SOCIAL WATCH REPORT 2004

AN INTERNATIONAL CITIZENS' PROGRESS REPORT

ON POVERTY ERADICATION AND GENDER EQUITY

SOCIAL WATCH REPORT 2004

Fear and Want

Obstacles to Human Security

- **Citizen organisations from fifty countries monitor government compliance with international commitments**
- Country by country progress and regression
- Quality of life index
- Country gender ranking
- World Bank secret scorecard
- An Iraqi perspective on Iraq

GRAPHIC DESIGN: MONOCROMO

SOCIAL WATCH REPORT 2004

SOCIAL WATCH REPORT 2004

Fear and Want

This publication was funded by Novib / Oxfam Netherlands and The Ford Foundation.

INSTITUTO DEL TERCER MUNDO
Jackson 1136, Montevideo 11200, Uruguay
item@item.org.uy
Fax: +598 (2) 411 9222

Graphic design: MONOCROMO
Gimena Fernández, Valentina Ordoqui, Pablo Uribe
info@monocromo.com.uy
Phone: +598 (2) 908 6241

Infographics design: DENDRITA

Printed by: MONOCROMO

Printed in Uruguay
Edición hecha al amparo del Art. 79 de la Ley 13.349
(Comisión del Papel)

ISSN: 0797-9231

Dep. Legal: 330282

For orders and requests please contact:

Social Watch
Casilla de Correo 1539
Montevideo 11000, Uruguay
socwatch@socialwatch.org
http://www.socialwatch.org/
Phone: +598 (2) 419 6192
Fax: +598 (2) 411 9222

SOCIAL WATCH INITIATIVE IS PROMOTED AND DEVELOPED BY:

Algeria: Association El Amel pour le Développement Social, mselougha@yahoo.fr • **Angola: SINPROF (Sindicato Nacional de Professores), mi21163@yahoo.es** • **Argentina: Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales (CELS) – Programa de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales, desc@cels.org.ar** • **Bahrain: BHRS (Bahrain Human Rights Society), cdhrb@hotmail.com, sabikama@batelco.com.bh** • **Bangladesh: CDL (Community Development Library), rdc@bol-online.com; Unnayan Shamunnay, shamunnay@sdnbd.org** • **Bolivia: CEDLA (Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo Laboral y Agrario), cedla@caoba.entelnet.bo;** Capítulo Boliviano DD.HH. Democracia y Desarrollo: AIPE (Asociación de Instituciones de Promoción y Educación); APDHB (Asamblea Permanente de Derechos Humanos de Bolivia – CBB); APDH-NAL (Asamblea Permanente de Derechos Humanos); Área Identidad Mujer y Trabajo Fundación Solón; Asamblea Permanente Derechos Humanos; Asociación + Vida; ASOFAMD (Asociación de Familiares de Detenidos Desaparecidos de Bolivia); Capacitación y Derecho Ciudadano; CÁRITAS La Paz; CASA DE LA MUJER; CASDEL (Centro de Asesoramiento Legal y Desarrollo Social); Católicas por el Derecho a Decidir; CEADES (Colectivo de Estudios Aplicados al Desarrollo Social); CEDIB (Centro Documentación e Investigación Bolivia); CENPROTAC (Centro de Promoción de Técnicas de Arte y Cultura); Centro Gregoria Apaza; Centro Juana Azurduy; CEPROLAI (Centro de Promoción del Laicado); CIDEM (Centro de Información y Desarrollo de la Mujer); CIPCA NAL (Centro de Investigación y Promoción del Campesinado); CISEP (Centro de Investigación y Servicio Popular); CISTAC (Centro de Investigación Social, Tecnología Apropiada y Capacitación); COLECTIVO REBELDÍA; Comunidad EQUIDAD; Coordinadora de la Mujer; DNI (Defensa del Niño Internacional); DNI-NAL (Defensa del Niño Internacional); DNI-Regional CBB; ECAM (Equipo Comunicación Alternativa con Mujeres); Fundación La Paz; Fundación Tierra; IFFI (Instituto de Formación Femenina Integral); INFANTE (Promoción Integral de la Mujer y la Infancia); IPTK (Instituto Politécnico Tupac Katari); MEPB (Movimiento Educadores Populares de Bolivia); MIAMSI (Acción Católica Internacional); Oficina Jurídica de la Mujer; PRODIS YANAPAKUNA (Programa de Desarrollo e Investigación Social); Red Andina de Información; UNITAS (Unión Nacional de Instituciones para el Trabajo de Acción Social) • **Brazil: Reference Group: Ibase, observatorio@ ibase.org.br; Cedec; Fase; Inesc; Rede Dawn; SOS Corpo;** Abong; Action Aid; AMB Articulação de Mulheres Brasileiras; Articulação de Mulheres Negras Brasileiras; Ceap; Centro de Estudos Afro-Brasileiros UCAM; Centro de Estudos de Defesa do Negro Pará; Centro de Mulheres do Cabo; CESEC-UCAM; Cepia; Cfêmea; Comunidade Bahaí; Criola-Rio; Fala Preta; Fórum de Mulheres de Salvador; Geledés/Instituto da Mulher Negra; Grupo de Mulheres Negras Malunga Ibase; Instituto Patricia Galvão; MNDH Movimento Nacional de Direitos Humanos; NOVA; Observatório Afro-Brasileiro; Observatório da Cidadania; Redeh; Rede Mulheres e Educação; Rede Saúde; Themis • **Bulgaria: BGRF (Bulgarian Gender and Research Foundation), bgrf@fastbg.net;** BEPA (Bulgarian-European Partnership Association); National Trade Union Federation of «Light Industry»; ATTAC – Bulgaria • **Burma: Burma Lawyers Council, aunghtoo@access.inet.co.th, blcms@cscoms.com** • **Cambodia: SILAKA, silaka@forum.org.kh;** ADD (Action on Disability and Development); ADHOC (Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association); CDPO (Cambodian Disabled People's Organization); CEPA (Cultural and Environment Preservation Association); CLO (Cambodian Labor Organization); CHHRA (Cambodian Health and Human Rights Alliance); CSD (Cambodian Women's Development Agency); GAD (Gender and Development Agency); KHRACO (Khmer Human Rights and Against Corruption Organization); KKKHRA (Khmer Kampuchea Krom Human Rights Association); KKKHRDA (Khmer Kampuchea Krom Human Rights and Development Association); KYA (Khmer Youth Association); LAC (Legal Aid Association); LICADHO; PADEK (Partnership for Development in Kampuchea); USG (Urban Sector Group); URC (Urban Resource Center); UPWD (Urban Poor Development Fund); UPDF (Urban Poor Development Fund); Vigilance • **Canada: Social Watch Canada (Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives/The North-South Institute), jfoster@nsi-ins.ca** • **Chile: ACTIVA- Area Ciudadanía, activaconsultores@vtr.net**; ACJR (Alianza Chilena por un Comercio Justo y Responsable); ANAMURI (Asociación Nacional de Mujeres Rurales e Indígenas); CEM (Centro de Estudios de la Mujer); CODEPU (Corporación de Promoción y Defensa de los Derechos del Pueblo); Colectivo CON-SPIRANDO; Corporación La Morada; EDUK; FORO, Red de Salud y Derechos Sexuales y Reproductivos; Fundación de Superación de la Pobreza; Fundación Terram; Programa de Ciudadanía y Gestión Local; SOL (Solidaridad y Organización Local) • **China: Network (Research Center) for Combating Domestic Violence of China Law Society, buwei@public3.bta.net.cn** • **Colombia: Corporación Región, coregion@epm.net.co;** Plataforma Colombiana de DD.HH. Democracia y Desarrollo • **Costa Rica: Centro de Estudios y Publicaciones Alforja, cep@alforja.or.cr;** AMES (Asociación de Mujeres en Salud); Coordinadora de Barrios; Centro de Educación Popular de Vecinos; Sindicato de Profesionales en Ciencias Médicas; Frente de Organizaciones para la Defensa de la Seguridad Social; LIMPAL (Liga Internacional de Mujeres Pro Paz y Libertad); Agenda Cantonal de Mujeres - Desamparados; Asociación Voces Nuestras; FEDEAGUAS-Guanacaste; SINAE (Sindicato de Auxiliares de Enfermería); SEBANA (Sindicato de Empleados del Banco Nacional); Coordinación Técnica del Consejo Consultivo de la Sociedad Civil • **Ecuador: Centro de Derechos Económicos y Sociales (CDES), cdes@cdes.org.ec** • **Egypt: LRRC (Legal Research and Resource Centre for Human Rights), lrrc_hr@hotmail.com** • **El Salvador: CIDEP (Asociación Intersectorial para el Desarrollo Económico y progreso social), cidep@cidep.org.sv;** APSAL (Acción para la Salud en El Salvador); CODEFAM (Asociación Comité de Familiares de Víctimas de Violaciones a los Derechos Humanos de El Salvador); FUMA (Asociación Maquilishuatl); LAS DIGNAS (Asociación de Mujeres por la Dignidad y la Vida); • **European Union: EUROSTEP (European Solidarity Towards Equal Participation of People) sstocker@eurostep.org** • **Germany: Social Watch Germany, jens.martens@weed-online.org;** Caritas Germany; EED (Church Development Service - An Association of the Protestant Churches in Germany); DGB-Bildungswerk e.V.; Diakonisches Werk of the Protestant Church in Germany; Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung; Terre des Hommes Germany; Vereinte Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft (ver.di); Werkstatt Ökonomie; WEED (World Economy, Ecology and Development); Bread for the World • **Ghana: Third World Network Africa, contact@twnafrica.org;** Abantu for Development – Ghana; Centre for Democracy and Development; Christian Council; Civic Response; Consumers Association of Ghana; Friends of the Earth; Gender Studies and Human Rights Documentation Centre; General Agricultural Workers Union; Ghana Association of the Blind; Ghana National Association of Teachers; Ghana Registered Nurses Association; Integrated Social Development Centre; Islamic Council; National Union of Ghana Students; Network for Women's Rights; Save the Children Ghana; Trades Union Congress; University of Ghana Students Representative Council • **Guatemala: INIAP (Instituto de Investigación y Autoformación Política), iniap@intelnet.net.gt**; Coordinadora Si Vamos Por la Paz; Comité Beijing • **Honduras: CEM-H (Centro de Estudios de la Mujer Honduras), cemh@cablecolor.hn;** CEHPRODEC (Centro Hondureño de Promoción para el Desarrollo Comunitario); Iniciativa de la Marcha Mundial de la Mujeres-Capitulo Honduras • **India: CYSD (Centre for Youth and Social Development), cysdbbsr@vsnl.net;** NCAS (National Centre for Advocacy Studies); SAMARTHAN • **Indonesia: PPSW (Center for Women's Resources Development), ppsw@cbn.net.id;** ASPPUK (Association for Women in Small Business Assistance) • **Iraq: Iraqi Al-Amal Association, baghdad@iraqi-alamal.org** • **Italy: Unimondo, jason.nardi@unimondo.org**; ACLI (Associazione Cattolica Lavoratori Italiani); ARCI (Associazione Ricreativa e Culturale Italiana); Fondazione Culturale Responsabilità Etica; ManiTese; Movimondo; Sbilanciamoci • **Japan: PARC (Pacific Asia Resource Center), office@parc-jp.org** • **Jordan: Jordanian Women's Union, jwu@go.com.jo;** Women Organization to Combat Illiteracy in Jordan • **Kazakhstan: Center for Gender Studies, gender@academset.kz** • **Kenya: Social Development Network, sodnet@sodnet.or.ke;** Action Aid Kenya; BEACON; CGD (Centre for Governance & Democracy); Coalition Forum on Justice; DARAJA - Civic Initiative Forum; Econews Africa; Education Rights Forum; FEMNET; KENDREN (Kenya Debt Relief Network); Kenya Human Rights Commission; Kenya Land Alliance; KEWWO (Kenya Women Workers Organisation); People Against Torture; Public Law Institute; Release Political Prisoners; Ujamaa Centre; Undugu Society • **Korea, Rep. of: CCEJ (Citizen's Coalition for Economic Justice), mmm@ccej.or.kr, dohye@ccej.or.kr** • **Lebanon: ANND (Arab NGO Network for Development), annd@annd.org**; Coordination of the NGOs working in the Palestinian communities in Lebanon; Lebanese Development Forum; Movement Social • **Malaysia: Consumers' Association of Penang, meenaco@pd.jaring.my;** Cini Smallholders' Network; Penang Inshore Fishermen Welfare Association; Sahabat Alam Malaysia (Friends of the Earth, Malaysia); Teras Pengupayaan Melayu; Third World Network • **Mexico: Equipo PUEBLO, pueblodip@equipopueblo.org.mx;** Espacio de Coordinación de Organizaciones Civiles sobre DESC (DECA Equipo Pueblo; Centro de Reflexión y Acción Laboral; Sección mexicana de FIAN, Casa y Ciudad miembro de Coalición Hábitat México; Oficina Regional para América Latina y el Caribe de la Coalición Internacional del Hábitat; Centro de Derechos Humanos Miguel Agustín Pro-Juárez; Centro de Estudios Sociales y Culturales Antonio de Montesinos; Comision Mexicana de Defensa y Promocion de Derechos Humanos; la Defensoria del Derecho a la Salud; Catedra UNESCO de Derechos Humanos (UNAM), Liga Mexicana por la Defensa de los derechos Humanos; Centro de Derechos Humanos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales; Centro de Análisis e Investigación FUNDAR) • **Morocco: Espace Associatif, espasso@iam.net.ma** • **Nepal: Rural Reconstruction Nepal-RRN, rrn@rrn.org.np;** All Nepal Peasant Association; Alliance for Human Rights and Social Justice; Child Worker Concern; Centre Nepal: General Federation opf Nepalese Trade Union; Informal Sector Service Centre; NGO Federation of Nepal • **Netherlands: NCDO (National Committee for International Cooperation and Sustainable Development, a.roerink@ncdo.nl;** NOVIB / OXFAM Netherlands • **Nicaragua: CCER (Coordinadora Civil para la Emegencia y**

la reconstrucción), ccer@ccer.org.ni • Nigeria: SRI (Socio Economic Rights Initiative), s_watchngr@yahoo.com; Center for Human Rights and Development; Civil Resources Concern; CP (Concerned Professionals); Development Support Initiative; DEVNET; Gender & Human Rights/Social Watch-Nigeria; LEDAP (Legal Defence and Assistance Project); Legislative and Leadership Project; Nigerian Habitat Coalition; Peoples' Rights Organization; Project Alert (for Women's Rights); Rural Women Empowerment Network; RUWEN (Rural Women of Nigeria); South East Budget Network; Transition Monitoring Group, Lagos State Branch; Uyo Youths Foundation • **Pakistan: Indus Development Foundation, qureshiaijaz@hotmail.com • Palestine: Bisan Center for Research and Development, bisanrd@palnet.com;** Palestinian Non-Governmental Organisations' Network (PNGO) -integrated by more than 95 NGOs • **Panama: Fundación para el Desarrollo de la Libertad Ciudadana, Capítulo panameño de Transparencia Internacional, tipanama@cableonda.net;** CEASPA (Centro de Estudios y Acción Social Panameño) • **Paraguay: Decidamos, direccion@decidamos.org.py** [BASE - ECTA (Educación Comunicación y Tecnología Alternativa); CDE (Centro de Documentación y Estudios); CEPAG (Centro de Estudios Paraguayos Antonio Guasch); Equipo de Educación en DD.HH.; FE Y ALEGRÍA Movimiento de Educación Popular Integral; ÑEMONGUETARA Programa de Educación y Comunicación Popular; PRESENCIA Proyecto de Formación y Capacitación de la Mujer para la vida cívica; SEAS - AR (Servicio de Educación y Apoyo Social); SEDUPO (Servicio de Educación Popular); SERPAJ - PY (Servicio Paz y Justicia Paraguay); TAREA] • **Peru: Conades (Comite de Iniciativa; Grupo de Accion Internacional), hecbejar@yahoo.com;** Comisión Episcopal de Acción Social; CEDEP; Red Jubileo 2000; Plataforma Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Comité Perú; Grupo Género y Economía; Grupo de Economía Solidaria y la Asociación Nacional de Centros • **Philippines: Social Watch Philippines, sowat@info.com.ph:** ACCORD (Alternative Community-Centered Organization for Rural Development); ACT (Alliance of Concerned Teachers); AER (Action for Economic Reforms); AFRIM (Alternate Forum for Research in Mindanao); ALAGAD-Mindanao; Alay Kapwa-Social Action Center; Albay NGO-PO Network; Alliance of Community Development Advocates Provincial NGO Federation of Nueva Vizcaya; ANGOC (Asian NGO Coalition for Agrarian Reform and Rural Development); ATD Fourth World Philippines; BAGASSE (Bisaya Alliance Growth and Sustainable Sugar Estate); BANGON (Bohol Alliance of Non-Governmental Organizations); Bantay Katilingban; Banwang Tuburan; BAPAKA; Bataan NGO-PO Network; Beijing Score Board; BIND (Broad Initiative for Negros Development); CARET Inc.; Caucus on Poverty Reduction; CCAGG; CCF Reconciliation Center; CMA – Phils. (Center for Migrant Advocacy Philippines); CMLC; CODE- NGO (Caucus of Development NGO Networks); COMPAX - Cotabato; Co-Multiversity; Convergence; CPED (Center for Policy and Executive Development); Daluyong Ugnayan ng mga Kababaihan (National Federation of Women's Group); DAWN-Southeast Asia / Women & Gender Institute; ECPAT Philippines; ELAC - Cebu; Emancipatory Movement for People's Empowerment; E-Net (Civil Society Network for Education Reforms); FDC (Freedom from Debt Coalition); Federation of Senior Citizens Association of the Philippines; Feed the Children Philippines; Focus on the Global South - Philippine Program; Free the Children Foundation; Government Watch – Ateneo School of Government; IBASSMADC; IDS-Phils (Integral Development Services, Phils.); IID (Initiatives for International Dialogue); Iloilo Code of NGOs; INAM (Indicative Medicine for Alternative Health Care System Phils., Inc.); IPD (Institute for Popular Democracy); ISSA (Institute for Social Studies and Action); Jaro Archdiocesan Social Action Center; Jihad Al Akbar; JPIC-IDC (Justice for Peace and Integrity of Creation-Integrated Development Center); KAMAM; Kapatiran-Kaunlaran Foundation, Inc.; KASAMAKAPA (multi-sectoral organization of CSOs for environmental and development in Marinduque); KATINIG (Kalipunan ng Maraming Tinig ng Manggagawang Inpormal); KFI (Kasanyagan Foundation Inc.); KIN (Kitanglad Integrated NGO's); Kinayahan Foundation; Konpederasyon ng mga Nobo Esihano para sa Kalikasan at Kaayusang Panlipunan; La Liga Policy Institute; Labing Kubos Foundation, Inc.; LRC (Legal Rights and Natural Resources Center, Inc.); Lubong Salakniban Movement; MAG (Medical Action Group); Midsayap Consortium of NGOs and POs; Mindanawon Initiative for Cultural Dialogue; MLF (Mindanao Land Foundation); MODE (Management & Organizational Development for Empowerment); National Anti Poverty Commission Basic Sectors; NATRIPAL; NCCP (National Council of Churches in the Philippines); NCSD (National Council of Social Development); NEGRONET; NGO-LGU Forum of Camarines Sur; NGO-PO Network of Quezon; NGO-PO of Tobaco City; NIUGAN (Nagkakaisang Ugnayan ng mga Manggagawa at Magsasaka sa Niyugan); NOCFED (Negros Oriental Center for People's Empowerment); Outreach Philippines, Inc.; Oxfam Great Britain; PAFPI (Positive Action Foundation Philippines, Inc.); PAGBAG-O (Panaghugpong sa Gagmayng Bayanihang Grupo sa Oriental Negros); Paghiliusa sa Paghidaet-Negros; PAHRA (Philippine Alliance of Human Rights Advocates); PCPD (Philippine Center for Population & Development, Inc.); PCPS (Philippine Center for Policy Studies); Peace Advocates Network; PEPE (Popular Education for People's Empowerment); Philippine Human Rights Info Center; Philippine Partnership for the Development of Human Resources in Rural Areas - Davao; - National; Phil-Net Visayas; PhilNet-RDI (Philippine Network of Rural Development Institutes); Pinoy Plus Association; PIPULI Foundation, Inc.; PLCPD (Philippine Legislators Committee on Population and Development Foundation); PPI (Philippine Peasant Institute); PROCESS-Bohol (Participatory Research Organization of Communities and Education towards Struggle for Self Reliance); PRRM Alliance of Community Development Advocate; PRRM (Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement); RDISK (Rural Development Institute of Sultan Kudarat); Remedios Aids Foundation; Research and Communication for Justice and Peace; Rural Enlightenment & Accretion in Philippine Society (REAPS); SAMAPA (Samahang Manggagawa sa Pangkalusugan); SAMAPACO; SARILAYA; Save the Children Fund U.K.; Silliman University; SITMO (Save the Ifugao Terraces Movement); Social Action Center of Malaybalay Bukidnon; TACDRUP (Technical Assistance Center for the Development of Rural and Urban Poor); Tambuyog Development Center; Tanggol Kalikasan; Tarbilang Foundation; Tebtebba Foundation, Inc.; TFDP (Task Force Detainees of the Philippines); The Asia Foundation; The Community Advocates of Cotabato; TWSC (Third World Studies Center); U.S. (Save the Children); UKP (Ugnayan ng mga Kababaihan sa Pulitika); ULAP (Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines); U-Lead! (Union for Fresh Leadership); UP-CIDS (UP Center for Integrative and Development Studies); Urban Missionaries; WHCF (Women's Health Care Foundation); Womanhealth Philippines; Women Alliance Movement for Peace and Progress; Young Moro Professionals • **Portugal: OIKOS, sec.geral@oikos.pt • Senegal: ENDA Tiers-Monde, enda@enda.sn;** A.D.E.S.E.N (Association Pour le Développement Économique Social Environnemental du Nord) • **Spain: Intermón Oxfam, intermon@intermon.org**; Cáritas Española • **Sri Lanka: MONLAR (Movement for National Land and Agricultural Reform), monlar@sltnet.lk • Sudan: National Civic Forum, h_abdelati@hotmail.com • Suriname: Stichting Ultimate Purpose, maggiesc@yahoo.com;** CAFRA Suriname (National Department of Caribbean Association for Feminist Research and Action) • **Switzerland: Swiss Coalition of Development Organisations** (Bread for All, Caritas, Catholic Lenten Fund, Helvetas, Interchurch Aid, Swissaid), **mail@swisscoalition.ch • Syrian Arab Republic: Environmental Tourism Culture Centre (ETCC), issamkh@hotmail.com • Tanzania: WLAC (Women's Legal Aid Center), wlac@raha.com;** AFREDA (Action for Relief Development Assistance); Amnesty International (T); APT (Association for the Prevention of Torture Tanzania); Center for Social Ethics; CHAWATA (Chama cha Walemavu Tanzania); CHRP (Center for Human Rights Promotion); DOLASED- Mr. Mandesi; ENVIROCARE (Environment, Human Rights Care and Gender Organization); ENVIROHURO (Environment and Human Rights Organization); Federation of Women Economists in Tanzania; JET (The Journalists Environmental Association of Tanzania); KAGDE (Kagera Group for Development); KIWAHATO (Kikundi cha Haki za wanawake na Watoto); KIWASHE (Kituo cha Wasaidizi wa Sheria); KOSHIKA Women Group; Kuleana (Center for Children's Rights); KWIECO Kilimanjaro Women Information Exchange and Consultancy Organization); LHRC (Legal and Human Rights Center); Mbezi Biogas and Environment Conservation; Mwanza Women Development Association; N.Y.F (National Youth Forum); Taaluma Women Group (TWG); TAHEA (Tanzania Home Economic Association); TAHURET (Tanzania Human Rights Education Trust); TAMWA (Tanzania Media Women Association); Tanga Paralegal Aid Scheme; TANGO- Maria Shaba; Tanzania Human Rights Association; TAWLA (Tanzania Women Lawyers Association); TAWOVA (Tanzania Women Volunteers Association); TAYOA (Tanzania Youth Association); TCRC (Tanzania Conflict Resolution Center); TGNP- Ms. Gena Akilimali; UNA (United Nations Association); WAMATA (Walio katika Mapambano na Ukimwi Tanzania); WAT (Women Advancement Trust); WiLDAF (Women in Law and Development in Africa); Women's Research and Documentation Project; ZAHURA (Zanzibar Human Rights Association) • **Thailand: Focus on the Global South, Thailand, ranee@focusweb.org;** Arom Pongpangan Foundation; Center for Social Development Studies; Chulalongkorn University Social Research Institute; Foundation for Children's Development; Foundation for Women; Frontiers for the Advancement of Women; Political Economy Center; Thai Development Support Committee • **Tunisia: LTDH (Tunisian League for Human Rights), sjourshi@lycos.com • Uganda: DENIVA (Development Network of Indigenous Voluntary Associations), deniva@utlonline.co.ug;** Action Aid Uganda; Africa 2000 Network; Centre for Basic Research; Fort Portal; International Council on Social Welfare; Kabarole Research Centre; MS Uganda; NURRU; Rural Initiatives Development Foundation; SODANN (Soroti District Association of NGOs Network); Tororo Civil Society Network; Uganda Debt Network; Uganda Rural Development and Training Programme • **United States of America: IATP (Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy), iatp@iatp.org;** Center of concern; WEDO (Women's Environment and Development Organization) • **Venezuela: Fente Continental de Mujeres;** Comité de Base "Juana Ramírez, la Avanzadora"; Red Popular de Usuarias de Banmujer • **Viet Nam: GENDCEN (Center for Gender, Environment and Sustainable Development Studies), que@hn.vnn.vn; Vietnam Women's Union, vwunion@netnam.org.vn • Yemen: Yemen NGOs for Children's Rights, fouziaabdallah@yahoo.com • Zambia: WFC (Women for Change), wfc@zamnet.zm** ■

Table of contents

TABLES AND CHARTS IN THE COUNTRY REPORTS

The cost of not daring

It is impossible to give final, uncontroversial answers to hypothetical questions about current events and yet much international debate these days is centred around just such a question: is the world a better place without Saddam Hussein in power? This kind of question inevitably begs another: wouldn't the world be better off if the money and efforts invested in the war in Iraq had been directed elsewhere, for example to helping the poor?[1]

It is difficult to add anything new to the enormous amount of information and comment already circulating around these questions, yet this Social Watch report does precisely that by throwing light on them from another angle - that of the grassroots organisations around the world which are engaged in the frontline of the battle against poverty and discrimination. The voices of civilians are silenced, their sufferings are ignored and even their deaths go uncounted once the logic of war prevails.

The review of the situation in Iraq presented in this Social Watch report has been provided by the Al-Amal Association, the only non-foreign NGO active in the country. A long-time member of the Social Watch international coalition, Al-Amal had been reporting from within the country long before the war, with a critical view both of the Saddam regime and of the US threats against it. With similar independence and courage, Colombian civil society organisations denounce the excesses of both the government and the armed opposition in the decades-long civil war the country is suffering, while Peru provides a dramatic example of how terrorism and state-terrorism combined in making the poor and indigenous people the silent and ignored victims of a "dirty war". That particular "war on terrorism" was being widely covered by local and international press. How was it possible then for the genocide of the indigenous population to go unnoticed at the time? That is the question that Peruvian society is now asking itself in a healthy exercise aimed at avoiding the repetition of those mistakes.

Similarly, thousands of people die easily avoidable deaths[2] *every day around the world without making it to the headlines. Will the world be asking itself in a few years time, like the Peruvians are doing now, why no one took the decisions to prevent them? If so, no decision-maker could argue as an excuse that there were no warnings.*

In a recent interview with Australian Broadcasting Television, World Bank President James Wolfensohn complained of the staggering inequities between government spending on global military expenditure and funding for development programmes. "We're doing about 50 billion dollars for development expenditures and 1,000 billion for military expenditures, and I find that out of balance", he said. Other voices have pointed to even worse consequences: direct civilian casualties, massive human rights violations, growing xenophobia, disrespect for international laws.

It is still too early to assess how much damage this has caused to an international legal and institutional system with the UN at its centre that was carefully crafted over decades after conflicts that took millions of lives. But it is clear that public disbelief in the word of its leaders does not help strengthen democracy.

When governments make promises, a substantial portion of public opinion tends to be sceptical. After all, five centuries ago Niccolò Machiavelli, the founder of what now is called "political science", substantiated this incredulity when he stated that "A prince never lacks legitimate reasons to break his promise." On the other hand, American Pulitzer Prize-winning columnist Herbert Agar found enormous value in promises during the hard times of the Great Depression: "Civilisation rests on a set of promises; if the promises are broken too often, the civilisation dies, no matter how rich it may be, or how mechanically clever. Hope and faith depend on the promises; if hope and faith go, everything goes."

A big promise was made in the year 2000 by the presidents and prime ministers of almost all independent nations in the world: to eradicate poverty from the face of the earth within one generation. (See box.)

And Social Watch was created in 1995 precisely in order to remind governments of the commitments they made to place gender equity and poverty eradication at the top of their national and international agendas. Citizen coalitions from some fifty countries on all continents have been reporting on their findings every year since then. Never before has this role seemed so necessary and so difficult at the same time.

It is for these reasons that instead of asking the national Social Watch coalitions to focus their research for this report on one dimension of the many development goals agreed upon by the international community,[3] *the question put to them was "what in your country are the main obstacles to human security?"*

1 See in this report the articles by Ziad Abdel Samad and by Mirjam van Reisen, Simon Stocker and Florent Sebban for regional views on the relation between "security" and "human security" in the Middle East and in the European Union.

2 See in this report the article by John Foster for an in depth analysis of this situation in relation to the HIV/AIDS pandemia.

3 Previous Social Watch reports have focused on education, on poverty and on essential social services, for example.

The diverse range of answers to this question forms the core of this report.[4] Security certainly includes freedom from fear, and people fear war, terrorism, civil conflict, crime and domestic violence. But those fears cannot be dissociated from fear of unemployment, disease, poverty, exclusion and discrimination.[5] In some cases people even fear the very institutions that should guarantee the security of the nation. In many others, the same imbalance in priorities that Wolfensohn noted on a global scale is also occurring locally. Everywhere lip service is being paid to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) that set global targets to reduce poverty and promote gender equity by 2015, but citizens are not seeing enough action. The World Bank that Wolfensohn presides, while nominally committed to fighting poverty and achieving the MDGs, in reality allocates its funds according to a secret grading system which promotes policies that have quite the opposite effect.[6]

The MDGs should not merely be an opportunity for development institutions like the World Bank to raise more funds from reluctant donor countries, but the actual yardstick against which policies and results are measured. The essential purpose of agreeing on benchmarks and indicators is to allow the public to assess and monitor the performance of their governments and the international institutions they control. At the same time demands by public opinion that promises be kept promote the political will needed to make them a reality.

It is precisely in order to help citizens around the world monitor their authorities that every year Social Watch complements the country assessments produced by the national platforms with comparative international tables. Based on an initiative by the Philippines Social Watch coalition to formulate a "Quality of Life Index" that can be used by grassroots organisations and provides meaningful views of situations at the sub-national level (provinces or municipalities), we developed a similar index for the whole world to complement other analytical tools such as the Human Development Index.

Another innovation in this report is the ranking of countries according to their achievements towards gender equity, in a way that we hope will contribute to the ongoing debate on how to monitor progress in compliance with the legally binding Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).

What the indexes, rankings and assessments for each of the different social development areas show is the persistence of enormous inequalities in the world, with a widening gap between the poor and the rich, as well as substantial efforts by many developing countries to improve the situation of their population. Yet the commitments made by the richer countries have not been met and it is clear that at this pace they will not be by 2015.

It is not enough to class the resulting global performance as insufficient. Concrete responsibilities have to be identified at all levels. Governments not investing enough on health or education are frequently being forced by the International Monetary Fund to make generous payments to foreign creditors or even to keep precious cash idle in the vaults of the banks as reserves to prevent the kind of instabilities that were generated by the very economic policies the Fund recommended. World Bank monies aimed at helping the poor are only disbursed on condition that trade policies are adopted that create urban unemployment and drive small farmers to bankruptcy, or that the essential services that may help people living in poverty are transformed into profit-making operations. None of the promises of a "development round" of trade negotiations have been met and at the World Trade Organization developed countries block all attempts to reform the present unfair trade system in a way that would benefit developing countries. In so many countries corruption among public officials is the most frequent excuse for not raising aid, or even cutting it back, yet corporations bribing those officials into accepting abusive deals are never held accountable in the donor countries where their headquarters are based.[7]

Two millenniums ago, Seneca wrote that "It is not because things are difficult that we do not dare. It is because we do not dare that things are difficult."

None of the measures required to solve these and other problems are technically difficult or politically unviable. In fact, most if not all of them would enjoy massive political support everywhere. Not daring, delaying or failing to take action can only lead to humanity not achieving the minimum goals that have already been agreed upon. And frustrating the hopes of peoples and nations all around the globe will certainly not help make the world a more secure place for our children.

Roberto Bissio
Social Watch Co-ordinator

4 For an analysis of the common and diverse concerns reflected in the national reports, see the article by Karina Batthyány.

5 On what "human security" means for women, this report includes three articles by June Zeitlin and Doris Mpoumou; Marina Durano; and Norma Enríquez and Amanda Muñoz.

6 See in this report the article by Nancy Alexander on the World Bank scorecard for borrowing governments.

7 Related to this issue, Bruno Gurtner writes in this report about how tax evasion deviates billions of dollars from development.

War, money and promises

Thalif Deen

The US-led war on Iraq is threatening to undermine the UN-led global war against poverty.

The deadline to achieve some of the UN-mandated social and economic goals - including the eradication of disease, illiteracy and poverty - is 2015. "But I think the war on Iraq is a setback because it really distracts attention from the fight against poverty. I am worried," says Eveline Herfkens, the United Nations' Executive Coordinator for the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and a former Dutch development minister.

The MDGs, including a pledge to reduce by half the number of people living on less than a dollar a day, were laid out at a special session of the UN General Assembly in September 2000, when world leaders agreed on a Millennium Declaration.

The document also included time-bound targets for achieving universal primary education and gender equality and empowerment.

But non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are expressing fears that the war on Iraq - and the projected rise in global military spending - might have a negative fallout on economic development and the flow of development aid.

"Japan has announced it will scale back its UN contributions even before the war began. The United States has cut allotment to its own Millennium Challenge Account (geared to provide assistance to developing nations). Global trade volumes and international direct investments both fell in 2001. The war almost assures us these figures are unlikely to climb up in the near future," said Saradha Ramaswamy Iyer of the Third World Network in Kuala Lumpur.

"The long term economic impact of the war - the bad and worse outcomes - can only have disastrous effects, particularly in developing countries," she told IPS.

Those effects are likely to leave the weakest and poorest of developing countries more vulnerable than ever before, she added.

Already many countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, are "seriously lagging" behind in achieving the (Millennium) goals, and will therefore have to make additional efforts to meet their targets, Herfkens said.

The funds for implementing these goals have to come mostly from Western donors, including the US, Japan and the 15-member European Union (EU).

According to the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the reconstruction of war-devastated Iraq alone could cost over USD 30 billion in the first three years. But these are funds that may well be diverted from poverty eradication and anti-AIDS programs, says Iyer.

"If the world's richest nations were genuine in their stated desire to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, they need to mobilize the same political will that is now manifest in fighting wars," adds Henry Northover of the London-based Catholic Fund for Overseas Development.

Northover says that one quarter of the USD 26 billion promised by the US for the use of airbases in Turkey could have cancelled the outstanding debt of the whole of sub-Saharan Africa.

"It is a scandal that the lives of millions of the world's poorest people must take second place to the resources that are being used to pursue the war against Iraq," he said.

This week, congressional committees approved a request from US President George W Bush for a hefty USD 75 billion to fund the first six months of the Iraqi war and related anti-terrorism and foreign aid expenses.

Global annual military spending, which reached USD 780 billion in 1999 and USD 840 billion in 2001, is heading for a trillion dollars, according to UN estimates.

The London-based ActionAid says that Official Development Assistance (ODA) from the world's richest to the poorest countries has continued to decline over the last decade. At last count, it was USD 53 billion in 2000, down from USD 56 billion in 1999.

Herfkens is confident that the EU countries will live up to their commitments to reach the target of spending 0.7% of their gross national product (GNP) on ODA before the next decade. In contrast, she said, the US contribution is 0.15% of GNP, although Washington contributes most among the world's countries in dollar terms, about USD 10 billion annually. The collective EU aid budget is about USD 25 billion yearly.

Last year, Bush pledged an "additional" USD 5 billion in aid to developing nations, bringing the US total to USD 15 billion. But Herfkens said it remains to be seen how much of that will really be "additional."

According to published reports, the administration has sought congressional approval for about USD 1.3 billion in additional aid this year, but is likely to receive only about USD 300 million.

Iyer also expressed serious concern over the US trend towards unilateralism. "The biggest worry is that the retreat from multilateralism, as evidenced by the marginalization of both the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the run-up to the war, will spill over into internationally negotiated rules governing trade and finance and take the political steam out of free trade," she added.

A landmark decision on multilateral trade was taken in mid-2001 at the global trade round in Doha, Qatar, when the 145 members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) decided to work towards slashing subsidies and trade barriers in agriculture, which is heavily protected by Western nations. But several targets for the reform of the multilateral trading system have been missed in recent months.

Iyer said that none of the promises made at the Doha meeting, including those related to issues of patents and agricultural subsidies, had been met, and that prospects for the future are not good.

Agricultural subsidies favor 5% of the population of rich nations and impoverish about 90% of the people in the South, she added. The EU's USD 440 billion a year subsidy for cereals, dairy products and sugar has driven African farmers to poverty while America's USD 4 billion subsidy to 25,000 cotton farmers have lowered world prices by a quarter, said Iyer.

"So it was a sign of hypocrisy to talk about poverty eradication in the MDGs on the one hand, and perpetuate it on the other, through trade practices that distorted development."

She pointed out that subsidies per cow in the EU amount to about USD 2.50 per day while subsidies for a cow in Japan equal USD 7.50 per day.

"At the same time, 75% of people in sub-Saharan African lived on less than a dollar a day," she added. *(IPS)* ■

THEMATIC REPORTS

Obstacles to human security

Analysis of the 2004 Social Watch national reports

From the Social Watch national reports it emerges clearly that in industrialised or developed countries the main obstacle to human security is linked to the economic dimension. The main problems are recession, weak growth, economic crises, and deterioration in the quality and conditions of people´s lives. The outstanding obstacles are the lack of equitable parameters in the distribution of social benefits and the provision of access to basic services for all sectors of society. These reports offer a vision of human security which will enable all human beings to live in dignity.

Karina Batthyány

Security has been the subject of a heated debate all over the world, a debate about policies that would make the world and the societies in it more secure, a debate about the factors causing uncertainty, fear and insecurity among people and within States. This debate is complex and involves a wide range of antagonistic opinions. It is an expression of the world's great diversity and a reflection of the varying opinions and positions held by different countries and their policy-making apparatus. In this ongoing and unavoidable global re-assessment of security the concept of *human* security can help shift the focus of the debate in the direction of what humanity really wants rather than what a few States and their specialised security bodies are interested in or perceive.

The concept of human security has different dimensions, and the statistics in the 2004 Social Watch Report are organised around them.

Origins and definition of human security

The concept of human security appeared in the context of research for peace in the 1980s as a counterpoint to the concept of "national security" predominant during the Cold War. It came into widespread use internationally in 1994 when the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) built its *Human Development Report*[1] around it. UNDP maintains that the core of human insecurity is vulnerability and that we must ask ourselves how people can be protected, insisting on their direct involvement and on the close linkage between development and security.

As a starting point, UNDP identified the following eight dimensions of human security (and therefore, human insecurity): economic, financial, food, sanitary, environmental, personal, gender, community and political.

A few years later, governments in countries such as Japan, Norway and Canada adopted the collection of ideas underlying this concept in the design of their foreign policies. They also adopted a list of specific subjects including the prohibition of anti-personnel mines, the control of light arms, the prevention of recruitment of child soldiers, the promotion of International Humanitarian Law, support for new human rights bodies set up by the United Nations, assistance for refugees and participation in peacekeeping operations.

The concept of human security, then, is evolving, and the discussion that it generates is an excellent opportunity to redefine the old security schemes based on military force and to identify the needs of the planet as a whole in all its diversity, aspects which have hardly been considered in general public policies.

According to the Commission on Human Security, human security "means protecting vital freedoms. It means protecting people from critical and pervasive threats and situations, building on their strengths and aspirations. It means creating [political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural] systems that give people the building blocks of survival, dignity and livelihood."[2]

Human security is complementary to the notion of territorial security of the State in that it is more concerned with the individual and the community than with the State itself. It is therefore possible to differentiate clearly between "national security" policies which focus on the State's territorial integrity and the freedom to determine its form of government, and "human security" which emphasises people and communities, and in particular civilians who are in situations of extreme vulnerability, whether owing to war or social and economic marginalisation. Dangers to people's security include threats and situations which, from the point of view of state security, are not always classified as threatening. Moreover, the human security focus widens the range of actors involved in such a way that the State is not the exclusive actor. The aim of human security is not only to protect people but to empower them so that they can fend for themselves.

Leading academics like Economics Nobel Prize winner Amartya Sen have been calling for years for the adoption of this new human security perspective as an instrument for re-thinking the future and for re-assessing the concept of development itself, which is not only related to the growth in per capita income but also with expanding people's freedom and dignity. Sen advocates re-defining the old international institutions that were set up in the 1940s and drawing up an agenda of the changes that are most needed. Among others, he includes trade agreements, patents laws, global health initiatives, universal education, dissemination of technology, environmental policies, foreign debt, conflict management, disarmament, etc. An agenda, in short, that will make human security viable.

The objectives of human security also agree with the Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace and the Millennium Declaration adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1999 and 2000, respectively. Although the idea of human security and the early work in this sphere originated in predominantly Western circles and governments, from the very start the debate acquired an international dimension and has included all the different shades of opinion and divergent positions which characterise the political and cultural diversity of the world. The academic and political debate is centred on whether human security should focus on first generation political rights or whether it should also include second and third generation rights, including the rights to development and to food.

Human security is inclusive and people-centred. It emerges from civil society in an attempt to protect individuals and their communities. It goes beyond issues of territorial defence and military power. And it is based on the notion of personal security, on the understanding that not only the State but also non-State actors and human beings are responsible for development and must become involved in promoting policies and actions that will strengthen people's security and development.

Human security is multi-dimensional. It seeks to define the political, economic, social, cultural and environmental dimensions which affect people's security, and identify traditional and non-traditional threats to security based on the fact that security is not unidimensional but encompasses many spheres.

Human security emphasises association and joint effort, that is to say, multi-lateralism and co-operation. The current international context and the results of globalisation have changed the scale of the problems which were formerly seen from an exclusively national perspective. We are now faced

1 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). *New dimensions of Human Security*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.

2 Human Security Commission. "Final Report" at www.humansecurity-chs.org/finalreport/

with a new international order in which the capacity to interact is essential if States are to recover their ability to work with other actors and generate a system able to meet people's demands at national, regional and international levels.

Human security and human development

In Kofi Annan's view human security "…in its broadest sense, embraces far more than the absence of violent conflict. It encompasses human rights, good governance, access to education and health care and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfil his or her potential. Every step in this direction is also a step towards reducing poverty, achieving economic growth and preventing conflict. Freedom from want, freedom from fear, and the freedom of future generations to inherit a healthy natural environment - these are the interrelated building blocks of human - and therefore national - security."[3]

The paradigm of human development links human security to equity, sustainability, growth and participation, since it allows an assessment of the degree of life security attained by people in society, as well as interpreting the possibilities and challenges that society may encounter in its progress toward full and sustainable human development.

From the perspective of human security, what matters in terms of security is not so much that States and societies should be concerned with guaranteeing peace from external threat, but rather that they should guarantee the minimum conditions for people to be secure and to feel secure in their societies.

Two basic dimensions

There are two basic dimensions to human security. The first is to protect people against chronic threats like hunger, disease and repression; the second is to protect them against sudden and damaging changes in their daily lives, whether it is in the home, in employment or in the community. These threats can have a negative impact on people at all income levels and stages of development in a country.

Human security complements State security, promotes human development and enhances human rights. It is complementary to State security in that it focuses on people and on fighting causes of insecurity which were formerly not considered as specific threats to State security. By contemplating these new types of additional risks it extends the scope of human development beyond the notion of "growth with equity."

What lies at the core of protecting human security is respect for human rights. The promotion of democratic principles is a step toward achieving human security and development in that it permits people to participate in governance structures, thus allowing their voices to be heard. In order to achieve this it is necessary to set up stable institutions which establish the rule of law and empower people.

Human security is only possible when it is based on sustained development. This presupposes security at different levels for all members of society - security from physical danger and threats, income security, security in education, housing security, health security and environmental security.

Threats and obstacles to human security as viewed from the national reports

The Social Watch national reports offer a series of arguments and evidence about the problems and difficulties which put at risk the security of people in different countries.

The possible threats or obstacles can be grouped into seven main dimensions: economic, food, health, personal, community, cultural (including the gender dimension) and political, all of which appear in the different national reports. In country after country it is poverty, economic exclusion, social inequality and food insecurity that stand out as the biggest and most common obstacles to human security.

While this article does not attempt to make a regional analysis in the strict sense of the word, it is possible to identify different problems in different regions of the world or the different ways countries are positioned in the international context.

Thus, it emerges clearly that in industrialised or developed countries the main obstacle to human security is linked to the economic dimension. The main problems mentioned are recession, weak growth, economic crises, and deterioration in the quality and conditions of people's lives. The outstanding obstacles in these countries are the lack of equitable parameters in the distribution of social benefits and the provision of access to basic services for all sectors of society.

On this point, the reports from Portugal, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Germany are very illuminating. The Portuguese report cites the deterioration in people's conditions of life due to the economic crisis and a growing feeling of personal insecurity. Switzerland reports on the poor economic growth since the beginning of the 1990s, and the impact of tax reductions that are making it increasingly difficult to implement social improvements, which means that social inequality in Switzerland will continue to grow. The report from the Netherlands deals with the way economic problems are affecting social security, and to what extent they also affect tolerance and hospitality toward immigrants. The report from Germany also mentions these problems and dwells on the obstacles to human security that stem from fiscal problems and the reduction in expenditure on social welfare.

Poverty and economic inequity

An issue which recurs again and again in the reports from developing countries is poverty and the resulting deterioration in the living conditions of millions of people. There is no doubt that poverty stands out as one of the biggest obstacles to human security.

The seriousness of this problem appears eloquently in the reports from Algeria, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Kenya, Nepal, Nigeria, Panama and Uganda, to mention only a few.

Poverty is closely linked to other obstacles. The Algerian report lists the main threats to human security as "widespread and increasing poverty, frequent terrorist attacks and natural disasters". In Kenya, poverty and organised crime are the biggest obstacles. Again, in Panama poverty affects 40% of the population, so the biggest challenge to human security is the fight to contain it, particularly in rural areas, and to ensure that the population receives the minimum services it requires. The report from Colombia explains that it will not be possible to guarantee full human security while war, poverty and inequality continue to worsen.

Conditions that go hand in hand with poverty, like unemployment and economic inequity are also cited in reports from countries such as Bolivia and El Salvador.

These are situations of economic insecurity framed in the context of generalised extreme poverty. Two key elements in the fight toward eradicating poverty are the setting up of markets that operate adequately, and the creation of institutions outside the market. A number of the reports suggest that the essential issues are a fair distribution of wealth and economic growth which will benefit people living in extreme poverty.

Besides chronic poverty, other obstacles to human security are unfavourable economic conditions, the social impact of economic crises, and natural disasters. Social policies which meet people's basic needs and guarantee minimum economic and social conditions are required if the people affected by the crises are to have real security or some way of escaping from poverty. Three quarters of the world population do not have social security protection or do not have a guaranteed job.

Another aspect is the different obstacles that are rooted in gender. It is vitally important that everyone should have access to land tenure and/or ownership, access to credit, education and housing, particularly in the case of poor women.

The equitable distribution of resources is perceived as crucial for guaranteeing the means of life. Moreover, social protection measures and security networks can contribute to establishing minimum social and economic conditions for the most vulnerable sectors of the population.

3 Kofi Annan. "Secretary-General Salutes International Workshop on Human Security in Mongolia." Two-Day Session in Ulaanbaatar. 8-10 May 2000. Press Release SG/SM/7382. www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20000508.sgsm7382.doc.html

Health security

Another subject which stands out in the reports is health security, that is, health as an element in human security. In spite of the progress made in health care, more than 20 million people died in the past year from diseases that could have been prevented. Health is an essential component because the very foundation of security is the protection of human life, and good health is a precondition for social stability.

Three big health problems are identified as closely linked to human security: infectious diseases, health threats related to poverty, and the dangers to health resulting from violence, conflicts and war.

The most serious problems in this area are infantile mortality and HIV/AIDS. There is a close relation between child mortality and poverty, since the direct causes of the latter are malnutrition, lack of drinking water and adequate sanitation, infections, poor food and lack of medical attention. A further vulnerable point is the increase in the numbers of HIV/AIDS victims, particularly evident in sub-Saharan Africa and Brazil.

Governance problems, political insecurity and corruption

As well as the economic and sanitary dimensions to human security there are other threats which have to do with people's security in the political and social spheres. These include the weakness of democratic governance and the instability of political systems. These dimensions of vulnerability lead to violence in a number of countries such as Colombia, Nepal, Nigeria and Uganda.

