oil prices in 2008. While inflation has dropped in the past few months as the agricultural commodity bubble burst and oil prices fall from their peaks, food prices remain high with the consumer price index showing a sharp 9.2% rise in February 2009 for food. (The food and non-alcoholic beverages component contributes close to 80% of the 3.8% rise in the overall CPI in February 2009.) Significant increases were seen for rice, bread and other cereals whose indices have shot up by a whopping 18 per cent. Oil prices, though has been cut a few times over the last few months of 2008 in line with the drop in global oil prices, were still higher than the pre-crisis levels.

Much of the increase in food prices is also due to the fact that Malaysia is a major food importer and therefore is vulnerable to rising prices and speculation in food prices. Rapid development in the past few decades has shifted the focus of economic planning towards industrialization and industrial agriculture at the expense of food production as it became cheaper to buy food from other countries. Apart from rice, Malaysia also imports vegetables, fruits, meat, and grains.

Malaysia is currently about 60% self-sufficient in rice and the Government plans to inject about USD 2 billion to increase rice production to once again reach the 90% self-sufficiency level. The Food Security Policy was launched in April 2008 and subsidies and incentives have been paid out with the hope to boost rice production nation-wide. Simultaneously, the Bumi Hijau (green earth) campaign, an initiative similar to that introduced in the 1970s, was to encourage Malaysians to grow vegetables and other edible greens apart from rearing chicken and fish for their own consumption.

Despite these initiatives, there needs to be more effective long-term planning for economic recovery. The Government needs to give serious consideration to different aspects of the problem, including more efficient use of land, labour and technology, that may hamper the achievement of the targetted goals.

Civil society responses

A series of protests and activities including public forums were held by various civil society organizations and NGOs to raise public awareness of the negative impacts of these crises— especially to the vulnerable groups in society.

The Oppressed People’s Network (JERIT; the acronym means “scream”), a coalition of civil society groups, has been particularly active in organizing various activities to highlight their concerns and present their demands. They held a protest against the oil price hike in January 2008 and ended the year with the “The People: The Force of Change” bicycle campaign to express their concern for workers’ rights and the hardships being faced by ordinary, working class Malaysians as the economy faces a slowdown.

The bicycle campaign saw groups of cyclists flagged off from three main locations in the north, south and east coast of Peninsular Malaysia and they pedaled simultaneously towards the Parliament building in the capital city of Kuala Lumpur to present a memorandum to the Government and opposition party, highlighting their concerns and demands.

Their main demands include the introduction of a minimum wage, decent housing, price controls for essential goods and an end to the privatization of essential services. They also linked this to broader civil and political rights including the restoration of local government election and the repeal of the Internal Security Act, which allows indefinite detention without trial.

Along the way, they distributed leaflets to the public and presented the memorandum to the chief ministers of the various states (Malaysia has a federal system of government). Despite numerous obstacles placed by the police including arrests, they managed to make their way to their final destination. And during those two weeks in December 2008, the campaign received much publicity and public support along the routes they traveled on.

Social Watch 113 Malaysia
MALETA
No shelter from the crisis

Although the Maltese economy seemed at first to be shielded from the global economic crisis, the effects are starting to be felt. Tourism is declining, and food and utilities have become more expensive. Opinion polls show that the Maltese are not confident of the immediate future, expecting deteriorating quality of life in 2009. The number of asylum seekers grows daily, and their plight tends to get worse.

Kopin Malta
Joseph M. Sammut

At the end of 2008, most developed countries were in recession and the world economy was in a steep downturn. During the year’s first two quarters, the Maltese economy seemed largely sheltered from the effects of the financial crisis. Growth continued to be driven by domestic demand, primarily in the form of higher consumption expenditure and a sharp accumulation of inventories. Conditions in the labour market remained favourable, with the private sector continuing to fuel job creation. There was a slight increase in employment (1.3%), while the unemployment rate remained stable at a relatively low 6%. However, net exports contributed negatively to growth for the third and fourth quarters.

The rise in international food and fuel prices resulted in higher consumer prices and inflation. Malta’s inflation rate was 4.7% – the highest rate in the euro area in 2008. Moreover, recent international developments pose increasing risks to growth. Malta’s export market was the worst affected in the whole of the EU in 2008: there was a fall of 14%, compared with an average rise of 6.2%. The Spring report of the European Commission Economic and Financial Affairs forecasts 0.7% GDP growth, 1.9% inflation, 7.4% unemployment, a negative balance of 2.6% in the budgetary deficit’s proportion of GDP and a lowering of the current account balance by -7.0%.

Maltese banks remain sufficiently liquid and well capitalized to cover credit and operational and market risks. They are well regulated to protect clients, although one of the most important banks suffered a 60% decrease in its annual profits for 2008 due to the collapse of an international bank. The Government guaranteed bank deposits up to EUR 100,000 (USD 132,000).


5 Malta Union of Teachers (MUT), General Workers Union (GWU), Union of Cabin Crew, Union Haddiema Bank Centrari, Union of Technical and Clerical Workers of Malta Environment and Planning Authority (MEPA), Union Professionisti Arvalità għall-Ambjent u Ppjanar, University of Malta Academic Staff Association (Umasa), Airline Pilots Association, Union Periti u Inginnera Servizz Pubbliku and Association of Aviation Engineers.


9 Malta Union of Midwives and Nurses (MUMN), Malta Union of Teachers (MUT), General Workers Union (GWU), Union of Cabin Crew, Union Haddiema Bank Centrari, Union of Technical and Clerical Workers of Malta Environment and Planning Authority (MEPA), Union Professionisti Arvalità għall-Ambjent u Ppjanar, University of Malta Academic Staff Association (Umasa), Airline Pilots Association, Union Periti u Inginnera Servizz Pubbliku and Association of Aviation Engineers.
and needs to place the loss-making corporation on a sound financial footing. The issue of utility bills requires a proper socio-economic study that is based not only on global or average figures but also on budgetary surveys of different types of households, businesses and organizations. Such a study should also offer viable recommendations on sustainable energy scenarios in Malta.

Labour
The global slowdown began to be felt at the beginning of 2009, when many manufacturing companies brought in a four-day week and others announced redundancies to reduce their work force and financial losses. Redundancies may amount to hundreds or even thousands during 2009. Tourism plays an important role in the Maltese economic and labour spheres; currently, fewer tourists are coming from Great Britain, which accounts for 33% of the market. This will badly affect workers in this industry.

Malta Shipyards used to be the bulwark of the Maltese workforce, employing 5,000–6,000 workers as recently as the 1990s. In 2008, privatization was set in motion and employees were offered early retirement and voluntary resignation schemes. Out of 1,626 employees, only 59 workers did not apply for any of the schemes and remained on the company’s books, while another 679 who had applied for early retirement have stayed on to complete remaining contracts before the company is wound down. There were 14 interested bidders for the shipyard, but a local paper revealed that none of the offers met the Government’s expectations. The failure to clinch an acceptable deal is a severe blow to the administration.

In an interview to *Time of Malta* in 2008, EU Competition Commissioner Neelie Kroes criticized the privatization strategy, stating that the Government’s intention to write off EUR 100 million (USD 132 million) in losses before the shipyard is privatized is not acceptable under EU law.

Development aid
The Government’s published Overseas Development Policy (October 2007) identified five priority countries for Maltese development aid, four of which are in central and eastern Africa: Somalia, Sudan, Eritrea and Ethiopia. Maltese NGOs believe this is a political choice since most immigrants come from these countries.

The lack of transparency and of timely and independent evaluations of official Maltese aid compromises NGOs’ engagement on development cooperation issues. The Government has promised NGOs a clear analysis of figures in reporting on official development assistance (ODA), but this has yet to happen. The Government has also indicated that more aid funds will be allocated for technical assistance and that information and communications technologies (ICTs) will be a priority. NGOs are concerned that technical assistance does not generally respond to the real needs of developing countries and suffers from low accountability, while ICTs usually do not match the principle of country ownership.

Although in 2007 Malta continued to have the highest ratio of ODA to GNI (0.15%) in the EU, NGOs are concerned that a substantial share of reported ODA was spent on housing asylum seekers in their first year in the country. In practice, this means that aid money is being spent on detention centres. NGOs are also worried that aid is inflated by the inclusion of imputed student costs.

Migration and asylum-seekers
The situation of migrants and asylum seekers has not improved and, in some respects, has worsened due to the record number of boat people arriving in 2008 and in the first two months of 2009. A United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention visited Malta in January 2009. Although the Working Group noted many positive points, it said that the detention of asylum seekers was not consistent with international human rights law and described the conditions at the Safi and Lyster Barracks camps as “appalling.”

According to the Working Group, the conditions in the camps affect the physical and mental health of detainees to such a degree that they are unable to understand their rights or follow up the legal process that would lead, for better or worse, to a change in their status.

Asylum applications take an inordinate amount of time to be processed: after six months in Malta some migrants are still waiting just to be interviewed. The so-called “fast track” system is not much better. Although intended for the most vulnerable people—for example, pregnant women and people with disabilities—it takes up to three months to secure their release from detention centres. An Eritrean migrant filed a constitutional case against the Principal Immigration Officer and the Justice and Home Affairs Minister in May 2007, claiming a violation of his human rights due to the lengthy procedures for asylum and inhumane conditions of detention; a verdict is still awaited.

The Government affirms that it has to achieve a balance between security and humanitarian concerns, and that efforts are ceaselessly undertaken to improve conditions, but the system is currently overwhelmed: in 2008 it had to cope with 2,775 new arrivals, compared to 1,702 the previous year. Finally, whilst appreciating the United Nations Group’s comments that illegal immigration is a problem that should be shared by the world as a whole, it is worth noting that such appeals have already been made in the past, to little effect.

The financial crisis and public opinion
The autumn 2008 Eurobarometer indicates that the Maltese are becoming increasingly pessimistic about the economy; trust in the political establishment is dwindling and expectations for an improvement in the quality of life are going down. A decisive majority (57%) gave the economy a negative assessment, while only 39% perceived it to be in good shape and 45% expect it to deteriorate further during 2009—a hefty 25% increase in economic pessimism than that registered a year earlier. Thirty-two per cent stated that employment would worsen, while only 23% thought that the situation would improve and a further 27% did not expect the situation to change in the coming 12 months. Fifty-six per cent believed that Malta has become more economically stable thanks to the adoption of the euro, while 33% disagreed. Maltese confidence in the euro outstrips that expressed by other euro zone members, where some 48% of respondents agreed that the euro has helped stabilize their economies and 42% disagreed.

In the political sphere, 51% of Maltese expressed dissatisfaction with their political parties, while only 34% expressed confidence. This was reflected in the March 2008 parliamentary elections, where voter turnout was slightly lower than usual. On the flip-side, 59% of Maltese said they trusted the European Commission, while just 13% did not. The European Parliament is the most trusted institution among Maltese respondents, with 64% saying they trust it as opposed to 14% who said they do not. A lower proportion (57%) tends to trust the Maltese parliament, though this is a 15-point increase over last year; 50% trusted the Government as an institution—a 5 percent points increase—and 37% did not.

The issues of inequality and poverty in Malta, it is hard to quantify since statistics are not easily available. The growing number of migrants settling in distinct areas is creating the phenomenon of “ghettoization”. These ghettos are surely poverty traps and breeding grounds of future social tensions. When one takes into consideration the effects of the economic slowdown, the higher food and utility prices, the four-day week, redundancies, and pensioners who survive on a pension ceiling set 30 years ago, it is safe to predict that more people in 2009 will fall into the category of “have-nots”.

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13 See: <docs.justice.gov.mt/SENTENZI2000_PDF/MALTA/CIVILI_PRIM_AWLA_(SEDE_KOSTITUZZJONALI)120>.


The worsening crisis challenges social rights

Problems such as increasing poverty, the breakdown of the agricultural sector, insufficient employment and the decline of GDP already existed in Mexico before the current crisis hit. The minor adjustments the Government is announcing only reinforce the neo-liberal economic model, and social unrest is on the rise. However, there are a number of civil society proposals that call for alternative strategies to confront the manifold crises, to minimize impacts and revise the economic model.

Several Mexican civil society organizations agree that the current global crisis is systemic and is a consequence of the exhausted capitalist neo-liberal economic model based on financial deregulation and trade liberalization. The crisis is not only in finance but also in food, labour, environmental, energy and other sectors, and although its impact is being felt by all of humanity, it is particularly severe in the countries of the South.1

As explained by Arturo Guillén, the crisis has followed a complex path, triggered in its final stages by the real estate crisis in the United States and the resulting economic recession, which tended to "rapidly globalize" and cause the GDP of apparently strong economies in Europe and Asia to drop.2 The crisis has also spread to Latin America, with varying impacts in different countries, areas and sectors, but it cannot be blamed solely on factors outside the region.

The impact of the crisis in Mexico3

Without belittling the effects of the global crisis on the country, it must be said that many of the problems—such as the increase of poverty in absolute figures, the breakdown of the agricultural sector, the insufficient generation of jobs (in spite of the slightly favourable export-import balance prior to the crisis) and the drop in GDP—were already present in the economy.4 Undoubtedly, the systemic crisis has made these problems worse.

The following figures help illustrate the national dimensions of the crisis:

- The worldwide increase in fuel prices has led to increases in food prices over and above the general rate of inflation. In January 2009 food prices went up 11.3%, while inflation was 6.3%. The impact has been most severely felt by the poorest as they devote a greater percentage of their income to the purchase of food.5
- In the third quarter of 2008, 71.3% of the economically active population (31 million people) lived on an income of three minimum wages—MXN 152 a day (about USD 11.4)—or less. The unemployment rate was 4.2%, which meant that 1.9 million people were unemployed, and 11.8 million people were surviving in the informal sector.6
- Exports to the United States have plummeted, and hundreds of thousands of people are losing their jobs as companies slash expenditures. In November 2008 manufacturing exports overall dropped an average of 7.3%, while those to the United States fell 18%.7
- North of the border, unemployment among Mexican immigrants has increased, causing remittances to fall; remittances were down -9.8% in December 2008 from December 2007. Households in the poorest 20% of the population that receive remittances therefore realized only 6 out of 10 pesos.8 These are the households that will suffer more the decrease in remittances.
- By February 2009 unemployment was 5.3%9 and industrial activity had dropped by 13.2%,10 the worst figures in these areas since the so-called “tequila crisis” in the mid-1990s and an indication that there will be a severe recession.

The grave impact of the crisis in the labour sector will be used as an excuse to freeze or reduce salaries, work will become even more precarious, employers will be given more freedom to hire and fire and jobs will be outsourced; all of which will reduce rights and restrict the authority of the unions.11

With regard to rural areas, the absence of an equitable agricultural policy and indifference have given rise over the years to three types of consequences,

1 Espacio DESC is the reference group for Social Watch in Mexico and contributed in the area of economic, social and cultural rights.
2 Executive Director of DECA Equipo Pueblo, A.C., the focal point organization of Social Watch in Mexico since 1996, <laurabecerra@equipopueblo.org.mx>.
3 Coordinator of the Citizen Diplomacy Programme, DESCA, and Social Watch Mexico <arleandavalo@equipopueblo.org.mx>.
6 Assessments based on documents issued by the National Movement for Food and Energy Autonomy, Workers’ Rights and Democratic Freedom and the Democratic Alliance of Civil Organizations (ADOC) – networks of which Equipo Pueblo is a member – as well as the “Crisis Analysis and Strategy” session of Espacio DESC (23 April 2009).
10 Sánchez Rosales, “Mexico: Pobreza y presupuesto social en el contexto de la crisis financiera 2008-2009”.
11 Ibid.
12 ENOE, March 2009.
14 de la Cueva, H. Otra integración es posible y otra salida a la crisis también: escenarios de las Américas en el 2009 y los retos del Movimiento Sindical [A different integration and a different way out of the crisis are possible: scenarios in the Americas in 2009 and the challenges of the Trade Union Movement], Mexico City, 2009.
made worse by the crisis: (1) food speculation on
the stock market, which puts foodstuffs beyond the
reach of poorer families; (2) the invasion of national
markets by food products produced and traded by
transnational corporations, which sacrifice soil, for-
est and water reserves to productivity and destroy
national systems of production, particularly tradi-
tional ones; and (3) the flood of genetically modified
seeds, which sweeps away the store of natural seeds
and ancient ecosystems. 15 The national No Maize no
Country16 campaign – endorsed by our organiza-
tion – proposes such measures as moving from an
agricultural model based on large monocultures that
involve the increasing use of water, machinery and
contaminants, towards sustainable peasant farming
that not only has the potential to respond to national
food needs but also has additional ecological vir-
tues.

On the basis of this evaluation, it is possible to
state that Mexico was faced with the worst possible
scenario with which to confront a crisis that had been
in the making for several years. The Government has
submitted uncritically to the neo-liberal economic
model, and several of the measures announced are
merely minor adjustments that sustain and reinforce
this model.

Government and civil society responses

During the recent Summit of the Americas, the Eco-
nomic Commission for Latin America and the Carib-
bean17 confirmed that countries in Latin America do
not have a common strategy to overcome the crisis
but have announced and implemented a diversity of
measures, as shown in the table.

In October 2008, shortly after minimizing the po-
tential threat of the United States crisis on Mexico due
to the “strength of the country’s public finances”, the
Government announced a Programme for the Promo-
motion of Growth and Employment (PICE, in Spanish),
a five-point anti-crisis plan that consisted of: (1) ex-
panding public expenditure in infrastructure in order
in order to foster economic growth; (2) changing the rules
toward counteryclical spending, recapitalization of banks
and infrastructure, among other things.18 Even
without having touched the USD 5.7 billion
from the IMF, World Bank and Inter-American Devel-
oping Bank credit lines, President Felipe Calderón’s
administration increased public debt by MXN 968.48
million (about USD 72.74 million) in just its first two
years in office (2007–2008), a sum equal to 12 times
the debt contracted during the first two years of Er-
nesto Zedillo’s Government (1995–1996), when the
country faced its worst economic crisis in 60 years.20
It is extremely worrying that these measures, in ad-
increasing to the public debt, reinforce the neo-
liberal economic model and its institutions, whose
limitations and contradictions have been pointed out
in many different forums. It is also surprising, given
that several countries in Latin America are trying out
difficult measures or procedures from those
imposed by this model.

Public unrest has been growing in the face of
the crisis, but so have the number of proposals being
put forward by civil society. For example, the National
Movement for Food and Energy Autonomy, Workers’
Rights and Democratic Freedom – in a letter dated 16
April 2009 addressed to Barack Obama, the President
of the United States – suggested initiating a dialogue
at the highest level on items such as the urgent renego-
tiation of NAFTA and the safeguarding of labour, social
and human rights in the region. This would include
establishing an Asymmetrical Compensation Fund for
North America, negotiating a bi-national agreement
regarding immigration, and the signature of an agree-
ment in order to promote the Treaty for the Economic
and Social Development of North America.

Others believe that times of crisis provide fertile
fertile ground for new theoretical concepts. In any case,
it is imperative to generate new ideas, alternatives
and strategies that are capable of dealing with “the
crisis”, be it to minimize its impact or to revise the
economic model.

Supervising public expenditure

In the short and medium term, a major issue on the
agenda of civil society organizations working on
social development and human rights will be the
supervision of public expenditure. This is related to
the State’s obligation to devote the highest quantity
of resources available for the progressive achieve-
ment of economic, social and cultural rights, as
well as the premise that “even when resources are
severely limited, due to adjustment processes, eco-
nomic recession or other factors, it is possible and,
in fact, it is a duty to protect the vulnerable members
of society through the adoption of relatively low-cost
programs”.21 It should be noted that the Gov-
ernment responded to the 1995 crisis by cutting
expenditure, which seriously affected education,
health and electricity and had very negative effects
on the achievement of economic, social and cultural
rights. Although so far the Government has asserted
that it will maintain its spending levels, it is vital that
its budgetary allocations tackle social issues more
effectively and sustainably “by reducing operating
expenses, refocusing priorities and reducing admin-
istrative costs in certain departments”.22

From the human rights perspective it is also es-
tential to follow up on investments in infrastructure
promoted as part of the PICE, particularly in order
to ensure that, in the case of mega-projects (such as
dams), the communities that are likely to be affected
are duly informed and consulted, and that social and
environmental studies are carried out effectively in
order to evaluate projects’ viability and their capacity
to promote real development.

In the long term, there is an opportunity at hand
not only to survive, but also to outline and foster a more
equitable economic and social model, as a way out of
the current crisis and to prevent new ones.23 In any case,
respect for international human rights framework is the
key point of reference that will make possible the crea-
tion of “another Mexico” and “another world”. ■

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There is a crisis, after all

Moldova is living through turbulent times. Prior to the April elections, the ruling Communist Party downplayed the effects of the financial crisis, even though experts had stated that those countries for which remittances constitute one third of GDP, such as Moldova, would be the most vulnerable. Once the polls were over, however, the Government started to refer to the crisis as a “catastrophe”. Yet the measures it has promoted in response are missing the target.

Moldova is currently experiencing stormy political times. In April 2009, when the ruling Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM) won the parliamentary elections, thousands of demonstrators took to the streets alleging fraud, fighting with police and ransacking Parliament. The Government claimed that the dispute over the election results was a cover for an attempted coup organized with the involvement of Romania. Later, after the presidential elections in June, the President and leader of the PCRM, Vladimir Voronin, publicly “ceased political partnership” with the opposition.

A new political reality

The fact that the political crisis overlapped with the economic/financial crisis increased the gap between the Government and the opposition, as they both denied any responsibility and each blamed the other. Fresh parliamentary elections on July 29 produced a parliament in which no single party had a majority, much less the 61-seat supermajority necessary to elect a new president. The four main opposition groups gained a combined total of 53 parliamentary seats. This is still not enough to push for a president of their choice, although leaders vowed to form an alliance to force the Communists out.

The Transnistrian settlement has also been brought back to centre stage. This is a consequence of the post-electoral strategy of President Voronin, who signed the Barvikha Declaration, regarded by the opposition as a capitulation to Russian interests.1 As a result of the declaration, the Russian military presence could end up being legalized, the country could become confederated or Moldova could lose Transnistria. The opposition fears that little is left of Moldova’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and feels it has the right to disagree with the price the PCRM leader paid for Russia’s support — with the purpose of eliminating from the race other contestants who targeted the Russian-speaking electorate — in the electoral campaign.

At the same time, Moldova’s international standing has deteriorated and its bid to join the European Community has been jeopardized. Huge amounts of rhetoric were expended in defining the April elections as a “test” for Moldovan democracy, as well as for guaranteeing progress towards integration into Europe (over half of Moldova’s trade is with the EU, a large number of Moldovans work in the EU and over 70% of the population support European integration). However, the preliminary result of the “test” has been abuse of administrative resources, the constant harassment of the opposition leading to protests and revolt, and the flagrant violation of human rights by law enforcement bodies.

Moldovan society has been deeply divided and radicalized not just by the way the electoral campaign was carried out, but more so by the behaviour of the security forces in the post-electoral period. Political stability will only be regained if there is a full investigation of the April events.

Crisis and opportunities

Although before the elections in April 2009 the Government vehemently denied the crisis would affect the country and tried to artificially maintain the economic situation, the World Bank was not so optimistic and it included Moldova among the developing countries with the highest level of vulnerability.2 After the elections, however, President Voronin declared in a meeting with businesspersons, members of the acting Government, congresspersons and politicians that “the crisis is a fire, a catastrophe”. Government officials explained that the downplaying of the crisis before the elections has been aimed at not “creating panic”.

Indeed, despite Moldova’s impressive economic growth in 2008 (7.2%), the country has been severely hit by the second round of effects from the global financial crisis. The initial consequences were already visible in the last quarter of 2008 and have been confirmed by statistical indicators in the first quarter of 2009.3 According to the Moldovan Premier, Zinaida Greceanii, the effects are mostly due to decreasing exports and imports, reduced production and lower remittances. In this situation, only a policy meant to secure and keep economic stability will allow Moldova to tackle the crisis.

Premier Greceanii underscored that investments in infrastructure are to come both from budgetary and foreign resources. She cited a Czech investment project to be implemented in the north of the country, which provides EUR 600 million for the construction of a power station. According to the Prime Minister, the economic liberalization reform (capital legalization, fiscal amnesty, the tax on reinvested income, as well as the strict banking policies that have been lately promoted) will also help ensure Moldova’s macroeconomic stability and diminish the effect of the crisis.

The Minister of Finance has said that the Moldovan financial system is very solid and that during the last year the capitalization of banks increased by 26.8%, assets by 22.3% and credit portfolios by 19.4%. As a result, the current liquidity of the Moldovan banking system is approximately 30%, significantly more than the requirements of risks limitation (at least 20%).4

* There are no available data on BCI.
1 President Voronin, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Transnistria’s Russian-installed “president” Igor Smirnov signed a Russian-drafted joint declaration on 18 March declaring that “noting the stabilizing role of the existing peacekeeping operation, the sides consider that it would be advisable to transform it into a peace-guaranteeing operation under the aegis of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe upon [attaining] the outcome of a settlement in Transnistria.”
3 See <www.expert-grup.org/?go=biblioteca&a=110>.
4 The first – and so far the only – bank to announce bankruptcy was the Investprivatbank, in June 2009.
However, the Association for Participatory Democracy announced that, due to the economic crisis, many domestic banks have stopped granting credit to individuals for personal consumption and mortgages and even to companies, as the latter, particularly in the building sector, are incapable of repaying the loans. On the other hand, with the potential depreciation of the national currency, the leu, versus main reference currencies, citizens are not crowding in to ask for credit.

Much of the banks’ liquidity was due to remittances from Moldovans working abroad. It may be that, since transfers have decreased, the banks have less currency in their portfolios. Data from the National Bank of Moldova show that currency reserves in April 2009 constituted USD 1,086 billion, having diminished by almost USD 586 million (35%) compared to December 2008. This reduction was due to interventions on the currency market under the form of sales and to payments made to the account of country’s external debt, among other external payments, as well as due to the reduction of the exchange rate of component currencies of the currency reserves in relation to the US dollar. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), for its part, predicts that if remittances and exports continue to decrease, the currency reserves of the country might fall by USD 1.3 billion, which means in practice that the country will be without currency reserves.

On the other hand, according to the Academy of Sciences of Moldova (ASM), the world crisis might have positive effects for the country. While remittances and imports will be reduced, this will “stimulate the real economy in order to fill in the vacuum of products on the internal market”. The depreciation of the leu is also seen as having some positive effects such as increasing exports. The need to be competitive, the ASM report stresses, might lead to an improvement in the quality of goods to conform to European standards.

A country dependent on remittances

In the opinion of World Bank economists, countries for which money remittances constitute one third of GDP are the most vulnerable to the economic crisis. Among these countries are Moldova and Tajikistan, where money remittances constitute 35% and 45% of GDP respectively, and also Armenia and Kyrgyzstan. In 2008, Moldovan migrants sent back USD 1.66 billion just through official channels — mostly from Italy and Russia. Recent research by the International Organization for Migration confirmed that over 35% of the Moldovan population lives in households that receive remittances.

A poll conducted in Moldova by CBS-AXA revealed that 20% of the Moldovan beneficiaries of remittances in 2008 are now not receiving money from abroad and 45% reported that they receive less or much less than last year. However, contrary to many assumptions and concerns, there is no evidence of a mass return of migrants due to the economic crisis, although the number of those who returned temporarily in 2008 doubled (from 4.9% to 9.1%) and 8% of them declared they were returning for good. What is particularly interesting is that the main reason mentioned for the return was family, while job-loss and lack of financially interesting opportunities were only secondary motivations.

The Government’s response

The Government’s priority is the payment of salaries, pensions, scholarships and social allowances. Programmes meant to help initiate new businesses and infrastructure projects are to be further launched and implemented to ensure Moldova’s economic stability and to attract new foreign investments. Among the measures included in the anti-crisis (or anti-catastrophe) plan announced by President Voronin are: keeping the “zero quota” of corporative income tax for the next four years, with the aim of sustaining the economic agents in the context of the global crisis; introduction of a fixed rate for the income of physical persons — for example, 15% — and increasing the amount of non-taxable income; reducing the contribution to the social budget by 5%; increasing VAT from 20% to 22% to ensure the Social Fund; and reducing budgetary expenses to a minimum of 20%.

The anti-crisis plan provides approximately 40 modifications to legislative documents. Parliament will examine the plan after the new composition of the Government is approved. According to the acting Vice-Premier, none of these measures will give support. In his opinion, the proposals testify to the fact that none of the previous reforms were efficient or produced the expected results.

On the other hand, economists say that reduction by 5% of the social contribution comes too late. It threatens the de-capitalization of social funds and puts in jeopardy the capacity of the Government to pay pensions. In addition, increasing VAT from 20 to 22% will hinder consumption even further and reduce exports. Since the national economy is based on consumption, it would have been better to lower VAT. If these measures are the whole “anti-crisis package”, then the Government is only taking care of accumulating new financial means in the budget.

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6 Ibid.

7 See: <www.iom.md/materials/studies_reports/2009_05_11_moldova_country_profile.pdf>.


MOROCCO

Direct impacts, weak responses

Morocco’s heavy dependence on the world economy has made it vulnerable to the global economic crisis. A drop in the demand for Moroccan exports, the sharp reduction in remittances and a severe inflationary process are some of the worst effects. The scant success of anti-crisis policies promoted by the Government aggravates the situation and increases social instability. New proposals arise from the unions and civil society in order to create new conditions for a more equitable economic and social model.

The social aspects of the crisis

The social impacts will make themselves felt through several macroeconomic channels. According to the economic growth forecasts of the High Commission for Planning (HCP, in French), non-agricultural activities will show a net reduction of 3.9% in 2009 against 5% in 2008, due to the worldwide recession which will cause global demand for Moroccan products to fall 1.2% in 2009, after a growth of 2% in 2008. Exports dropped 31.8% in January-February 2009, compared to the previous year, while the cost of imports only fell 15.7% as a consequence of lower prices for raw materials in recent months. Tourist income and foreign investments decreased 25.5% and 71.9% respectively between January-February 2008 and the same period in 2009.

The impact on employment is already being felt. Thousands of workers – particularly women – have been laid off over the last months in the textile and clothing industry, and work schedules have been drastically cut. At the same time, several companies are beginning to consider salary cuts, postponing staff promotions and training incentives, as well as cutting back on training budgets. Others are abandoning hiring projects and/or favouring short-term employment contracts.

Another form of transferring the crisis to poorer households is linked to remittances sent by Moroccans overseas (MREs, in French), which in 2008 represented over 8% of Moroccan GDP. According to some studies, these transfers contributed to a decrease in poverty of 4.2 percentage points, from 23% in the late 1990s to 19% at present. However, MRE remittances have fallen about 15%, from MAD 8.200 million (some USD 1,020 million) in January-February 2008, to little over MAD 7,000 million (USD 870 million) for the same period in 2009. A major reduction should therefore be expected in sources of income and in the purchasing power of the families of emigrants, who belong mainly to the poorer sectors of the population. The negative impact of the reduction of MRE transfers also risks impacting on real estate, which provides work for thousands of Moroccans in many regions of the country, particularly in the east.

Moreover, the crisis will probably mean increased unemployment among some MREs, who therefore risk lapsing into poverty. In Spain, for example, the unemployment rate amongst Moroccans – the largest foreign community after European Union nationals – is over 21%, compared to 14% for Spaniards. Increased violence and racist and xenophobic acts, which often focus on Maghrebi foreigners, will probably increase in several European countries.

The third factor affecting the vulnerable social layers of the population is inflation, which has increased sharply during the last two years, rising from an average level of under 2% in the 1996-2007 period, to 3.9% in 2008. This rate, however, does not show the wide-ranging price hike for staple items during the last two years (see chart). The impact of these increases will be more damaging for disadvantaged social strata, amongst whom basic foodstuffs (e.g., cereals, sugar and cooking oil) represent over 50% of the family budget. The loss of purchasing power will consequently be reflected in a reduction in the quality and quantity of foodstuffs consumed and/or the sacrifice of other expenses (such as education, health and transport). Children, pregnant women and nursing mothers will be at particular risk. Moreover, there is a risk that chronic malnutrition will persist due to the lack of minerals – such as vitamins and minerals – which close to a third of the population suffer from, especially women and children under the age of three.

The energy and environmental crises

The energy crisis has aggravated the difficulties of life for the disadvantaged strata and even for the middle strata, particularly due to rising water, electricity, sanitation and public transport bills, which represent around 15% of the Guaranteed Inter-professional Minimum Wage (SMIG, in French).

The environmental crisis, which is a consequence of demographic pressures and a development model focused on growth and urbanization, threatens to exhaust resources and worsen standards of living and sanitary conditions. The floods, downpours and snowfalls which have recently affected several regions, killing over 40 people and exposing thousands to total indigence and poverty, are a good example of these dangers.

In conclusion, the impact of the multilateral crisis of neoliberal capitalism places the fulfillment of economic and social rights at risk, particularly the right to food, to work, to health and access to...
Morocco

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joined by left-wing politicians and other groups. Rest. Protests are led by the unions, by some civil rights of the disadvantaged social strata.

Government measures in response to the crisis

The Government has taken measures to help some of the sectors which are particularly exposed to the crisis, such as the textile and clothing, leather, and automobile equipment sectors. This anti-crisis plan has three dimensions:

- With regard to social aspects, the State will take on 100% of employer payments to the National Social Security Fund, and the export companies benefiting from this measure undertake to retain their personnel.
- In the financial area, the Central Guarantee Fund will provide guarantees in favour of exporting companies so that they can have access to exploitation credit, and postpone 2009 expiry dates for investment credit.
- In commercial terms, the State will assume 80% of the expenses of trade or market diversification missions.

In order to limit the impact of higher global prices on basic products, the Government has adopted an increase in Compensation Fund amounts to subsidized products, the temporary suspension of taxes on wheat imports and a slight increase of minimum hourly wages.

Exporters in the textile and clothing sector benefited from the social dimension of the anti-crisis plan, which did not prevent them from reducing workers’ salaries or cutting working schedules. The financial and commercial measures had very little effect, due to the reluctance of banks and the lethargy of exporting enterprises. Lay-offs and restrictions in working conditions have also affected several sectors which are barely covered by the plan (such as tourism, export agriculture and construction).

The supposed social measures had scant effect on the rise of the prices of staple items, most of which are deregulated, while the increase of the minimum wage barely compensated for the rise in the cost of living. This led to a net loss in purchasing power for thousands of workers. It may be concluded that the Government still has a greater interest in protecting capital than in defending the economic and social rights of the disadvantaged social strata.

Civil society’s response

In such a situation it is hardly surprising that there should be new outbreaks of worker and social unrest. Protests are led by the unions, by some civil society associations and by coalitions of both, and joined by left-wing politicians and other groups. Renewed conflicts with unions emerged as a result of the deterioration of economic and social rights and the failure of social dialogue, due to the Government’s refusal to satisfy union claims with regard to the revaluation of salaries and family subsidies, civil service promotions, compliance with trade union freedom and the right to strike, and the adoption of social protection.