Governments across the world have developed national security plans in the framework of the global fight against terrorism, but this has not contributed to alleviate the political insecurity prevailing in many countries. The national reports emphasise the need for democratic conditions, good governance and political security as pre-requisites for human security.

In many countries human security is jeopardised by corruption, discrimination based on race, sex, ethnic origin, religion or political orientation, as well as political insecurity and the absence of democratic possibilities.

Different forms of violence

Another group of obstacles to human security mentioned in the reports, principally those from Africa and Latin America, are those connected to different kinds of violence such as urban violence, murder, organised crime, armed conflicts and terrorist attacks.

Criminal networks are clearly on the rise, causing urban violence to increase, particularly in Latin America. The country that stands out is Brazil, where one of the main obstacles to human security is urban violence in general, especially urban violence aimed at poor young people. The murder rate is nearly ten times higher in this population sector than for the country as a whole.

There is a greater awareness that among the different kinds of violence reported, it is women and children who are the main victims. According to the reports, gender-related violence is on the increase.

The social inequalities of gender

Finally, special attention should be paid to the problems of gender. In general, the overall panorama of human security for women is bleak, expressed by non-recognition of the specific rights of women, particularly with respect to work and reproductive health rights, and violence against women in various different spheres.

Although the question of gender is addressed in the reports from a number of developed countries, it is the developing counties that show particular concern and interest in providing options and opportunities for those who have never had them - education for girls, protection for women against domestic violence and violence in the workplace, and access for all women to real political and economic power. The emphasis placed on the dimensions affecting gender equity is determined by the reality in each different country.

Three obstacles

To sum up, the three most serious obstacles to human security are, firstly, threats to the security of individuals and their communities, in particular to the most vulnerable sectors of society; secondly, conflicts, threats and different kinds of violence (inter-State conflicts, breakdown of States, human rights violations, terrorism, organised crime, etc.); and thirdly, poverty and economic exclusion.

The national reports offer a vision of human security which will enable all human beings to live in conditions of justice, equity, freedom, tolerance, good health, and to have access to adequate food, education and a healthy environment. In other words, the conditions that allow us to live in dignity. ■

Judge and jury: the World Bank's scorecard for borrowing governments

The World Bank uses a controversial "one-size-fits-all" scorecard - the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) to rate each borrowing government. The CPIA ratings are prepared annually and consist of 20 criteria (grouped in four clusters) related to a government's policy and institutional performance. The CPIA rating system may represent a new and more powerful kind of conditionality that interferes in a country's domestic affairs. Rather than reward governments for promises to adopt loan conditions, CPIA helps make it possible to reward those that have already conformed to donor and creditor policy preferences. Many poor and/or heavily indebted governments see compliance with these policy preferences as essential to maintaining their lifeline to external aid and debt relief.

Citizens' Network on Essential Services

Nancy Alexander[1]

I. An overview of the CPIA rating system

A. What is the CPIA?

Every year, the World Bank rates the economic, social and political performance of each borrowing government by the extent of its compliance with its own definition of "good" policies and institutions. For this purpose, it uses an instrument called the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA).

As described in Part B, below, the CPIA rates the policy and institutional performance of each government relative to 20 criteria (grouped in four clusters). The World Bank uses its ratings of individual governments as diagnostic tools to help: 1) allocate loan and grant resources among borrowers, 2) determine the policy direction of new operations, and 3) establish debt relief targets.

The World Bank's staff uses a formula to divide up the funds available for low-income countries that includes "need" (income per capita) and "performance." For the fiscal years 2003 to 2005, the Bank established resource allocations that were nearly five times higher for the governments in the top-performing quintile than for those in the poorest-performing quintile.[2]

B. What does the CPIA rate?

The CPIA rates countries primarily on the basis of current performance in relation to twenty, equally-weighted criteria that are grouped into four clusters:[3]

- *Economic management,* including management of inflation and current account; fiscal policy; management of external debt; and management and sustainability of the development program.
- *Structural policies,* including trade policy and foreign exchange regime; financial stability and depth; banking sector efficiency and resource mobilization; competitive environment for the private sector; factor and product markets; and policies and institutions for environmental sustainability.
- *Policies for social inclusion*, including gender equity and equality of economic opportunity, equity of public resource use, building human resources, safety nets; and poverty monitoring and analysis.
- *Public sector management and institutions*, including property rights and rule-based governance; quality of budgetary and financial management; efficiency of revenue mobilization; efficiency of public expenditures; and transparency, accountability and corruption in the public sector.

As described in Part D, country performance is judged not only relative to these policy clusters, but also relative to governance and portfolio performance.

According to the Bank, the purpose of the CPIA is to measure a country's policy and institutional development framework for poverty reduction, sustainable growth and effective use of development assistance. The view presented here is that the CPIA rates the extent to which a government has: a) adopted neoliberal economic policies (i.e., liberalization and privatization in the context of strict budget discipline) and b) developed institutions, particularly those that protect property rights and promote a business-friendly environment.

In this sense, the CPIA derives its prescriptive approach from the World Bank Group's recent mandate, articulated in its Private Sector Development (PSD) Strategy.[4] Among other things, CPIA-derived policy prescriptions focus on the PSD Strategy's call for governments to improve the climate for businesses and expand the privatization "frontier" into basic services - health care, education, and, particularly, water and energy. (The IMF, World Bank and WTO define the "private sector" as including both for-profit firms and not-for-profit agencies or NGOs.)

Since the Board of Executive Directors adopted the PSD Strategy, the management of the World Bank Group has been tasked with ensuring that all institutional and sector strategies and action plans conform to the PSD Strategy. Recently, the World Bank Group has become more balanced in rhetorical presentations of its approach to the respective roles of the public and private sectors. However, its newer (and forthcoming) loan and guarantee instruments, as well as new collaborations between arms of the World Bank, are significantly focused on promoting the role of the private sector.[5]

C. Is there a plan to disclose all of the CPIA ratings?

Not yet. The World Bank keeps the *nominal* ratings of all its borrowers entirely secret. The Bank does disclose the *relative* ratings - that is, ratings of the performance of borrowers relative to one another - of nearly 80 *low-income* governments. (See Appendix, "CPIA Ratings for 2003.") However, as shown in Table 1, only the relative ratings of government performance on *clusters of criteria* are disclosed, not the ratings of government performance on each of the *twenty criteria that comprise the clusters.*

Until recently, the Bank's staff discussed CPIA ratings with those governments that were performing well, but only rarely did such discussions take place with poorly-performing governments. Today, the Bank is beginning to educate its borrowers about the rating system and discuss their current CPIA ratings with them. After disclosing all of the ratings to multilateral and bilateral donors and creditors, the Bank plans to disclose them to the public.

In late 2003, members of the Bank's Board of Executive Directors had diverse views disclosing the CPIA ratings. Different members favored:

- Rapid disclosure;
- Delayed disclosure;

1 Nancy Alexander is Director of the Citizens' Network on Essential Services. www.servicesforall.org

2 The population-weighted average per capita per annum (PCPA) allocation shows a substantial range: from USD 2.4 for the bottom quintile to USD 12 - or five times as much for the top quintile in its fiscal year 2004-2006 calculations. This ratio was 4.6 in the fiscal year 2003-2005 exercise. See International Development Association (IDA), "Allocating IDA Funds Based on Performance: Fourth Annual Report on IDA's Country Assessment and Allocation Process". March 2003, p. 8. IDA is the branch of the World Bank that gives loans to low-income countries. The International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) are two other branches of the World Bank Group.

3 Detailed descriptions of these clusters and criteria appear in the Appendix.

4 The World Bank Group's Board of Executive Directors adopted the PSD Strategy as their new corporate blueprint on 26 February 2002. The PSD Strategy would provide businesses with greater incentives to invest in low-income countries. For instance, the World Bank Group is designing and launching new loan, grant and guarantee products that, among other things, a) subsidize corporate costs of making utility network to poor households and reducing their consumption costs; b) extend a higher volume of loans and guarantees to local-level governments, particularly for implementing private provision, and c) compensate corporations for losses arising from devaluations in local currency. The Bank's private sector arm, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), is working closely with IDA on the privatization agenda in low-income countries, despite the fact that these countries have little or no regulatory capacity. Moreover, PRSPs are being evaluated, in part, by the extent to which they promote the private sector.

5 International Development Association. "Allocating IDA Funds Based on Performance". March 2003, p. 1.

- No disclosure out of concern that it would jeopardize the ability of some countries to attract foreign direct investment and other financial flows;
- A more objective and robust CPIA rating methodology prior to the disclosure of ratings. To this end, an external review panel recently completed its report on the CPIA rating system.[6]
- Greater country "voice." Some Board members are concerned that developing countries have no ownership of the CPIA process and feel that the Bank's management should not just teach governments about the CPIA system. They feel that other donors and creditors as well as governments, themselves, should participate in the rating process as equal "partners" with the Bank.

Low-income country governments did not consent to the Bank's disclosure of their cluster scores. Many Bank borrowers, including many of the World Bank's African Governors, adamantly oppose the Bank's proposed disclosure of all criteria scores as well. However, low-income countries may have little choice about whether further disclosure will take place. The Bank exacerbates a double standard when borrowers' income levels determine whether the Bank will ignore or respect their voices. Such unequal treatment of borrowing countries violates the Bank's mandate.[7]

D. How is the CPIA used to allocate funds to low-income countries?

As noted above, the World Bank divides up its funds for low-income countries taking into account both "need" (income per capita) and "performance." The CPIA is an important input in calculating a government's performance rating. In order to establish a government's overall performance rating (i.e. the IDA Country Performance - ICP Rating), the Bank ensures that scores are consistent within each, and across all, regions in performing the following calculations:

- The CPIA (comprised of the four clusters listed in Part B above) accounts for 80% of a government's rating.
- The Bank also rates each government's performance on the portfolio of outstanding loans. This rating counts for 20% of a government's rating. It measures how well a government manages its loan resources, including how well it achieves timely disbursement through efficient procurement practices.
- Finally, the level of grants and loans to which a borrowing government has access will then increase or decrease as a result of the Bank's application of a "governance factor" to the government's CPIA and portfolio performance ratings.[8] Each country's "governance factor" is derived from selected ratings, including the quality of its overall development program and its public sector management and institutions. The governance factor is therefore given a very high weight relative to other criteria. In recent years, the application of a governance factor has reduced the resource allocation to some countries by as much as 50%.[9]

TABLE 1

CPIA disclosure policy

BORROWING COUNTRIES	RELATIVE CLUSTER SCORES (IN QUINTILES)	RELATIVE CRITERIA SCORES	ABSOLUTE CLUSTER AND CRITERIA SCORES (NUMERICAL ON A SCALE FROM 1 TO 6)
Low-Income IDA Countries	**YES**. Disclosed in performance quintiles (see appendix)	**NO** DISCLOSURE	**NO** DISCLOSURE
Other IBRD Countries	**NO** DISCLOSURE	**NO** DISCLOSURE	**NO** DISCLOSURE

CHART 1

IDA Country Performance Rating



Source: "Allocating IDA Funds Based on Performance". International Development Association, March 2003.

E. What is controversial about the Bank's rating of the performance of borrowing governments?

- Most development practitioners are critical of a system, such as the CPIA's, that approximates a "one-size-fits-all" set of "good" policies and "good" institutions. For instance, there is little agreement about what constitutes "good" trade policy. Even where there is agreement on general policy principles, there are still disagreements, even among neoliberal economists, about the pace, sequence and implementation of these policies, as well as their impacts, such as short-term distributional effects.
- The Bank's methodology for evaluating a country's governance, e.g., its accountability to its citizens, is wildly unreliable. Yet, the CPIA assigns greater weight to the governance factor than to any other set of indicators. The governance indicator now in fashion is the Kaufmann-Kraay indicator from the World Bank. Yet the inventors of this indicator, themselves, openly concede that it has an extremely high margin of error.
- When scores relating to certain criteria (governance, gender, government accountability) constrain or shape fundamental decisions relating to resource allocation and the role of the government, the process may violate the Articles of Agreement of the World Bank Group, which prohibit interference in a country's domestic political affairs.[10]
- The rating system may further exacerbate unequal treatment of countries by inducing governments with less power and resources to comply with CPIA-derived prescriptions, while wealthier and more powerful countries do as they please. For example, the IMF and World Bank have induced governments - particularly the poorer ones - to adopt some rules of trade agreements that have not even been

6 As of this writing, the panel does not know whether its report will be disclosed.

7 For instance, the Bank has given IBRD borrowers discretion over the decision of whether or not to disclose their CASs, whereas low-income countries have had no choice. Moreover, unlike IDA borrowers, IBRD borrowers are not required to prepare a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). IBRD borrowers have refused to have their sovereignty compromised by the process of preparing and presenting a PRSP to the IFIs' Boards for "endorsement."

8 The methodology involves finding a weighted average of the CPIA score and the portfolio performance score and multiplying the result by the "governance factor" to produce the country's IDA Performance Rating.

9 International Development Association, "IDA's Performance-Based Allocation System: Current and Emerging Issues". October 2003, p. 2. Currently, the weight of the governance factor is projected to decline relative to other factors.

10 Such interference is routine, but not usually recognized as such. For instance, the Bank's "Strategic Communications Toolkit on Privatization" (2002) instructs Bank staff about how to put together majorities in the parliaments of borrowing countries to approve Bank-supported privatization legislation.

negotiated![11] More prosperous countries have greater autonomy.

- The Bank is the wrong institution to rate performance in areas where it has a weak record and little applied knowledge (institutional development, gender equality, and labor-intensive growth). Moreover, the United Nations has a stronger mandate to work in the political arena and assess governance than does the World Bank.
- In today's world, many domestic policy decisions are strongly influenced by external factors (exogenous shocks, such as drops in commodity prices; natural disasters; erratic donor and other financial flows; and the CPIA process itself). Hence, the CPIA rating can punish governments for factors that are beyond their power to control.
- There is too little debate about the legitimacy of a rating system that encompasses such a broad range of political, social and economic performance criteria. Nor is there much debate about the implications of the system for the policy autonomy of borrowers - particularly low-income borrowers. Instead of addressing such fundamental issues, donors and creditors are competing over who has the best rating system.

F. What happens when a government flunks the CPIA?

Countries that receive low CPIA scores are usually also designated as Low-Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS). (See Appendix for countries that receive transposed scores of "D" or "F".) Donors and creditors assume responsibility for many functions of the so-called "failed" governments of LICUS countries. In 2002, donors and creditors are establishing a range of mechanisms, such as the Independent Service Authority (ISA), in each of 30 LICUS countries. These mechanisms permit donors and creditors to manage finances and contract out public services to private (including NGO and inter-governmental) providers.[12]

G. Do "good policies" (as indicated by the CPIA) foster economic growth?

Prominent World Bank economists, such as David Dollar, use CPIA statistics to prove, among other things, that governments with "good policies" (as defined by the CPIA) prosper and make good use of foreign aid and credit. This important claim is the basis for the "selectivity" policies of donors and creditors, through which donors and creditors increasingly allocate lending toward governments that have adopted "good policies." For instance, World Bank lending concentrates on three of India's 24 states that are committed to implementing private sector development.[13]

One team of independent economists, led by William Easterly,[14] has had privileged access to the mostly secret CPIA database - and was therefore able to assess the World Bank's claim that there is a correlation between "good policies" and economic growth in developing countries. However, when using an expanded CPIA data set, Easterly's team could not replicate Dollar's results, concluding instead that "foreign aid does not raise growth in a good policy environment."[15]

The World Bank's own internal evaluators issue a warning against interpreting any Bank research as finding that "good policies" as measured by the CPIA from 1977 to 2000 help explain good economic growth.[16]

II. How can the CPIA undercut sovereignty?

A. One path for all?

Many of the CPIA rating criteria imply that good government performance is achieved by hard-earned progress toward the preferred policies of the Bretton Woods institutions (e.g., complete trade liberalization; budget surpluses) rather than by tailoring policies to respond to a country's specific conditions, much less to preferences of citizens (even substantial majorities) or their elected representatives.

This World Bank rating system approximates a "one-size-fits-all" approach to policy-making for all developing and transition country borrowers. Bank-financed operations are contingent upon the government's compliance with the institution's policy prescriptions, including those that are intended to remedy its performance weaknesses, *as assessed by the CPIA*.

It is true that governments routinely transmit requests to the World Bank through instruments, such as Letters of Development Policy, that espouse commitments to certain policies. However, these letters are often drafted by the Bank itself. Even when governments themselves articulate policy commitments, they often do so in order to access loan resources, not because of domestic approval of the policies. Thus, when the Bank embeds these commitments in policy conditions with which governments are obliged to comply, it can further undercut not only democratic decision-making processes, but also the institutional ownership necessary to sustain policy implementation.

B. The CPIA and policy conditionality: at odds with country ownership?

The CPIA rating system - particularly its evaluation of the quality of a borrower's governance - may represent a new and more powerful kind of conditionality that interferes in a country's domestic affairs. Rather than reward governments for promises to adopt loan conditions, the CPIA enables the World Bank to reward those that have *already* conformed to its policy preferences. *There is absolutely no borrowing country involvement in, or ownership of the CPIA process*. Hence, when the impetus for economic reforms and debt relief agreements is traced to influential instruments, such as the CPIA, that lack any borrower ownership or involvement, the legitimacy of the reforms can be challenged.

C. The CPIA and the PRSP

The IMF and World Bank promised that a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) would set forth the government's own priorities which, in turn, would guide operations financed by donors and creditors. However, the sovereignty of governments is compromised because:

- The institutions have broken this promise. In practice, the World Bank's CPIA can be more influential than the PRSP in shaping key economic policies in borrowing countries. As noted above, the World Bank will require a government to remedy weaknesses in its CPIA rating in order to qualify for more financing or debt relief. Moreover, a government's budget targets, including the budget ceiling for the priority actions identified by a PRSP, must conform to the IMF's conception of "realistic" targets.
- Donors and creditors promote CPIA priorities as they play a major role in preparation of each government's PRSP. Indeed, the influence of external actors can overshadow the influence of domestic constituencies, even parliamentarians. The process of formulating PRSPs can displace more "homegrown" policy-making processes.[17]
- CPIA-derived policy prescriptions can override the policy priorities of citizens and elected officials. Domestic constituencies are unaware of their government's CPIA ratings and the implications of those ratings for public policies.

11 The IMF and World Bank require that governments adopt procedures for establishing "transparency in procurement," when in Cancun 169 developing countries opposed opening trade negotiations on that issue. Even more outrageously, the Bank has proposed binding loan conditions that require borrowers to adopt laws calling for "national treatment" in government procurement. This means that governments would need to treat foreign providers (e.g., water, health care, education providers) the same as domestic providers in every regard, including equivalent subsidies. (See Ghana's July 2003 Poverty Reduction Support Credit.)

12 The World Bank's *World Development Report 2004* describes the role of ISAs on p. 215. Due to the special situation of LICUS countries, the World Bank is designing a new performance rating scale that will differentiate more clearly among them.

13 The Bank is working particularly closely with Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and Andra Pradesh. Although Andra Pradesh has followed Bank prescriptions for seven years, its growth rate has stagnated.

14 Until recently, Easterly was a senior economist of the World Bank.

15 Communication from W Easterly to the author, 27 February 2004.

16 As quoted in Herman, Barry, "How Should Measurements of an Enabling Environment for Development Be Used?" Discussion paper for 18th Technical Group Meeting of the Group of 24. Geneva, 8-9 March 2004.

17 When Senegal attempted an autonomous policy approach in its "10th Economic and Social Development Plan for 2002-2007", the IMF and World Bank concluded that the PRSP should supplant this homegrown plan, which they characterized as "a thing of the past".

What is the PRSP?

The CAS? The MDGs?

The PRSP. The IMF and World Bank require that each low-income country prepare a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) - a three-year "national development strategy" - in order to qualify for external financing and debt relief. In preparing a PRSP, governments often solicit input from a wide variety of domestic constituencies. Ostensibly, a principal purpose of the PRSP is to strengthen country ownership of its development future. However, ownership may not materialize since, among other things, donors and creditors have a major role in preparing the PRSP. Moreover, each PRSP must be endorsed by the Boards of Executive Directors of the IMF and World Bank.

The PRSP is supposed to provide a framework for external assistance, but this is not always the case. The Bank is selective about what PRSP-endorsed policies are integrated into its CAS.

The CAS. For each borrowing government, the Bank prepares a Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) which outlines prospective Bank investments over a medium-term (e.g., three-year) time horizon and stipulates which policy conditions (i.e., "performance triggers") a government is required to implement. The document is significant because it identifies which Bank-financed operations will actually be implemented on the ground in cooperation with other creditors and donors.

Years ago, Bank leadership proposed that the CAS constitute a contract between the Bank and a borrowing government. This proposal was rejected. Hence, at present, the CAS is solely owned by the Bank.

The MDGs. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) aim to halve the proportion of people in poverty by the year 2015. The PRSP is the "roadmap" to the MDGs. Hence, achievement of the MDGs is highly dependent upon CPIA-derived policy prescriptions which guide the implementation of operations financed by the World Bank (as articulated in its CAS) in collaboration with other donors and creditors. ■

D. The CPIA and the CAS: raising the costs of non-compliance?

In each Country Assistance Strategy (CAS), the Bank specifies the policy conditions (i.e., triggers) that the government must accomplish in order to retain or increase its access to resources. The Bank stipulates that these triggers should be derived from the CPIA performance rating. A 2003 Bank paper stated that the main policy prescriptions included in the CAS are "increasingly focused on aspects of the CPIA that are shown to be weak. The triggers can also include policy targets from the PRSP, *to the extent that they are expected to strengthen policy and institutional performance*." [18] (Emphasis added.)

When a government fails to comply with a policy condition attached to a loan it may lose access to future installments of that loan. However, when a policy condition is contained in the World Bank's CAS for a government, non-compliance has far greater consequences. A non-compliant government may lose access to a *succession of loans* and, in some cases, the World Bank may terminate assistance to an entire sector or country and, with the IMF, suspend debt relief.

Because the Bank-owned CAS only selectively includes policy targets from the government-owned PRSP, the Bank's development plan may reflect different priorities than a government has espoused.

E. The CPIA and the MDGs

Although the PRSP is supposed to be the "roadmap" for achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, the influence of the CPIA over the PRSP underscores the lack of ownership that governments have over their own development future. Moreover, the achievement of MDGs significantly depends upon whether the neoliberal policy preferences embedded in the CPIA can help overcome poverty and deprivation. There is more evidence to rebut this claim than to support it.[19] Accordingly, it is legitimate to ask: Who is responsible for achieving the MDGs? *Governments*, which may need to adopt CPIA-derived policies in order to maintain their financial lifeline to donors and creditors? Or, *the donors and creditors* that drive the development process "from behind"?

F. The CPIA and debt relief for low-income countries.

It appears likely that the calculation of a government's debt distress and debt relief will no longer hinge primarily on its ratio of debt to exports, as is currently the case. Instead, it is likely to be calculated on the basis of a government's debt burdens; the quality of its policies and institutions, as measured by the CPIA; and shocks.[20]

III. Conclusion

Donors and creditors dominate the policy-making of low-income countries more than ever before. The CPIA represents a policy straightjacket. No matter what a country's own development strategy (or PRSP) says, a country is likely to adhere to CPIA-derived policy prescriptions if it expects to retain external support. Governments are in a double bind if citizens and elected officials choose a path other than that specified by CPIA-derived priorities. Because of instruments like the CPIA, country "ownership" of the development process can be a mirage.[21]

The CPIA rating system undercuts democracy in borrowing countries by constraining the policy choices available to citizens and their elected officials. If donors and other multilateral creditors adopt the CPIA rating system, then a policy cartel wielding most aid, credit, and debt relief will have an even more profound consequence for democracy and development.

The CPIA straightjacket is one indicator of the increasingly ideological approach to policy-making. Harvard Professor Dani Rodrik concludes that, "The broader the sway of market discipline, the narrower will be the space for democratic governance… International economic rules must incorporate 'opt-out' or exit clauses [that] allow democracies to reassert their priorities when these priorities clash with obligations to international economic institutions. These must be viewed not as 'derogations' or violations of the rules, but as a generic part of sustainable international economic arrangements."[22] Occasionally, such exits from obligations are possible for large borrowers from the IMF and World Bank, but the institutions discriminate against low-income countries.

The Rodrik approach is minimalist insofar as it would allow governments to opt out of commitments which they made, freely or under duress, to the IMF and World Bank. However, the ideal - so often proclaimed and so little practiced - would invite governments and their citizens to authorship as well as ownership of their national strategies.

To put these heretical ideas into perspective, one might reasonably ask what kind of CPIA rating *industrialized* country governments might receive? Developing country governments are not given the same flexibility that their wealthier counterparts claim for themselves when determining whether or when to liberalize, privatize or exercise greater budgetary discipline. For instance, if the United States and the European Union were subject to CPIA review, their current fiscal policies would result in austerity measures that are politically unimaginable. From blatant protectionism to market distorting subsidies and ballooning deficits, everyday policies of the governments that control the IMF and World Bank reveal a shocking double standard that makes a mockery of national sovereignty for most of the world's countries. ■

18 World Bank, "Country Assistance Strategies: Retrospective and Future Directions". 14 March 2003, p. 49.

19 Importantly, Weisbrot and Baker find that growth rates in every region were higher in the period 1960-1980, before the introduction of structural adjustment, than in the period 1980-1997. Similarly, Easterly finds an inverse correlation between the number of adjustment loans made per year and developing country growth rates. See also King, Lawrence P. *The Emperor Exposed: Neoliberal Theory and De-Modernization in Post Communist Society*. Yale University, 2002.

20 See Kraay, Aart and Vikram Nehru, "When is External Debt Sustainable," World Bank Working Paper. 28 January 2004.

21 The exceptions would be countries that are large or do not depend heavily on external financing, and can take an independent stand. Such countries, like China, often borrow significant sums from the IFIs but lack crippling debt burdens.

22 Rodrik, Dani. "Four Simple Principles for Democratic Governance of Globalization". Harvard University, May 2001. www.demglob.de/rodrikpaper.html

Appendix:

I. Country performance ratings for 2003

For each policy cluster in the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), the Bank applies numerical performance ratings from 1 (low) to 6 (high). The charts in this paper convert these numbers to five "letter" grades (A,B,C,D and F). The reason for presenting the data this way is that the Bank itself places each government in one of five quintiles, based upon the quality of its performance in each area. Quintiles display the performance of governments *relative* to one another, whereas the real, undisclosed data present nominal scores. The following tables present the World Bank's aggregated performance ratings of *low-income* borrowing governments relative to one another. (All ratings for other World Bank's borrowers are secret.) While the letter grades and the quintiles from which they are derived are not exact representations of the numeric scores, they are still highly indicative.

To produce each country's overall performance rating, the Bank applies a heavily-weighted "governance factor" to the weighted average of the CPIA score (which counts for 80% of the overall rating) plus the government's portfolio performance score (which counts for 20%). In other words, in order to obtain the IDA country rating, the Bank applies the (absolute) rating of the "governance factor" in column "A" to the averaged (absolute) ratings in columns "B" and "C."[23]

23 Some countries have not been rated and do not appear in any of the tables below, e.g., Afghanistan, Liberia, Myanmar, Somalia, Timor-Leste. An entry of "N/R" indicates that the country was not rated in that category.

Country Performance Ratings for 2003

	IDA Country Rating	A Governance	B Overall CPIA Rating	1 Economic Management	2 Structural Policies	3 Social Inclusion	4 Public Sector	C Portfolio Performance
Europe/Central Asia								
Albania	C	C	C	C	B	C	D	B
Armenia	A	B	A	A	A	B	B	A
Azerbaijan	B	B	B	A	C	D	C	A
Bosnia & Herzegovina	B	B	B	B	B	C	C	B
Georgia	D	D	C	D	D	B	F	C
Kyrgyzstan	C	C	C	C	D	B	D	C
Moldova	C	C	C	D	C	C	D	C
Serbia & Montenegro	B	B	C	C	C	A	C	D
Tajikistan	D	D	D	D	F	D	F	B
Uzbekistan	F	F	F	F	F	C	F	C
Latin America and the Caribbean								
Bolivia	C	D	B	C	B	B	B	D
Dominica	B	B	C	F	A	B	B	C
Grenada	A	A	A	B	A	A	A	C
Guyana	B	C	C	C	C	D	C	A
Haiti	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	N/R
Honduras	B	B	A	C	A	A	B	D
Nicaragua	B	B	A	C	A	A	A	F
St. Lucia	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	B
St. Vincent & the Grenadines	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	F
Africa								
Angola	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	C
Benin	A	A	B	B	A	F	B	A
Burkina Faso	B	B	B	A	C	B	A	D
Burundi	D	D	F	D	F	F	F	A
Cameroon	C	D	C	B	B	D	D	D
Cape Verde	A	A	A	B	A	A	A	A
Central African Republic	F	F	F	F	D	F	F	F
Chad	D	D	D	C	D	D	D	F
Comoros	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	D
Congo, Dem. Rep.	D	D	D	D	F	F	F	C
Congo, Rep.	D	D	D	D	D	F	D	C
Côte d'Ivoire	D	D	D	F	C	F	C	F

Country Performance Ratings for 2003

	IDA Country Rating	A Governance	B Overall CPIA Rating	1 Economic Management	2 Structural Policies	3 Social Inclusion	4 Public Sector	C Portfolio Performance
Djibouti	D	D	D	D	C	D	D	D
Eritrea	D	D	D	F	F	B	C	C
Ethiopia	C	B	C	C	F	C	B	C
Gambia	C	C	D	D	C	D	D	D
Ghana	A	A	B	C	B	B	A	D
Guinea	D	D	D	F	D	D	D	D
Guinea-Bissau	F	D	F	F	F	F	F	F
Kenya	C	C	C	C	C	C	B	F
Lesotho	C	C	C	B	C	D	B	F
Madagascar	A	A	B	B	B	B	B	A
Malawi	B	B	C	D	C	B	B	C
Mali	B	C	B	A	C	C	B	C
Mauritania	A	A	A	A	B	B	A	A
Mozambique	B	B	C	C	D	C	C	C
Niger	D	D	D	C	D	D	D	D
Nigeria	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Rwanda	B	A	B	C	B	C	B	C
Sao Tome & Principe	D	C	F	F	F	F	D	B
Senegal	B	B	A	A	A	C	B	C
Sierra Leone	D	C	D	D	D	D	D	D
Sudan	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	N/R
Tanzania	A	A	A	A	B	A	A	C
Togo	F	F	F	F	D	F	F	F
Uganda	A	A	A	A	A	A	B	B
Zambia	C	C	C	D	B	C	B	C
Zimbabwe	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
South Asia/East Asia/ the Pacific								
Bangladesh	C	D	B	A	B	B	D	F
Bhutan	A	A	A	A	C	A	A	A
Cambodia	F	F	D	C	F	D	F	F
India	A	A	A	A	B	B	A	C
Indonesia	C	D	B	B	B	B	C	D
Kiribati	D	C	D	B	F	F	C	N/R
Lao PDR	D	F	F	D	F	D	F	A
Maldives	C	C	A	B	A	B	A	F
Mongolia	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C
Nepal	B	B	B	A	B	D	B	D
Pakistan	B	C	B	B	A	C	A	C
Papua New Guinea	F	F	F	F	D	F	F	N/R
Samoa	A	B	A	A	A	C	A	B
Sri Lanka	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	F
Solomon Islands	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Tonga	F	F	D	D	F	C	D	C
Vanuatu	F	F	D	D	F	F	C	N/R
Viet Nam	C	D	A	A	D	A	C	C
Middle East/North Africa								
Yemen	B	C	B	A	D	C	C	C

II. Rating criteria

The Bank rates each low-income country government on twenty criteria using a numerical scale (from 1 to 6). The 2002 version of these criteria is summarized as follows. Few changes have been made in the 2003 version.[24]

A. Economic management

- **Management of inflation and current account.** Countries with the highest rating (6) have not needed a stabilization program for three years or more. Countries with the lowest rating (1) have needed, but have not had, an acceptable program for three years or more.
- **Fiscal Policy.** Countries with high ratings have fiscal policies consistent with overall macroeconomic conditions and generate a fiscal balance that can be financed sustainably for the foreseeable future, including by aid flows where applicable.
- **Management of external debt.** Ratings take into account the existence and amount of any arrears; whether and how long the country has been current on debt service; the maturity structure of the debt; likelihood of rescheduling, and future debt service obligations in relation to export prospects and reserves.
- **Management and sustainability of the development program.** Degree to which the management of the economy and the development program reflect: technical competence; sustained political commitment and public support and participatory processes through which the public can influence decisions.

B. Structural policies

- **Trade policy and foreign exchange regime.** How well the policy framework fosters trade and capital movements. Countries with a high grade have low (10% or less) average tariffs (weighted by global trade flows) with low dispersion and insignificant or no quantitative restrictions or export taxes. There are no trading monopolies. Indirect taxes (e.g. sales, excise or surcharges) do not discriminate against imports. The customs administration is efficient and rule-bound. There are few, if any, foreign exchange restrictions on long-term investment capital inflows.
- **Financial stability and depth.** This item assesses whether the structure of the financial sector, and the policies and regulations that affect it, support diversified financial services and present a minimal risk of systemic failure. Countries with a low rating have high barriers to entry and banks' total capital to assets ratio less than 8%. Countries with high scores have diversified and competitive financial sectors that include insurance, equity and debt finance and non-bank savings institutions. An independent agency or agencies effectively regulate banks and non-banks on the basis of prudential norms. Corporate governance laws ensure the protection of minority shareholders.
- **Banking sector efficiency and resource mobilization.** This item assesses the extent to which the policies and regulations affecting financial institutions help to mobilize savings and provide for efficient financial intermediation. Countries with high scores have real, market-determined interest rates on loans. Real interest rates on deposits are significantly positive. The spread between deposit and lending rates is reasonable. There is an insignificant share of directed credit in relation to total credit. Credit flows to the private sector exceed credit flows to the government.
- **Competitive environment for the private sector.** This item assesses whether the state inhibits a competitive private sector, either through direct regulation or by reserving significant economic activities for state-controlled entities. It does not assess the degree of state ownership per se, but rather the degree to which it may restrict market competition. Ideally, firms have equal access to entry and exit in all products and sectors.
- **Factor and product markets.** This item addresses the policies that affect the efficiency of markets for land, labor and goods. Countries with high scores limit any controls or subsidies on prices, wages, land or labor. Remaining controls are consistently applied and explicitly justified on welfare or efficiency grounds.
- **Policies and institutions for environmental sustainability.** This item assesses the extent to which economic and environmental policies foster the protection and sustainable use of natural resources (soil, water, forests, etc.), the control of pollution, and the capture and investment of resource rents.

C. Policies for social inclusion and equity

- **Gender.** This item assesses the extent to which the country has created laws, policies, practices and institutions that promote the equal access of males and females to social, economic and political resources and opportunities.
- **Equity of public resource use.** This item assesses the extent to which the overall development strategy and the pattern of public expenditures and revenues favor the poor.
- **Building human resources.** This item assesses the policies and institutions that affect access to and quality of education, training, literacy, health, AIDS prevention, nutrition and related aspects of a country's human resource development.
- **Social protection and labor.** Government policies reduce the risk of becoming poor and support the coping strategies of poor people. Safety nets are needed to protect the chronically poor and the vulnerable. The needs of both groups are important, but in countries where the chronically poor remain inadequately protected, an unsatisfactory score (2 or 3) is warranted.
- **Poverty monitoring and analysis.** This item assesses both the quality of poverty data and its use in formulating policies.

D. Public sector management and institutions

- **Property rights and rule-based governance.** Countries with high scores have a rule-based governance structure. Contracts are enforced. Laws and regulations affecting businesses and individuals are consistently applied and not subject to negotiation.
- **Quality of budgetary and financial management.** This item assesses the quality of processes used to shape the budget and account for public expenditures. It also addresses the extent to which the public, through the legislature, participates in the budget and audit processes. Ratings should cover both national and sub-national governments, appropriately weighted.
- **Efficiency of revenue mobilization.** This item evaluates the overall pattern of revenue mobilization, not only the tax structure as it exists on paper, but revenues from all sources, as they are actually collected. Countries with high scores generate the bulk of revenues from low-distortion taxes such as sales/VAT, property, etc. Top corporate and personal tax rates are in line with international levels. The base for major taxes is broad and free of arbitrary exemptions. Tax administration is effective, cost efficient and entirely rule-based.
- **Efficiency of public expenditures.** This item assesses the extent to which the desired results of public programs are clearly defined and the available resources are used efficiently to achieve them. National and sub-national governments should be appropriately weighted. Countries with high scores specify the expected results of public programs. Performance is reported and influences budget allocations. Public servants' compensation is adequate (e.g. at least 75% of comparable private sector compensation) and their hiring and promotion are competence-based. Line agencies have flexibility to make operational decisions and are accountable for results and adhering to budget.
- **Transparency. Accountability and corruption in the public sector**. In countries with high scores the reasons for decisions and their results and costs are clear and communicated to the general public. Accountability for decisions is ensured through audits, inspections, etc. Conflict of interest regulations for public servants are enforced. Authorities monitor the prevalence of corruption and implement sanctions in a transparent manner.

24 Recent changes in the allocation system can be reviewed at: www.worldbank.org/ida

Tax evasion: hidden billions for development

The tax burden is shifting from the rich to the poor. Developing countries are losing at least USD 50 billion per year, a loss equivalent to the annual official aid of the OECD countries to developing countries. This is the amount required by the World Bank and the UNDP to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. It is also equivalent to six times the estimated annual costs of achieving universal primary education. And it is almost three times the cost of universal primary health coverage. The only successful way to counter harmful tax practices and international tax competition is through global initiatives.

Swiss Coalition of Development Organizations

Bruno Gurtner[1]

Today countries from all over the world face a growing problem in collecting taxes to fund public goods and services such as health services, education, infrastructure and, vital for developing countries, to fund the reduction of poverty.

Globalisation undermines the fiscal basis of the welfare state. Markets have become globalised, yet tax structures have remained national. Open borders cause exaggerated tax competition, which in turn leads to a race to the bottom in taxation of companies and high incomes. International tax competition and harmful tax practices are providing more and more opportunities for the wealthy to escape their tax obligations. The burden of taxation is shifting. Wealthy individuals and transnational corporations benefit from tax havens and low-tax regimes throughout the world. Ordinary citizens and smaller domestic business bear the cost in two ways.

On the one hand, governments increase taxes on consumption, smaller incomes and smaller business. On the other hand, governments cut their expenditures for investment in basic services and infrastructure development needed for future growth. Reduced social services will affect poor people far more than rich people. Smaller domestic infrastructure investment stunts economic growth needed for sustainable development. If unchecked, these trends will be disastrous for development.

Tax havens: the new global shadow industry

Financial centres play a destructive role. They serve as loopholes in the tax system of most countries. Capital flight associated with tax evasion in particular steal from developing countries the capital to fund investment and to provide social services. Twenty years ago there were only a few tax havens, managed by a few professionals. With the worldwide liberalisation of capital flows, the dismantling of capital controls and the electronic communications revolution the offshore industry has become a major global business.

Some 60 tax havens span the globe. They compete with each other to attract mobile capital by offering low tax or no-tax environments and dubious benefits such as secrecy and poor regulation. Secrecy encourages the illegal evasion of taxes. Secrecy means non-disclosure of information such as business accounts, ownership of assets, trusts and companies. Where tax is payable, this is often at minimal rates, negotiated in secret with the authorities with little references to tax law. So tax havens offer complete or large and secrete exemptions to non-residents - and only to non-residents - from taxing corporate or personal income.

Tax havens have poor or no regulation. Where codes and laws exist, there is often neither the political will nor the resources to implement them effectively. Governments of offshore centres have little administrative capacity to oversee these financial shifts.

Lack of regulation is also providing suitable environments for money laundering and it undermines the stability of the financial system. Financial crises are more frequent and more profound.

Services at offshore centres include personal and corporate banking, offshore funds and trust management and administration.

The offshore industry is not an isolated phenomenon occurring only on exotic Caribbean islands. Offshore centres are very closely linked to major financial centres like New York, London, Tokyo, Zurich, Hong Kong and Singapore. Most of the world's tax havens are actually located in the big financial centres. The offshore industry has become the new and enormous global shadow industry. Companies for offshore purposes are now being established at the rate of over 150,000 per year. Today there are more than one million offshore companies worldwide. Enron for example had 881 offshore subsidiaries, 692 only in the Cayman Islands. The world biggest oil trader companies are located in Switzerland, though Switzerland has no oil!

Half of the world trade appears to pass through tax havens, although they account for only 3% of the world's GDP. The value assets held offshore, either tax free or subject to minimal taxes, is at least USD 11 trillion, over one third of the world's annual GDP. One third of all cross-border private banking is managed by the Swiss financial sector. And the offshore industry as a whole is involved in about a half of the world's financial transactions.

Winners and losers

The winners of these recent tendencies are transnational companies, wealthy individuals, fiscal havens and offshore centres, the financial service industry, high income specialists and mobile factors such as capital. Shifting resources abroad is often simply a matter of opening up an account and moving capital to an offshore bank.

Tax havens provide legitimate, "well-respected" companies with many means of escaping taxes. Almost every large American or European bank has a branch office or business contacts in the Caribbean. Transnational companies may easily establish subsidiaries in offshore centres, create some simple paperwork, and manipulate prices of goods and services passing through these offshore subsidiaries (transfer pricing). They shift their profits out of the higher tax economy (where the real economic activity is taking place) into the offshore centre where little or no taxes are paid. Philip Morris and RJReynolds, two big tobacco companies, shifted their international headquarters in the mid-1990s from the Unites States to Switzerland to take advantage of Swiss tax and legal advantages.

Transnational companies press governments to reduce taxes on companies' profits, to provide tax holidays or to give other tax incentives. The losers are the states and the governments, who lose their sovereignty over taxation policy. Small and medium domestic businesses have to pay more taxes; so do small and medium salaries and consumers.

One can observe a heavy shift of taxation away from mobile to immobile tax factors, from capital to salaries, from big transnational companies to small business. One can also observe a heavy shift from progressive taxation (taxing higher income more than smaller income) to flat taxes and from profits and incomes to indirect taxes such as value-added-taxes (consumer taxation). In short: the tax burden is shifting from the rich to the poor! So US-billionaire hotel owner Leona Helmsley was right in arguing at her trial for tax evasion in 1989: "Only the little people pay taxes".

Developing countries: the most affected

The shifting of the tax burden threatens the developing world in a particularly disastrous way. Developing countries are losing at least USD 50 billion a

1 The author is Senior Economist of the Swiss Coalition of Development Organizations. The author can be contacted at bgurtner@swisscoalition.ch or at info@taxjustice.net

year.[2] This huge loss is equivalent to the annual official aid of the OECD countries to developing countries. It is the same figure required by the World Bank and the UNDP to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. It is also equivalent to six times the estimated annual costs of achieving universal primary education. And it is almost three times the cost of universal primary health coverage.

With capital account liberalisation the rich are far more able to take their wealth and income out of their countries to deposit in fiscal havens and offshore centres without paying taxes at home. Developing countries are losing tax income of at least USD 15 billion a year due to this tax evasion of their own rich elites. Rich people in India have at least CHF 1 billion (USD 785 million) in fiduciary bank accounts in Switzerland, most probably without paying taxes in India. At a seminar of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in New York in July 2002 representatives of developing countries were emphatic in pointing out that (from their point of view) the United States and Europe serve as tax havens for their own wealthy citizens seeking to avoid paying taxes at home.

Transnational companies pressure developing countries to keep tax rates on companies' profits and capital very low. They lobby the governments of developing countries to give them tax holidays. They demand that governments provide free or cheap infrastructure services. Developing countries compete with each other to provide better conditions for transnational companies in order to attract their foreign direct investments. Unregulated international tax competition and harmful tax practices of this kind are responsible for the loss of at least USD 35 billion a year. Even the IMF and also the Mc Kinsey Consulting Company found in studies that such tax incentives do not pay!

How to tackle these abuses?

Naturally most countries try to protect their tax basis. But the only successful way to counter harmful tax practices and international tax competition is through global initiatives. Some years ago the OECD started a programme to eliminate harmful tax practices within and outside its membership and published a list of unco-operative tax havens. OECD also promotes information exchange with tax authorities and the financial sector. Within the UN an Ad Hoc Group of Experts on International Co-operation on Tax Matters meets regularly. The EU tries to co-ordinate its tax policies. Preliminary documents to the Monterrey Conference on Financing for Development (March 2002) asked in vain for an international tax authority. The IMF, the World Bank and OECD at that time launched an "International Taxation Dialogue", but did not actually promote the initiative. Another proposal, more discussed within NGO and scientific circles, was to establish a minimum tax on corporate profits.

Our answer: the Tax Justice Network

At the European Social Forum in Florence in 2002 some European NGOs and social movements which have been active in the field of financial criminality got together and founded the European Tax Justice Network (TJN) to fight against tax evasion. This was a response to the harmful trends in global taxation due to economic globalisation, which inhibits the ability of states to tax wealthy beneficiaries and large corporations adequately. TJN found that these trends have disturbing implications for development, democracy, public services and poverty.

At the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre in 2003 the Network was expanded into a global network, thanks to Northern and Southern American organisations. The WSF of Mumbai in January 2004 extended it to Asia. Now the Network needs support from Africa to be really global!

TJN's aims are to:

- Eliminate cross-border tax evasion;
- Limit the scope for tax avoidance;
- Publicise issues and educate interested parties;
- Advocate at an international level, within the UN, IMF, OECD, EU, etc.;
- Encourage, support and co-ordinate national and regional activities;
- Promote links between interested parties around the world, particularly North-South links;
- Encourage research and debate.

In Porto Alegre the TJN discussed a draft for a Declaration/Manifesto.[3] Among others it contains the following important strategic points:

- Eliminating cross-border tax evasion and limitation of the scope for tax avoidance, so that large corporations and wealthy individuals pay tax in line with their ability to do so;
- Increasing citizens' influence in the democratic control of taxation, and restricting the power of capital to dictate tax policy solely in its own interest;
- Restoring similar tax treatment of different forms of income, and reversing the shifting of the tax burden onto ordinary citizens;
- Removing the tax and secrecy incentives that encourage the outward flow of investment capital from countries most in need of economic development.

The TJN presented the finalised Declaration/Manifesto in March 2003 in the British Parliament. All organisations agreeing with the content of the Declaration are invited to sign it. In May 2003 the TJN held an international media conference in Berne, Switzerland. The Network organised in July 2003 a research seminar in Essex, England (a second seminar will be held again in Essex on 1 and 2 July 2004).

The TJN has started its international advocacy work and has already had informal contacts with the OECD tax authority. And it contributed to the recently published report of the ILO World Commission on the Social Dimensions of Globalisation. Representatives of TJN attended as observers the meeting of the UN Ad Hoc Group of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters. The TJN will contribute to the follow-up of the Monterrey process (ECOSOC/BWI meetings).

In the meantime the TJN has created its own website (in English, French, Spanish, Portuguese, German), is publishing a newsletter and is exchanging information through its e-mail list. A provisional steering committee is trying to enlarge the Network, seek more support for the Declaration and deepen the strategy discussion. We have started preliminary discussions to establish a small professional international secretariat. We welcome your contribution and your active collaboration! ■

2 Oxfam GB. *Tax Havens: Releasing the Hidden Billions for Poverty Eradication.* Oxfam Policy Paper. 8 June 2000. www.oxfam.org.uk/shatnew/press/tax.htm

3 For more information or to read and sign the Declaration, or to subscribe to the e-mail list and forum please check our website: www.taxjustice.net

Stopping mass murder: action against AIDS

UNAIDS estimates that USD 10.5 billion will be needed by 2005 just to support a "bare bones" effort against AIDS. This huge sum is thrown into dramatic relief by what one country alone can manage when it comes to war. By the end of 2003, the cost of the war on Iraq to US taxpayers was more than USD 200 billion. One "mad" cow in North America can command sustained headlines in the land of the rich and powerful, while millions of humans die silently abroad.

North-South Institute

John W Foster[1]

"It's mass murder by complacency. …the time for polite, even agitated entreaties is over. This pandemic cannot be allowed to continue, and those who watch it unfold with a kind of pathological equanimity must be held to account. There may yet come a day when we have peacetime tribunals to deal with this particular version of crimes against humanity."

Stephen Lewis, UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for HIV/AIDS in Africa[2]

Human security does not mean much if the human beings concerned are not alive to enjoy it. Preoccupied with the "threat of terrorism", citizens in wealthy countries are becoming more and more conscious of their vulnerability to disease, just as those in poorer lands have been vulnerable to a greater degree. The scourge of "flu" in poultry threatens the livelihood of millions of Asians. The appearance of a small number of SARS cases throws the economy of Canada's metropolis into a tailspin. One or two "mad" cows in North America lead to major ruptures in trade in beef internationally. Not only "no man is an island" but no region, nationality or species is invulnerable in our biosphere (although some make claims for the cockroach).

Regarding AIDS the United Nations Security Council broke precedents in examining the need for action, the General Assembly held a Special Session committing the world's leaders to a dramatic response, the Secretary-General sparked the creation of a Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) make a modest pledge to halt and reverse the spread of the disease by 2015.

Adults and children estimated to be living with HIV/AIDS, December 2003

Source: UNAIDS. *AIDS Epidemic Update. December 2003.* At www.unaids.org/en/default.asp

The present

- Three million dead in 2003, a world total of approximately 30 million to date.
- Five million new infections in 2003, they continue at approximately 14,000 per day.
- Forty million living with HIV/AIDS.[3]

The vast majority - 95% - of people living with HIV/AIDS live in the developing world. The majority of these are women and girls, made more vulnerable by the ongoing feminisation of poverty. Women represent 50%-58% of HIV-positive adults in sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa and the Middle East and the Caribbean. Life expectancy has been cut dramatically in sub-Saharan Africa: in Zimbabwe by 35 years, in Botswana and Swaziland by 28 years.

Prevalence rates have risen dramatically in some sub-Saharan countries: to 38.8% in Botswana, 31% in Lesotho, 33% in Swaziland and Zimbabwe. Twenty-four African countries have a prevalence rate greater than 5% among adults. Where prevalence rises above 1% of a population, there is potential for a more generalised epidemic. A 5% rate threatens exponential growth in the general population.

The future

The UNDP Human Development Report 2003 states "China, India and the Russian Federation - all with large populations and at risk of seeing HIV infection rates soar - are of particular concern. About 7 million people are infected in these countries, and in sub-Saharan Africa 7 million cases exploded to 25 million in a decade. …[E]ven in a moderate scenario, by 2025 almost 200 million people could be infected in these three countries alone."[4]

There are areas where even now too little is known about the extent of infection; denial and stigma retard effective surveillance and treatment as well. There is the potential for a considerable rise in infections in the Middle East and North Africa, but in a number of countries the data is scant. UNAIDS states that speedy action on prevention is urgently required, particularly among groups that

1 John W. Foster is Principal Researcher, The North-South Institute, Ottawa, Canada and chair of the Coordinating Committee of Social Watch.

2 Lewis, Stephen. "AIDS, Gender & Poverty: A United Front Against the Pandemic", *Social Development Review*, 7:1. London: International Council on Social Welfare (ICSW). 2003. From a press briefing given at the United Nations, New York, 8 January 2003.

3 UNAIDS. *AIDS Epidemic Update.* Geneva: UNAIDS, December 2003. These figures are estimates. The number of deaths is between 2.5 million and 3.5 million, for example.

4 UNDP. *Human Development Report 2003: Millennium Development Goals: A compact among nations to end human poverty.* New York and Oxford: UNDP/Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 4.

could be drawn into the next phase of spread of the disease. Reluctance to deal with men who have sex with men, sex workers and injection drug users has hampered response. Condom promotion is largely absent in the region, but some countries are developing more substantial prevention programmes. These must be extended to deal with migrant workers, young people, refugees and displaced persons and transport route workers, among others.[5]

HIV/AIDS, development and human security

Where AIDS is highly prevalent, the impact goes far beyond the already incredible suffering and loss of life, undermining human security in many dimensions. In such countries the prospect of achieving the MDGs is faint, in fact life expectancy, economic and social security are moving backward.

- Economic security: the UNDP Human Development Report 2003 notes that AIDS "can throw development off course."[6] A World Bank study indicates that an adult HIV prevalence rate of 10% can reduce the growth of national income by up to one third.[7] UNICEF estimates that by 2010, the South African economy will be 20% smaller than it would have been without HIV/AIDS.[8]
- Food security: As 2002 ended, some 14.4 million people in six southern African countries were at risk of starvation. Agricultural production and food supply have become tenuous. The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates that seven million agricultural workers in 25 severely affected African countries have died from AIDS. Some 16 million more could die in the coming 20 years unless the impact of the disease is reversed.[9]
- Families and social structure: HIV/AIDS not only destroys "human capital" but threatens societal collapse because the function of the family by which knowledge and abilities are transmitted from one generation to the next is interrupted or destroyed. Children are left without one or more parents to love, raise and educate them. The MDG objective of reducing infant mortality by two-thirds by 2015 is virtually impossible in countries with high rates of infection.
- National security: Many military forces in Africa have infection rates five times that of the civilian population, in some cases rates as high as 50% or 60%. In reducing the operational capacity of many of Africa's armed forces, HIV/AIDS contributes to vulnerability to both internal and inter-state conflict.
- Governance: HIV/AIDS prevalence puts governments in affected countries under incredible strain. Having been weakened by decades of structural adjustment, and under ever increasing strictures administered by the World Bank, IMF and WTO, governments now need to be radically strengthened in their capacity to serve their citizens' needs. But they are stalked by the threat of "state failure". For example, a recent study of the Ministries of Finance, Economic Planning and Development and Public Services and Information in Swaziland, documents that "solely as a result of HIV/AIDS the three ministries will lose 32% of their staff complement" over a twenty-year period. To replace teachers lost to the pandemic, Swaziland will have to train 13,000 people between 1999 and 2016 instead of the 5,093 that would normally be needed.[10]

Saving lives: prevention, treatment and care

The work of prevention, treatment and care requires education, community engagement and functioning health care systems. As UNAIDS notes "in Africa, where two-thirds of the world's HIV-positive people live, health-care systems were already weak and under-financed before the advent of AIDS. They are now buckling under the added strain of millions of new patients. In many places facilities for diagnosis are inadequate and drug supplies are erratic, even for HIV-related conditions that are easy to diagnose and inexpensive to treat."[11] A comprehensive approach to health, for healthy populations, demands the rehabilitation and in some cases recreation of public health systems. To sustain healthy populations, of course, will require other basics as well - decent nutrition, clean water and decent housing. A successful response to the pandemic will be sustainable only if part of a more general development strategy.

It is only in the last few years that the prospect of access to treatment has become a reality, about a decade ago in affluent countries, and frustratingly in the distant future elsewhere. It was frequently argued that it was impossible to successfully and sustainably administer new anti-retroviral treatments in poorer countries, because they required a level of sophistication and economic development that was simply not there. The prohibitive cost of the so-called triple-therapy was clearly another block. The price of therapy for one patient in early 2000 was USD 10,000-12,000 per year.

Yet by the end of 2000 the price had dropped to USD 500-800 per person for first-time anti-retroviral treatment in low-income countries, and by 2003, the prices of the least expensive generic combination recommended by the World Health Organization (WHO) was under USD 300 per person per year.[12]

Perhaps the single most important step forward was taken by the government of Brazil, with strong pressure from civil society organisations. From 1996 Brazil has provided universal free access to triple anti-retroviral treatment. Even in the first year it extended survival to an average of 58 months from an average of 5 months in the 1980s. "It is the first time a study has demonstrated that universal free access to triple anti-retroviral treatment in a developing country can produce benefits on the same scale as in richer countries."[13] But the study also indicated that perhaps only 40% of the 600,000 HIV-positive patients in Brazil are aware of their infection. "The rest just fear the social and physical consequences of this disease and prefer not to undergo the test."

Other countries have not been even this lucky. In South Africa the resistance of the government to anti-retroviral treatment and the obduracy of drug companies in protecting their patents delayed response to a rapidly escalating number of infections for years. The persistence of such civil society activists as the Treatment Action Campaign, with the support of international NGO networks has made significant progress, but the delays have had tragic consequences on a mass scale.[14]

Drugs

"Today, at least 400 die every day in Kenya from AIDS. …This is the genocidal action of the cartel of pharmaceutical companies which refuse to provide affordable medicines in Africa at the same time as they declared USD 517 billion in profits in 2002."[15]

5 UNAIDS. "The Middle East and North Africa". *AIDS Epidemic Update.* December 2003.

6 UNDP, *op cit*, p. 41.

7 Bell, Clive, Shantayanan Devarajan and Hans Gersbach. *The Long-Run Economic Costs of AIDS: Theory and an Application to South Africa.* June 2003. World Bank Research Report.

8 Cited in Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (SCFAIT), House of Commons, Canada. *HIV/AIDS and the Humanitarian Catastrophe in Sub-Saharan Africa.* June 2003, p. 16.

9 Cited in International Crisis Group. *HIV/AIDS as a Security Issue.* Washington/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 29 June 2001, p. 11.

10 Whitside, Alan, et al. *What is driving the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Swaziland, and what more can we do about it?* National Emergency Response Committee on HIV/AIDS (NERCHA) and UNAIDS, April 2003.

11 UNAIDS. *Access to HIV Treatment and Care*, Fact Sheet. Geneva: UNAIDS, July 2003.

12 *Ibid.*

13 Pio Marins, Jose Ricardo. University of Campinas. Quoted in "Free HIV Drugs in Brazil Have Boosted AIDS Survival", Reuters (25 July 2003), in CDC HIV/STD/TB Prevention News Update, 30 July 2003.

14 CSOs have demonstrated that treatment can be actualised. In the township of Khyelitsha, near Capetown, Medecins Sans Frontieres clinics helped people stabilise their condition, developing simple ways to assure regular use of complex dosages and training community nurses to supervise and support patients. In Soweto, mother-to-child transmission has been reduced with help from OXFAM, involving the drug Nevirapine, the provision of powdered milk and a supervised community care system. These initiatives need to be scaled up on a massive basis. They also must be supported by basic needs provision, clean water, adequate nourishment and stable housing.

15 Statement by American Jesuit Angelo D'Agostino, at a press conference held by Archbishop Paul Josep Cordes, President of the Vatican humanitarian agency Cor Unam. From "Le Vatican part en guerre contre les companies pharmaceutiques", *Le Soleil*, Quebec, 30 January 2004.

The fight to open up access to life-saving drugs has been going on virtually since their availability was announced. The creation of the WTO in the mid-1990s was accompanied by a phenomenal extension in protection of privately - largely corporately - held patents, via the international agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). The agreement commits participating countries to extend 20-year patent protection to the owners of patents on medicines, a tremendous victory for the large pharmaceutical firms holding many of the world's drug patents, and funding or controlling much of continuing research.

The TRIPS Agreement contains provisions which should, in theory, provide the flexibility for countries to balance these protections with action for public health, for example through issuing a compulsory license to permit the manufacture of lower-cost generic copies of the patented products. In practice, however, some countries, under pressure from corporations or more powerful producer countries, either forbad compulsory licensing or simply did not take advantage of the possibility.[16]

A saw-off of interests occurred at the WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar. On 14 November 2001, a declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health affirmed that TRIPS "does not and should not prevent members from taking measures to protect public health" and "in particular, to promote access to medicines for all".

The declaration left unresolved the situation of countries that lacked the capacity to produce generic medicines themselves. It committed countries to find an "expeditious" solution for this problem. Negotiations ground on for almost two years, and only when the lack of a deal threatened to upset the next WTO Ministerial planned for Cancun, Mexico in September 2003, did negotiators resolve the deadlock. It permits countries with productive capacity to export via a compulsory license to an eligible importing country. Of course, the TRIPS Council of the WTO retains the right to be notified of countries' intentions and monitor and supervise a number of conditions. The right to drugs, and one might say, the right to health, can be accessed only under the TRIPS Council's authority. Property rights are honoured over those of people.

The agreement is only an "interim waiver" regarding TRIPS provisions, pending agreement to amend the TRIPS Agreement itself. Meanwhile, in negotiations like those for the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas, the large pharmaceutical corporations are seeking TRIPS+, something more than 20 years' protection.

Treatment advocates found the agreement "seriously flawed", giving WTO bodies an intimate and potentially intrusive and complicating role which could delay or prevent progress. Importing countries remain beholden to the decision-making of the wealthy.[17]

16 Development and human rights NGOs, organisations of People Living with AIDS and their allies undertook a persistent and globe-girdling campaign to expand the legal windows for access and offset corporate and big power pressure.

AIDS does not travel alone

Malaria kills more than a million people a year, 700,000 of them African children. New treatments - the three-day two-drug combination therapy - cost USD 0.40 for a child's treatment, USD 1.50 for an adult. But many families cannot afford even this, and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria remains strapped for cash. WHO estimates it would cost USD 1 billion to cut in half the 1.1 million annual deaths due to malaria. This is roughly what Pfizer pharmaceuticals made from the sales of one drug, Viagra, in 1999.

The imbalance in research priorities and expenditures continues to bedevil progress against diseases that attack poor people. The World Watch Institute notes that between 1975 and 1997, 1,223 new medical drugs were developed, largely to target diseases of affluence and over consumption. In the same period only 13 of the new drugs aimed to treat malaria, schistosomiasis and other "tropical diseases" affecting developing countries. Germán Velásquez, Coordinator of the Drug Action Programme at WHO states "After Doha, it is clear that if drugs are considered as goods, health will remain an extension of the market, with remedies and treatments available only to those with enough purchasing power."[18] The United Kingdom's recent Commission on Intellectual Property Rights went on to ask whether a drug which makes it possible for people to exercise a fundamental human right - the right to health - can be bound by rules which thwart access for 20 years. Essential drugs, it could be said, are a global public good, something with benefits that extend to all countries, people and generations.[19]

"This AIDS drug thing is simple. It's a chance to dip our well-fed toes in the water, by actually using our collective discoveries and inventions to benefit humanity. Maybe we shall find that it isn't so dangerous and that our economic system doesn't collapse. And the health benefits will be immediate and spectacular."[20]

Scale

"Whatever else, the war in Iraq and the aftermath is going to cost this world in excess of USD 100 billion and I want someone to explain to me why there is always so much money for conflict and pennies for the human condition."[21]

17 Nevertheless treatment advocates are seeking by a variety of means to make sure that every opening created by the agreement is utilised in pursuit of access for those needing treatment.

18 Velásquez, Germán. "Drugs Should be a Common Good: Unhealthy Profits", *Le Monde Diplomatique*. English Edition, July 2003.

19 Commission on Intellectual Property Rights. *Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy. Report of the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights*. London: Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, September 2002, p. 48.

20 Sulston, John (Nobel Prize for Medicine (shared), 2002). "The Rich World's patents abandon the poor to die", *Social Development Review*, 7:1. London: ICSW, 2003. Originally published in *The Guardian*, 18 February 2003.

The huge numbers of infected and dying people may deaden our sensitivities and threaten a sense of futility. In 2001 the WHO Commission on Macroeconomics and Health estimated that costs of responding to HIV/AIDS could reach USD 14 billion by 2007 and USD 22 billion by 2015. It would have distributed funds one-third to each of prevention, treatment of opportunistic infections and antiretroviral therapy. These are based on very conservative estimates.[22] UNAIDS estimates that USD 10.5 billion will be needed by 2005 just to support a "bare bones" effort against the disease.[23] These may seem large numbers, but they are thrown into dramatic relief by what one country alone can manage when it comes to war. By the end of 2003, the cost of the war on Iraq to US taxpayers was estimated at more than USD 200 billion, most of it allocated in one year.[24]

Scaling up

An estimated 40 million people live with HIV/AIDS today. WHO has attempted to build world support and resources for the provision of treatment to three million of them by 2005: a modest beginning, but one that thus far seems out of possible grasp.

In sub-Saharan Africa only 50,000 people were estimated to have treatment in 2002. In Asia and the Pacific, only 43,000. In Latin America and the Caribbean the picture is slightly better, in good part due to Brazil's example, with close to 200,000 getting treatment by the end of 2002.

The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria was created with high expectations in 2001, designed not to replace existing monies but to raise additional funds. In its first two rounds of funding it spent USD 1.5 billion of which 65% went to HIV/AIDS. For 2003-2005 the Fund called for a budget of USD 9.7 billion, but only had pledges of USD 1.5 billion by mid-2003.

Official Development Assistance (ODA) should be playing a significant role, and the Monterrey Financing for Development Conference (2002) was taken as a sign that the long decline in commitments from wealthy countries was being reversed. Ireland, Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden all committed to significant increases in the next two to six years. Canada confirmed a yearly increase of 8%, but it will take five years to reach 1991 spending levels.

21 Lewis, Stephen, see footnote 2.

22 The Commission assumed, for example, that only 5% of Africans affected are currently aware of their status and therefore in a position to know whether or not treatment is appropriate. World Health Organization (WHO). *Macroeconomics and Health*. Geneva: WHO, 20 December 2001, p. 53.

23 UNAIDS. "Despite substantial increases, AIDS funding is still only half of what will be needed by 2005." Press release. 26 June 2003.

24 This amount is over and above the regular US Department of Defense expenditure of roughly USD 400 billion. These amounts dwarf what is needed for HIV/AIDS and indicate that effective funding is not a matter of capacity but of political choice.

Debt cancellation

Debt cancellation could also be a significant source of relief. Conditionalities on loans, whether obvious or subtle, continue to encourage limitations on public spending, pressure governments to privatise public services - including health services - and conform to WTO agreements such as TRIPS. The UN Population Fund examined the extent to which the World Bank's Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) process had been used to optimise opportunities to respond to HIV/AIDS as part of an integrated response to poverty. The report concludes "most PRSPs completed have generally missed the opportunity for effectively assessing the links between poverty, population and HIV/AIDS."[25] The report provides a checklist on mainstreaming HIV/AIDS in poverty reduction strategies.

The gap between the need to save lives through treatment and adequate support now and the leadership and commitment necessary on the part of those who control resources and the pricing of treatment remains immense. The expenditure commitments made by some wealthy countries on "reconstructing" Iraq have come within months after the defeat of Saddam Hussein. The effort to cajole or embarrass governments into committing increased resources to combat the global pandemic grinds on slowly. Some dream of something like the "Marshall plan" which aided Europe after World War II.

Turning point

Speaking at the United Nations early in 2003 UN Special Envoy Stephen Lewis referred to signs of "determination and hope" he had discovered in Africa. "What has changed," he stated, "is the maturity, vehemence and confidence of the organisations of People Living with HIV/AIDS…they know the cost of generic drugs; they know about the treatment regimes; they know that WHO has undertaken to have three million people in treatment by 2005; they know that the rich members of society vault down to South Africa for treatment, while the poor remain helplessly behind; they know about Doha and intellectual property rights and the WTO; they know, from bitter experience, about all the false political promises. Increasingly, we're dealing with sophistication and determination in equal measure."[26]

Are we, in fact, at a turning point in the fight against the pandemic? A very few years ago only one or two African governments had developed strategies to deal with the disease, today many have at last begun to implement such strategies and the African Union's Maputo Declaration (July 2003) commits African governments to a comprehensive approach and seeks international support.[27] Some countries, like Uganda, and some districts within countries are showing remarkable progress in prevention and reduction in infections. Generic drug manufacturers in low- and middle-income countries, like Brazil, India and Thailand, are producing some anti-retroviral drugs at a reasonable cost. The pre-Cancun agreement on export of generic drugs to countries lacking productive capacity belatedly offers the potential of fulfilling commitments made at the Doha WTO two years earlier. Canada, among wealthy countries, has begun an initiative that would permit firms to produce and export such drugs as well.

Nevertheless the fundamentals necessary to reach millions - strengthened health systems in developing countries with trained and adequately supported staff, adequate supplies of medicines for universal access, sustained security in basic needs - remain tragically out of reach. Just as important is the lack of leadership among the wealthy - whether in the North, among the petroleum rich or in emerging wealthy classes in middle-income countries - in ramping up the level of resources and organisation equal to the task. What is required is a multiplication of dollars, francs, pounds, marks or yen. What is offered is usually a small percentage increase, if that.

Stephen Lewis has raised the prospect that someday those who prevent the delivery of life-saving drugs and the health systems and basic needs which would enable them to be effective and sustainable may face a tribunal, like the authors of the Holocaust at Nuremberg after World War II or the sponsors of genocides today at Arusha and The Hague. Who would be in the dock facing justice? Those who foisted an unnecessary and costly war on Iraq? Those who strive by all possible means to protect the privilege of patents? Or those who permit through complacency or worse the continuation of this human waste and the misallocation of the globe's resources?

The provision of universal access in Brazil, the move toward provision of treatment in South Africa, the Doha Declaration and the pre-Cancun compromise on generic drug provision have all been due, in good part, to mobilised networks of activists, of People Living with HIV/AIDS, of spirited physicians and healthcare workers and of a few - too few - politicians who caught the fire of urgency.

It is time for a wildfire of action to free the resources and the ingenuity to save millions of lives and right the grotesque wrong that condemns them and future millions more to suffering and death. ■

Taking action

What sorts of action are required?

- Access on affordable terms to life-extending drugs.
- Recognition and reinforcement of human rights, particularly the right to the "highest attainable standard of physical and mental health." (CESCR).
- Radically increased resources via the Global Fund, other multilateral and bilateral channels, ODA, debt cancellation and relief, to support public health services and other essential components of immune ability like clean water, adequate food and housing.
- Enhancement of public health services and support including training, public education, support for community-based prevention and care initiatives.
- Continued research for vaccines for HIV/AIDS, and drugs and treatment regimes suitable for other large-scale diseases affecting the world's poor majorities.
- And, above all, a vigilant, persistent and creative alliance of civil society organisations without which the other actions are unlikely to be fulfilled.

25 United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). *The impact 2003*. pp. 85-92.

26 Lewis, Stephen, see footnote 2.

27 African Union. *Maputo Declaration on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, Malaria and other related infections diseases.* AU Declarations. Assembly/AU/Decl. 1-5. Addis Ababa: African Union, July 2002.

No human security without gender equality

Women's empowerment is essential to human development and poverty eradication. Human security, a promising platform and framework for the United Nations to promote peace, human rights and human development, will become one more lofty idea that does not translate into action if it is not used to improve the situation of women in their families and communities.

Women's Environment & Development Organization (WEDO)

June Zeitlin / Doris Mpoumou[1]

The United Nations has been a critical forum for the global women's movement particularly in the past 30 years. From the 1975 UN International Women's Year, through the Decade for Women (1976-1985) and the global conferences and summits of the 1990s,[2] women participated actively and with resolve to shape economic, social, and sustainable development. In these settings, advocates influenced key resolutions, won crucial commitments and established strategic mechanisms that set a far-reaching global policy agenda in which it became widely accepted that promoting gender equality and women's empowerment is essential to human development and poverty eradication.

Yet, despite these policy gains, and despite efforts to use these government commitments to achieve legal and policy changes to protect and advance women's rights at the national level, many women - especially poor women - are worse off today than they were a decade ago.

Over the past decade, major global forces have emerged that are undermining the gains made by women. The neo-liberal economic model and market-driven policies - particularly changes in trade and finance rules, and the deregulation and privatization of public goods and services - have exacerbated the poverty, food insecurity, and economic exclusion of the majority, while increasing the wealth and economic opportunities, and thus over-consumption, of the privileged few. At the same time, the world is becoming increasingly dangerous due to unilateral military intervention and communal and ethnic violence. Escalating militarism and new and revived fundamentalism, both secular and religious, have created a stifling climate for progressive change.

While it is well documented that women's empowerment is central to poverty eradication and national development, women still face significant barriers when it comes to access to resources, wage employment, and decision-making positions. As macroeconomic and national policies are too often gender blind, they are ineffective in addressing the needs of poor and minority women. In many parts of the world, the impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic has further increased women's income-earning, domestic and care-taking responsibilities.

These external forces and trends, promoted by the international financial institutions and the WTO, perpetuate and reinforce the structural inequalities between women and men in the economy and society. As a result, the external stronghold on national development policy and frameworks has weakened the ability of some governments to meet basic social needs, while increases in military and "anti-terrorism" spending further drain limited public resources for education, health and social services. This emphasis on national security and policing is also being used to undermine hard-won civil rights and civil liberties.

These trends are exacerbated by the policies of the United States, where the current administration employs its unsurpassed military and economic power for narrow economic, political, and ideological interests with dire consequences for people in the United States and around the world. The pre-emptive war in Iraq, the most extreme case so far of US unilateralism, was preceded by the administration's earlier repudiation of the Kyoto Protocol, its retreat from the International Criminal Court treaty, and its failure to ratify the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).

Women advocates working to implement the global policy commitments of the 1990s have often been stymied by these global challenges. While the UN is the most universal and legitimate global governance institution, it finds itself at a crossroads, weakened by a lack of resources and a broad agenda, as well as power imbalances among its diverse membership. The voices of developing countries and civil society, particularly those speaking for women, the poor, and other marginalized groups, are demanding reform. Instead of advancing the status quo by accommodating the international financial and trade institutions, the transnational corporations, and powerful industrialized countries, the UN must emerge as a counterweight, an accountable institution and effective promoter of peace, human rights, gender equality, sustainable development, and economic justice.

Human security is a promising platform and framework for the UN to promote peace, human rights and human development. However, what we have learned from more than a decade of experience of working with women seeking not only gender equality and equity but also social transformation is that without an explicit commitment to gender equality and the application of a gender lens, women's aspirations, needs, concerns and solutions are neither visible nor adequately addressed.

Too often, "human" development, "human" rights, and now perhaps "human" security assume men's experiences are the norm, fail to acknowledge gender differences and ultimately do not succeed in achieving their goals.

Women's empowerment and gender equality is central to human security. Unless approaches to human security can be used to improve the situation of women in their families and communities, it will be one more lofty idea that does not translate into action. We hope this paper will further bridge the discourse between proponents of "human security" and women's rights activists and together we can further develop a more "gendered" approach.

A people-centered human security does not necessarily imply a gender-sensitive approach to human security.

Traditionally, security has been understood in relation to the State, with a focus on security of territory from external aggression, or as global security from the threat of a nuclear apocalypse. The 1994 Human Development Report advocates for greater emphasis on people's security marking a shift from the provision of security through armaments, to security through human development. This understanding of human security does not replace the security of the state with the security of people. Rather, the two aspects are seen as interdependent.

A people-centered human security approach is in fact a gender-neutral approach. This approach is usually biased to women as it assumes men's experiences as the norm. Thus, given the absence of an explicit discussion of gender inequalities, the assumption that a people-centered approach automatically includes a gender perspective rings empty.

However, it is much easier to raise issues of gender equality and women's empowerment if the discussion focuses on people rather than the state. It is difficult to ask, "Where are the women?" if the emphasis is placed on the states.

Integrating a gender perspective into the human security approach

The Beijing Platform for Action calls for bringing a gender perspective to all structures, institutions, policies and programs. Its paragraph on gender mainstreaming specifically states that: "governments and other actors should promote an active and visible policy of mainstreaming a gender perspective in all policies and programs so that, before decisions are taken, an analysis is made of the effects on women and men, respectively."

This is consistent with the approach of the UN Commission on Human Security, which quite successfully integrates gender concerns throughout their report. The report concentrates on distinct but

1 The authors are respectively Executive Director and Gender and Governance Program Coordinator of WEDO.

2 UN Conference on the Environment and Development, Rio, Brazil 1992; UN Conference on Human Rights, Vienna, 1993; International Conference on Population and Development, Cairo, Egypt, 1994; UN Conference on Social Development, Copenhagen, Denmark, 1995; UN Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, China, 1995.

interrelated issues concerning conflict and poverty. These include protecting people in conflict and post-conflict situations, shielding people forced to move, overcoming economic insecurities, guaranteeing essential health care, and ensuring universal education. The Commission discusses for example the differential impact of poverty on women as well as men and specific problems that women face as immigrants or refugees. The report also recognizes the important role women play in peace processes including conflict resolution. However, the report fails to identify as core matters issues of physical integrity that women have identified as central to their intimate security. These include especially issues of violence against women in the family and women's reproductive rights. This gap is an illustration of the fact that we cannot prioritize gender mainstreaming over women specific work or vice versa, as both approaches are complementary.

What it would take to create human security for women

Until now, no comprehensive examination and analysis of women's human security has been undertaken although the Beijing Platform for Action identified in 1995 many constituent elements of women's human security such as issues of security in situations of armed and other forms of conflict, security from violence, environmental disaster, food security, shelter and housing. It is essential to understand the concept of human security from a gender perspective, in order to improve women's human security in a comprehensive and holistic manner. This means that gender equality goals and objectives must be incorporated into the human security approach. These issues relate to the central question of what is different about women's and men's security. These questions are not to be seen as additions or extras to the main discussions. Rather they should be integrated into the very understanding of what human security approach entails.

Violence against women

Violence against women is a very different security issue for women and men. Acts or threats of violence, whether occurring within the home or in the community, or perpetrated or condoned by the State, instill fear and insecurity in women's lives and are obstacles to the achievement of equality. The fear of violence, including harassment, is a permanent constraint on the mobility of millions of women and limits their access to resources and basic activities.

Violence against women is one of the crucial social mechanisms by which women are forced into a subordinate position compared with men. In many cases, violence against women and girls occurs in the family or within the home, where violence is often tolerated. The neglect, physical and sexual abuse, and rape of girl children and women by family members and other members of the household, as well as cases of spousal and non-spousal abuse, often go unreported and are thus difficult to detect. Even when such violence is reported, there is often a failure to protect victims or punish perpetrators. In many cases, women do not have control over sex and become pregnant. All these factors represent a concrete core of human insecurity surrounding women's bodies.

A second issue to highlight is violence against women during armed conflict. Women are subjected to violence because they are women. They are raped, forced into prostitution, trafficked, or impregnated against their will. There is great concern over gender-based violence in times of conflict not only because of its prevalence, but also because the most horrific crimes against women go unpunished and are not always recognized as violations of fundamental human rights.

Inequalities in power and decision-making

Worldwide, women continue to be dismally represented in political decision-making despite some gains made at the local level where women have better chances of getting elected and where they start their political careers. These disparities between women and men in public positions persist throughout national and international fora. Today, women represent only 15.2% of national legislatures.

Structural and cultural barriers prevent women's full and equal participation in decision-making. Prevailing gender stereotypes and discriminatory attitudes present serious obstacles to women's political participation. Similarly, the type of electoral system and campaign finance laws limit political opportunities for women. Furthermore, the unequal control over economic resources described below influences women's decision-making at the basic level of the household as well as in public institutions.

Both the CEDAW and the Beijing Platform for Action highlight the importance of women's equal representation in political decision-making. Articles 7 and 8 of the Convention respectively call upon State Parties to ensure that women, on equal terms with men, participate in the formulation of government policy and international institutions. The Platform for Action is concerned with both women's access to and full participation in public, private and non-governmental structures and organizations and women's capacity to participate in decision-making and leadership positions.

These inequalities in relation to power are essential in the context of human security. It is important that women represent a minimum critical mass of 30% in political decision-making because they are then more likely to influence the decisions that affect their lives and the future of their families.

Inequality in access and control over resources

Nowhere in the world do men and women have equal access and control over resources - over credit, land, water and time. Women play a critical role in managing natural resources and have extensive knowledge and experience of the water, land, and energy supplies that sustain households and communities. Yet, their lack of land tenure or inheritance rights, and current trends such as water privatization, undermine their ability to own, manage, use, and conserve these resources and to provide for themselves and their families. Women's limited title to land, property and inheritance often means less access to agricultural extension services and credit and translates into reduced access to water and food.

Women are still concentrated in the informal sector, where there are no job or safety protections, and those entering the formal wage economy tend to be employed in the lowest-paying jobs with the greatest environmental and safety hazards. Women still earn less than men for the same work, outnumber men among those who are illiterate. Women's responsibility for domestic chores tends to mean that time is an extremely limited resource for women - time to participate in community organizations, time to study and time to earn an income. Thus, women's ability to protect their own security and ensure the security of family members differs enormously.

Women's human rights

The protection and respect of human rights has been identified as an important element in a human security agenda. This aspect of the agenda must be explicitly broadened to ensure a more active pursuit of women's rights as human rights. It is important that the use of human rights in this context clearly include gender-specific rights issues such as women's reproductive rights and violence against women in the family. Women's human rights must be at the core of the understanding of human security.

Women's agency

A human security approach should not focus solely on women as victims - as rape victims, as refugees without options, as widows without resources, as powerless community workers excluded from the main decision-making organizations, etc. It is crucial that women's agency, especially in times of crisis, be highlighted, as even in the most difficult situations women possess resources, skills and capabilities.

There is growing conscientious effort in documenting women's initiatives in building peace and security especially since the adoption of the UN Security Council Resolution, which calls for an increased participation of women in peace processes. Similar initiatives are underway to highlight women's agency in the area of food security.

No human security goal can be achieved without taking into account the security interests of both women and men. It is critical that discussion on human security continue to focus on people - both women and men as an alternative to the state military-based security that has created so many conflicts worldwide. ■

References

Beijing Platform for Action. www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/platform/

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/

Women's Environment & Development Organization (WEDO). www.wedo.org/5050kit.htm

Women's agency in the midst of crises

When macroeconomic policy is viewed together with its microeconomic effects a broader picture of the economy emerges. In this way the linkages between them become clear - linkages that should be borne in mind in the pursuit of "growth with equity" and "downturn with security." The emphasis on "human freedoms and human fulfilment" under the umbrella of human security ensures that, whether in times of growth or crisis, women's agency is recognised, preserved and strengthened.

Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN)

Marina Fe B. Durano

Waves of crises

The final decade of the 20th century taught us how painful financial crises can be. We saw crises hit Mexico in 1995, East Asia in 1997, and Brazil and Russia in 1998. The crises continued with Argentina and Turkey in 2001. The waves of crises crashed down ever more frequently, with higher peaks and deeper troughs. The waves were never confined to their place of origin but lashed shores halfway around the world.

Various multilateral groupings and agencies have sought to understand the causes of crises in order to formulate preventive measures and mitigate their effects if they cannot be anticipated. Most of the responses have been directed at the nationally-determined macroeconomic policies of the countries where the crises originated. For example, there were debates on whether currency boards were superior to floating exchange rate systems. Responses have also been directed at regulation, supervision, and related institutional structures of the respective countries, such as changes in the standards on capital adequacy and disclosure rules applied to banks.

Less attention, however, has been paid to those who have suffered the consequences of these crises. The banking system, identified as a victim of the primary effects, was cushioned by financial bailouts that were meant to prevent the aggravation of the crisis. The poor have been relegated to the status of victims of the secondary effects, as if it were necessary to emphasise their already vulnerable position in society. At best, some countries have the barest of publicly provided social insurance that is supplemented by social assistance or welfare programmes to help the poor. But the norm is more likely the absence of social safety nets that the Asian financial crisis of 1997 served to highlight. Not much has been done since then to improve these mechanisms.

Human security, as a broad concept, helps us focus on the unprotected victims of crises. The main difference between human security and the traditional notion of state security is that the unit of analysis is the people, both individuals and groups, rather than the State and its apparatus. Thus, security goes beyond military incursions and state defence to include economic shocks and social protection.

Human security from economic crises

The United Nations Commission on Human Security (CHS) claims that the objective of human security is "to protect the vital core of all human lives…from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations" and the approach uses "ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment".[1] How can this objective be met in the context of economic and financial crises? When do economic and financial crises constitute critical and pervasive threats?

Although the measurement of the impact of financial crises on the indicators of survival, livelihood and dignity cannot be perfectly established, it is quite obvious that such effects are devastating when these crises occur in a context of extreme poverty. Poverty implies a vulnerability to crises, whether small or large. It would be more useful to identify the specific expressions of tragedy in the localities experiencing crises so that appropriate actions of redress could be undertaken.

Financial crises are pervasive threats that repeat themselves over time. At the national level, financial crises may appear rarely; but taken together at the global level, the threats must be addressed internationally. These threats penetrate the layers of social relations that constitute the body around the vital core of human life, which is defined as "a set of elementary rights and freedoms people enjoy."[2] Four levels are easily identified: the household level, the local or community level, the national level and the international or global level. The various levels determine the different contexts, conditions and trends that will give the impact of the crises their local character. Moreover, each person will have their own conception of what is vital to them. Therefore the impact of crises will always have unique features requiring very specific response mechanisms.

Governments have the responsibility for creating response mechanisms. Financial crises fall into the domain of macroeconomic policy, particularly monetary policy. Even the regulation of financial markets is still at the level of the macroeconomy. A human security perspective, however, will insist that macroeconomic policy and financial regulatory frameworks are able to demonstrate the extent to which these measures effectively protect the vital core of human lives. This is a perspective that will force finance ministers and central banks to account for monetary and fiscal policies - either as threats to or protection for people's survival, livelihoods and dignity. This approach expands the indicators of success beyond growth and gross national income per capita, which are the usual macroeconomic indicators.

Response mechanisms are not the exclusive purview of governments. They also express active agency through informal or formal groups and civil society organisations. During crises, households and communities actively seek ways to alleviate declines in their standard of living. As the CHS has said, "[g]rass-roots efforts to build people's resilience through community-based savings schemes, credit facilities and insurance systems are important to enable people to survive low-intensity crises."[3] But the financial crises of the last decade were of such tragic depth that these survival systems have been threatened and disrupted.

The protests from civil society that followed the eruptions of crises cannot be seen as disruptive activities. The human security perspective salutes such activities in that these protest actions are a form of communication that lets governments and policymakers know that things have gone wrong. This is particularly important in the case of financial markets and the formal banking system since these institutions continue to be closed to people living in poverty, and therefore, are unlikely to be responsive to their interests. Yet the volatility of financial markets has an immediate impact on the poor because the relative prices of markets that are important to the poor are compromised in any case. Thus, finance ministers and central banks must also learn to open their doors to civil society organisations for active engagement rather than dismiss them as contributors to political instability. If human security was a central tenet in finance ministers' meetings, these gatherings would not be surrounded by barricades and the barriers to communication would be brought down.

In the absence of the considerations outlined above, poverty and deprivation will remain the natural outcome of financial and economic crises.

Social policy integrated with macroeconomic policy

Human security is not just another term for social protection, although social protection is a large

1 Commission on Human Security. *Human Security Now.* New York: Commission on Human Security, 2003, p. 4.

2 *Ibid.*

3 *Ibid*, p. 87.

component of it. The CHS reports that "[t]he search for responses to new and persistent problems prompted reform of welfare systems in developed countries, a revised social agenda following the collapse of state provision of social services in countries in transition, and a new interest in social 'safety nets' and social protection in developing countries suffering economic setbacks engendered by financial volatility (as in East Asia), undergoing fundamental structural change (as in Latin America and elsewhere), or experiencing long periods of stagnation and even economic regress (as in Africa and elsewhere)."[4] In order for these reforms on social protection to be effective, the human security approach must emphasise the empowerment of those who need protection the most. Thus governments' obligation to provide social protection will be based on informed engagements and negotiations with the poor. This obligation to protect goes hand in hand with people's empowerment. Social protection does not then become a paternalistic responsibility of governments but a collective responsibility among all social groups.

An important lesson from the East Asian crises is that a comprehensive system of social protection is needed for two reasons. Not only does it protect people from the negative impact of the shocks against economic growth but it also assists those who were unable to benefit from growth. In order to achieve both, macroeconomic policy must be formulated in such a way that it does not sacrifice the objectives of social policy. In other words, from a human security perspective, the growth objectives of financial policy and macroeconomic policy cannot take precedence over social policy objectives in such a way that "human freedoms and human fulfilment" are sacrificed.

The integration of social policy with macroeconomic policy usually finds a link in employment. However the nature of employment today is no longer limited to the narrow confines of the factory and the shop floor. The labour force is more heterogeneous than ever - workers in the informal sector, home-based workers, contractual workers, and migrant workers, among others. These workers are not normally included in social security systems connected with formal sector work. It is necessary to continue the reforms of social protection systems that are being undertaken both in developed and developing countries so that the increased heterogeneity of the workforce is seriously considered. These systems must be strengthened and their coverage expanded.

Women's agency, not default social protection

There is one type of worker that is not usually considered under the heading of social protection. Yet these workers play a crucial but undervalued role in the economy. Housewives, mothers and other unpaid providers of care have been assigned the task to care for the needs of dependents – the children, the elderly, the sick and the disabled. But the able-bodied worker is also a dependent of these care providers since the able-bodied worker requires cooked food, clean clothes, fresh water, fire on the hearth, emotional support and the like in order to function productively. Normally, unpaid care providers are considered economically dependent on the paid able-bodied workers but the other side of the coin is that the paid able-bodied workers are socially dependent on their care providers.

When there is a breakdown in publicly provided social protection due to financial crises and private services markets become more expensive, the system of care that has been socially determined as belonging to women is relied upon for support. Women are the default providers of social protection.

Among the expressions of women's adjustment to the absence or deterioration of social protection, there is a decline in the quality of women's use of time. When they lose outside support, women increase the number of hours worked in order to perform caring functions. This phenomenon has been called increasing time intensity of work. In these situations, women do multiple tasks within the same block of time.[5] Home-based workers, for example, undertake productive activities while watching over children. The presence of social protection would have ensured that childcare was available and that the home-based worker would have engaged in productive activities in a proper work environment.

Since human security requires an actively engaged public, women's voices need to be heard during deliberations over the structure and content of social protection. The double burden of market and non-market work with the added feature of time intensity precludes women from engaging in public dialogue and debate. Women's mobility is further curtailed by poor and expensive transportation and by fear of bodily harm.

The biggest benefit from the human security approach is that an integrated view of social policy and macroeconomic policy should relieve women of the double work burden. These unpaid caregivers should not be deprived of pursuing their own fulfilment. By working to increase the well-being of those who receive their care, they may be sacrificing their own well-being. This sacrifice is what human security hopes to avoid particularly during times of crisis and recession.

A human security perspective brings to light the role of women in bearing the downside risks of financial crises. Human security calls on all social actors to work together to spread the burden of care so that caregivers are not exploited and deprived of their capabilities.

Conclusion

When macroeconomic policy is viewed together with its microeconomic effects a broader picture of the economy emerges. We are thus reminded of the linkages between them, which we must continually bear in mind as we pursue "growth with equity" and "downturn with security".[6]

Moreover, collective action is called for: among women and men, among organised groups be they states, communities, or civil society organisations in order to chart a development programme that places "human freedoms and human fulfilment" at the centre of the agenda.

The emphasis on "human freedoms and human fulfilment" under the umbrella of human security ensures that whether in times of growth or crisis women's agency is recognised, preserved and strengthened. ■

4 *Ibid*, p. 85.

5 Floro, Maria Sagrario. "Economic restructuring, gender and the allocation of time". *World Development* Vol 23, No 11, 1995, pp. 1-25.

6 "Downturn with security" is an expression used by Prof Amartya Sen in his lectures on Human Security.

The most unequal of the unequal

If for most of the population of Latin America and the Caribbean human security is a long way from becoming a reality, this is especially true for women, for whom human security is only a dream. In the region, women have suffered historically from discrimination and social exclusion in the non-recognition of their specific rights as women and the violence to which they are subjected. The region faces a huge challenge in the next few years: to provide and guarantee the conditions that will make it possible for all its citizens, men and women, to live in dignity and peace.

Comité de América Latina y el Caribe para la Defensa de los Derechos de la Mujer (CLADEM)[1]

Amanda Cecilia Muñoz Moreno / Norma Enríquez Riascos

> We kept on twisting and turning, and gaining altitude…
> there were so many curves in the road
> that it was impossible to know what we would find
> around the next bend…
> until at last the wind dropped,
> and we came out of the clouds,
> we all gasped with wonder,
> and then we sighed,
> because we were in a place
> you only ever find in fairytales,
> the blue sky above,
> the white clouds below,
> and all the problems of the world forgotten…
>
> *Amy Tan*[2]

The concept of human security has been defined in multifarious ways, yet it could be summarised as the full and progressive realisation of human rights, essentially the right to live life in peace, to have one's basic social and cultural needs met, to have access to the beneficial developments of science and technology and to enjoy a healthy environment. For United Nations experts it includes economic development, social justice, environmental protection, disarmament, respect for human rights and the rule of law;[3] the capacity of States and individuals to anticipate and resolve their conflicts by peaceful means;[4] the quality of life of members of a society;[5] and freedom from fear and deprivation.[6]

These definitions inevitably lead to the conclusion that in Latin America and the Caribbean, for the vast majority of the population, human security in any real sense of the word is still a long way off. Women are worse off - for them human security is only a dream.

In more economically developed countries advances in human security are the product of government policies designed to overcome inequities and of laws promoting the real enjoyment of human rights. States that guarantee the human security of their citizens strive to establish conditions favourable to personal security and the protection of life. Improving human security goes hand-in-hand with resolving internal as well as international armed conflicts. In countries experiencing internal or international armed conflicts human security is seriously compromised. However, the greatest threats to human security arise from inequality and social exclusion.

In the light of historical discrimination and exclusion perpetrated against women, the outlook is gloomy. The most serious indications of their plight are the non-recognition of their rights as people - particularly of their specific rights as women - and the violence to which they are subjected.

The persistence of a patriarchal culture perpetuates prejudices against women in the public mind which exclude them from participating in the exercise of power. Women are therefore prevented from participating in improving the material conditions of their own lives, and from receiving any social and political recognition. The former translates into unequal distribution of wealth, making women "the poorest of the poor"; the latter is evidenced by the absence of public structural policies and relevant legislation to promote their empowerment.

Taking account of the specific needs of women

The welfare and the human security of women in the region depend on access to adequate and timely health services; access to quality consumer goods; the opportunity for active participation in decisions affecting the future of their country or region; the right to knowledge and to an education free from stereotypes and discrimination; the right to housing; and in general to everything that makes it possible for men and women to live life with dignity and in peace.

One way of overcoming historically determined inequalities based on sexual discrimination is to design affirmative action measures, such as are recommended in the various international human rights treaties and in the action plans of world conferences, all of which have been signed by most of the countries of the region.

These measures, aimed at taking proper account of specific gender needs and long-term social inequities that exist to this day, are urgently demanded by women, but they have been extremely difficult to implement.

The quest for equality and recognition of gender differences implies that full realisation of rights for women in the field of health care involves, in addition to basic health care, sexual and reproductive health. Governments must urgently develop policies and legislation promoting women's autonomy in the areas of sexuality and reproduction, legalising abortion[7] or penalising sterilisation without consent. Secondly, accessible services must be provided for (a) informed fertility control, including access to safe and effective methods of contraception, and to assisted reproduction techniques; (b) universal coverage during pregnancy, childbirth and postpartum period; (c) medical attention for spontaneous or induced abortion.[8]

Other ways of recognising differences without converting them into inequalities appear in the Belén do Pará Convention and the Vienna Declaration (1993), which acknowledge that violence against women constitutes a human rights violation. Whereas specific health rights for women derive from biological differences, violence as an expression of discrimination against women constitutes a historical phenomenon. In spite of the above-mentioned international instruments, women continue to be subjected daily to violence in many shapes and forms. If human security involves good quality of life and the chance to live it in peace and free from fear of violence, human security for women is non-existent either in the public or the private spheres.

Equitable enjoyment of access to resources and opportunities

Inequity between men and women is evident in their access to socially constructed opportunities:

1 www.cladem.org

2 From *The Kitchen God's Wife* by Amy Tan, Ivy Books, 1991. Re-translated into English from the Spanish translation of the novel. The original in English was not available at the time of going into print.

3 Millennium Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. *We the Peoples. The role of the United Nations in the 21st century.* 2000.

4 Sadako Ogata, former United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

5 Ramesh Thakur, Vice Rector (Peace and Governance) of the United Nations University in Tokyo.

6 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

7 Abortion is still the first cause of maternal mortality in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile and Paraguay. It is the second cause in Colombia and Peru, while in Brazil, Mexico and Panama it appears as the third cause. With exceptions, abortion is criminalised in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Paraguay. In Panama, under certain circumstances it is exempt from criminal responsibility. Colombia, El Salvador, Honduras and Chile criminalise it in all cases; only in Puerto Rico has abortion been legalised. CLADEM. *Silencios Públicos, Muertes Privadas*. 1998.

8 In Latin America the rate of births attended by skilled health personnel in the period 1995-2000 was between 100% in Chile and 99% in Uruguay, versus 69% in Ecuador and 56% in Peru. As to maternal mortality (1985-1999), the most serious cases are found in Bolivia with 390 per 100,000 live births and Peru with 270 per 100,000. The lowest rates for maternal mortality are in Chile, Uruguay and Argentina with 23, 26 y 41 deaths per 100,000 live births, respectively. Comunidad Andina. *Documentos Estadísticos: Indicadores sociales: Educación, Salud, Pobreza, Tecnología, Género y Aspectos de Gobernabilidad y Democracia*. Mayo 2003. Report based on UNDP *Human Development Report 2002*.

employment, housing, education, civil and political decision-making processes, science, technology, credit, etc. Analysis of all these aspects demonstrates the structural inequity that affects women. The picture becomes even more complex when including the prevalent cultural patterns and the roles society assigns to women.

In the world of labour high-powered and prestigious jobs are still reserved for men. Salary differences persist, although they are beginning to blur due to international commitments made by governments and modern constitutional reforms which include human rights. In Latin America and the Caribbean, in the formal employment sector women earn approximately 15% less than men.[9] In the informal sector and in rural areas, earnings inequalities are higher. Current macroeconomic policies, resulting from the globalisation of market forces, have had their greatest impact on women. Structural adjustment and industrial restructuring have increased women's unemployment.

Women's access to housing, whether as tenants or owners, is restricted. The percentage of all women who own houses or land worldwide is barely higher than 1%, according to the International Labour Organization, which also states that only little more than 10% of the world's wealth is in the hands of women.[10]

At the regional level, the consolidated report of the Andean Community,[11] gives statistics for the population living below the poverty line of USD 1 per day (at 1985 international prices, adjusted for purchasing-power parity). In Chile and Uruguay, this group represent less than 2% of the population for the period 1983-2000. In Brazil, Bolivia, Peru and Mexico, this group represents between 11.6% and 15.9% of the population; in Paraguay, Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela it varies from 19.5% to 23% of the population.

"The GINI Index measures the inequality of income or consumption distribution within a country. For Uruguay (0.423), Ecuador (0.437) and Bolivia (0.447) this indicator shows the more 'equitable' distribution of income. The next group includes Peru (0.462) and Venezuela (0.495). A third group, with less equitable income distribution than the first two groups, is made up of Mexico (0.531), Chile (0.566), Colombia (0.571), Paraguay (0.577), and Brazil (0.607)."[12]

Gender inequalities in estimated income are as follows: in Uruguay, income earned by women is 51% of that earned by men; in Colombia the corresponding figure is 47%; in Bolivia, 45%; and in Venezuela, 41%. The lowest ratios of estimated income earned by women relative to that earned by men are found in Ecuador, with a ratio of 29%, and Peru (25%).[13]

Privatisation of public services has made customers out of people who as users previously had rights to State-provided services. The effect has been to put a brake on the advances in education, health, access to housing and other public services such as electricity, telephone services, etc., achieved throughout Latin America. This setback has made women more unequal again, and among them rural women are the worst off.