To date, there have been several sectoral strikes (education, health, local communities, etc.) and a general strike as well. Amongst other particularly dynamic social movements, it should be mentioned the various struggles fostered by the Coordinating Committee against the High Cost of Living, as well as by the National Associations of Unemployed Professionals. Several collective action strategies have been deployed, such as sit-ins, spontaneous popular marches and national mobilization days against poverty. Demands make reference to halting the increase of prices, sustaining the Compensation Fund, applying a mobile salary scale, bringing public services up to standard, stopping the privatization of water and electricity distribution, and claiming the right to work in the civil service. The Government has suppressed some of the demonstrations with a heavy hand; a case in point are the events that took place in the cities of Sefrou and Sidi Ifni. Moreover, certain difficulties appear to be hindering the activities of these movements, such as internal disagreements, difficulties appearing to be hindering the activities of these movements, such as internal disagreements, little activity with regard to vulnerable populations and the absence of political perspective.

This does not mean that there are no alternative proposals in order to confront the crisis and promote the economic and social rights of the disadvantaged social strata. On the basis of the principle that the State should guarantee economic and social rights, social movements propose creating an insurance fund against unemployment, the defence and democratization of public services, combating monopolies and situational income, and establishing a guaranteed minimum income, as well as supplying civil society with data and information in order to raise the awareness of public opinion and mobilize vulnerable populations. In the long term, the main role of the democratic State must be to promote economic and social rights through the creation of citizen forces, which favour a new economic and social model based on social justice and give priority to the satisfaction of basic needs, food autonomy, social economy, and the protection of the environment and cultural diversity.
Without dialogue there can be no human development

Mozambique’s exports – and probably its tourist industry – will suffer as a consequence of the world crisis. Food security and rural development are under threat because direct investment is lacking and because incentives are paid for crops grown for biofuels rather than food. As there is no ongoing participative dialogue between the Government and the people, progress in human development is almost impossible in the short or medium term. The main challenges facing the country include strengthening democracy and making public administration fairer and more transparent.

The Government claims that the global financial crisis will not affect the country’s economy. In line with this stance it has adopted a policy of monitoring the economic sector, directly supervising the commercial banks and paying special attention to areas that can withstand the crisis such as energy and gas production. It has also announced through the Ministry of Development and Planning that the country needs USD 120 million to finance the 2009 balance of payments, and that this will serve to keep the macroeconomic indicators stable.

However, the Mozambique International Bank (Milennium Bim) has published a report forecasting that the nation’s economy will shrink because the G-19 countries that finance more than half the national budget, and those that make foreign direct investments, will have negative economic growth. Prices for aluminium, tobacco, sugar, tea, chestnuts and prawns have fallen, which is expected to negatively affect export volumes, and this in turn will weaken activities that foster economic growth and hamper efforts to promote tourism.

Increasing inequality

According to official figures, the country enjoyed an average annual GDP growth rate above 8.5% in 2000–2007, but this fell to 6.2% in 2008 and is expected to be about 4% in 2009. However, the country’s evolution in terms of human development and improving its people’s quality of life is still fraught with contradictions. GDP is growing, but at the same time the cost of living is rising and consequently people’s real incomes are falling. Social inequalities are becoming increasingly visible. According to UNDP, Mozambique is 175th on a list of 179 countries ranked by their human development level.

As regards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the UN recognizes that progress has been made in three areas; poverty, infant mortality and maternal health. However, although the poverty rate did fall by 4% between 2000 and 2007, more than half the population remains poor. There are wide variations between the different regions of the country. The further north one goes from the capital city, Maputo, located in the south, the worse poverty becomes. A 2007 population census shows that around 70% of the population still lives in rural areas, and more than 50% in the central and northern parts of the country. In the main cities, many families and groups of young people have been reduced to living in the open (in public spaces, on the streets or on rubbish tips) or in houses that are falling down. The unemployment rate is 30%–35% of the economically active population. According to one youth organization, the number of sex workers aged 14 to 25 has increased in the last five years.

In February 2008, the sharp increase in the cost of living sparked off a kind of people’s revolt in Maputo made up mainly of women and school-aged children. This spread to the province of Gaza and the town of Manica, and for two days the main public services were paralyzed. The Government managed to prevent the conflict from having serious consequences by lowering fuel prices and subsidizing the cost of transport.

No transparency

Mozambique is approaching its fourth multi-party elections, and the ruling party is seeking the re-election of Armando Guebuza. Guebuza waged his election campaign under the banner of the fight against poverty, and he blamed permissiveness and lack of interest in society for this and a whole range of other ills including corruption, lack of transparency in public administration and the poor functioning of public services. He maintained that poverty stemmed from the fact that the people do not have a spirit of enterprise or make any effort to better themselves. He suggested that the colonial past had given people an inferiorly complex that made it difficult, even today, for them to free themselves since the key to liberation is higher self-esteem.

This argument emphasizing self-esteem and the spirit of enterprise has been taken up and enlarged upon by the whole ruling class, but the real issue is that most of the people have little or no access to education, timely health services, safe and good quality transport, law and order or a whole range of other public services. The population in general, and also foreign diplomats in the country, are deeply concerned by the way the ruling party and individuals near the seat of power are enriching themselves. There is widespread criticism of the way a privileged minority flaunts its considerable wealth in front of the poverty-stricken majority. Anti-corruption organizations like the Public Integrity Centre say the country badly needs a law to regulate conflicts of interest since its political rulers are almost all from the entrepreneurial class. One outstanding example of this is the President himself, who is a shareholder in dozens of enterprises operating in the country.

Agriculture and hunger

More than half the population survives on subsistence agriculture, but there has been very little investment in this area. The proportion of the national budget allocated to agriculture is a meagre 3%–4%.
per year, only a third or a quarter of what is spent on the security services. The State has implemented an incentive scheme to stimulate the production of jatropha, a plant that provides the raw material for biofuels, and encourage farmers to switch from food production to this crop even though a market for it has not yet been developed. One example of the dire consequences of this policy occurred in Mogincual, which suffered a famine in 2008 as a result of low agricultural food production because priority had been given to jatropha. The land that has been set aside for growing this crop, mainly in the provinces of Gaza, Manica, Sofala, Tete and Nampula, is very fertile, and in the years ahead this may mean a reduction in food production for family consumption, which will further intensify the problem of hunger. To make matters worse, specialized enterprises are planting other kinds of crops for export such as sugar cane.

Problems in education and health

According to UNICEF, more than a million children are growing up outside the education system, and the average teacher in Mozambique has to cater to 74 pupils. To improve the education system, enrolment fees should be abolished and there should be increased investment in infrastructure and teaching materials, as well as the number of teachers, and access to education for young people should be widened. UNICEF stresses that while significant progress has been made in expanding teaching in the country, this has not been accompanied by increased investment in the sector. It is known that around half of primary school teachers have no formal vocational training.

National health services reach only 30% of the people. More than 65% of children suffer from vitamin A deficiency. In 2008 the G-19 countries injected around EUR 308 million into the general budget and warned Mozambique that it would have to step up the fight against malaria (still the deadliest disease), cholera and HIV and AIDS. The programmes to prevent or combat diseases are very feeble and in any case they are concentrated in the main urban areas so rural populations suffer more. Other outstanding problems in the health care field include the lack of qualified human resources to provide training in the sector and the need for greater technical and financial resources.

The HIV and AIDS situation is very serious. It is estimated to be spreading at a rate of 500 new cases per day and now affects some 16.2% of the population. The UN reports that the incidence is 1.7 times higher among women. It has been estimated that AIDS will reduce the country’s per capita economic growth by 0.1%–0.3% per year. Life expectancy would also fall from 37.1 years in 2006 to 35.9 years by 2010.

Other challenges

The G-19 countries have also called on the Government to strengthen its capacity to guarantee social security and improve access to justice. They have expressed concern about excessive bureaucracy, lack of impetus in the fight against poverty and little progress in combating corruption, even though this has been identified as the root cause of numerous other ills that are putting a brake on Mozambique’s development.

To address income inequality, in 2007 the Government set up a fund known as the “Seven Million Meticals” (the nation’s currency, around USD 264,000) to stimulate rural districts by training people organized in associations to undertake local income-generating initiatives. However the fund has been severely criticized for having no clear criteria regarding its objectives or how it would be managed. The district administrations that have been put in charge are not competent in the management of banking or microfinance institutions. In addition, workers in these rural districts are among the least skilled in the country. It has been reported that fake associations have been set up to receive the money, more than half the debtors cannot be located and there are no guarantees that the loans will be repaid. Some critics claim that the real purpose of the fund is to maintain the visibility and presence in rural districts of the Frelimo party, which has been in power since 1975.

The Government has implemented a medium-term public sector pay policy in an effort to attract and retain skilled personnel, particularly in rural districts. But in practice professionals with higher levels of training prefer to seek employment in the private sector, where pay levels and working conditions are better.

In November 2008, the country was reorganized into 43 municipal councils (from the 33 that had existed previously). The scheme to continue decentralizing the sectoral funds is still in operation, and the same applies to how these funds are administered. However it has emerged that a large portion of the budget is not being administered at the local level but is still controlled by the central Government or the provinces. These resources have to be decentralized just as the administration has been. For this to take place, people have to be trained and the necessary infrastructure, electrical power grid, telephone network and banking institutions have to be developed.

Conclusion

While the Government has managed to maintain a policy that is applauded abroad, at home it has not maintained ongoing, inclusive and participative dialogue with the people, so it is almost impossible for there to be progress in human development in the short and medium term. Other big obstacles to development are the fact that the legal system is weak and there is discrimination in relation to party allegiances. So the problems remain: democracy has to be strengthened and public administration has to become fairer and more transparent.
Nepal, which ranks 145 out of 179 countries in the 2008 Human Development Index, faces multiple interrelated crises – including food, energy, climate and politics – as well as continuing, though currently sporadic, civil unrest.1 So far, no significant impacts of the global financial crisis have been reported; however experts warn that the country is likely to be affected in various ways.

For example, remittances, which currently account for 19% of GDP, have been extending a lifeline to the economy for almost a decade.2 It is chiefly due to them that the balance of payments is still in surplus despite a huge trade deficit. Furthermore, they helped decrease the poverty rate from 42% in 1995/96 to 31% in 2003/04. More than 1.2 million people are working overseas.3 A slow-down of the construction and service sectors in the Middle East, a major source of remittances, and in countries such as South Korea, Malaysia and Japan, will reduce demand for Nepali labour abroad. Since over 34% of households receive remittances, an increase of over 80% since 1994/95, their decline could affect progress in poverty alleviation and potentially lower domestic demand, as households will be more hesitant to spend money due to declining income. The balance of payments surplus will go down.

The global slow-down and recession in developed economies will also affect exports, foreign investment and overseas development assistance as well as the service industry, which contributed 50.9% of GDP in 2007. In terms of merchandise trade, about 80% of Nepal’s readymade garments are exported to the United States. Germany is the largest market for its carpets. Delayed financial recovery in these countries is likely to have a negative impact on the country’s export trade.4 The Confederation of Nepalese Industries recently estimated that the manufacturing sector would incur a loss of USD 256.16 million.5 A further downward spiral in demand in the already distressed garment and textile industry, combined with the continued decline in global prices of key exported commodities, could result in the total loss being much higher.

The crisis will also have a significant impact on the tourism sector. Europe accounts for 25.7% and the US for 5.9% of the total tourist arrivals. As the Western financial crisis steadily worsens, potential tourists are likely to postpone or cancel travel plans. By working with the Government and launching promotional packages, the Hotel Association of Nepal is hoping to entice about a million tourists in 2010; however if the global economic slow-down continues, this dream seems unachievable.6

There will also be downward pressure on the total foreign exchange reserve held by the Central Bank. It will try to tame the inflation rate, currently over 13%, by raising interest rates. Even the banking system may be in trouble if the vibrant real estate market slows down.7 Meanwhile, the aid industry will not be spared from the crisis. NGOs in Nepal receive funding from corporate donors, governments and large foundations in the West. Reduced funding will force these organizations to scale back development initiatives. This will have a negative impact on the fight against poverty and other development challenges.8

Environmental crisis

Global warming resulting from climate change, to which Nepal is a minimal contributor, also threatens to melt Himalayan snow and glaciers, thus rendering the glacial environment unsafe for humans. A recent analysis from the Department of Hydrology and Meteorology shows that the country faces an annual average temperature rise of 0.06°C. Continued warming has affected the Himalayan ecology, including snowfall patterns and ice melting – most substantially in terms of glacier retreat and significant increases in the size and volume of glacial lakes, making them more prone to Glacial Lake Outburst Flooding (GLOF). There are at least 20 lakes in the mountainous region at risk, and there is growing concern that an earthquake or excessive precipitation could prompt GLOF, washing away settlements and destroying infrastructure such as hydroelectric plants, roads and bridges along river basins.9 More worryingly, melting Himalayan glaciers could have a huge impact on water resources and fluvial ecological systems across South Asia.10

In addition, rainfall patterns seem to have changed quite dramatically over the last few years. It is no longer easy to predict when the monsoon rains will come; the country’s average rainfall is now less dependable than in the past.11

According to experts, Nepal will feel the effects of the global financial crisis on several fronts. Other crises, related to the environment, food, energy, finance and politics have been buffeting the society for a long time. It is imperative to see this reality from a gender perspective, and to analyse the role of civil society in promoting initiatives and programmes to help alleviate the situation of the vulnerable populations disproportionately affected by the downturn.

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1 The end of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)-led rebellion in November 2006, followed by the institution of a new Government in May 2008, has not brought violence to a complete end yet.
5 “Impact of Global Financial Crisis on the Nepali Economy.”
10 Ibid.
will come and how long they will last, and crop yields are being reduced. In 2006, farmers had to replant their rice crop as the rains stopped abruptly. And this second sowing ended badly as heavy rains fell during the harvest, damaging the crops. The monsoon floods of 2008, which can also be attributed to global warming since flooding was due to melting snow from the mountaintops, displaced over 180,000 people.

**Energy crisis**
Nepal is the second richest country of the world after Brazil in terms of fresh water resources. It has the potential to produce 82,000MW of hydroelectricity, and the production of half this quantity is technically feasible. However, so far only about 1% of Nepal’s hydroelectric potential is being tapped and in 2008 and 2009 the country experienced the worst electricity crisis in years. A chronic imbalance between energy consumption and energy resource endowment has been created. Every year, demand for electricity increases by 10% whereas production remains constant. The mismatch between the demand and supply forced the Government to declare a national power crisis in December 2008.

The Nepal Electricity Authority then imposed 12-hour daily power cuts. As the dry season approached in early 2009, power cuts increased up to 16 hours per day. As a consequence, productivity in the industrial sector has declined by at least 50%. The lack of power is putting several small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) out of business. These SMEs not only produce final goods and provide employment but also supply intermediate goods to larger firms. The shortage of power has also seriously affected other businesses, with several domestic jute mills, local FM radio stations, cyber businesses, paper factories, hotels and tourist spots going under. People are increasingly using diesel fuel, the supply of which is erratic as it is imported. In the rural areas there has also been pressure on the forests, due to the lack of alternative sources of energy.

**Food crisis**
Nepal is listed among 16 “hunger hotspot” countries with the world’s most serious problems of food insecurity. The years of conflict have deterred investment in agriculture. Some 69% of the population depends on agriculture, many of them subsistence farmers on small plots of land, but the “green revolution” has not achieved substantial results among the peasantry. Falling productivity has removed the status of self-sufficiency in food that the country once enjoyed.

The World Food Programme is currently providing food assistance to 2.7 million people. The situation was greatly aggravated during 2008, not only by rising prices but also by India’s decision to suspend exports of rice on which Nepal depends. Conflict and frequent natural disasters have added to the problem. UNICEF calls malnutrition the cause of 60% of child mortality and the World Food Programme estimates 41% of the population is undernourished.

The widespread dependence on subsistence agriculture underlies many problems of environmental degradation, in particular the depletion of forest resources, which in turn leads to loss of biodiversity and desertification. Survival strategies, the knowledge of the poor and sustainable livelihood options need to be linked.

**Political and social crisis**
The current coalition Government faces several challenges. It is tasked with establishing a lasting peace, institutionalizing democracy by drafting a Constitution for the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal, and setting up a federal system of government acceptable to most, if not all, sectors of society. However, delayed action on these tasks has left room for multiple problems. Several splinter armed groups have emerged in different parts of the country and more are in the offing. Their daily abductions, extortions, killings, lootings, thefts, strikes and skirmishes have further destabilized the country and are a big threat to the newly established democracy.

**Gender impacts of the crises and the role of civil society**
The impacts of the diverse crises will affect both women’s and men’s livelihoods. With changes in climate, traditional food sources become more unpredictable and scarce. Women’s livelihoods are more dependent on the natural resources threatened by climate change, which can cause loss of harvests, often their sole source of food and income. When the land is inundated, roads and houses are damaged. Much of the burden of caring for people migrating from the flooded areas falls on women. The exacerbation of existing water shortages affects women in particular as they are traditionally responsible for water collection in their communities.

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13 See <www.unicef.org/info/country/nepal_nepal_background.html>.

14 See <www.wfp.org/countries/nepal>.

Social Watch 125 Nepal
In Nicaragua, the fall in income from exports and remittances is already beginning to make itself felt and is having a tangible effect in terms of higher unemployment and increased poverty. In the short term, to limit the impact of the crisis, the government should increase public sector expenditure and thus stimulate economic activity and employment, even though these measures alone do not attack the country’s main problems. A major change of direction and a complete overhaul of the current growth model are urgently needed. Agriculture is very backward and must be revived, and a major effort to recapitalise the country’s human capital is essential.

The current international economic crisis is not only the most serious and severe since the Second World War but also the most synchronised in the sense that although it first began in the developed countries it is now affecting the economies of every region in the world at the same time. In 2009, for the first time in more than 60 years, the world’s economy will have negative economic growth (-1.3%), and the OECD has stated that world trade will contract by 13.2%. The crisis is expected to cause the loss of 50 million jobs worldwide1, and it is predicted that 200 million people will sink into poverty. The World Bank has announced that more than 400,000 children could die from avoidable causes as a result of the crisis.2

In Nicaragua in the short term, the crisis will probably affect the growth of two crucially important areas of the country’s economy, namely exports and family remittances, and it will lead to increased unemployment. Between January 2008 and March 2009, a net total of nearly 20,000 jobs were lost in the export-processing zones alone.3

Presumably the impact of the international economic crisis will be reflected in a considerable loss of dynamism in aggregate demand. This in turn will cause a serious slowdown in the rate of growth of production and employment, and there is the inherent risk that the country might slide into recession. Various projections about Nicaragua’s economy show that to a greater or lesser extent the main components of aggregated demand will decelerate markedly in 2009.

The reduction in exports of goods and services, in the flows of family remittances and in internal and external credit, added to liquidity problems and increased uncertainty, will probably translate into strong repressive pressures that, with varying degrees of intensity, will affect many sectors of the country’s economy. The slowdown in the rate at which aggregate demand is growing could translate into a GDP growth rate of only 0.5%, but this is the most optimistic scenario, and it is far more likely that there will be negative growth (-1%).

### Falling exports and remittances

The production of goods and services for export has been the main driving force behind Nicaragua’s economic growth, but on the other hand goods and services for the domestic market have hardly grown at all in the last fifteen years. Moreover, Nicaragua’s exports are heavily dependent on the United States. Before 2008 this accounted for 26.7% of the country’s GDP, but this market has been severely battered by the crisis and by March 2009 exports had shrunk by nearly 19%.4

In 2008, family remittances amounted to USD 807 million or nearly 13% of GDP, but by May 2009 they had fallen 4%. Four out of ten families in Nicaragua receive remittances, and 60% of this flow comes from the United States. Remittances provide an essential social cushion in the Nicaraguan economy, and it has been estimated that without them the rate of poverty would increase by four percentage points.

### Unemployment and poverty

According to the ECLAC, the unemployment rate increased from 7.5% in 2008 to between 7.8% and 8.1% in 2009, and the informal market expanded. This rise means that up to 1.8 million people have been added to the 1.6 million who were already unemployed.5

This, in turn is reflected in the fact that there is less employment and it is of worse quality. The loss of formal employment means that more and more people are losing the benefits of social security protection, which affects not just the main recipients but also their dependants.

It is difficult for people who lose their jobs in the formal sector to find another in the same part of the economy, as this sector is shrinking at an alarming rate. The poor cannot afford the luxury of remaining unemployed, so they will probably drift into employment or sub-employment in the informal sector. But this sector has to absorb not only these new unemployed but also most of the young people who join the economically active population, so it will become saturated and income per person will fall. Poverty and extreme poverty levels are already very high and they will increase still further, so the social fabric will deteriorate even more.

In Nicaragua, income is very unevenly distributed (Gini rating: 0.56). Population groups in the lowest reaches of the income distribution scale benefit less in phases of economic growth and they tend to suffer more from any adverse shock that occurs. People in the poorer sectors of the population do not have savings or assets to fall back on to alleviate the impact of economic hardship and carry them through difficult times, and the crisis could rapidly push many of them below the extreme poverty line or even into indigence.

In all likelihood, as unemployment increases various ways of generating income will emerge in the informal economy. These will take the form of small-scale and family undertakings as a survival strategy, and more people will seek ways to become self-employed. These strategies could make for a considerable increase in unpaid work by members at home.

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3 See: <impreso.eltiempo.com.ni/2008/10/14/economia/87227/ >.
of the family, and the main weight of this will fall on women and children. But employment in small-scale and family undertakings will in turn become saturated so per capita income in households that depend on these jobs will fall even more, in a scenario in which the levels of poverty associated with this kind of employment are already very high.

To make matters worse, in 2007-2008 food prices increased sharply and this had a cruel impact on the poor, as it severely restricted their access to food and aggravated their situation. In the twelve months up to December 2007, the price of food index jumped by 24.9%, and up to December 2008 it rose by another 22.5%.

This worsening food access situation has not only affected the urban poor, some 93.8% of whom (according to the FAO) are net purchasers of food, but has also impacted on the rural poor, of whom 73% are also net buyers. The worsening economic straits in which many households find themselves could hamper their access to food even more, and exacerbate the problem of hunger in a country in which 22% of the population are already undernourished.

**Women are affected more**

Women as a population group are particularly vulnerable to the effects of the crisis. According to the National Institute of Information about Development (INIDE), some 71% of working-age women in rural areas and 58% in urban areas are not in the workforce and therefore do not have their own sources of income. In many cases, low household income means that women are overloaded with work at home, trying to produce the goods that the family can no longer afford in the market.

Of Nicaraguans who are employed, some 86.5% work in services (35.8%), trade (32.3%) and manufacturing (18.4%), and these sectors are vulnerable to the adverse effects of the crisis in terms of unemployment or jobs becoming precarious. In fact, job losses in the export-processing zones have impacted more on women than on men.

**Measures to contain the effects of the crisis**

What is mainly needed to contain the adverse effects of the international economic crisis is to counter the slowdown in aggregate demand or total expenditure oriented to the acquisition of goods and services at the domestic level. When it comes to putting a brake on trends leading towards recession, the instrument that governments most frequently have recourse to is to increase money and credit in the economy to stimulate consumer spending and investment and to attenuate liquidity problems. This policy would mean that the central bank could (1) lower the official reserve limit (the legally stipulated level of reserves), (2) re-purchase bank bonds that have been placed on the open market, or (3) lower the discount rate for credit lines for the financial system.

In any case it will be essential to make credit more easily available to support banks that could eventually run into liquidity problems – due for example to the withdrawal of their foreign sources of finance – or to enable banks to provide assistance for enterprises with liquidity problems. In an extreme case, the central bank could even assist banks with solvency problems to recapitalise. In no way would this be privileged treatment for the financial sector, it would mean underpinning the financial system because instability in that sector could have extremely severe repercussions in the economy as a whole. Bear in mind that the current world crisis began with a “simple crisis” in the financial sector.

Up until now the most important measure the Government has taken was to obtain a contingent credit line with the Central American Economic Integration Bank (BCIE), and this will be utilised if some Nicaraguan banks eventually find themselves in financial difficulty.

Another aspect of the problem is that the banks would find it hard to expand their credit operations aggressively in a context of such weak and uncertain prospects in the various sectors of the economy. In fact, bank credit tends to be pro-cyclical, that is to say it tends to behave restrictively when the economic situation is deteriorating, which causes the downside to worsen even more.

The logical course of action to put a brake on the shrinkage in aggregated demand caused by falling private consumption and investment would be to increase public expenditure. This is part of aggregate demand, just as private spending is, and as such it would serve to stimulate economic activity and employment. But if the opposite course is taken, if public spending is reduced instead of increased, the recession will get worse. In other words, reducing public expenditure is pro-cyclical.

The most effective option to counteract this dramatic slowdown in demand would be to implement a public investment package sufficiently extensive to compensate for the shortfall in growth in the other components of aggregate demand. This is what governments all over the world are doing.

What is needed is an aggressive programme of public investment in basic infrastructure that matures rapidly, such as the repair and maintenance of roads and improvements to the road network, the expansion and improvement of the potable water distribution and sanitation systems, the expansion of the energy supply grid, and the maintenance, repair and construction of new classrooms, housing, etc. In addition there should be a programme to improve productivity in small and medium economic units, in rural as well as urban areas. This wide-front approach would yield various benefits as it would not only help to counteract or at least attenuate the impact of the crisis, but it would also stimulate the creation of new assets and capabilities that would make a contribution to the future development of the country. These investments would constitute prerequisites and provide basic foundations for the development process.

It is also essential to take all possible steps to protect current levels of expenditure in the basic priority area of human capital, which means especially in education, health care services and access to essential medicines and nutrition, and to expand expenditure on social protection, which ought to function as a cushion against the worst effects of poverty when there are adverse fluctuations in the economy.

**Long term measures**

However, it is not enough merely to tackle the negative impacts of the crisis in the short term. It is vital to initiate a change in the direction the country is going, to decisively overcome the extreme backwardness and state of abandonment that agriculture\(^6\) and rural areas have fallen into, and to re-orient today’s growth model and invest on an unprecedented scale in human capital and basic infrastructure. We propose a major national effort to achieve, within a strict time frame, a series of basic goals:

- To eradicate adult illiteracy. By the proposed deadline 100% of the population over 15 years old should be literate.
- To achieve universal pre-primary education coverage, raising net enrolment among children aged 3 to 5 to 100%.
- To achieve a net primary school enrolment rate of 100%.
- For at least 80% of children who enrol in the first grade of primary education to complete the whole basic education cycle.
- To achieve a net secondary education enrolment rate of 75%.
- To achieve a significant improvement in the quality and relevance of education at all levels.
- To raise average schooling in the country to 9 years within the set deadline.

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\(^6\) Agriculture accounts for 21% of the gross added value produced by the various sectors of Nicaragua’s economy. It employs around 30% of the country’s employed workforce, and it generates more employment than any other single sector.
NIGERIA

Deepening plight

The majority of Nigerians have been living for a long time in a situation of economic meltdown. Corruption is widespread, the country lacks electricity, education and health are in a deplorable condition, and the armed fight for the control of oil resources continues to be intense. The global economic crisis has further deepened the plight of the poor. Experts underscore that the country should take measures to curtail its dependence on crude oil and address the poor implementation of annual budgets.

More than 90% of Nigerians have been dealing with the economic meltdown for many years, and their plight has worsened since the present Government came to power. With the total collapse of public infrastructure – such as roads and electricity – and widespread corruption, life has become an unending story of want, destitution and fear. Nigeria is on the brink of qualifying as a failed state.

Corruption

Every day the electronic and print media report cases of Government officials looting public funds and transferring the money overseas. According to former World Bank President Paul Wolfowitz, more than USD 300 billion were stolen over some four decades and stashed in foreign banks. It has been suggested that if the United States, with its trillion dollar national budgets, can send its Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, after USD 14 billion of tax-evaders’ money in Switzerland, there is no reason for Nigeria to ignore calls by Nobel laureate economist Joseph Stiglitz and United Nations officers to go after billions of naira, the national currency, in foreign banks. Instead of doing this, however, there is talk of borrowing more money and going back into the debt trap to fight the economic crisis.

Electricity

Nigeria needs to generate a minimum of 10,000 megawatts a day to ensure the distribution of regular power supplies. However when the current Government came into power in 2007, it was generating only 3,000 megawatts of electricity daily. Two years down the line, this has dropped to less than 1,500 megawatts. The consequence is darkness all over the country. In the absence of a regular and uninterrupted power supply, businesses are collapsing. The industrial sector has practically become extinct. Unemployment is holding sway. According to a front-page report in The Guardian newspaper, the Government is taking another USD 600 million loan from the World Bank to improve the power supply situation.

Problems arising from this are many. For example, there is no guarantee that the loan will not end up in the foreign accounts of government officials; and the electricity project is a long-term one, while the needs of the people are immediate.

Education and health

University lecturers are embarking on repeated strikes in 2009 to draw attention to the deplorable state of the education sector. They complain about, among other issues, lack of teaching facilities, the total collapse of infrastructure such as electricity and housing, and the Government’s high-handedness in dealing with their requests for improvements. The situation at the primary and secondary levels is not different from that in tertiary education. Senior government officials and politicians send their children to schools and universities abroad. After their schooling is completed, those who study abroad refuse to return to the rot at home.

Hospitals and health facilities have turned to mortuaries; they are places where the sick go to die. Government officials and politicians go overseas to treat their medical problems. The mass exodus of doctors and other health professionals to Europe and the US, where there are better working conditions, has been taking place for several years. Hospitals and other public health facilities lack drugs. Where medicines are available, they are fakes. The efficient, privately owned health facilities are unaffordable for the poor majority.

Armed conflict in the Niger Delta

The armed conflict between government forces and militant separatists in the Niger Delta region, over control of the oil that generates 95% of Nigeria’s oil wealth, does not give any sign of slowing down. The militants are kidnapping foreign workers and blowing up pipelines and other facilities belonging to the oil companies. Several companies, including BP-Shell, are closing down their operations in the region. There are fears that at the rate at which oil production is declining, the Government may not meet its targeted revenue. The result will be more poverty and death.

Poor implementation of annual budgets

During a Roundtable on the business and economic outlook for the 2009 fiscal year and review of the 2009 budget, organized by the Bureau of Business Information (BBI) in Lagos in January 2009, experts painted a gloomy economic picture for Nigerians. The panelists included the Chief Executive Officer of Economic Associates, Dr. Ayo Teriba; the Director of Research, the National Economic Intelligence Committee (NEIC), Mr. Weneso Orogun; and renowned economist and senior member of...
the Lagos Business School Academic Faculty, Dr. Doyin Salami. Besides the global economic crisis, they listed poor implementation of the yearly budgets as a major contributing factor to the slow growth of the economy over decades. According to the experts, the question is not whether there is increased economic hardship and poorer quality of life for the average Nigerian, but how long this situation will last.

Orogun described it as scandalous that the utilization of capital projects by the third quarter of 2008 was 33%. He wondered why the Ministry of Transportation had only utilized 42.3% of its allocation in 2008, refunding some USD 420 million to the Treasury, given the poor state of the transport sector, especially roads. Indeed, in September 2008, only 10 ministries had utilized more than 50% of their capital releases. Orogun attributed the situation to weak technical capacity to implement budgets, inefficient budget monitoring and corruption.

Teriba, who was the guest speaker, said the global meltdown would mean not only reduced global demand for goods and services but also a sharp decline in global commodity prices as manifested, for instance, in the drastic reduction in the price of crude oil. He also said there would be credit scarcity and high interest rates with attendant multiplier effects. In specific terms, he presented a scenario in which local banks would find it very difficult to give out loans and, if they did, the interest rate would be very high. This would add to the prevailing high cost of doing business in the country, which would worsen the plight of the industrial sector and indeed virtually all business operators. In addition, the expert said industrial firms and other companies would also experience less demand for their goods and services due to the reduced purchasing power of Nigerians. These would invariably translate into loss of wealth, job cuts and other socioeconomic problems.

Teriba emphasized that the imminent economic problems would not be solved as early as they should because there seemed to be no capacity to manage the situation, although he believed that the Government could still mitigate the effects of the global meltdown by doing more to restore confidence in the economy. He suggested that the decision to base the 2009 budget on USD 45 per barrel of crude oil projected a pessimism that sent the wrong signal to stakeholders. In his opinion, since the Government had based the budget for 2008 on USD 59 per barrel, while the price of crude oil had been USD 100, it could base the 2009 budget on a much higher price and use the gains of 2008 to make up the difference.

Salami said hard times awaited Nigerians because of the measures that would be taken by the Government and employers in the face of the global crisis. Decrying the country’s dependence on crude oil, he noted that global demand was expected to decline from 85.84 million barrels daily (mbd) in 2008 to 85.66 mbd in 2009, just as non-Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)-countries were expected to raise supply in 2009 to 51.15 mbd (from 50.57 in 2008). This implied that as revenue from oil dropped, the Government would increase tax enforcement efforts, thereby reducing citizens’ disposable income and savings. He emphasized that there would be lean years for those who depended solely on trading, and suggested that one solution would be to identify undervalued assets in the economy and convince people to invest in them.

With this state of affairs, the future is bleak. The global economic crisis has only added to the deplorable living conditions of the poor in Nigeria. This is a very bad scenario that can only get worse.

References
Since 1948, when they were turned into a refugee population within their own country and the neighbouring Arab States, Palestinians’ living conditions have been grim. Furthermore, since the Israeli military occupation in 1967, colonization and racial discrimination have become common practices of the occupying power. Both the separation wall, on which construction began in April 2002, the closure imposed on the Palestinian territories and the last brutal Israeli attack on Gaza of December 2008 have increased segregation, unemployment and economic recession.

According to the 2007 Report released by the World Bank to the Ad-Hoc Liaison Committee, per capita GDP fell from USD 1,812 in 1999 to USD 1,129 in 2006. Moreover, GDP was being increasingly driven by government and private consumption from remittances and donor aid; investment had fallen to extremely low levels, leaving “an inadequate productive base for a self-sustaining economy”. ¹

Moreover, the West Bank and Gaza had an expanding labour force and, as result of the unpredictability of the border crossings and checkpoints, the private sector was shrinking. For this reason, public sector employment grew by 60%. While the public sector expanded, the economy’s productive capability hollowed out, making it increasingly donor dependent.²

**Gender Equity Index (GEI)**

Palestinian People in May 2007 indicate that 58% of Palestinians live below the poverty line, and about half of these, 30%, live in extreme poverty.³ Furthermore, about 9.4% of the average-sized Palestinian households that are technically above the poverty line (a monthly income of about USD 500–750) are at high risk of falling into poverty if the current socioeconomic conditions continue.

In terms of the negative income poverty trend, the percentage of households below the poverty line rose from 50% in March 2006 to 60% in August 2007, with intervening peaks of income poverty of as much as 68% as measured in November 2006. Poverty in the Gaza Strip is more pronounced, with 71% of households poor in August 2007, up from 52% in March 2006. It is most prevalent and severe in the governorates of Khan Younis and North Gaza. In the West Bank, the share of poor households overall the same period appears to have remained essentially stable, moving from 49% to 51%; but these figures hide regular peaks of income poverty to over 60%⁴ and some governorates in the northern West Bank, such as Toubas, Salt, Tulkarem and Qalqilya, show poverty rates similar to the Gaza Strip.

Persistent high poverty rates force many households to rely on coping mechanisms such as drawing on other resources than the main household income. However, underscore the severity of poverty in the occupied Palestinian territory, nearly 40% of the population no longer

2 Ibid.
have access to these alternative means of coping with hardship.⁵

The last massive attack

An all-out blockade was imposed on Gaza; all entry and exit points were closed; all donor-funded projects were frozen; Gaza was turned into a big prison in which 1.5 million Palestinians were jailed, with only some emergency humanitarian support flowing in. At the end of December 2008, Israel launched an all-out war on Gaza, which lasted 22 days, killed more than 1,400 Palestinians, injured thousands, destroyed thousands of homes, left scores of homeless and practically destroyed Gaza’s civilian and security infrastructure. As of this writing, no actual steps have been taken to “reconstruct” Gaza.

Moreover, the effects of the conflict are not just determined by the number of human losses or of facilities destroyed. As the overall methods of occupation are violent, their impact permeates the Palestinian society socially, psychologically, culturally and economically.

Aid under pressure

As the World Bank reports,⁶ aid flows into the West Bank and Gaza “remain fragmented and focused on bilateral arrangements with donors based on short-term political positions rather than a collective, longer-term view on broader economic and governance fundamental”. Aid has been reactive and temporary in nature. The aid agenda has been determined less by Palestinian development needs than by the competing political agendas of the main donors. Besides, aid has been focusing mainly on what has been described as state building policies, while neglecting the need to focus on Palestinian society building.

Furthermore, some donors’ aid has not been neutral; it has exacerbated internal conflict by supporting one group against the other, by withholding support from factions because of their political positions, or by refraining from funding development projects in compliance with Israeli restrictions and pressures. Development aid dropped from about 28% of total disbursements in 2005 to slightly less than 10% in 2007. In the meantime, “budget support” rose from about 30% in 2005 to nearly 70% of 2007 disbursements.⁷

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⁵ UNDP (2007), op. cit.
⁶ World Bank (2007), op. cit.
⁷ Ibid.

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Source: <ifamericansknew.org/>

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Social Watch 131 Palestine
Development of an anti-crisis plan

Despite the serious setbacks expected as a result of the international financial crisis, the outlook for Paraguay could be worse. The country has a low level of external debt (due in part to the difficulty of previous governments in implementing earlier loans), a respectable level of international reserves, and an economy largely based on exporting agricultural commodities. A small country such as Paraguay, which produces food and clean energy and has plenty of fresh water and fertile land, has comparative advantages that can and should be strengthened.

At first, the crisis created by the financial disaster in Northern countries was perceived as a remote issue with little effect on Paraguay. However, in the wake of one of the most devastating regional droughts in years, it has become evident that these two disasters will have a major influence on any projects planned by the Patriotic Alliance for Change Government that took office in 2008. They will also hobble the new Government in vital negotiations, such as the attempt to obtain a fair price for the energy that is produced by the bi-national Itaipú dam and used by Brazil.

It is still hard to gauge the full impact of the twin disasters and, therefore, to determine what government responses would have any likelihood of success. However, the need to abandon the cruel, opportunistic approach and improvisation of previous governments is clear. The transition involves a process of relearning the art of governance. In the current crisis, the Government must exercise extreme caution in discerning trends and formulating countervailing policies. For example, the 2009 national expenditures budget was based on Government economic projections that have proven to be overly optimistic.

In the space of a few months, growth plunged from 5% to 2% and then to 1.7%. Some analysts believe that official predictions are still too rosy, and expect GDP to decline 2%. This would lead to a fiscal deficit, although this is no longer seen as a problem.

A UNDP/UNICEF-UNFPA Report on the Investing in People programme, issued in early 2009, cautioned the Government to take measures to avoid an increase in poverty and extreme poverty in 2009 that would jeopardize the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. Design problems and appalling management of social programmes, along with a decade of neglect of the rural sector, have helped swell the ranks of the poor by 1 million, according to official statistics. Due to increased unemployment, a fall in income and a reduction in remittances, the proportion of the population below the poverty line soared from 35.6% in 2007 to 40.3% in 2009, while the proportion who are extremely poor climbed from 19.4% to 22.8%—the intermediate target for 2008 was 13%. Some experts fear the current crisis could increase their numbers by another 300,000.

Early estimates project 80,000-100,000 jobs will disappear—approximately the number of new jobs Paraguay needs to create each year just to meet the demand for decent employment among rural workers and young people. Currently, 35% of the economically active population is unemployed or underemployed and 70% of salaried workers earn less than the legal minimum wage. Only 15% of Paraguayans have some kind of health insurance. This dire situation is a legacy of the long rule by the Colorado Party, which had supported Alfredo Stroessner’s dictatorship.

Soy producers, known as “Braziaguayans” because of their origin, were the first to demand State help. Until recently, they had benefited from agricultural mechanization and an export boom that accompanied the global jump in oil prices and expectations generated by the biofuel frenzy. In recent months, however, these producers, the country’s most dynamic export sector, have watched while drought, low productivity, a drop in world prices, and the withdrawal of transnational companies that provided financing have shrunk their profits.

Initially, soy producers asked for financing to cover 50% of their harvest, at an estimated cost of US$ 500 million. The sum needed was reduced by half when more precise projections of the cost of refinancing credits and sowing the next crop were available, however even the lower amount was far beyond the available resources of either the Government or the private financial sector. Many organizations also questioned whether this financial support would be the best use of limited public resources at a time when so many sectors need assistance.


2 Última Hora. 17 January 2009.

3 Ibid.


5 ABC Newspaper, 6 October 2008; Última Hora. 18 October 2008
Government response to the crisis
Following a period of doubt and assertion, the Government has been preparing a cautious, phased, realistic anti-crisis strategy based on rationalizing and reinforcing available resources. This strategy is being implemented in four phases:

**Phase 1, beginning October 2008**
Introduction of monetary measures to ensure the liquidity of the banking system and fiscal measures to streamline expenses and increase income. These measures include:

- Conditional reduction of legal reserves required on deposits, whether in the form of guarani (the Paraguayan currency) or dollars. This is expected to motivate banks to capture long-term savings and free up resources to finance or refinance productive loans.
- Reduction of interest rates on instruments of monetary regulation so that banks “make their money work”; that is, increase the amount of credit they offer.
- Central Bank support for the guarani when the dollar began appreciating. This has had both positive and negative effects: it penalizes importers but can help exporters. In addition, devaluation of the guarani could make debt payments more expensive.

**Phase 2, beginning January 2009**
Introduction of an expansive fiscal policy. The plan is to implement an expansive budget, with increased spending on public works (paving roads, building bridges) and social policies intended to create employment and protect vulnerable sectors from the crisis. Initial estimates envisioned a budget deficit of USD 300 million. The Government made a commitment to regularly review stimulus expenditures; both budgetary increases (public works of around USD 100 million to 200 million) and conditional transfers (involving between 17,000 and 120,000 beneficiaries).

**Phase 3, beginning February 2009**
Introduction of measures to satisfy the financial and credit needs of productive sectors. The strategy is to strengthen the Financial Agency for Development credit portfolio, with the goal of generating more opportunities for medium- and long-term refinancing and public financing for small and medium producers. State spending will give priority to domestic production.

**Phase 4 (in design stage)**
Multilateral contingency credits. Some of these are already under review. Others have preliminary approval or will be submitted to Parliament. These credits, allocated to roads and production (Inter-American Development Bank), as well as agricultural production and water (World Bank), will require a review of methods of awarding public/private contracts, as well as improvements in budgetary implementation.

In developing the Anti-Crisis Plan for parliamentary consideration, the Government has expanded its discussions with various sectors of society—political and parliamentary parties, private sector representatives and civil society organizations. Even so, it has not won unanimous agreement on either the value of the proposed measures or their likely effectiveness in mitigating the impact of the crisis. Some groups argue that the plan must be implemented in any case, since it will fund loans that have already received commitments or where approval has been delayed. Others feel that final decisions on the contingency loans from multilateral banks should be contingent on a thorough review of their beneficiaries and cost, as well as how effectively they reinforce public expenditures.

To complicate matters, new demands for government financing are springing up, though they are difficult to justify and/or satisfy. For instance, wage increases were requested by public service unions in 2008, echoing demands of private sector workers, in addition to the soy producer pleas for immediate refinancing and soft credit. Longstanding demands for land, food self-sufficiency and revitalization of the rural economy are also resurfacing in the countryside.

The controversy among interest groups is heightened by opposition to conditional cash transfers to the most vulnerable sectors voiced by business entrepreneurs and opportunist politicians. These transfers are more generous and available to more people than under the previous administration, which increased competition for them and complicated access. Conditional transfers are justifiable in “exceptional times” and until better alternatives can be introduced. However, they are not a panacea nor are they easy to allocate fairly, since it is hard to discriminate between the poor and the destitute based on income alone, and everybody is affected by inadequate education and public health services characterized by low coverage and/or poor quality. Furthermore, Paraguay’s transfers will not be sufficient, and their effective implementation will depend on the Government’s ability to deal with issues of method and measurement, as well as all kinds of local pressures.

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The Government still has to develop the political will and strategy it needs to build a parliamentary majority in a country where political parties are floundering in a crisis of leadership, mediation and representation. Its primary challenge is to neutralize the retrograde forces in Colorado Party, which has already announced its intention to ignore the anti-crisis plan; this could lead to a parliamentary boycott.

The civil society response
The first sectors to complain about Government policies were those that had benefitted from the prior Government’s neoliberal policies and market integration: agro-exporters, industrialists, importers and advertising executives. With few exceptions, business sectors have limited themselves to demanding more information on the scope of the crisis and voicing complaints, rather than suggesting alternatives. They also make excessive demands, which are quickly seen to be illegitimate. The soy producers, for example, insisted that the Government not only to cover their losses, but also provide enough funding to maintain their level of production and profit through public subsidies. They earned extraordinary profits in the previous cycle, thanks in part to speculation in the future market for agricultural commodities that accompanied the promotion of biofuels in many countries. This is a sign that the crisis could lead to an impasse or to the reinforcement of earlier resource allocation plans that should really be replaced.

The irresponsibility and myopia of the right-wing opposition is leading it to oppose the anti-crisis plan, simply to damage the new centre-left Government. At the other end of the spectrum, demands of worker and peasant organisations could be manipulated by left-wing parties inside and outside the Government, or by elements of the media that want to confuse the public for their own reasons.

Some groups denounce the anti-crisis proposals as neoliberal measures that will lead to damaging and unnecessary foreign indebtedness and benefit banks, international finance and the rich. However, this is not the time to allow ideological considerations to prevent efforts in dealing with a critical situation that is largely a legacy of poor public administration and unresolved structural issues, which will become increasingly important in the future.

Civil society organizations such as the Coordinating Committee for Child and Adolescent Rights and Decidamos (Let’s Decide), which have formed the Alliance for Investment in Childhood and Adolescence, contribute to publicizing the effects of the crisis on vulnerable children and adolescents and offer specific proposals in policy debates on the issue.

An anti-crisis plan might not be an ideal solution, but it is necessary. Given the country’s previous record in planning, just putting it into practice would mean progress. Its success will depend on a thorough understanding of inherited problems, as well as those emerging in this new, chaotic and unpredictable era. In any event, the crisis could provide the impetus to economic, social and environmental reforms and strengthen the State’s administrative capacity and ability to take control of the country’s future. This, in turn, could facilitate greater participation of civil society in the public sphere.

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6 Última Hora, 31 January 2009.

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Social Watch 133 Paraguay

**PERU**

### The workers’ proposal

The Government’s economic stimulus plan for tackling the crisis adds USD 3 billion to this year’s budget, which the Government will spend—in partnership with private-sector employers—on housing construction, financing for the export sector, and social welfare programmes. The trade union confederation has issued an alternative plan designed to maintain economic expansion and job creation, preserve jobs, support the worst-off sectors of society and encourage growth and consumption of domestic production.

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Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú (CGTP)
Support from CGTP
María Huamán Rivero

Peru has not been spared from the effects of the global crisis. GDP growth, which reached almost 10% in 2008, but was down to less than 4% in January 2009, according to the National Institute of Statistics and Information Technology. Exports are expected to plunge from USD 32 billion in 2008 to around USD 22 billion this year. The country’s President declared that this will lead to 200,000 layoffs, as well as a fall in the purchasing power of wages and savings. The worst affected sectors are the mining, industrial manufacture of non-primary resources, agribusiness, trade and services sectors. Unless the Government responds swiftly and effectively, the downturn will worsen in the second half of the year.

The current official economic stimulus plan adds 10 billion Peruvian soles (PEN), equal to almost USD 3.4 billion, to the 2009 budget. The Government will raise this money by issuing sovereign bonds and spend it, in partnership with private-sector employers, on housing construction, finance for the export sector, and social welfare programmes valued PEN 500 million (USD 169 million).

When times are good, workers are typically asked to wait patiently for the benefits of growth; in times of crisis, they are expected to tighten their belts. But countering the damage caused by this crisis requires boosting domestic demand by increasing workers’ consumption and protecting national production, as well as suspending free trade agreements (FTAs) that leave the Peruvian market far too open at a time of shrinking international markets.

The graph that follows shows the dramatic fall in real earnings among the economically active population of Peru during the period 1970-2006, calculated in Peruvian soles (USD 1 = soles 2.95 in July 2009) per annum. While the average worker was paid 6,000 soles per annum in 1974, by 2006 the average worker was earning 1,700 in real wages, less than a third as much. The slight recovery in the period following the adoption of the neoliberal model in 1990 fell far short of what workers gained during the 1970s, when the State applied a Keynesian model and was actively involved in the economy, trade union organization, collective bargaining and ensuring job security.

### The CGTP proposal

In response to the crisis, the CGTP, working with a group of economists, has issued an alternative proposal, addressed to both the Government and the general public.

**Objectives**

Instead of allowing a recession to deepen, the country should respond to the crisis by encouraging a new kind of economic growth; by promoting job creation and job security, rather than by accepting mass layoffs. We believe it is possible to stimulate growth that is based on consumption of goods produced domestically and well-balanced exports. State investment should focus on productive sectors of the economy, as well as regions that have sustained massive job losses, with particular attention to the needs of the poorest sectors of society, children and the elderly.

### Specific policies

The plan requires Government action in the following areas: fiscal policy, stimulating the domestic market, promotion and protection of decent employment, increasing agricultural productivity and food sovereignty, encouraging small businesses and protecting the poorer sectors of the population.

1 Secretary General of the General Worker’s Confederation of Peru (CGTP).

2 See: <www.cgtp.org.pe>
Protecting decent jobs
The Government should promote collective bargaining and trade union freedom, along with tripartite commitments, negotiated by workers and employers in each industry and Government in order to maintain employment. It needs to introduce a job retraining programme for workers laid off as a result of the crisis, financed by the Fiscal Stabilization Fund and international development assistance. These workers should also be given temporary unemployment insurance. Tax incentives should be offered to businesses sponsoring job training programmes and investing in technological innovation.

Raising agricultural productivity and defending food sovereignty
The Government should promote a coordinated policy to increase productivity in agriculture and livestock farming. This should include re-establishing price controls, as well as the imposition of anti-dumping tariffs and special taxes on food oligopolies. The Government should also widen access to credit and refinancing for the agricultural sector, and repeal the legislative decrees that facilitate land acquisitions that dispossess peasant and Amazonian communities.

Defending micro and small enterprises (MSEs)
The Government should give preference to MSEs as suppliers and expand financing for these enterprises by increasing the Financial Corporation for Development’s allocations to the Fund to Guarantee Loans to Small Business.

Protecting the poorest
Government should launch temporary employment programmes that improve productive infrastructure and basic health, education and nutrition services. It should also provide cash transfers for peasants and poor livestock farmers who are not involved in temporary employment programmes, so they can prevent their land and animals from being auctioned off. In addition, it should provide state pensions for people over 65 years of age who have no income, and introduce a universal health insurance system that guarantees quality care.

The CGTP proposal supports economic integration and trade at the regional and sub-regional level, as well as internationalization of Peruvian companies and market diversification.


Source: Graph produced by Francisco Verdera, ILO employment specialist in Lima.
PHILIPPINES

From bad to worse

In the Philippines, economic globalization resulted in the expansion of informal labour, the contraction of local industries and heavy dependence on exports and remittances from abroad while poverty continued to rise due to inequitable distribution of the gains. Today, the global crisis is slowing down remittances while factories are closing. As usual, it is the poor and the marginalized who pay the heaviest cost. A stimulus package that is rights-based, pro-poor and sustainable is urgently needed.

Contrary to assessments by the Government and credit rating agencies that it could withstand the global crisis, the Philippines’ outward-oriented economy has made it extremely vulnerable to external shocks. The globalization of production, which resulted in the rapid expansion of informal labour, the contraction of local industries due to global competition with cheap and highly subsidized imports, and heavy dependence on exports and overseas labour markets have brought about dire consequences for the livelihood of most citizens.1

In fact, even before the global crisis struck, most Filipinos were already reeling from deteriorating economic conditions. According to the Family Income and Expenditure Survey, household incomes were in decline from 2003 to 2006. Moreover, scores of Filipinos were trapped in low productivity jobs, with below-poverty-line wages and record levels of hunger,2 as registered by the Social Weather Stations.3 The Government has finally admitted that poverty rose in 2006 during a time of economic growth, making apparent the inequitable distribution of economic gains. As of June 10, 2009, the Government has downgraded GDP growth targets for 2009 to a low range of 0.8 to 1.8%,4 compelling National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB) Secretary to declare that the Philippine economy is “teetering into recession.”5

Remittances and exports

The fall-out from the crisis will be widespread. Remittances, in fact, comprised 13% of GDP in 2007. Filipinos working abroad comprise one tenth of the total population (around 8 million), arguably “the biggest net foreign exchange earner for the Philippine economy.”6 Now, however, the Department of Labour and Employment says that up to 575,000 overseas Filipinos could lose their jobs, particularly in South Korea, Taiwan, Macao, Singapore and Hong Kong, among those working on cruise ships. The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas [Central Bank of the Philippines] projects remittances will slow down 6–10%.

Export earnings plummeted 40.4% in 2008 compared to the previous year, with electronics declining by 47.6%.7 Labour officials are nervous at the rising number of factories closing down not only in the electronics sector but also among garment manufacturers and other companies in industrial parks, where more than 108,000 workers were affected by the crisis from October 2008 to March 2009 alone. This includes 50,380 displaced workers and 59,149 workers operating under “flexible” arrangements (such as reduced work hours or forced leave).8

Unemployment, social security and food

Filipinos cannot afford increasing unemployment and underemployment. While the unemployment rate stands at 8–10%, underemployment had already climbed to 22% even before the global crisis struck. Indeed, mere employment does not guarantee a decent life: a majority (51%) of the Philippine labour force, composed of 12.1 million farmers and fisherfolk and about 10 million workers and unskilled workers, are earning poverty-level wages, just like those in the burgeoning informal sector.

A large majority of workers in export processing zones are women. Significant lay-offs or work flexibility arrangements in these zones due to the crisis will therefore mostly affect women, who are primarily responsible for managing households and caregiving. The deepening crisis will place further stress on women as they discharge their multiple responsibilities. Overall, however, male workers comprise the majority of the unemployed (64.1%) compared to female workers (35.9%), since man-dominated industries such as construction and transport have been most affected by the crisis.9

Philippine social insurance covers about 84.5% of employed workers. However, the working poor benefit little from social security services, and coverage of those in the informal sector is limited.10 There is no unemployment insurance and the Government has sidestepped safety nets to address joblessness on the grounds that they would be too expensive. Furthermore, the reach of social assistance programmes for those living below the poverty line is limited, as is the level of benefits. Private social security is also not spared by the global meltdown: the Philippine pre-need industry11 has already sought

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12. Pre-need firms offer plans to provide for future education costs, retirement, etc. As plan-holders’ payments are placed in trust funds that invest in financial instruments such as stocks and bonds, they are subject to the vagaries of the market.
Government help in dealing with the reduced value of their trust funds. Unfortunately, mismanagement, greed and regulatory capture have also marred the workings of some pre-need companies and some are reportedly on the brink of collapse, endangering the earnings of thousands of plan-holders.

Food and fuel price levels have eased somewhat compared to 2008. However since many Filipinos are earning meagre incomes, the purchase of goods and services to meet basic needs remains a daunting challenge. As a result of the global meltdown there have been increases in the price of rice, a staple in Filipino households, which means further food insecurity. Indeed, the Asian Development Bank has calculated that for every 10% increase in food prices, 2.72 million Filipinos would slip into poverty.13 Although the Philippines is a middle-income country, this masks regional disparities: while the capital enjoys high growth levels, child malnutrition in some regions is equal to or even exceeds that of sub-Saharan Africa. This illustrates the high level of inequality in the country; its Gini co-efficient of 0.45 is the 3rd highest in Asia, behind Nepal and the People’s Republic of China.

Basic social services, the environment and ODA

The delivery of basic social services will undoubtedly suffer due to the global financial meltdown.14 The Millennium Development Goal (MDG) target of universal primary education is already the most threatened goal nationally.15 Many educators are alarmed that students dependent on remittances from relatives and benefactors will not go to school next academic year due to collapsing incomes abroad.16 Prior to the global crisis, the Philippines was already the worst performing country in the region in terms of infant mortality and maternal mortality rates, owing largely to public underinvestment.17 Whatever funds that go to health-related MDGs are generally ODA-backed, although whether the aid is going where it is needed most – the poorest communities – requires further investigation, according to advocates of the Alternative Budget Initiative (ABI).18

The Government has also relied on ODA to implement environmental legislation such as the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act in the last three years.19 Its spending priority is in mining and forest production (rather than protection) in spite of unresolved issues related to huge mining disasters and widespread deforestation. This means that if ODA significantly decreases as a result of the global crisis, its negative impact will be especially felt in sectors like health and the environment.

Government response to the crisis

The Government has joined the global chorus to “pump-prime the economy” in the form of the now familiar-sounding economic stimulus package. Government is tutoring a PhP 330 billion (USD 6.87 billion) Economic Resiliency Plan (ERP) to address the crisis. A study conducted by the ABI however, showed that of the PhP 1.4 trillion (USD 29.14 billion) national budget recently passed by both Houses of Congress, only PhP 10.070 billion (USD 208.25 million) in new money will go to an Economic Stimulus Fund (ESF) geared to address the negative impact of the global crisis. Included under the ESF are items such as student loan assistance for college students, technical and vocational skills training for youth, loans and grants to small and medium enterprises, training assistance to laid off workers and returning overseas Filipino workers, construction of school buildings, and the like. While many of these are laudable, one cannot help but question why the bulk of the funds are for tertiary education and none for early childhood, primary and secondary education. Second, the emphasis on re-training for laid off workers is good but there must be greater emphasis on job creation that goes beyond the construction of school buildings. In other words, there is no comprehensive plan to mitigate the effects of the crisis. Most alarmingly, the President has vetoed the special provision on the use and release of the PhP 10 billion (USD 208 million) which effectively subjects it to ‘conditional implementation’ based on guidelines to be drawn up, ultimately, by the Executive. Given that national elections are coming up in 2010, civil society is concerned that the funds might be used for other purposes.

Frequently bandied about by government officials is an additional PhP 300 billion (USD 6.2 billion) for the ESF, ostensibly to be pooled from public coffers. Furthermore, not many pin their hopes on the “charitable spirit” of the business sector, especially in the context of the economic downturn. Even during prosperous times, the Government’s revenues were alarmingly below targets due to massive tax evasion by big companies and rich individuals.

ABI advocates are dismayed by the fact that at a time of worsening job insecurity and rising hunger, public officials boosted their pork barrel in the 2009 national budget by billions of pesos.20 Debt interest payment stands at PhP 302.65 billion21 (USD 6.3 billion), which constitutes 21% of the 2009 national budget. However the Government will have to raise an even larger amount of PhP 378.87 billion (USD 7.86 billion) to pay the principal component of the debt, which is disingenuously not reflected in the expenditure side of the national budgeting process.22

Finally, there is widespread concern that much of public funds, including those in the economic stimulus package, will end up as “political stimulus” instead, going to the electoral war chests of administration candidates preparing for the national elections to be held next year. There is a widely held belief that the Arroyo administration has routinely used public funds to stay in power and that its prudential “governance” agenda has been ensuring its own political survival in the face of growing social and political unrest.

Moving forward

A stimulus package is definitely in order but, unlike the one outlined by the Government, it should be based on a clear national strategy that is rights-based, pro-poor and sustainable that aims at strengthening domestic demand, especially in light of the current economic climate that is hostile to exports. It should place a premium on food security, on job creation by strengthening local enterprises to benefit both male and female workers, and on investment in pro-poor and green infrastructure projects (e.g., construction of a network of irrigation systems, electrification of far-flung villages and developing clean energy) as well as expansion of social and economic security for the poor and unemployed.

In the short term, immediate relief is needed to cushion the worsening effects of the impact of the global crisis on Filipinos. This means ensuring that the ESF goes to where it is meant to: food, income and emergency work relief, as well as to basic social services. Furthermore, the removal of the regressive Reformed Value Added Tax on oil, the implementation of a PhP 125 (USD 2.59) across-the-board wage hike and a PhP 3,000 (USD 62.20) monthly increase in Government salaries will provide some degree of economic relief. Finally, renegotiation of the national debt so that the bulk of the country’s revenues go to urgently meeting the basic needs of the people rather than to service the debt requires serious consideration.

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14 This report does not include a discussion of the effects and impact of the conditional cash transfer programme on the delivery of social services, particularly in education and health, as it was only piloted in a number of municipalities in 2008. The programme bears watching in 2009.
18 ABI is a broad-based network of civil society organizations monitoring and lobbying for increased social and environment spending in the Philippine national budget. It is anchored by Social Watch Philippines.
21 This reflects what is included in the 2009 Budget Law and the Presidential Veto Message, which restores a budget cut of PhP 50 billion (USD 1.06 billion).
22 Tanchuling, M. Interview with the Secretary-General, Freedom from Debt Coalition, Philippines, 3 March 2009.
An even gloomier development picture

Even before the world financial crisis started to take its toll causing devaluation, increased unemployment and reduced income, investments and exports, Poland had already experienced rising wage and income inequality during its transition to a market economy. As the Government lacks transparency in its operations, there is no opportunity for public debate to discuss the measures taken to cope with the crisis, such as the use of loans from international financial institutions. At the same time, Polish society’s patriarchal mentality and lack of social protection policies make women the first victims of the crisis.

Prior to the world financial crisis, Poland was an exemplary case of a successful neoliberal transition into the market economy. According to a recent report from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Poland was second lowest among 30 member states in child poverty and fourth in income inequality, with the richest 10% of the population gaining a bigger share of market income and paying a lower share of the tax burden than in any other OECD state except Turkey. Privatizations have affected most acutely the social sectors (pensions, health care and education), while state support has been extended to businesses (e.g., the Deputy Prime Minister has announced a plan to support companies that had engaged in risky currency options markets) but not to citizens.

This gloomy picture, however, is getting even darker as the crisis unfolds. The initial impact was a drastic devaluation of the Zloty (the national currency) – by approximately 25-30% within six months in relation to the euro and the Swiss franc – and a plunge in the Warsaw stock exchange. While this initially affected primarily Polish financial markets and companies involved in currency options, it has now begun to affect the national political debate, particularly with the more recent decrease in national revenues and decline in investments and exports. Further, contrary to initial (rather optimistic) scenarios, the financial crisis is having a significant impact on access to finance for both Polish businesses and consumers.

Unemployment

Recent labour market surveys indicate that unemployment has increased from 9% to 12% since the beginning of the crisis, including in white-collar positions. However, the actual numbers of people without any means of livelihood are higher, and only 15.5% of those unemployed are entitled to an allowance and eligible for public health care. The rest are on their own.

In addition, the statistical average does not reflect the hardships in towns where one significant employer, from whom the majority of households derive their livelihoods, is closing due to plummeting orders or opportunistic manoeuvres: for example, some companies are reportedly blaming the financial crisis in order to lay off workers and cut costs.

The effects of the financial crisis are most severely felt by those who do not have any savings, means to produce their own food or rural family ties (despite being on the verge of extinction under pressure from large scale agriculture, smallholder farms still survive in Poland). However, the new middle class families are also in a tight spot, especially young couples with children who have incurred huge mortgages with adjustable interest rates, or in foreign currencies, to purchase their dwellings.

Access to finance and long-term growth perspectives

As a result of the so-called “credit crunch” (a sudden reduction of access to credit and an increase in its costs), the prospects for the country’s economic growth have declined substantially: from a reported 6.5% in 2007 and 5.5% in 2008 to a prediction for 2009 ranging between 2.5% and 3.7%.

Furthermore, Poland has started to be affected by a sudden halt in capital inflow, followed by increasing risk aversion among investors and the crowding-out effect, as competition grows among the strongest EU economies for public debt financing. The situation has been further exacerbated by the foreign exchange crisis: the weakening Zloty had a damaging impact on companies that entered into currency options contracts as well as on persons repaying foreign currency mortgages.

The supply of credit has been strongly limited in all segments of the credit market, and more than 80% of the banks have introduced far more rigorous criteria for extending credit of any type. In particular, they have increased the requirements concerning the level of security and, in the case of mortgage loans, the amount of the borrowers’ own contributions. Also, almost every bank has raised its credit margins – from 1-2% in mid-2008 to 7-8% in the first quarter of 2009. The cost of money in the interbank market has increased substantially due to an unprecedented decline in mutual trust between financial institutions. The Polish Financial Supervision Commission (FSC) has sharpened liquidity ratios and reporting obligations. The banks’ assessment of the prospects

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4 Rybicki, K. Finansowanie rozwoju Polski w kryzysie. Ernest & Young, February 2009.

5 All data based on report by the National Bank of Poland. Situation of the credit market in the first quarter of 2009, Warsaw, January 2009.

6 In July 2008, the Polish Financial Supervision Authority imposed an obligation on banks to maintain and report their quantity liquidity standards, thereby improving banks’ liquidity and helping to contain the “confidence crisis.” See: <www.krs.gov.pl/struktura_bankowa/DecyzjeStanowiskowe_nadzoru/uchwaly/index.html>.
of the economy is very negative, and they expect further restrictions in lending to enterprises.  

**Consumers: the mortgage market standstill**

The banks’ prevailing policy of setting the required amount of own contribution at 30% rules out any possibility of purchasing their own homes for the majority of people, while there is already a shortage of around 2 million flats on the market. The most likely result will be a drastic increase in rents, but the prices of apartments for sale will not necessarily fall quickly. Also, the costs of servicing foreign currency mortgage loans (79%–81% of the total credit portfolio in 2008) drastically increased, due to the sudden drop in the value of the Zloty and a very unfavourable change in the banks’ policy regarding the calculation of the spread.

The public believes that banks are manipulating the exchange rates at the clients’ cost. At present the difference between the purchase and the selling rate can reach as much as 12%, while even the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection is unable to impose exchange rate restrictions. Consumer groups are therefore forming through the Internet in order to purchase foreign currencies in wholesale quantities, hoping to negotiate the amount of spread and sometimes even renegotiate terms and conditions of credit agreements.  

**Credit crunch and threat of massive bankruptcy**

Already 15% of enterprises are having problems obtaining operating credit. For every one out of two enterprises, banks have tightened the terms and conditions for lending, a situation that will certainly get worse in 2009. According to preliminary forecasts, banks will have 50% less funds for lending in 2009 than in the preceding year. It is very likely that they will start sending *en masse* calls to companies for repayment or renegotiation of loans, claiming default on the terms of the credit agreement. In 2008, because of competitive pressure, banks granted a gigantic number of loans with minimum margins of interest, but those loans are now becoming a burden. Small and medium-sized companies that do not have significant security in their private capital are particularly threatened.  

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9 Data from the Association of Polish Banks reported at a conference in December 2008. Available from: <www.zbp.pl/site.php?%7=MTI=MTI=MTI=MTI>.
12 Survey conducted by the Polish Confederation of Private Employers Lewiatan. See: <www.pkplewiatan.pl>.

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On top of the credit crunch, thousands of companies fell into the trap of currency options and are now struggling on the verge of bankruptcy. Encouraged by the banks, companies were buying options in massive amounts to protect their export profits. After the rapid devaluation of the Zloty they not only lost all invested capital but have also amassed a huge amount of debt due to poorly protected contracts.

**The democratic deficit**

Other major problems include the fall in State income and the rising costs of servicing the public debt. They go hand in hand with the prevailing democratic deficit: there was no public debate on the new emergency loan from the World Bank in the amount of EUR 3.75 billion, and the State’s activities are largely opaque to the media, elected politicians and the public. When the Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., which operates as a central registry of credit swaps trades, published its details, including the top 1,000 contracts, it turned out that the Republic of Poland and other sovereign states engaged in derivatives trading as much as the private sector. Since the early 2000s the OECD, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have organized trainings and seminars for finance ministry officials to persuade them to engage in creating and dealing in markets for state debt. When the State operates like a commercial firm, it abandons its citizens, especially those who do not generate income for the State or market.

**Gendered effects**

In 1989 and 1990, when Poland embarked on the free-market road, the first casualties were women garment workers, as inefficient factories closed and nothing replaced them. Today the revamped garment sector, where women again predominate, is shrinking again as import orders (mainly from Germany) fall and local subcontractors downsize or close, resulting in an estimated net job loss of 40,000.  

**Trapped in the grey economy**

The decrease in family incomes due to the economic crisis might cause pauperization of whole social groups, particularly among the lower and middle classes. It is very likely that this will in turn have a more significant impact on women, since they traditionally are the main responsible for family well-being (this is particularly true among the lower income groups). According to some analysts, crises amplify the grey (informal) sector in the Polish economy as many, especially small entrepreneurs try to minimize labour costs and avoid taxation and other costs associated with formal employment. It seems very likely that the growth of the grey economy will affect women more than men, as they are more often engaged in low paid jobs, especially in the private service sector (e.g. in retail).