Consequences of internal armed conflicts

Armed conflicts, whether internal or international, seriously endanger human security as well as human life. Although political and social instability is evident in many of the region's countries, at the moment only Colombia is affected by a civil war.

The internal armed conflict in Colombia has repercussions which affect the entire population. International Humanitarian Law has been flouted, and with it human security has vanished like a mirage - especially for victims of forced displacement, which is particularly hard on women and children. Forced displacement involves multiple simultaneous violations of human rights, such as social and cultural uprooting, loss of property, including land and homes,[14] loss of jobs and livelihood, and loss of food security.

More than three million people in the country are victims of this desperate humanitarian crisis. Adding insult to injury, there are no public policies in existence to tackle the problems faced by forcibly displaced people in an integrated way, even though the Constitutional Court has repeatedly ordered government authorities to speed up the relocation processes for these people and provide for their food, occupational, clothing, health and housing needs, and for the education of children.[15]

Living conditions for people in the war zones, as well as for the general population, are even more adversely affected by the government policy of spending resources on the war that should have been allocated to social investment.

The National Human Development Report for Colombia 2003,[16] sets out four conditions that make human life worth living: long life and health; access to knowledge; an income adequate enough to live a decent life; and actively belonging to and participating in a community.

All four of these conditions could be achieved for everyone in Colombia and in all the countries of the region if governments put into effect the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).

The unequal status of women would also be overcome if governments honoured the international human rights treaties and the commitments made at world conferences, among which the following can be mentioned:

- Implement measures to eradicate poverty; design policies to address structural unemployment and underemployment of women and young girls; offer training and provide access to productive resources; introduce appropriate measures to increase incomes; and bridge the earnings gap between women and men.
- Eradicate stereotypes and introduce cultural transformations which States have committed themselves to; reduce the burden of domestic labour of women and girls, in their homes and out of them; provide social security to women workers' who do paid work at home; and adopt effective measures to eliminate the adverse effects of poverty on the opportunities open to children and young people.
- Adopt measures that take into account the poverty-related risks and illnesses of women; ensure adequate social and economic protection during illness, maternity, child-rearing, widowhood, disability and old age.
- Design policies to guarantee food security in order to improve the nutritional status of girls and women, and adopt measures to promote effective participation by women in decision-making at all Sate levels.

Latin America faces a huge challenge in the next few years. It must provide the conditions and guarantees that will make it possible for all its citizens, men and women, to live life with dignity and in peace; where all are included as full participants of society and are able to exercise democratic choices; and where systems of justice become more credible and government institutions are perceived to be more legitimate.

In the light of all of the above, we affirm with Adela Cortina, that "for any state to properly maintain its democratic legitimacy, it must be capable of creating consensus and obtaining the commitment of society to provide a certain 'acceptable minimum' for all its citizens, as measured by the standards of humanity's achievements and needs, and to make real progress towards social inclusion."[17] ■

9 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). www.eclac.org

10 IEPALA. *Hagamos un solo mundo.* Madrid, 1986.

11 Comunidad Andina, *op cit.*

12 *Ibid.* The dates of reference for Andean Community countries are: for Ecuador, 1995; for Colombia and Peru, 1996; for Venezuela, 1998; and for Bolivia, 1999. For MERCOSUR countries the dates of reference are: for Uruguay, 1989; and for Brazil and Paraguay, 1998. For Chile and Mexico the date of reference is 1998.

13 *Ibid.*

14 Studies show that 59.8% of the Colombian population are below the poverty line. Land is in the hands of the very few: 1.08% of the population own 53% of the land. Only 55.7% of the population are landowners. Nearly three million children and young people have no access to basic education. Garay Salamanca, Luis Jorge. *Colombia: entre la exclusión y el desarrollo. Propuestas para la transición al Estado social de derecho.* Bogotá, 2002.

15 Corte Constitucional. Sentencia T 1635/2000, SU-1150/2000, among others.

16 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). *National Human Development Report 2003 for Colombia. Understand in Order to Transform the Local Roots of Conflict.* Bogotá, 2003.

17 Cortina, Adela. "Presupuestos morales del Estado Social de Derecho". 1995. Quoted by Garay Salamanca, Luis Jorge, *op cit.*

European Union security concerns vs. human security aspirations

The strengthening of the European Union's role in the world must respect the principles enshrined in the first European Constitution that provides a clear and solid independent legal basis for development co-operation and humanitarian aid. Europe must provide strong institutional and financial backing for these two policies if it wants to be a responsible actor contributing to the eradication of world poverty. The increasing emphasis on security issues, the fight against terrorism and concerns over weapons of mass destruction threaten to overshadow all European foreign policy, leaving little or no room for policies geared towards human security.

European Solidarity Towards Equal Participation of People (EUROSTEP)
Europe External Policy Advisors (EEPA)

Mirjam van Reisen / Simon Stocker / Florent Sebban[1]

In recent years the European Union's strong emphasis on the fight against terrorism has been a central part of its foreign policy. This is an immediate consequence of the position adopted after the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon in 2001. The integration of foreign policies around the theme of security follow from the Conclusions and Plan of Action agreed by the Extraordinary European Council Meeting on 21 September 2001.

This meeting agreed that "the fight against terrorism will, more than ever, be a priority objective of the European Union." The Council also agreed that "The European Union will step up its actions against terrorism through a co-ordinated and inter-disciplinary approach embracing all Union policies."[2]

The General Affairs Council was charged with the role of "co-ordination and providing impetus in the fight against terrorism. ... The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) will have to integrate further the fight against terrorism."[3]

The integration of all policies under the major banner of security has since threatened the independence of policies for development co-operation and humanitarian assistance. These have been made increasingly subordinate to and integrated with foreign security and defence policy objectives. A first step towards this end was the sudden inclusion of the Development Council into a newly established General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) in June 2002, which could co-ordinate internal and external actions in "the fight against terrorism".

The European Security Strategy

The need to integrate all instruments of foreign policies was further emphasised by the European Council on 12 December 2003 through the adoption of a Security Strategy proposed by Javier Solana, High Representative for the CFSP. The paper identifies five key threats: Terrorism, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Regional Conflicts, State Failure and Organised Crime.

These threats must be tackled by "bringing together the different instruments and capabilities: European assistance programmes, the European Development Fund, military and civilian capabilities from Member States and other instruments. All of these can have an impact on our security and on that of third countries. Security is the first condition for development. Diplomatic efforts, development, trade and environmental policies should follow the same agenda. In a crisis there is no substitute for unity of command."[4]

This Security Strategy has already been reflected in various proposals on the Draft Constitution (article III-210) as well as in the Commission's proposal for Europe's financing from 2007 to 2013.

The fight against global terrorism

The Action Plan to fight Terrorism adopted by the European Council in 2001 is still being implemented. The rotating Presidency of the EU is held by Ireland in the first half of 2004, which has stated its full commitment to the Action Plan. The Irish Presidency's programme for the six months includes "the fight against terrorism through full use of the Union's internal and external instruments".[5] The Presidency also plans to make the issue of combating global terrorism an important element of EU dialogue with third countries.

Enlargement and the new Constitutional Treaty

The year 2004 will be a landmark for the EU. In May ten new Member States will accede to the EU.[6] In order to prepare for this enlargement of the Union the Member States have been negotiating the establishment of a Constitutional Treaty, which will need to be approved and ratified by all 25 Member States of the enlarged Union. However, in December 2003 negotiations on the Constitutional Treaty failed, notably because governments could not agree on the powers of the new European Foreign Minister, particularly in the context of greater powers envisaged for Europe's security and defence policy. Negotiations on the Constitutional Treaty are expected to continue in 2004.

Security, defence and the fight against terrorism in the Draft Constitutional Treaty

The increased international focus on fighting terrorism and security as part of a foreign policy agenda has motivated important provisions in the Draft Constitutional Treaty. This now includes an expanded foreign policy with increased powers in security and defence. In earlier drafts the Treaty included explanations that resources for development policy could be used for defence and security purposes, including the fight against terrorism. The Treaty introduces a European Foreign Minister who could use EU resources (like development co-operation or humanitarian aid) to finance the Common Foreign Security and Defence Policy (Articles I-39 and I-40).

The Treaty also contains a solidarity clause (Article I-42)[7] which sets out that "the Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the victim of terrorist attack or natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States, to:

(a) - prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the Member States;

- protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack;

- assist a Member State in its territory at its request in the event of a terrorist attack;

(b) - assist a Member State in its territory at its request in the event of a disaster."

The European Foreign Minister would oversee the whole of Europe's foreign policies including trade, defence and security as well as development assistance and humanitarian aid. A new category of co-operation is brought into the Treaty, especially aimed at co-operation with neighbouring countries. This will include policies related to migration and to increasing security on the EU's new outside borders.

1 Simon Stocker and Florent Sebban are respectively Director and policy officer of Eurostep; Mirjam van Reisen is Director of Europe External Policy Advisors (EEPA). All three are based in Brussels.

2 Extraordinary European Council. *Conclusions and Plan of Action.* Brussels, 21 September 2001.

3 *Ibid.*

4 European Council. "A secure Europe in a better world", *European Security Strategy.* Brussels, 12 December 2003.

5 Irish Presidency of the EU Council. "Europeans - Working Together", *Programme of the Irish Presidency of the European Union January-June 2004.* Dublin, January 2004.

6 Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.

7 Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. Adopted by consensus by the European Convention on 13 June and 10 July 2003 and submitted to the President of the European Council in Rome on 18 July 2003. Part I, Title V, Chapter II: Special Provisions, Article 42: Solidarity clause. http://europa.eu.int/futurum/constitution/part1/title5/chapter2/index_en.htm

Articles linked with security issues within the Draft Constitution[8]

Article I-15

1. The Union's competence in matters of common foreign and security policy shall cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union's security, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, which might lead to a common defence.

Article I-27

2. The Union Minister for Foreign Affairs shall conduct the Union's common foreign and security policy. He or she shall contribute by his or her initiatives to the development of that policy, which he or she shall carry out as mandated by the Council. The same shall apply to the common security and defence policy.
3. The Union Minister for Foreign Affairs shall be one of the Vice-Presidents of the Commission. He or she shall be responsible there for handling external relations and for co-ordinating other aspects of the Union's external action. In exercising these responsibilities within the Commission, and only for these responsibilities, the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs shall be bound by Commission procedures.

Article I-39

4. The common foreign and security policy shall be put into effect by the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs and by the Member States, using national and Union resources.

Article I-40

1. The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on assets civil and military. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States.
4. Decisions on the implementation of the common security and defence policy, including those initiating a mission as referred to in this Article, shall be adopted by the Council acting unanimously on an initiative from the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs or from a Member State. The Union Minister for Foreign Affairs may propose the use of both national resources and Union instruments, together with the Commission where appropriate.

Article III-210

1. The tasks referred to in Article I-40 (1), in the course of which the Union may use civilian and military means, shall include disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace keeping tasks, tasks undertaken for crisis management, including peacemaking and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories. ■

A widening of the democratic gap

The position and role of the European Foreign Minister is one of the main issues still being negotiated in the Constitutional Treaty. The proposal most seriously considered is that of a so-called "double-hatted" Foreign Minister who would combine the role of Vice-President of the powerful European Commission, with that of Minister functioning under the even more powerful European Council of Member States. No adequate procedures have been proposed to secure clear accountability and control of the activities of this "superman" or "superwoman", who, given the double hats, can turn to various procedures - mostly as he/she would see most appropriate (Article I-27). There is also no role given to the European Parliament to exercise control over the actions of the European Foreign Minister.

Disagreement over the Constitutional Treaty is mainly centred on the relative role of the EU Council or of the European Commission in the implementation of the EU's foreign policy. "Federalists" are claiming a greater role for the European Commission while the "anti-federalists" are seeking a greater role for the EU Council. However, both of these scenarios will widen the democratic gap - and will contribute to a centralisation of decisions in foreign policies without any effective countervailing power or control.

European civil society

European NGOs have been active in influencing the negotiation on the Constitutional Treaty. The *act4europe* campaign was launched by the Civil Society Contact Group that brings human rights, environment, social and development NGOs together with the trade unions. *Act4europe* has been pressing for greater democratic controls, transparency and civil dialogue alongside specific demands for economic, environmental and social sustainable policies, internally and externally.

The Draft Constitutional Treaty and the MDGs

In response to pressure exercised by civil groups the Draft Constitutional Treaty includes some important principles related to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). These are:

Poverty Eradication. The Treaty assigns an important place to poverty eradication, which is identified as the primary goal for development assistance. It also establishes poverty eradication as one of the overarching objectives of the EU's external relations.

Coherence. The Constitutional Treaty incorporates the principle that all policies that affect developing countries should take the development objective of poverty eradication into account.

Independence. The Treaty clearly establishes independent legal bases for development co-operation and for humanitarian assistance, which cannot be subsumed as policies subordinated to EU's external relations.

All developing countries. The Treaty establishes that the EU's development policy is the principal framework governing its co-operation with all developing countries. Recently pressure has been increasing to effectively limit development policies to countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. With these proposed changes to the Union's Regulation for co-operation with Asian and Latin American (ALA) countries, the European Commission tried to create possibilities for using these financial resources for the fight against terrorism.

These are crucially important articles given that without these, a legal base would be created to gear instruments for co-operation with developing countries towards EU security and defence interests, and perceived needs in the fight against terrorism.

Europe's commitment to the MDGs

In January 2004 the Council adopted conclusions on the effectiveness of EU external actions - on proposals from the Irish Presidency. These conclusions addressed three specific issues:

- EU leadership in progressing development issues multilaterally;
- Maximising effectiveness of EU external assistance and
- Meeting the MDGs.

These conclusions[9] include, among others, the following commitments:

- The EU and its Member States will advocate that UN reform includes efforts to ensure that the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) fulfils its role more effectively, particularly in the co-ordinated follow-up to the implementation of the outcome of major global conferences;
- In the international architecture, the EU will promote more coherence in trade and development policies between the UN, the WTO and the Bretton Woods institutions. The EU and its Member States will also seek to ensure fully that the governance structures of the Bretton Woods institutions are capable of reflecting the concerns of developing countries.
- Achieving the MDGs is a key objective for the EU and the wider international community. The commitments made by the EU Member States at the 2002 UN Financing for Development Conference

8 These articles proposed by the European Convention on the future of Europe need to be approved by an Intergovernmental Conference (composed of Heads of States from all 25 EU Member States) before they enter into force. The Intergovernmental Conference is likely to adopt the final Constitutional Treaty by the end of 2004.

9 General Affairs and External Relations Council. *Conclusions*. Brussels, 26 January 2004.

Article III-218 of the Draft Constitution on Development Co-operation[10]

1. Union policy in the sphere of development co-operation shall be conducted within the framework of the principles and objectives of the Union's external action. The Union's development co-operation policy and that of the Member States shall complement and reinforce each other. Union development co-operation policy shall have as its primary objective the reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty. The Union shall take account of the objectives of development co-operation in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries.
2. The Union and the Member States shall comply with the commitments and take account of the objectives they have approved in the context of the United Nations and other competent international organisations. ■

in Monterrey reflect the Union's leadership role in the international efforts to achieve the MDGs. The Council:

- Agrees that a major effort will have to be sustained during 2004 to ensure that commitments on increasing ODA levels made by Member States at the Monterrey Conference are met.
- Will ensure that the EU is well positioned to provide leadership in the international stock-taking of the MDGs in 2005.
- Believes that the EU's commitment to the achievement of the MDGs should be reflected across the range of EU policies and its decisions on financial allocations.

Europe's future budget negotiations

The EU works with a seven-year planning of its budgetary framework. The first proposals on the next framework (2007-2013) were released in early 2004 by the European Commission.[11] The key objective in the external area, formulated for these financial perspectives, is that "Europe should project a coherent role as a global partner, inspired by its core values in assuming regional responsibilities, promoting development and contributing to civilian and strategic security."

The Commission proposes that External Policies be divided into three different parts within the EU's financial proposal for the years 2007 to 2013.

EU's Neighbourhood Policy. Through different proposals made by President of the European Commission Romano Prodi and new provisions within the Draft Constitution on Europe's immediate environment, the EU is developing a special policy towards its neighbouring countries. This should lead to more stability in Europe, but risks seeing aid retargeted from populations living in poverty towards Europe's neighbours.

EU as a Sustainable Development partner. The proposal emphasises the EU's role in the fight against poverty and its commitment to the UN MDGs as the centre-point of its development co-operation policy. It identifies development co-operation and humanitarian aid as crucial elements of the EU's external relations together with the CFSP, trade, enlargement and relations with neighbouring countries. This is consistent with consensus achieved so far on the Draft Constitutional Treaty in the Inter Governmental Conference. Recognising that Europe is a "leading trade power", the Commission puts emphasis on the need for the "global economic player" to have a single voice in multilateral trade negotiations. But, according to the Commission, this voice should be based on the European development model based on "open and competitive markets". Yet while EU seeks to liberalise markets all over the world, including in developing countries where liberalisation is criticised for deepening poverty, it continues to protect its agricultural market from the rest of the world.

EU as a Global Player. The financial proposal suggests a 38% increase, from 2006 to 2013, in the resources allocated to external relations. However, the increase would be for strategic security (heading "EU as a Global Player") with other components of Europe's foreign policies like development co-operation, enlargement or humanitarian aid not benefiting from additional investment. The explanation given for this increase is the growing need for a powerful Europe able to speak with one voice in order to respond to global security concerns. The Commission would like Europe to respond to "fundamental threats: terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, failed states, internal and regional conflicts". This language is drawn from the European Security Strategy paper drafted by Javier Solana.

Coherent EU finances? The financial perspectives are incoherent in that the largest proportion of the budget (in total more than EUR 300 billion in seven years) is allocated to support for the EU's agricultural sector. Less than EUR 100 billion is allocated to foreign policies among which a growing part will be dedicated to Europe's security strategy. This is small compensation for the losses facing farmers in developing countries due to the advantage European farmers will receive from European subsidies.

Conclusions

The EU constantly emphasises its role as the world's largest donor of development and humanitarian assistance, with over half of Official Development Assistance being provided by the EU and its Member States. However, its predominant role as a donor only remains credible if its co-operation with developing countries is truly focused on eradicating poverty as the principal objective, and in working effectively for the realisation of the MDGs.

Europe's development policy indeed has the eradication of poverty as its overarching objective, but its development policy is part of a general external actions framework that has security as the overarching objective since 11 September 2001. This increasing paradox is clearly detrimental to EU's co-operation with developing countries.

The economic strength of the Union, reflected by the scale of its trade and investment with the rest of the world, as well as its role as major player in development and humanitarian aid, give Europe an enormous potential for becoming a strong force in global development.

Its economic and development policies have defined the image that the EU has in the globalised world. But Europe's political role is currently too weak to be considered as an important factor in defining EU's role in the world. However with the adoption of the Draft Constitutional Treaty and the increasing will of citizens and governments to see their continent active in the world stage, the political role played globally by the old continent is likely to increase in the coming years.

Europe's chance to become a global player is in providing an alternative to the increasingly unilateral world order. Security threats need to be evaluated not just in terms of military analysis, but also in costs on human security. If the security threats destroy the very values on which Europe has been built and demolish the democratic nature of its institutions, they will remove the European project further from its original intention and from what its citizens want. This, eventually will undermine the whole European project.

Europe's role should be in stabilising a new world order, and this will strengthen its political role in a constructive way forward. Development policy is an indispensable part of this approach. This is the way European citizen's see the role of the EU. More than two thirds of all Europeans see the Union as a continent contributing to the eradication of world poverty. The strengthening of EU's role in the world must respect the nature of the first European Constitution that provides a clear and strong independent legal basis for development co-operation and humanitarian aid. Europe therefore needs to offer clear and strong institutional and financial capacity to those two policies if it wants to be a responsible actor in the world.

Europe's history is based on its diversity of cultures and languages. The EU should approach other parts of the world in a responsible manner by offering its founding values of democracy, equality, solidarity, social justice, human rights, tolerance and a strong commitment to international rule of law. Europe's values and background should be at the centre of its external relations. The EU should promote a concept of human security, promoting global diversity and advocating shared partnerships between world citizens. ■

10 Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, *op cit.* Part III, Title V, Chapter IV: Cooperation with third countries and humanitarian aid, Section 1: Development cooperation. http://europa.eu.int/futurum/constitution/part3/title5/chapter4/section1/index_en.htm

11 Commission of the European Communities, COM(2004)101. *Building our common Future; Policy challenges and Budgetary means of the Enlarged Union 2007-2013.* Brussels, 10 February 2004.

The linkages between international, national and human security

Human security is not an alternative to national security, rather they are complementary concepts in that the former is one of the means of achieving the latter. It is important to highlight the effects on human security of the US occupation of Iraq as well as its influence on politics, the economy and culture in Arab countries. It is clear that two things are indispensable for addressing the roots of human security problems in the region: action by civil society organisations and a transformation in institutional policies.

Arab NGO Network for Development

Ziad Abdel Samad[1]

"In its most simple expression, human security is all those things that men and women anywhere in the world cherish most: enough food for the family; adequate shelter; good health; schooling for the children; protection from violence whether inflicted by man or by nature; and a State which does not oppress its citizens but rules with their consent."

Louise Frechette, United Nations Deputy Secretary-General

"Human security refers to the quality of life of the people of a society or polity. The core element of human security is human rights."

Ramesh Thakur, United Nations University

These quotations summarise the concept of human security as it is understood today. It has shifted from focusing on the State (public security), to focusing on the individual, as a human being and citizen (private security). This shift in meaning was brought about by the advance of neo-liberal globalisation and all that it implies, for the new global perspective has minimised the importance of borders and prompted recognition that state security is essential, but not sufficient, for ensuring individual well-being.

However it is important to note that human security is not an alternative to state security, rather they are complementary concepts in that state security should be seen as one of the means to an end, which is human security. The concept of human security "may even require protecting people from their states"[2] in situations where ruling groups do not serve their people but serve undemocratic interests that perpetuate their power. Democracy implies a process towards a more responsible and aware society, where common and individual security are both provided and respected.

At the beginning of the century the notion of security was articulated by relating the concepts of international security, state security, and human security.[3] International security, which is primarily identified with globalisation, is directed at protecting the interests of transnational corporations, and is linked to the weight of international organisations and state actors, interdependent markets, and stability as a public good. Although state security is principally linked to sovereignty and border issues, it tends to prioritise investment security. Human security, therefore, is linked to both international and state security, which are the means of achieving higher standards of human security.

This paper discusses human security in the Arab region with reference to factors relating to international and state security and the linkages between them. It signals the links between the threats to human security that are affecting the whole region and those that are country-specific. It also considers the role of NGOs and social movements in the struggle to achieve human security.

The Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the Iraqi occupation

In the case of the Arab region it is essential to highlight the effects on human security produced by the foreign occupation of Iraq and US expansionism, expressed in its desire to influence the region's politics, economies and culture.

There are two major conflicts in the Arab region, the Palestinian-Israeli and the Iraqi conflicts. These are two of the most complex conflicts in the world today, representing a major source of global instability and political division, and threatening security beyond the borders of the countries directly involved. These conflicts not only lead to loss of human life and damage to property, but are the main causes of an instability that is hindering social, economic and political development, and depriving Arab countries of opportunities to attract foreign investment, as well as adding to the factors prompting highly qualified human resources to emigrate.

The realities of Arab states

Arab countries have been governed by a succession of undemocratic regimes which have frustrated the development of democratic movements and respect for human rights. Arab states and their repressive political regimes are good at controlling and oppressing their own people, but perform poorly as global partners, negotiators, and decision makers. This situation will continue as long as Arab leaders fail to realise the importance of empowering their people in order to empower themselves. The Arab Human Development Report,[4] published by UNDP in 2002, highlighted the lack of democracy in the region and the need for democratisation of Arab states as a main condition to securing sustainable development and preventing further conflicts and instability in the region.

The realities of Arab economies

Whether in terms of its insertion in international markets or of regional trade agreements, it is clear that the Arab region is not as advanced as other regions of the world. Arab economies' share of total global GDP is between 2.8% and 3%. Arab nations have been slow to join global trade agreements, such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and most countries in the region have made little progress in strengthening local capacities to meet the challenges arising from such integration. Arab countries have not been flexible enough to implement the changes needed to restructure their economies and open up to global partnerships.

Even the steps they have taken towards privatisation and market opening did not include appropriate measures to protect local markets, products and labour from foreign competition. Most of these processes have taken place under undemocratic regimes lacking the most basic transparency. Arab countries' influence in global and regional organisations, like the WTO and the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, as well as in free trade agreements (FTAs) and the global economy in general, is still marginalised and they are far

1 Executive Director of the Arab NGO Network for Development. The author is grateful to Kinda Mohamdieh for her assistance.

2 Heinbecker, Paul. "Peace Theme: Human Security". Presented at the Lysoen Conference, hosted and chaired by the Norwegian Foreign Minister, 19-20 May 1999. www.peacemagazine.org/9907/humsecur.htm

3 Rojas Aravena, Francisco. *Human Security: Emerging Concept of Security in the Twenty-First Century,* 2002. www.unidir.ch/pdf/articles/pdf-art1442.pdf. Aravena is Director of the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO), Chile.

4 United Nations Development Programme. *Arab Human Development Report. Building a Knowledge Society,* 2002. www.undp.org/rbas.

from being able to defend their own interests and the rights of their people.[5]

In addition, Arab states have so far failed to enter into regional economic partnerships or develop effective co-operation policies as a strategy to strengthen their position and meet the challenges of a global economy. As a result, inter-Arab economic exchange does not exceed 8% of the region's total exchange on the global market.

International financial institutions in the Arab region

The involvement of international financial institutions (IFIs) in the Arab region has grown over the last two decades.

The (conditional) support and aid programmes proposed by IFIs are a major challenge, especially given the lack of local and regional strategies and development policies.[6] Inappropriate macroeconomic policies and structural adjustment programmes have often led to economic recession. During the last three decades, economic growth in the Arab region has been around 4%, which is close to the population growth rate, thus leading to stagnation of per capita growth. Moreover, the policies implemented have led to high inflation rates, which exceeded 12% in the 1990s, and a 51% drop in foreign direct investments.[7] The exposure of local investors and producers to competition from transnational companies is also presenting a significant challenge and threatening national sovereignty.

Economies in transition from socialism, such as Egypt, Yemen, Tunisia and Algeria have implemented structural adjustment programmes over the last two decades, but these have produced poor results and did not respond to local needs.

Following the end of the civil war in Lebanon in 1990, the National Economic Rehabilitation Plan, basically recommended by Bechtel[8] and implemented by Lebanese governments during the last decade, had disastrous results. The country ended up with a huge budgetary deficit of over 40% (and as high as 55% in some years) and debts exceeding 180% of GDP. At the conference on Lebanon in Paris in November 2002 (Paris II), the IMF was delegated to monitor the implementation of a further structural adjustment programme.

Despite this evidence that IFI-sponsored measures are in fact adding to the challenges facing the region, IFIs are expected to play a major role over the next few years in Iraq, Syria and Libya.

The United Nations in the Arab region

Although Arab states have ratified the UN human rights charters and other related conventions, they have stated many reservations and have not formulated effective policies to implement their recommendations. Moreover, the region is expressing a growing mistrust in the effectiveness of the UN system.

In this context, it is worth mentioning the double standards of certain countries with respect to international law. While the United States led the war to disarm Iraq of its purported weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), the entire world knows for a fact that Israel possesses its own WMDs, which are a threat to the stability of the entire region. After nearly a year of occupation, the world is now aware of the misleading information that the United States spread in order to justify its occupation of Iraq. Furthermore, UN resolutions on Palestine are not implemented while other UN resolutions are implemented immediately - in Iraq and in other parts of the world.

Anti-globalisation and the rise of fundamentalism

In the context of social, political and economic inequalities and double standards in international law, the accelerated process of globalisation is threatening people's identities, cultures, religions and social traditions in the region. This in turn has resulted in the rise of anti-globalisation movements, a fact which has lead Arab countries to espouse different kinds of isolationism. Various forms of extremism have evolved, and religious fundamentalism has become more vigorous. Religious fundamentalism has been primarily related to Islam,[9] and consequently to the Arab region, where Muslims make up the highest proportion of the population. For this reason the Arab region has been identified as a major threat to global security, and Arabs have been subjected to biased judgments and prejudiced stereotyping.

External vs internal threats

At state level, the security of Arab nations could be measured by their degree of sovereignty and border protection. The permanent threats to sovereignty from the Arab-Israeli conflict have introduced major challenges in the development agendas of Arab countries. Yet among the many factors impeding progress on these agendas, the main one has been that almost all countries were governed by military juntas which took power through coups. Thus, priority was given to external threats under the slogan "the sole cry is the battle cry", thereby marginalising the social and economic needs of the people. Moreover, the allocation of a major part of national budgets to militarisation and arms purchases, as well as the lack of democracy and the restrictions imposed on participation by civil society organisations, meant opportunities were lost to make progress in different fields of development and weakened the structures of government and decision-making processes.

Implications of the "war on terrorism"

The "war on terrorism" is shifting the concept of security in the region away from a focus on the individual towards a renewed focus on the state. In the name of individual freedoms and human rights, and thus in the name of human security, the war on terrorism has directed global efforts to counter the negative impacts of Arab societies' weak and undemocratic structures, manifested in the rise of religious fundamentalism. However, it does not address the causes of these extremist trends, which lie in the loss of individuals' sense of worth in Arab societies and the spread of undemocratic regimes that centralise state power.

Consequently, human security in the region faces huge threats in that the role of individuals in society is weakened and their ability to be productive and improve their living conditions is limited. However, it is essential to differentiate between three types of threats to human security in the region. First, the threats deriving from occupation and war which affect the region as a whole. Second, the threats that stem from FTAs and the consequences of corporate globalisation for development in general and human development indicators in particular. Third, internal threats specific to each Arab country, the roots of which are entrenched in the undemocratic practices of governing regimes, violations of human rights, and the deterioration in living conditions.

Internal threats to human security

The Palestinian-Israeli conflict and related security issues have been affecting the whole region for over 50 years. The challenges introduced by corporate-led globalisation, whether economic, political, social or cultural, affect Arab states as much as they affect other developing countries. However, the prevalent tendency to explain all the ills of Arab states with reference to these contexts impedes the introduction of better human security conditions in

5 Twelve Arab countries are members of the WTO, five are observers, and two have applied for membership, while three have not yet applied. Seven Arab countries signed the Euro-Med partnership agreement, while the Gulf countries are negotiating an agreement with the EU. Morocco and Jordan have signed FTAs with the US, Egypt is currently in negotiation with the US and the rest have been invited to initiate negotiations with the US.

6 The Lebanese case is an excellent example of how the IMF is imposing reforms on borrower countries in order to consider debt restructuring.

7 Houbayka, Louis, "Globalisation and the Arab Economy". *An-Nahar* newspaper, 16 January 2004. www.annaharonline.com.

8 Bechtel is the engineering, reconstruction, and telecommunications company which has been contracted to rebuild the infrastructure in Iraq and has close links to the US Government. www.bechtel.com, www.bechteltelecoms.com

9 Religious fundamentalisms, whether Christian, Jewish, or Islamic are on the rise around the world, a phenomenon witnessed in the United States, where the ultra-right Jewish lobby, in alliance with neo-conservative Christian groups, have had a significant influence on US foreign policy. Moreover, Zionism, as an ultra-Jewish ideology, has been defending the killing of Palestinian civilians and children in the name of the Torah and their belief that they, as the "chosen people", have the exclusive right to live in the Holy Land. These groups, both in the United States and in Israel, are blind to the human rights violations that are taking place every day against Palestinian civilians in occupied Palestine. However, in the case of other religions the fundamentalist label is not applied indiscriminately to all their followers, as happens with Islam.

the region. For a better understanding of the essential aspects of human security in Arab countries a distinction must be drawn between threats that affect the region as a whole and threats internal to each state. It is crucial to realise that the security of the individual in Arab countries does not depend solely on the security of national borders and the finalisation of conflicts in the region.

Although many aspects of human security (respect for human rights, freedom from want and fear, sufficient and adequate food, shelter and education) are suppressed in conflict areas like Palestine and Iraq, this does not mean that they should be in other Arab countries. But the conflicts in the region generate significant obstacles for the countries surrounding Palestine and Iraq, by destabilising political decision-making and depriving them of many opportunities to attract foreign investment. So it is essential that Arab states and leaders realise that they have the power and capacity to work on strengthening human security in their countries. This process of empowerment that governments could initiate within their own countries and with the support of their people is a pre-requisite for helping the Palestinian and Iraqi causes and supporting the Palestinian and Iraqi people. An internally weak state cannot offer help to another, whereas one whose people are empowered can more effectively mobilise resources and consolidate its own sovereignty and national policies.

In the Arab region, the general opinion is that "state security will remain fragile as long as regional security is not achieved, which makes it difficult to speak of human security as an independent and complete concept; and the fact that human rights mechanisms are being subjected to double standards, undermines the concept of human security".[10]

It is evident from this approach that there is a generalised lack of awareness that state and regional security are not the only factors that determine human security standards in a country. Freedom from want and freedom from fear play a major part in strengthening a person's sense of security. Freedom from want starts with the implementation of sound economic policies and strategies that establish social justice as their goal. It can be further consolidated by governments through the fight against corruption and mismanagement of public resources. Freedom from fear depends on having one's human rights respected and consolidated, and on receiving support from one's government, instead of oppression and disrespect.

Lack of secularism

The unregulated role of religion in Arab countries and the inability to strengthen secularism will continue to pose a threat to human security. Most of the wars in the last century had their roots in ethnic (Kurds, Amazigs, Saharaui) and religious conflicts (Lebanon, Algeria, Egypt, Sudan). As long as religious matters are not separated from political and social life, they will add a major threat to the human security of Arab citizens.

The religious fundamentalism that is central to the concept of global terrorism in our time does not have its roots in a single source. However it is true that the situation in Arab countries and the conditions in which Arab peoples live have played a significant role in the rise of fundamentalism in the region. There is a prevalence of undemocratic practices among the regimes governing the Arab region. In most Arab countries elections are not free and fair, women's participation is very restricted, civil society organisations continue to face considerable constraints on their right to exist and their ability to play an active role, there is strict state control of civic associations, and there is a lack of an independent media. All these issues are internal to each Arab country, and could be addressed independently of the issue of conflict within the region. Yet a new addition to the agenda of world politics - the war on terrorism - has stalled progress by focusing on short-term coercive responses rather than addressing the underlying causes related to social inequality, exclusion, marginalisation and oppression by states as well as by individuals.[11]

The agenda of the "war on terrorism"

Some would say that the agenda of the parties waging war on terrorism is to exert pressure on Arab regimes to introduce political reforms and promote democracy. In the case of the war on terrorism, however, these reforms are being introduced through the use of coercion, whereas in the context of the WTO and the Euro-Med partnership they have been advocated without resorting to threats of military action. As mentioned above, progress has generally been slow. Yet an unhurried process of integration into the WTO and the Euro-Med partnership can be considered a positive sign if it reflects a constructive approach to introducing the changes needed in a way that would benefit the whole nation and not just a few corporate interests. In this sense, the regulations imposed as a condition for joining these organisations are becoming major engines of change in the region, whether economic (creation of a free trade zone), social (cultural exchanges), or political (democracy and human rights).

However, as the Bahraini report notes: "Bahrain's accession to the WTO had a positive effect on the processes of democratisation and promotion of human rights. Yet the US strategy of combining the war against terrorism with the reform of allied regimes such as Bahrain, while positive in the short term, could prove to be negative in the long term."[12] Thus, adopting political and structural reforms in order to secure an enabling environment for multilateral corporations instead of the human security of the population will lead to the disruption of the whole process and have negative consequences on internal security in the long term.

Non-governmental organisations and social movements

The greatest violent conflicts of the 20th century were often waged in the name of religion, politics, ethnicity, or racial superiority.[13] It is not just poor countries that are involved in wars - "the greatest conflicts in this century have been waged between some of its richest people. This means that political approaches in human security issues are necessary".[14] Among the political approaches is the right of "non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to rebuild security".[15] It is essential to recognise the vital role of NGOs in contributing to the strategies to meet human security standards and working towards a better understanding of the concept of human security among the public. NGOs could successfully take the concept out of the academic and political domains and into the arena of public understanding and awareness, and consequently apply the concept through means of a practical, change-oriented approach. "The more we focus our attention directly on the symptoms, rather than on transforming the institutions and values that cause them, the more certain we can be that the crisis will deepen because of the lack of appropriate action. Under the circumstance, the need for a theory of the causes of the breakdown is of more than academic relevance."[16]

The role of Arab civil society organisations is essential in the process of addressing the roots of human security problems in Arab states by working on issues of human rights, women's rights, children's rights, social security, food security, housing, etc. But such a process would require the transformation of institutional policies and values in Arab states, to enable Arab civil organisations to acquire legitimacy and autonomy, and an empowering legal framework for their work. ■

10 From a keynote speech by Dr Amro Mousa, Secretary General of the Arab League.

11 Bajpai, Kanti. *Human Security: Concept and Measurement.* www.nd.edu/~krocinst/ocpapers/op_19_1.pdf.

12 Bahrain Human Rights Society. "Bahrain: Progress and obstacles on the road to human insecurity", in this *Social Watch Report 2004.*

13 Bajpai, Kanti, *op cit.*

14 Heinbecker, Paul, *op cit.*

15 *Ibid.*

16 Korten, David C. *Getting to the Twenty-First Century: Voluntary Action and the Global Agenda.* New York: Kumarian Press, 1990.

MEASURING PROGRESS

Countries by critical development areas

Since 1995 Social Watch has presented a summary of the situation of countries in relation to the 2000 targets set as part of the commitments assumed by governments at the World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen and the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, and in relation to the goals set for the year 2015 in the Millennium Declaration.

For this edition we have developed a monitoring strategy by thematic area that incorporates and consolidates the dimensions of analysis relating to development and human security, in line with the approaches defined at the international summit meetings.[1]

The indicators used to assess the different areas of interest were selected not only in line with conceptual criteria regarding the relevance of each one, but also on the basis of practical considerations relating to coverage and international comparability of the indicators.[2]

In our interpretation of the information provided in the tables, we have chosen to include both regional analysis and analysis based on the classification of countries according to their income levels.[3]

Thematic areas

- Poverty and distribution
- Food security
- Health security
  - Morbidity and mortality
  - Women's reproductive health
  - Water and sanitation
- Education
- Information, science and technology
- Gender equity
  - in Education
  - in Economic activity
  - in Empowerment
- Public expenditure
- Development aid
- International commitments and human rights

1. Poverty and distribution

Selected indicators:

Gini Index

International poverty line: Population living with less than USD 1 a day (%)

International poverty line: Poverty gap of population living with less than USD 1 a day (%)

Population below the national poverty line (%)

Share of poorest quintile consumption 1987-2001

The world is characterised by great poverty amidst abundance. Of the world's total 6 billion inhabitants, 2.8 billion - almost half - live with less than USD 2 a day, and 1.2 billion - a fifth - live with less than USD 1 a day. Almost two-thirds (62%) of people who are fighting for survival on less than USD 1 a day live in South Asia and another fifth (20%) in sub-Saharan Africa. Latin America is home to 5% of the world's poor, most of them living in Mexico and Central America.[4]

While the indicators presented in the table **The present situation of poverty in the world**[5] are used internationally to measure poverty and income distribution,[6] it is important to bear in mind that the information available on a global level for this type of measurement is very limited. Not only is information not available for all countries, but the measurement criteria are not the same and/or are applied to non-comparable universes.[7] Clearly, the problem of obtaining information relating to two points in time, which will also allow for minimum comparisons to be made between countries, presents yet another obstacle to attempts to monitor the principal goal established by governments at the Millennium Summit: reducing world poverty by half.

2. Food security

Selected indicators:

Undernourishment (% of total population)

Estimated low birth weight

Under 5 children malnutrition (weight for age)

Food security is defined as access for all people at all times to the food needed to live a healthy and active life. It entails a range of needs like availability of and access to nutritionally adequate food. With respect to this dimension, Social Watch proposes to focus the analysis specifically on the nutritional well-being of the population, which depends to a large part on the level of food security that countries achieve.

To measure this concept we combine three indicators: undernourishment, malnutrition and low birth weight. The indicators included in this area allow us to review the issue of food security both in relation to different target populations (infants, children and the population in general) and also in relation to the different consequences of food insecurity.

According to the latest FAO estimates,[8] there are 842 million undernourished people in the world, 95% of whom live in developing countries. Across the developing world as a whole, the number of undernourished people has declined by only 19 million since the beginning of the 1990s.

Each year 18 million children are born with low birth weights, 9.3 million in Central Asia and 3.1 million in sub-Saharan Africa.[9]

The **Food security** table included in this report shows that the situation on a global level has developed unevenly. More than half the countries (75) for which information is available are currently in a situation above the average for the area. Among these it is worth highlighting the relatively good situation among

Present situation and recent evolution in food security[10]

PRESENT SITUATION	EVOLUTION IN FOOD SECURITY				
	⟵	←	=	→	⟶
Countries in a better situation	1	7	26	16	
Countries above average		6	9	3	4
Countries below average	2	6	9	8	4
Countries in a worse situation	4	7	11	4	6
Total countries with sufficient information to be included in the ranking by present situation and evolution	7	26	55	31	14

1 Social Watch Report 2003 provided a critique of the operationalisation of the goals set at the Millennium Summit, highlighting the excessive focus on the situation of countries in relatively worse situations, while the expectations and demands for progress directed at other countries with relatively higher levels of development are lowered.

2 It should be noted that in several areas we chose to include indicators that overlap considerably in order to ensure that the area was represented in case any single indicator was missing from the summary value.

3 World Bank. *World Bank Development Indicators 2003.* Country clasification by income levels.

4 World Bank. *World Development Indicators.* 2000.

5 World Bank. *World Development Indicators.* 2003.

6 Although there are complex theoretical debates surrounding their use. See, for example, Vigorito, Andrea. "Some comments on country-to-country poverty comparisons". In *Social Watch Report 2003. The poor and the market.* Montevideo, 2003.

7 In many cases the information provided for the country refers only to certain regions or cities.

8 FAO, *The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2003.*

9 UNICEF. *Progress since the World Summit for Children. A statistical review.* UNICEF, 2001.

10 The definition of the categories relating to present situation and evolution in this area can be found in the Methodology section; these categories are the same as those used in the tables.

a small group of low-income countries: Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Georgia and the Ukraine. However, almost 1 in 4 countries (32) are in a relatively worse situation in this area; 29 of these are low-income countries and 3 are lower middle-income countries.

During the 1990s, almost half the countries with information (80) experienced no significant change in their situation. Twenty-nine per cent of countries (50) showed on average an improvement, but 24% of countries (41) regressed. The trend towards an improved situation is not steady, but a noteworthy effort was made by a large number of lowest-income countries (40% of this sector, 25 countries) which have managed to improve their nutritional levels, compared with a decade ago.

On a regional level, the countries that made most progress in this area were those in South and East Asia and the Pacific: 5 of the 8 countries in Central Asia showed progress over the decade, while only one (Afghanistan) regressed. Of the 25 countries in East Asia and the Pacific for which data are available, 9 progressed and 3 regressed (Democratic Republic of Korea shows the most drastic increase in undernourishment).

Evolution in other regions was much more varied: in Latin America 11 countries improved their situation, but 9 regressed over the decade. In the Middle East and North Africa 38% (8 countries) regressed and 29% (6 countries) progressed. Iraq is the country in this region showing the greatest regression over this period.

In sub-Saharan Africa 34% (15 countries) showed setbacks, while 32% (14 countries) made progress. In this region the countries with the highest levels of regression are Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea and Comoros.

OVER HALF THE POPULATION IS UNDERNOURISHED IN…	
Congo, Dem. Rep.	73%
Somalia	71%
Afghanistan	70%
Burundi	69%
Tajikistan	64%
Eritrea	58%
Mozambique	55%
Angola	50%
Haiti	50%
Zambia	50%

FOOD INSECURITY AT THE MOMENT OF BIRTH (LOW BIRTH WEIGHT) IS CRITICAL IN…	
Mauritania	42%
Sudan	31%
Bangladesh	30%
Haiti	28%
Yemen	26%
India	26%

AT LEAST 4 OUT OF EVERY 10 CHILDREN UNDER THE AGE OF 5 SUFFER FROM MALNUTRITION IN…	
Afghanistan	49%
Nepal	48%
Bangladesh	48%
Ethiopia	47%
India	47%
Yemen	46%
Cambodia	45%
Burundi	45%
Eritrea	44%
Maldives	43%
Angola	41%
Niger	40%
Lao PDR	40%

3. Health security

Selected sub-dimensions:

Morbidity and mortality
Women's reproductive health
Water and sanitation

For the purposes of this report we decided to divide the area of health security into three sub-dimensions. Since each table represents a specific topic and as such relates directly to international commitments on the issue, they are presented separately and the information they contain is ranked according to the summary present situation for each country, based on its component indicators.

3.1. Morbidity and mortality

Selected indicators:

Morbidity and mortality

Malaria (cases per 100,000 people)
Tuberculosis (cases per 100,000 people)
AIDS (% of 15-49 years old)
Infant mortality (per 1,000 live births)
Under-5 mortality (per 1,000 live births)

Immunisation

DPT immunised 1-year-old children
Polio immunised 1-year-old children
Measles immunised 1-year-old children
Tuberculosis immunised 1-year-old children

The main conclusion of WHO's *The World Health Report 2002* is that gaps between countries and regions are getting steadily wider. The difference in life expectancy between sub-Saharan Africa and developed countries is 32 years (46 and 78 years respectively). And the situation is growing ever worse, as a result of the drop in life expectancy caused by AIDS in Africa and the drop in the probability of children reaching the age of five, due to the profound impact of transmittable diseases.

A higher life expectancy can be achieved through progress in the area of health and by reducing indices of maternal and infant mortality. The process of "demographic transition" that has taken place in these countries starts with high birth and death rates. In general mortality rates are the first to be reduced, followed by birth rates. This transition process began many years ago in developed countries and in the poorest countries it has not yet concluded.

While in developed countries mortality is concentrated (60%) among senior citizens (70 years old and over), in many developing regions it is concentrated in much lower age groups, due to the high rates of infant mortality and premature mortality among adults. The health challenges facing adults are only just beginning to be taken into consideration in health policies in developing countries. These challenges continue to be regarded as a characteristic concern of wealthy countries, where the child mortality rate has already been reduced to very low figures.[11]

The **Health** table reflects the situation of countries in relation to their morbidity and mortality rates. The indicators relating to infant mortality have been prioritised, together with its causes and the most prevalent diseases, since lowering infant mortality rates constitutes one of the most important goals set at the international summits.

When countries are sorted according to their health situation significant differences between regions become clear (Chart 1).

Nine out of every ten countries in the group in a worse situation are in sub-Saharan Africa. The group in a relatively better situation includes principally 90% of countries in Europe, 85% of countries in North Africa and the Middle East, and 64% of countries in Latin America.

Among the countries in a worse situation, the most serious cases are Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia, where one in five children dies before reaching the age of five and which have very high rates of malaria, tuberculosis and HIV-AIDS.

If countries are grouped by income levels (Chart 2), it becomes clear that a country's situation with respect to health security is closely related to its wealth.

Child mortality rates continue to represent a key indicator for understanding the health situation in countries and can be used as an indicator of development levels. They also show huge regional variations (Chart 3). Today the great majority of child deaths happen in developing countries, and almost half in Africa. A child in Sierra Leone is three times as likely to die before the age of five than a child in India and 94 times more likely than a child in Sweden.

11 WHO, *The World Health Report* 2002.

Present situation and recent evolution in health security (morbidity and mortality)[12]

PRESENT SITUATION	EVOLUTION IN MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY				
	⟵	←	=	→	⟶
Countries in a better situation	3		16	6	3
Countries above average		3	9	14	7
Countries below average		2	14	20	8
Countries in a worse situation		1	23	69	8
Total countries with sufficient information to be included in the ranking by present situation and evolution	3	6	62	109	26

CHART 1. Distribution of regions by present situation in health security



CHART 2. Distribution of countries grouped by income, by present situation in health security



CHART 3. Infant and under-5 mortality averages by region



12 See footnote 10.

Within countries the highest rates of infant mortality occur among the poorest sectors.[13] In many countries where infant mortality rates have decreased this improvement is concentrated among relatively less poor children, which widens the gap among them.

Since 1970, under-5 mortality has dropped in the world from 147 to 80 per 1,000. This improvement was centred in South-East Asia, the East Mediterranean and Latin America, while in Africa progress was more modest. The greatest reductions took place between 20 and 30 years ago, although this was not the case in Africa and the Western Pacific region, where the rate of improvement dropped in the 1980s, nor in some Eastern European countries where this tendency was reverted in the 1970s.[14]

From 1990-2002, 119 countries made progress and 62 showed no change. By region, South Asia is where the greatest progress has been made (Chart 4).

The most notable advances took place in countries where mortality was already low, while countries with higher mortality rates did not register such a clear improvement.

Similarly, while less developed countries show greater variations in their health situation and in progress made, among the richer nations the picture is much more homogeneous, since the levels of health security reached are closely linked to the rapid generalisation of advances in medical science.