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The economic crisis that Portugal has been facing since at least 2001, reinforced by the current international financial and economic crisis, has brought increasing unemployment and poverty. The latter, however, is not just an effect of the current situation, but remains a structural condition. Almost half the population, including members of the middle class who lost their jobs and/or houses, experienced poverty between 1995 and 2000. Climate change is also affecting the economy and the well being of citizens. New approaches and specific measures are needed to combat poverty and tackle environmental challenges.

Credit, housing and poverty risk

Lack of access to credit is another very negative consequence of the international economic crisis. Although there are no official data regarding this, many families lost their houses due to non-payment of loan instalments in 2008. According to the 2007 EU Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), non-monetary income components such as home ownership contribute to softening the incidence and intensity of poverty.2 Housing losses – or increasing acquisition problems among the middle or lower classes – and job losses have increased the risk of poverty, defined by the EU-SILC as the share of adult inhabitants with an annual income in 2006 below EUR 4,544 (approximately EUR 379 per month).

According to the EU-SILC, the risk of poverty for unemployed Portuguese was 32% in 2006, slightly more than in 2005 (31%). This increase is predictable due to the increased unemployment mentioned above. Overall, however, the poverty risk went down to 18%, a reduction of approximately 5% from 1994 when it was 23%.

The improvement reflected the positive effects of European programmes since 1989 to combat poverty and the National Action Plan for Inclusion 2003-2005,3 which had some very positive guiding principles:

- A multidimensional and multidisciplinary approach to poverty and deprivation;
- An emphasis on partnerships between public and private actors;
- Participation of all interested parties, especially the poor;
- Empowerment of the poor; and
- Mainstreaming policies and actions to generate awareness in each sector-based policy and prevent the fight against poverty being reduced to a peripheral programme.

The EU-SILC showed that 47% of families had experienced poverty between 1995 and 2000, with 72% remaining poor for two or more years.4 Many of these are the new poor, men and women who had recently belonged in the middle class but who became impoverished due to a family crisis such as the loss of a job or increased interest rates on housing loans or mortgages. At the beginning of 2009, NGOs highlighted some dramatic stories of people who had seen their lives changed radically and become dependent on the help of third parties. The President of the European Anti Poverty Network has said that, of the 2 million poor in Portugal, 17% are currently employed but their salaries do not cover their daily needs.5 Poverty is increasing in the big cities and has led to several recent suicide attempts.

Addressing poverty

These findings suggest that the problem “is not what we are doing, but what is still to be done”.6 A transfer of approximately 3.5% of the income from those who are not poor would be enough to meet the needs of those who are.7 Poverty in Portugal – as elsewhere – will not be solved merely by social policies, although these are also important. There is a need for economic policies that deal with the unequal distribution of income, property and power. Economists and civil society organizations increasingly point out that inequality in assets leads to economic inefficiency, and that there should be more investment in human capital (skills, education, health, training), which would also promote human rights. Only in this way will Portugal overcome the weaknesses that have so long hindered its productivity, condemning it to one of the lowest economic growth rates in Europe.

Three key recommendations to fight poverty are:

- Protection of the population that is highly vulnerable to poverty when defining social policies.
- Integrating economic policies into the fight against poverty, namely in terms of employment opportunities and institutionalization.

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1 “Children reaching...” estimated following procedure “1” in p. 209.
3 See: www.pnai.pt.
5 See Rede Europa Anti Pobreza at: <www.reapn.org/>.
7 Ibid.
of bank credit, specifically concerning hous-
ing.

• Criteria that guarantee the General State
Budget (GSB) works for social cohesion.
Some organizations, such as Oikos, have
suggested that a group should be created
under the auspices of the Assembly of the
Republic to monitor the GSB. It should have
representation from civil society, scholars
and policymakers, and use the following cri-
teria: gender sensitivity, childhood rights,
elderly rights, promotion of human capital
and territorial consistency.

Impacts of climate change
A comprehensive study on the impact of climate
change in Portugal, the SIAM II,8 suggests that
the most significant effects of global warming
are: important erosion of the coastline, increasing
frequency of extreme weather events (such as
prolonged droughts and sudden floods), reduc-
tion of rainfall (by 30%–40%) and increasing av-
erage annual temperature. While not catastrophic,
consequences of climate change in the country
will entail losses between 5%–10% of GDP. There
are potential impacts on water resources, coastal
zones, fisheries, agriculture, forests, biodiversity,
energy, human health, and important sectors of
the national economy such as tourism.

Given the inevitability of global climate
change, it is becoming increasingly clear that
policies for mitigation and adaptation must be
strengthened. Regarding mitigation, there is a
need to reduce CO₂ emissions, improve energy ef-
ciency, emphasize the reutilization and recycling
of products, review the whole transport and mo-
tility policies, and focus on clean and renewable
energy. The country should also develop mecha-
nisms to use a significant part of the resources of
the Portuguese Carbon Fund projects to achieve
a double benefit: offsetting carbon emissions/
energy efficiency; and combating poverty, par-
ticularly in developing countries.

Regarding adaptation it will be required,
among other measures, to invest in protecting the
coastline and water resources, to favour invest-
ment on crops more resilient to climate change,
and increase the energy efficiency in public and
residential buildings. ■

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8 Santos, F. D. and Miranda, P. Alterações Climáticas em
**ROMANIA**

**Dire prospects**

A decline in exports has triggered bankruptcies, and a contraction in activities and unemployment is on the rise in Romania. Remittances, representing 5% of GNI, dropped 10% at the beginning of 2009. The privatization and sale of national banks over the last few years has led to the country and its citizens to become indebted to Western banks. A recent multi-billion loan from the IMF seems designed mainly to benefit these foreign financial institutions. Among the casualties of the crisis is aid for development: the entire Romanian development cooperation policy is in danger of disappearing.

Like its neighbours from the former Soviet bloc, Romania is caught in the turmoil of the global financial and economic crisis. The country had enjoyed an economic boom in the past few years, fuelled in part by heavy borrowing from Western banks and easy access to foreign loans. Currently, however, there is a credit crunch, the national currency is unstable, and the situation looks dire.

**State budget, remittances and unemployment**

Romania is dependent on falling EU markets. Exports have decreased by 25% and capital flows are reversing direction. January 2009 alone saw repatriations worth EUR 539 million. The decrease in exports has led to rising unemployment, bankruptcies and a contraction in companies’ activities. Some 500,000 people (5.7%) were unemployed in April 2009, almost half of them women, compared to 3.9% in April 2008. In May 2009, the European Commission estimated unemployment would rise to 8%. Each percentage point means an additional 100,000 unemployed.

Although the average net monthly salary was EUR 327 in March 2009, an increase of 17.6% compared to March 2008 according to the National Statistics Institute, this is less impressive than in the first months of 2008, when there were raises of more than 30%. It is expected that the crisis will cause the increases to slow further and even reverse. The Government has announced that budgetary salaries will be frozen, which means less purchasing power. In a national television interview in April 2009, the Prime Minister, Emil Boc, recognized that there was a real danger that the Government would not be able to pay state salaries and pensions. In addition, as traditional export markets for food producers have contracted, Romanian farmers also find themselves threatened at home by subsidized agricultural and food product imports from other EU member states looking to reorient their exports.

Budgetary revenues began to go down in the last quarter of 2008, a trend that has continued in 2009 – with 8.7% less in January than the same period in 2008 – and is likely to worsen. The largest decrease was in taxes on profits (-30.7%). Taxes on earnings and salaries brought in almost 20% more than the same period in 2008. Funds collected through VAT, which remains the main source for the budget, dropped 8% and are likely to drop further.

In response, new and higher taxes as well as increases in social contributions have been proposed. In March 2009, the Government announced an increase in contributions to health insurance funds of around 1% for both employees and employers, explaining that higher unemployment would lead to fewer contributions. Previously, the mandatory contribution had been 5.2% for employees and 5.5% for employers. Business representatives believe that this measure will further increase unemployment since companies will continue to cut costs and operate with fewer employees.

In February 2009, the Government announced that companies hiring unemployed persons, sole supporters of families or persons over 50 years old would receive subsidies for a period of up to 12 months in order to cover half the salaries of their new employees. The subsidies would also support employment of Roma and of those who, because of lack of education or skills, do not have a fair chance in the labour market. For people unemployed for more than two years, the subsidies would cover 75% of their salary for 24 months. The scheme, worth a total of EUR 133 million, is 85% funded by the European Commission. Of this, EUR 29 million is allocated for employment in the rural areas.1 In March 2009, the Government also decided to extend the period of unemployment benefits by three months, while employers and employees will be exempted for three months from paying social insurance contributions during temporary suspension of activities.2

According to data from the National Bank of Romania, citizens working abroad sent home EUR 8.7 billion in 2008 (up from 7 billion in 2007). This was almost as much as total foreign direct investment (a record EUR 9 billion) and represents 5% of GNI.3 A study released by the World Bank ranks Romania 8th among developing countries in terms of migrant remittances.4 However, at the beginning of 2009, the level of remittances dropped 10% compared with the same period in 2008. Italy and Spain, the two countries that are the source of 90% of total remittances, both face serious economic problems and high rates of unemployment. Some 800,000 Romanians were

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1 “Children reaching...” estimated following procedure “1” in p. 209.
2 National reports 142 Social Watch
working in Spain, mainly in the hardest hit sectors (services, industry and construction). In November 2008, Spanish authorities announced that 100,000 Romanians were unemployed, with 30,000 more expected to lose their jobs by 2009. 7

In November 2008, the Romanian Minister of Labour and Social Affairs stated that in 2009 Romania could absorb up to 500,000 workers from abroad, as there was a shortage of labour for infrastructure projects and in the agricultural sector. However, these comments were basically meant to soothe the Italian and Spanish Governments’ concerns that Romanian workers would become a burden on their countries’ already overstretched public finances, increased sharply. This has led to a scenario in which the Government committed will be achieved by 2015.

**Foreign banks, the IMF and the people**

Virtually all Romanian banks have been privatized over the last few years and sold to foreign banks. Until the beginning of the financial crisis, foreign banks made huge profits on a market in full and rapid expansion. In 2008, BCR (Este Group/Austria) reported an increase in net profit of 119.8%, BRD Société Générale (France) registered an increase of 46%, and Raiffeisen Bank (Austria) increased its profit by 75.6% compared to 2007. The net profit of just these three, the largest banks in Romania, totalled more than EUR 1 billion.

At the beginning of the financial crisis, the Romanian National Bank intervened in an attempt to calm down the lending extravaganza triggered by the competition, imposing a series of restrictions aimed at preventing defaults. However, the level of indebtedness increased sharply. This has led to a scenario in which, just as in most of Central and Eastern Europe, Romanian debts are owed to Western European banks, especially from Austria, France, Greece and Italy. Without any consideration for the potential negative impact of their actions, the banks fuelled a consumption trend based not on actual production by the local real economy but on an increase in imports from Western Europe. Basically, with money borrowed from Western Europe, these banks have supported their own national economies by putting Romania and its citizens in debt. 8

This situation is aggravated by the fact that Western European governments have been putting pressure on their banks to pull back, undercutting subsidiaries in Eastern Europe. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) expects defaults of up to 20% on Eastern European loans, with Romania among those especially hard hit. The decision makers in Bucharest are constrained in their fiscal policy choices by the fact that belt-tightening is required to correct the negative values of the balance of payments. At the same time, a weakening of the national currency could potentially trigger defaults, thereby shaking financial stability. In order to counter these dangers, the Government asked for and received a loan of EUR 19.95 billion from the IMF, the European Commission, the World Bank and the EBRD. Of the total loan, the IMF will provide EUR 12.95 billion.

The Government insists that the loan will be linked to the commitment of foreign banks in Romania to resume credit without externalizing the resources in the country or affecting the national budget obligations for education and health. At the end of March 2008, the IMF obtained written commitments from the heads of offices of the main bank subsidiaries in Romania that they would continue to support these branches and would not withdraw capital. However the Government has a poor record of withstanding foreign pressure. It also lacks the means to circumvent foreign “solutions” to national problems. Both the Government and civil society, with few exceptions, have been slow to react and expose the real stakes. The austerity measures proposed by the Government, including freezing public wages and pensions and tax hikes, have provoked discontent and mobilization by trade unions.

The IMF loan seems to have been contracted under external pressures, mainly to save foreign companies’ interests in Romania. It will not serve to repay the country’s foreign debt but will cover the debts of local subsidiaries of foreign banks. Public funds will thus be used to repair the damage done by private capital. The governments of Western Europe have generally been able to manage this damage. However the desperate calls from the Austrian Government to UNDP Romania to hire experts, the IMF intervention to rescue its banks in Eastern Europe prove that foreign banks are sometimes dangerously overexposed (e.g., Austrian banks have lent the region an amount equivalent to 70% of Austria’s GDP). The repayment of a loan that represents 40% of Romania’s annual budget will only be possible over the next years through decreasing the population’s standard of living.

**Crisis in development assistance**

In 2007, when joining the EU, Romania pledged to contribute as a donor country to alleviating poverty in the world by participating in the EU aid policy and by configuring its own official development assistance (ODA) policy. The current financial crisis is likely to have a dramatic impact on Romanian aid flows. The ODA budget managed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) was cut from EUR 5 million in 2008 to EUR 1.9 million in 2009. Meanwhile, the multibillion loan from the IMF has already imposed budgetary constraints for “non-essential” areas, and repaying the loan (by 2015) will affect the ODA budget for many years to come. Even though multilateral ODA contributions will remain at a relative constant level, it is very unlikely that the 0.17% ODA target to which the Government committed will be achieved by 2015.

The Romanian NGO platform for development (FOND) has warned that the entire Romanian development cooperation policy is in danger of disappearing. 11 Crucially, all previous investment in the newly developed institutional capacity for the MFA is being affected. The Government has addressed the majority of its internal capacity development needs through out-sourcing specific tasks to UNDP Romania. CSOs are concerned that, by doing this, the Government is missing its main short-term objective: strengthening national capacity.

A clear signal of the impacts of this approach was the change in the internal administrative structure of the MFA at the beginning of 2009. While important financial resources were allocated by the Government to UNDP Romania to hire experts, the Development Assistance unit within the MFA was downgraded and its staff was halved, with a subsequent decline in capacity for programming and managing development assistance. Although budgetary cuts in times of crisis are understandable, destroying administrative capacity in public institutions is not acceptable as it has long-term implications. UNDP representatives should understand that by diverting resources and delaying empowerment processes, they risk harming the emerging local development cooperation actors in Romania.
Farming: the sole answer

As the most food-import dependent country in West Africa, Senegal faces several challenges as a consequence of the multiple global crises which affect the economy, finance, environment, energy and, of course, food. All of these challenges result in the decline of the quality of life of Senegal’s citizens – particularly amongst the more vulnerable sectors – because of their repercussions on the country’s scant production, diminished imports and the high price of basic products. The Government’s plans do not provide an adequate response to the country’s needs. Civil society proposes returning to traditional agriculture, duly encouraged and supported by the State.

In Senegal, the worldwide food crisis caused by an increase in demand – particularly in the case of cereals – within a context of low yields and higher production costs due to the increase of oil prices, has given rise to riots throughout the country. The high price of oil and the increasing demand for energy have conspired against subsistence agriculture, as regards cultivated areas, due to the production of sugar cane and maize for biofuel (diesel and ethanol). The situation has become even more serious due to the problems caused by climate change and the financial crisis. Assistance for development diminished and exports were restricted in some countries – such as India – which particularly affected the more helpless populations of underdeveloped countries such as Senegal.

Some of the consequences of the crisis – which in developed countries impact on purchasing power rather than on the availability of food – are in Senegal malnutrition and the mass exodus of the population towards urban centres. In addition, poverty and unemployment have a negative impact on the likelihood of fulfilling the MDGs.

The level of access to basic social services for the population has remained extremely low in the country, with over 53.9% of the population subsisting below the poverty threshold. The more disadvantaged sectors in rural areas and the suburbs of large cities, together with children, women and the elderly, are the most affected. The Government’s measures have not been effective since they have barely enabled access to healthy food in sufficient quantity to the population that is very close or below the poverty threshold. Measures taken should focus on the most disadvantaged, whose needs are greater, as in Senegal the State’s budget favours the rich, the salary earners and city dwellers, and includes, in particular, subventions for electricity, gas, water and fuel. There are families in the cities’ suburbs and in the country who barely have access to food.

Some of the factors that have influenced the most on the deterioration of the situation are:

- A rain-dependent agricultural sector which must confront soil degradation, low production, the absence of agricultural development policies and the establishment of unpopular programmes which lack coherence, such as Back to Agriculture or the Great Agricultural Offensive for Food and Abundance (GOANA, in French), the lack of access to supplies, agricultural materials and credit, and weak investment in the sector (for example, the failure to honour the Maputo commitment, according to which the State should devote 10% of the budget to agriculture).

- The country’s food dependence (Senegal is, per capita, the most food-import dependent country in West Africa). Local rice production barely covers between 20% and 30% of the country’s needs; wheat is 100% imported. The production of cereals covers less than 50% of the demand.

- The environmental crisis resulting from global warming has reduced fishing in Senegalese waters. Fishing is an important source of resources for the primary sector and one of the main sources of protein for the population. According to the National Agency for Statistics and Demography, shortages amongst some species have resulted in an increase of 13.8% in the price of fish and other fresh marine products.

- As regards energy, the country’s total dependence on oil imports and SENELEC’s production makes it still incapable of guaranteeing an effective and financially accessible electrical service for consumers. Thus, despite its potential for generating renewable energy – Senegal is a very sunny country – energy sometimes represents 50% of the total cost of production.

- Populations and enterprises face difficulties in obtaining access to electricity, the price of which has gone up several times. Consumers strongly criticize the billing system and there are continuous energy cuts which cause inconvenience to households and slow down craft and industrial production. All of this has led to a wave of uprisings led by imams, priests and later on consumer associations and workers’ unions.

- Due to the crisis which the African Refiners Association has been undergoing for some time, butane gas suffers chronic shortages on the market and is sold at prices which are inaccessible to consumers who, in addition, must queue for 24 or 48 hours at the points of sale.

Measures taken by the Government:

- The objective of the GOANA programme is to achieve food self-sufficiency through the production of 2 million tonnes of maize, 3 million tonnes of cassava, 500,000 tonnes of rice, 2 million tonnes of other cereals such as millet, sorghum and fonio millet. However, this solitary undertaking of the Government’s, which established no connections with leading figures of the various agricultural sectors, or did so to a very limited extent, delays in establishing factors of production (such as seeds, fertilizers and agricultural materials), the intervention of administrative staff and traders in land and supply issues, have not made it possible to achieve the objectives despite adequate amounts of rain.

- The organization of a campaign for the distribution of provisions and cattle feed, for a total of...
CFA 10 billion (USD 22 million) in rural populations affected by the crisis.

• The State’s removal of customs duties and import duties on some products such as subsidized rice and butane gas, although the expected results have been diminished by the drain of large quantities of these subsidized products sold in bordering countries by unscrupulous traders.

• The reduction of taxes on the salaries of workers for a total of CFA 6 billion (USD 13.2 million) and the subsidy of food products for a total of CFA 7 billion (USD 15.4 million).

Nonetheless, these measures are inadequate due to the fact that they are merely interim solutions, as well as being inequitable and ineffective, since they have not reached the more vulnerable sectors of the population. In their place, it is necessary to implement social investment in infrastructure in order to improve the population’s access to basic social services (food, water, energy, education, health and habitat) and reduce inequality between men and women and different ethnic groups.

The impact on health

Although primary health care, the care of pregnancy-related risks and health care for the elderly show some progress, the social and financial crisis has hit the health sector and generated, amongst other things, personnel strikes, hospital debt, the closure of some of the maternity services – particularly in Dakar – the lack of qualified personnel, closed health posts or posts run by non-medical staff. There have been new outbreaks of diarrhoeal diseases and malaria. The illegal distribution of medicine has emerged (10% of the drugs circulated in the country are falsified) due to the absence of legislation adapted to the current situation and the absence of dissuasive measures.

Sanitation is very deficient throughout the country. Frequent floods often lead to the displacement and rehousing of people in unsuitable locations (such as schools and other public buildings) which upsets social and cultural networks and further deteriorates the sanitation situation.

An alarming lack of water-purifying stations and the strain on the Cambereen station in Dakar is a cause of the contamination of all of the beaches and bays of the city, which are used to dump domestic and industrial sewage. In addition, the public garbage collection service is inadequate.

Gender and the crisis

Senegal continues to follow a very patriarchal model which has displayed scant progress regarding the relationship between men and women. However, in order to obtain the application of international instruments (signed and ratified charters, conventions or declarations of principles) the Government is obliged to collaborate with partners to whom it is connected by means of bilateral or multilateral agreements. Despite the fact that institutions such as the United Nations, the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States, the International Francophone Organization and civil society movements seek the materialization of all agreements, the gap between the spirit of the texts and national reality is wide.

Civil society proposals

In an attempt to find a way of acting directly on the endogenous factors of the current situation, we propose:

• Supporting inclusive management in conceiving, applying and following up economic and social development policies and programmes, in compliance with the commitments undertaken by each party.

• Fostering a return to the land, making family agriculture a pillar of growth, in contrast with agro-business, as indicated in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Document. With regard to food security and self-sufficiency, we request the establishment and application of medium to long term agricultural policy with wide participation of the actors involved and a consistent financing plan. The process for the drafting and approval of the Agro-Sylvio-Pastoral Act, whose application has been delayed, could be a source of inspiration.

• Carrying out a genuine land ownership reform with the purpose of re-establishing the rights of peasant farmers and local communities, granting them full and complete ownership of the land, which is their basic working tool. The imbalance between urban and rural settings regarding the right to property, which is stipulated by the Constitution, needs to be corrected.

• Modifying public and private consumption and investment models.

• Increasing the value of the contributions made by Senegalese who are part of the diaspora, by turning a large part of the money transfers from abroad into savings and investment.

• Guaranteeing equitable and effective geographic development in order to increase the size of the domestic market and make local populations sustainable.

• Carrying out a cultural revolution in order to truly change the mental outlook of peasant farmers and achieve the emergence of modern farming. This implies the eradication of illiteracy through the enrolment in schools of all school-age children (boys and girls) in rural areas, in order to provide them with the basic tools they need for the considered control of their environment.
Serbia is suffering from declining industrial output, dropping exports, imports, foreign and internal trade and a marked decline in the Belgrade Stock exchange. In addition, there is a high foreign trade deficit. The absence of foreign investment inflows and credit could cause serious problems in the balance of payments and an increase in the trade deficit, together with rising unemployment and falling earnings.

The declining economy
The planned GDP growth of 3.5% for the 2009 budget proved to be over-optimistic. The fall of GDP is evident, estimated at -4.8%. The industrial production in May 2009 went down by 18% compared to the 2008 average. The limiting factors of sustainable development are high unemployment and other social problems. According to data from the National Employment Agency, the number of unemployed by the end of June 2009 was 763,062 (25.85% – of which 52.94% were women) and 70% of employed people worked part-time.2 Estimates of the number of workers who lost jobs between December 2008 and March 2009 vary from 31,001 to 133,000,3 in many cases due to decreased production and cancelled orders. On the average, approximately 2,500 employees get dismissed every month. More than 2,000 small and medium-sized enterprises ceased to exist in 2008; the economic context does not favour setting up new businesses while bankruptcy threatens 60,000 firms. Internal debt, totalling more than USD 3 billion in February, puts economic activities and employment at risk.

The foreign debt is constantly increasing and topped USD 30.7 billion in June 2009 (64% of GDP),4 16% higher than in 2007. While last year’s foreign trade deficit was USD 9.5 billion, the value of the national currency, the dinar, dropped by 25% in the last quarter of 2008. The lack of foreign direct investments (FDI), and of money inflows from foreign banks, has limited the resources for defending it. An estimated foreign currency inflow of USD 5.9 billion is needed to maintain the dinar’s stability. However, given that the country gained only USD 3.3 billion from the large-scale privatizations carried out since 2003 (now completed) and that increased foreign investment is not to be expected, this amount of money will not be available.

In fact, the results of privatization have been disastrous. The bulk of the capital from selling state property went into consumption, not investment, and the export sector was not restructured. Most of the investment went to banking, trade and real estate. Pushing industrial production into the background and neglecting technological development have led to the economy’s extremely low competitiveness. There are no valid official figures for the total state revenues from the privatization process since 2000.5 The purchase by foreign investors of whole industrial branches (e.g., the dairy industry) has contributed to monopolies and rising prices. The sale of 51% of the Oil Industry of Serbia to the Russian company Gazprom for USD 528 million has also raised discontent among the public and experts as this was one of the country’s biggest sources of revenue. Before privatization, State companies contributed 44.5% of the GDP, in comparison to 17% in 2008. The number of workers shrank from 400,000 to 135,000 and is still decreasing. Even US Steel, who has bought the biggest Serbian forge Smederevo, has announced that it will dismiss workers.

The economic turmoil and unfavourable privatizations have led to increasing poverty. Within the first quarter of 2009, the number of those living below the poverty line increased by 60,000 people, and the trend has not declined.6 Those who are most at risk are the unemployed, children, people above 65 years of age, persons with disabilities, the Roma, refugees, women, rural elderly households and large families.

Government response
The Government initially hesitated in the face of the crisis, reacting slowly and failing to warn the people. In an evaluation of the impact of the crisis in December 2008, it suggested that some sectors would be hit hard – though it was hard to know which ones – while others would not be affected.7 However, it did develop a “Framework of Measures” related to the state (in the broadest sense), the economy (industrial and financial sectors) and the general population.8 In February 2009, the Government adopted a stimulus package aimed at increasing liquidity through approving loans to banks (so they could offer loans to businesses on favourable terms), and providing incentive funds for export-related activities to companies (which were then under an obligation not to reduce the number of employees). Favourable terms were set up for credit accounts of citizens to stimulate purchasing power and production. According to the Ministry of the Economy and Regional Development, up to 4 August, a total of USD 874 million had been given as loans for increasing liquidity9 and USD 25 million for consumer loans.10 Almost 1,000 requests for start-up loans for small and medium-sized enterprises were submitted. The Union of Employers demanded strict rules for ap-

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3 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Until August 2009, 90% of Serbian companies have submitted requests for these loans.
Announced new packages of saving measures in the evening that were revoked the following morning. At one point the Ministry of the Economy recommended that the Ministry of Justice urge courts to prolong proceedings related to labor disputes in which workers were claiming non-payment of salaries from newly privatized firms and other benefits from the privatization process. The Ministry claimed that paying salaries would jeopardize production in those firms, in complete disregard of the independence of the judiciary. This controversial recommendation was subsequently revoked.

The revised savings plan was adopted on 16 April, together with a revision of the 2009 State budget. The Government announced the setting up of a special budget fund that will be filled by taxing high salaries and reducing salaries in the public sector.

The Social Economic Council did not support the new savings plan because it includes the firing of workers and reducing salaries. The Council estimated that the measures would not stimulate the non-payment of taxes by big private companies, the State lost an additional USD 1.3 billion.

Who really needs to tighten their belt? By implementing the newly adopted Law on Confiscation of Property Gained by Crime, the state could collect USD 2.64 billion in one year, a sum equaling the one Serbia is asking for from the IMF. At the International Automobile Fair in Belgrade, all the most expensive models were sold on opening day for a total of more than USD 2.6 million.

The level of subsidies for a four-member family without an income in December 2008 was USD 134. The minimum cost of living for a four-member family was estimated at USD 1,100. One of the priorities of the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy will be opening food kitchens for the poor; there are now 58 kitchens for 21,000 beneficiaries, but many more are needed. In March, the Ministry of Trade and Finance opened the first “SOS Market” in Belgrade and announced the establishment of similar markets all over the country. These markets are supposed to sell food products at lower prices and are intended to improve the situation of vulnerable groups. SOS cards have recently begun to be issued.

Instead of protecting workers from their rights being violated, trade unions leaned to the other side. At the beginning of 2009, the Union of Independent Unions and the United Branch Union “Independence” agreed with the Union of Employers and the Government to postpone the implementation of the General Collective Bargaining Contract and to delay some of employers’ financial obligations towards workers, including paying worker benefits. This contributed to the overall practice of employers in the private sector to not pay wages and other benefits. As a result, every tenth worker in Serbia (180,000 in total) does not receive a salary. The labour inspectorate receives thousands of reports, but claims that it has no mechanisms to force employers to pay salaries.

At midst of August, 30,000 workers in 29 companies have been on strike over unpaid wages, health and pension insurance and violations of collective or privatization contracts. Strikes become more and more frequent, and the workers voices more and more resolute. For instance, workers from the Partizan factory in Kragujevac went on hunger strike until exhaustion to force the owner to pay unpaid salaries. And those from the First May factory in Lapovo sued down on the railroad tracks and blocked international railway transportation. Workers from the Zastava Electro in Rasina and from the Belgrade Department Stores have spent months protesting against bad privatization practices, including protests in front of governmental buildings in Belgrade. Workers of Rashka Textile Company in Novi Pazar, being in a hunger strike for a week, succeeded in catching the public’s attention and forcing the payment of salaries after one of them severed and ate his own finger.

17 In January 2009, the average pension was USD 303 a month and the average salary USD 440. The highest salaries were those of managers of public enterprises (USD 3,100).
19 The Board of the Supreme Court has decided that this recommendation violates the Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

Slovakia successfully reformed its economy to enter the EU. Growth is slowing down, however, and the car industry – the country’s industrial pride and joy – is already reducing production. To tackle the crisis the Government has taken various measures, many designed to boost employment and regulate the market. For their part, NGOs must immediately address their lack of preparedness for the crisis. Discrimination against Roma and women persists, as does the authoritarian way in which the Government tries to ignore its political opponents. Overseas development assistance (ODA) has been legally institutionalized and is growing; nevertheless it still remains below EU standards.

The “tyranny of the majority” continues

Despite accomplishments at the European level, the internal political scene remains highly strained. The ruling coalition – the two main parties in which are the Smer and the Slovak National Party (SNS) – continued its “tyranny of the majority” during 2008 and the beginning of 2009. Complete disregard for the political opposition was a daily occurrence (e.g., the representatives of Smer as well as the Government – including the Prime Minister – repeatedly emphasized that the opposition should not expect to discuss government proposals or have an opportunity to participate in any decision-making process).

The Government also found a new enemy: the media. The Prime Minister has called journalists idiots, prostitutes and silly hyenas and has criticized them as former agents of the National Security of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (who are also among his own supporters). The so-called “Hungarian card” was played in the campaign for the March 2009 presidential election, with the winner and current President and his main supporters (the Smer and the SNS) issuing a statement accusing their principal opponent of being supported by members of the Hungarian minority. This divided Slovak society and offended Hungarian nationals.
Populism and nationalist politics surfaced immediately after the ruling coalition took office in 2006.\textsuperscript{3} Early in 2008 the Prime Minister began to mythologize Slovakia’s history, coining the term “old Slovaks”\textsuperscript{4} while defending the historical figure of highwayman Juraj Jánošík, dubbing him “the first socialist”.\textsuperscript{5}

Another severe problem is corruption and clientelism. The ruling coalition repeatedly advocates its right to favour its own party members or other supporters. However, several ministers as well as senior civil servants had to step down or were withdrawn due to pressure from international institutions (e.g., the European Commission), the national media and the political opposition.\textsuperscript{6}

### Discrimination

The Geneva-based Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions gave a 2007 Housing Rights Violator Award to Slovakia (along with Burma and China), criticizing its persistent discrimination against its Roma population, who frequently are segregated and/or forcibly evicted from their homes. More than 120,000 Roma reside in slums, lacking access to basic services such as water and electricity. The Government has done little to improve this situation, and Roma living conditions are still far below the European average. An especially egregious case of abuse occurred in March 2009 when policemen forced six young Roma boys to undress and to kiss each other. The incident was videotaped and the officers and their direct superiors were fired. The director of Charter 77, Zuzana Sztamáry, protested, however, noting that sanctions must match the severity of the offence – which these clearly did not.

The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, during its 41\textsuperscript{st} session in New York in 2008, pointed to a number of concerns as described in the last country reports for Slovakia, and advised the Government to take measures to address these.

### Development assistance

The years 2004-07 were considered a transitional period, during which the Slovak Agency for International Development Co-operation (Slovak Aid) approved 229 projects for almost EUR 14 million (USD 18 million). The institutionalization of Slovak Aid was legally completed on 1 February 2008, when the Act on Official Development Assistance came into force.

In April 2008, the “National Programme for Official Development Assistance in 2008” was approved. Financial resources were primarily destined for Afghanistan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Serbia and Ukraine. There was also a lump sum for several other countries (Albania, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, Mongolia, Mozambique, Sudan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan). However, although official Slovak development assistance in 2008 was higher than in 2007, it is still below EU standards.\textsuperscript{7}

### References


**SLOVENIA**

**Challenges for an emerging civil society**

The effects of the global crisis are beginning to be felt in this export-oriented country. They translate into rising food and energy prices, unemployment and poverty, and require a systemic response. This creates an opportunity to focus on human rights and environmental concerns, as well as on civil society issues that have been gaining momentum nationally. Slovenians therefore need to demand more from their Government than a mere boosting of the market.

**Basic Capabilities Index (BCI)**

- **Children reaching 5th grade:** BCI = 99
- **Survival up to 5:** BCI = 99
- **Births attended by skilled health personnel:** BCI = 100

**Gender Equity Index (GEI)**

- **Education:** GEI = 65
- **Economic activity:** GEI = 71

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1. IEG of Argentina = 72.3
2. IEG of Algeria = 52.7
3. IEG of Bahrain = 46
4. IEG of Bangladesh = 52.7
5. IEG of Benin = 42.1
6. IEG of Bolivia = 66.1
7. IEG of Brasil = 68.2
8. IEG of Bulgaria = 73.4
9. IEG of Cambodia = 61.6
10. IEG of Canada = 74.5

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**Unemployment**

The trends in unemployment show the most detrimental and long-lasting effects of the crisis. Unemployment has risen in every region, primarily among people who were on short-term contracts. Data from February 2009 show very negative tendencies: 77,182 people were registered at the Employment Service, which is 4.4% more than in January 2008 and 15.2% more than in February 2008. It should be noted, however, that the actual number of unemployed people is substantially larger, since in the past few years tens of thousands have been erased from the statistics due to “breach of obligations” (usually failure to report or refusing work beneath their level of qualifications).  

Even more revealing are the figures for newly registered employment seekers. In the first two months of 2009 there were 21,052 new employment seekers – a rise of 83% compared to the same period in 2008. Almost half of them were workers whose short-term contracts had not been extended. There has also been a staggering rise in the number of permanently unemployed – by almost 150% compared to the same period in 2008 – as well as those losing jobs due to bankruptcy, whose number has more than doubled (219%). On average the individuals registered at the Employment Service have been jobless for almost 22 months.

**A feeble response**

Attempts to combat unemployment have been inadequate. The Government passed a law on partial subvention of full-time employment in January 2009. The total sum for subventions is EUR 200 million (USD 261 million), and employers may apply for EUR 60 to 120 (about USD 78 to 157) per worker per month, depending on whether they shorten their working hours to 36 or 32 hours a week. However, experts, employers and trade unions all consider this measure insufficient.

For example, the subventions are too low to help those companies facing serious liquidity problems or the inability to maintain previous levels of production due to cancelled orders. They are also limited to a maximum of six months, although estimates suggest that the need will last much longer than that. Moreover, no subsidies are provided either for the self-employed, who represent more than 10% of the working population, or for those who were already working part time such as people with disabilities. Another drawback is that the law does not set eligibility criteria based on business records, so companies not affected by the crisis may also be receiving subsidies.

Trade unions warn against possible abuses by employers, such as proposing annexes to working agreements that voluntarily lower their employees’ wages, which means that they are still eligible for subsidies but can also reduce payment to workers due to shorter working hours. Other abuses include shortening the work time but keeping the workload the same – workers are threatened and have to work unpaid overtime hours or with greater intensity and shorter breaks.

The Employment Service has published two additional public tenders that provide subsidies for full- and part-time employment in 2009 and 2010. Both are co-financed by the European Structural Funds. Extra points are awarded to applicants who wish to hire women or people with disabilities, and a higher amount can be claimed by those hiring persons who have been registered as unemployed for more than 24 months. An estimated 3,850 people should be employed full-time and another 400 part-time through these tenders. An additional amount has been made available for co-financing employers’ professional training programmes for employees in order to increase productivity and workers’ employability.

While the subsidies show the Government’s concern with preventing massive lay-offs, it is also evi-
dent that all these measures have a very narrow range, in terms of both funds and timeframe. They do not demonstrate long-term planning or address structural problems but are merely a counter measure to the current situation. Permanent employment is not a requirement in any of them. This is very much in accordance with employers’ demand for “greater flexibility” in the labour market – meaning more and more people employed on short-term contracts. This holds true also for applicants for state subsidies, who may lay-off their employees as soon as the subsidy runs out.

**Shifting headlines**

With the decline in the economy, there has been a substantial shift in media attention. While issues of migrant workers (especially in construction) and the exploitation they faced (no contracts, inappropriate working conditions, low wages, racism) were featured in the media towards the end of 2008, their situation and the problems they face now there is little demand for their services have been swept under the rug. Headlines instead draw attention to financial difficulties in Slovenia’s major companies.

Also, the media are used to make draconian measures more acceptable. For instance, they highlighted the announcement by the general director of the Chamber for Industry and Commerce that 30,000 to 50,000 people would lose their jobs in 2009: this does not help the workers but just legitimizes further lay-offs. The leading business journal, Finance, gave a similar estimate of 46,000 redundant workers. The numbers from the Employment Service are much lower, however: approximately 10,000 new employment seekers by the end of 2009.

**Poverty and social changes**

The Human Rights Ombudsman addresses poverty as a problem needing to be urgently addressed, since it is a multi-layered phenomenon that deeply affects human dignity. Although Slovenia declares in its Constitution that it is a “social state”, more and more Slovenians are facing poverty. According to official data, 11.5% of the population lives below the EUR 500 (about USD 653) poverty threshold. These statistics do not take into account the fact that the poor often experience human rights violations in the areas of social care, health, and education.

There is increasing poverty both among the elderly who live on small pensions and among the youth. In fact, more and more young people are being raised with minimal opportunities for development, few incentives, low self-esteem, difficulties integrating into society and few job opportunities. Moreover, it is getting more and more difficult for young adults to start their own families, as they are unable to enter the housing market. A whole sub-class of people who feel unhappy, cheated and useless and who resent society is being created. New systemic approaches are needed: financial aid is not enough; it is mandatory to reassert values such as solidarity and community.

**Human rights and global issues**

Lately, human rights have been gaining centre stage in the country. The new coalition Government, elected in 2008, has declared that respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of law, social protection and an open society are basic values. It also committed itself to change in light of the new challenges posed by global developments.

This is partly due to the impetus gained in 2008 by NGOs and related organizations (together with attention to issues such as climate change, the Millennium Development Goals, the relevance of civil society and respect of human rights, as well as accountability of governmental institutions) when Slovenia held the presidency of the EU. Raising more awareness about these issues, both among the public and civil servants, and the creation of links and forums where initiatives can be presented to the Government are needed to have a lasting effect.

**Discrimination, disrespect of Constitutional Court rulings, slow judicial procedures, children’s rights, social security and the pension and health systems are among the most common topics in complaints filed at the human rights bodies in Slovenia.** According to the Human Rights Ombudsman, the values that should guide society, especially in times of crisis, are human dignity, mutual respect, trust, honesty and willingness to help the vulnerable.

**An open question**

However, the question remains whether Slovene society, which in the past ignored human rights and environmental issues, will demand that their Government adopt a rights-based approach and effectively protect them or whether the pressing economic issues will take precedence. One example is the case of the so-called “erased” – non-ethnic Slovenes who were denied legal status after independence in 1991. The issue should have been settled, but successive governments have not respected the ruling of the Constitutional Court.

Right-wing political parties oppose this ruling in fear of having to bestow large amounts of compensation on the victims.

In terms of the environment, wind power stations in protected areas, gas terminals in the sea and another coal-based power station are all being planned. If the responses to the current and manifold crises focus on reviving the economy and consumerism, issues such as environmental policy will continue to give way to plans for keeping jobs and boosting the market.
SOMALIA

A defenceless country

Somalia is the only country in Africa, if not the world, where a central authority is unable to provide even basic public services, whether in the area of health, education, sanitation or security. For two decades the nation has been experiencing clan warfare led by Mogadishu-based warlords whose militias have been engaged in killing mainly innocent, unarmed civilians. In 2006 they were defeated by the Union of the Islamic Courts, made up of Islamists who had used a network of clan-based courts as a political platform. Further fighting, however, took place between the Islamists and other forces backed by Ethiopia before the latter pulled its troops out in January 2009 and the moderate Islamist Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed was installed as the new president. Despite the presence of a peacekeeping mission from the African Union, there continues to be ongoing conflict caused by power struggles between political and religious groups and resource-based clashes between clans.¹

The civil war ruined the country and affected its people economically, socially, culturally and politically. In the absence of an effective central government, many services are now being provided by the business sector at high cost. The global crisis is also affecting food security, energy, water and climate in Somalia, deepening insecurity and instability. As in the rest of the Horn of Africa, food shortages have been worsened by rising commodity prices, conflict and piracy (limiting the movement of people and goods) and impaired aid operations. Increased food prices have also been blamed on rising fuel costs, lower agricultural production and weather shocks.

Food crisis

Livestock has traditionally been the most important sector for income generation in Somalia, while agriculture has provided staple and cash crops including sorghum, maize, beans, sesame and diverse fruits such as bananas and watermelons. However, many farmers have lost productive assets, including livestock and irrigation equipment, to invading militias or have been expelled from their farms. In addition, agricultural production has been declining as a result of drought and low rainfall in most areas of the country.

At the same time, there have been rising maritime freight charges on imported goods due to the hostile actions of Somali pirates bent on hijacking ships. The prices of basic commodities, including food, went up by between 200% and 400% in many urban markets in the first six months of 2008.² The effects of decreased cereal production, coupled with general insecurity, have lowered the living standards of the majority of the population. Due to the humanitarian crisis, in 2008 more than 2.7 million Somalis (that is, over 40% of the population) became totally dependent on food aid and emergency services provided by international agencies. These agencies, however, are facing extreme difficulties in trying to get food into the country; the task has been hampered by the violence that internally displaced a million Somalis in just 18 months (from April 2007 to September 2008).

Up to 70% of rural people in the south are threatened by food shortages, and about 36% of children are underweight, with one in six suffering from acute malnutrition. The number of malnourished children nationally is currently estimated to be 200,000, of whom 60,000 are severely malnourished and could die if treatment is not made available. In 2008, UNICEF began supplying supplementary feeding to 44,000 children under five years old along the 30 km Mogadishu-Afgoye corridor and in central and southern Somalia.³

Spiralling inflation

As there is no central bank, all currency circulating in the market was either printed before the Government collapsed or is being produced by business people with links to local authorities or former warlords; thus, inflation has spun out of control. In 1991 the exchange rate for one US dollar was 2,000 shillings; in 2009 it is 35,000 shillings. Dishonest traders have pushed inflation to its highest level during 18 chaotic years by refusing to accept the various denominations of the Somali shilling and only taking US dollars. Demonstrators in Mogadishu denounced the traders and were quoted as saying: “We have our own currency, if that currency is rejected, it means that we have no way to live.” ⁴

Water crisis

Northern and central Somalia suffer from acute water shortages. Even important provincial capitals like Hargeisa, Dusamareb and Garowe face this situation. Southern Somalia is generally greener because the Shabelle and Juba Rivers flow down from the Ethiopian highlands. Nevertheless, this area also becomes semi-arid when droughts affect these sources. According to Sidow Ibrahim Addou from the USAID-funded Famine Early Warning Systems Network, water shortages in the Gedo region mean the disappearance of virtually all pastureland.⁵

In the north-eastern regions, where the majority of people depend on animal rearing and there are no rivers, environmental changes – especially La Niña, which lowers ocean surface temperatures causing lower rainfall – have led to tremendous losses of cattle. In 2007, for instance, citizens fled areas such as Hamure village, 280 km east of Bosasso, because of water scarcity. The wells there have dried up and no one maintains the boreholes, a situation made worse by the lack of a functioning central government and the weakness of regional authorities. As the land is becoming drier and rainfall has shrunk from its average of 250 mm per year, potential evaporation soars above 2,000 mm per year.

In Somalia, comprising the north-western territories, the water crisis is even worse. Entire

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¹ IBSI of Central African Republic = 45.8 IBSI of Chile = 61.9 IBSI of Cyprus = 65.1
⁴ Abdinur, M.H. “Somalis rally against rising food prices, inflation.” Agence France Presse (AFP), 6 May 2008.
villages are being abandoned as adverse climate change is reducing water sources instead of replenishing them.

Health crisis

The movement of populations from drought-affect ed areas to camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) is increasing the risk of epidemics such as cholera, diarrhoea and other water-borne diseases and of the spread of polio. Somalia’s lack of a basic functioning health infrastructure that could adequately respond to these emergencies worsens the plight of those affected, especially women, children and the elderly.

The infant mortality rate is estimated to be 156 per 1,000, an upsurge from earlier UN records of 132/1,000. The maternal mortality rate has also gone up to 1,600 per 100,000 live births, from earlier UNICEF records of 1,400/100,000. AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis and other diseases continue to take a heavy toll.

Refugees and displaced people

More than 60,000 Somalis crossed the border into Kenya in January 2009 alone, and the Dhahab camps in north-eastern Kenya are estimated to hold 230,000 refugees. Some 850,000 fled Mogadishu’s violence in 2007/2008 while 400,000 of those internally displaced, previously in Mogadishu’s IDP camps, fled to the outskirts of the city seeking safety. Another 50,000 persons were displaced as a result of the 2008 border dispute between Somaliland and Puntland; they remain in camps in Ethiopia, Somaliland and Puntland.

Unfortunately, the assistance provided by both international and local NGOs has been hindered by the seemingly endless insecurity, especially in the southern and central regions. Two World Food Programme Somalia staff members were deliberately targeted and murdered in January 2009, while 34 aid workers were killed in 2008; other aid workers have been kidnapped and remain in captivity. There continue to be roadblocks set up at strategic positions to hijack supplies, and piracy against vessels carrying humanitarian goods.

Fuel crisis

Somalia is a net fuel importer. Any fluctuation in oil prices therefore directly affects the country. Fuel nearly tripled in price during one two-week period in late 2007 and early 2008, from USD 0.40 per litre to USD 1.10. In some cases, the cost of transportation has quadrupled, leaving many people cut off. Other goods such as imported foodstuffs and medicines, as well as services such as education and health, have also been affected. In a country where electricity is mostly generated from diesel-fuelled generators, oil price increases have affected the generation companies. The additional cost has been transferred to the sectors that need electricity most, and the public bears the brunt of the crisis.

The lack of a centrally functioning government or bilateral relations with energy-producing countries has prevented the Somali people from buying oil more cheaply from countries in the Middle East, or purchasing electric energy from countries in the Horn of Africa such as Uganda and Ethiopia that have high potential for hydroelectric generation.

Environmental crisis

Deforestation is a major cause of lower rainfall and drought, which in turn lead to famine. Trees are cut, forests are cleared and branches and trunks are burnt for the production of charcoal, a large quantity of which is exported to countries in the Gulf States, with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates being the main buyers. It is estimated that boats carry abroad on average the equivalent in charcoal of 10,000 trees. This trade in Somalia’s ‘black gold’ causes an environmental disaster. As traders demand more and more charcoal, the loss of trees leads to scarcity of water, lower rainfalls and extremely high evaporation.

Unfortunately, droughts are often followed by devastating flooding of the rivers that flow from the Ethiopian highlands. This has become a recurrent cycle.

Recommendations

Civil society groups, from community-based organizations to national forums, are advocating for the causes of the disasters to be addressed. Government ministries and empowered bodies are badly needed to combat deforestation. Action against environmental abuse will limit its adverse effects on rainfall, the soil’s capacity to hold water, the local climate, habitats for animal species and bio-diversity in general.

References


Not tackling the basic issues

The shortcomings in the Spanish economy, adjustments to which were too long delayed, have been laid bare. Faced with spiralling unemployment and the collapse of credit, the Government stands as guarantor but fails to tackle basic issues such as job insecurity, access to housing and the extension of social rights. Similarly with international aid: while Spain consolidates its role as a sympathetic country, essential issues such as global warming and agricultural subsidies are not given the attention they deserve.

The crisis in Spain has its own distinct aspects, suggesting that “failures” of the international financial system or bad practices are not its only causes. Just as major US financial companies were collapsing, President José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero was in New York at the September 2008 UN General Assembly meeting, declaring his confidence in the robustness of the Spanish financial system. Nevertheless, the Government rushed to grant a Treasury guarantee of EUR 30 billion to cover its risks. This figure represents over EUR 650 per person, while the country spends EUR 30 per person on development aid. Weathering the storm takes precedence over seeking opportunities in the crisis.

Job destruction

Current figures for job losses are staggering. Between January 2008 and January 2009 unemployment rose by more than a million to over 3.5 million people – 14% of the economically active population and almost double the European average. According to data published by the Social Security office, more than 840,000 jobs disappeared in 2008 and the trend shows no signs of diminishing.

The Government has sought to mitigate the drop in purchasing power through tax reductions for workers and simplified procedures for creating new economic activities. It has also instigated reductions in default interest rates for non- or late payment in order to help save companies from financial asphyxiation. These measures are intended, at least, to enable workers to hold out for a while, in the hope that economic activity and confidence in the markets will recover. It is worth noting that the Government has so far resisted the usual opportunistic bids by employers to demand greater job insecurity through flexibilization and cheaper redundancies as a pre-requisite for creating more jobs.


1 Intermon Oxfam’s contribution to this report has been undertaken by its research team, led by Deborah Iriago, and is limited to the last two sections.

The collapse of credit

Despite the EU base interest rate (Euribor) having already fallen to a historic low, financial bodies seem unwilling to take on new risks and the availability of credit remains scarce. Clearly the EUR 30 billion approved by the Government and other public guarantees have so far failed to get the financial sector to provide credit and, with it, the money supply that is indispensable for reviving economic activity. Furthermore, in December 2008, according to data from the Bank of Spain, the family credits portfolio fell for the first time in eight years, in contrast to the growth shown by the portfolio of credits approved for general government. This apparent paradox is explained by financial entities’ predilection for public guarantees when selecting risks and by the enormous funding difficulties faced by local government bodies.

The Government has therefore prioritized acting as public guarantor in order to maintain confidence in the balance and stability of the financial system, on which so many citizens’ savings and deposits depend. But the issue demands much more. While financial bodies continue submitting quarterly results showing spectacular profits, the unstoppable devaluation of financial and mortgage assets has meant that the general public has so far not been able to enjoy the benefits of this stability. Social movements, as well as academic and political sectors, are beginning to voice the need for public financial bodies that would prioritize public service functions rather than profit margins.

Delay in adjustment

The alacrity with which the Government has responded to the needs of the banking and finance sector is in sharp contrast to the tardy and limited attention paid to problems of the real economy, which is now seeing an abrupt process of adjustment which had been long overdue when the crisis broke.

The three main problems, frequently cited in analyses during the previous growth cycle, were: the sheer magnitude of the “property bubble” and the relative importance of the construction industry to GDP and employment growth; excessive borrowing by individuals and businesses; and low rates of national competitiveness and savings. In the previous period, little was done to address needed adjustment processes, due perhaps to a reluctance to bear the social and political costs. The global financial crisis has brought together and accelerated these processes, severely affecting employment levels and the viability of businesses with high short-term credit needs.

In response, the Government has adopted a twin approach. It remains firm in resisting lobbying by conservative sectors and employers in favour of tax rebates for large revenues, lower company taxes and more flexible dismissal requirements, while at the same time approving social measures aimed primarily at the unemployed and low-income and high-risk groups. However, this dual reaction – aimed at avoiding any damage to the system of social guarantees (so that it can act as a shock absorber in the crisis) – does nothing to reverse the trends and enable the recovery of credit, employment or the price index.

It would appear that the Government is relying on being able to contain the pressures until confidence in international financial markets has recovered and a new growth cycle is underway. However, it is not just a question of knowing when recovery will occur or how large a shortfall can be tolerated in the public accounts used to fund the measures (these have already used up the surplus accumulated over
previous years, and the EU has issued its first warnings. It is also a case of dealing with basic problems that beset the Spanish economy, related mainly to job insecurity, access to housing and the extension of basic social rights to a large section of the population.

Spain abroad
The year 2009 is one of continued discussion of development cooperation, including questions on what form cooperation in the struggle against poverty should take. During 2007 and 2008 Spain was a supportive country not only in terms of management of the global crisis affecting developing countries in particular, but also more generally in its commitments to levels of Official Development Assistance (ODA).

**ODA:** Between 2004 and 2007 Spanish ODA increased by more than 20% (in current values). Despite keeping its international cooperation budget for 2009 at the same level as in 2008 (EUR 5 billion), Spain is still one of the most generous donor countries. In December 2007, the State Pact against Poverty was signed, under which all Spanish political parties undertook to comply with the international commitment to channel 0.7% of GDP into ODA from 2012.

**Humanitarian action:** 2008 saw the culmination of a series of processes that will help consolidate Spain as a global actor in humanitarian efforts. An Office for Humanitarian Action became operational within the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID), strengthening institutional management capacity in dealing with humanitarian crises, and enabling the country to ignore media pressure in deciding whether to become involved with specific humanitarian crises.

**Food crisis:** At the FAO summit in June 2008, Spain made a commitment to contribute EUR 500 million in response to this crisis. In January 2009 Spain and the UN jointly organized the High Level Meeting on Food Security for All (RANSA) in Madrid, designed to strengthen coordination among the various institutions involved in this area (FAO, World Food Programme, International Fund for Agricultural Development, World Bank, IMF) and advancing the Global Partnership for Agriculture and Food Safety (GPoAFS) initiative. At this meeting President Rodríguez Zapatero committed a further EUR 1 billion to this end, to be paid over five years. The EUR 1.5 billion total does not represent any additional resources but rather a commitment to assign part of the previous ODA budget. What is remarkable is that the negative impact of EU agricultural policies on world food security is not questioned as part of this initiative, putting its chances of success seriously at risk.

Within the framework of the G20 and in line with the foregoing, as part of the package of measures it has proposed in order to manage the financial crisis, Spain supports the idea that multilateral development banks increase their net flows towards low- and average-income countries in times of low growth.

**Solidarity is not enough**
Although all these initiatives demonstrate solidarity, they contrast with Spain’s position on aspects that are crucial to developing countries, such as trade, agriculture, international migration and climate change.

**Trade:** One of the greatest risks in the international response to the current financial crisis is that countries unilaterally adopt commercial protectionism as a way out. Unlike other EU countries, Spain has always sided with those less inclined to be flexible in their position and include development as a core element of trade negotiations. At the meeting of the G20 in late 2008, countries were called on to refrain from increasing applied tariffs for at least a year, while nothing was said about the use of state subsidies and rescue plans. This meant calling into question the only means of protection most developing countries can afford while allowing those that are out of their reach (and that, additionally, can be devastating for their agriculture).

**Agriculture:** Of equal concern is the inconsistency between the global initiatives supported by Spain and the one the Department of Rural Affairs aspires to lead, pushing for a European platform to block the necessary Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reforms. This initiative has been presented as one that should remain at the forefront during the Spanish presidency of the EU, ignoring the fact that the distorting impact of rich countries’ agricultural policies is one of the causes of the erosion of agriculture in poor countries and of the crisis in food prices.

**Immigration:** The international economic crisis has hit millions of migrants hard as they are immediately threatened by unemployment (particularly in the construction and hotel industries), reducing the remittances these workers send to their families. The Government’s reaction has been disappointing: one measure involves repatriation incentives, which has met with limited success because migrants who have overcome the many barriers to obtaining Spanish residency will not happily give up this right.

In addition, regular immigration quotas have been drastically cut and efforts intensified to detect, detain and deport illegal workers. The Government passed the new Law of Asylum and Refuge in December 2008. Following a European Directive approved along similar lines in July 2008, this “will reinforce the worrying advance of unsympathetic – even xenophobic – policies in Europe, which is more concerned about the interests of the States than about the right to asylum”, according to the Spanish Commission for Refugee Assistance.

**Climate change:** At the end of 2009 a global agreement on climate must be reached to succeed the current Kyoto Protocol. This requires consensus on the sharing of efforts to reduce emissions and the funding of adaptations in developing countries. Spain contributes to existing international funds, although – as with the rest of the international community – this falls far short of the estimated USD 50 billion a year that is needed. In addition, Spain is reluctant to make new financial commitments for mitigation and adaptation in developing countries. Within the framework of the EU, the financial crisis is used as an excuse to dilute the already limited funding programmes. No agreement has been reached on innovative mechanisms for raising the necessary funds, such as auctioning emissions rights, nor on commitments countries are willing to make in the context of a global agreement.

2 In Ecuador and Mexico, for example, the fall in 2008 is estimated to be around 20%.
3 The scheme offers returning migrants the possibility of advance payment of cumulative unemployment benefits in their own country of origin with support to any business initiatives they might undertake. In February 2009 only some 2,000 migrants (of a total of around 200,000 unemployed non-community foreigners) had signed up.

Poverty reduction is endangered

Although its financial system has not yet been severely affected by the global economic crisis, the decrease in exports, remittances and aid will imperil Tanzania’s progress in eradicating poverty. Basic services, such as the provision of clean water, sanitation and health, must be extended, as well as credit and instruction to farmers. For all this, it is essential that aid is not discontinued.

The Tanzanian economy depends mainly on agriculture, which accounts for about 42% of GDP. Average annual economic growth since 2000 has been 5.8%, up from 3% in the late 1990s. Although the country has undergone significant macroeconomic and structural reforms, including privatization of public companies, market liberalization and investments in key economic sectors such as mining, agriculture, tourism and telecom industries, it has a long way to go regarding poverty reduction. More than one third of the population still lives on less than USD 1 per day.

Economic growth has not yet adequately translated into increased per capita income. The budget allocation for development programmes, including social services such as health, education and infrastructure, is minimal compared to recurrent expenditures such as salaries of public officials and management of government offices. In addition, Tanzania is heavily dependent on aid, which contributed approximately 42% of the national budget in 2007.

**Impacts of the global crisis**

Although the world economic crisis has had an impact on Tanzania, financial institutions have not been affected so far. There are several reasons for this: the country has a low level of integration into international financial markets; foreign assets cover just 11% of total commercial bank assets; and banks are licensed, regulated and supervised under national laws — i.e., not operated as branches of parent banks abroad but as independent subsidiaries. In addition, the country had a limited amount of foreign borrowing and no securities from the international banks that were affected by the crisis. The interbank cash market continues to be liquid and stable, and lending to the private sector increased by 47% in 2008.

However, the Tanzanian economy faces a big challenge since the income from key exports has decreased due to declining demand and lower prices. For example, in January 2009, 138,011 bales of cotton (a quarter of the total output for the 2008/09 season) were piled up in ginneries due to lack of orders. In June 2008 it was expected that cotton farmers would earn TSH 300 (USD 0.23) per kg, but prices in the world market fell as low as TSH 200 (USD 0.16) per kg. Tourism and mining may also feel the impact. Tourism contributes 17.2% of GDP, second in importance only to agriculture. Tanzania received 719,031 tourists during the financial year 2006/07 and moneyaccrued was about USD 1 billion. Many tourists have already cancelled bookings, and it is estimated that earnings may decline to 20%. Mining may be affected due to the reduction in foreign direct investment (FDI).

**Food status**

Tanzania has about 45 million hectares adequate for agricultural production. Out of these, only 6.3 million (about 15%) have been cultivated. Irrigation only covered some 300,000 out of 2.3 million hectares by 2006. Approximately 75% of agricultural workers are in subsistence production characterized by small-scale cultivation, the use of hand tools, and reliance on traditional rain-fed cropping methods and animal husbandry. The other 25% work on large-scale farms that focus on export crop production. Production is low, especially among the smallholders. The quality of export crops has also remained

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5. Ibid.
low in relation to those produced by neighbouring countries. These factors have significantly limited rural growth. Cotton farmers in the Mwanza and Shinyanga regions faced a particularly difficult year, as the situation described above has substantially reduced their incomes and purchasing power.10

Poor agricultural production is partly a consequence of the limited use of agricultural inputs like fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides and improved seeds. Such inputs are expensive even where they are available, and extension services are often lacking. Regarding livestock, the cost of veterinary drugs and the non-availability of services are some of the main problems. Furthermore, there is drought, disease and limited access to markets; market prices for animals and access to market information are also cited among the problems hindering production.

The majority of Tanzanian smallholders are not qualified to get credit from financial institutions. According to the Agricultural Sample Census 2002/03, only 3% of the total number of agricultural households managed to access credits. The main credit providers were farming cooperatives (35%), family, friends and relatives (32%), traders/trade stores (9%), savings and credit co-operative societies (8%), religious organizations/NGOs/projects (8%), private individuals (4%) and commercial banks (2%). Only 1.6% received credit from formal sources.

Access to safe drinking water
Tanzania has an adequate supply of water to meet the needs of users; statistics from the Food and Agriculture Organization show that it had 2,466.9 and 2,291.9 cubic square meters per capita in 2006 and 2007 respectively. However, some parts of the country receive over 1,600 mm of rain annually and others around 600 mm, and there is inadequate water storage. Water services are unevenly distributed among districts and regions and among urban and rural population.11 Most rural people spend an average of 27 minutes fetching water, compared to 5.9 minutes spent by urban dwellers. The increasing cost of supplying safe domestic water makes it unaffordable to the poor. Lack of water has led to increased socio-economic pressures and even conflicts among users during prolonged dry periods.

In addition, Tanzania is lagging behind on technology to control flooding during the rainy season. The drainage pipes tend to burst due to the large volumes of water, resulting in the mixing of dirty and clean water. This, together with the lack of a systematic way of treating the direct water supply to the population, leads to diseases including cholera, bilharzias, malaria, scabies and trachoma in areas with poor sanitation facilities.

HIV/AIDS care and treatment
In 2006 it was estimated that only 10% of people living with HIV/AIDS were enrolled to get treatment. Out of this figure, 57% were between 15-49 years of age and 61% were adult females.12 Out of the total number of those enrolled, 60,341 were admitted for anti-retroviral therapy. This figure covers only one quarter of the people in need of treatment and care. Serious challenges include inadequacy of drugs and facilities for diagnosis, urban-based services – for example, Dar es Salaam has nearly 30% of the patients enrolled in ARVs –, and side effects from using ARVs.

Governmental responses
The Government has initiated preventive measures, including: setting up a warning system using selected indicators of financial sector performance on a daily basis to determine signs of weakness; an intensified oversight of the banking system and broadened collection of information on the performance of banks; and ensuring the adequate capacity of the Government and the Bank of Tanzania to intervene when necessary.

Tanzania will not be immune to the impacts of the world crisis, as its budget depends on nations that have been directly affected. More measures are required to reduce the impacts. In particular, donor countries should rise to the challenge and continue to support the least developed countries rather than discontinuing their aid.  

References


THAILAND

A short-sighted response (once more)

The Government has issued a prompt response to the crisis under the usual shape of stimulus packages. However, a more sustainable vision becomes mandatory: one that brings into the solution the environmental and food security concerns the country and the world are currently facing. If change is to happen, it will have to come from an invigorated social movement, backed by solid support from academics and entrepreneurs.

Initially, people in Thailand watched the subprime mortgage crisis unfold in the United States with little idea of what it meant, much less how it could affect them. Their first clue came in November 2008 when exports, which had enjoyed double-digit annual growth during the past decade, were suddenly down 20% compared to November 2007. Next, as employers moved quickly to minimize costs, workers took to the streets in protest of wage and benefits cuts. Then it was official: the crisis had arrived.

Thailand is no stranger to economic upheaval, having been ground zero for the Asian financial crisis 12 years ago, but the current recession is poised to cut far deeper into the country’s economic, social and political fabric. Unlike 1997, when Bangkok’s banking and currency mischief was contained mostly by the region, the current crisis has now swept away much of the world’s wealth. Thus Thailand’s export sector, the heart of its economy which continued to pump strongly during last decade’s crisis, is now in free fall, dropping at an annual rate of more than 30%.

Labour and unemployment
More than 250,000 workers lost their jobs between October 2008 and February 2009. Unemployment increased 140% from January 2008 to January 2009. The Federation of Thai Industries estimates that by the end of this year unemployment will reach 1.5-2 million people, 5%-8% of the registered workforce. However, actual unemployment will be far worse, as official estimates neglect the informal sector which accounts for 60% of all jobs. This includes workers whose employers sidestep the unemployment insurance system, and those who remain unemployed after exhausting their six months of unemployment benefits.

According to official numbers, during the previous crisis, unemployment peaked at just 5.6% in 1998. Labour advocacy groups such as the Arom Pong-pangan Foundation anticipate that unemployment will soon dwarf this figure, since the current crisis is expected to endure for a long time and because of the trends in the labor market during the past decade.

Today’s workers have less bargaining power because of changes in employment and termination procedures, according to Bundit Thanachaisrethavuth and Vassana Lamdee of Arom Pong-pangan Foundation. Instead of hiring workers directly, many employers outsource personnel management to “invisible” intermediaries in order to avoid any direct legal responsibility over employment practices. Moreover, the mass layoffs of the past, which could assure strong public support for stricter labour practices, no longer occur. Workers are let go in piecemeal fashion, sometimes without compensation, and immediately transported back to their rural hometowns to keep them from stirring up trouble.

While trying to address the crisis through their watchdog role, both media and civil society groups are also impacted by the crisis. Print media in particular is cutting back in the wake of shrinking advertisement revenues. NGOs are taking a double hit as overseas donors slash their budgets and their weakening currencies convert into fewer Thai baht.

Farming
During the 1990s crisis many unemployed workers found a temporary cushion in the farming sector; now, however, the rural rice bowls have less to offer. Although lower oil prices have cut farm input costs more than prices, the reduced demand for exports, especially for major commodities like rubber and cassava, have eliminated opportunities to absorb displaced workers. Worse still, as a result of the growing influx of cheap farm products from China following the implementation of the 2003 free trade agreement, Thai farmers have lost competitiveness. In addition, over the past decade, due to growing family debts and increasing labour migration from farms to factories, there are less small farmer owners of land. This shift in labour dynamics is also reducing farming skills and decreasing the number of urban labourers willing to return home to support the family farm.

The poorest among the poor
These trends place even greater pressure on the 23 million workers in the informal sector, the majority of whom are women. Whether service workers, factory contractual workers, food vendors, farmers, handycraft makers, scavengers, taxi drivers, they already feel the pinch from the shrinking consumers’ wallets
and the rising competition, as many laid-off workers attempt to join their ranks. As the economy worsens, women, in addition to lower incomes are expected to face greater burdens, said USA Lerdrisiratsun, programme director of the Women Foundation. In cases of divorces or separation, a rising trend in Thailand, the responsibility of child rearing continues to fall disproportionately on women. The National Statistic Office reports that 30% of children from single families are under the sole care of their mothers. With less money, it is feared that many women will cling on to abusive relationships in order to minimize the economic hardship on their families. The lack of Government support for child rearing combined with a weakening economy is also likely to drive more women into the sex industry and/or overseas jobs arranged through human trafficking rings.

Since they are one of the most vulnerable groups in society, children are the ultimate victims of any crisis, economic, social or political, asserted Chetta Munkong of the Children Foundation. School drop-out rates are on the rise as students join in their families’ efforts to meet economic needs. For those who are able to remain in school, children’s rights advocates also worry the crisis may have already impacted the quality of their education. Facing tougher economic constraints themselves, more and more teachers are spending less time in the classroom and more time seeking supplementary income.

The rapid economic expansion of the past decade, combined with increased constraints on their ability to sustain their livelihoods through natural resources, has thrown an increasing number of ethnic minorities into the informal workforce. Thus, for the first time, some of these communities will be directly suffering the impacts of a recession. Sea Gypsy communities, for example, have gradually been entering the hotel and tourism industries, but with tourism already off 20%, jobs are disappearing. With no formal education, and facing far greater competition from other unemployed workers should new jobs materialize, the impacts to these and other marginalized communities may last the longest.

**Governmental responses**

In January 2009, the Government issued a USD 4.5 billion economic package that included tax cuts, expanded free education, subsidies for transportation and utilities, and cash handouts for low-wage earners. Two similar packages have been anticipated before the year ends. Although Thai society welcomed this speedy response, the direction of this policy and the handling of its implementation have raised many concerns.

One of the most controversial measures was the one-time THB 2,500 (USD 57) cash handouts to government and private-sector employees earning less than THB 14,000 (USD 267) per month. Even those eligible for the fund criticized the policy as blatant populism as opposed to a meaningful stimulus. For example, the vast majority of workers in this category are in the informal sector, and are thus ineligible; this also raises the issue of gender discrimination, since the vast majority of women are working in the informal economy.

Social activists such as Bundit of Arom Pongpangan Foundation are also critical of the top-down structure and lack of transparency of the fund’s management that provides a fertile environment for corruption. For example, the THB 7 billion (almost USD 199 million) designated for retraining 240,000 workers will be available only to State agencies with limited accountability, not to the local administration organizations and community professional associations which work more directly with the unemployed.

To complement its stimulus plan, the Government is also working on a major overhaul of the regulatory structure for financial markets. However, contrary to many other countries that are establishing greater safeguards to protect consumers and their economies, Thailand is moving towards wholesale deregulation and liberalization to increase the role of the capital market in developing the economy. It is feared that this initiative, led by many of the same people involved in the 1997 financial crisis now looking exclusively for short term gains, will pave the way for a new crisis as soon as the country is again on its feet.