	1990	2002
INFANT MORTALITY REGRESSION		
Slight regression		
Zambia	189	192
Rwanda	178	183
South Africa	60	65
Uzbekistan	62	68
Kazakhstan	67	76
Significant regression		
Kenya	97	122
Cameroon	139	166
Swaziland	110	149
Zimbabwe	80	123
Botswana	58	110
Iraq	50	125
UNDER-5 MORTALITY REGRESSION		
Iraq	50	125
Botswana	58	110
Cameroon	139	166
Swaziland	110	149
Zimbabwe	80	123

13 FAO, *op cit.*

14 *Ibid.*

CHART 4. Under-5 mortality reduction - 1990-2002



CHART 5. Malaria: countries in a critical situation



CHART 6. Distribution of regions by present situation in AIDS prevalence



Present situation and recent evolution in health security (immunisations)[16]

PRESENT SITUATION	EVOLUTION IN IMMUNISATIONS				
	⟵	←	=	→	⟶
Countries in a better situation	8	7	3	5	10
Countries above average	7	2	9	10	1
Countries below average	1	4	13	14	10
Countries in a worse situation		1	16	37	20
Total countries with sufficient information to be included in the ranking by present situation and evolution	16	14	41	66	41

Transmittable diseases: tuberculosis, malaria and HIV-AIDS

Infectious and parasitic diseases are the 10 primary causes of death among children. Ninety per cent of deaths among children from AIDS or malaria happen in sub-Saharan Africa. This region concentrates 23% of births and 42% of deaths in the world.[15]

Each year malaria is responsible for almost a million deaths among children under five years old, representing 11% of total deaths for that age group (Chart 5). The countries showing the worst setbacks in malaria prevalence are the Republic of Congo, Sudan, Ghana and Guinea.

As far as tuberculosis is concerned, the balance for the period is slightly in favour of progress (100 countries) against regression (82). The worst setbacks took place in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Afghanistan, Kenya, the Republic of Congo, Papua-New Guinea, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia, where prevalence doubled or more.

The incidence of HIV-AIDS by region also reveals a critical situation in sub-Saharan Africa, whose countries comprise almost the totality of those in the group in a worse situation compared with the rest of the world in 2001. Latin America and the Caribbean (especially the latter) is the region with the second highest prevalence rate for AIDS (Chart 6).

AIDS has become the primary cause of death among adults aged between 15 and 59 years. Eighty per cent of AIDS deaths take place in sub-Saharan Africa, where in some countries these deaths have been responsible for the reversal in the positive trend in life expectancy, and have caused a decline in this indicator. AIDS is also directly responsible for up to 50% of infant deaths in Africa. Moreover, adult deaths from AIDS have the indirect effect of increasing the likelihood of deaths due to neglect among orphaned children.

3.2. Women's reproductive health

Selected indicators:

Women aged 15-49 attended at least once during pregnancy by skilled health personnel (doctors, nurses or midwives)

Births attended by skilled health personnel (doctors, nurses or midwives)

Estimated maternal mortality ratio (per 100,000 live births)

Contraceptive use among currently married women aged 15-49

At the World Conference on Population and Development (Cairo, 1994), 165 States approved the following definition of reproductive health: "Reproductive health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity, in all matters relating to the

15 UNICEF, *op cit.*

16 See footnote 10.

reproductive system and to its functions and processes. Reproductive health therefore implies that people are able to have a satisfying and safe sex life and that they have the capability to reproduce and the freedom to decide if, when and how often to do so. Implicit in this last condition are the rights of men and women to be informed and to have access to safe, effective, affordable and acceptable methods of family planning of their choice, as well as other methods of their choice for regulation of fertility which are not against the law, and the right of access to appropriate health-care services that will enable women to go safely through pregnancy and childbirth and provide couples with the best chance of having a healthy infant."

In recent years clear progress has been made in the coverage and quality of health care for women, but there are still serious deficiencies in terms of both quality and quantity in the provision of services, which translate into poor health indicators: high maternal mortality, low prevalence of contraceptive use, low percentages of births properly attended.

According to WHO data, 1,600 women die each day as a result of complications during pregnancy and childbirth. In developing countries, maternal mortality is 18 times higher than in industrialised nations. Moreover, 50 million women suffer from pregnancy- and birth-related health problems. Because women in developing countries have more pregnancies and obstetric care is inadequate, exposure to the risk of maternal mortality lasts 40 times as long as in the developed world. Half of perinatal deaths are principally due to inappropriate or unavailable prenatal and obstetric maternal care.

There is a clear difference between the overall situation in developed countries and the situation in developing countries. In developed nations, almost universal access to proper medical care in pregnancy and childbirth, the availability of medicines and safe surgical procedures, together with high levels of contraceptive use and low levels of fertility, contribute to an overall good level of reproductive health. The situation is somewhat different in developing countries: more than 95% of adult deaths due to causes related to poor reproductive health occur in these countries.

Reviewing the summary for the area, recent evolution shows a clear trend towards progress in all country groups. However, a group of 11 countries has suffered a decline in reproductive health. Among these, the situation is especially bad in Moldova, Viet Nam and Turks and Caicos Islands, which show significant regression, in the first case linked to the use of contraceptives indicator, while in the other two countries there has been a decline in coverage of prenatal care and in births attended by skilled health personnel.

In developed countries women face a 1 in 2,125 risk of dying from pregnancy- or birth-related causes. This risk is 33 times higher (1 in 65) for women in developing countries. This can be seen clearly in the maternal mortality indicator. While in countries in a better situation maternal mortality shows values of under 10 per 100,000 (Germany, Austria, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Kuwait, New Zealand, Portugal, Qatar, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Czech Republic) in the 10 countries in a worse situation this indicator reaches values of over 1,000 per 100,000 (Afghanistan, Angola, Central African Republic, Chad, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Sierra Leone, Tanzania).

In the developing world 45 million women do not receive prenatal care and 60 million births are not attended by skilled health personnel.

Compared with the almost universal coverage of births by skilled personnel in wealthy countries, the situation among the countries in the last group in the table is very varied. There the values range from 65% in Equatorial Guinea to 6% in Ethiopia (Chart 7).

Almost 60% of women and men in the world today use modern contraceptive methods.[18] The highest rate of contraceptive use (67%) is in North America (the United States and Canada). The lowest (15%) is in Africa. The indicator used in Chart 8 (contraceptive use among currently married women aged 15-49) shows this information in a more restricted form but allows us to compare countries. According to this indicator

Present situation and recent evolution in health security (reproductive health)[17]

PRESENT SITUATION	EVOLUTION IN REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH				
	⟵	←	=	→	⟶
Countries in a better situation		1	7	11	8
Countries above average		1		9	8
Countries below average	2	2	2	10	
Countries in a worse situation	1	4	12	17	3
Total countries with sufficient information to be included in the ranking by present situation and evolution	3	8	21	47	26

CHART 7. Births attended by skilled health personnel - 1999-2000 (%)



CHART 8. Contraceptive use among currently married women aged 15-49 (%)



17 See footnote 10.

18 www.savingwomenslives.org

the highest rates are found in China (84%), the Republic of Korea (81%), Spain (81%), Brazil and Colombia (77%), and the United States (76%). At the other extreme we find a group of 11 countries where the rate of contraceptive use is under 10%: Angola, Chad, Guinea-Bissau, Ethiopia, Mali and Mauritania (8%), Guinea and Mozambique (6%), Afghanistan and Eritrea (5%), and Sierra Leone (4%).

On the other hand, according to WHO data every year throughout the world 50 million pregnancies are terminated. Some 20 million abortions are carried out in unsafe conditions. Each day 200 women die as a consequence of unsafe abortions, and 95% of these deaths take place in developing countries.

For women and men, reproductive health and sexual health constitute a first step forward of vital importance towards the possibility of having more life options and greater means to achieve them, as well as the opportunity to escape poverty. Births that come too early, too late or too close represent grave risks.

3.3. Water and sanitation

Selected indicators:

Percentage of population with access to sanitation

Percentage of population with access to improved water sources

Universalisation of access to sanitation and improved water sources are included among the Millennium Development Goals, on the understanding that they are fundamental to improving a country's health situation and achieving a better quality of life for its inhabitants.

It is estimated that 600 million urban and more than 1 billion rural inhabitants currently live in overcrowded, bad quality dwellings, without adequate water, sanitation and rubbish collection. More than 1.2 billion people still lack access to safe drinking water and 2.4 billion do not have adequate sewage disposal services.

Regional figures are alarming: 150 million people living in cities Africa, 700 million in Asia and 120 million in Latin America and the Caribbean do not have access to suitable water sources. The lack of proper sanitation in cities affects 180 million people in Africa, 800 million in Asia and 150 million in Latin America.

Each year more than 2 million people die from diseases linked to the lack of proper water and sanitation services. These diseases are much more prevalent in cities than in rural areas. Infant mortality rates in particular are 10 to 20 times higher in cities lacking adequate sanitation services than in those that do have them.

This already critical situation is being exacerbated by globalisation policies that have accelerated the trend towards the privatisation of basic services like water. In some countries more than half the urban population depends on private water suppliers, whose services are generally more expensive than those of public providers.[19]

Present situation and recent evolution in health security (water and sanitation)[20]

PRESENT SITUATION	EVOLUTION IN WATER AND SANITATION				
	⟵	←	=	→	⟶
Countries in a better situation		1	2	9	3
Countries above average		2	1	13	14
Countries below average			3	8	4
Countries in a worse situation			21	2	2
Total countries with sufficient information to be included in the ranking by present situation and evolution		3	27	32	23

The data for 2000 presented in the **Habitat** table show a polarised situation. Thirty-eight per cent of countries (59) are in a relatively better situation for the area. On the other hand, 20% of countries (32) are in a relatively worse situation for the area, and all of these are low - or lower middle -income countries.

One in five countries for which information is available has achieved universal coverage in these services (28 countries with respect to sanitation and 30 in access to adequate water sources) and one in four is relatively close to achieving this target, with coverage of 90% or above.

At the other extreme, in 12% of countries (19), less than half the population has access to improved water sources and in one in five more than 50% of inhabitants lack adequate basic sanitation.

Since 1990 the vast majority of countries that had not achieved universal coverage have improved access to adequate water and sanitation for their populations. A total of 80 countries are progressing in this area.

This trend of significant progress in the majority of countries contrasts strongly with the situation in several countries that show no change in this area (based on the average evolution of both indicators) and that started out from very low coverage rates: such is the case with Haiti (where access to sanitation has improved slightly, from 23% to 28%, but which shows regression in access to water sources, from 53% to 46%), Togo (where sanitation coverage has diminished from 37% to 34% and access to water sources has improved slightly, from 51% to 54%) and Papua New Guinea (showing difficulties in water provision, which has increased over 19 years from 40% to 42%, but with a significant level of coverage in sanitation: 82%).

More serious is the situation in three countries where coverage in one of the two services has declined significantly: Argentina, where access to water dropped from 94% to 79% (while sanitation rose from 82% to 85%), Burkina Faso, which also shows a regression in access to water sources from 53% to 42% (with sanitation coverage increasing from 24% to 29%) and Uganda, which, despite a improvement in access to water (from 45% to 52%), has registered a decline in access to sanitation from 84% to 79%.

At a regional level, sub-Saharan Africa contains the most countries in relatively worse situations with respect to coverage in these services. Of the 42 countries in the region, only 4 are in an above-average situation for the area.

SANITATION COVERAGE IS BELOW 25% IN...	
Benin	23 %
Congo, Dem. Rep.	21 %
Niger	20 %
Cambodia	17 %
Eritrea	13 %
Ethiopia	12 %
Afghanistan	12 %
Rwanda	8 %

WATER COVERAGE IS BELOW 40% IN...	
Oman	39 %
Angola	38 %
Lao PDR	37 %
Mauritania	37 %
Cambodia	30 %
Chad	27 %
Ethiopia	24 %
Afghanistan	13 %

4. Education

Selected indicators:

Children reaching 5th grade

Illiteracy (15-24 years old)

Primary school enrolment ratio (net)

The indicators selected for the area of education provide information on children's access and permanence in the education system and on the consequences of the lack of education in post-childhood years.

19 UN-HABITAT. *Water and Sanitation in the World's Cities: Local Action for Global Goals*. 2003.

20 See footnote 10.

Achieving universal basic education, which is one of the minimum goals set by the international community for 2015, means not only getting all children into the education system, but also making sure that they all complete their education. Achieving both targets together is not currently a reality in many countries, where failure to meet one or other goal produces a high level of illiteracy in following generations.

According to UNESCO data, more than 115 million school-age children are not enrolled in the education system, 94% of whom live in developing countries. In Central Asia, one in four children are not in education. In addition, 20% of children who start school do not complete their education. In sub-Saharan Africa just one in three children who enrol complete primary school.

More than 860 million adults are illiterate, a third of them in India, China, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Among the younger generations, 140 million people aged between 15 and 24 are illiterate and it is expected that by the year 2015, despite the efforts being made to expand education coverage, the figure will remain alarming: 107 million illiterate young people.[21]

According to the data shown in the table **Education** presented in this report, half the countries for which information is available (77) are in the "better situation" category for the area. This group includes 44 countries that are not high-income, but which nonetheless have performed well in the education indicators. However, the countries in a worse situation in this area (28) are almost all low-income (except Djibouti, which is lower middle-income).

This situation reflects the progress made by an important number of countries since the beginning of the 1990s. More than half the countries for which data are available (89) have made some progress in the area of education. At the other extreme a total of 19 countries have regressed over this period.

On a regional level, sub-Saharan Africa shows progress in 77% of its countries (34). However, another five have regressed over this period, including two countries that show a serious decline in one of the indicators: in Angola primary enrolment has dropped from 57% to 37% and in the Republic of Congo the percentage of children reaching 5th grade has fallen from 62% to 55%. Consequently, sub-Saharan Africa currently has average rates for the indicators of 67% primary enrolment, 72% of children reaching 5th grade and 26% illiteracy among young people.

Another region that is worth looking at in detail is Latin America and the Caribbean, where 18 countries have made progress in education and only one Caribbean country has regressed slightly (Bahamas, where illiteracy among young people rose from 2.7% to 3.5%). The current averages for Latin America in each indicator is 94% primary enrolment, 84% of children reaching 5th grade and 6% illiteracy among young people.

Present situation and recent evolution in education[22]

PRESENT SITUATION	EVOLUTION IN EDUCATION ⟵	←	=	→	⟶
Countries in a better situation			5	8	12
Countries above average		2	4	10	10
Countries below average		6	10	6	4
Countries in a worse situation		6	38	27	5
Total countries with sufficient information to be included in the ranking by present situation and evolution		14	57	51	31

CHART 9. Enrolment, permanence and illiteracy



The Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia show no regression, but the percentage of countries making progress is lower than in the above-mentioned regions.

Worst performers in education

- Less than half of school-age children enrol in education in 11 countries for which data are available, and the situation is particularly bad in Niger, Djibouti and the Republic of Congo, where practically 3 out of 10 children do not enrol in primary school.
- Malawi, Guinea-Bissau, Rwanda, India and Nicaragua all perform badly in terms of keeping children in school, with less than half of children who enrol reaching 5th grade.
- In Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali more than 6 out of every 10 youngsters are illiterate, while in Iraq, Bangladesh and Mauritania one in two people aged between 15 and 24 is illiterate.

Some countries have achieved high rates of primary enrolment, but fail to keep their students in school. In others, coverage is more limited, but the children who enrol stay in the system (Chart 9).

5. Information, science and technology

Selected indicators:

Internet users (per 100,000 people)
Personal computers (per 1,000 people)
Telephone mainlines (per 1,000 people)
Scientists and engineers in research and development (per million people)
Information and communication technology expenditure (% of GDP)
Tertiary education enrolment ratio (% gross)

Countries' sustainable development cannot be conceived of if they do not have the endogenous ability to generate the necessary scientific and technological knowledge to improve their inhabitants' quality of life.

The selected indicators in this new area seek to show both people's access to the new technologies and countries' technological potential with respect to levels of higher education and the percentage of scientists in society. Performance in these indicators showed a high degree of internal correlation, which strengthens the validity of the area.

Although developing countries account for 79% of the world's population, they represent only

21 UNESCO. *Education for All Monitoring Report 2003.*

22 See footnote 10.

27% of the total number of researchers in the world. In terms of expenditure on research and development (R&D), developing countries account for about 19% of total world R&D expenditure as compared to their share of 39% of the world's GDP. Developing countries devote just 0.9% of their GDP to R&D, whereas developed countries generally spend 2.4% of GDP.[23]

As we enter the new millennium, almost every country in the world has a direct connection to the Internet. Although this is an impressive achievement, the penetration levels of information and comunication technologies vary among and within countries, creating a digital divide between those with high and those with low access levels. At present 80% of the world's population does not have access to basic communications infrastructure and less than 10% has access to the Internet. Less than 1% of people in South Asia are online, even though it is home to one-fifth of the world's population. The situation is even worse in Africa. There are only one million Internet users on the entire continent whereas in the UK alone there are 10.5 million.[24] Sub-Saharan Africa contains about 10% of the world's population but only 0.2% of the world's one billion telephone lines.

Unlike in the other thematic areas, in recent years global evolution in this area shows an explosive upward trend. However, and in spite of progress being made in a significant number of countries, the gap between wealthy and poor countries and among different regions is increasing in several of the selected indicators.

Countries' current situation ranking in the table **Information, science and technology** shows that while just 29% of countries for which information is available are above the average, half of countries (92) fall into the "worse situation" category (Chart 10).

The average profile for countries in each group clearly highlights inequalities in access to the different resources studied. The gap between countries in a better situation and those in a worse situation is very wide with respect to Internet access (a ratio of 41 to 1 per 1,000 people), personal computer use (28 to 1 per 1,000 people), and telephone mainlines (15 to 1 per 1,000 people). There is also a wide gap with respect to the number of scientists and engineers (16 to 1 per million inhabitants).

To assess the rate of evolution in this area we need to distinguish analytically between performance associated with the expansion of technology and communications, and performance with respect to human resources in research and development. Over the period under study, it is among the former indicators that great progress

23 UNESCO Institute for Statistics, Science and Technology. www.uis.unesco.org

24 Address by UNESCO Director-General Koïchiro Matsuura on the occasion of the Round Table on Science, the Information Society and the Millennium Development Goals during the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS). Geneva, 11 December 2003.

25 See footnote 10.

CHART 10. Access to modern communications technologies for countries by present situation



Present situation and recent evolution in information, science and technology[25]

PRESENT SITUATION	EVOLUTION IN INFORMATION, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY				
	⇐	←	=	→	⇒
Countries in a better situation		2	56	34	
Countries above average		2	5	22	11
Countries below average				11	20
Countries in a worse situation				2	20
Total countries with sufficient information to be included in the ranking by present situation and evolution		4	61	69	51

Evolution in information, science and technology according to countries' income levels

	EVOLUTION				
	←	=	→	⇒	Total
Low income	2	57	6		65
Lower middle income	2	6	41	2	51
Upper middle income	1	1	18	16	36
High income			3	21	24
High income non OECD		1	6	18	25
Total countries with information on evolution	5	65	74	57	201

CHART 11. Present situation by region



has been registered, while in relation to the latter, there are even some countries that have regressed.

Development in communications has improved in all the countries for which data are available, although not all countries have progressed at the same rate. There are more telephone mainlines, personal computers and Internet users per capita. In contrast, evolution in terms of human resources training and funding for research and development is uneven, although there are more countries that have made some progress in these indicators.

Only 10% of low-income countries (6) have made progress in the indicators for which information is available, and 88% (57) are progressing very slowly compared with the rest of the world (or show a mix of progress and regression among the various indicators), which means that we cannot say that they have progressed in the area.

There are very large differences with respect to the current situation among regions. Not a single country in sub-Saharan Africa, Central or South Asia, or Latin America and the Caribbean is among the countries in a better situation. However, 12 European countries (32%) and 6 of the 29 countries (20%) in East Asia and the Pacific are in a better situation (Chart 11).

In Europe, North America and Latin America almost all countries have progressed, while less than one in four have done so in Central and South Asia, and only 17% in sub-Saharan Africa.

The disparities in the rates of evolution alert us to the growing gaps among regions: significant progress is principally concentrated in those regions with a higher level of development. While in Europe more than half of countries are progressing rapidly, no country in Central and South Asia is managing to make such rapid progress.

Three countries in sub-Saharan Africa have made significant progress, basically linked to substantial improvements in the proportion of Internet and personal computer users, and telephone mainlines: Cape Verde, Seychelles and Mauritius (this last country also shows progress in tertiary education enrolment).

A group of five countries have regressed due to a decline in the tertiary education enrolment rate: Palau, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Georgia and Kazakhstan (these last two countries also show a drop in the number of scientists per inhabitant).

6. Gender equity

Except for the United States, all the world's governments support the conclusions of the UN conferences in Cairo (1994) and Beijing (1995) and have committed to putting into practice their platforms for action which aim to achieve gender equality and eliminate all forms of discrimination against women.

In this edition of Social Watch we pay special attention to the evolution of the indicators relating to gender equity. While the problem of gender inequity should be measured using a cross-cutting approach in all the dimensions of analysis of social phenomena, a series of separate indicators have been included that aim to show the principal spheres in which gender inequities restrict the rights of women as human beings.

Changing women's traditional role in society and changing relations between women and men, within both the domestic and other spheres, is a complex task requiring the formulation and monitoring of specific policies. In order to do this indicators are needed, as are statistics showing their evolution. Disaggregated data are increasingly available showing the differences between men and women in terms of various social indicators, but agreement has not yet been reached as to how to measure "gender equity" as a whole, in a way that will allow comparisons to be made among countries.

Given the specific thematic monitoring that a range of international institutions has been carrying out in relation to gender equity, we decided to present each of the dimensions separately, ordered according to the average situation in each one. However, we also present a global ranking of countries that combines different dimensions, in an attempt to summarise the general situation of countries on the basis of the average situations in each of the dimensions.

Selected sub-dimensions:

Education
Economic activity
Empowerment

The first dimension shows gender differences in access to primary, secondary and tertiary education. Taken together the various indicators show women's participation in the different levels of the education system.

The second dimension chosen relates to economic activity and the labour market, since participation in economic activity, that is having a paid job, is one of the circumstances that most conditions women's and men's lives. Studying sex-disaggregated data on economic activity puts in focus gender differences which need to be understood and which were previously invisible. For the purposes of this report we have chosen two indicators: the percentage of waged women workers in non-agricultural sectors of the economy and the relation between female and male incomes.

A third dimension called "empowerment" provides information on women's participation in various political and economic decision-making bodies.

6.1. Education

Selected indicators:

Literacy ratio gap (women/men)
Net primary enrolment ratio gap (women/men)
Net secondary enrolment ratio gap (women/men)
Gross tertiary enrolment ratio gap (women/men)

This dimension is of particular importance since, according to UNESCO data, of the 860 million people who cannot read or write (the majority of whom live in developing countries) at least two-thirds (573 million) are women. The countries in a worse situation with respect to female/male illiteracy are Niger (0.44), Iraq (0.50), Benin and Burkina Faso (0.52), Mali (0.54), Nepal (0.57) and Yemen (0.58).

The majority of illiterate women in the world live in rural areas in developing countries, especially in Africa, the Arab countries and East and South Asia, where illiteracy rates among women are over 60%.

While many countries have progressed, sex inequality in access to education is present in most developing countries and is far from being eradicated.

Parity in access to education is still far from being achieved in Pakistan, India and the majority of countries in sub-Saharan Africa. The greatest disparities by sex in access to primary education are to be found in Yemen, Niger, Chad, Benin, Mali, Pakistan, Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia and Guinea, all of which show values below 0.80.

The gender gap is even wider in secondary education and average values for these countries are between 0.3 and 0.6. The balance at times swings in favour of girls, in those cases where a considerable number of boys do not complete secondary school. There are more girls than boys in

Present situation and recent evolution in gender equity (education)[26]

PRESENT SITUATION	EVOLUTION IN EDUCATION GENDER GAP				
	⟵	←	=	→	⟶
Countries in a better situation			2	2	12
Countries above average		2		8	8
Countries below average		1	2	5	6
Countries in a worse situation	1	3	92	12	5
Total countries with sufficient information to be included in the ranking by present situation and evolution	1	6	96	27	31

26 See footnote 10.

27 See footnote 10.

secondary school in Mexico, Colombia, the United Arab Emirates and Sweden, among others.

In tertiary education regional disparities increase. In Western Europe there are 93 women for every 100 men in higher education. In South-East Asia there are 58 women per 100 men, in North Africa 63 women per 100 men, and in East Asia 71 women per 100 men. The gap is greater in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, with 30 and 38 women for every 100 men respectively.

In South America, the Caribbean and West Asia, the number of women in tertiary education exceeds the number of men. With the exception of Latin America, all developing regions in the world show significant differences in women's and men's education levels. In Africa, Asia and the Middle East average levels of female access to formal education are half those of men.

6.2. Economic activity

Selected indicators:

Women wage employment in non-agricultural sector (as % of total non-agricultural employees)

Estimated earned income ratio (women/men)

Evolution in this area shows that 19% of countries have regressed in this dimension, 37% show no change and 44% show progress.

The female labour force has grown in almost all the regions in the world, but labour inequalities between women and men persist. In the world as a whole women receive on average between 50% and 80% of what men earn.

In developed countries the gender wage gap ranges from 30% to just under 10%. In Latin America women earn between 44% and 77% of male earnings.

The statistics on employment, salary levels and the data that is beginning to be collected regarding women's total work burden (both paid and unpaid) show that women's economic contribution is far greater than their wage levels. However this contribution is invisible because statistics on employment and national accounts underestimate women's participation in the economically active population and gender-based discrimination persists in the workplace.

ILO studies attribute this paradoxical situation to four main factors: persistent differences between women's and men's wages (as shown in the table); unequal access to steady jobs; the perpetuation and at times the accentuation of professional segregation; and the growth of "ghost work" (that is invisible work in the domestic, agricultural and informal sectors, which is unpaid but economically necessary).

28 See footnote 10.

Present situation and recent evolution in gender equity (economic activity)[27]

PRESENT SITUATION	EVOLUTION IN ECONOMIC ACTIVITY GENDER GAP				
	⟵	←	=	→	⟶
Countries in a better situation	2	7	11	6	1
Countries above average	1	5	6	16	5
Countries below average	3	3	7	12	5
Countries in a worse situation	1	2	23	9	2
Total countries with sufficient information to be included in the ranking by present situation and evolution	7	17	47	43	13

Present situation and recent evolution in gender equity (empowerment)[28]

PRESENT SITUATION	EVOLUTION IN EMPOWERMENT GENDER GAP				
	⟵	←	=	→	⟶
Countries in a better situation	2	15	18	13	2
Countries above average		11	10	25	8
Countries below average		6	6	19	19
Countries in a worse situation		1	1	1	10
Total countries with sufficient information to be included in the ranking by present situation and evolution	2	33	35	58	39

6.3. Empowerment

Selected indicators:

Female professional and technical workers (as % of total)

Female legislators, senior officials and managers

Seats in parliament held by women

Women in decision-making positions in government at ministerial level

Gender equality also implies that women should be fully represented in decision-making at all levels. Women must have the capacity to participate directly in the formulation of social, health, labour and budget policies. Improvements in gender equality can lead to better governance, by directly involving that half of the population which until now has been almost absent from decision-making spheres.

Countries' evolution in this dimension shows that in 20% of countries there have been setbacks, 25% show no change and 55% have made progress.

Clear progress has been made in North America, Europe, Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, while in the Middle East and North Africa progress has been more limited. In these regions 65% of countries show no change, 25% have registered some progress and 10% have regressed.

If we analyse participation in parliaments, we find that female participation is tending to grow, especially in developing countries. Little by little women have been winning more seats in Uganda, Senegal, Burundi, Guinea and Latvia. This trend contrasts with the relatively low rates of women's parliamentary participation in some developed countries, such as the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada or France, which are lagging far behind the targets set as part of internationally defined goals.

The countries that have the greatest level of female MPs are Sweden (45%), followed by Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and Norway (ranging between 36% and 38%).

In Argentina the percentage of women MPs has increased from 3% to 30% since a law was passed establishing quotas by sex in electoral lists. Other cases worthy of note are Uganda, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Rwanda and Viet Nam, which all have more than 25% female MPs, following campaigns to increase women's political participation. The most spectacular increase took place in South Africa in the first elections held after apartheid was abolished, with the proportion of women in the national parliament rising from 3% in 1990 to 30% in 2003.

On the other hand, the situation in Arab and Muslim countries - many of which do not have a single woman MP (for example, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain) - means that they come at the bottom of the ranking.

Some other data that clearly illustrate the low levels of female representation in decision-making are the fact that globally only one in nine politicians elected is a woman and just 6 out of the 185 member states of the United Nations has a female permanent representative.

Likewise, if we analyse the data relating to women's participation in ministerial-level posts, their absence is even more marked. In general executives show very low rates of female participation. The highest rates are registered in Sweden (43%) and Denmark (41%). On average, countries in a better situa-

tion have about 20% of women in ministerial posts. At the other extreme, among the countries for which data are available for this indicator, 26% (47 countries) have no women in the cabinet.

7. Public expenditure

Selected indicators:

Public health expenditure (% of GDP)
Public education expenditure (% of GDP)
Total social security expenditure (% of GDP)
Total debt service (% of GNI)
Military expenditure (% of GDP)

This thematic area includes indicators relating to political decisions concerning public spending. The promotion of health and education to generate a better quality of life for the population requires greater spending, and in general public expenditure benefits the poorest sectors.

The priority given to military spending, which may mean that fewer funds are available for social spending, depends on the geo-political context and is linked to governments' political will to prevent conflicts or resolve them militarily. On the other hand, payment of interest on foreign debt is another limiting factor that the governments affected have only partial control over, but which can be affected by the decisions taken by creditor countries, which are almost always the most developed.

Analysis of the variation in public spending on education and health should take into account the trends towards privatisation which are common currency in international trade talks. A greater liberalisation of the services sector - especially key social services like education and health - impact most negatively on the most vulnerable sectors of the population in the poorest economies, where private spending on health currently exceeds public spending, in contrast to the case in the majority of the wealthy economies.

According to certain international analyses, global per capita health spending stood at USD 482 in the year 2000. However, in rich countries per capita expenditure amounted to USD 2,700, while in regions like sub-Saharan Africa it was only USD 29. In the same year, average per capita spending on education was 28 times higher in wealthy nations than in developing countries. While an average of USD 38 per student was spent in South Asia, in high-income countries spending per student reached USD 4088.

Meanwhile, estimated military expenditure for 2001 was 2.3% of global income, that is, over USD 800 billion a year. This is equal to USD 137 per inhabitant in the world.[29]

As shown in the table **Public expenditure**, in the countries that are in a relatively better situation (29) education and health account for an important share (on average 11% of GDP) of overall public expenditure. These countries spend an average of USD 7.5 in these areas for every USD 1 spent on their military budgets. For these countries foreign debt service is much less of a burden than it is for the rest of the countries, representing on average 2% of GNI (Chart 12).

At the other extreme we find the countries in a worse situation (16) where average combined expenditure on education and health does not reach 4% of GDP, in other words, a similar proportion to what these countries spend on their military budget. Moreover, their debt service payments account for almost 9% of GNI. However, it should be noted that there are great variations between some of the countries that comprise this category. For example, the group includes both Angola (where debt service accounts for 23% of GNI but shows a ratio of USD 1.5 spent on education and health for every USD 1 of military spending) and Burundi (where debt service is just 3.5% of GNI but military spending exceeds 8% of GDP, and USD 0.6 is spent on education and health for every USD1 that goes on military expenditure).

On a regional level, in both Asia and Africa there are a great number of countries below the average. However, the situation varies depending on which indicator is consulted. The worst situation with respect to public education and health expenditure is found in South Asia, with an average of 3.4% and 2.1% of the GDP spent on education and health respectively. Military spending, for its part, is greatest in the Middle East and North Africa, where it represents 5.7% of GDP. The region that shows the most critical situation regarding the share of public expenditure devoted to servicing the foreign debt is Central Asia (8.9%).

Present situation and recent evolution in public expenditure[30]

PRESENT SITUATION	EVOLUTION IN PUBLIC EXPENDITURE				
	⟸	←	=	→	⟹
Countries in a better situation	1	2	13		
Countries above average		15	50	13	
Countries below average		3	32	9	
Countries in a worse situation			28	1	
Total countries with sufficient information to be included in the ranking by present situation and evolution	1	20	123	23	

CHART 12. Averages for area indicators by current situation



The 1990s have not witnessed great changes in the structure of public spending in the majority of the countries for which information is available (140). Just 12% have achieved changes that impact positively on their development, although most of them are countries that today remain below average in this area. None of them falls into the group of countries in a worse situation.

Evolution over recent years in this area has mainly centred on changes in the weight of debt service. As the table shows, three out of ten countries have improved their situation with respect to how much of public expenditure goes on debt servicing, while at the same time three out of ten show setbacks.

As far as the rest of the indicators are concerned, around 80% of countries show no change over the period.

THE SHARE OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE GOING TO SERVICE THE FOREIGN DEBT HAS GONE DOWN IN...

	1990	2001
Congo, Rep.	22.9	4.8
Gambia	12.9	2.8
Honduras	13.7	5.4
Jordan	16.5	7.6
Papua New Guinea	17.9	9.5
Syrian Arab Republic	9.9	1.4

29 World Bank. Press releases, April 2003.

30 See footnote 10.

PRESENT SITUATION IN THE AREA	EAST ASIA & PACIFIC	EUROPE	CENTRAL ASIA	LATIN AMERICA & CARIBBEAN	MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA	SOUTH ASIA	SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA	NORTH AMERICA
Countries in a better situation	3	1	1	2	2	2	5	
Countries above average	11	9	7	14	9	3	25	
Countries below average	3	11	1	11	5	1	12	1
Countries in a worse situation	5	17		2	1	1	2	1
Total countries with information on present situation	22	38	9	29	17	7	44	2

8. Development aid

Selected indicator:

Net Official Development Assistance from DAC countries to developing countries and multilateral organisations (% of GNI)

Just as the distribution of public expenditure is an indicator linked to government decision-making, development aid is also an issue of political will. It is important to highlight the evolution of the percentage of GDP that OECD countries have given to Official Development Assistance (ODA) and assess compliance with the commitment assumed 40 years ago to allocate 0.7% of GDP to ODA (Chart 13).

Quite apart from the evolution shown by the developed countries with respect to this commitment, a simple consideration of the volume of aid in comparison with, for instance, military spending or agricultural subsidies, highlights the absurdity of the situation.

CHART 13. Net ODA disbursements at current prices and exchange rates (% of GNI).



9. International commitments and human rights

To finish we provide an evaluation of the political will shown by countries in the international arena in terms of which key international human rights conventions and treaties they have signed and ratified.

Selected dimensions:

Status of ratifications of the principal international human rights treaties

Status of ratifications of the fundamental ILO conventions

Status of ratifications of international treaties mentioned in the Millennium Declaration

Since 1995 Social Watch has been demanding that governments, the UN system and international institutions comply with the national, regional and international commitments to eradicating poverty. A fundamental tool in Social Watch's work has been the lobbying carried out by member organisations, demanding compliance by national and international authorities with the commitments assumed by governments.

On 10 December 1948, the UN General Assembly approved and proclaimed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Since then, governments have signed a series of international treaties concerning fundamental human rights,[31] which have force of law on an international level. As well as individuals' civil and political rights, these international treaties and conventions enshrine the rights to health, education and decent housing, to non-discrimination and decent jobs for all men and women, and the rights of the child, among others.

Among the obligations assumed by States when they sign and ratify these international treaties is the commitment to guarantee at national level compliance with the agreements, by passing national legislation and implementing policies designed to apply them in practice. One aspect worth noting, especially in the case of the CESCR, is that ratification of these obligations means that governments should attempt to guarantee progressive enjoyment of these rights and should moreover present periodic reports on their progress in this respect to the treaty-monitoring bodies.

This edition of Social Watch includes the table **Status of ratifications of the principal international human rights treaties** displaying the current situation of each un member State in terms of the human rights charters it has signed and ratified.

We also provide a list of **Reports to be submitted to the UN treaty bodies during 2004-2005** as well as a table on the **Status of official countries' reports to UN human rights treaty bodies**. this information is extremely useful given that these reports contain details of the action governments are taking to guarantee full enjoyment of citizen rights.

Beyond simple political will

The human rights dimension has also been incorporated in the tables showing country by country progress in the different areas of social development and equity.[32]

In each table the areas of development are linked directly to the corresponding international human rights treaty, which the majority of governments has signed.

31 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 1948; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), 1965; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), 1966; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), 1979; Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), 1989.

32 According to the guidelines laid down at the international summits: World Summit on Social Development (1995), the Fourth World Conference on Women (1995) and the Millennium Summit (2000).

For example:

HUMAN RIGHTS	INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS
The right to **universal education** is enshrined in:	**Education** is considered in:
UDHR - Art. 26	**Millennium Development Goals** - Goal 2
CERD - Art. 5	**World Summit for Social Development** - Commitment 1
CESCR - Art. 13 & 14	**Fourth World Conference on Women - Beijing Platform for Action** - Critical Areas of Concern
CEDAW - Art. 5, 10 & 14a	
CRC - Art. 28 & 29	

These linkages show that there are other ways of calling for compliance with the commitments assumed on an international level at the UN world conferences, which go beyond merely appealing to the political will of governments, since there exists in international law a framework making them legally binding.

The commitments to improving health, education, morbidity and mortality, reproductive health, information, habitat and housing, together with gender equity, are rights that are inherent to all people on the basis of the simple fact that they are human beings, in other words they are rights which cannot either be given or taken away. Governments have an obligation to respect and protect these rights, in fact to do everything within their power to ensure that they are fulfilled and guaranteed. Human rights are universal, that is they are valid and demandable anywhere in the world. They are also indivisible, reflecting an integral approach that does not allow for them to be separated one from the other.

When governments sign or ratify the CESCR they commit to doing everything within their power to guarantee progressive enjoyment of those rights. In line with this commitment, policies and programmes aimed at ensuring basic development goals should include among their objectives that of ensuring an increase in the number of people who enjoy full rights. In other words, they are committing to adopting a rights-based approach in the actions they carry out. This means that governments should ensure that each of their policies or programmes approaches the different specific issues they aim to tackle within a human rights framework.

The tables Social Watch generally presents reflect progress and setbacks in the quality of life of citizens through the evolution of a series of basic indicators (access to education, health care coverage, access to drinking water, participation of women in decision-making, etc.). From the point of view of human rights, these indicators can be interpreted in another way. When the tables show that a country is regressing in one of the areas relating to internationally assumed development goals, it is clear that the country is not fulfilling its commitment to respect, protect, fulfil or guarantee human rights. In this sense, then, we can talk of the violation of citizen's human rights in that country.

This edition of Social Watch includes lists of the international human rights treaties and of the commitments assumed in previous UN conferences and in the Millennium Development Goals. It is hoped that this information can be used as another tool by lobbying organisations to pressure their governments in their struggle to eradicate poverty and its causes, ensuring an equitable distribution of wealth and respect for human rights. ■

Methodology and data management

While the use of electronic media has clearly speeded up access to information,[33] many of the problems that Social Watch signalled in previous years continue to make it difficult to carry out comparative analysis on the evolution of the indicators.[34] This year we have maintained the same criteria as were adopted in previous editions regarding the selection of data sources. That is, our first choice continues to bae the most recent source provided by any of the international institutions that are generally recognised as providing reliable data, even if some changes appear surprising and could be interpreted in different ways, or be seen to result from a variety of causes.

In those cases in which the most recent data were not available from these institutions, we chose from among the alternatives on offer those "secondary" sources whose data for previous years most closely and consistently matched the data published by the acknowledged authority on the subject.

If several alternative sources were available, we chose whichever best-known source was regarded as being (or basing its information on)[35] the best authority on the topic in question.

If none of the above criteria could be applied, we chose the source offering data from the largest number of countries.

In those cases in which the data related to a period (for instance, 1990-1994) rather than to a single year, we followed the recommendation that the data be assigned to the year falling in the middle of the period (which in the above example would be 1992) in order to allow us to calculate the rate of variation. ■

33 The question of the accessibility of information is another issue altogether. Most international institutions' large databases can only be accessed by paying high-cost subscriptions.

34 These problems include, for example, the fact that the dates for which information is available often do not coincide, and the significant differences in the figures provided by different sources for the same year.

35 Large databases can be consulted that refer to the original source from which the information was taken.

Measuring countries' present situation and the rate of change

In each of the thematic areas the information is displayed in relation to the chosen indicators. Each indicator covers three columns: the first shows the country's initial situation (data from 1990 or the closest possible year), the second column shows the latest available data and the third and last column (titled "progress or regression") shows the rate of change.[36]

In order to assess the evolution of each indicator, two aspects were taken into account: initial and final levels and the rate of change of progress or regression.

The **situation** a country is in according to each indicator is given by the last available value for that indicator.

Each country is assigned a value from 1 to 4 (1 indicates worst situation and 4 indicates best situation) according to the distribution of values for each indicator[37] and the value for all the indicators for that area is then given by the average of these values for each country.[38] In this way a self-referential ranking is obtained, independent of the distance from the goals or from specific conceptually defined levels.

This ranking was only applied to those countries with information for at least half the indicators that make up the overall thematic area.

To avoid giving a false impression of accuracy, the average values were rescaled[39] to create four country categories:

Countries in better situation

Countries above average

Countries below average

Countries in worse situation

A fifth group is also presented showing information for those countries which lack sufficient data to be included in the ranking (*Countries with insufficient data to summarise the area*).

Within each group the countries are listed in alphabetical order.

The **rate of change** for each country is obtained by considering the variation in the values of the indicator over the time period within which the measurements are made. The quotient between the variation in the indicator and the time period reflects the rate of change for the item in question.

The values for this rate of change have also been rescaled in sections (using a reference scale from 1 to 5), which are presented in the tables in the column titled "Progress or regression". A series of symbols are used to illustrate the changes in order to make the information easier to read and to avoid the false impression of accuracy given by a numerical value.

The categories defined in this rescaling are as follows:

Significant progress

Slight progress

Stagnant

Slight regression

Significant regression

"Significant progress" applies to those countries which are progressing at rates above the average for all countries making progress.

"Slight progress" applies to those countries which are progressing at rates below the average for all countries making progress.

"Stagnant" refers to those countries where no changes (or quantitatively insignificant changes) have been recorded over the period in question.

"Slight regression" applies to those countries which are regressing at rates below the average for all countries regressing (i.e. they are regressing more slowly).

"Significant regression" applies to those countries which are regressing at rates above the average for all countries regressing (i.e. they are regressing more rapidly). ■

36 In some tables two extra columns appear displaying the date of the information selected.

37 For this the variable was normalised (by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation) and then the mean positive values and the mean negative values for the normalised indicator were calculated. The four categories were established according to the values above and below the mean positive values for the normalised indicator, and the values above and below the mean negative values for the normalised indicator.

38 In the case of the table showing morbidity and mortality rates the child immunisation ranking was included as another indicator in the calculations of the average value for the area. The immunisation table is presented separately and ordered according to the average value of its indicators.

39 The possible range for the average of the area was divided into four groups as follows: group 1 (between 4 and 3.26); group 2 (between 3.25 and 2.6); group 3 (between 2.5 and 1.76); group 4 (between 1.75 and 1).

Country gender ranking

Gender equity is a complex concept involving multiple dimensions of both a quantitative and qualitative nature, for many of which there are no data records available. This Social Watch report includes a ranking of those countries for which data is available in terms of the different dimensions selected as indicators in the thematic area relating to gender equity.

Taking as our first parameter for selection existing information that is comparable on an international level, the dimensions chosen are: education, economic activity and participation in political and economic decision-making ("empowerment").

The final ranking was constructed by combining the internal ranking for each of the above-mentioned dimensions in a single final index of countries. The challenge we were faced with was how to unify the different dimensions along which gender equity has been measured, in order to obtain a more comprehensive ranking than that provided for each dimension separately or in traditional indexes. While we have not yet managed to build a unified index showing values that in turn can be used as a monitoring tool for each country, in the way that the Quality of Life Index (QLI) works for countries' poverty and welfare evolution, we hope that the inclusion of the gender tables and their ranking on the basis of the combination of the indicators presented will make a contribution to existing measurements of gender equity.

The two indexes that so far are most used to classify countries on the basis of their levels of gender equity are the Gender-related Development Index (GDI) and the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) developed by the UNDP. The GDI measures progress along the same dimensions and using the same variables as the Human Development Index (HDI), but takes into account inequalities in progress between women and men (it combines life expectancy, education levels and differences in earned income). The greater the gender inequality relating to basic human development, the lower a country's GDI value is in comparison with its HDI.

The GEM shows the degree to which women can actively participate in a country's economic and political life. It measures gender inequality in three key areas of economic and political participation and decision-making. This index is comprised of variables measuring women's participation in decision-making in administrative and executive posts, professional and technical positions and in parliamentary seats. The GEM focuses on women's opportunities in the economic and political sphere and thus differs from the GDI, which measures gender inequality in terms of basic capabilities. These two indexes cover central dimensions of gender equity, but they do so separately.

The final index measuring gender equity constructed by SW for this report, which takes into account the three dimensions of education, economic activity and empowerment, sorts countries into groups on the basis of the average values of their indicators.

The countries in the *first group* are Finland, Poland, Slovakia, Sweden and the United States. In the *last two groups*, that is the countries that are furthest from achieving gender equity, are Côte d'Ivoire, Pakistan, Chad and Yemen.

The first big contrast can be seen in the dimension relating to education, where the countries in the last places on the ranking have an average value for ratios of female to male literacy of 0.7, for ratios of primary school enrolment of 0.7, and of secondary school and tertiary education enrolment of 0.3. In contrast, the countries in the first group have values of 1 or more for all the indicators relating to education.

With respect to earned income ratio and economic activity in the countries in the first group, women receive on average 60% of the wages received by their male counterparts and have a 50% participation rate in the workforce. In the countries at the bottom of the ranking, women's participation in the labour force stands at an average of 6% (except for Chad, which has a rate of 20.6%) and their earned income represents 30% of male wages.

Finally, if we take the percentage of women in parliament as the indicator relating to the dimension of empowerment, it is here that we see the greatest variations within each final country grouping. In the first group, for example, we find Sweden, which, as we already noted in the table **Gender equity: women's empowerment**, is the country with the highest percentage of women MPs (45%) and the United States with 14%. Among the last places in the ranking we find Yemen with just 1% of women MPs and Pakistan with 22%.

The ranking proposed in this Social Watch report is a first step towards combining different dimensions in an index, which doubtlessly will need adjusting in future editions. On the other hand, although any attempt to unify in a single ranking the different dimensions in which gender equity is currently measured is certainly a worthy endeavour, a gender perspective should in fact be incorporated horizontally in all the dimensions used to analyse social development, thus defining the very concept of development. It is meaningless to say a society "is developed" and "has achieved gender equity", when the latter is one of the necessary conditions for achieving development. ■

Gender ranking technical notes

To construct the table ranking countries according to their performance in the dimensions relating to gender equity, we used the same method that Social Watch uses in other areas. That is, the values shown relate to the average of each country's performance in the different dimensions of analysis, which in this case are: education, economic activity and empowerment.

The unified index is calculated by combining each country's values for the component dimensions in an unweighted average.

Each country is classified in one of four categories according to the distribution of each indicator. The average for the area is calculated on the basis of the average of the values resulting from that classification. This first scaling exercise eliminates the gaps between values and standardises their distribution. The general ranking therefore provides no more than a basic indexing criterion referring to countries' relative positions and not to the indicators' conceptual levels.

When countries share the same relative position, they are listed in alphabetical order. ■

General classification of countries: situation by thematic area and Quality of Life Index (QLI)

Criteria for classifying countries' situation

In the past the Social Watch Annual Report has included a ranking of countries' situations based on a wide range of indicators. Up until now the method used to construct this ranking has consisted in calculating the unweighted average of all the scores obtained by a country in each of the thematic areas related to development.[1] Given the practical difficulties involved in taking so many different dimensions into account, we have been working on designing an index that allows us to provide a functional summary of the overall situation of a given country using the available information. Previously, the Social Watch methodology had produced an index ranking countries in relation to each other, based on the average values of their current situations by area. In contrast, the new index we present in this edition aims not only to provide a criterion for ranking the countries in relation to each other, but also to allow the situation in a given country to be monitored over time, by tracking changes in its summary value.

There are several possible strategies for constructing such an index. One is to take into account the different thematic areas and their component indicators, in order to obtain (through factorial analysis) a statistical index that, by reducing the number of dimensions, comes closer in empirical terms to explaining variance between countries. This option, however, is significantly hampered by the heterogeneity of the set of available indicators, both in terms of the number of countries for which information is available, and the degree of comparability between countries.[2]

A second approach, which has already been adopted in several summary indexes in use by various international organisations, is to select certain indicators for which the above-mentioned difficulties can be minimised since there is sufficient and comparable data available for them, and which in empirical terms show an evolution that reflects that of a series of basic indicators of economic and social development.

In principle, opting for summary measurements means consciously leaving out certain dimensions that on a conceptual level may be considered essential. By reducing the analytic dimensions and selecting a set of variables that has a strong correlation with the range of original variables allows us still to explain the same levels of variance between countries while using fewer variables. In other words, reducing the number of variables allows us to include the situation of a greater number of countries.[3]

Within this general approach, Social Watch decided to take as its starting point the methodological proposal presented in the 2001 Philippines Social Watch Report[4] relating to the construction of a Quality of Life Index (QLI). After a series of adjustments, this index finally proved to have a very high correlation[5] with the ranking based on the complete set of indicators, obtained using the criteria adopted by Social Watch up until now.