Civil society groups point out that the biggest flaw in the Government’s stimulus policy is the lack of a coherent strategy. There is no vision for how Thailand might utilize stimulus resources to help address some of the root causes of inequality and of the persistent social and economic hardship that the majority of the population suffer. Surichai Wankaoe, director of the Social Research Institute at Chulalongkorn University, points out that the package fails to provide a rudder for an economic policy that for too long has been at the whim of multinational demand, leaving the country vulnerable to global market volatility. In many respects, it resembles similar programmes launched during the 1930s: make-work projects and hand-out programmes that in the end do little more than offer temporary assistance and no contribution to the foundation of a stronger economy or society.

To build a more resilient economy the country must implement strategies that strengthen domestic consumption of domestic products. Advocates cite the success the tourism industry has enjoyed in recent years, marketing to domestic tourists to offset reductions in demand from foreign tourists. A much better starting point, however, would be to support food security and safety. With such a strong and still largely centralised farming sector, policies, incentives and regulations aimed at organic food production could have far-reaching effects on both the domestic economy and public health. World Trade Organization concerns aside, if regulations are placed on both the use of chemicals and banning products that contain them, Thailand would immediately gain a competitive advantage over imports. Many farmers are already using organic methods merely as a means to reduce the cost of inputs, with little access to any distribution network where their products could receive premium prices.

To further aid farmers in rural areas, the issue of land reform is also a key, added Prayong Dokkamyai, coordinator of the Northern Farmers’ Network. Pre-sently, 90% of Thailand’s land is owned by 10% of the population. At minimum, a highly progressive tax structure should be put in place for land ownership, as well as purchase assistance for first-time buyers, particularly in the agricultural sector. Such programmes could be tied to organic farming policies so they help encourage new land holders to shift toward these highly valued crops.

Another area where Thailand must look inward is energy. Nearly 90% of oil is imported, eating up 10% of the country’s GDP. This represents a lot of money and jobs that could be a part of an expanded alternative fuels programme, should steps be taken to support it. Similarly, incentives should be given for alternative homegrown energy generation/savings technologies to halt the country’s march toward purchasing nuclear power stations and erecting coal-fired power stations.

The Government should be working to stimulate cleaner, domestic energy supplies as part and parcel of a plan to address the challenges of climate change. Leading scientists and economists have shown how the catastrophe is rapidly approaching Thailand’s shores and that now is the time to do something to prepare for it. Government agencies need to gain expertise and technologies to better understand the changes the country will face, and the adaptation strategies required for both the economy and society to navigate a climate-resilient future.

The farming sector is critical to this preparedness. Drought is already a more frequent problem, and with major changes in rainfall patterns projected, farmers need to have alternatives for new crops, cropping patterns and farming techniques. Stimulating domestic research, testing and implementation of these new approaches should be a top priority to ensure a viable farming sector.

Efforts aimed at strengthening the economy must not be the sole focus of the country’s response to the current crisis. The evolving role of the welfare State is equally important. Following the success with the implementation of universal healthcare during the past decade, civil society groups feel that now is time to explore retirement benefits that would cover the majority of people, whether working in the formal employment sector or not.

**Opportunity**

If there is any silver lining in the current economic crisis, it is that it presents the opportunity to take a hard look at the factors that created it and the strategies to be deployed in order to avoid its recurrence. Tax breaks, worker training, and re-regulation of financial markets can provide valuable stimulus, but only if the target lies beyond a short-term recovery. Change will have to come from an invigorated social movement, supported by academics and entrepreneurs. Thailand is no stranger to such mobilizations, which generated its “People’s Constitution” – a landmark in democratic political reform, the first in the country drafted by an elected assembly – in 1997. The question however is whether such a movement can happen quickly enough to have any impact on the Government’s response to the current crisis.
Millennium Development Goals at risk

The financial crisis will hamper efforts to reduce poverty in Uganda. Foreign aid, remittances and revenues derived from exports are already shrinking. The Government must develop new strategies to help identify the root causes of poverty, exclusion and poor social conditions at home, while joining other countries at both regional and international levels in pushing for reform of the global financial architecture. Various efforts from civil society, if supported, might help to tackle the crisis.

Towards the end of 2008, leaders of the G-20 called on developed and developing countries, as well as international finance institutions, to take “urgent” actions to avert the negative impacts of the global economic crisis. A World Bank report to the G-20 finance ministers’ meeting in March 2009 warned of the long-term implications for developing countries, including reduced health and education services for the poor.1

In addition, official development assistance (ODA) to poor countries may decrease as the crisis deepens in donor countries.2 The United Nations Commission on Social Development warns that the current crisis will undermine social policy and threaten social stability, with food and climate crises pushing the most vulnerable to the margins of society.3

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has indicated that financial markets in sub-Saharan Africa are vulnerable due to the downturn in global growth and that Uganda is at risk due to borrowing for investment in the stock market.4 The Central Bank has warned that, with diminished earnings from exports and tourism, the country’s economic growth will now be in the range of 5% or 6% rather than the 8% previously projected.5

The Finance Minister has reported that while Uganda is not “directly exposed” to risk, the economic downturn could lead to a reduction of financial inflows from outside investments, tourism, remittances from abroad and aid flows from donor countries.6 He added that reduced remittances and donor support has already led to a revenue collection shortfall of US$ 108 billion (USD 51.4 million) from July 2008 to February 2009. Remittances peaked at USD 1,392 million in financial year 2007/08.7 Further, foreign trade has been unimpressive. While an increase in exports was registered between 2003 and 2007, imports widened the trade deficit in 2007 (see Chart 1). The World Bank notes that low-income countries in sub-Saharan Africa have come under pressure owing to the impact of lower commodity prices.8

Outlook for achieving the MDGs cloudy

According to the IMF World Economic Outlook report 2008, a decline in world growth of one percentage point would lead to a 0.5 percentage point drop in Africa’s gross domestic product (GDP). The report anticipated the possibly serious effects of the global financial crisis on Africa in terms of trade, foreign direct investment (FDI) and aid resources. It also noted that while the correlation between African GDP and world GDP between 1980 and 1999 had been 0.5, it was only 0.2 between 2000 and 2007. Meanwhile, the UNCTAD World Investment Report 2008 showed FDI inflows to Uganda for the years 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007 to be USD 295 million, USD 380 million, USD 400 million and USD 368 million.

These were significant contributions to the Ugandan economy. A decline in FDI may affect the country’s ability to achieve MDG targets, especially on poverty reduction. This will be especially critical for poor households, and those headed by older people, youth, persons with disabilities and displaced women and children, and may entrench intergenerational poverty. The Government is currently revising its Poverty Eradication Action Plan to integrate it into the National Development Plan.9

Uganda’s population in 2008 was 29.6 million, 49% of which was under 15 years old. The population distribution is 85.1% rural and 14.9% urban. The total fertility rate is 6.7 births per woman, and the population growth rate continues at 3.2%. It is notable that the percentage of people living below the poverty line was reduced from 38.8% to 31.1% between Uganda National Household Surveys (UNHS) 2002/03 and UNHS 2005/06, a reduction by 1.4 million persons in absolute terms.20 However, a significant number will still face hardships in coping with the effects of the global financial crisis. The share of agriculture in the total GDP has continued to decrease and stood at 21% in 2007. This means more strategies, including modernization, are needed to improve agricultural production and the incomes of the rural population in order to reduce poverty.

The net enrolment ratio in primary education was 84% in 2005/06; and literacy rates of 15-24 year olds increased from 80% to 84%. Although the provision of universal primary education and universal

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3 Gu, Z. and Wang, X. “UN Commission discusses steps to mitigate negative impact of global financial crisis on social development.” China View online. 6 February 2009. Available at: <news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-02/06/content_10770873.htm>.
7 IMF. Op. Cit.
Government measures to mitigate the impact of the crisis for fiscal year 2008/09 include: improving revenue collection to contribute around Land Acquisition Loan Facility of GDP; assisting landless and poor persons to acquire land through the Land Acquisition Loan Facility; increasing funds for agricultural mechanization and agricultural extension services to cover all districts; amending the Cooperative Societies Act of 1991 to improve the supervision and regulation of cooperative societies; supporting scientists to develop commercial technologies and prototypes; supporting small and medium enterprises; rolling out micro-finance to 600 out of 1,020 sub-counties; and ensuring effective regulation and supervision of banks.11

Donor support to Uganda, through both direct budget support and projects, is expected to make up 30% of the national budget 2008/09. The Government should ensure a reduction in spending on public administration and lower interest rates on bank loans. The performance of the private sector will demand sound and prudent credit management, and individuals who borrow for commercial purposes should also be strict on managing loan accounts. Also needed are innovative policies for industrialization and trade, requiring greater Government efforts to promote economic integration, especially those in line with the East African Community.

A variety of civil society organizations are engaged in diverse development issues including human development, peace, HIV and AIDS, anti-corruption monitoring, food security and climate change. Action Aid Uganda, for example, has provided assistance to displaced Congolese and to conflict-affected persons in northern Uganda, and DENAVA is empowering communities in budget resource allocation, anti-corruption monitoring and increasing awareness among returnees in northern Uganda. The AIDS Support Organisation (TASO) has continued to provide prevention and mitigation services for people across the country. The National Association of Professional Environmentalists (NAPE) and the Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment (ACODE), which focus on environmental security, successfully encouraged the Government to revisit a planned sale of part of the Mabira forest, one of the biggest natural reserves. Food Rights Alliance is advocating for increased food security. It is important that a favourable environment is generated in which the efforts from civil society – supported by adequate resources from the Government, development partners and communities – crystallize into a solid contribution for coping with the crisis.


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The unemployment crisis underscores the reality of a system that does not recognize or guarantee essential social or economic rights. Since December 2007, the number of unemployed has risen to 13.1 million – 5.6 million more than at the start of the recession. Movements for human rights, green jobs, fair trade, healthcare and housing are advancing proposals and stepping up demands for real and structural change. The U.S. cannot afford to squander this opportunity for real change.

1 A perfect storm refers to a critical or disastrous situation created by a powerful concurrence of factors. See: <www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/perfect+storm>.


3 Ibid.


6 H. Shierholz and K. Edwards. “Jobs report offers no sign of

7 Discouraged workers are those who, while willing and able to engage in a job, are not seeking work because they believe there are no suitable available jobs. See: <stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?id=645>.


WANTED: The right to food security

Americans have also been hit hard by the food crisis. Food banks, for example, have had great difficulty keeping up with demand as the public is donating less and there are less food stocks available.10 In the Midwest and the South the food crisis has been compounded by flooding and hurricanes, resulting in a decrease in crops to farmers’ markets and local food distribution.11

U.S. Department of Agriculture statistics indicate that at least 36 million people, including more than 4 million children, live in food insecure households.12 Foodlinks America reports that, “more low-income Americans received food benefits under the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) in January 2009 than at any other time in the history of the program. Over 32.2 million people relied on the program that month, erasing the month-old record of 31.8 million. The caseload increase was fueled by the 11 states that had participation increases in excess of 20% between January 2008 and January 2009: Utah, Florida, Nevada, Arizona, Wisconsin, Georgia, Vermont, Maryland, Texas, and Massachusetts.”13

In this food crisis, U.S. agribusinesses have profited from the chokehold that some large corporations have over both production and distribution even as smaller U.S. farmers struggle with rising input costs and lower returns.14

Rejoining the world – details matter

Internationally, the Obama Administration has quickly shown leadership since the presidential election. In early April 2009, the State Department announced it would seek a seat on the Human Rights Council, saying that “Human rights are an essential element of American global foreign policy.”15 The Administration also gave Cabinet-level status to the newly appointed US Ambassador to the United Nations.

President Obama engaged in the G-20 process, pledging new funds to address the economic downturn. However, the USD 100 billion in new funding for the IMF has been met with deep scepticism among civil society organizations who question whether the IMF is equipped to implement real economic stimulus packages rather than its traditional and harmful austerity programmes.

The Administration pledged to double U.S. assistance for long-term agricultural development assistance to more than USD 1 billion in 2009, and then expanded its offer to amount to USD 3.5 billion of aid for food security over three years. Although this money is much needed, how the money will be spent matters a great deal – and there are great differences of opinion. For example, the Congress and the Administration continue to promote technological solutions, including investments in biotechnology and Genetically Modified Organisms, while U.S. food activists are pushing for approaches that prioritize local food systems and climate friendly agricultural practices.

On climate, the Administration has engaged in the process leading up to the December talks for a new global climate treaty, but its positions are unclear. For example, it has yet to ratify the Kyoto Treaty and to define its global commitments to cap emissions at a time when urgent action is needed.

Bright spots and steps in the right direction

President Barack Obama’s administration has sought to respond to the crisis with additional funding and policy initiatives focused on stabilizing financial markets, domestic job creation (including green jobs), expanded benefits for the recently unemployed and initiatives directed at homeowners who have recently lost or are at risk of losing their homes.

Elected officials are under increasing pressure to respond to the public’s growing awareness that markets must also serve broader social, economic and environmental goals. Proposed policy responses such as mandatory interest rate reductions, restructuring the bankruptcy laws, and measures to curb excessive domestic and international financial speculation – among other proposals – are also moving through the legislative process.

The Administration has placed new restrictions designed to close the revolving door between business and government that has contributed so heavily to misdirected policies in key sectors such as housing, finance, trade, health and agriculture. It has indicated support for organic production, stronger competition measures to regulate corporate activity and stronger food safety oversight, and also made pledges for increased funding to support renewable energy and clean fuel standards. The 2008 Farm Bill included an additional USD 100 million to support local food systems, increase access to healthy food and support organic, beginning and minority farmers. While insufficient to meet demand, these are important and encouraging steps.

Looking ahead

Government intervention is a critical element in ensuring economic recovery and a new direction in domestic economic development. Ensuring citizen oversight and accountability remains the missing link. For example, initiatives like <www.recovery.gov> showcase the Administration’s unprecedented and innovative use of technology to keep the public informed. Information, however, is not a substitute for the kind of engagement and accountability which must be at the heart of real change and national recovery.

Domestic movements for human rights, green jobs, fair trade, healthcare and housing are advancing innovative proposals and stepping up demands for real and structural change. For example, the movement to hold the U.S. accountable to international human rights standards, through organizing and education on the interconnected nature of civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights is taking root.16 A 2008 World Public Opinion Poll showed that vast majorities of Americans favor most human rights and principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, including equality, women’s rights, racial justice, the rights to food, education and health care and believe strongly that their Government has responsibility to secure them.17 Translating changing attitudes into sustained public will and new policies remains a central challenge. Bold action and solutions are needed. The U.S. cannot afford to squander this opportunity.

13 Foodlinks America Newsletter, 10 April 2009. The ‘SNAP’ programme is the renamed U.S. Food Stamps programme that helps low-income families and people buy affordable, healthy food.
16 Although it is a signatory to the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination, the U.S. has not yet ratified the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).
Not such a participatory democracy

In the midst of sharp political polarization, discussion regarding the impact on the country of the international economic crisis has been postponed. A series of plans promoted by the Government attempt to ensure food security as well as universal access to health, housing and education. However, there have been complications involving the distribution of food, cutbacks in health plans and an insufficient response to the demand for housing. Results come closest to those hoped for in education.

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During his second presidential term, President Hugo Chávez won a referendum on the Constitution in February 2009 that will allow him to be re-elected indefinitely. These electoral proceedings gave rise to widespread controversy and reenergized the polarization that already existed in society.

The electoral climate4 postponed any discussion with regard to the possible consequences to the country of the worldwide economic crisis. Despite the fact that Venezuela is highly dependent on hydrocarbon exports, President Chávez is optimistic regarding the impact of the global recession: “Put the price of oil at zero and Venezuela will still not undergo a crisis”.5 The increase in the price of crude oil gave rise to considerable income and a monetary surplus, which resulted in a steady rise in imports and a high measure of public debt. The oil bonanza also made it possible to develop a variety of social programmes – known as “missions” – and to reduce the poverty indices.

According to the Budget Act for fiscal year 2009,6 oil revenue represents 46.5% of the country’s economic reserve of food in order to guarantee food security (estimates are based on a 30% vegetable oil production rate).7

The Ministry of Food was created in 2004 with the mandate to generate an operational and strategic framework of food security. The Ministry of Food acknowledged that Mercal imported 125 active and 47 inactive ones.5

Indefinitely. These electoral proceedings gave rise to widespread controversy and reenergized the polarization that already existed in society.

The food items listed in the basic food basket became available to food at State-regulated prices. PDVAL currently operates parallel to and in the same way as Merval, and its estimated distribution for 2009 was 755,000 metric tons.

At the same time, due to their improved purchasing power, Venezuelans increased their general levels of consumption by almost 20% in 2007. According to figures released by President Chávez, daily calorie consumption increased 23%, from 2,202 to 2,717 calories. Poverty indices have fallen due to the effects of the economic bonanza resulting from high oil and tax revenues. Data from the Comprehensive Social Indicators Service of Venezuela for the second half of 2007 indicated that income poverty affected 33% of the population, while extreme poverty had fallen to 9.6%.

The Human Development Index reached 0.8263, a figure higher than the previous decade’s index of 0.7793. Moreover, the Nutrition Institute established a Sub-nutrition Prevalence Index for 2006 of 6%, the projection of which would fulfill the Millennium Development Goal regarding the eradication of hunger by 2015. However, the increase in prices reduced the purchasing power of wages. By January 2009 the Workers’ Documentation and Analysis Centre estimated that the cost of the food basket was about USD 750,7 the equivalent of two minimum wages (USD 371.73).

Food security

The Ministry of Food was created in 2004 with the mandate to generate an operational and strategic reserve of food in order to guarantee food security for the population. It oversees the food mission – Mercados de Alimentos (Merval) [Food Markets] – a network established in 2003 that distributes subsidized products in working-class areas; the Strategic Food Programme Foundation; and the food centres set up in 2004. Originally 1,000 in number, these now consist of 5,963 active centres, 65 non-operational ones and 47 inactive ones.

Food has been among the items most sensitive to inflation. Statistics published by the Central Bank indicate that between March 2007 and March 2008 the price of food increased 42.6%, the highest rise in 11 years. There continues to be a steady increase in consumer prices. There are also other variables that hinder the State’s efforts to guarantee the right to food for the more vulnerable sectors of the population. Since 2006, the country has been affected by fluctuating food shortages, a situation that reached its peak between late 2007 and early 2008, when 13 of the food items listed in the basic food basket became difficult to obtain.

Despite its verbal promotion of food autonomy, the Government resorted to increased imports. The Ministry of Food acknowledged that Merval imported 70% of the items on offer. By 2008, it was estimated that 45.6% of the average 2,460 calories consumed daily in Venezuela came from food that had been purchased abroad. During that year, Merval benefited some 9.6 million people, and sold almost 1.3 million metric tons of food. In January 2008, the Food Producer and Distributor (PDVAL) was created, a subsidiary in the agricultural area of Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), the State-owned petroleum company. Rafael Ramirez, the Popular Power Minister for Energy and Oil, announced that the food network would be on a national scale and allow access to food at State-regulated prices. PDVAL currently operates parallel to and in the same way as Merval, and its estimated distribution for 2009 was 755,000 metric tons.


7 Servicio Integrado de Indicadores Sociales de Venezuela [Comprehensive Social Indicators Service of Venezuela].

8 Centro de Documentación y Análisis de los Trabajadores [Workers’ Documentation and Analysis Centre].
A comprehensive and systematic food security strategy, as suggested by General Comment N° 12 of the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, does not yet exist in Venezuela. Although low-cost food distribution has achieved significant levels of success, other aspects, such as increasing national agricultural production, are less developed.

The right to education
It is in the fulfilment of the right to education that Venezuela displays its most positive figures. For the Global Campaign for Education, the country shows some of the best indicators in Latin America and, according to the 2008 Report and Accounts, delivered by the President to the National Assembly on 9 January 2009, over 7.5 million Venezuelans were registered in the various levels of the school cycle. Furthermore, it was revealed that the level of illiteracy had decreased to 0.4% due to the implementation of the Robinson mission and that over 437,000 students had graduated from Robinson II, 81,000 of whom were indigenous inhabitants. In addition, 345,000 scholarships were awarded to persons of limited means, while 67,000 people were trained to enter the labour market. The Ministry of Education reported an increase of 2.8% in the availability of educational services in 2007, with the construction of 726 new training establishments. Repetition rates were 5.1% between first and sixth grades, while constancy levels of schooling are still improving: for every 100 students registered in first grade, 66 reach ninth grade, three more than in the previous period and 22 more than in the 1999–2000 period.

The right to health and housing
While progress has been made in fulfilling the right to education and food, other economic, social and cultural rights have stagnated or declined. With regard to health, normative progress made in the Constitution itself, as well as government promotion efforts, have not managed to overcome the sector’s structural problems.

In December 2003, the Executive Branch activated the Misión Barrio Adentro [Inside the Neighbourhood Mission] as a way to improve basic care in working-class areas. Significant progress was made in the short term, partly due to the participation of 14,345 coordinators and doctors as well as the construction of a variety of welfare modules all over the country. However, in 2008 there was a slowdown of this health policy, and closed modules and decreasing numbers of doctors and coordinators (to 8,500) were reported. The strategy has been developed in parallel with the national hospital network, and the main health centres continue to show serious shortcomings. This lack of coordination has become more critical due to the National Assembly’s nine-year delay in enacting a Constitutional Health Law.

With regard to the right to housing, the Government has not been able to achieve its objectives in this sector for 10 years. By 2008, according to official information published in the media, 23,223 new dwellings had been built. The Ministry of State for Housing had estimated the housing deficit in the country at 2.8 million dwellings – 1 million for new families, 800,000 “shacks” that needed to be replaced, and a further million in high risk zones such as on mountain slopes or in watercourse areas – and that 200,000 dwellings a year over 10 years are needed to be built in order to address the deficit. However, in 2007 the Government attained the highest figure yet, with 61,512 dwellings. In 2005, the Executive elevated the department in charge of housing construction policies to ministerial rank, a measure that has been hindered by the institutional weakness of the sector. No fewer than four different officials were appointed Minister in 2008 alone, a high turnover that has obstructed the continuity of policy. Instability in the institution has persisted in 2009, as the Ministry of Housing and Environment merged with the Ministry of Infrastructure in February to form a new body known as the Popular Power Ministry of Public Works and Housing.

The right to life and citizen security
In the field of labour rights, the decline in unemployment continued, reaching 7.2%. The informal economy declined for the fifth consecutive year – from 43.2% in September 2008 – as compared to the formal economy, calculated at 56.8% in the same month. However, the percentage of people who work without enjoying the various labour benefits established by law is still high. Furthermore, the collective recruitment process in the public sector remains paralyzed, which has reduced the capacity of the working class to face inflation. Increasing homicides owing to labour conflicts over the right to employment constitute a serious setback. Conflicts between the construction and oil unions for control of jobs led to 48 union leaders being murdered in 2007 and 21 in 2008.

In fact, violence has become one of the most serious problems in the country. According to figures released by the Department of Scientific and Criminal Investigation (CICPC), 10,606 firearm homicides took place in the country between January and September 2008. It is estimated that 130 murders occur in Caracas for every 100,000 inhabitants, one of the highest rates in the continent. During 2008, robbery increased 8%, homicide 11% and kidnapping an alarming 101%. Provea monitored 247 cases of violations of the right to life in 2008; the worst offenders, with the greatest number of complaints, are the CICPC (18.6%) and the police departments in the states of Lara (12.55%) and Anzoátegui (7.2%).

The high levels of violence affect different sectors and conflicts. According to the 2008 report by the Venezuelan Prison Observatory, the prison population totalled 23,457 people. During that year, 422 inmates died violently and 854 people were wounded by firearms or sharp objects. Also during 2008, seven peasant leaders were murdered during confrontations linked to land disputes. According to estimates circulated by Braulio Álvarez, congressman and coordinator of the Simón Bolívar Peasant Front, 214 peasants have been murdered since the passage of the Law on Land and Agricultural Development.

The criminalization of civil society
During the years of his mandate, President Chávez has promoted popular participation in the construction of so-called participatory democracy. However, its impact has been limited due to the tendency to exclude broad social sectors for political or ideological reasons. Complaints have been made about pressure on civil servants to participate in promotional events and the establishment of patronage networks in working-class areas that exclude those who do not support the President. In this respect, the increasing militarization of popular organizations is a matter for concern, as is their inclusion in tasks related to citizen security, which could give rise to potential human rights violations. Another worrying issue is the tendency to criminalize expressions of protest. During 2008, 1,763 demonstrations were monitored throughout the country; 83 of them were repressed, hindered or obstructed by State security forces. At least 89 demonstrators were subjected to criminal judicial proceedings arising from their participation in the protests. Moreover, three people were killed by police officers during the demonstrations.

There continues to be evidence of serious difficulty in obtaining access to public information, which, among other things, interferes with citizens’ right to carry out social monitoring activities. Finally, the work of human rights NGOs continues to be hindered and criminalized. Highly placed government spokespeople accuse such NGOs of wanting to destabilize the country and carry out a U.S. agenda. In this respect, the enactment of a Law of International Cooperation has been made a priority. Such a law would establish rules for a series of controls and filters for the work of civil society organizations.

9 The Robinson mission uses volunteers to teach reading, writing, and arithmetic to adults while Robinson II allows people to obtain an elementary school certificate and/or train for specific jobs.
13 Questions are raised with regard to the employment measurement changes adopted by the National Statistics Institute (INE), which now in effect include persons who have earned at least one wage during the period analysed, who belong to a cooperative or other form of social economy or who have received a subsidy from the National Executive. Some claim that such broad terms of inclusion legitimize various forms of labour flexibility.
Vietnam has translated socialist principles into action by achieving most of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) well ahead of time. However, it is not immune to the multiple global crises. There is an increasing gap between the rich and the poor, and rising sea levels due to climate change are already having negative impacts. Although civil society organizations still do not have much of a presence in the country, some groups have taken the lead to respond collectively to the issues.

As the global crisis began to be felt in 2008, Vietnam witnessed an inflation rate of 14.1% in February—an all time high in East Asia, almost twice that of Indonesia (7.4%) and more than twice that of China (6.5%). This led to a price hike of 24% for foodstuffs compared to the same period in 2007 and a 17% increase in electricity, water and gasoline compared to the previous year.1 Around the time of Tet, the Vietnamese new year, in 2008 the price of rice fluctuated between VND 5,000 and VND 7,000 (about USD 0.30 and 0.40, respectively) per kilogram. Since then, the price has increased to over VND 10,000 (USD 0.60). The Consumer Price Index hit a record high of 28.9% in December 2008, though it stabilized in the first four months of 2009 and is currently at 11.6%.

Economic growth during the first quarter of 2009 was fairly high at 3.4% but far lower than the targeted annual plan. The worst hit have been the major export-oriented sectors (agriculture, garments and textiles). This has added more pressure to the macroeconomy in general and to the most vulnerable wage-earning groups in particular. Diminishing demand is affecting industries and causing unemployment. Nguyen Phu Diep, head of the Labour Management Department in Hanoi’s Industrial Parks (IPs) and Export Processing Zones (EPZs), says that 19 enterprises there cut 4,300 jobs, which is approximately 20% of workers in these sectors. It is estimated that 10,000 workers in Thang Long IP will lose their jobs in 2009. Declining purchasing power leads families to cut essential expenses such as health and education; the current rate of out-of-pocket health expenditures is approximately 62.8%.

Causes and impacts of the crisis

Over the last decade, Vietnam has stood as an example of a development model that lifted millions of people out of poverty while trying to ensure that the benefits of its vibrant market economy were fairly and evenly distributed across society to maintain the Government’s socialist orientation. However, the aim of reducing poverty is still a challenge, as is the increasing gap between the rich and the poor. According to the World Bank, the consumption of the richest 20% of the population accounts for 43.3% of total expenditure in the country, while the remaining 80% spends modestly. The situation has created two disparate groups: a minority with “voice”, represented by emerging capitalists, and a voiceless majority made up of rural communities, wage labourers, small farmers and those being left out of the race.

Poverty and rural-urban dynamics

Since 2005 Vietnam has witnessed a blossoming of industrial zones and urbanized areas, with more than 190 industrial zones and clusters built on land recovered from over 100,000 households. This is leaving rural areas with limited livelihood resources. Approximately 90% of the poor depend on agricultural production—which is distributed in a relatively even fashion. Only 4% of rural households have no agricultural land of their own, which may be considered as an advantage for ensuring household food security.2

An estimated two-thirds of displaced households benefit from greater job opportunities and the chance to realize the cash value of their land holdings. Equal property (land) rights have become a very important issue as strong gender stereotypes still exist. Though there has been legislation to promote equal access to land for women, the implementation of these laws is very limited. As a result, women are the worst affected during transitions. Large numbers of people are trying to find an opportunity to earn a living in the cities. In Hanoi alone, the annual population growth is 3%. It is estimated that by 2010 there will be 120,000 to 130,000 people migrating to the capital city.

A 2008 report by ActionAid revealed that the urban poor and migrants, as net consumers, were the worst hit by price hikes. They have also been the first and worst affected by the impact of the recent economic crisis. The majority of migrants work on a short-term basis and are the most vulnerable group during the economic downturns affecting the employment sector. According to the Ministry of Labour, War Invalids and Social Affairs in January 2009, approximately 67,000 workers, mostly migrants, had lost their jobs. The number is predicted to rise to 150,000 by the end of 2009. Since the unemployed do not have insurance, this crisis is pushing rural migrants into extremely difficult situations.

Agriculture

Vietnam has become the world’s second largest rice exporter, largely by maintaining an annual agricultural sector growth rate of 4% for the last two decades. However, this was a major factor in helping the country to avoid being trapped in the economic crisis of 1997. Almost 70% of the labour force works in farming. The Central Committee of the Communist Party aims to industrialize and modernize the country by reducing the farming labour force to 30% by 2020. However, the current crisis is making it difficult to achieve these goals, despite the introduction of several modernization programmes in the sector. More than 75% of the labour force has not yet undergone any vocational training, and adult education still requires a lot of reinforcement.

Membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) has widened Vietnam’s opportunities for economic growth but also introduced a number of challenges in the agricultural sector. Due to the push towards commercialized production and the increasing drive of market forces and capital accu-

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mulation, poor farmers currently face a severe risk of impoverishment. At the same time, increased use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides has already caused serious damage to the local environment and undermined the indigenous knowledge of local economies. Farmers have become more vulnerable during the transition, particularly in the absence of a Law on Agriculture, due to lack of formal credit facilities and of insurance to protect them. On a more positive note, farmers have been introduced to more advanced practices and high-yield crop varieties that have contributed to increased production.

Climate change, food security and human development

Vietnam will be severely affected by climate change. As a large section of the population lives within the global low-elevation coastal zone, it is particularly vulnerable to rising sea levels. During a seminar on climate change organized by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development in January 2008, the Minister, Cao Duc Phat, acknowledged that 73% of the population, especially poor people, are already suffering from the negative impacts of climate change and environmental degradation. Statistics show that storms, landslides and floods in 2007 caused damage that exceeded 1% of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

A study conducted by ActionAid and experts from the Rural Development Centre of the Institute of Policy and Strategy for Agricultural and Rural Development shows some clear evidence of the impact on climate change and disasters in Ha Tinh Province, where food productivity has been reduced by up to 40% in some communes. Poor households are the most affected due to the fact that cropping patterns are not diversified. The study also revealed that the local community has been proactively developing its own mechanisms to adapt to climate change, such as modifying cropping patterns and animal husbandry practices. However, these locally initiated adaptation tools do not receive any support from the Government or donors.

Although human development indicators have shown spectacular progress during the last 15 years, climate change poses an imminent threat to achieving the MDGs, particularly in the Mekong Delta region. The United Nations Development Programme’s poverty report notes that natural disasters constitute a major cause of poverty and vulnerability in the country. The poverty alleviation strategy requires a reduction of the rural and agriculture sector’s vulnerability to these by mainstreaming disaster risk reduction strategies into the national plan.

Responses and policy commitments

Since the beginning of the global crisis, the Government has applied strong economic measures to combat inflation and maintain sustainable growth. The main focus has been on key issues such as strict financial policy implementation, a boost in production, export increases and reduction of excessive imports. As the economic crisis unfolds, the Government has made commitments to ensure the rights of vulnerable groups through appropriate mechanisms of social protection. It has also played a leading role in mobilizing to achieve the MDGs. However, as a signatory to most of the international human rights conventions, it must ensure stronger compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in order to protect the rights of the affected population through appropriate policies and programmes at the local level.

While the Government is energetically addressing the issues, adopting an economic stimulus plan of USD 1 billion (1.1% of GDP), the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the IMF have released analyses of projected economic growth rates for 2009. The ADB’s is the most cautious at 4.5%, which still leaves Vietnam in better shape than most Asian economies despite the global downturn, while the IMF and the World Bank project a growth of 4.75% and 5.5% respectively.

The role of civil society

Although the presence of civil society organizations (CSOs) in Vietnam is still tiny, some groups have taken the lead in collectively responding to the crisis. For example, in response to the South East Asian Call to Action, a report on the food crisis was prepared by CSOs and presented during the ASEAN People’s Forum in Bangkok in February 2009.

In addition, the Vietnam Academy for Social Science is currently collecting evidence and soliciting inputs on the social impacts of the financial crisis. The findings are to be presented to the National Assembly, whose members will discuss short-term and long-term strategies to cope with economic fluctuation and its social impacts. CSOs were given an opportunity to participate in this exercise through the incorporation of the WTO monitoring process.

Conclusion

Governments should use the opportunity presented by the current global economic crisis to address other crises – including food, climate change, jobs and poverty – and to develop long-term sustainable strategies for solving them. The global crisis should be seen as a chance to develop a green global economy that will respect and preserve common goods, prevent further global warming and ensure a sustainable, safe and clean environment for future generations. ❖

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## YEMEN

### Oil is not enough

With an economy dependent on oil exports and reserves, which are beginning to show signs of depletion, Yemen is betting on the international price of crude going up in order to finance its budget. The country is one of the most backward in terms of development, but official social policies are not based on serious economic studies and their application is increasingly chaotic. A corrupt minority makes use of the State’s resources and wealth, which do not reach the needier sectors of the population.

### Civil and political rights

During 2008, the country was severely criticized by international human rights organizations, particularly those concerned with freedom of opinion and expression. Partisan newspapers such as Atauri (The Revolutionary) and Al-Uahdai (The Unionist), or independent ones such as the daily Al Aidm (Days) published in Aden, are facing a series of charges, which activists see as a continuous and premeditated assault on these freedoms.

Transparency International reports have indicated a clear decline in the struggle against corruption, in spite of the country ratifying the United Nations convention on this issue1 in 2005 and setting up the Supreme National Authority for Combating Corruption in 2007. Civil society works in close cooperation with the official government organization in order to raise awareness about the dangers of corruption, the need for social control over use of the general budget and the strengthening of transparency and integrity.

Despite some significant progress in ensuring free elections, both in parliamentary elections in 1993, 1997 and 2001 and in direct municipal and presidential elections in 2006, conflict between the ruling party and the opposition has resulted in a two-year postponement of the elections that should have been held in April 2009.

### Economic and social situation

Yemen’s economy has been weak since the Republic was instituted in 1990. Since then, the country has undergone successive economic crises – from the Gulf War in 1991, which caused the return of migrants from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf area who had been the main source of foreign currency inflow, to the Saadah conflict2 in the north, which was still active in 2008.

The rial, the official currency, is undergoing a decrease in purchasing power due to the weakening of the economy. While in the early 1990s one U.S. dollar was worth about 20 rial, it is now worth 200 rial.

In 2007, the rise in the price of oil resulted in increased government income. However, the fall of international prices from mid-2008 has had a negative impact on the economy. This will be a severe blow since the country did not save while it was able to do so. The Government has announced a 50% reduction of expenditure in construction and infrastructure, which will have serious effects on services as well as on national and individual income in 2009.

The budget is dependent on oil extraction, and the possible depletion of the country’s reserves, whose yield is in continuous decline – from 420,000 barrels a day in 2005 to under 350,000 at present – puts it at risk. Yemen, therefore, can only hope for the international prices of crude oil to go up.

Crops of khat – a stimulating and energizing plant considered to be an economic plague since it squanders over 20 million labour hours a day – take up over half the cultivated land and use up vast quantities of subterranean water, as well as a quarter of the labour force. It is estimated that this costs USD 7 million a day.

These reasons, among others, explain why 42% of Yemenis live below the poverty line, according to 2006 food programme estimates. It is expected that this percentage will continue to increase as the price of food – especially wheat – rises in 2009. In 2007 average annual per capita income was USD 930. Economic growth decreased from 5.6% in 2005 to 3.6% in 2007, according to a government report. The World Bank estimates the unemployment rate among persons of working age to be over 35%; the Government speaks of 17%.

Yemen has one of the worst development indices in the world, ranking 157th of 175 countries in the 2007 Human Development Report, and 131st in the Transparency International report of the same year.3

### The effect of trade agreements

Yemen followed the prescriptions of the IMF and World Bank and completely liberalized its trade in

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2. This refers to an armed revolt led by Zaidi religious leader Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi, which began in 2004.

The great gender gap

The general participation of women, who constitute 25.7% of the labour force, continues to drop significantly. The education gap is considerable, at 65%, female illiteracy is among the highest in developing countries. The following table shows the gender gap in education, according to 2005 statistics.

With regard to health, statistics show that 366 out of every 100,000 women who are pregnant or give birth die from complications and the lack of health care. Some 55%, mainly in the rural areas, receive no care at all during pregnancy and labour.

Despite the growth of women’s political participation as voters (they represent over 42% of the electorate), their participation as candidates and winners of parliamentary and local elections is a mere 0.5%.

Although Yemen has ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the gender gap remains wide and several laws that discriminate against women remain in force. Many civil society organizations, public figures and other leaders make considerable efforts to raise awareness and promote real change, such as the adoption of the quota principle in elections and nominations.

The enjoyment of social rights

Education

The rate of access to basic education for children of school age is estimated to be barely 56.6%. This means that 2.9 million children of that age are left out of the educational system, of whom 1.9 million are girls. According to the third national Human Development Report, the internal efficiency of the educational system is very low. Repetition and dropout rates are on the increase, the compulsory school timetable quota is not fulfilled, and there is an acute shortage of teachers in rural schools. Teaching and practice are inadequate and are not complemented by modern educational methods that take into account the needs of the labour market. The Report concludes that current methods and styles of teaching do not stimulate development or critical thought.

Health

Yemen’s health services are unable to keep up with growing needs resulting from demographic growth after a decline in the use of family planning. Health facilities are poorly distributed, equipment is inadequate, and human resource management is inadequate with regard to the training and qualifications of workers. In addition, the health environment is fragile and sanitary awareness is diminishing. Although rural inhabitants make up 75% of the population, their health coverage does not exceed 30% and no more than 3.5–4% of the general state budget is devoted to rural health. A World Health Organization report shows that 60% of the population lives in regions exposed to malaria, and it is estimated that 3 million people a year contract the disease. According to a report drafted by a Parliamentary Committee on water and the environment, around 12 million people suffer illnesses related to water pollution.

Labour

The Constitution, as well as various labour and civil service laws, undertakes to fulfil international conventions with regard to every citizen’s right to work and to a decent standard of living by means of a fair wage. However, Government actions in the last few years show that these commitments are being ignored. The social security system covers governmental employees and 70,000 workers in the private sector, which means that over 4 million workers are left out. At present, there is no health insurance system. Of the many children who are outside the educational system, most help their parents in farming and herding activities, some resort to begging and still others are taken illegally to neighbouring countries in order to beg or engage in domestic work.

Civil society and human rights

There are some 6,000 registered civil society organizations. Over 75% are of a charitable nature and distribute aid to poor families as well as offering a variety of services. Organizations with an interest in human rights are few and lack specialization; the same organization may be active in the rights of women or children, or in civil, political and economic rights. They have, however, managed to organize a variety of training cycles, conferences and other activities.
ZAMBIA

A Government in denial

The global economic meltdown is already seriously affecting Zambia, which is highly dependent on the production and price of copper, its primary export. Although for the past 45 years politicians have promised to diversify into other products, almost nothing has been done. The Government’s reaction to the effects of the crisis has been both predictable and disappointing. The 2009 National Budget is in denial and Parliament is not paying attention.

Zambia was one of the early casualties of the world economic meltdown. Copper makes up 90% of national revenue, and by September 2008 its price on the London Metal Exchange had crashed. While during its peak period copper used to fetch as much as USD 9,000 to USD 10,000 per ton, it was now going for just under USD 4,000. However, besides Luan­shya residents and others in the Copperbelt who were directly affected when either the mines were closed or the workers were retrenched, most Zambians are still unaware of the situation. Information in the country, even though reluctantly and rather clumsily guaranteed in Article 20 of the Constitution, is a privilege: only professionals and those “happy few” in the Government have access to it. Local radio and television – especially radio, accessible to millions of poor, mostly illiterate Zambians – often do not broadcast the same news in English, which many people do not speak, as in local languages.

In the middle of the crisis

Zambia is in the throes of the global crisis on all fronts: energy, food, water, environment and, of course, the financial system itself. The fall of copper prices is aggravated by mine closures and, since Anglo-American investment pulled out from Konkola Deep in 2002, owners have been leaving the country because of the slump in demand caused by cuts in consumption in Asian and Western countries. With the credit crunch in the main copper markets, buyers have been driven away, thousands of mine workers have already been sacked, and more layoffs are due.

Unlike the United States and other countries that have responded to the economic meltdown by providing financing to failing banks and major industries to try to keep them afloat, Zambian President Rupiah Banda does not have any resources to give out.

Women for Change
Prof. Michelo Hannongo

Skyrocketing food prices

Food prices have exploded through the roof in Zambia. Though high food prices, like the economic crisis, have a global reach, unimaginative local economic and agricultural policies have exacerbated the problem. The farming sector, which in good years produces over 9,000 metric tons of maize, now produces less than 6,000 metric tons. During the electoral campaign last year, President Banda politicized the issue of failed agriculture and the consequent hunger suffered in the country. When he came face-to-face with poverty, he emotionally announced that he would reduce the price of mealy-meal (a staple food) as well as that of fertilizers. He got votes for this but never delivered on his promises. Rather, the Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection (JCTR) Basic Needs Basket for Lusaka shows huge rises in the cost of basic food items in January 2009: staples such as mealy-meal, beans, kapenta (fresh and dried small fish), vegetables, milk, cooking oil, etc. all skyrocketed.

In the same way, there were sharp rises in essential non-food items such as charcoal, soap, electricity, water and sanitation, and housing. The price of paraffin, the main energy source for poor households apart from wood fuel, has gone up way. High petrol and diesel fuel prices translate into high transport costs, already beyond the reach of the largely unemployed population. Zambians have not benefited from the recent fall in world fuel prices, and the price in the country remains above the lowest in the region. This was one of the main factors behind the bankruptcy of the privately owned Zambian Airways: foreign airlines fly into Lusaka or Livingstone with fuel from their home base or other countries in the region to avoid buying it locally.

Of course, this type of information is not featured on the Zambian Government’s Web site. Even information that is common knowledge—that copper prices have fallen and that Asian buyers have since shunned the product—is not mentioned. In the Vice President’s “Statement on the floods situation in Western Province in general,” food relief is mentioned only in the context of the floods that have hit Shangombo in the Western Province. Neither the food crisis nor the crisis in the copperbelt has come up in Parliament, and the people’s representatives have not been demanded answers from ministers.

Similarly, the 2008 Government Progress Report on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) claims successful economic policies and that the country is on course with almost all the goals. The report, which relies heavily on the Government’s Fifth National Development Plan (FNDP), praises the Government for its “excellent performance”. It does not, however, mention that several key players, including some Members of Parliament from opposition parties, have questioned the legitimacy of the Plan and its formulation through a wide consultative process, since only one or two short public sessions were held outside government ranks to scout for public inputs, and little from these filtered into the final document.

1 Rather than protect the “right to information”. Article 20 protects “freedom of expression”, including “the right to not be hindered in the enjoyment of… freedom to receive ideas and information without interference”. See: <www.thezambian.com/wikis.constitution/constitution/of-zambia-1996.aspx>.


3 See: <www.norad.no/items/988/38/9645826131>.


5 In January 2009, Zambian Airways announced suspension of operations mainly due to high fuel costs. The Government announced in February its intention to sue the airline to recover the money it owes to various firms.


The FNDP claims that Zambia is likely to achieve all but one of the MDGs by 2015. It concedes — without explaining why — that the exception is ensuring environmental sustainability. This admission has been endorsed by credible sources, among them the United Nations Development Programme. Experts have shown a close link between poverty and environmental degradation: the majority of poor people have no choice but to exploit natural resources such as wood for their energy needs. Poverty and rapid population increases, coupled with the inability of the Zambia Electricity Supply Corporation to connect more than 50% of the poor, leads to widespread use of wood fuel. Even though Zambia has the cheapest rates for electricity in the region, poor people have no access to it. In addition, Minister of Energy, Felix Mutati, has admitted there have been stiff tariff increases. In an interview for an audience of potential Chinese investors, Mutati said that these hindered investment.

The MDG Progress Report claims spectacular achievements also on the gender equality target. Reality, however, tells a different story. The Legal Resources Foundation News documents several cases in which women have been subjected to discrimination owing to oppressive laws and traditional attitudes and practices.10 Experts have no access to it. In addition, Minister of Energy, Felix Mutati, has admitted there have been stiff tariff increases. In an interview for an audience of potential Chinese investors, Mutati said that these hindered investment.

In other words, the Government has said that it is winning the war against poverty and social injustice. However, the facts on the ground point in a different direction: very few homes, if any, have been affected by the money received from Zambia’s admission to the HIPC completion point.11

The 2009 budget
The budget announced by current Finance Minister Situmbeko Musokotwane in 2009, apart from the admission that “as a result of weakening global demand, the global economy will, beyond doubt, negatively impact our economy and constrain our efforts to reduce poverty,” predicts for 2009 a “growth rate of 5%, lowering of inflation to 10% and limiting domestic borrowing to 1.8% of GDP”.12

There is no credible strategy to mitigate the effects of the global meltdown already affecting the population. The core of Musokotwane’s budget is premised on foreign investment, which has melted away with the world economic crisis. Though Zambia enacted the Citizens Economic Empowerment Act, which aims to empower local people with economic opportunities in 2006, the 2009 budget makes available to them an initial capital of just ZMK 10 billion (about USD 2 million), a paltry sum by any measure.

Diversification from copper
Cooperating Partners Group Chairperson and World Bank country manager Dr. Kapil Kapoor has observed that “diversification out of copper has been a much stated objective of Zambian leadership for several years”.13 But he notes that this “has not been achieved and over 70% of foreign exchange earnings still come from copper”, leaving the country vulnerable to price fluctuations. There has been no serious effort to reduce reliance on copper in spite of poor performance. Copper is a technology-intensive industry. Most of the processing plants depend on the availability of huge amounts of foreign exchange, so that the industry is not only the main producer of foreign exchange but also the main consumer. With credit drying up on the money markets and purchasers of copper products withdrawing from the markets,14 it is not difficult to see the dark clouds gathering over Zambia – some would say the storm has already broken. ■

References


12 Musokotwane, S. Budget Address by the Minister of Finance and National Planning, delivered to the National Assembly on Friday 30 January 2009.
MEASURING PROGRESS
FOOD SECURITY

A fragmented scenario

Complete table at: www.socialwatch.org/statistics2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Summary: CURRENT SITUATION (colour)</th>
<th>COUNTRIES</th>
<th>ESTIMATED LOW BIRTH WEIGHT (%)</th>
<th>UNDER-5 CHILD MALNUTRITION (underweight for age, %)</th>
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NOTE:
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SOURCE:
UNICEF (www.unicef.org/sowc09).

For more detailed information on the reference years of the data see complete tables at: www.socialwatch.org/statistics2009

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Estimated low birth weight (%): Percentage of newborns weighing less than 2,500 grams, with measurement taken within the first hours of life, before significant postnatal weight loss has occurred. Due to changes in the methodology of the sources the construction of data series presents comparability problems.

Under-5 child malnutrition (underweight for age, %): Percentage of children under five whose weight for age is less than minus two standard deviations from the median for the international reference population ages 0 to 59 months. The reference population adopted by the WHO in 1983 is based on children from the United States, who are assumed to be well nourished.
## Summary:

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### RECENT EVOLUTION

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### NOTE:

1. **Evolution:** Evolution of indicators obtained by re-escalating those values resulting from the relative rate of variation among the following ranks:
   - Minor than 5: significant progress;
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\[
(2009 \text{ value} - 2008 \text{ value})/2008 \text{ value} \times 100
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3. **Stagnant Evolution:** In those indicators showing stagnant evolution in all their values, said evolution responds to lack of updating, being reproduced those values registered in 2008. Data refer to years or periods other than those specified in the indicator definition.

### SOURCE:

UNICEF (www.unicef.org/sowc09).

For more detailed information on the reference years of the data see complete tables at: www.socialwatch.org/statistics2009

### DEFINITION OF INDICATORS:

- **Estimated low birth weight (%):** Percentage of newborns weighing less than 2,500 grams, with measurement taken within the first hours of life, before significant postnatal weight loss has occurred. Due to changes in the methodology of the sources the construction of data series presents comparability problems.

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## Summary

<table>
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<tr>
<th>COUNTRIES</th>
<th>CURRENT SITUATION (Basic Capabilities Index value, 0-100)</th>
<th>RECENT EVOLUTION</th>
<th>UNDER-5 CHILD MALNUTRITION (underweight for age, %)</th>
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A fragmented scenario

The concept of food security has to do with the level of people’s free access to safe and nutritionally adequate food in sufficient quantities to satisfy their daily energy needs and preferences as regards food choice, to be able to lead healthy, active lives.1 This is a complex concept and it involves at least three broad dimensions: the availability of food, people’s access to food, and its ultimate beneficial effects, in other words its impact on people’s state of health.

It is difficult to find indicators comparable across a large number of countries that are based on reliable sources and are periodically updated. These indicators should reflect the situation of the population that is the final beneficiary of the effort. The fact that food is available and that people have access to it does not necessarily establish clear parameters about its real distribution.

With this in mind, Social Watch has selected, from the range of information available, three indicators that really capture the last of the dimensions mentioned above. We understand that what really reflects food coverage is its final impact on the population’s state of health, and this data is crucial to be able to make international comparisons.

The real health situation in each country can be captured in a reasonably direct way by the proportion of people who are undernourished, the proportion of children aged 5 who have low weight for their age. These aspects are closely linked to the population’s difficulties as regards exercising their right of free access to adequate food.

Global evolution

In 2009 there was no registered variation in the “low birth weight” indicator (the percentage of newborn infants weighing less than 2,500 grams), so variation from 2008 to 2009 can only be gauged by examining the changes in the proportion of children under 5 who are underweight (malnutrition).

The data show that 15% of the children in the world suffer from malnutrition and one in ten was underweight at birth (Table 2). As regards malnutrition, the indicator for which there is new information, the values show that half as many children had nutrition problems in 2009 compared to 2008 (the average fall in this value was 64.7%). Improvement was generalized in this dimension, and only Azerbaijan and Romania (which went from 7% to 8% and from 3% to 4%, respectively) showed a worsening in their absolute values on this indicator (these countries are in Central Asia and Europe, respectively).

In the group of countries in the worse relative situation the average evolution was -13.9% (from 38.6% in 2008 to 33.9% in 2009). Naturally, in the countries in the better relative situation this indicator fell much more and in 2009 it was nearly four times lower (the decrease was from 15.1% in 2008 to 3.8% in 2009, which is a negative variation of 297.4% over the year).

However, in comparative terms, this generalised improvement involved a widening of the gap between the relative situations of different countries and regions. In fact, the accelerated fall in the figures for some countries and the slow improvement in others translates into relative regression in a large number of countries.

Access by regions

Like in other dimensions, the regions that have achieved the most pronounced reduction in malnutrition are North America (100% of countries are in the better relative situation) and Europe (68.4% are in the better relative situation and 31.6% above the average), and no countries in these regions are in the worse relative situation or below the average (Chart 1).

No countries in Central Asia are in the worse relative situation, 2 in 10 (22.2%) are below the average, and 7 in 10 (77.8%) are above the average (11.1%) or in the better relative group (66.7%).

East Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean and the Middle East and North Africa showed similar behaviour. In all three regions most of the countries (66.7%, 78.8% and 75%, respectively) are above the average (30%, 45.5% and 60%, respectively) or in a better relative situation (36.7%, 33.3% and 15%, respectively). But these regions also have countries that rank in the worse relative situation (10%, 6.1% and 5%, respectively) or below the average (23.3%, 15.2 and 20%, respectively).

Sub-Saharan Africa is not the region that ranks lowest in food security. However, although it does have some countries above the average (11.1%), most are below this level (51.1%) and nearly 4 in 10 are in the worse relative situation (37.8%).

Lastly we come to the most problematic region in terms of food insecurity, South Asia. Nearly 9 in 10 countries (87.5%) are in the worse relative situation and the remaining 1 in 10 are below the average (12.5%).


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TABLE 1. Current food security situation by evolution (number of countries)

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Worse relative situation</th>
<th>Below average</th>
<th>Above average</th>
<th>Better relative situation</th>
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<tr>
<td>Average</td>
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<td>10.4</td>
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TABLE 2. Food security: averages by indicator of countries in worse and better situations

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<th></th>
<th>Low birth weight (%)</th>
<th>Malnutrition in children under 5 Low weight (%)</th>
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<td>Worse relative situation</td>
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<td>Better relative situation</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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<td>10.4</td>
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<td>Number of countries</td>
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FOOD SECURITY
## Differences become more noticeable


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Summary: CURRENT SITUATION (colour)</th>
<th>COUNTRIES</th>
<th>LITERACY (15-24 years old, %)</th>
<th>PRIMARY SCHOOL ENROLMENT RATE (net, %)</th>
<th>CHILDREN REACHING 5TH GRADE (%)</th>
<th>SECONDARY SCHOOL ENROLMENT RATE (net, %)</th>
<th>TERTIARY EDUCATION ENROLMENT RATE (gross, %)</th>
<th>Value</th>
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For more detailed information on the reference years of the data see complete tables at: www.socialwatch.org
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**Source:** Literacy (15-24 years old, %), Primary school enrolment rate (net, %), Children reaching 5th grade (%), Secondary school enrolment rate (net, %), Tertiary education enrolment rate (gross, %). For more detailed information on the reference year of the data and complete tables, see www.socialwatch.org.
**Summary: CURRENT SITUATION (colour) RECENT EVOLUTION (arrow-icon)**

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**NOTE:**
1. **Evolution:** Evolution of indicators obtained by re-escalating those values resulting from the relative rate of variation amongst the following ranks:
   - Minor than -5: significant regression; Between -5 and -1: regression; Between -1 and 1: stagnant; Between 1 a 5: slight progress; Larger than 5: significant progress.

2. **Value reached by the index:** The value results from adding the values calculated for each dimension and dividing the result by the total number of dimensions presenting data.

3. **Stagnant Evolution:** In those indicators showing stagnant evolution in all their values, said evolution responds to lack of updating, being reproduced those values registered in 2008.

**DEFINITION OF INDICATORS:**
- **Literacy (15-24 years old, %):** Percentage of people aged 15-24 who can, with understanding, read and write a short, simple statement on their everyday life.
- **Primary school enrolment ratio (net, %):** Number of children enrolled in primary school who belong to the age group that officially corresponds to primary schooling, as percentage of the total population of the same age group. Last available data: 2003/2006.
- **Children reaching 5th grade of primary school (%):** Percentage of children entering first grade of primary school who eventually reach grade five.
- **Secondary school enrolment ratio (net, %):** Number of children enrolled in secondary school who belong to the agegroup that officially corresponds to secondary schooling, as percentage of the total population of the same age group.
- **Tertiary education enrolment ratio (gross):** Ratio of total enrolment, regardless of age, to the population of the age group that officially corresponds to the level of education shown. Tertiary education, whether or not to an advanced research qualification, normally requires, as a minimum condition of admission, successful completion of education at secondary level.

Methodological notes and guidelines at the end of the section.
EDUCATION

Differences become more noticeable

Improving the quality of education, covering different levels and reducing by 50% the number of illiterate adults are key objectives agreed by a large part of the countries in the world. Target dates have been set for 2014 or 2015, depending on the case, and require constant monitoring. For this reason, Social Watch monitors several basic indicators which, independently of their participation in other indices, have their own specific value and require independent attention.

Global evolution

Although the number of countries which have regressed (15.9%) is greater than in 2008 (5%), more than six in ten countries achieved slight (36.4% of the countries) or significant (27.2%) progress. In 2008 barely 15.8% of the countries had shown any significant progress (Table 1).

Polarization is, therefore, clearly present since average figures by indicator – with the exception of tertiary education (which has risen from 4% to 4.8%) – have fallen amongst the countries in the worst relative situation and risen amongst those in the best relative situation. On analyzing indicators which measure a greater educational level, it becomes clear that, from 2008 to 2009, both the condition and degree of the decline deteriorate amongst countries in the worst situation and improve amongst those in the best relative situation. The countries in the worst situation – which are becoming fewer – show a lower level of educational coverage and those in the best situation – more and more of them – display better levels of coverage. In addition, differences in indicators which measure the lower levels of instruction are emphasized amongst the first, and in indicators which measure the higher levels of instruction, amongst the second. Regarding the rest of the indicators, the number of countries ranked in the worst relative situation has diminished, although not as significantly as the increase of the number of countries in the best relative situation.

Access by Region

The regions in the best situation regarding the access of their populations to education are led by North America and Central Asia, with no countries below the average. Europe, with no countries in the worst relative situation, does however have three countries below the average (7.1%), 12 countries above the average (28.6%) and 27 in the best relative situation (64.3%).

Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Middle East and North Africa, display a similar distribution: most of their countries are ranked above average (67.5% and 80%, respectively) and the number of countries in the worst relative situation is marginal (2.5% and 5% respectively).

On the other hand, in East Asia and the Pacific, countries in an intermediate situation are in the majority, although the balance is positive: nearly four out of ten countries are in the worst relative situation (15.2%) or below average (24.2%), while six out of ten have ranked above average (36.4%) or in the best relative situation (24.2%).

In contrast, South Asia has no above average countries and seven out of ten countries are in the worst situation or below average (20% and 50% respectively). It is thus the most polarized of all the regions. However, the worst situated of the geographical areas is Sub-Saharan Africa, where nine out of ten countries are in the worst relative situation (59.6%) or below average (29.8%) and only one in ten has achieved an above average ranking (6.4%) or best possible situation (4.3%).

TABLE 1. Current situation according to evolution in education (number of countries)

| Worse relative situation | 7 | 1 | 22 |
| Below average | 3 | 1 | 31 |
| Above average | 10 | 2 | 42 |
| Better relative situation | 21 | 8 | 35 |
| Total | 41 | 12 | 130 |

TABLE 2. Averages by indicator of countries in better and worse relative educational situations

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Literacy (15-24 years, %)</th>
<th>Primary education enrolment rate (net, %)</th>
<th>Children who reach 5th grade (%)</th>
<th>Secondary education enrolment rate (net, %)</th>
<th>Tertiary education enrolment rate (gross, %)</th>
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The gap is widening faster

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<th>PERSONAL COMPUTERS (per 1,000 people)</th>
<th>TELEPHONE MAINLINES (per 1,000 people)</th>
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<th>R&amp;D EXPENDITURE (% of GDP)</th>
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References:
CURRENT SITUATION (latest available data):
- Better situation
- Above average
- Below average
- Worse situation

RECENT EVOLUTION (between most recent and previous available data):
- Significant progress
- Slight progress
- Stagnant
- Regression
- Major implosion

Complete table at: www.socialwatch.org/statistics2009
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Summary:</th>
<th>COUNTRIES</th>
<th>INTERNET USERS (per 1,000 people)</th>
<th>PERSONAL COMPUTERS (per 1,000 people)</th>
<th>TELEPHONE MAINLINES (per 1,000 people)</th>
<th>ICT EXPENDITURE (% of GDP)</th>
<th>R&amp;D EXPENDITURE (% of GDP)</th>
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### Summary:

**RECENT EVOLUTION**

The following ranks:

\[
\text{(2009 value – 2008 value) / 2008 value} \times 100
\]

This rate is obtained from the following operation:

- **Regression**: Between -1 and 1: stagnant; Between 1 and 5: minor; Between -5 and -1: significant regression; Between -5 and -1: major regression.

#### Current Situation (colour)

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**NOTE:**

1. **Evolution:** Evolution of indicators obtained by re-escalating those values resulting from the relative rate of variation among the following ranks:
   - Minor < -5: significant regression; Between -5 and -1: regression; Between -1 and 1: stagnant; Between 1 and 5: slight progress; Larger than 5: significant progress.
   - This rate is obtained from the following operation: (2009 value – 2008 value / 2008 value) * 100

2. **Value reached by the index:** The value results from adding the values calculated for each dimension and dividing the result by the total number of dimensions presenting data.

3. **Stagnant Evolution:** In those indicators showing stagnant evolution in all their values, said evolution responds to lack of updating, being reproduced those values registered in 2008.


For more detailed information on the reference years of the data see complete tables at www.socialhealth.org/statistics2009.

**DEFINITION OF INDICATORS:**

- **Internet users (per 1,000 people):** People with access to the internet, per 1,000 people.
- **Personal computers (per 1,000 people):** Personal computers are self-contained computers designed to be used by a single individual, per 1,000 people.
- **Telephone mainlines (per 1,000 people):** Telephone lines connecting a customer’s equipment to the public switched telephone network. Data are presented per 1,000 people for the entire country.

Information and communication technology expenditure (% of GDP): includes external spending on information technology (‘tangible’ spending on information communication technology products purchased by businesses, households, governments, and education institutions from vendors or organizations outside the purchasing entity), internal spending on information technology (‘intangible’ spending on internally customized software, capital depreciation, and the like), and spending on telecommunications and other office equipment. Expressed as percentage of gross domestic product (GDP).

Research and development expenditure (% of GDP): Expenditures for research and development are current and capital expenditures (both public and private) on creative work undertaken systematically to increase knowledge, including knowledge of humanity, culture, and society, and the use of knowledge for new applications. R&D covers basic research, applied research, and experimental development. Expressed as percentage of gross domestic product (GDP).

**Methodological notes and guidelines at the end of the section.**
L
ike in the other indexes, the trend in Information and Communication Technologies is towards increasing polarisation – that is to say, the gap between countries and regions in the better and worse relative situations is continuing to widen. An examination of the evolution of countries in terms of their relative situation (Table 1) shows those in the worse relative situation have plummeted and those in the better relative situation have risen appreciably.

The proportion of people in the world who have benefited from technological progress has varied substantially from one year to another. There has also been considerable variation in the proportion of resources different countries allocate to research and development in terms of finance and public policies (Table 2).

The biggest differences are in expenditure on Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) and on Research and Development (R&D). Among the countries in the worse relative situation this is expressed as a fall, and among those in the better relative situation this is expressed as a rise. In the countries in the worse relative situation average expenditure on ICTs decreased by around half from 2008 to 2009 (from an average of 5% of GDP to 3.9%) and spending on R&D simply stopped (from 0.3% of GDP in 2008 to 0% in 2009). On the other hand, in the countries in the better relative situation average expenditure on ICTs increased by 24.3% (from an average of 7% of GDP to an average of 8.7%) and spending on R&D nearly quadrupled (with a net increase of 27.9%, it went from 1.9% of GDP in 2008 to 7.2% in 2009).

In the countries in the worse relative situation, this evolution in expenditure was accompanied by a process of elitization in access to the various modern communication technologies. The number of people with a telephone line (per 1000 inhabitants) fell by 157.8%, that is to say it decreased by nearly two thirds (from 37 users per 1000 inhabitants in 2008 to 20.6 in 2009). And now there are a third fewer Internet users than in 2008 (28.7% fewer, with a reduction from 514 per 1000 inhabitants to 668.8).

At the other end of the spectrum, in the countries in the better relative situation, the effects of the above-mentioned favourable evolution of expenditure are evident. In these countries today there are 8.9% more people with telephone lines than in 2008 (a rise from 517 per 1000 inhabitants to 562.9), and there has been a 21.1% increase in the number of people with a personal computer (from 535 per 1000 inhabitants in 2008 to 678.4 in 2009). In addition, there has been a relative increase\(^1\) of 23.1% over 2008 in the number of Internet users (from 514 per 1000 people to 668.8).

There is a stark contrast between countries at the bottom of the scale, where only 3% to 5% of the population have access to information communication tools, and the countries at the top, where between 56% and 68% have access. If the generalised use of new technologies, particularly those that permit horizontal, symmetrical communication with the rest of the world, are factors that promote and underpin the rights of “information citizens”, these vast differences reflect the increasing polarisation, and therefore for some populations increasing exclusion, in the modern world.

### Access by regions

The regions that are best positioned in this dimension are North America, where there are no countries below the average, and Europe, where no countries have remained in a worse relative situation although 6 are below the average (and 21 above average and 19 in a better relative situation).

The distribution in Latin America and the Caribbean is similar to that in the Middle East and North Africa region. Most of these countries are in the intermediate situation (71.8% and 84.2%, respectively) and the proportion of countries in the worse situation is relatively small (12.8% and 15.8%, respectively).

East Asia and the Pacific, on the other hand, is the most heterogeneous region, but the balance is clearly negative: 35.3% of the countries are in a worse relative situation, 23.3% are below average, 26.5% are above average and only 14.7% are in a better relative situation.

This contrasts with South Asia, where no countries are above the average or in a better relative situation and 85.7% are in a worse situation.

But the geographical region in the worse situation is sub-Saharan Africa, where not only there are no countries in a better relative situation but nearly nine tenths of the countries (87.5%) are in the worse relative situation. Moreover, 8.3% are below the average and only 4.2% are above average.

---

\(^1\) In this case the word “increase” refers to the rate of relative variation between the values considered.

---

**TABLE 1. Current situation by ICT evolution (number of countries)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situation</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Worse relative</th>
<th>Below average</th>
<th>Above average</th>
<th>Better relative</th>
<th>Total</th>
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</thead>
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<td>Worser relative situation</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>55</td>
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<tr>
<td>Below average</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>44</td>
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<tr>
<td>Above average</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better relative situation</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>196</td>
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</table>

**TABLE 2. Averages by indicator for countries in worse and better ICT situation**

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<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Worse relative</th>
<th>Better relative</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
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<td>Internet users</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>668.8</td>
<td>258.8</td>
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<td>Personal computers</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>678.4</td>
<td>167.9</td>
</tr>
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<td>Telephone lines</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>562.9</td>
<td>217.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditure on ICTs</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
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<td>Expenditure on R &amp; D</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

![Chart](chart.png)

**CHART 1: Current ICT situation by regions (number of countries)**

1 In this case the word “increase” refers to the rate of relative variation between the values considered.
**DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE**

Commitments undertaken are further and further away from being fulfilled

### TRENDS IN OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE (% of GNI) *

<table>
<thead>
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<tbody>
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<td>Australia</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.25</td>
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**NOTES:**

A: Net disbursements at current prices and exchange rates.

B: Including debt forgiveness of non-ODA claims in 1990, except for total DAC.

**SOURCE:** OECD, Website Database (www.oecd.org); August 2009.

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S
ince the 1970s developed countries have under-
taken to devote a fixed amount to Official De-
velopment Assistance (ODA), a commitment which
was ratified with the final declaration of the World
Summit for Social Development, held in Copenhagen
in 1995. Official Development Assistance was set as a
percentage (0.7%) of Gross National Product (GNP)
of the donor countries of the OECD’s DAC. In addition,
etched in the framework of the Millennium Development
Goals it was proposed to foster a world association
for development, upholding the commitment of the
more developed countries to provide financial as-
sistance, as well as the responsibility of the receiving
countries to allocate this assistance to social develop-
ment, and particularly to the reduction of poverty.

In 2008 international aid amounted to 0.28% of
the gross national product of donor countries, con-
firming the decreasing tendency of the last few years
and thus moving even further away from meeting the
commitments undertaken. Denmark, Norway, Sweden,
the Netherlands and Luxembourg are the only
countries which have met the United Nations’
target, and exceeded the goal of 0.7% of gross na-
tional product.

**Some specific cases**

Whereas Sweden (albeit greatly removed from the
country following it), Denmark, Luxembourg and
Ireland increased their commitment (incremental
rates of 5.1%, 1.2%, 1.1% and 5.2% respectively),
the Netherlands and Norway reduced their
assistance in 2008 (incremental rates of -1.3%
and -8%, respectively). The countries which most
increased their net assistance included the United
Kingdom, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, Finland and
Switzerland.

At all events, the countries with the highest rela-
tive rate of increase were the Republic of Korea
and Greece, which increased their rate from 0.07% to
0.09% and from 0.16% to 0.2%, thus achieving in-
cremental rates of 22.2% and 20%, respectively.

On the other hand, Poland, Austria and Hungary
were the countries which most reduced their assist-
ance; from 0.1% to 0.8%, from 0.5% to 0.42%, and
from 0.08% to 0.07% respectively; that is, incremen-
tal rates of -25%, -19% and -14.3% respectively.