The Quality of Life Index (QLI): a proposal for measuring evolution in poverty and welfare

Definition and antecedents

The QLI[6] is an approach for measuring poverty and welfare based purely on capabilities[7] since all its component indicators refer to outcomes and not simply means for reaching the goals of development. The index is therefore based on indicators directly linked to development goals and excludes variables relating to income.

The dimensions included in the QLI are infant health, reproductive health and education. The indicators originally selected in the Philippines SW report were malnutrition in under-fives, percentage of births attended by skilled health personnel and the proportion of children enrolled in first grade who reach fifth grade.

These indicators are approximate measures of human capabilities and have been shown to be sensitive enough to summarise a population's overall situation with respect to health, educational performance and literacy.

This index covers three dimensions that are fundamental to any approach to measuring quality of life and human development.

On a conceptual level, the choice of the variable relating to staying in primary school until 5th grade is justified on the grounds that were just the rate of coverage to be taken into consideration this would ignore the phenomenon of high primary school drop-out rates present in less developed countries.

The inclusion of the variable relating to malnutrition in children under five also appears to be an adequate proxy for food security in childhood. The Philippines Social Watch report considered the possibility of substituting it with infant mortality, since the latter is an indicator that shows a high correlation with the former and is more widely available in national statistical records.[8]

The percentage of births attended by skilled health personnel is in practical terms an accurate measure of levels of health care, which enjoys a degree of independence from geographical or climatic factors that could distort analyses of the health situation that were based on prevalence of diseases. In addition, it should be noted that this indicator focuses attention on two at-risk groups: children and pregnant women.

This index was used in the Philippines to carry out sub-national (provincial) comparative studies and the results obtained were very encouraging. The QLI proved to be a very good tool for measuring aspects relating to the quality of life, and presented a strong correlation with poverty levels measured using data on incomes and with the Human Development Index (HDI).

Poverty and quality of life

Poverty, quality of life and welfare are complex concepts. It is almost impossible to reflect the complexity and dynamic nature of a particular situation by using a simple numerical value. However, a well-designed index can be an efficient tool for identifying the incidence of poverty, defining objectives and monitoring and evaluating strategies. The indicators

1 The criterion used up until now by Social Watch assumes a certain consistency in the behaviour of the indicators that figure in each thematic area, in that it is assumed that a country can be ranked in a given area on the basis of at least half its component indicators. For a detailed explanation of the methodology used up to the present, see the Methodology section in the Social Watch annual reports from 1997 to 2003.

2 Problems of comparability derive from the use of different definitions and different sample populations, and substantial differences in the dates for which data is available in different countries. The greater the number of indicators, the greater the difficulties, and the fewer the countries which can be included in any statistical analysis.

3 The basic supposition underpinning this strategy is that the relations identified between variables in the case of countries with full sets of data are maintained in those countries where the full set of data is lacking.

4 Raya, Rene R (2001). "An alternative measure of poverty and human capability: Introducing the Quality of Life Index".

5 For the 79 countries with complete sets of data, a value of 0.902 was obtained in the Spearman rank correlation coefficient.

6 The Quality of Life Index developed by Action for Economic Reforms Philippines is derived from the Capability Poverty Measure developed by Amartya Sen and popularised in the UNDP's Human Development Index (HDI).

7 In contrast to the HDI, which combines capabilities indicators with income measures.

8 This suggestion has been taken up and the indicator used in the construction of the QLI in this report is the mortality rate among children under the age of five.

used cannot replace a more comprehensive social analysis of the situation, but they can provide a good starting point for the development and design of programmes since they provide tools for measuring and comparing situations.

Income-based measurements of poverty have functional limitations that make precise monitoring of their evolution difficult. These indices depend on household-level surveys of spending and consumption which, because of the high cost that they entail, are not always carried out in a systematic manner in all countries. The QLI therefore represents a good alternative when these other indicators are not available. We must also add that it is not our intention that this index substitute other existing measurements of poverty and welfare, but rather that it complement them by highlighting specific dimensions of these phenomena.

The comparative advantage of using the QLI derives from the simplicity of the calculation involved (see technical notes) and the low costs that it implies since it does not depend on expensive household surveys. The index is consistent with national and international statistical systems and can be easily calculated from indicators regularly generated by governments and agencies. In addition, not only is it a useful tool for ranking countries' relative situations, but it also enables time series analysis to be used in monitoring poverty.

There is no doubt room for improvement in the concept and design of the QLI, which is still being perfected. Some components could be modified to improve its sensitivity for measuring welfare.

Results

The QLI index successfully reproduced the ranking of countries on the basis of the average for each thematic area, excluding the area of gender equity, for which a separate country ranking was constructed. The correlation between the QLI and this ranking was 0.9.[10] This means that the QLI proved to be a good summary measure of the dimensions Social Watch works with, even though these include other thematic areas than those strictly included in the index.

The correlation between the ranking by thematic areas and the final ranking produced by the QLI was as follows:

	SPEARMAN RANK CORRELATION COEFFICIENT[11]
Social Watch ranking according to countries' average final situation by thematic area	0.93
Reproductive health	0.89
Education	0.84
Information, science & technology	0.82
Morbidity & mortality	0.77
Food security	0.75
Water & sanitation	0.73
Public expenditure	0.48

As can be seen in the table, in addition to the considerable degree of correlation between the QLI ranking and each individual area, there is also very strong correlation with the final average generally used by Social Watch.

With respect to the relationship between the QLI and the indicators relating to the specific areas included in the index, we can see that the QLI provides an acceptable explanation of variance between countries .

The table shows those correlations which have Pearson's linear correlation coefficients of more than +/- 0.65:

INDICATORS BY AREA	PEARSON'S LINEAR CORRELATION COEFFICIENT [12]
HEALTH	
Under-five mortality rate	**-0.85**
Infant mortality rate	-0.85
% children immunised against polio	0.71
% children immunised against DPT	0.71
% children immunised against measles	0.68
% children immunised against TB	0.62
REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH	
% births attended by skilled health personnel	**0.95**
Maternal mortality rate	-0.84
Use of contraceptives	0.72
Prenatal health care	0.71
EDUCATION	
% children reaching 5th grade	**0.85**
Illiteracy rate (15-24 year olds)	-0.77
Enrolment in primary school	0.64

From the table we can see that quite apart from the foreseeable strong correlation between the QLI and its component indicators, there is also a high correlation with the other indicators in the areas from which the QLI component indicators are taken.

In addition, it is worth highlighting the strong correlation between the QLI and other measurements of poverty and welfare.

	PEARSON LINEAR CORRELATION COEFFICIENT
HDI 2003 (value)	0.90
HPI (value)	-0.80
International Poverty Line	-0.66
GDI per capita (2001)	0.62

9 No imputed values were assigned for under-five mortality rates. Imputed values for percentage of births attended by skilled health personnel were assigned to eight countries, and imputed values for ratio of children reaching fifth grade were assigned to 65 countries. The procedures used to arrive at imputed values aimed to reflect with the least possible distortion the position of countries in the ranking by situation, in line with the hypothesis that the indicators will behave consistently with the four broad groups defined for each thematic area. However, in countries where values have been imputed, special caution should be exercised when analysing changes in the value of the index over time.

10 The same value was obtained when this average was correlated to the QLI before the imputed values were added.

11 Spearman rank correlation is a distribution-free analogue of correlation analysis. Like regression, it can be applied to compare two independent random variables, each at several levels (which may be discrete or continuous). Unlike regression, Spearman rank correlation works on ranked (relative) data, rather than directly on the data itself. Spearman rank correlation coefficient indicates agreement: a value near 1 indicates good agreement; a value near 0, poor agreement. Of course, as a distribution-free method, the Spearman rank correlation does not make any assumptions about the distribution of the underlying data.

12 Correlations measure how variables or rank orders are related. Pearson's correlation reflects the degree of linear relationship between two variables. It ranges from +1 to -1; where a correlation of +1 means that there is a perfect positive linear relationship between variables.

The high correlation (0.90) between the HDI and the QLI can be explained by the fact that they share many of the same component indicators.

These results encourage us to continue to develop further this type of capabilities-based tool, which, as we have already pointed out, allows poverty and welfare to be measured independently of measures of income levels.

Without doubt there is a great need to improve the series, and the accuracy and consistency of the data used in the generation of the key indicators of social development. The gaps in the information available are a constant problem plaguing the definition of objectives and the process of monitoring. The QLI was designed precisely to fill these gaps and so to contribute towards analyses of poverty and policy design and planning for development.

	HDI	LIFE EXPECTANCY	ILLITERACY (AGES 15-24)	ENROLMENT IN PRIMARY EDUCATION	ENROLMENT IN TERTIARY EDUCATION	GDI 2001
QLI	0.90	0.79	-0.77	0.64	0.70	0.62
Under-five mortality rate	-0.92	-0.90	0.73	-0.70a	-0.66	-0.58
% births attended by skilled health personnel	0.85	0.72	-0.74	0.61	0.63	0.55
% children reaching 5th grade	0.71	0.64	-0.58	0.40	0.59	0.59

The ranking of countries in the QLI is presented in the table enclosed with the 2004 edition of Social Watch. Countries showing the same values in the index are presented in alphabetical order. ■

QUALITY OF LIFE INDEX (QLI)

Technical notes: computing the country Quality of Life Indices

In calculating the QLI for this report we used two of the same indicators applied in the Philippines (percentage of births attended by skilled health personnel, and percentage of children reaching fifth grade). However, the third indicator used in the Philippines - malnutrition among under-fives - has been replaced here by the mortality rate among children under five.

The selection of these three indicators was also determined by the criterion of seeking to obtain the highest possible number of units of analysis with information available at national and even local levels, in order to ensure consistency with international standards of measurement, and thus allow comparisons to be made and links identified with existing indicators of welfare.

The number of countries with information available for each indicator was considerable: 193 countries had infant mortality rate statistics, 120 had primary school cohort survival data, and 179 had information on births attended by skilled health personnel. The number of countries for which all three indicators were available was further increased through the imputation[9] of values for missing indicators. Imputed values were calculated according to the arithmetic mean for the group to which the country in question belonged, in the relevant thematic area. In this way, it was possible to calculate the QLI for 173 countries.

The QLIs in this report were computed using the unweighted average of the actual values of the three component indicators: under-five mortality, attended births and primary education cohort survival rate. For the sake of simplicity, the three indicators were assigned equal weights in the computation of the QLIs. The actual reported values of the under-five mortality rate and cohort survival ratio for countries were used without transforming or standardising the values since both indicators already form part of international statistics. Thus, the corresponding indices for under-five mortality rate and primary cohort survival ratio are represented as:

Infant Health Index is $I_1 = (1- M)$, where M is the under-five mortality rate (expressed as a percentage) or the probability of dying between birth and exactly five years of age expressed per 1,000 live births.

Education Index is I_2 where I_2 is the primary school cohort survival rate, or percentage of children entering first grade of primary school who eventually reach grade five.

Reproductive Health Index is I_3 where I_3 is the percentage of births attended by skilled health personnel (doctors, nurses or midwives).

The Quality of Life Index for a particular country is then obtained by calculating the simple average of the three component indices:

$$QLI = (I_1 + I_2 + I_3) / 3$$

THE PRESENT SITUATION OF POVERTY IN THE WORLD

	GINI INDEX		POPULATION LIVING WITH LESS THAN USD 1 A DAY		POVERTY GAP OF POPULATION LIVING WITH LESS THAN USD 1 A DAY		POPULATION BELOW THE NATIONAL POVERTY LINE		SHARE OF POOREST QUINTILE CONSUMPTION 1987/2001[A]	
	YEAR	(%)	YEAR	(%)	YEAR	(%)	YEAR	(%)	YEAR	(%)
Algeria	1995	35.3	1995	<2	1995	<0.5	1995	22.6	1995	7.0[B]
Armenia	1998	37.9	1998	12.8	1998	3.3	1998	55.0	1998	6.7[B]
Australia	1994	35.2								5.9[C]
Austria	1995	30.5								7.0[C]
Azerbaijan	2001	36.5	2001	3.7	2001	<1	1995	68.1	1995	7.4[B]
Bangladesh	2000	31.8	2000	36.0	2000	8.1	2000	33.7	2000	9.0[B]
Belarus	2000	30.4	2000	<2	2000	<0.5	2000	41.9	2000	8.4[B]
Belgium	1996	25.0								8.3[C]
Benin							1995	33.0	1995	
Bolivia	1999	44.7	1999	14.4	1999	5.4	1999	62.7	1999	4.0[B]
Bosnia and Herzegovina							2001/02	19.5	2001/02	
Botswana	1993	63.0	1993	23.5	1993	7.7				2.2[B]
Brazil	1998	60.7	1998	9.9	1998	3.2	1990	17.4	1990	2.2[C]
Bulgaria	2001	31.9	2001	4.7	2001	1.4				6.7[C]
Burkina Faso	1998	48.2	1994	61.2	1994	25.5	1998	45.3	1998	4.5[B]
Burundi	1998	33.3	1998	58.4	1998	24.9	1990	36.2	1990	5.1[B]
Cambodia	1997	40.4					1997	36.1	1997	6.9[B]
Cameroon	1996	47.7	1996	33.4	1996	11.8	1984	40.0	1984	4.6[B]
Canada	1997	31.5								7.3[C]
Central African Republic	1993	61.3	1993	66.6	1993	38.1				2.0[B]
Chad							1995/96	64.0	1995/96	
Chile	1998	57.5	1998	<2	1998	<0.5	1998	17.0	1998	3.2[C]
China	1998	40.3	2000	16.1	2000	3.7	1998	4.6	1998	5.9[C]
Colombia	1996	57.1	1998	14.4	1998	8.1	1992	17.7	1992	3.0[C]
Costa Rica	1997	45.9	1998	6.9	1998	3.4	1992	22.0	1992	4.4[C]
Côte d'Ivoire	1995	36.7	1995	12.3	1995	2.4	1995	36.8	1995	7.1[B]
Croatia	2001	29.0	2000	<2	2000	<0.5				8.3[B]
Czech Republic	1996	25.4	1996	<2	1996	<0.5				10.3[C]
Denmark	1997	24.7								8.3[C]
Djibouti							1996	45.1	1996	
Dominican Republic	1998	47.4	1998	<2	1998	<0.5	1992	20.6	1992	5.1[C]
Ecuador	1995	43.7	1995	20.2	1995	5.8	1994	35.0	1994	5.4[B]
Egypt	1999	34.4	2000	3.1	2000	<0.5	1999/2000	16.7	1999/2000	8.6[B]
El Salvador	1998	50.8	1997	21.4	1997	7.9	1992	48.3	1992	3.3[C]
Eritrea							1993/94	53.0	1993/94	
Estonia	1998	37.6	1998	<2	1998	<0.5	1995	8.9	1995	7.0[C]
Ethiopia	2000	57.2	1999/00	81.9	1999/00	39.9	1999/2000	44.2	1999/2000	2.4[B]
Finland	1995	25.6								10.1[C]
France	1995	32.7								7.2[C]
Gambia	1998	47.8	1998	59.3	1998	28.8	1998		1998	4.0[B]
Georgia	2000	38.9	1998	<2	1998	<0.5	1997	11.1	1997	6.0[B]
Germany	1998	38.2								5.7[C]
Ghana	1999	39.6	1999	44.8	1999	17.3	1992	31.4	1992	5.6[B]
Greece	1998	35.4								7.1[C]
Guatemala	1998	55.8	2000	16.0	2000	4.6	1989	57.9	1989	3.8[C]
Guinea	1994	40.3					1994	40.0	1994	6.4[B]
Guinea/Bissau	1993	47.0					1991	48.7	1991	5.2[B]
Guyana	1999	44.6	1998	<2	1998	<0.5	1993	43.2	1993	4.5[B]
Honduras	1998	59.0	1998	23.8	1998	11.6	1993	53.0	1993	2.0[C]
Hong Kong (China)	1996	43.4								5.3[C]
Hungary	1998	24.4	1998	<2	1998	<0.5	1997	17.3	1997	10.0[B]
India	1997	37.8	1999/2000	34.7	1999/2000	8.2	1999/2000	28.6	1999/2000	8.1[B]
Indonesia	2000	30.3	2000	7.2	2000	1.0	1999	27.1	1999	8.4[B]
Iran, Islamic Rep.	1998	43.0	1998	<2	1998	<0.5				5.1[B]
Ireland	1987	35.9								6.7[C]
Israel	1997	35.5								6.9[C]
Italy	1998	36.0								6.0[C]
Jamaica	2000	37.9	2000	<2	2000	<0.5	2000	18.7	2000	6.7[B]
Japan	1993	24.9								10.6[C]
Jordan	1997	36.4	1997	<2	1997	<0.5	1997	11.7	1997	7.6[B]
Kazakhstan	2001	31.2	1996	1.5	1996	0.3	1996	34.6	1996	8.2[B]
Kenya	1997	44.5	1997	23.0	1997	6.0	1992	42.0	1992	5.6[B]
Korea, Rep.	1998	31.6	1998	<2	1998	<0.5				7.9[C]
Kyrgyzstan	2001	29.0	2000	2.0	2000	0.2	1999	64.1	1999	9.1[B]
Lao PDR	1997	37.0	1997/98	26.3	1997/98	6.3	1997/98	38.6	1997/98	7.6[B]
Latvia	1998	32.4	1998	<2	1998	<0.5				7.6[C]
Lesotho	1995	56.0	1993	43.1	1993	20.3	1993	49.2	1993	1.4[B]

Source: World Development Indicators 2003, World Bank.

THE PRESENT SITUATION OF POVERTY IN THE WORLD

	GINI INDEX		POPULATION LIVING WITH LESS THAN USD 1 A DAY		POVERTY GAP OF POPULATION LIVING WITH LESS THAN USD 1 A DAY		POPULATION BELOW THE NATIONAL POVERTY LINE		SHARE OF POOREST QUINTILE CONSUMPTION 1987/2001[A]	
	YEAR	(%)	YEAR	(%)	YEAR	(%)	YEAR	(%)	YEAR	(%)
Lithuania	2000	36.3	2000	<2	2000	<0.5				7.9[B]
Luxembourg	1998	30.8								8.0[C]
Macedonia, FYR	1998	28.2	1998	<2	1998	<0.5				8.4[B]
Madagascar	1999	46.0	1999	49.1	1999	18.3	1999	71.3	1999	6.4[B]
Malawi	1997	50.3	1997/98	41.7	1997/98	14.8	1997/98	65.3	1997/98	4.9[B]
Malaysia	1997	49.2	1997	<2	1997	<0.5	1989	15.5	1989	4.4[C]
Mali	1994	50.5	1994	72.8	1994	37.4				4.6[B]
Mauritania	1995	37.3	1995	28.6	1995	9.1	2000	46.3	2000	6.4[B]
Mauritius							1992	10.6	1992	
Mexico	1998	51.9	1998	8.0	1998	2.1	1988	10.1	1988	3.4[C]
Moldova	2001	36.2	2001	22.0	2001	5.8	1997	23.3	1997	7.1[B]
Mongolia	1998	44.0	1995	13.9	1995	3.1	1995	36.3	1995	5.6[B]
Morocco	1999	39.5	1999	<2	1999	<0.5	1998/99	19.0	1998/99	6.5[B]
Mozambique	1997	39.6	1996	37.9	1996	12.0	1996/97	69.4	1996/97	6.5[B]
Namibia	1993	70.7	1993	34.9	1993	14.0				1.4[C]
Nepal	1996	36.7	1995	37.7	1995	9.7	1995/96	42.0	1995/96	7.6[B]
Netherlands	1994	32.6								7.3[C]
New Zealand	1997	36.2								6.4[C]
Nicaragua	1998	60.3	1998	82.3	1998	52.2	1998	47.9	1998	2.3[B]
Niger	1995	50.5	1995	61.4	1995	33.9	1989/93	63.0	1989/93	2.6[B]
Nigeria	1997	50.6	1997	70.2	1997	34.9	1992/93	34.1	1992/93	4.4[B]
Norway	1995	25.8								9.7[C]
Pakistan	1999	33.0	1998	13.4	1998	2.4	1998/99	32.6	1998/99	8.8[B]
Panama	1997	48.5	1998	7.6	1998	2.9	1997	37.3	1997	3.6[B]
Papua New Guinea	1996	50.9					1996	37.5	1996	4.5[B]
Paraguay	1998	57.7	1998	19.5	1998	9.8	1991	21.8	1991	1.9[C]
Peru	1996	46.2	1996	15.5	1996	5.4	1997	49.0	1997	4.4[C]
Philippines	2000	46.1	2000	14.6	2000	2.7	1997	36.8	1997	5.4[B]
Poland	1998	31.6	1998	<2	1998	<0.5	1993	23.8	1993	7.8[B]
Portugal	1997	38.5	1994	<2	1994	<0.5				5.8[C]
Romania	2000	30.3	2000	2.1	2000	0.6	1994	21.5	1994	8.2[B]
Russian Federation	2000	45.6	2000	6.1	2000	1.2	1994	30.9	1994	4.9[B]
Rwanda	1985	28.9	1983/85	35.7	1983/85	7.7	1993	51.2	1993	9.7[B]
Senegal	1995	41.3	1995	26.3	1995	7.0	1992	33.4	1992	6.4[B]
Sierra Leone	1989	62.9	1989	57.0	1989	39.5	1989	68.0	1989	1.1[B]
Singapore	1998	42.5								5.0[C]
Slovakia	1996	25.8	1996	<2	1996	<0.5				8.8[C]
Slovenia	1998	28.4	1998	<2	1998	<0.5				9.1[C]
South Africa	1995	59.3	1995	<2	1995	<0.5				2.0[B]
Spain	1990	32.5								7.5[C]
Sri Lanka	1995	34.4	1995/96	6.6	1995/96	1.0	1995/96	25.0	1995/96	8.0[B]
St. Lucia	1995	42.6								5.2[C]
Swaziland	1994	60.9					1995	40.0	1995	2.7[C]
Sweden	1995	25.0								9.1[C]
Switzerland	1992	33.1								6.9[C]
Tajikistan	1998	34.7	1998	10.3	1998	2.6				8.0[B]
Tanzania	1993	38.2	1993	19.9	1993	4.8	1993	41.6	1993	6.8[B]
Thailand	2000	43.2	2000	<2	2000	<0.5	1992	13.1	1992	6.1[B]
Togo							1987/89	32.3	1987/89	
Trinidad and Tobago	1992	40.3	1992	12.4	1992	3.5	1992	21.0	1992	5.5[C]
Tunisia	1995	41.7	1995	<2	1995	<0.5	1995	7.6	1995	5.7[B]
Turkey	2000	40.0	2000	<2	2000	<0.5				6.1[B]
Turkmenistan	1998	40.8	1998	12.1	1998	2.6				6.1[B]
Uganda	1996	37.4	1996	82.2	1996	40.1	1993	55.0	1993	7.1[B]
Ukraine	1999	29.0	1999	2.9	1999	0.6	1995	31.7	1995	8.8[B]
United Kingdom	1995	36.0								6.1[C]
United States of America	1997	40.8								5.2[C]
Uruguay	1998	44.8	1998	<2	1998	<0.5				4.5[C]
Uzbekistan	2000	26.8	1998	19.1	1998	8.1				9.2[B]
Venezuela	1998	49.5	1998	15.0	1998	6.9	1989	31.3	1989	3.0[C]
Viet Nam	1998	36.1	1998	17.7	1998	3.3	1993	50.9	1993	8.0[B]
Yemen	1998	33.4	1998	15.7	1998	4.5	1998	41.8	1998	7.4[B]
Zambia	1998	52.6	1998	63.7	1998	32.7	1998	72.9	1998	3.3[B]
Zimbabwe	1995	56.8	1990/91	36.0	1990/91	9.6	1995/96	34.9	1995/96	4.6[B]

Note: Countries in alphabetical order. **A:** Last available data within the period. **B:** Refers to expenditure shares by percentiles of population, ranked by per capita expenditure. **C:** Refers to income shares.

Source: World Development Indicators 2003, World Bank.

FOOD SECURITY: The governments of the world agreed on…

"The Committee affirms that the right to adequate food is indivisibly linked to the inherent dignity of the human person and is indispensable for the fulfilment of other human rights… The right to adequate food is realized when every man, woman and child, alone or in community with others, has physical and economic access at all times to adequate food or means for its procurement."

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 12 on the Right to Adequate Food.1999.

"We consider it intolerable that more than 800 million people throughout the world, and particularly in developing countries, do not have enough food to meet their basic nutritional needs."

World Food Summit Plan of Action. Rome, 1996.

	UNDERNOURISHMENT (% OF TOTAL POPULATION)			LOW BIRTH WEIGHT			UNDER 5 CHILDREN MALNUTRITION (WEIGHT FOR AGE)		
	1990/1992 (%)	1998/2000 (%)	Progress or regression	Initial data (%)	Last available data (%)	Progress or regression	Initial data (%)	Last available data (%)	Progress or regression
Countries in better situation									
Albania		8.0		6.5 F	5 O	=		14 P	
Algeria	5.0	6.0	=	9.0 D	7 P	=	9.2 H	6 P	→
Argentina	2.5	2.5	=	5.9 H	7 O	=	1.9 J	5 L	←
Belarus		2.5		4.2 F	5 O	=			
Belice				0.3 K	4 O	←		6 H	
Bosnia and Herzegovina		6.0			4 P			4 P	
Brazil	13.0	10.0	→	12.0 E	9 L	→	7.0 E	6 L	=
Chile	8.0	4.0	→	5.2 I	5 N	=	1.6 I	1 O	=
China	16.0	9.0	→	6.0 G	6 N	=	17.4 H	10 P	→
Colombia	17.0	13.0	→	8.0 D	7 P	=	10.1 E	7 P	→
Costa Rica	6.0	5.0	=	6.3 G	6 O	=	2.8 F	5 L	←
Croatia		18.0		6.3 F	6 O	=	0.7 J	1 L	=
Cuba	5.0	13.0	←	7.6 F	6 P	=		4 P	
Czech Republic		2.5		5.9 G	6 O	=		1 G	
Egypt	5.0	4.0	=	9.0 H	10 P	=	10.4 F	4 P	→
Estonia		2.5		4.0 F	5 O	=			
Georgia		16.0		5.0 F	6 N	=		3 O	
Hungary		2.5		9.3 F	9 O	=	2.2 D		
Iran, Islamic Rep.	4.0	5.0	=	8.0 G	7 K	→	15.7 K	11 N	→
Jordan	4.0	6.0	←	2.0 K	10 M	←	6.4 F	5 M	=
Kazakhstan		8.0		6.5 J	6 O	=	8.3 K	4 O	→
Korea, Rep.	2.5	2.5	=	4.3 C	4 P	=			
Kuwait	22.0	4.0	→	3.3 D	7 N	←		2 M	
Kyrgyzstan		8.0		6.0 I	6 M	=		11 M	
Latvia		5.0		4.9 H	5 O	=			
Lebanon	2.5	3.0	=	9.5 F	6 P	→		3 L	
Libya	2.5	2.5	=	4.0 H	7 J	←		5 K	
Lithuania		3.0		4.0 F	4 O	=			
Macedonia, FYR		4.0		7.7 I	6 N	→		6 O	
Mexico	5.0	5.0	=	12.0 D	9 O	→	16.6 E	8 O	→
Moldova		10.0		6.6 H	7 O	=		3 L	
Morocco	6.0	7.0	=		9 H			10 H	
Panama	19.0	18.0	=	8.5 H	10 M	←	6.1 H	8 M	←
Paraguay	18.0	14.0	→	8.7 H	9 L	=	3.7 F	5 N	=
Peru	40.0	11.0	→	8.0 H	10 L	←	10.7 H	7 P	→
Poland		2.5		8.4 F	6 N	→			
Qatar				5.0 C	10 O	←		6 K	
Romania		2.5		7.1 F	9 O	=		6 G	
Russian Federation		5.0		5.3 F	7 O	=	4.2 I	3 K	→
Saudi Arabia	4.0	3.0	=	8.3 E	3 N	→		14 L	
Slovakia		2.5		6.4 G	7 O	=			
Slovenia		2.5		5.6 G	6 O	=			
Syrian Arab Republic	5.0	3.0	→	11.0 F	6 P	→	12.1 I	13 K	←
Tunisia	2.5	2.5	=	9.2 E	5 P	→	10.3 D	4 P	→

→ **Significant progress**
→ **Slight progress**
= **Stagnant**
← **Slight regression**
← **Significant regression**

Note: A: 1985 data; B: 1986 data; C: 1987 data; D: 1988 data; E: 1989 data; F: 1990 data; G: 1991 data; H: 1992 data; I: 1993 data; J: 1994 data; K: 1995 data; L: 1996 data; M: 1997 data; N: 1998 data; O: 1999 data; P: 2000 data; Q: 1990/98 data; R: 1991/97 data; S: 2001 data.

	UNDERNOURISHMENT (% OF TOTAL POPULATION)			LOW BIRTH WEIGHT			UNDER 5 CHILDREN MALNUTRITION (WEIGHT FOR AGE)		
	1990/1992 (%)	1998/2000 (%)	Progress or regression	Initial data (%)	Last available data (%)	Progress or regression	Initial data (%)	Last available data (%)	Progress or regression
Turkey	2.5	2.5	=	7.0 D	15 N	←	10.4 I	8 N	→
Turkmenistan		8.0		5.2 H	5 M	=		12 P	
Ukraine		5.0		8.0 J	6 O	→		3 P	
United Arab Emirates	3.0	2.5	=	6.0 H	15 P	←		7 L	
United States of America				7.0 F	8 O	=		1 J	
Uruguay	6.0	3.0	→	8.4 H	8 P	=	6.2 E	5 K	→
Venezuela	11.0	21.0	←	16.0 H	6 P	→	7.7 F	4 P	→
Countries above average									
Armenia		46.0			8 O			3 P	
Azerbaijan		23.0		6.3 I	10 P	←		17 P	
Bahrain				7.3 I	10 P	←	7.2 E	9 K	←
Bolivia	26.0	23.0	→	6.0 H	8 N	←	11.1 F	10 N	=
Bulgaria		15.0		6.3 E	9 O	←			
Dominican Republic	27.0	26.0	=	11.0 G	13 L	←	10.3 G	5 P	→
Ecuador	8.0	5.0	→	13.0 H	16 O	←	16.5 B	15 O	=
El Salvador	12.0	14.0	←	7.1 H	13 N	←	15.2 D	12 N	→
Fiji				18.0 G	12 I	→		8 I	
Gabon	11.0	8.0	→	7.7 C	14 P	←		12 P	
Ghana	35.0	12.0	→	17.0 D	9 N	→	30.3 D	25 O	→
Guyana	19.0	14.0	→	12.0 C	14 N	=	18.3 I	12 M	→
Honduras	23.0	21.0	→	9.0 H	6 L	→	18.0 H	17 S	=
Indonesia	9.0	6.0	→	8.2 C	9 M	=	39.9 C	25 P	→
Jamaica	14.0	9.0	→	4.7 E	11 O	←	4.6 G	4 O	=
Malaysia	3.0	2.5	=	6.9 G	9 M	←	25.0 F	18 O	→
Mauritius	6.0	5.0	=	9.0 D	13 O	←		16 K	
Mongolia	34.0	42.0	←	4.5 F	6 P	=	12.3 H	13 P	=
Nigeria	13.0	7.0	→	20.0 D	9 O	→	35.3 F	27 O	→
São Tomé and Principe				7.0 C	7 P	=	16.6 B	16 L	=
Swaziland	10.0	12.0	←	7.0 A	9 P	=		10 P	
Thailand	28.0	18.0	→	18.0 F	7 P	→	25.3 C	19 I	→
Uzbekistan		19.0		5.5 H	6 P	=		19 L	
Countries below average									
Benin	19.0	13.0	→	9.6 F	15 L	←	35.0 C	23 S	→
Bhutan				15.0 J	15 O	=	37.9 D	19 O	→
Botswana	17.0	25.0	←	8.0 D	11 K	←		13 P	
Cambodia	43.0	36.0	→	18.0 I	9 P	→		45 P	
Cameroon	32.0	25.0	→	10.0 C	10 N	=	15.1 G	22 N	←
Cape Verde					13 N			14 J	
Congo, Rep.	37.0	32.0	→				23.9 C	14 O	→
Côte d'Ivoire	18.0	15.0	→	15.0 C	17 O	=	12.4 B	21 O	←
Gambia	21.0	21.0	=	24.0 E	14 P	→		17 P	
Guatemala	14.0	25.0	←	7.4 H	12 O	←	33.2 C	24 O	→
Iraq	7.0	27.0	←	8.0 G	23 N	←	11.9 G	16 P	←
Kenya	47.0	44.0	→		9 N		22.6 I	23 P	=
Korea, Dem. Rep.	18.0	34.0	←		7 P			28 P	
Lesotho	27.0	26.0	=	10.0 C	14 P	←	15.8 H	18 P	←
Malawi	49.0	33.0	→	20.0 D	13 H	→	27.6 H	25 P	→
Mali	25.0	20.0	→	17.0 D	16 L	=	30.6 C	27 L	→
Myanmar	10.0	6.0	→	14.0 F	16 L	←	32.4 F	36 P	←
Namibia	15.0	9.0	→	12.0 F	15 H	←		26 H	
Nicaragua	30.0	29.0	=	8.0 H	13 N	←	11.0 I	12 N	←
Oman				8.7 F	8 O	=	24.3 G	24 K	=
Papua New Guinea	25.0	27.0	←	16.0 J	11 P	→			
Senegal	23.0	25.0	←	10.0 A	12 M	=	21.6 H	18 P	→
Solomon Islands				20.0 G	13 P	→	21.3 E	21 M	=
South Africa					15 P			9 K	
St. Vincent and the Grenadines					10 Q			20 L	

Significant progress
Slight progress
Stagnant
Slight regression
Significant regression

Note: A: 1985 data; B: 1986 data; C: 1987 data; D: 1988 data; E: 1989 data; F: 1990 data; G: 1991 data; H: 1992 data; I: 1993 data; J: 1994 data; K: 1995 data; L: 1996 data; M: 1997 data; N: 1998 data; O: 1999 data; P: 2000 data; Q: 1990/98 data; R: 1991/97 data; S: 2001 data.

	UNDERNOURISHMENT (% OF TOTAL POPULATION)			LOW BIRTH WEIGHT			UNDER 5 CHILDREN MALNUTRITION (WEIGHT FOR AGE)		
	1990/1992 (%)	1998/2000 (%)	Progress or regression	Initial data (%)	Last available data (%)	Progress or regression	Initial data (%)	Last available data (%)	Progress or regression
Sudan	31.0	21.0	→	13.0 F	31 P	←	33.9 I	11 P	→
Suriname	12.0	11.0	=	13.0 C	11 P	=			
Togo	28.0	23.0	→	20.0 D	13 N	→	24.6 D	25 N	=
Trinidad and Tobago	13.0	12.0	=	16.0 G	23 P	←	6.7 C		
Uganda	23.0	21.0	→		13 K		23.0 E	23 P	=
Viet Nam	27.0	18.0	→	15.0 E	9 M	→	45.0 E	34 P	→
Zimbabwe	43.0	38.0	→	5.6 E	10 O	←	11.5 D	13 O	=
Countries in worse situation									
Afghanistan	63.0	70.0	←	20.0 H				49 M	
Angola	61.0	50.0	→	21.0 C	12 P	→	20.0 E	41 L	←
Bangladesh	35.0	35.0	=	50.0 C	30 N	→	65.8 F	48 P	→
Burkina Faso	23.0	23.0	=	11.0 C	18 O	←	32.7 I	34 O	←
Burundi	49.0	69.0	←	16.0 J			37.5 C	45 P	←
Central African Republic	49.0	44.0	→	15.0 D	13 J	→	23.2 K	24 P	←
Chad	58.0	32.0	→		24 P		35.0 A	28 P	→
Comoros				6.8 C	18 L	←	18.5 H	25 P	←
Congo, Dem. Rep.	32.0	73.0	←		15 R			34 K	
Eritrea		58.0			14 K		41.0 I	44 K	←
Ethiopia		44.0		8.9 I	12 P	←	47.7 H	47 P	=
Guinea	40.0	32.0	→	25.0 D	10 O	→		33 P	
Guinea-Bissau				20.0 C	20 P	=		25 P	
Haiti	64.0	50.0	→	15.0 C	28 J	←	26.8 F	17 P	→
India	25.0	24.0	=	28.0 G	26 O	→	63.9 F	47 O	→
Lao PDR	29.0	24.0	→	60.0 G	14 P	→	44.0 I	40 P	→
Madagascar	35.0	40.0	←	10.0 D	15 M	←	40.9 H	33 P	→
Maldives				20.0 I	12 O	→	39.0 J	43 K	←
Mauritania	14.0	12.0	→	13.0 I	42 P	←	47.6 G	32 P	→
Mozambique	69.0	55.0	→	20.0 D	13 M	→	27.0 K	26 M	→
Nepal	19.0	19.0	=	23.0 I	21 P	→	48.5 K	48 S	=
Niger	42.0	36.0	→	20.0 A	12 P	→	42.6 H	40 P	→
Pakistan	25.0	19.0	→	25.0 D	21 G	→	40.2 G	38 K	→
Philippines	26.0	23.0	→	8.7 I	18 N	←	33.5 F	32 N	→
Rwanda	34.0	40.0	←	17.0 A	12 H	→	29.4 H	29 P	=
Sierra Leone	46.0	47.0	=	17.0 D	22 P	←	28.7 F	27 P	=
Somalia	67.0	71.0	←					26 P	
Sri Lanka	29.0	23.0	→	19.0 I	17 P	→	37.3 C	33 P	→
Tajikistan		64.0		8.3 H	13 P	←			
Tanzania	36.0	47.0	←	8.6 G	11 O	←	28.9 H	29 O	=
Yemen	36.0	33.0	→	47.0 J	26 M	→	30.0 H	46 M	←
Zambia	45.0	50.0	←	2.3 A	11 L	←	25.2 H	25 O	=
Countries with insufficient data to summarise the area									
Antigua and Barbuda					5 K				
Australia				6.3 J	7 P	=			
Austria				5.6 F	7 O	=			
Bahamas				8.0 C	7 P	=			
Barbados				11.0 K	10 M	→			
Belgium				6.1 E	8 M	←			
Bermuda				7.0 K					
Brunei Darussalam				5.0 J	10 P	←			
Canada				5.6 C	6 P	=			
Cook Islands					1 M				
Cyprus				9.0 I					
Denmark				5.4 G	6 L	=			
Djibouti				20.0 H			22.9 E	18 L	→
Dominica				11.0 A	10 P	=			
Equatorial Guinea					13 P				

→ **Significant progress**
→ **Slight progress**
= **Stagnant**
← **Slight regression**
← **Significant regression**

Note: A: 1985 data; B: 1986 data; C: 1987 data; D: 1988 data; E: 1989 data; F: 1990 data; G: 1991 data; H: 1992 data; I: 1993 data; J: 1994 data; K: 1995 data; L: 1996 data; M: 1997 data; N: 1998 data; O: 1999 data; P: 2000 data; Q: 1990/98 data; R: 1991/97 data; S: 2001 data.

	UNDERNOURISHMENT (% OF TOTAL POPULATION)			LOW BIRTH WEIGHT			UNDER 5 CHILDREN MALNUTRITION (WEIGHT FOR AGE)		
	1990/1992 (%)	1998/2000 (%)	Progress or regression	Initial data (%)	Last available data (%)	Progress or regression	Initial data (%)	Last available data (%)	Progress or regression
Faeroe Islands				3.0 A					
Finland				4.1 H	6 O	⬅			
France				5.6 G	6 K	=			
French Polynesia				5.3 J					
Germany					7 O				
Greece				6.0 A	7 K	=			
Greenland				5.7 H					
Grenada				9.0 K	11 N	⬅			
Guam				7.1 D					
Hong Kong (China)	2.5	2.5	=	5.0 J					
Iceland				2.9 H	4 N	=			
Ireland				4.4 C	4 I	=			
Israel				7.4 G	8 O	=			
Italy					6 N				
Japan				6.3 F	7 J	=			
Kiribati				3.0 J	5 P	⬅	12.9 A		
Liberia	33.0	39.0	⬅						
Luxembourg				5.5 E	4 N	=			
Macao (China)				4.5 J					
Malta				5.9 I	7 K	⬅			
Marshall Islands					14 M				
Mayotte									
Micronesia, Fed. Sts.					9 I				
New Caledonia				8.6 G					
New Zealand				5.7 J	6 M	=			
Norway				5.6 G	5 M	=			
Palau				9.6 J	9 P	=			
Portugal				5.4 E	7 N	=			
Puerto Rico				14.0 K					
Samoa				4.0 G	4 P	=			
San Marino				10.0 A					
Serbia and Montenegro		8.0							
Seychelles				10.0 C	10 F	=	5.7 D		
Singapore				8.3 H	8 N	=			
Spain				5.1 E	6 K	=			
St. Kitts and Nevis				12.0 K	9 P	➡			
St. Lucia				9.0 K	8 O	➡			
Sweden				4.4 F	4 N	=			
Switzerland				5.2 H	6 O	=			
Tonga					2 F				
Tuvalu					3 M				
United Kingdom				6.8 H	8 P	=			
Vanuatu				9.0 F	7 J	➡			
West Bank and Gaza				6.0 K	9 P	⬅			

HUMAN RIGHTS
The right to food is enshrined in:
UDHR - Art. 25
CESCR - Art. 11
CRC - Art. 24 & 27

UDHR: Universal Declaration of Human Rights
CESCR: International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
CRC: Convention on the Rights of the Child

INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS
Food security is considered in:
Millennium Development Goals - Goal 1
World Summit for Social Development - Commitment 6
Fourth World Conference on Women - Beijing Platform for Action

Sources:
Children undernourished in total population: The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2002, FAO (www.fao.org)
Estimated low birth weight: World Development Indicators 2003, World Bank; UNICEF End Decade Website Database (www.childinfo.org) and The State of the World's Children 2004, UNICEF (www.unicef.org/sowc04).
Malnutrition prevalence: World Development Indicators 2003, World Bank and UNICEF End Decade Website Database (www.childinfo.org).

➡ **Significant progress**
➡ **Slight progress**
= **Stagnant**
⬅ **Slight regression**
⬅ **Significant regression**

Note: A: 1985 data; B: 1986 data; C: 1987 data; D: 1988 data; E: 1989 data; F: 1990 data; G: 1991 data; H: 1992 data; I: 1993 data; J: 1994 data; K: 1995 data; L: 1996 data; M: 1997 data; N: 1998 data; O: 1999 data; P: 2000 data; Q: 1990/98 data; R: 1991/97 data; S: 2001 data.

CHILDREN'S IMMUNISATION: The governments of the world agreed on…

"States Parties recognize the right of the child to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health and to facilities for the treatment of illness and rehabilitation of health"

Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 24. 1989.

"Each day, 40,000 children die from malnutrition and disease, including acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS), from the lack of clean water and inadequate sanitation and from the effects of the drug problem… These are challenges that we, as political leaders, must meet."