Some countries such as Norway and Austria should
be carefully watched, since within the fluctuating
framework of their very significant yearly contribu-
tions, they are nonetheless tending towards a very
noteworthy reduction of assistance.
## WATER AND SANITATION

### The fastest breach

Complete table at: www.socialwatch.org/statistics2009

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Summary: CURRENT SITUATION (colour)</th>
<th>COUNTRIES (Basic Capabilities Index value, 0-100)</th>
<th>POPULATION WITH ACCESS TO SANITATION (%)</th>
<th>POPULATION WITH ACCESS TO IMPROVED WATER SOURCES (%)</th>
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Summary: 3. Stagnant Evolution: In those indicators showing stagnant evolution in all their values, said evolution responds to lack of updating, being reproduced those values registered in 2006.


**DEFINITION OF INDICATORS:**

Population with access to sanitation (%): Percentage of the population with at least adequate excreta disposal facilities (private or shared, but not public) that can effectively prevent human, animal, and insect contact with excreta. Improved facilities range from simple but protected pit latrines to flush toilets with a sewerage connection. To be effective, facilities must be correctly constructed and properly maintained.

Population with access to improved water sources (%): Percentage of the population who use any of the following types of water supply for drinking: piped water, public tap, borehole or pump, protected well, protected spring or rainwater. Improved water sources do not include vendor provided waters, bottled water, tanker trucks or unprotected wells and springs.

**NOTE:** 1. Evolution: Evolution of indicators obtained by re-escalating those values resulting from the relative rate of variation among the following ranks: Minor than 5%: significant regression; Between -5% and -1%: regression; Between 1% and 5%: slight progress; Larger than 5%: significant progress.

2. Value reached by the Index: The value results from adding the values calculated for each dimension and dividing the result by the total number of dimensions present.

This rate is obtained from the following operation: (2009 value – 2008 value)/2008 value) * 100

For more detailed information on the reference years of the data see complete tables at: www.socialwatch.org/statistics2009
WATER AND SANITATION

The fastest breach

A ccording to WHO, in 2000 1.1 billion people (17% of the world’s population) lacked access to an improved water supply. Nearly two-thirds of these people live in Asia. In Sub-Saharan Africa, at present four out of ten persons lack access to an improved water supply. In 2002, there were 2.6 billion people who lacked improved sanitation services. Nearly 1.5 billion of them lived in China and India. In Sub-Saharan Africa, only 36% had access to these services. These deficiencies are closely linked to diseases such as diarrhea, malaria, ascariasis, trichuriasis, ancylostomiasis1 and hepatitis A.

In addition, they are related to the existence of water sources which are contaminated with arsenic and fluoride. All of which implies the need to redouble focused efforts to detect alternative sources of water and/or to implement procedures and technology capable of extracting them and guaranteeing healthy levels for human consumption.2

In short, these are essential aspects if sustainable development is to be guaranteed, since they involve basic conditions of existence and health. This is not only because the preservation of life is involved, in itself a sufficient end which cannot be delayed, but also because it involves the degree to which individual capabilities and the conditions for existence are affected. Together with malnutrition, water contamination leads to the alteration and reduction of the physical and cognitive capacity of large sectors of the population.

In general terms, deficiencies in water and sanitation no longer affect every region in the world. There are no countries either in Europe or in North America situated beneath the world average. In fact, the vast majority are situated in the best relative position, whereas in Sub-Saharan Africa and in South Asia nine out of ten countries are ranked below the world average.

Countries in East Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle East and North Africa, and Central Asia show similar results. In the first place they mostly tend to be above the world average (63.9%, 81.6%, 83.3% and 88.9%, respectively). In addition, some of the countries in these regions have managed to achieve places in the best relative position: 36.8% in Latin America and the Caribbean, 27.8% in the Middle East and North Africa, 22.2% in East Asia and the Pacific, and 21.7% in Central Asia.

1 Nearly 2 million people die every year due to diarrhoeal diseases – including cholera – 1.3 million die from malaria (in both cases 90% are children below the age of five) and 133 million suffer from intestinal helminthiasis with serious consequences resulting in some 9,400 deaths per year (source: “Water, Sanitation and Health”, WHO. Available at: <www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/publications/facts2004/es/index.html>.

2 The principal mitigation strategies consist in the exploitation of deepseated water, using freshwater sources, building reservoirs and extracting harmful elements (source: “Water, sanitation and health”, WHO.

Special cases

Four of the countries in the worst situation are Niger, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Ghana – not necessarily because of their position in the Water and Sanitation Index, but because of the relative values of each of their indicators and their recent evolution. These are countries which have suffered serious (Niger, Eritrea and Ghana) or slight (Ethiopia) regression. Some of them have also undergone very rapid demographic evolution: Niger increased its population from 7.7 million in 1990 to 10.1 million in 2000 and 14.2 in 2007; Ethiopia, from 53.5 million in 1994 to 73.9 in 2000 and 83.5 million in 2008; Ghana, from 17 million in 1995 to 18.4 million in 2005 and 23.5 million in 2007 (Eritrea has 4.9 million inhabitants but there is no data on population evolution).3

Beyond these similarities, two different situations should be noted. Niger and Ethiopia have undergone a significant drop regarding population with sanitation services between 2008 and 2009 (from 13% to 7%, and from 13% to 11%, respectively). In both cases, in a situation which was already alarming, now only 42% of the population has access to water from improved sources. These are mainly agricultural countries, with a life expectancy of 56 and 52 years and a rural population of 83% and 84% respectively.

The cases of Eritrea and Ghana are somewhat different. They are also basically agricultural countries, but they also have rich mineral resources (Ghana particularly, has gold, diamonds and manganese deposits). In both countries life expectancy is higher (57 and 60 years, respectively) and there is a relatively smaller rural population, particularly in Ghana. In both countries most of the population has access to improved water sources (60% in Eritrea and 80% in Ghana). Most countries are stagnant in their coverage of these services; although services reached acceptable levels, many countries are stagnant in a scenario of rigid limitations to the access of drinkable water and sanitation.
### Unequal Improvement

**RECENT EVOLUTION**


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<tr>
<th>Summary: CURRENT SITUATION (colour)</th>
<th>COUNTRIES (Basic Capabilities Index value, 0-100)</th>
<th>TUBERCULOSIS cases per 100,000 people</th>
<th>PEOPLE LIVING WITH HIV/AIDS (15-49 years old, %)</th>
<th>INFANT MORTALITY (per 1,000 live births)</th>
<th>UNDER-5 MORTALITY (per 1,000 live births)</th>
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**Under-5 mortality:** UNICEF (www.unicef.org). 
**Tuberculosis:** World Bank (www.worldbank.org). 
**People living with HIv/AIdS:** UNAIDS (www.unaids.org). 
**Infant mortality:** World Bank (www.worldbank.org). 

**References:** For more detailed information on the reference data see complete tables at: [www.socialwatch.org/statistics2009](http://www.socialwatch.org/statistics2009).
### Summary: Recent Evolution (arrow-icon)

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**Sources:** UNICEF (www.unicef.org/sowc09) for infant mortality; UNICEF, World Health Organization (www.who.int), World Bank (www.worldbank.org) for other indicators; for more detailed information on the reference year of data, see complete tables at www.socialwatch.org.
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**Summary: RECENT EVOLUTION**

**COUNTRIES**

(Basic Capabilities Index value, 0-100)

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**NOTE:**

1. Evolution: Evolution of indicators obtained by re-escalating those values resulting from the relative rate of variation among the following ranks: Minor than -5: significant progress; Between -5 and -1: slight progress; Between -1 and 1: stagnant; Between 1 and 5: regression; Larger than 5: significant regression.

2. Value reached by the index: The value results from adding the values calculated for each dimension and dividing the result by the total number of dimensions presenting data.


**DEFINITION OF INDICATORS:**

**Tuberculosis (cases per 100,000 people):** Total number of tuberculosis cases reported to the World Health Organization per 100,000 people. A tuberculosis case is defined as a patient in whom tuberculosis has been bacteriologically confirmed or diagnosed by a clinician.

**People living with HIV/AIDS (15-49 years old, %):** Percentage of adults (15-49 years) living with HIV/AIDS.

**Infant mortality (per 1,000 live births):** Number of infants dying before reaching one year of age, per 1,000 live births in a given year.

**Under-5 mortality (per 1,000 live births):** Probability of dying between birth and exactly five years of age expressed per 1,000 live births.

**Methodological notes and guidelines at the end of the section.**
Unequal improvement

The World Health Organization (WHO) is the direct authority and coordinator of health action in the United Nations, and its responsibilities include setting standards, providing technical support to countries, and monitoring health trends in the world. In its 2007 World Health Report the WHO stated that “…world health security depends more than ever on international cooperation and the will of all countries to act effectively to confront the new and emerging threats”.1

Since the Alma-Ata Conference of September 1978 in the USSR, the accent has been on primary health care. These measures are seen as an ever more convincing response to the world’s current health problems, and an instrument to promote equity, solidarity and social justice through improved health quality for all.2

The implementation of a primary health care system requires a mature national health organization and public policies focused on developing it and making it sustainable, so that the extent or proportional impact of certain diseases or specific levels of mortality can be measured and evaluated with precision, not just with regard to a country’s health situation and its needs for international support in this area but also as regards the priorities and health development models prevailing in those countries.

This is why Social Watch selected three indicators, out of the wide range available, that capture the incidence of diseases linked to a lack of preventive strategies and a lack of suitable health education. It also selected two indicators that capture mortality in situations of great vulnerability in a context of deficient health attention and prevention: infant mortality and mortality among children under 5 years old.

Global evolution

The overall situation has improved. The estimate of people in the world in the 15 to 49 age bracket living with HIV/AIDS is still 2% and this rate has not changed, which indicates a pause in the expansion of the disease. Infant mortality fell by 9.6% (from 2008 to 2009, it decreased from 39 to 35.6 deaths among children under one year old per 1000 live births), mortality among children under 5 also decreased (from 56 to 54.3 deaths per 1000 live births, which is an evolution of -3.1%), and based on 2009 data, the incidence of tuberculosis dropped from 199 to 136.5 cases notified to the WHO per 100,000 people (which is amounts to reduction in the rate of 45.8% on the figure available for 2008).

When we examine the performance of these indicators in the countries in the better and worse relative situations differences emerge, and this is one of the main themes for reflection in the analysis of the data for 2009 (Table 2).

In the countries in the better relative situation the evolution of all these indicators has been favourable (variation between the 2008 and 2009 values: tuberculosis = -157.9%; HIV/AIDS went from 0.3% to 0.0%; infant mortality = -79.1%; mortality among children under 5 years old = -58.7%). On the other hand, in the countries in the worse relative situation there was slight improvement only in the tuberculosis and infant mortality indicators (variation in the indicator value: tuberculosis = -0.6%; infant mortality = -5.4%). But in other respects the situation became considerably worse, mainly with the spread of HIV/AIDS but also in mortality among children under 5 years old (variation in the indicator value: HIV/AIDS = 49.7%; mortality among children under 5 = 7.7%).

As to the relative evolution in different countries, the above-mentioned disparities and the regression of some indicators and for some countries explain the unequal and polarised behaviour that took place in the year from 2008 to 2009 (Table 1).


Measuring progress 198 Social Watch
# Reproductive Health

## Marked polarization


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Summary:</th>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Women aged 15-49 attended at least once during pregnancy by skilled health personnel (%)</th>
<th>Births attended by skilled health personnel (%)</th>
<th>Contraceptive use among currently in union women aged 15-49 (%)</th>
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**RECENT EVOLUTION** (between most recent and previous available data)

- **Better situation**
- **Above average**
- **Below average**
- **Worse situation**

1. **Evolution**: Evolution of indicators obtained by re-escalating those values resulting from the relative rate of variation among the following ranks: Minor than -5: significant regression; Between  -5 and -1: regression; Between -1 and 1: stagnant; Between 1 and 5: slight progress; Larger than 5: significant progress.

2. **Value reached by the index**: The value results from adding the values calculated for each dimension and dividing the result by the total number of dimensions presenting data.

3. **Stagnant evolution**: In those indicators showing stagnant evolution in all their values, said evolution responds to lack of updating, being reproduced those values registered in 2008.

**References**

- Births attended by skilled health personnel: Reproductive Health Indicators Database, Department of Reproductive Health and Research, WHO (www.who.int/reproductivehealth/). Except for (+) Demographic and Health Surveys - STAT compiler (www.measuredhs.com/accesssurveys).
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**Summary:**

- **CURRENT SITUATION**
  - **COUnTRIeS** (Basic Capabilities Index value, 0-100)
  - **WOMEN AGED 15-49 ATTENDED AT LEAST ONCE DURING PREGNANCY BY SKILLED HEALTH PERSONNEL (%)**
  - **BIRTHS ATTENDED BY SKILLED HEALTH PERSONNEL (%)**
  - **CONTRACEPTIVE USE AMONG CURRENTLY IN UNION WOMEN AGED 15-49 (%)**

**SHW2009 ING v02.indb 200 8/27/09 7:06:36 PM**
### Summary: CURRENT SITUATION (colour)

#### RECENT EVOLUTION (arrow-icon)

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<td>Saudi Arabia (95)</td>
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**Note:**
1. Evolution: Evolution of indicators concerning the rate of variation in the following ranks:
   - Minor than -5: significant regression
   - Between -5 and -1: regression
   - Between -1 and 1: stagnant
   - Between 1 a 5: slight progress
   - Larger than 5: significant progress

   This rate is obtained from the following operation:
   \[
   \frac{(2009 \text{ value} - 2008 \text{ value})}{2008 \text{ value}} \times 100
   \]

2. Value obtained by the index: The value results from adding the values calculated for each dimension and dividing the result by the total number of dimensions presenting data.

**Sources:**
- Births attended by skilled health personnel: Reproductive Health Indicators Database, Department of Reproductive Health and Research, WHO (www.who.int/reproductivehealth/). Except for (+) Demographic and Health Surveys - STAT compiler (www.measuredhs.com/accesssurveys).
### DEFINITION OF INDICATORS:

**Women aged 15–49 attended at least once during pregnancy by skilled health personnel (%)**: Percentage of women aged 15–49 years attended at least once during pregnancy by skilled health personnel (doctors, nurses or midwives).

**Births attended by skilled health personnel (%):** Percentage of births attended by skilled health personnel (doctors, nurses or midwives).

**Contraceptive use among women currently in union aged 15–49 (%)**: Percentage of women in union aged 15–49 currently using contraception.

---

**Summary:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRIES</th>
<th>WOMEN AGED 15–49 ATTENDED AT LEAST ONCE DURING PREGNANCY BY SKILLED HEALTH PERSONNEL (%)</th>
<th>BIRTHS ATTENDED BY SKILLED HEALTH PERSONNEL (%)</th>
<th>CONTRACEPTIVE USE AMONG CURRENTLY IN UNION WOMEN AGED 15–49 (%)</th>
<th>Value</th>
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<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>94.2</td>
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</table>

**NOTES:**

1. **Evolution:** Evolution of indicators obtained by re-escalating the values resulting from the relative rate of variation among countries. The value is obtained by adding the values calculated for each dimension and dividing the result by the total number of dimensions presenting data.

2. **Value reached by the index:** This value is obtained from the following operation: (2009 value – 2008 value/ 2008 value)*100. This rate is obtained from the following operation:

   - For more detailed information on the reference years updating, being reproduced those values registered in 2008.

   - Evolution in all their values, said evolution responds to lack of "Stagnant evolution: those indicators showing stagnant evolution in all their values. These indicators lack of growth in the coming year."

   - Minor than -5: significant regression; Between -5 and -1: slight regression; Between -1 and 1: stagnant; Larger than 5: significant progress; Between 1 a 5: slight progress; Larger than 5: significant progress.

3. **Definition of regression:**

   - Stagnant evolution: those indicators showing stagnant evolution in all their values. These indicators lack of growth in the coming year.

   - Significant regression: those indicators showing a "value" (comparison of 2009 value and 2008 value) less than -5.

   - Significant progress: those indicators showing a "value" (comparison of 2009 value and 2008 value) larger than 5.

   - Slight regression: those indicators showing a "value" (comparison of 2009 value and 2008 value) between -5 and -1.

   - Slight progress: those indicators showing a "value" (comparison of 2009 value and 2008 value) between 1 a 5.

   - Significant progress: those indicators showing a "value" (comparison of 2009 value and 2008 value) larger than 5.

**Sources:**

- **World Bank (www.worldbank.org).**
- Contraceptive use among currently in union women aged 15–49.
- **Reproductive Health Indicators Database, Department of Reproductive Health and Research, WHO (www.who.int/reproductivehealth/).**
- Contraceptive use among currently in union women aged 15–49.
- **Demographic and Health Surveys - STAT compiler (www.measuredhs.com/accesssurveys).**
- Contraceptive use among currently in union women aged 15–49.
- **Global Health Atlas, WHO (www.who.int/GlobalAtlas).**
- Contraceptive use among currently in union women aged 15–49.
- **World Health Organization (www.who.int).**
- Contraceptive use among currently in union women aged 15–49.
Marked polarization

The term “reproductive health” was used for the first time at the United Nations Conference on Population and Development in Cairo in 1994. It refers to a situation of complete physical, mental and social well-being in all the functions and processes connected with reproduction.

According to the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), every minute, somewhere in the world, one woman dies from avoidable causes during childbirth, and for every woman who dies under these circumstances there are 20 or more whose health is permanently damaged through delivery-related complications. This adds up to more than half a million women a year who lose their lives and more than ten million whose chances of leading a full and healthy life are seriously impaired. The situation is extremely worrying in the poor countries, which have the highest rates of involuntary pregnancy, abortions under bad conditions, HIV/AIDS infection, and maternal death and permanent injury.

Prevention is geared to avoiding teenage pregnancy, the start of sexual relations and the use of contraception. Attention, on the other hand, deals with sexually transmitted diseases, particularly HIV/AIDS, skilled health care during pregnancy and delivery, and follow-up on birth complications among women and newborn babies.

Global evolution

In the reproductive health dimension in 2008, more than a fifth of countries (23.8%) remained stagnant and some 70.7% made progress. In the latter group 6.6% made slight progress and the majority (64.1%) made significant progress. On the other hand, 8 countries regressed slightly (4.4%), and in two more (1.1%) this was severe, so in total only 5.5% of countries regressed (Table 1). All in all the overall balance is positive, but we should put this into perspective by examining the average levels in the countries at the two ends of the spectrum (Table 2).

The indicator for “Women aged 15 to 49 attended at least once during pregnancy by skilled health personnel (%),” did not register changes but evolution in reproductive health was still favourable. This is because the proportion of women (with partners) in this age bracket who use contraception and the proportion of deliveries attended by skilled health personnel did increase (in 2008 the rates were 80.7%, 44.9% and 79.1%, respectively, and in 2009 80.7%, 47.9% and 79.6%, respectively).

However, this overall progress obscures the significant polarization that took place. In the countries in the worse relative situation all the average values of the indicators fell (from 67.2%, 17.1% and 37.9% in 2008 to 48%, 15.4% and 32.4% in 2009, respectively). On the other hand, the opposite occurred in the countries in the better relative situation; all the average values of these indicators increased (93.9%, 64.5% and 96.9% in 2008 and 94.3%, 72.3% and 99.6%, respectively).

The situation by regions

No country in Europe or North America is below the average; the overwhelming majority are in the better relative situation (87.9% and 100%, respectively). In Central Asia most of the countries are positioned around the average (33.3% are below and 44.4% are above). There are no countries in the worse relative situation and two are in the better relative situation (22.2%).

In East Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean and the Middle East and North Africa region, most of the countries are above the average (18.8%, 24.4% and 38.9%, respectively) or in the better relative situation group (53.1%, 39.4% and 38.9%, respectively). However, there are also some countries below the average (12.5%, 33.3% and 16.7%, respectively) and some in a worse relative situation (15.6%, 3% and 5.6%, respectively).

South Asia is the most polarised region. Three quarters of the countries (75%) are in a worse relative situation and a quarter (25%) are above the average. There are no countries in the better relative situation, and nor are there any slightly below average.

Lastly, the most disadvantaged region is sub-Saharan Africa. Nearly nine tenths (84.8%) of these countries is in the worse relative situation or below the average (26.1% and 58.7%, respectively), one in ten are above the average (10.9%) and only 4.3% are in the better relative situation group.

1 As regards methodology, countries are classified using two different procedures, and in this case the two are combined. Regression or progress refer to differences in the relative growth rate, but relative position is established by standardisation based on the quotient between the differences with the measures and the standard deviation of the distribution. For this, progress or regression in growth rate can correspond to different relative positions. Therefore a country that is very well positioned but from one year to the next registers a fall in the values of its indicators could figure among the countries in the better relative situation and at the same time be in the severe regression group.

---

**TABLE 1. Current situation according to evolution in reproductive health**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situation</th>
<th>Total</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Worse relative situation</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Below average</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above average</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better relative situation</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 2. Reproductive health: averages by indicator of countries in worse and better situations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situation</th>
<th>Women aged 15–49 attended at least once during pregnancy by skilled health personnel (%)</th>
<th>Use of contraception by women (with partners) aged 15 to 49 (%)</th>
<th>Births attended by skilled health personnel (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Worse relative situation</td>
<td>Average 48.0</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>32.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of countries</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better relative situation</td>
<td>Average 94.3</td>
<td>72.3</td>
<td>99.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of countries</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Average 80.7</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>79.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of countries</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## RATIFICATIONS OF FUNDAMENTAL ILO CONVENTIONS

### Up to July 2009

- **C87**: Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948.
- **C98**: Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949.
- **C100**: Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951.
- **C105**: Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957.
- **C111**: Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958.
- **C182**: Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999.

### Countries that have ratified all these conventions:

- Albania; Algeria; Angola; Antigua and Barbuda; Argentina; Armenia; Austria; Azerbaijan; Bahamas; Barbados; Belarus; Belgium; Belize; Benin; Bolivia; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Botswana; Bulgaria; Burkina Faso; Burundi; Cambodia; Cameroon; Central African Republic; Chad; Chile; Colombia; Comoros; Congo, DR; Congo, Rep.; Costa Rica; Côte d’Ivoire; Croatia; Cyprus; Czech Republic; Denmark; Djibouti; Dominica; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; Egypt; El Salvador; Equatorial Guinea; Estonia; Ethiopia; Fiji; Finland; France; Gambia; Georgia; Germany; Greece; Grenada; Guatemala; Guinea; Guyana; Haiti; Honduras; Hungary; Iceland; Indonesia; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Jamaica; Kazakhstan; Kyrgyzstan; Latvia; Lesotho; Libya; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Macedonia; Madagascar; Malawi; Mali; Malta; Mauritania; Mauritius; Moldova; Mongolia; Montenegro; Mozambique; Netherlands; Nicaragua; Niger; Nigeria; Norway; Pakistan; Panama; Papua New Guinea; Paraguay; Peru; Philippines; Poland; Portugal; Romania; Russian Federation; Rwanda; San Marino; Sao Tome and Principe; Senegal; Serbia; Seychelles; Slovakia; Slovenia; South Africa; Spain; Sri Lanka; St Kitts and Nevis; St Vincent and Grenadines; Swaziland; Sweden; Switzerland; Syria; Tajikistan; Tanzania; Togo; Trinidad and Tobago; Tunisia; Turkey; Uganda; Ukraine; United Kingdom; Uruguay; Venezuela; Yemen; Zambia; Zimbabwe.

### Countries that have not ratified all the mentioned conventions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries that have not ratified all conventions</th>
<th>Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining</th>
<th>Elimination of Forced and Compulsory Labour</th>
<th>Elimination of Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation</th>
<th>Abolition of Child Labour</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
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**Source:** ILOLEX, ILO website Database (www.ilo.org/).
### RATIFICATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS INTERNATIONAL TREATIES

#### Up to July 2009


E: Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), 1984. Entry into force: 26 June 1987.


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Social Watch 205 Status of ratifications of human rights international treaties
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Source: Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (www2.ohchr.org)
How to read the Social Watch tables

The thematic area tables present the statistical information available for each indicator.

1. Current situation in the area: Illustrates the current situation of the countries in the corresponding dimension through a summarizing measurement that evaluates countries based on their performance on the set of indicators included for which information is available (see box “Methodological notes: Thematic tables”). The different categories are colour coded (see References: 7). The categories are: Better situation, Above average, Below average, Worse situation.

2. Evolution in the area: Presents the evolution of country situations as an average of the evolution in indicators for which sufficient information is available (see box “Methodological notes: Thematic tables”). The categories are indicated by symbols (see 7). Categories are: Major regression, Regression, Stagnant, Slight progress, Significant progress.

3. Basic Capabilities Index (BCI) value: Presents the values of the BCI for each country, a measurement designed by Social Watch that evaluates countries with regard to the basic conditions of development (for more information, see the box “Technical notes: BCI design in the Basic Capabilities Index 2008” article in this Report). Countries with the highest BCI scores are listed first.

4. Indicator: Each thematic area includes indicators that are pertinent to evaluating the dimension in question and for which information is available from a large number of countries. This makes it possible to visualize the situation in each country while comparing the distances between them. The definitions of each indicator can be found on the right or at the foot of the corresponding table (see 8).

5. Current situation: This column presents the latest data available for each country according to the source consulted. These figures allow us to evaluate and compare the present situation in the countries of the world. Given that in many cases, the latest available figures are not up to date, it is important to take into account the time period to which the data correspond.

6. Evolution: Based on current and initial data,1 the rate of progress or regression over the intervening time period is calculated for each country with reference to the evolution of all of the countries in this indicator (see box “Methodological notes: Thematic tables”). The result is expressed graphically (see 7), facilitating the reading and evaluation of performance in the indicator during this period. The categories are: Major regression, Regression, Stagnant, Slight progress, Significant progress.

7. Value reached in the index: Presents the value resulting from adding the reached values in each dimension and dividing by the total number of data dimensions.

8. References: Shows the categories of the CURRENT SITUATION in a country in the area and the RECENT EVOLUTION for each indicator and for the whole area. These variables are constructed by Social Watch to facilitate the evaluation of countries in each area based on the information available (see box “Methodological notes: Thematic tables”).

9. Definitions, Notes and Sources: The definition of each indicator as well as the source(s) of the information used are provided on the right side or at the foot of the corresponding table. The information used for the indicators is obtained from recognized international organizations that compile the statistics produced by the countries. Notes have been added with information needed to read the tables.
Methodological notes: thematic tables

Measurement of the current situation of countries and the rate of change

The situation a country is in, according to each indicator, is given by the latest available value for that indicator.

Each country is assigned a color according to the distribution of values on each indicator, and an average of these values is then given for all the indicators in that area. In this way a self-referential ranking is obtained, independent of distance from goals or from specific conceptually defined levels.

This ranking was only applied to those countries with information available for at least half the indicators that make up each overall thematic area.

To avoid giving a false impression that the data are exact values, the average values were rescaled to create four country categories:

- **Countries in better situation**
- **Countries above average**
- **Countries below average**
- **Countries in worse situation**

Countries for which sufficient information to be included in the ranking (Countries with insufficient data to summarize the area) are also shown.

Recent evolution

The evolution of countries on each indicator is evaluated by comparing the latest data available with previous information. This procedure involves assessing the country’s initial and final levels in the two latest reports. The rate of change is the relative proportion of variation in relation to the latest data available, which is why this is a rate of variation (an incremental rate based on 100).

The values for this rate of change have also been rescaled in sections (using a reference scale of 1 to 5), and in the tables these appear in a column to the right of the current indicator value. A series of symbols are used to illustrate changes in order to make the information easier to read (numerical values are not used because they would tend to give the impression that the information is exact, which in this case it is not).

The categories defined in this rescaling are as follows:

- **→ Significant progress**
- **→ Slight progress**
- **‖ Stagnant**
- **← Regression**
- **← Major regression**

**Significant progress** applies to those countries which are progressing at rates above the average for all countries making progress.

**Slight progress** applies to those countries which are progressing at rates below the average for all countries making progress.

**Stagnant** refers to those countries where no changes (or quantitatively insignificant changes) have been recorded over the period in question.

**Regression** applies to those countries which are regressing at rates below the average for all countries regressing (i.e. they are regressing more slowly).

**Major regression** applies to those countries which are regressing at rates above the average for all countries regressing (i.e. they are regressing more rapidly).

In addition, an average of progress and regression of the indicators is built for each dimension for which information on recent evolution is available. The average appears in the column “Recent evolution” of the area, and values are also rescaled to obtain the aforementioned five categories.

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1 For this, the variable was normalized (by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation) and then the mean positive values and the mean negative values for the normalized indicator were calculated. The four categories were established according to the values above and below the mean positive values for the normalized indicator, and the values above and below the mean negative values for the normalized indicator.
Basic Capabilities Index (BCI) and Gender Equity Index (GEI)

BCI

The Basic Capabilities Index (BCI) is an index-summarized development by Social Watch1 that compares and classifies countries in accordance with their progress in social development. This is a useful tool for monitoring the evolution of basic indicators and to make comparisons between and within countries. The BCI evaluates society in different countries as regards some basic minimum capabilities that are the essential starting conditions to enable people to have an adequate quality of life.

The index uses three indicators to identify situations of poverty: survival until the age of 5, the percentage of children who reach the 5th grade at school and the percentage of births attended by skilled health personnel. These indicators express different dimensions that are included in internationally agreed development goals (education, infant health and reproductive health).

Unlike other poverty indicators, such as those used by the World Bank (which consider the number of people living on less than one or two dollars per day) or the classification developed by the UNDP based on the Human Development Index (which combines income figures with health and education indicators) the BCI is based on the latest information available for each country and is easier to construct. It can be applied on the sub-national and municipal levels and does not depend on costly household surveys, which indexes based on income require.

The BCI does not use income as an indicator. It employs a definition of poverty which considers the level of development of a person’s capabilities and the possibility to exercise and enjoy his or her human rights to a greater or lesser extent. This index has proved to be highly correlated with measurements of other human capabilities that reflect the social development of countries.

Each country is assigned a value on the BCI, and then its evolution over time can be evaluated and comparisons with other countries can be made. The BCI indicators attain their maximum level when all women receive skilled health care during childbirth, when no child drops out of school before completing the fifth grade and when infant mortality is reduced to its minimum possible level of less than five deaths among children under 5 per thousand live births. These indicators are closely connected to the capabilities that the members of a society must have. These capabilities mutually reinforce each other to make greater individual and collective development possible. Particularly important in this context are the capabilities that facilitate the incorporation of young people into society, as this is essential to promote the future development of countries.

Note that a BCI value of nearly 100 does not necessarily mean a high level of social development; it merely means the country has achieved universal coverage in the essential minimum requirements to be able to progress towards improved well-being. This is the starting point, not the finish line.

GEI

Social Watch developed the Gender Equity Index (GEI) to make gender inequality situations in countries visible and measurable, and to monitor their evolution over time. The GEI is based on information that is available and comparable internationally. It makes it possible to position and classify countries in accordance with a selection of important indicators of gender inequality in the dimensions of education, economic participation and empowerment.

The GEI gives a simple and direct reading so countries can be compared easily. For the purposes of measurement, proportional relations have been ascertained, in other words the ratio between the sexes, so the structure of opportunities as regards gender inequality can be inferred.

The index measures the gap between women and men, not their well-being. Thus, for example, a country in which young people of both sexes have equal access to university education receives a value of 100 on this point, and a country in which girls and boys are both equally impeded from completing their primary education would also receive a value of 100.

This does not mean that the education is of adequate quality but that, in this case, girls do not suffer from inequality in participation.

The GEI is calculated to respond to the need to reflect all situations that are unfavourable to women. Therefore, when there is a proportional relation disadvantageous to women in comparison to men, the GEI does not register its maximum value of 100 points. Thus the final value attained depends on the degree of negative inequality for women in a given country or region, because it reflects inequality in an inversely proportional way: the greater the inequality the lower the value on the index, and vice versa.

No indicator value can exceed 100 points (complete equity in participation)2 even if there are inequalities that are positive for women. This asymmetry means the GEI cannot and should not be read as a percentage of participation of the population in gender relations because the proportion of participation may ultimately register as being very different if some of the indicators are favourable to women.

1 The BCI was originally based on the Quality of Life Index developed by the non-governmental organization Action for Economic Reforms-Philippines, which in turn was derived from the Capability Poverty Index proposed by Professor Amartya Sen and popularized as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Index.

2 The relative participation of women in one specific area (for example ‘university professionals’, which is one of the four indicators in the ‘empowerment’ dimension) is divided by the relative weight of men in that situation. The ratio obtained is multiplied by 100. If the resulting value is over 100, indicating that women’s participation exceeds that of men, the value is taken as 100. This is done so that, in the final value on the index, participation rates that are favourable to women in some specific situations shall not conceal negative participation rates in others.

METHODOLOGICAL NOTES FOR THE ICB

Procedure 1. There is no information for the country in one of the indicators of the index for the current period, but information does exist for the previous period. In order to calculate the present value of the BCI the indicator’s data was standardized (subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation), and then the mean positive and negative values were calculated to form four categories (best situation, above average, below average and worst situation). The country was situated in the corresponding category according to the value of the indicator of the previous period and the group indicator mean was assigned to it, now on the basis of present period data. That is, this indicator is assumed to be in an “average” situation within the group.

Procedure 2. There is no information for the country in at least one of the indicators of the index for neither the current nor the previous period. In order to calculate the present BCI value, the average was calculated for the indicators for which the country showed data (11+2, 11+3 or 12+3, as appropriate), within its region. The resulting variable was standardized and then re-scaled above and below the standardized mean according to the four categories generated, placing the country within this categorization and awarding it the information for the absent indicator corresponding to its lower limit.
SENEGAL: The environmental crisis resulting from global warming has reduced fishing ... ( ...) Fishing is an important source of resources for the primary sector and one of the main sources of protein for the population.

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: ... the poor spend upwards of 50% of their income on food — the poorest spend 80% or more. The increase in food prices has increased not just poverty, but also hunger.

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: ... women continue to be the first to lose their jobs and are increasingly finding themselves engaged in petty informal trading of vegetables and tomatoes as a coping mechanism.

CLIMATE CHANGE: The Least Developed Countries, who contributed the least in pollution, will suffer the most. Many small island developing states may one day just disappear from the map.

LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES: Unprecedented food crises, triggered by soaring food prices and leading to "food riots", have shaken over 30 LDCs, where workers and peasants have become unable to afford food items basic for survival.

POLAND: ... the growth of the grey — informal — economy will affect women more than men, as they are more often engaged in low-paid jobs, especially in the private service sector.

Social Watch is an international network of citizens’ organizations struggling to eradicate poverty and the causes of poverty, to ensure an equitable distribution of wealth and the realization of human rights. We are committed to social, economic and gender justice, and we emphasize the right of all people not to be poor.

Social Watch holds governments, the UN system and international organizations accountable for the fulfilment of national, regional and international commitments to eradicate poverty.