World Summit for Children, 1990

	DPT IMMUNISED 1-YEAR-OLD CHILDREN			POLIO IMMUNISED 1-YEAR-OLD CHILDREN			MEASLES IMMUNISED 1-YEAR-OLD CHILDREN			TUBERCULOSIS IMMUNISED 1-YEAR-OLD CHILDREN		
	1990/1994 (%)	2002 (%)	Progress or regression	1990/1994 (%)	2002 (%)	Progress or regression	1990/1994 (%)	2002 (%)	Progress or regression	1990/1994 (%)	2002 (%)	Progress or regression
Countries in better situation												
Albania	94	98	→	97	98	=	96	96	=	81	94	→
Antigua and Barbuda	100	98	=		90		89	99	→			
Argentina	87	88	=	84	91	→	93	97	→	100	99	=
Armenia	81	94	→	92	96	→	95	91	←	83	97	→
Australia	95	93	=		93		86	94	→			
Azerbaijan	84	97	→	94	99	→	82	97	⟶	50	99	⟶
Bahamas	87	98	→		98		86	92	→			
Bahrain	95	98	→		98		87	99	→			
Belarus	85	99	→	93	99	→	96	99	→	93	99	→
Botswana	56	97	⟶	78	97	⟶	55	90	⟶	92	99	→
Brazil	66	96	⟶	68	97	⟶	78	93	⟶	92	99	→
Brunei Darussalam	100	99	=		99			99			99	
Bulgaria	99	94	←	97	94	←	98	90	←	98	98	=
Canada		97			89			96				
Chile	97	94	←		95		81	95	→		94	
Cook Islands		99			99			98			95	
Costa Rica	95	94	=	88	94	→	90	94	→	97	91	←
Croatia		95		85	95	→		95		92	99	→
Cuba	92	99	→		98		94	98	→		99	
Cyprus	93	98	→		98		76	86	→			
Czech Republic		98		98	97	=				98	97	=
Denmark	95	98	→	95	98	→	84	99	⟶			
Dominica	69	98	⟶		98		96	98	=		98	
Egypt	87	97	→	91	97	→	87	97	→	95	98	→
Estonia	76	97	⟶	87	98	→	82	95	→	99	99	=
Fiji	82	92	→		99		72	88	⟶		99	
Finland	90	98	→	100	95	←	97	96	=	99	99	=
Germany	80	97	⟶	90	95	→	50	89	⟶			
Grenada	81	98	⟶		98		85	94	→			
Honduras	84	95	→	95	95	=	90	97	→	95	94	=
Hungary	99	99	=	99	99	=	99	99	=	100	99	=
Iran, Islamic Rep.	91	99	→		99		85	99	→		99	
Israel	91	97	→		93		91	95	→			
Italy	83	95	→		96		43	70	⟶			
Japan	87	95	→	94	81	←	66	98	⟶	93		
Jordan	92	95	→	96	95	=	87	95	→			
Kazakhstan	80	95	⟶		95		95	95	=		99	
Kiribati	97	99	=		96		75	88	→		99	
Korea, Rep.	74	97	⟶	74	99	⟶	93	97	→	72	89	→
Kuwait	94	98	→	98	94	←	98	99	=			
Kyrgyzstan	99	98	=	84	99	⟶	99	98	=	97	99	=
Latvia	85	97	→	72	98	⟶	97	98	=	89	99	→

⟶ **Significant progress**
→ **Slight progress**
= **Stagnant**
← **Slight regression**
⟵ **Significant regression**

	DPT IMMUNISED 1-YEAR-OLD CHILDREN			POLIO IMMUNISED 1-YEAR-OLD CHILDREN			MEASLES IMMUNISED 1-YEAR-OLD CHILDREN			TUBERCULOSIS IMMUNISED 1-YEAR-OLD CHILDREN		
	1990/1994 (%)	2002 (%)	Progress or regression	1990/1994 (%)	2002 (%)	Progress or regression	1990/1994 (%)	2002 (%)	Progress or regression	1990/1994 (%)	2002 (%)	Progress or regression
Lebanon	82	92	→		92		39	96	→			
Lithuania	76	95	→	88	97	→	89	98	→	96	99	→
Luxembourg	90	98	→		98		80	91	→			
Macedonia, FYR		96		91	97	→		98		96	91	←
Malaysia	89	96	→		97		70	92	→		99	
Maldives	94	98	→		98		96	99	→		98	
Malta	63	95	→		95		80	65	←			
Mexico	66	91	→	92	92	=	78	96	→	98	99	=
Moldova		97			98			94			99	
Monaco	100	99	=		99		100	99	=		99	
Mongolia	69	98	→	77	98	→	92	98	→	90	98	→
Morocco	81	94	→	87	94	→	79	96	→	93	90	←
Netherlands	97	98	=		98		94	96	=			
Niue		99			99			99			99	
Oman	98	99	=	97	99	=	98	99	=	96	98	=
Palau	100	99	=		99		98	99	=			
Poland	96	99	→		98		95	98	→		95	
Qatar	82	96	→		96		79	99	→		99	
Romania	96	99	→		99		92	98	→		99	
Russian Federation	60	96	→	82	97	→	81	98	→	87	97	→
Samoa	90	96	→		96		89	99	→		98	
San Marino		96			96			74				
Saudi Arabia	92	95	→		95		88	97	→		98	
Serbia and Montenegro		95			95			92			95	
Seychelles	99	99	=		99		86	98	→		99	
Slovakia	99	99	=		98		99	99	=		98	
Slovenia		92			93			94			98	
Spain	93	96	→		96		97	97	=			
Sri Lanka	86	98	→	88	98	→	80	99	→	86	99	→
St. Kitts and Nevis	100	98	=		97		100	99	=		99	
St. Vincent and the Grenadines		99			99			99			90	
Sweden	99	99	=		99		95	94	=			
Syrian Arab Republic	90	99	→		99		87	98	→		99	
Thailand	85	96	→	93	97	→	70	94	→	98	99	=
Tunisia	91	96	→	97	96	=	88	94	→	80	97	→
Turkmenistan	79	98	→	92	99	→	80	88	→	94	99	→
Tuvalu		98			98			99			99	
Ukraine	79	99	→	91	99	→	89	99	→	89	98	→
United Arab Emirates	89	94	→		94		78	94	→		98	
United States of America		94		79	90	→		91				
Uzbekistan	79	98	→	51	99	→	85	97	→	89	98	→
West Bank and Gaza		97			97			94			96	
Countries above average												
Algeria	58	86	→	72	86	→	53	81	→	92	98	→
Andorra		90			90			90				
Bangladesh	69	85	→	94	85	←	82	77	←	95	95	=
Barbados	91	84	←		86		87	92	→			
Belgium	94	90	←	100	95	←	85	75	←			
Belize	91	89	=		93		86	89	→		97	
Bosnia and Herzegovina		80		45	86	→		89		24	91	→
Cape Verde	88	94	→		94		79	85	→		92	
Comoros	94	89	←		98		87	71	←		90	
Dominican Republic	69	72	→	98	73	←	96	92	←	64	99	→
Ecuador	75	89	→	78	90	→	67	80	→	100	99	=

→ **Significant progress**
→ **Slight progress**
= **Stagnant**
← **Slight regression**
← **Significant regression**

	DPT IMMUNISED 1-YEAR-OLD CHILDREN			POLIO IMMUNISED 1-YEAR-OLD CHILDREN			MEASLES IMMUNISED 1-YEAR-OLD CHILDREN			TUBERCULOSIS IMMUNISED 1-YEAR-OLD CHILDREN		
	1990/1994 (%)	2002 (%)	Progress or regression	1990/1994 (%)	2002 (%)	Progress or regression	1990/1994 (%)	2002 (%)	Progress or regression	1990/1994 (%)	2002 (%)	Progress or regression
Eritrea		83		36	83			84		46	91	
France	95	98		92	98		71	85		78	83	
Gambia	92	90	=	92	90	=	86	90		98	99	=
Georgia	69	84		69	89		81	73		67	91	
Greece	54	88		95	87		76	88		50	88	
Guatemala	66	84		73	84		68	92		70	96	
Guyana	82	91			93		77	95			91	
Iceland	99	92			91		99	88				
Iraq	83	81	=	50	84		83	90			93	
Ireland	65	84			84		78	73			90	
Jamaica	86	87	=	93	86		69	86		100	90	
Libya	62	93			93		59	91			99	
Mauritania	33	83			82		38	81			98	
Mauritius	85	88		89	88	=	76	84		87	87	=
New Zealand	90	90	=	68	82		90	85		20		
Nicaragua	66	84		84	85	=	82	98		89	84	
Norway	86	91			91		87	88	=			
Panama	86	89		83	85	=	99	79		95	92	
Peru	72	89		87	90		64	95		91	90	=
Portugal	89	96		92	96		85	87	=	92	82	
Rwanda	57	88		23	85		55	69		32	99	
São Tomé and Principe	92	92	=		93		71	85			99	
Singapore	85	92		92	92	=	84	91		98	98	=
St. Lucia	91	74			90		83	97			95	
Switzerland	90	95			94		90	79				
Tajikistan	94	84		74	85		91	84		69	98	
Tanzania	78	89			91		79	89			88	
Tonga	94	90			90		86	90			99	
Trinidad and Tobago	89	89	=	85	89		79	88				
United Kingdom	85	91			91		89	83				
Uruguay	97	93		88	93		97	92		99	99	=
Viet Nam	85	75		94	92	=	85	96		95	97	=
Countries below average												
Austria	90	83			82		60	78				
Benin	78	79	=	81	72		73	78		90	94	
Bhutan	84	86	=	84	89		79	78	=	96	83	
Bolivia	41	81		86	79		53	79		91	94	
Burundi	86	74		50	69		75	75	=	62	84	
China	97	79		94	79		98	79		94	77	
Colombia	87	85	=	95	81		82	89		99	85	
El Salvador	80	81	=	92	81		98	93		83	92	
Ghana	50	80		48	80		52	81		61	91	
India	92	70		91	70		87	67		96	81	
Indonesia	87	75		93	74		86	76		100	77	
Kenya	42	84		84	83	=	41	78		92	91	=
Lesotho	77	79	=	59	78		87	70		59	83	
Malawi	87	64		98	79		81	69		99	78	
Marshall Islands	92	80			80		52	80			90	
Micronesia, Fed. Sts.	85	75			79		81	84			39	
Myanmar	69	77		77	77	=	68	75		83	80	
Namibia	38	77		79	78	=	77	68		100	83	
Nepal	80	72		62	72		68	71		61	85	
Philippines	88	70		88	70		85	73		89	75	
Solomon Islands	77	71			68		70	78			76	

Significant progress
Slight progress
Stagnant
Slight regression
Significant regression

	DPT IMMUNISED 1-YEAR-OLD CHILDREN			POLIO IMMUNISED 1-YEAR-OLD CHILDREN			MEASLES IMMUNISED 1-YEAR-OLD CHILDREN			TUBERCULOSIS IMMUNISED 1-YEAR-OLD CHILDREN		
	1990/1994 (%)	2002 (%)	Progress or regression	1990/1994 (%)	2002 (%)	Progress or regression	1990/1994 (%)	2002 (%)	Progress or regression	1990/1994 (%)	2002 (%)	Progress or regression
South Africa	74	82	→		84		79	78	=		94	
Suriname	83	73	←		73		65	73	→			
Swaziland	89	77	←		76		86	72	←		95	
Turkey	74	78	→	81	78	←	67	82	⇒	72	77	→
Uganda	77	72	←	79	73	←	74	77	→	100	96	←
Venezuela	61	63	=	73	77	⇒	61	78	⇒	95	90	←
Yemen	89	69	⇐		69		74	65	←		74	
Zambia	71	78	→	88	79	←	68	85	⇒	100	92	←
Countries in worse situation												
Afghanistan	25	47	⇒	18	48	⇒	20	44	⇒	44	59	→
Angola	24	47	⇒	28	42	→	38	74	⇒	48	82	⇒
Burkina Faso		41			42			46		63	72	→
Cambodia	38	54	⇒	54	54	=	34	52	⇒	78	63	←
Cameroon	36	48	→	31	48	⇒	36	62	⇒	46	77	⇒
Central African Republic	61	40	⇐	29	40	→	67	35	⇐	82	70	←
Chad	20	40	⇒	18	40	⇒	23	55	⇒	43	67	⇒
Congo, Dem. Rep.	36	43	→		45		37	45	→		55	
Congo, Rep.	77	41	⇐	79	41	⇐	77	37	⇐	94	51	←
Côte d'Ivoire	42	54	→		54		40	56	⇒		66	
Djibouti	85	62	⇐		62		85	62	⇐		52	
Equatorial Guinea	14	33	⇒		39		18	51	⇒		73	
Ethiopia	49	56	→	36	57	⇒	38	52	→	50	76	⇒
Gabon	78	38	⇐	66	31	⇐	76	55	⇐	97	89	←
Guinea	20	47	⇒	70	44	⇐	25	54	⇒	75	71	←
Guinea-Bissau	61	50	←	68	50	⇐	53	47	←	95	70	←
Haiti	41	43	=	40	43	→	31	53	⇒	42	71	⇒
Lao PDR	18	55	⇒		55		32	55	⇒		65	
Liberia		51			50			57			67	
Madagascar	71	62	←	64	61	←	57	61	→	81	73	←
Mali	42	57	⇒	39	57	⇒	43	33	←	67	73	→
Mozambique	46	60	→	55	55	=	59	58	=	78	78	=
Nauru		80			59			40			95	
Niger	22	23	=	20	25	→	25	48	⇒	32	47	→
Nigeria	56	26	⇐	35	25	←	48	40	←	46	54	→
Pakistan	83	63	⇐	66	63	←	76	57	⇐	78	67	←
Papua New Guinea	67	57	←	66	46	⇐	66	71	→	91	71	←
Paraguay	79	77	=	83	78	←	70	82	→	97	65	←
Senegal	66	60	←	55	60	→	57	54	←	71	70	=
Sierra Leone	83	50	⇐	43	50	→	75	60	⇐	60	70	→
Somalia	18	40	⇒	23	40	⇒	30	45	⇒	48	60	→
Sudan	62	40	⇐	70	40	⇐	57	49	←	78	48	←
Timor-Leste		57			56			47			83	
Togo	77	64	←	71	63	←	65	58	←	73	84	→
Vanuatu	76	54	⇐		53		66	44	⇐		90	
Zimbabwe	78	58	⇐		74		76	58	⇐		80	

HUMAN RIGHTS
The right to health and health services for children is enshrined in:
UDHR - Art. 25
CERD - Art. 5
CESCR - Art. 12
CRC - Art. 24 & 25

UDHR: Universal Declaration of Human Rights
CERD: International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
CESCR: International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
CRC: Convention on the Rights of the Child

INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS
Children's health is considered in:
Millennium Development Goals - Goal 4 & 6
World Summit for Social Development - Commitment 8 & 10
Fourth World Conference on Women - Beijing Platform for Action - Critical Areas of Concern

Source: The State of the World's Children 1996, UNICEF, for 1990/1994 data and The State of the World's Children 2004, UNICEF (www.unicef.org/sowc04), for 2002 data.

⇒ **Significant progress**
→ **Slight progress**
= **Stagnant**
← **Slight regression**
⇐ **Significant regression**

HEALTH: The governments of the world agreed on…

"*(We) recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health… The provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant mortality and for the healthy development of the child..; The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other diseases…*"

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article 12. 1966.

"*…take specific measures for closing the gender gaps in morbidity and mortality where girls are disadvantaged, while achieving internationally approved goals for the reduction of infant and child mortality.*"

World Conference on Women - Beijing Platform for Action, Paragraph 106. 1995.

	MALARIA (cases per 100,000 people)			TUBERCULOSIS (cases per 100,000 people)			AIDS (15-49 years old)	INFANT MORTALITY (per 1,000 live births)			UNDER-5 MORTALITY (per 1,000 live births)		
	1997	2001	Progress or regression	1994	2001	Progress or regression	2001 (%)	1990	2001	Progress or regression	1990	2002	Progress or regression
Countries in better situation *													
Albania				22	18			37	23		45	30	
Algeria	1	1	=	49	59	←	0.1	42	39		69	49	
Andorra				37	11				6			7	
Antigua and Barbuda				5 [D]	2				12			14	
Argentina	2	1	=	40	31		0.7	25	16		28	19	
Armenia	24	2	=	20	37	←	0.2	50	31		60	35	
Australia				6	5	=	0.1	8	6	=	10	6	
Austria				16	13		0.2	8	5		9	5	
Bahamas				28	27 [H]	=	3.5	24	13		29	16	
Bahrain				8 [C]	18	←	0.3	15	13	=	19	16	
Barbados				1 [C]	2	=	1.2	14	12	=	16	14	=
Belarus				42	54	←	0.3	18	17	=	21	20	=
Belgium				15	13		0.2	8	5		9	6	
Bosnia and Herzegovina				45	61	←	<0.1	18	15		22	18	
Brazil	240	225	=	48	43		0.7	50	31		60	36	
Brunei Darussalam				52 [E]	65	←		10	6		11	6	
Bulgaria				63	49		<0.1	15	14	=	16	16	=
Canada				7	6		0.3	7	5	=	9	7	=
Chile				30	20		0.3	16	10		19	12	
Colombia	452	482	=	24	27	←	0.4	29	19		36	23	
Cook Islands				21	10						32	23	
Costa Rica	126	33	→	9	15	←	0.6	15	9		17	11	
Croatia				48	30		<0.1	11	7		13	8	
Cuba				15	8		<0.1	11	7		13	9	
Cyprus				5	4 [H]	=	0.3	11	5		12	6	
Czech Republic				19	13		<0.1	11	4		11	5	
Denmark				10	9	=	0.2	8	4		9	4	
Dominica				17	7 [F]			19	14		23	15	
Egypt				6	15	←	<0.1	76	35		104	41	
Estonia				43	49	←	1.0	12	11	=	17	12	
Fiji				37	22		0.1	25	18		31	21	
Finland				11	9		<0.1	6	4	=	7	5	=
France				16	10		0.3	7	4		9	6	
Germany				16	9		0.1	7	4		9	5	
Greece				7 [E]	5		0.2	10	5		11	5	
Grenada				3	5 [G]	←		30	20		37	25	
Honduras	1101	365	→	79	68		1.6	47	31		59	42	
Hungary				41	30		0.1	15	8		16	9	
Iceland				7	4		0.2	6	3		5	4	=
Iran, Islamic Rep.	60	32	=	21	17		<0.1	54	35		72	42	
Ireland				15	10		0.1	8	6	=	9	6	
Israel				8	9	=	0.1	10	6		12	6	
Italy				10	8		0.4	8	4		10	6	
Jamaica				4	5	=	1.2	17	17	=	20	20	=
Japan				36	28		<0.1	5	3	=	6	5	=
Jordan				11	7		<0.1	35	27		43	33	
Korea, Rep.	4	5	=	86	79		<0.1	8	5		9	5	
Kuwait				14	32 [F]	←		14	9		16	10	
Lebanon				31	15			32	28		37	32	

Significant progress
Slight progress
Stagnant
Slight regression
Significant regression

Note: A: 1989 data; B: 1994 data; C: 1995 data; D: 1996 data; E: 1997 data; F: 1998 data; G: 1999 data; H: 2000 data; I: 1992 data; * children immunisation status is included among the indicators used to build the ranking.

	MALARIA (cases per 100,000 people)			TUBERCULOSIS (cases per 100,000 people)			AIDS (15-49 years old)	INFANT MORTALITY (per 1,000 live births)			UNDER-5 MORTALITY (per 1,000 live births)		
	1997	2001	Progress or regression	1994	2001	Progress or regression	2001 (%)	1990	2001	Progress or regression	1990	2002	Progress or regression
Libya				30 C	25 H		0.2	34	16		42	19	
Lithuania				57	70		0.1	10	8		13	9	
Luxembourg				8	7		0.2	7	5		9	5	
Macedonia, FYR				37	32		<0.1	32	22		41	26	
Malaysia	127	56		60	66		0.4	16	8		21	8	
Malta				7	4		0.1	9	5		14	5	
Mauritius	6	1 G		14	11		0.1	21	17		25	19	
Mexico	5	5		18	19		0.3	37	24		46	29	
Monaco				3	9 G				4			5	
Morocco	1	<1		114	93		0.1	66	39		85	43	
Netherlands				12	9		0.2	7	5		8	5	
New Zealand				10	10		0.1	8	6		11	6	
Nicaragua	915	201		64	47		0.2	52	36		68	41	
Norway				6	6		0.1	7	4		9	4	
Oman	45	24		15	11		0.1	25	12		30	13	
Poland				43	26		0.1	19	8		19	9	
Portugal				57	41		0.5	11	5		15	6	
Qatar				59 C	49			19	11		25	16	
Samoa				28	14			33	20		42	25	
San Marino				8	4 H				4		10	6	
Saudi Arabia	106	15		15	16			34	23		44	28	
Serbia and Montenegro				34	43		0.2				30	19	
Seychelles				11 C	23			17	13		21	16	
Singapore				50	37		0.2	7	3		8	4	
Slovakia				33	18		<0.01	12	8		15	9	
Slovenia				27	18		<0.1	8	4		9	5	
Spain				22 C	17		0.5	8	4		9	6	
Sri Lanka	1196	348		34	39		<0.1	19	17		23	19	
St. Kitts and Nevis				5	5			30	20		36	24	
St. Lucia				17	10			19	17		24	19	
St. Vincent and the Grenadines				12 C	9			21	22		26	25	
Sweden				6	5		0.1	6	3		6	3	
Switzerland				13	8		0.5	7	5		8	6	
Syrian Arab Republic	1	<1		37	30			37	23		44	28	
Tonga				24	11			25	17		27	20	
Trinidad and Tobago				10	16		2.5	21	17		24	20	
Tunisia				27	20			37	21		52	26	
Turkey	56	16		37 C	26		<0.1	61	36		78	42	
United Arab Emirates	4			19	3			12	8		14	9	
United Kingdom				11	10		0.1	8	6		10	7	
United States of America				9	6		0.6	9	7		10	8	
Uruguay				21	21		0.3	20	14		24	15	
Venezuela	98	81		23	25		0.5	23	19		27	22	
West Bank and Gaza				3 C	1 F			42 I	21		40	25	
Countries above average *													
Azerbaijan	130	13		37	61		<0.1	84	77		105	105	
Bangladesh	56	40		40	54		<0.1	96	51		144	77	
Belize	1790	475		30	59		2.0	39	34		49	40	
Bhutan	464	279		64	47		<0.1	75 I	74		166	94	
Bolivia	662	185		130	124		0.1	87	60		120	71	
Cape Verde	5	33 H		80 C	67			45	29		60	38	
China	2	2		30	38		0.1	38	31		49	39	
Comoros	2422	1930 H		19	17 H			88	59		120	79	
Dominican Republic	10	12		57	56		2.5	53	41		65	38	
Ecuador	137	846		86	47		0.3	43	24		57	29	
El Salvador		6		70	23		0.6	46	33		60	39	
Georgia		8		30 C	77		<0.1	24	24		29	29	
Guatemala	305	307		26	21		1.0	60	43		82	49	
Guyana	3806	3554		36	55		2.7	65	54		90	72	
Indonesia	79	93		26	43		0.1	60	33		91	45	
Iraq	66	5		101	44		<0.1	40	107		50	125	
Kazakhstan				63	163		0.1	42	81		67	76	

Significant progress
Slight progress
Stagnant
Slight regression
Significant regression

Note: A: 1989 data; B: 1994 data; C: 1995 data; D: 1996 data; E: 1997 data; F: 1998 data; G: 1999 data; H: 2000 data; I: 1992 data; * children immunisation status is included among the indicators used to build the ranking.

	MALARIA (cases per 100,000 people)			TUBERCULOSIS (cases per 100,000 people)			AIDS (15-49 years old)	INFANT MORTALITY (per 1,000 live births)			UNDER-5 MORTALITY (per 1,000 live births)		
	1997	2001	Progress or regression	1994	2001	Progress or regression	2001 (%)	1990	2001	Progress or regression	1990	2002	Progress or regression
Korea, Dem. Rep.		516		51 E	134			26	42		55	55	
Kyrgyzstan		1		60	133		<0.1	68	52		83	61	
Lao PDR	1076	498		25	44		<0.1	120	87		163	100	
Latvia				44	83		0.4	13.7	17		20	21	
Maldives	4			103	46		0.1	80	58		115	77	
Moldova				60	84		0.2	30	27		37	32	
Mongolia				73	138		<0.1	77	61		104	71	
Nauru				38	24							30	
Nepal	29	29		78	125		0.5	100	66		145	91	
Pakistan	54	55		11 C	24		0.1	96	84		130	107	
Palau				245	171 G				24		34	29	
Panama	19	32		32	59		1.5	27	19		34	25	
Paraguay	11	48		39	37			30	26		37	30	
Peru	754	305		210	143		0.4	58	30		80	39	
Philippines	59	45		269	139		<0.1	45	29		66	38	
Romania				94	128		<0.1	26.9	19		32	21	
Russian Federation				48	92		0.9	17.4	18		21	21	
Solomon Islands	16854	16512		91	63			29	20		36	24	
Suriname	2748	4075		13	19		1.2	35	26		48	40	
Tajikistan	507	186		16	57		<0.1	98	91		78	72	
Thailand	163	100		83	78		1.8	34	24		40	28	
Turkmenistan		<1		46 C	82		<0.1	80	69		97	98	
Tuvalu				203	182 F						56	52	
Ukraine				40	75		1.0	18	17		22	20	
Uzbekistan		<1		67	69		<0.1	53	52		62	68	
Viet Nam	86	86		72	115		0.3	36	30		51	39	
Countries below average *													
Botswana		2836		342	619		38.8	45	80		58	110	
Burkina Faso		619 H		9	20		6.5	118	104		210	207	
Cambodia	1096	399		137	143		2.7	80	97		115	138	
Eritrea		5648		491	72		2.8	92	72		147	89	
Gabon	3152	2148 F		99	133 G			60	60		92	91	
Gambia	27369	10096 G		92 C	120 G		1.6	103	91		154	126	
Ghana	11941	17143		101	60		3.0	74	57		126	100	
Haiti		119		83 C	124		6.1	102	79		150	123	
India	275	192		122	106		0.8	80	67		123	93	
Kenya		545 H		86	233		15.0	63	78		97	122	
Kiribati				332	225			65	51		88	69	
Madagascar		2219 A		80	100		0.3	103	84		168	136	
Mali	3688	741		32	37 H		1.7	152	141		250	222	
Marshall Islands				122 D	108			63	54		92	66	
Micronesia, Fed. Sts.				165	76			26	20		31	24	
Myanmar	256	252		36	89			91	77		130	109	
Nigeria	593	30 H		9	39		5.8	114	110		190	183	
Papua New Guinea	847	1793		128	323		0.7	79	70		101	94	
Rwanda	20310	6510 H		61 C	69		8.9	107	96		178	183	
São Tomé and Principe		31387 H		33	69			69	57		118	118	
Senegal		11925 H		85	89		0.5	90	79		148	138	
Somalia		118 H		28	75		1.0	133	133		225	225	
South Africa	75	61		230	339		20.1	45	56		60	65	
Sudan	5283	12530		85	75		2.6	75	65		120	94	
Tanzania	3602	1207 G		116	171		7.8	102	104		163	165	
Uganda		46 H		138	153		5.0	100	79		160	141	
Vanuatu	3442	3787		91	86			52	34		70	42	
Yemen	8560	7600 H		97 C	68		0.1	98	79		142	107	
Countries in worse situation *													
Afghanistan		1621		6 E	44			167	165		260	257	
Angola		6594		65	122 H		5.5	166	154		260	260	
Benin	11918	11545 F		40	43 H		3.6	111	94		185	156	
Burundi		43505		64	100		8.3	114	114		190	190	

Significant progress
Slight progress
Stagnant
Slight regression
Significant regression

Note: A: 1989 data; B: 1994 data; C: 1995 data; D: 1996 data; E: 1997 data; F: 1998 data; G: 1999 data; H: 2000 data; I: 1992 data; * children immunisation status is included among the indicators used to build the ranking.

	MALARIA (cases per 100,000 people)			TUBERCULOSIS (cases per 100,000 people)			AIDS (15-49 years old)	INFANT MORTALITY (per 1,000 live births)			UNDER-5 MORTALITY (per 1,000 live births)		
	1997	2001	Progress or regression	1994	2001	Progress or regression	2001 (%)	1990	2001	Progress or regression	1990	2002	Progress or regression
Cameroon	4613	2900 F	→	57	35 H	→	11.8	85	96	←	139	166	←
Central African Republic		2207 B		100 C	67	→	12.9	115	115	=	180	180	=
Chad	4843	4683 H	→	51	62 G	←	3.6	118	117	=	203	200	→
Congo, Dem. Rep.		1414 H		89	127	←	4.9	128	129	=	205	205	=
Congo, Rep.	350	5880 H	←	119	313	←	7.2	83	81	=	110	108	=
Côte d'Ivoire	6990	2449	→	100	101	=	9.7	100	102	=	155	176	←
Djibouti	700	536 H	→	618	652	←		119	100	=	175	143	→
Equatorial Guinea		2744 C		92	96 F	←	3.4	122	101	=	206	152	→
Ethiopia		621		185	147	→	6.4	128	116	=	204	171	→
Guinea	10951	75386 H	←	46	67 H	←		145	109	=	240	169	→
Guinea-Bissau		2421 G		157	106 H	→	2.8	153	130	=	253	211	→
Lesotho				237	479 H	←	31.0	102	91	→	120	87	→
Liberia		26699 F		88	70 F	→		157	157	=	235	235	=
Malawi		20080		197	226	←	15.0	146	114	=	241	183	→
Mauritania		9724 H		169 C	115 H	→		120	120	=	183	183	=
Mozambique		19842		109	119	←	13.0	143	125	=	235	197	→
Namibia	26217	1502 H	→	97 C	628	←	22.5	65	55	→	84	67	→
Niger	10026	1693 F	→	43	40 H	→		191	156	=	320	265	→
Sierra Leone		8943 G		63	102	←	7.0	185	182	=	302	284	→
Swaziland		469		245 C	653	←	33.4	77	106	←	110	149	←
Timor-Leste									85		160	126	→
Togo		9273		30	31 H	=	6.0	88	79	→	152	141	→
Zambia	37458	18877	→	392	434	←	21.5	108	112	=	189	192	←
Zimbabwe		5410 H		213	438	←	33.7	53	76	←	80	123	←
Countries with insufficient data to summarise the area													
Bermuda				7 C	7 E	=							
British Virgin Islands					14 E								
Cayman Islands				6 C	3	→							
Channel Islands								7	6	=			
French Polynesia				42	26	→		18	10	→			
Greenland				10	9	=							
Guam				66	40	→		9	6 H	→			
Hong Kong (China)								6	3	→			
Liechtenstein									10			11	
Macao (China)								10	4	→			
Netherlands Antilles					2								
New Caledonia				70	29	→		13	7	→			
Niue				92	49 G	→							
Northern Mariana Islands				83	76	→							
Puerto Rico				8	3	→		14	10	→			
Turks and Caicos Islands				105 G	17	→							
Virgin Islands (US)				9	4 C	→		20	8	→			

HUMAN RIGHTS
The right to health and health services is enshrined in:
UDHR - Art. 25
CERD - Art. 5
CESCR - Art. 12
CEDAW - Art. 11 & 14
CRC - Art. 24

UDHR: Universal Declaration of Human Rights
CERD: International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
CESCR: International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
CEDAW: Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
CRC: Convention on the Rights of the Child

INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS
Health is considered in:
Millennium Development Goals - Goals 4 & 6
World Summit for Social Development - Commitments 8 & 10
Fourth World Conference on Women - Beijing Platform for Action - Critical Areas of Concern

Sources:
Malaria: Human Development Report 2000, UNDP for 1997 data and Communicable Disease Global Atlas Database, WHO (www.who.int/GlobalAtlas) for 2001 data.
Tuberculosis: Communicable Disease Global Atlas Database, WHO (www.who.int/GlobalAtlas).
AIDS: The State of the World's Children 2004, UNICEF (www.unicef.org/sowc04).
Infant mortality: World Development Indicators 2003, World Bank.
Under-5 mortality: The State of the World's Children 2004, UNICEF (www.unicef.org/sowc04).

→ **Significant progress**
→ **Slight progress**
= **Stagnant**
← **Slight regression**
← **Significant regression**

Note: A: 1989 data; B: 1994 data; C: 1995 data; D: 1996 data; E: 1997 data; F: 1998 data; G: 1999 data; H: 2000 data; I: 1992 data; * children immunisation status is included among the indicators used to build the ranking.

WOMEN'S REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH: The governments of the world agreed on…

"*…States Parties shall ensure to women appropriate services in connection with pregnancy, confinement and the post-natal period, granting free services where necessary, as well as adequate nutrition during pregnancy and lactation.*"

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Article 12. 1979.

"*Provide more accessible, available and affordable primary health-care services of high quality, including sexual and reproductive health care, which includes family planning information and services, and giving particular attention to maternal and emergency obstetric care…*"

Conference on Women - Beijing Platform for Action, Paragraph 106. 1995.

	WOMEN AGED 15-49 ATTENDED AT LEAST ONCE DURING PREGNANCY BY SKILLED HEALTH PERSONNEL			BIRTHS ATTENDED BY SKILLED HEALTH PERSONNEL			ESTIMATED MATERNAL MORTALITY RATIO (PER 100,000 LIVE BIRTHS) [A]		CONTRACEPTIVE USE AMONG CURRENTLY MARRIED WOMEN AGED 15-49		
	Initial data (%)	Latest available data (%)	Progress or regression	1990 (%)	1999/2000 (%)	Progress or regression	1995 Model	2000 Model	Initial data (%)	Latest available data (%)	Progress or regression
Countries in better situation											
Albania		95 [R]			99 [P]		31	55		58 [R]	
Antigua and Barbuda		82 [P]		100 [N]	100 [P]	=				53 [E]	
Argentina		95 [I]		96 [I]	98 [Q]	→	85	82			
Armenia	82 [O]	92 [R]	→	96 [O]	97 [R]	=	29	55		61 [R]	
Australia		100 [H]			100 [P]		6	8	76 [C]		
Austria		100 [I]			100 [P]		11	4		51 [N]	
Bahamas					99 [P]		10	60	62 [E]		
Bahrain		97 [M]		94 [E]	98 [M]	→	38	28	53 [F]	62 [M]	→
Belarus		100 [Q]		100 [C]	100 [Q]	=	33	35		50 [M]	
Belgium					100 [P]		8	10	78 [I]		
Belize	96 [F]	96 [Q]	=		83 [P]		140	140	47 [H]		
Bosnia and Herzegovina		99 [R]		97 [H]	100 [R]	→	15	31		48 [R]	
British Virgin Islands		100 [G]		100 [K]	100 [Q]	=					
Brunei Darussalam		100 [L]			99 [P]		22	37			
Canada					98 [P]		6	6		75 [M]	
Chile		95 [I]		99 [K]	100 [P]	=	33	31			
China				50 [E]	70 [Q]	→	60	56	83 [I]	84 [O]	=
Cook Islands					100 [P]					63 [N]	
Costa Rica	95 [G]	70 [Q]	←	98 [I]	98 [Q]	=	35	43	75 [K]		
Croatia					100 [P]		18	8			
Cuba	100 [P]	100 [R]	=	100 [K]	100 [Q]	=	24	33	70 [D]		
Cyprus					100 [P]			47			
Czech Republic		99 [K]			99 [P]		14	9	78 [H]	72 [O]	←
Denmark					100 [P]		15	5	78 [E]		
Dominica	90 [G]	100 [Q]	→		100 [P]				50 [D]		
Dominican Republic	97 [H]	98 [N]	→	92 [H]	95 [N]	→	110	150	56 [H]	64 [N]	→
Estonia							80	63		70 [L]	
Fiji					100 [P]		20	75			
Finland		100 [J]			100 [P]		6	6	77 [F]		
France		99 [J]			99 [P]		20	17		75 [L]	
Georgia	74 [O]	95 [Q]	→		96 [P]		22	32		41 [R]	
Germany					100 [P]		12	8	75 [I]		
Grenada	100 [G]	98 [Q]	←	99 [P]	99 [Q]	=			54 [G]		
Guyana				95 [O]	96 [Q]	→	150	170			
Ireland					100 [P]		9	5			
Israel					99 [P]		8	17			
Italy							11	5		60 [N]	
Jamaica	98 [D]	99 [O]	=	79 [F]	88 [O]	→	120	87	55 [F]	66 [O]	→
Japan					100 [P]		12	10	58 [G]	59 [L]	=
Jordan	80 [G]	96 [O]	→	87 [G]	97 [O]	→	41	41	35 [G]	53 [O]	→
Kazakhstan	93 [M]	91 [Q]	←	100 [M]	99 [Q]	=	80	210	59 [M]	66 [Q]	→
Korea, Dem. Rep.					97 [P]		35	67	62 [I]		
Korea, Rep.					100 [P]		20	20	79 [H]	81 [O]	=
Kuwait		95 [M]		96 [C]	98 [N]	→	25	5		50 [N]	
Kyrgyzstan		97 [O]			98 [P]		80	110		60 [O]	

→ **Significant progress**
→ **Slight progress**
= **Stagnant**
← **Slight regression**
← **Significant regression**

Note: A: Due to changes in the model of estimation, 1995 and 2000 data are not comparable; B: 1984 data; C: 1986 data; D: 1987 data; E: 1988 data; F: 1989 data; G: 1990 data; H: 1991 data; I: 1992 data; J: 1991/93 data; K: 1993 data; L: 1994 data; M: 1995 data; N: 1996 data; O: 1997 data; P: 1998 data; Q: 1999 data; R: 2000 data; S: 2001 data.

	WOMEN AGED 15-49 ATTENDED AT LEAST ONCE DURING PREGNANCY BY SKILLED HEALTH PERSONNEL			BIRTHS ATTENDED BY SKILLED HEALTH PERSONNEL			ESTIMATED MATERNAL MORTALITY RATIO (PER 100,000 LIVE BIRTHS) [A]		CONTRACEPTIVE USE AMONG CURRENTLY MARRIED WOMEN AGED 15-49		
	Initial data (%)	Latest available data (%)	Progress or regression	1990 (%)	1999/2000 (%)	Progress or regression	1995 Model	2000 Model	Initial data (%)	Latest available data (%)	Progress or regression
Latvia					100 P		70	42		48 M	
Lithuania							27	13		47 M	
Luxembourg					100 P			28			
Macedonia, FYR		100 O			97 P		17	23			
Malaysia					97 P		39	41		55 L	
Mauritius				97 L	99 Q	→	45	24	75 H		
Moldova		99 O			99 P		65	36	74 O	62 R	←
Mongolia	90 P	97 R	→		97 P		65	110	65 L	60 P	←
Netherlands					100 P		10	16	79 K		
New Zealand		95 L			100 P		15	7		75 M	
Norway					100 P		9	16	74 F		
Poland					99 P		12	13	49 H		
Portugal					100 P		12	5			
Qatar		94 D			98 P		41	7		43 P	
Romania				99 K	99 N	=	60	49	57 K	64 Q	→
Russian Federation				99 P	99 Q	=	75	67			
Samoa					100 P		15	130			
Serbia and Montenegro					99 P			11		58 R	
Singapore					100 P		9	30			
Slovenia		98 I			100 P		17	17		74 L	
Spain							8	4		81 M	
Sri Lanka	80 K	98 R	→		97 P		60	92	66 K		
St. Kitts and Nevis		100 G			99 P				41 B		
St. Lucia		100 G			100 P				47 E		
St. Vincent and Grenadines		92 Q			100 P				58 E		
Sweden					100 P		8	2			
Switzerland							8	7		82 M	
Thailand		86 N			99 P		44	44	74 K	72 Q	←
Trinidad and Tobago		98 D		98 D	99 Q	=	65	160	53 D		
Turkmenistan				96 N	97 R	→	65	31		62 R	
Ukraine				100 N	100 Q	=	45	35		68 Q	
United Arab Emirates		97 M			96 P		30	54		28 M	
United Kingdom					99 P		10	13	82 K		
United States of America		99 F			99 P		12	17	71 G	76 M	→
Uruguay		94 O			100 P		50	27			
Uzbekistan	95 N	97 R	→	98 N	96 R	←	60	24	56 N	67 R	→
West Bank and Gaza		96 R		95 N	97 R	→	120	100			
Countries above average											
Algeria		58 G			92 P		150	140	47 I	64 R	→
Azerbaijan	98 O	69 R	←	100 P	88 R	←	37	94	55 R	55 S	→
Barbados	100 G	89 Q	←	100 M	91 Q	←	33	95	55 E		
Botswana	92 E	97 R	→	87 N	99 R	→	480	100	33 E	40 R	→
Brazil	74 C	86 N	→	76 H	92 N	→	260	260		77 N	
Bulgaria							23	32		42 O	
Cape Verde		99 P		54 M	89 P	→	190	150		53 P	
Colombia	83 G	91 R	→	76 G	88 R	→	120	130	66 G	77 R	→
Ecuador	76 F	69 P	←	66 F	69 Q	→	210	130	53 F	66 Q	→
Gabon		94 R			86 P		620	420		33 R	
Honduras	88 I	84 N	←	45 I	54 N	→	220	110	47 I	62 S	→
Iran, Islamic Rep.		77 O			90 P		130	76	49 F	73 O	→
Kiribati		88 L			85 P						
Lebanon		87 M			89 P		130	150		61 N	
Libya		81 M			94 P		120	97		40 M	
Mexico	78 D	86 M	→		86 P		65	83		67 M	
Namibia		87 I		68 I	76 R	→	370	300	29 I		
Oman	88 D	96 Q	→	87 D	91 M	→	120	87		24 M	
Panama		72 P		86 K	90 P	→	100	160	58 B		
Paraguay	84 G	89 P	→	53 G	59 P	→	170	170	44 G	57 P	→

Significant progress
Slight progress
Stagnant
Slight regression
Significant regression

Note: A: Due to changes in the model of estimation, 1995 and 2000 data are not comparable; B: 1984 data; C: 1986 data; D: 1987 data; E: 1988 data; F: 1989 data; G: 1990 data; H: 1991 data; I: 1992 data; J: 1991/93 data; K: 1993 data; L: 1994 data; M: 1995 data; N: 1996 data; O: 1997 data; P: 1998 data; Q: 1999 data; R: 2000 data; S: 2001 data.

	WOMEN AGED 15-49 ATTENDED AT LEAST ONCE DURING PREGNANCY BY SKILLED HEALTH PERSONNEL			BIRTHS ATTENDED BY SKILLED HEALTH PERSONNEL			ESTIMATED MATERNAL MORTALITY RATIO (PER 100,000 LIVE BIRTHS) [A]		CONTRACEPTIVE USE AMONG CURRENTLY MARRIED WOMEN AGED 15-49		
	Initial data (%)	Latest available data (%)	Progress or regression	1990 (%)	1999/2000 (%)	Progress or regression	1995 Model	2000 Model	Initial data (%)	Latest available data (%)	Progress or regression
Philippines	83 K	86 P	→	53 K	56 P	→	240	200		47 P	
Saudi Arabia		90 N			91 P		23	23		32 N	
Solomon Islands					85 P		60	130			
South Africa	89 M	94 P	→	82 M	84 P	→	340	230		56 P	
Suriname	91 N	91 R	=	91 D	95 N	→	230	110			
Tunisia	58 E	79 M	⟶	69 E	90 R	⟶	70	120	60 L		
Turkey	62 K	68 P	→	76 K	81 P	→	55	70		64 P	
Turks and Caicos Islands	100 P	82 Q	⟵	100 P	88 Q	⟵					
Vanuatu					89 P		32	130			
Venezuela		90 R		95 O	95 R	=	43	96			
Viet Nam	71 O	68 R	←	77 O	70 R	←	95	130		75 O	
Countries below average											
Bolivia	46 F	69 P	⟶	38 F	56 P	⟶	550	420	30 F	53 R	→
Côte d'Ivoire	83 M	88 R	→	45 L	47 Q	→	1200	690	11 L	15 Q	→
Egypt	52 H	53 R	=	37 H	61 R	⟶	170	84	46 H	56 R	→
El Salvador	69 K	76 P	→	52 E	58 P	→	180	150		60 P	
Ghana	82 E	88 P	→	40 E	44 P	→	590	540		22 Q	
Haiti	68 M	79 R	⟶	23 F	60 R	⟶	1100	680	10 F	27 R	⟶
Indonesia	76 H	89 O	⟶	32 H	56 Q	⟶	470	230	50 H	57 O	→
Iraq		78 N			72 P		370	250	14 F		
Lesotho	91 K	88 M	←	50 K	60 R	⟶	530	550	23 I	30 R	→
Liberia		83 C			51 P		1000	760	6 C		
Malawi		90 I			56 P		580	1800	13 I	31 R	⟶
Maldives					70 P		390	110			
Morocco	32 I	42 O	⟶	31 I	40 M	⟶	390	220	42 I	50 M	⟶
Myanmar		76 O			56 P		170	360	17 I	33 O	⟶
Nicaragua	72 K	82 P	⟶	59 K	64 P	→	250	230	49 I	60 P	⟶
Papua New Guinea		78 N			53 P		390	300		26 N	
Peru	64 I	67 N	→	46 I	50 N	→	240	410	59 I	69 R	→
Sudan	70 G	75 K	→		86 P		1500	590	9 G	8 K	=
Swaziland					70 P		370	370	20 E		
Syrian Arab Republic		51 K			76 P		200	160	36 K		
Tajikistan		71 R		79 N	71 R	←	120	100		34 R	
Togo	43 E	82 P	⟶	31 E	51 P	⟶	980	570		24 P	
Zambia	92 I	96 N	→	51 I	47 N	←	870	750	15 I	25 N	⟶
Zimbabwe	91 E	93 Q	=	70 E	73 Q	→	610	1100	43 F	54 Q	→
Countries in worse situation											
Afghanistan					12 P		820	1900		5 R	
Angola					45 P		1300	1700		8 N	
Bangladesh	26 L	33 R	→	10 L	13 Q	→	600	380	40 H	54 R	⟶
Benin		80 N			66 P		880	850	16 N	19 S	→
Bhutan					24 P		500	420		19 L	
Burkina Faso	59 K	61 Q	→	42 K	31 P	←	1400	1000	8 K	12 Q	→
Burundi		79 D			25 P		1900	1000	9 D		
Cambodia	34 P	38 R	→	34 P	34 R	=	590	450	13 M	24 R	⟶
Cameroon	79 H	75 R	←	58 H	56 R	←	720	730	16 H	19 P	→
Central African Republic		67 M		46 M	44 R	←	1200	1100		15 M	
Chad	23 O	42 R	⟶	15 O	16 R	→	1500	1100	4 O	8 R	→
Comoros	85 N	74 R	←	52 N	62 R	⟶	570	480		21 N	
Congo, Dem. Rep.					61 P		940	990	8 H		
Equatorial Guinea		37 L			65 P		1400	880			
Eritrea		49 M			21 P		1100	630		5 M	
Ethiopia		27 R			6 P		1800	850	4 G	8 R	→
Gambia					55 P		1100	540	12 G	10 R	=
Guatemala	53 M	60 Q	⟶	34 M	40 Q	⟶	270	240		38 Q	
Guinea	58 I	71 Q	⟶	31 I	35 Q	→	1200	740	2 K	6 Q	→
Guinea-Bissau		62 R			35 P		910	1100		8 R	

⟶ **Significant progress**
→ **Slight progress**
= **Stagnant**
← **Slight regression**
⟵ **Significant regression**

Note: A: Due to changes in the model of estimation, 1995 and 2000 data are not comparable; B: 1984 data; C: 1986 data; D: 1987 data; E: 1988 data; F: 1989 data; G: 1990 data; H: 1991 data; I: 1992 data; J: 1991/93 data; K: 1993 data; L: 1994 data; M: 1995 data; N: 1996 data; O: 1997 data; P: 1998 data; Q: 1999 data; R: 2000 data; S: 2001 data.

	WOMEN AGED 15-49 ATTENDED AT LEAST ONCE DURING PREGNANCY BY SKILLED HEALTH PERSONNEL			BIRTHS ATTENDED BY SKILLED HEALTH PERSONNEL			ESTIMATED MATERNAL MORTALITY RATIO (PER 100,000 LIVE BIRTHS) [A]		CONTRACEPTIVE USE AMONG CURRENTLY MARRIED WOMEN AGED 15-49		
	Initial data (%)	Latest available data (%)	Progress or regression	1990 (%)	1999/2000 (%)	Progress or regression	1995 Model	2000 Model	Initial data (%)	Latest available data (%)	Progress or regression
India	49 [K]	60 [Q]	→	34 [K]	42 [P]	→	440	540		48 [Q]	
Kenya	77 [F]	76 [R]	=	50 [F]	44 [P]	←	1300	1000	27 [F]	39 [P]	→
Lao PDR		29 [R]			21 [R]		650	650	19 [K]	32 [R]	→
Madagascar	78 [I]	73 [R]	←	57 [I]	46 [R]	←	580	550	17 [I]	19 [R]	→
Mali	31 [D]	47 [N]	→	32 [D]	24 [M]	←	630	1200	7 [N]	8 [S]	→
Mauritania		48 [H]			57 [P]		870	1000	3 [H]	8 [S]	→
Mozambique		71 [O]			44 [P]		980	1000		6 [O]	
Nepal	15 [H]	27 [R]	→	7 [H]	12 [R]	→	830	740	23 [H]	39 [S]	→
Niger	30 [I]	41 [R]	→	15 [I]	16 [R]	=	920	1600	4 [I]	14 [R]	→
Nigeria	57 [G]	64 [Q]	→	31 [G]	42 [Q]	→	1100	800	6 [G]	15 [Q]	→
Pakistan	27 [H]	28 [Q]	=	19 [H]	20 [P]	=	200	500	12 [H]	28 [S]	→
Rwanda	94 [I]	92 [R]	←	26 [I]	31 [R]	→	2300	1400	21 [I]	13 [R]	←
Senegal	74 [K]	77 [R]	→	41 [C]	51 [Q]	→	1200	690	7 [K]	13 [O]	→
Sierra Leone		68 [R]			42 [P]		2100	2000		4 [R]	
Somalia		32 [Q]			34 [P]		1600	1100			
Tanzania	62 [I]	49 [Q]	←	44 [H]	36 [Q]	←	1100	1500	10 [H]	25 [Q]	→
Timor-Leste					24 [P]		850	660			
Uganda	87 [F]	91 [M]	→	38 [F]	38 [M]	=	1100	880	5 [F]	23 [R]	→
Yemen	26 [I]	34 [O]	→	16 [I]	22 [O]	→	850	570	7 [I]	21 [O]	→
Countries with insufficient data to summarise the area											
Congo, Rep.							1100	510			
Djibouti							520	730			
French Polynesia							20				
Greece							2	9			
Guadeloupe							5				
Guam							12				
Hong Kong (China)									86 [I]		
Hungary							23	16	77 [K]		
Iceland							16				
Macao (China)							20				
Malta					98						
Marshall Islands					95						
Micronesia, Fed. Sts.					93						
Netherlands Antilles							20				
New Caledonia							10				
Niue					100						
Palau					100						
Puerto Rico							30			78 [N]	
Sao Tomé and Principe					79						
Slovakia							14	3	74 [H]		
Tonga					92						
Tuvalu					99						

HUMAN RIGHTS

The right to women's reproductive health is enshrined in:

UDHR - Art. 25
CESCR - Art. 10 & 12
CEDAW - Art. 11, 12 & 14
CRC - Art. 24

UDHR: Universal Declaration of Human Rights
CESCR: International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
CEDAW: Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
CRC: Convention on the Rights of the Child

INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS

Women's reproductive health is considered in:

Millennium Development Goals - Goals 5
World Summit for Social Development - Commitment 8
Fourth World Conference on Women - Beijing Platform for Action - Critical Areas of Concern

Sources:

Women aged 15-49 attended at least once during pregnancy: UNICEF End Decade Website Database (www.childinfo.org).
Births attended by skilled health personnel: UNICEF End Decade Website Database (www.childinfo.org) and The State of the World's Children 2004, UNICEF (www.unicef.org/sowc04).
Maternal mortality ratio: UNICEF End Decade Website Database (www.childinfo.org) and The State of the World's Children 2004, UNICEF (www.unicef.org/sowc04).
Contraceptive use: The UN Statistics Division Website (unstats.un.org/unsd/) and UN Population Information Network website (www.un.org/popin/).

→ **Significant progress**
→ **Slight progress**
= **Stagnant**
← **Slight regression**
← **Significant regression**

Note: A: Due to changes in the model of estimation, 1995 and 2000 data are not comparable; B: 1984 data; C: 1986 data; D: 1987 data; E: 1988 data; F: 1989 data; G: 1990 data; H: 1991 data; I: 1992 data; J: 1991/93 data; K: 1993 data; L: 1994 data; M: 1995 data; N: 1996 data; O: 1997 data; P: 1998 data; Q: 1999 data; R: 2000 data; S: 2001 data.

HABITAT: The governments of the world agreed on…

"*… (We) recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for him[her]self and his [her] family, including adequate food, clothing and housing…*"

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article 11. 1966.

"*We resolve… to halve, by the year 2015, the proportion of the world's people… who are unable to reach or to afford safe drinking water… By 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers as proposed in the 'Cities Without Slums' initiative.*"

Millennium Declaration, Paragraph 19. 2000.

	POPULATION WITH ACCESS TO SANITATION			POPULATION WITH ACCESS TO IMPROVED WATER SOURCES		
	1990 (%)	2000 (%)	Progress or regression	1990 (%)	2000 (%)	Progress or regression
Countries in better situation						
Albania		91			97	
Andorra		100			100	
Antigua and Barbuda		95			91	
Aruba					100	
Australia	100	100	▮▮	100	100	▮▮
Austria	100	100	▮▮	100	100	▮▮
Bahamas		100			97	
Barbados	100	100	▮▮	100	100	▮▮
Belarus					100	
Bulgaria		100			100	
Canada	100	100	▮▮	100	100	▮▮
Channel Islands		100			100	
Chile	97	96	▮▮	90	93	➡
Comoros	98	98	▮▮	88	96	➡
Costa Rica		93			95	
Croatia		100			95	
Cuba		98			91	
Cyprus	100	100	▮▮	100	100	▮▮
Denmark					100	
Djibouti		91			100	
Dominica		83		97	97	▮▮
Egypt	87	98	➡	94	97	➡
Finland	100	100	▮▮	100	100	▮▮
French Polynesia		98			100	
Grenada		97			95	
Guyana		87			94	
Hungary	99	99	▮▮	99	99	▮▮
Jamaica	99	99	▮▮	93	92	▮▮
Jordan	98	99	▮▮	97	96	▮▮
Kazakhstan		99			91	
Korea, Dem. Rep.		99			100	
Lebanon		99			100	
Macedonia, FYR		99			99	
Malta	100	100	▮▮	100	100	▮▮
Mauritius	100	99	▮▮	100	100	▮▮
Moldova		99			92	
Monaco		100			100	
Netherlands	100	100	▮▮	100	100	▮▮
Norway				100	100	▮▮
Russian Federation					99	
Samoa		99			99	
Saudi Arabia		100			95	
Singapore	100	100	▮▮	100	100	▮▮
Slovakia		100			100	
Slovenia				100	100	▮▮
St. Kitts and Nevis		96			98	
St. Lucia		89			98	
St. Vincent and Grenadines		96			93	

➡ **Significant progress**
➡ **Slight progress**
▮▮ **Stagnant**
⬅ **Slight regression**
⬅ **Significant regression**

	POPULATION WITH ACCESS TO SANITATION			POPULATION WITH ACCESS TO IMPROVED WATER SOURCES		
	1990 (%)	2000 (%)	Progress or regression	1990 (%)	2000 (%)	Progress or regression
Sweden	100	100	=	100	100	=
Switzerland	100	100	=	100	100	=
Thailand	79	96	→	80	84	→
Tonga					100	
Trinidad and Tobago	99	99	=	91	90	=
Ukraine		99			98	
United Kingdom	100	100	=	100	100	=
United States of America	100	100	=	100	100	=
Uruguay		94			98	
Vanuatu		100			88	
West Bank and Gaza		100			86	
Countries above average						
Algeria		92			89	
Bangladesh	41	48	→	94	97	→
Botswana	60	66	→	93	95	=
Brazil	71	76	→	83	87	→
Colombia	83	86	→	94	91	←
Ecuador	70	86	⟶	71	85	⟶
Georgia		100			79	
Guatemala	70	81	⟶	76	92	⟶
Honduras	61	75	⟶	83	88	→
Iran, Islamic Rep.	81	83	=	86	92	→
Iraq		79			85	
Kyrgyzstan		100			77	
Libya	97	97	=	71	72	=
Maldives		56			100	
Palau		100			79	
Panama		92			90	
Paraguay	93	94	=	63	78	⟶
Philippines	74	83	→	87	86	=
South Africa	86	87	=	86	86	=
Sri Lanka	85	94	→	68	77	⟶
Suriname		93			82	
Syrian Arab Republic		90			80	
Tunisia	76	84	→	75	80	→
Turkey	87	90	→	79	82	→
Uzbekistan		89			85	
Countries below average						
Argentina	82	85	→	94	79	←
Azerbaijan		81			78	
Belize		50			92	
Bhutan		70			62	
Bolivia	52	70	⟶	71	83	⟶
Burundi	87	88	=	69	78	⟶
Cameroon	77	79	=	51	58	→
Cape Verde		71			74	
Côte d'Ivoire	46	52	→	80	81	=
Dominican Republic	66	67	=	83	86	→
El Salvador	73	82	→	66	77	⟶
Gabon		53			86	
Ghana	61	72	⟶	53	73	⟶
India	16	28	⟶	68	84	⟶
Indonesia	47	55	→	71	78	→
Kenya	80	87	→	45	57	⟶
Korea, Rep.		63			92	
Lesotho		49			78	
Malawi	73	76	→	49	57	→
Mali	70	69	=	55	65	⟶
Mexico	70	74	→	80	88	→
Morocco	58	68	⟶	75	80	→
Myanmar	45	64	⟶	64	72	→
Nepal	20	28	→	67	88	⟶

⟶ **Significant progress**
→ **Slight progress**
= **Stagnant**
← **Slight regression**
⟵ **Significant regression**

	POPULATION WITH ACCESS TO SANITATION			POPULATION WITH ACCESS TO IMPROVED WATER SOURCES		
	1990 (%)	2000 (%)	Progress or regression	1990 (%)	2000 (%)	Progress or regression
Nicaragua	76	85	→	70	77	→
Nigeria	53	54	=	53	62	⟶
Oman	84	92	→	37	39	=
Pakistan	36	62	⟶	83	90	→
Papua New Guinea	82	82	=	40	42	=
Peru	60	71	⟶	74	80	→
Senegal	57	70	⟶	72	78	→
Sudan	58	62	→	67	75	→
Tajikistan		90			60	
Tanzania	84	90	→	38	68	⟶
Turkmenistan		100			58	
Uganda	84	79	←	45	52	→
Venezuela		68			83	
Viet Nam	29	47	⟶	55	77	⟶
Zambia	63	78	⟶	52	64	⟶
Zimbabwe	56	62	→	78	83	→
Countries in worse situation						
Afghanistan		12			13	
Angola		44			38	
Benin	20	23	→		63	
Burkina Faso	24	29	→	53	42	←
Cambodia		17			30	
Central African Republic	24	25	=	48	70	⟶
Chad	18	29	⟶		27	
China	17	40	⟶	71	75	→
Congo, Dem. Rep.		21			45	
Congo, Rep.					51	
Equatorial Guinea		53			44	
Eritrea		13			46	
Ethiopia	8	12	→	25	24	=
Fiji		43			47	
Gambia		37			62	
Guinea	55	58	→	45	48	→
Guinea-Bissau	44	56	⟶		56	
Haiti	23	28	→	53	46	←
Kiribati		48			48	
Lao PDR		30			37	
Madagascar	36	42	→	44	47	→
Mauritania	30	33	→	37	37	=
Mongolia		30			60	
Mozambique		43			57	
Namibia	33	41	→	72	77	→
Niger	15	20	→	53	59	→
Romania		53			58	
Rwanda		8			41	
Sierra Leone		66			57	
Solomon Islands		34			71	
Togo	37	34	←	51	54	→
Yemen	32	38	→	66	69	→

HUMAN RIGHTS:
The right to an adequate habitat is enshrined in:
UDHR - Art. 25
CESCR - Art. 11
CEDAW - Art. 14

UDHR: Universal Declaration of Human Rights
CESCR: International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
CEDAW: Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women

INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS
Habitat is considered in:
Millennium Development Goals - Goal 7
World Summit for Social Development - Commitment 12
Fourth World Conference on Women - Beijing Platform for Action - Critical Areas of Concern

Sources: The UN Statistics Division Website (unstats.un.org/unsd/) and World Development Indicators 2003, World Bank.

→ **Significant progress**
→ **Slight progress**
= **Stagnant**
← **Slight regression**
← **Significant regression**

EDUCATION: The governments of the world agreed on…

"Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free…Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding [and] tolerance…"

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 26. 1948.

"To ensure that [by the year 2015] children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling and that girls and boys will have equal access to all levels of education."

Millennium Declaration, Paragraph 19. 2000.

	CHILDREN REACHING 5TH GRADE			ILLITERACY (15-24 YEARS OLD)			PRIMARY SCHOOL ENROLMENT RATIO (NET)		
	1990 (%)	1999/2000 (%)	Progress or regression	1990 (%)	2001 (%)	Progress or regression	1990/1991 (%)	2000/2001 (%)	Progress or regression
Countries in better situation									
Albania	82 I			5.2	2.0	→	95.1	97.6	→
Algeria	94	97.2	→	22.7	10.8	→	93.3	98.3	→
Argentina		90.3		1.8	1.4	=	93.8	107.5	→
Aruba		98.1						97.0	
Australia					0.1 P		99.2	95.7	←
Austria					2.0 P		87.7	90.9	→
Bahrain	89	98.9	→	4.4	1.5	→	99.0	95.9	←
Barbados		97.8		0.2	0.2	=	83.0 D	104.9	⟶
Belarus				0.2	0.2	=		108.1	
Belgium	81 A				2.0 P		96.2	100.5	→
Belize	67	81.5	→	4.0	1.9	=	94.0 F	100.1	→
Brunei Darussalam	95 F	91.8	←	2.1	0.6	=	91.0 F		
Bulgaria	91	93.0 H	→	0.6	0.3	=	86.1	94.3	→
Canada					3.0 P		97.7	98.6 N	=
Cape Verde	60 C			18.5	11.4	→	99.0 D	98.8 M	=
Chile	92 I	99.9	→	1.9	1.1	=	87.7	88.8	=
China	86	98.2	→	4.7	2.1	→	97.4	93.2 N	←
Cuba	92	95.3	→	0.7	0.2	=	91.8	97.3	→
Cyprus	100	99.4	=	0.3	0.2	=	101.0	94.9	←
Czech Republic		99.2					86.7	90.3	→
Denmark	94	100.0 I	→		0.1 P		98.3	99.3 N	=
Ecuador	77 H	77.8	=	4.5	2.7	=	90.0 H	99.3	⟶
Estonia	93 G	99.2	→	0.2	0.3	=	100.0	97.6	←
Fiji				2.2	0.8	=	101.0 F	99.3 M	=
Finland	100	99.4	=		0.1 P		98.3	100.4	=
France		98.0 M			1.0 P		100.9	99.8	=
Germany					1.0 P		84.3	86.5 N	→
Greece	99			0.5	0.2	=	94.6	97.2	→
Guyana	87	94.8 M	→	0.2	0.2	=	88.9	97.9 N	→
Hong Kong (China)	100	100.0 I	=	1.8	0.6	=			
Hungary	98 F			0.3	0.2	=	91.3	90.2	=
Iceland	99 H	99.0 I	=				101.3	102.2	=
Indonesia	84	95.1	→	5.0	2.1	→	96.8	92.2	←
Ireland	100	98.5	=				90.4	90.2 N	=
Israel				1.3	0.5	=	91.9	100.7	→
Italy	100	99.2	=	0.2	0.2	=	102.6	100.0	=
Japan	100	100.0 H	=		1.0 P		99.7	100.8	=
Jordan	100	97.7 M	←	3.3	0.7	→	94.1	93.6 N	=
Kazakhstan				0.2	0.2	=	86.7	88.7	=
Korea, Rep.	99	98.0 J	=	0.2	0.2	=	103.7	99.5	=
Latvia				0.2	0.2	=	90.4	92.0	=
Lithuania				0.2	0.2	=		94.6	
Luxembourg					0.1 P		81.6	96.7	⟶

⟶ **Significant progress**
→ **Slight progress**
= **Stagnant**
← **Slight regression**
⟵ **Significant regression**

Note: A: 1986 data; B: 1987 data; C: 1988 data; D: 1989 data; E: 1990/91 data; F: 1991 data; G: 1992 data; H: 1993 data; I: 1994 data; J: 1995 data; K: 1996 data; L: 1997 data; M: 1998/1999 data; N: 1999/2000 data; O: 2000/2001 data; P: latest available data.

	CHILDREN REACHING 5TH GRADE			ILLITERACY (15-24 YEARS OLD)			PRIMARY SCHOOL ENROLMENT RATIO (NET)		
	1990 (%)	1999/2000 (%)	Progress or regression	1990 (%)	2001 (%)	Progress or regression	1990/1991 (%)	2000/2001 (%)	Progress or regression
Macao (China)		99.4		2.8	1.0	▮▮	81.2	84.8	➡
Malaysia	98	99.0 H	➡	5.2	2.3	➡	93.7	98.5	➡
Maldives				1.9	0.9	▮▮		99.0	
Malta	100	99.5	▮▮	2.5	1.4	▮▮	97.0	99.1 N	➡
Mauritius	98	99.0 K	▮▮	8.9	6.0	➡	95.0	94.7	▮▮
Mexico	79.9	88.5	➡	4.8	2.8	▮▮	100.2	103.4	▮▮
Mongolia				1.1	0.9	▮▮	90.1	88.8	▮▮
Netherlands					1.0 P		95.3	100.1	➡
Netherlands Antilles				2.5	1.7	▮▮		94.5	
New Zealand	90	97.0 K	➡				101.3	99.3	▮▮
Norway	100	100.0 I	▮▮		0.1 P		100.0	101.4	▮▮
Oman	96	95.9	▮▮	14.4	1.8	➡	70.3	64.6	⬅
Panama	82 C	91.9	➡	4.7	3.1	▮▮	91.4	100.2	➡
Peru	92 C	87.4	⬅	5.5	3.1	➡	87.5	104.5 N	➡
Philippines	75 C			2.7	1.2	▮▮	96.8	92.7	⬅
Poland	98	99.3	▮▮	0.2	0.2	▮▮	96.7	97.7	▮▮
Qatar	64	99.0 I	➡	9.7	5.0	➡	89.6	95.2 M	➡
Romania				0.7	0.4	▮▮	81.2	92.8	➡
Samoa	86 J	82.6 M	⬅	1.0	0.6	▮▮	112.3	96.9	⬅
Slovenia				0.2	0.2	▮▮	104.3	93.4	⬅
Spain		98.0 G		0.4	0.2	▮▮	103.2	102.3	▮▮
Sweden	100	97.0 J	⬅				99.8	102.4	▮▮
Switzerland		99.6			1.0 P		83.7	99.0	➡
Syrian Arab Republic	94	92.1	⬅	20.1	12.3	➡	97.8	96.3	▮▮
Tajikistan				0.2	0.2	▮▮	76.7	102.6	➡
Thailand		94.1 M		1.9	1.0	▮▮	75.9	85.4	➡
Trinidad and Tobago	96	98.2	➡	0.4	0.2	▮▮	91.0	92.4	▮▮
Tunisia	87	93.1	➡	15.9	6.2	➡	93.5	99.2	➡
United Arab Emirates	79.9	98.1	➡	15.3	9.0	➡	92.4	86.6	⬅
United Kingdom					1.0 P		97.0	98.9	▮▮
Uruguay	94	90.8	⬅	1.3	0.9	▮▮	91.9	90.4	▮▮
Venezuela	86	90.8 M	➡	4.0	1.9	▮▮	88.1	88.0	▮▮
Viet Nam		85.7		5.9	4.6	▮▮	90.5	95.4	➡
West Bank and Gaza	100 I	100.0 J	▮▮					96.8	
Countries above average									
Armenia				0.5	0.2	▮▮		69.2	
Azerbaijan					3.0 P			91.3 N	
Bahamas				3.5	2.7	▮▮	96.0 F	82.8 N	⬅
Bolivia		83.0		7.4	3.9	➡	90.7	96.9	➡
Botswana	97	86.6	⬅	16.7	11.3	➡	94.1	84.3	⬅
Brazil	72 F	71.0 H	⬅	8.2	4.5	➡	86.4	97.0	➡
Costa Rica	82	80.2	▮▮	2.6	1.7	▮▮	86.3	91.1	➡
Dominican Republic		75.1 M		12.5	8.6	➡		92.5	
Egypt		99.0		38.7	29.5	➡	85.9	92.6	➡
Equatorial Guinea				7.3	2.8	➡		71.7	
Iran, Islamic Rep.	90	97.5	➡	13.7	5.8	➡	95.0 D	73.6	⬅
Jamaica	96 D	88.9	⬅	8.8	5.7	➡	95.7	94.9	▮▮
Lebanon		96.9		7.9	4.6	➡		74.2	
Macedonia, FYR	95 G	95.0 J	▮▮				94.4	92.3	⬅
Moldova				0.2	0.2	▮▮	88.8	78.4	⬅
Namibia	63 F	92.2	➡	12.6	8.1	➡	86.3	81.6	⬅
Paraguay	70	78.1	➡	4.4	2.8	▮▮	92.8	92.1	▮▮
South Africa				11.5	8.5	➡	89.4	88.9	▮▮
Sri Lanka	94	83.0 J	⬅	4.9	3.1	▮▮	87.3	97.0 M	➡

➡ **Significant progress**
➡ **Slight progress**
▮▮ **Stagnant**
⬅ **Slight regression**
⬅ **Significant regression**

Note: A: 1986 data; B: 1987 data; C: 1988 data; D: 1989 data; E: 1990/91 data; F: 1991 data; G: 1992 data; H: 1993 data; I: 1994 data; J: 1995 data; K: 1996 data; L: 1997 data; M: 1998/1999 data; N: 1999/2000 data; O: 2000/2001 data; P: latest available data.

	CHILDREN REACHING 5TH GRADE			ILLITERACY (15-24 YEARS OLD)			PRIMARY SCHOOL ENROLMENT RATIO (NET)		
	1990 (%)	1999/2000 (%)	Progress or regression	1990 (%)	2001 (%)	Progress or regression	1990/1991 (%)	2000/2001 (%)	Progress or regression
Swaziland	76	84.2	→	14.9	9.2	→	89.2	92.8	→
Tonga	84	92.0 G	→					91.5	
Turkey	98	95.0 H	←	7.3	3.3	→	89.4		
Uganda				29.9	20.6	→		109.5	
Ukraine	59			0.2	0.1	=	80.2	71.7 M	←
United States of America					3.0 P		95.8	94.9	=
Uzbekistan				0.4	0.3	=	78.0	78.2 M	=
Vanuatu		82.9					70.7	95.9	→
Zimbabwe	94	79.0 J	←	6.1	2.6	→	89.2	79.6	←
Countries below average									
Benin	55	84.0	→	59.6	45.7	→	47.1	70.3 N	→
Cambodia	49 H	62.8	→	26.5	20.3	→	98.0 K	95.4	←
Cameroon	66 D	80.7 M	→	18.9	9.5	→	73.4		
Colombia	62	66.6	→	5.1	3.0	=	68.1	88.5	→
Cook Islands		51.5 M						84.6	
El Salvador	58 F	70.7 M	→	16.2	11.5	→	73.0 D	80.9 N	→
Eritrea	83 G	84.3 O	=	39.1	28.9	→	16.9	41.0	→
Gabon	66 B	59.0 I	←					87.6	
Ghana		92.2 O		18.2	8.4	→	53.1	58.2	→
Guatemala	50 J	56.0	→	26.6	20.4	→		84.3	
Guinea	59	84.4	→				27.0 C	47.0	→
Honduras				20.3	14.5	→	89.0 F	87.6	=
Iraq	72 B			59.0	55.0	→	101.6	93.1 N	←
Kenya				10.2	4.5	→	74.1	68.5	←
Kuwait				12.5	7.3	→	49.0	66.4 N	→
Lesotho	71	74.5	→	12.8	9.2	→	75.8	78.4	→
Liberia				42.8	30.2	→		83.4 N	
Malawi	64	34.0 I	←	36.8	28.2	→	49.0	100.6	→
Morocco		80.0		44.7	31.6	→	56.8	78.0	→
Myanmar		55.2		11.8	8.8	→	99.5	83.2	←
Rwanda	60	39.1	←	27.3	15.8	→	66.9	97.3 N	→
Saudi Arabia	83	93.7	→	14.6	6.9	→	62.1	57.9	←
Sudan	94	86.8 M	←	35.0	21.9	→	43.6	46.3 N	→
Tanzania	79	90.8 O	→	16.9	8.9	→	49.4	46.7	←
Togo	50	73.8	→	36.5	23.5	→	74.9	92.3	→
Yemen				50.0	33.5	→		67.1	
Zambia		80.6		18.8	11.3	→		65.5	
Countries in worse situation									
Bangladesh		64.9		58.0	50.9	→	71.1	88.9	→
Burkina Faso	70	69.1	=	75.1	64.2	→	25.7	35.5	→
Burundi	74 F	58.4	←	48.4	34.9	→	53.1	53.7	=
Central African Republic	24			47.9	31.3	→	52.5	54.7	→
Chad	53	53.9	=	52.0	31.7	→	42.0	58.2	→
Comoros	46 F	77.1	→	43.3	41.2	=	56.8	56.2	=
Congo, Dem. Rep.	55	64.0 G	→	31.1	17.3	→	54.8	32.6 M	←
Côte d'Ivoire	73	77.7	→	47.4	37.6	→	44.5	64.2	→
Djibouti	87	76.7 M	←	26.8	15.1	→	33.3	32.6	=
Ethiopia	58 G	63.8	→	57.0	43.8	→	24.4	46.7	→
Gambia	87 F	69.2 M	←	57.8	41.4	→	52.0 D	68.7	→
Guinea-Bissau		38.1 M		55.9	40.5	→	45.0 B	53.5 N	→
India	59 H	46.8 M	←	35.7	26.7	→			
Lao PDR	53 F	53.2	=	29.9	21.4	→	62.6	81.4	→
Madagascar	22	51.1 M	→	27.8	19.2	→	64.8	67.7	→
Mali	72	79.3 M	→	72.4	62.9	→	22.3	43.3 M	→
Mauritania	75	61.2	←	54.2	50.7	→	34.9	64.0	→

→ **Significant progress**
→ **Slight progress**
= **Stagnant**
← **Slight regression**
← **Significant regression**

Note: A: 1986 data; B: 1987 data; C: 1988 data; D: 1989 data; E: 1990/91 data; F: 1991 data; G: 1992 data; H: 1993 data; I: 1994 data; J: 1995 data; K: 1996 data; L: 1997 data; M: 1998/1999 data; N: 1999/2000 data; O: 2000/2001 data; P: latest available data.

	CHILDREN REACHING 5TH GRADE			ILLITERACY (15-24 YEARS OLD)			PRIMARY SCHOOL ENROLMENT RATIO (NET)		
	1990 (%)	1999/2000 (%)	Progress or regression	1990 (%)	2001 (%)	Progress or regression	1990/1991 (%)	2000/2001 (%)	Progress or regression
Mozambique	33	51.9 D	➡	51.2	38.3	➡	48.3	54.4	➡
Nepal		62.2		53.4	38.4	➡	87.8	72.4	⬅
Nicaragua	46	48.4	➡	31.8	28.0	➡	72.2	80.7	➡
Niger	62	74.0	➡	83.0	76.2	➡	23.9	30.4	➡
Pakistan				52.6	42.2	➡	35.4	66.3	➡
Papua New Guinea	59	59.0 I	▮▮	31.4	23.7	➡	68.5	83.8 N	➡
Senegal	85	72.3	⬅	59.9	48.2	➡	48.2	63.1	➡
Countries with insufficient data to summarise the area									
Afghanistan							26.8		
Andorra					0.1 P				
Angola							55.6	36.9	⬅
Bhutan	82 H	90.4	➡				13.9		
Congo, Rep.	62	55.0 I	⬅				90.1		
Croatia	100 G			0.4	0.2	▮▮	78.8		
Dominica		86.2							
French Polynesia							104.0 D		
Georgia							97.1	95.2	▮▮
Grenada								84.2	
Haiti	47 D			45.2	34.7	➡	22.1		
Kiribati	98	95.0 K	⬅						
Kyrgyzstan							92.3	82.5	⬅
Libya				9.0	3.3	➡	96.3		
Liechtenstein					0.1 P				
Monaco					0.1 P				
Nauru								81.0 M	
New Caledonia	95 D						97.0		
Nigeria				26.4	12.2	➡			
Niue								98.5 N	
Palau								111.0	
Portugal				0.5	0.2	▮▮	101.7		
Puerto Rico				3.9	2.4	▮▮			
Russian Federation				0.2	0.2	▮▮	98.6		
San Marino	100	100.0 J	▮▮						
Seychelles	93 F	99.0	➡						
Singapore				1.0	0.2	▮▮	96.4		
Slovakia								89.3	
Solomon Islands	85	81.0 H	⬅				83.3		
St. Lucia	95 F						95.3	99.8	➡
Suriname	100 B						78.4	92.2	➡
Tuvalu	96 H							103.6 M	

HUMAN RIGHTS
The right to universal education is enshrined in:
UDHR - Art. 26
CERD - Art. 5
CESCR - Art. 13 & 14
CEDAW - Art. 5, 10 & 14
CRC - Art. 28 & 29

UDHR: Universal Declaration of Human Rights
CERD: International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
CESCR: International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
CEDAW: Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
CRC: Convention on the Rights of the Child

INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS
Education is considered in:
Millennium Development Goals - Goal 2
World Summit for Social Development - Commitment 1
Fourth World Conference on Women - Beijing Platform for Action - Critical Areas of Concern

Sources:
Percentage of children reaching 5th grade: UNESCO Website Database, (www.unesco.org) and World Development Indicators 2003, World Bank.
Enrolment ratio: UNESCO Website Database, (www.unesco.org).
Illiteracy (15-24 years): UNESCO Website Database, (www.unesco.org) and World Development Indicators 2003, World Bank.

➡ **Significant progress**
➡ **Slight progress**
▮▮ **Stagnant**
⬅ **Slight regression**
⬅ **Significant regression**

Note: A: 1986 data; B: 1987 data; C: 1988 data; D: 1989 data; E: 1990/91 data; F: 1991 data; G: 1992 data; H: 1993 data; I: 1994 data; J: 1995 data; K: 1996 data; L: 1997 data; M: 1998/1999 data; N: 1999/2000 data; O: 2000/2001 data; P: latest available data.

INFORMATION, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY: The governments of the world agreed on…

"Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers."

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 19. 1948.

"We recognize that education, knowledge, information and communication are at the core of human progress, endeavour and well-being…The rapid progress of these technologies opens completely new opportunities to attain higher levels of development."

World Summit on the Information Society. 2003.

	INTERNET USERS (per 100,000 people)			PERSONAL COMPUTERS (per 1,000 people)			TELEPHONE MAINLINES (per 1,000 people)			SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS IN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (per million people)			INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY EXPENDITURE (% of GDP)			TERTIARY EDUCATION ENROLMENT RATIO (GROSS)		
	1997	2001	Progress or regression	1990	2001	Progress or regression	1990	2001	Progress or regression	1990	2000	Progress or regression	1992 (%)	2001 (%)	Progress or regression	1990 (%)	2000 (%)	Progress or regression
Countries in better situation																		
Australia	8639	37139	➡	150	516	➡	456	519	➡	2452	3353 N	➡	7	11	➡	35	63	➡
Austria	4448	31972	➡	65	335	➡	418	468	➡	1605 I	2313 N	➡	5	7	➡	35	58	➡
Belgium	4908	31110	➡	88	233	➡	393	498	➡	1853	2953 O	➡	5	8	➡	40	57 O	➡
Bermuda	19161	31646 O	➡	317 K	495	➡	617	869	➡									
Canada	15026	43434	➡	107	460	➡	565	676	➡	2300	2985 N	➡	7	9	➡	95	60 O	⬅
Denmark	11391	54115	➡	115	540	➡	567	719	➡	2238	3476 O	➡	6	9	➡	36	59	➡
Finland	19449	43086	➡	100	423	➡	534	548	=	4114 M	5059	➡	5	8	➡	49	74 M	➡
France	4266	26445	➡	71	337	➡	495	573	➡	2185	2718 O	➡	6	9	➡	40	54	➡
Germany	6702	37409	➡	90	382	➡	441	634	➡	3023 G	3161	=	5	8	➡	34	46 N	➡
Hong Kong (China)	10483	38681	➡	47	387	➡	450	580	➡	93 K			5	9	➡	19	27 M	➡
Iceland	27439	69149	➡	39	418	➡	510	664	➡	2653	5695 O	➡	6 I	7	=	25	49	➡
Israel	4428	28289	➡	63	246	➡	343	476	➡	1332 L	1563 M	➡	5	7 O	➡	34	53	➡
Japan	9156	44027	➡	60	349	➡	441	597	➡	5394	5095	⬅	6	10	➡	30	48	➡
Korea, Rep.	3567	51497	➡	37	256	➡	310	486	➡	1645	2319	➡	5	7	➡	39	78	➡
Netherlands	6393	49255	➡	94	428	➡	464	621	➡	2107 I	2572 O	➡	7	9	➡	40	55	➡
New Zealand	14927	28369	➡	97 G	393	➡	434	477	➡	1424	2197 M	➡	9	14	➡	40	69	➡
Norway	29504	59827	➡	145 G	508	➡	502	720	➡	3158 G	4112 O	➡	6	7	=	42	70	➡
Singapore	13519	36311	➡	66	508	➡	349	471	➡	1211 C	4140	➡	7	10	➡	19	44 M	➡
Sweden	23705	51720	➡	105	561	➡	681	739	➡	3077 G	4511 O	➡	8	11	➡	32	70	➡
Switzerland	7651	30743	➡	87	540	➡	574	746	➡	2452 E	3592	➡	8	10	➡	26	42	➡
United Kingdom	7419	40816	➡	108	366	➡	441	588	➡	2311	2666 N	➡	7	10	➡	30	60	➡
United States of America	14497	50057	➡	217	625	➡	545	667	➡	3808 G	4099 M	➡	7	8	=	75	73	⬅
Countries above average																		
Aruba		26667					282	350	➡							26 N	29	➡
Bahamas	1358	5462	➡				274	400	➡							19	25 M	➡
Bahrain	1602	21536	➡	50 K	142	➡	192	247	➡							18	25 N	➡
Barbados	756	5593	➡	57 K	92	➡	281	476	➡							27	38	➡
Belarus	49	4234	➡				153	279	➡	3297 H	1893 M	⬅				48	56	➡
Costa Rica	1641	9915	➡	69 M	170	➡	101	230	➡	530 D	533 L	=				27	16	⬅
Cyprus	4329	19720	➡	9	247	➡	419	631	➡	195 G	358 O	➡				13	20 O	➡
Czech Republic	2909	13693	➡	12	146	➡	158	375	➡	1947 H	1349	⬅	6	10	➡	16	30	➡
Estonia	5688	31500	➡	68 L	175	➡	204	352	➡	2079 L	2128 O	=				26	58	➡
Greece	1879	13219	➡	17	81	➡	389	529	➡	608 G	1400 O	➡	2	6	➡	36	50 M	➡
Grenada	1215	5179	➡	108 N	130	➡	177	328	➡									
Hungary	1972	14528	➡	10	100	➡	96	374	➡	1693	1445	⬅	4	9	➡	14	40	➡
Ireland	4072	23313	➡	86	391	➡	281	485	➡	1317	2184 O	➡	6	6	=	29	48	➡
Italy	2263	28301	➡	36	195	➡	388	471	➡	1373	1128 O	⬅	4	6	➡	32	50	➡
Latvia	2054	7206	➡	3 J	153	➡	234	308	➡	1546 I	1078 O	⬅				25	63	➡
Lithuania	993	7180	➡	5 J	71	➡	212	313	➡		2027 L					34	52	➡
Luxembourg	7191	24943	➡	371 L	517	➡	478	780	➡							6	9	➡
Macao (China)	2338	22955	➡	137 O	179	➡	255	394	➡		41					25	52	➡
Malta	3916	25063	➡	14	230	➡	360	530	➡	96 D						13	21 O	➡
Poland	2069	9834	➡	8	85	➡	86	295	➡	1231 J	1429	➡	2	6	➡	22	56	➡
Portugal	2713	24940	➡	27	117	➡	243	427	➡	958 H	1576 O	➡	3	7	➡	23	50	➡

➡ **Significant progress**
➡ **Slight progress**
= **Stagnant**
⬅ **Slight regression**
⬅ **Significant regression**

Note: 1985 data; B: 1986 data; C: 1987 data; D: 1988 data; E: 1989 data; F: 1990 data; G: 1991 data; H: 1992 data; I: 1993 data; J: 1994 data; K: 1995 data; L: 1996 data; M: 1997 data; N: 1998 data; O: 1999 data; P: 2000 data.

	INTERNET USERS (per 100,000 people)			PERSONAL COMPUTERS (per 1,000 people)			TELEPHONE MAINLINES (per 1,000 people)			SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS IN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (per million people)			INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY EXPENDITURE (% of GDP)			TERTIARY EDUCATION ENROLMENT RATIO (GROSS)		
	1997	2001	Progress or regression	1990	2001	Progress or regression	1990	2001	Progress or regression	1990	2000	Progress or regression	1992 (%)	2001 (%)	Progress or regression	1990 (%)	2000 (%)	Progress or regression
Puerto Rico	1337	15625					279	336								45	41 M	
Qatar	3114	6694		47 J	164		190	275		591 B						27	25	
Russian Federation	475	2971		3	50		140	243		4192 J	3481		2	3	=	52	64	
Seychelles	1306	10920		120 N	147		124	261										
Slovakia	3531	12473		28 J	148		135	288		2013 H	1844		4	8		19	30	
Slovenia	7512	30120		32 G	276		211	401		2899 H	2181		3	5		24	61	
Spain	2732	17968		28	168		316	431		966	1921		4	5	=	37	59	
St. Kitts and Nevis	2307	4667 N		128 N	175		237	569 P										
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	865	3043 P		89 N	116		124	220 P										
United Arab Emirates	3410	32793		29 H	135		206	340								9	12 N	
Countries below average																		
Argentina	280	8803		7	91		93	224		350 D	713		2	4	=	39	48 O	
Azerbaijan	25	308	=				86	111		3271 I	2799 M					24	22 O	
Belize	1337	7284		28 K	135		92	144								1	1 M	=
Brazil	794	4641		3	63		65	218		168 K	323		4	8		11	17	
Brunei Darussalam	4828	10174		11 H	75		136	264								4	14	
Bulgaria	1207	7646		11 H	44 P		242	359		6033	1316 O		2	4	=	31	41	
Cape Verde	245	2688		57 P	69		24	143										
Chile	1072	20142		11	106		66	233		323	370	=	5	8		21	38	
Colombia	520	2682		9 H	42		69	171		83 L	101	=	4	12		13	23	
Croatia	1814	5708 P		15 G	86		172	365		1946	1187 O					24	29 M	
Dominica		8333 P		65 O	75		164	291										
Dominican Republic	151	2187					48	110								20	23 M	
French Polynesia	216	6740		322 P	280		194	223								1	3 M	
Georgia	56	479	=				99	159		3186 L	2421 O					37	35	
Guyana	134	12398		24 N	26	=	20	92								6	12 M	
Jamaica	795	3861		3 J	50		45	197		8 B						7	16	
Jordan	596	4214		6 J	33		58	127			1948 N					16	29 O	
Kazakhstan	62	664 P					80	113 P		888 L	716 M					40	31	
Kuwait	2187	9783		7	132		247	240	=	261 I	212	=				12 G	21 N	
Kyrgyzstan		3039					72	78	=	853 I	581 M					14	41	
Lebanon	1364	6932 P		14 J	56		118	195 P								29	42	
Libya		370					48	109			361					15	49	
Macedonia, FYR	503	3440					148	263		1333 K	387 O					17	24	
Malaysia	2800	27308		8	126		89	196		85 H	160 N	=	5	7		7	28	
Mauritius	478	13167		4	109		52	257		184 E						4	11	
Micronesia, Fed. Sts.	572	4159					25	84									15 N	
Netherlands Antilles		939 O					247	372								14 N	22	
New Caledonia	990	11507					169	231		503 A						6	5 M	=
Oman	419	4843		2	32		60	90			4					4	8	
Panama	539	3153 P		27 N	38		93	148		117 L	124 O	=				21	35 O	
Peru	405	11386		15 K	48		26	78		231 L	229 M	=				30	29 N	=
Romania	443	4463		2	36		102	184		1221 G	913		1	2	=	10	27	
South Africa	1890	7095		7	69		93	112	=	337 G			5	9		13	15	
St. Lucia	1052	1952 O		0 I	147		127	313 P									25 N	
Trinidad and Tobago	1178	9163		4 G	69		141	240			145 M					7	6	=
Turkey	460	3648		5	41		121	285		220	306 O	=	3	4	=	13	15 O	
Ukraine	196	1222		2	18	=	136	212		3169 K	2118					47	43 N	
Uruguay	3367	11901		22 K	110		134	283			219 O					30	36	
Uzbekistan	11	598	=				69	66	=	1754 H						30	37 M	
Venezuela	394	5134		10	53		76	109		208 H	194	=	4	4	=	29	28	=
Countries in worse situation																		
Albania	48	316	=	1 L	8	=	12	50								7	15	
Algeria	3	195	=	1	7	=	32	61								11	15 N	
Angola	7	444	=	1 M	1	=	8	6	=							1	1 O	=
Armenia	109	1607 P		2 M	8	=	157	140	=	1547 M	1313					20	20	=
Bangladesh	1	187	=	0 M	2	=	2	4	=	50 I	51 K	=				4	7	

Significant progress
Slight progress
Stagnant
Slight regression
Significant regression

Note: 1985 data; B: 1986 data; C: 1987 data; D: 1988 data; E: 1989 data; F: 1990 data; G: 1991 data; H: 1992 data; I: 1993 data; J: 1994 data; K: 1995 data; L: 1996 data; M: 1997 data; N: 1998 data; O: 1999 data; P: 2000 data.

	INTERNET USERS (per 100,000 people)			PERSONAL COMPUTERS (per 1,000 people)			TELEPHONE MAINLINES (per 1,000 people)			SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS IN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (per million people)			INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY EXPENDITURE (% of GDP)			TERTIARY EDUCATION ENROLMENT RATIO (GROSS)		
	1997	2001	Progress or regression	1990	2001	Progress or regression	1990	2001	Progress or regression	1990	2000	Progress or regression	1992 (%)	2001 (%)	Progress or regression	1990 (%)	2000 (%)	Progress or regression
Benin	26	388	=	1 K	2	=	3	9	=	174 E						3	4 O	=
Bhutan		362		4 N	6	=	4	25	=									
Bolivia	448	1762	→	2 G	21	=	28	62	→	250 G	98	=				21	36	→
Bosnia and Herzegovina	57	1108	→				140 H	111	←							15	16 M	=
Botswana	307	2950	→	7 J	39	→	21	91 P	→							3	5	=
Burkina Faso	18	164	=	0	1	=	2	5	=	15 L	16 M	=				1	1 M	=
Burundi	8	86	=				2	3	=	21 E						1	1	=
Cambodia	6	82	=	0 K	1	=	0	2	=							1	3	→
Cameroon	7	296	=	1 K	4	=	3	7	=							3	5	=
Central African Republic	6	53	=	1 N	2	=	2	2	=	55	47 L	=				2	2 O	=
Chad	1	51	=	1 N	2	=	1	1	=							1	1 O	=
China	32	2650	→	0	19	=	6	137	⟹	353 J	545	→	2	6	⟹	3	7 O	→
Comoros		437		0	6	=	8	12	=							0	1 O	=
Congo, Dem. Rep.	0	11	=				1	0	=							2	1 N	=
Congo, Rep.	3	32	=	3 N	4	=	7	7	=	54 L	33	=				5	5	=
Côte d'Ivoire	20	427	=	1 L	7	=	6	18	=							3	7 N	→
Cuba	68	1069	→	5 M	20	→	31	51	=	1531 G	480	←				21	24	→
Djibouti	91	512	=	2	11	=	11	15	=							0 G	1	=
Ecuador	110	2545	→	2 G	23	→	48	104	→	102	83 N	=				20	18 M	←
Egypt	94	921	→	3 J	15	=	30	104	→	469			2	3	=	16	39 N	⟹
El Salvador	170	797 P	→	16 O	22	→	24	93	→	19 H	47	=				16	18	=
Equatorial Guinea	47	192	=	2 N	5	=	4	15	=								3 O	
Eritrea	9	357	=	2 O	2	=	4 H	8	=							1 J	2	=
Ethiopia	5	38	=	1 N	1	=	3	4	=							1	2	=
Fiji	222	1836	→	50 O	61	→	57	112	→	50 B						8	14 M	→
Gabon	47	1348	→	1 I	12	=	22	30	=								8 N	
Gambia	50	1343	→	0 J	13	=	7	26	=							2 J	2 M	=
Ghana	27	206	=	0	3	=	3	12	=							1	3	→
Guatemala	95	1712	→	1 I	13	=	21	65	→	103 D						8	8 M	=
Guinea	4	198	=	1 K	4	=	2	3	=							1	1 M	=
Guinea-Bissau	16	326	=				6	10	=							1	0 O	=
Haiti		369					7	10	=							1	1 M	=
Honduras	168	623 P	=	3 M	12	→	17	47	→							9	15	→
India	72	678	=	0	6	=	6	38	→	151	157 L	=	2	4	→	6	10 O	→
Indonesia	189	1914	→	1	11	=	6	35	→	130 A			2	2	=	9	15	→
Iran, Islamic Rep.	47	1557	→	14 J	70	→	40	169	⟹	590 J						10	10	=
Kenya	35	1627	→	0	6	=	8	10	=							2	3	=
Kiribati		2155		7 N	23	→	17	42	→									
Lao PDR		185		1 L	3	=	2	10	=							1	3	→
Lesotho	6	243	=				7	10 P	=							1	3	=
Liberia	4	31	=				4	2	=							3	3 M	=
Madagascar	14	219	=	1 M	2	=	2	4	=	12 J						3	2	=
Malawi	5	190	=	1 N	1	=	3	5	=							1	0 N	=
Maldives	301	3567	→	12 K	22	=	29	99	→									
Mali	9	270	=	0 K	1	=	1	4	=							1	2 N	=
Marshall Islands		1714		0	50	→	11	60	→									
Mauritania	4	255	=	6 L	10	=	3	7 P	=							3	4	=
Mexico	632	3657	→	8	69	→	65	137	→	160 I	225 O	=	3	3	=	15	21	→
Moldova	28	1405	→	2 K	16	→	106	154	→	496 J	334 M	←				36	28	←
Mongolia	107	1652	→	3 K	15	=	32	52	=	979 K	531	←				14	33	⟹
Morocco	22	1371	→	2 I	14	=	16	41	→							11	10	=
Mozambique	12	83	=	1 L	3	=	3	4	=							0	1	=
Myanmar		21		1 O	1	=	2	6	=							4	12	→
Namibia	57	2511	→	13 L	36	→	39	66	→							3 G	6 O	→
Nepal	23	254	=	1 I	4	=	3	13	=							5	5	=
Nicaragua	214	986 P	→	7 N	10	=	13	31 P	=	203 C	73 M	=				8	12 M	→
Niger	2	107	=	0 M	1	=	1	2	=							1	1	=
Nigeria	19	89	=	4 I	7	=	3	5	=	15 C						4	4 M	=
Pakistan	29	353	=	1	4	=	8	23	=	61	69 M	=				3	4 M	=

⟹ **Significant progress**
→ **Slight progress**
= **Stagnant**
← **Slight regression**
⟸ **Significant regression**

Note: 1985 data; B: 1986 data; C: 1987 data; D: 1988 data; E: 1989 data; F: 1990 data; G: 1991 data; H: 1992 data; I: 1993 data; J: 1994 data; K: 1995 data; L: 1996 data; M: 1997 data; N: 1998 data; O: 1999 data; P: 2000 data.

	INTERNET USERS (per 100,000 people)			PERSONAL COMPUTERS (per 1,000 people)			TELEPHONE MAINLINES (per 1,000 people)			SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS IN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (per million people)			INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY EXPENDITURE (% of GDP)			TERTIARY EDUCATION ENROLMENT RATIO (GROSS)		
	1997	2001	Progress or regression	1990	2001	Progress or regression	1990	2001	Progress or regression	1990	2000	Progress or regression	1992 (%)	2001 (%)	Progress or regression	1990 (%)	2000 (%)	Progress or regression
Papua New Guinea		952		55 P	57	→	8	12	=							3	2 N	=
Paraguay	98	1113	→	10 N	14	=	27	51	→							8	10 M	→
Philippines	140	2554	→	3	22	=	10	42	→	156 H			2	4	→	28	31	→
Rwanda	2	252	=				2	3	=	30 A						1	2	=
Samoa	178	1724	→	1 K	7	=	26	64	→							5	11	→
Saudi Arabia	50	1401	→	24	63	→	77	145	→							12	22 O	→
Senegal	29	1024	→	2	19	=	6	25	=	3 I	2 M	=				3	4 N	=
Sierra Leone	5	136	=				3	5	=							1	2	=
Solomon Islands	377	466	=	25 M	51	→	15	17	=									
Somalia		11					2	4 P	=							3	3 M	=
Sri Lanka	166	801	=	0	9	=	7	44	→	176 A	191 L	=				5	5 M	=
Sudan	2	177	=	0 J	4	=	3	14	=							3	7 N	→
Suriname	1084	3460	→		45		92	176	→								7 N	
Swaziland	92	1311	→				17	31	=							4	5	=
Syrian Arab Republic	33	362	=	6 J	16	=	41	103	→		29 M					18	15 M	←
Tajikistan		51					45	36	=	713 H						22	14	←
Tanzania	8	871	→	2 M	3	=	3	4	=							0	1	=
Thailand	635	5779	→	4	28	→	24	99	→	113 I	74 M	=	3	4	=	17	35	⟶
Togo	121	3223	→	4 K	21	→	3	10	=	82 E						3	4 O	=
Tonga	502	2780	→				46	109	→								4 O	
Tunisia	44	4135	→	3	24	=	38	109	→	110 I	336 O	→				9	22	→
Turkmenistan		147					60	80	=							22	19 M	←
Uganda	11	263	=	1 K	3	=	2	3	=	17 I	24	=				1	3	=
Vanuatu	550	2734	→				18	34	=								0 N	
Viet Nam	4	1269	→	0 H	12	=	1	38	→	274 K			2	7	⟶	2	10	→
Yemen	15	94	=	1 L	2	=	11	22	=							4	11 N	→
Zambia	9	243	=	7 N	7	=	9	8	=							2	2	=
Zimbabwe	33	780	=	0	12	=	12	19	=							5	4	=
Countries with insufficient data to summarise the area																		
Afghanistan							2	1	=							2	2 M	=
Andorra	3061	10448 P	→				414	438	→									
Antigua and Barbuda	3604	7353 P	→				253	481	⟶									
Cayman Islands							470	821 P	⟶									
Faeroe Islands	2273	6667 O	→	67 J			481	554 P	→									
Greenland	7935	33333	⟶	107 K			299	467	⟶									
Guam	2017	30581	⟶				293	509	⟶	167 G								
Iraq							39	29	=							13	14 O	=
Korea, Dem. Rep.							38	22	=									
Liechtenstein							572	608 P	→									
Mayotte							31	70	→									
Monaco																		
Northern Mariana Islands							287 H	396 P	⟶									
Palau																32 O	31	←
São Tomé and Principe		5956					19	36	=									
Virgin Islands (USA)	7034	11097 O		→			453	564 P	⟶									
West Bank and Gaza		1942																

HUMAN RIGHTS:
The right to information, research and professional training are enshrined in:
UDHR - Art. 19 & 27
CERD - Art. 5
CESCR - Art. 13 & 15
CEDAW - Art. 10 & 14
CRC - Art. 17 & 28

UDHR: Universal Declaration of Human Rights
CERD: International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
CESCR: International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
CEDAW: Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
CRC: Convention on the Rights of the Child

INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS:
Information, communication and research are considered in:
Millennium Development Goals - Goal 8
World Summit for Social Development - Commitment 6

Source: World Development Indicators 2003, World Bank.

→ **Significant progress**
→ **Slight progress**
= **Stagnant**
← **Slight regression**
⟵ **Significant regression**

Note: 1985 data; B: 1986 data; C: 1987 data; D: 1988 data; E: 1989 data; F: 1990 data; G: 1991 data; H: 1992 data; I: 1993 data; J: 1994 data; K: 1995 data; L: 1996 data; M: 1997 data; N: 1998 data; O: 1999 data; P: 2000 data.

GENDER EQUITY: The governments of the world agreed on…

Gender and education

"*Discrimination against women, denying or limiting as it does their equality of rights with men, is fundamentally unjust and constitutes an offence against human dignity.*"

Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Article 1. 1967.

"*We are convinced that .. women's empowerment and their full participation on the basis of equality in all spheres of society, including participation in the decision-making process and access to power, are fundamental for the achievement of equality, development and peace*"

Conference on Women - Beijing Platform for Action, Paragraph 13. 1995.

	LITERACY RATIO GAP (WOMEN/MEN)			NET PRIMARY ENROLMENT RATIO GAP (WOMEN/MEN)			NET SECONDARY ENROLMENT RATIO GAP (WOMEN/MEN)			GROSS TERTIARY ENROLMENT RATIO GAP (WOMEN/MEN)
	1990	2001	Progress or regression	1990/1991	2000/2001	Progress or regression	Initial data	2000	Progress or regression	2000/2001
Countries in better situation										
Albania	0.94	0.97	→	1.01	1.00	=	1.03 P	1.03	=	1.73
Algeria	0.79	0.90	⟹	0.88	0.97	⟹	0.80 G	1.05	⟹	
Argentina	1.00	1.00	=	1.00	0.99	=	1.07 P	1.06	=	1.67 T
Armenia	1.00	1.00	=		1.02			1.06		
Aruba					0.99		1.07 P	1.05	=	1.46
Australia				1.00	1.01	=	1.05 G	1.03	=	1.23
Austria				1.02	1.01	=	0.99 I	0.99	=	1.15
Azerbaijan					1.03			1.01 P		0.91 T
Bahamas	1.02	1.02	=		0.92		1.01 H	0.99 Q	=	
Bahrain	0.99	1.00	=	1.00	1.01	=	1.03 G	1.07	=	1.55 S
Barbados	1.00	1.00	=		1.01		1.05 P	0.97	=	2.50
Belarus	1.00	1.00	=		0.99		0.98 P	1.01	→	1.29
Belgium				1.02	1.00	=	1.03 G	0.98 M	=	1.15
Belize	1.01	1.01	=		1.04		1.11 G	1.07	=	
Botswana	1.10	1.09	=	1.08	1.04	=	1.19 G	1.14	=	0.80
Brazil	1.03	1.03	=		0.93		1.08 Q	1.08	=	1.36
Brunei Darussalam	1.01	1.01	=				1.12 H	1.11 L	=	2.00
Bulgaria	1.00	1.00	=	0.99	0.98	=	1.04 G	0.98	=	1.34
Canada				1.00	1.00	=	1.01 G	1.01 Q	=	1.33
Cape Verde	0.87	0.93	→		1.01		0.98 K	1.02 O	=	
Chile	1.00	1.00	=		0.99		1.07 H	0.76	⟸	0.92
Colombia	1.01	1.01	=	1.15	1.00	=	1.15 M	1.10	=	1.09
Costa Rica	1.01	1.01	=	1.01	1.00	=	1.07 G	1.11	=	1.20
Croatia	1.00	1.00	=	1.00			1.10 G	1.02 O	=	1.17
Cuba	1.00	1.00	=	1.00	0.99	=	1.14 G	1.05	=	1.13
Cyprus	1.00	1.00	=		1.01		1.01 G	1.02	=	1.32
Czech Republic				1.00	1.00	=	1.01 K	1.03 M	=	1.07
Denmark				1.00			1.03 G	1.03 Q	=	1.36
Dominican Republic	1.02	1.02	=		1.02		1.48 K	1.28	=	
Ecuador	0.99	0.99	=		1.01		1.51 O	1.04	=	
El Salvador	0.97	0.98	=				1.13 M	0.99 P	=	1.19
Estonia	1.00	1.00	=	0.99	0.98	=	1.07 I	1.03	=	1.56
Fiji	1.00	1.00	=		1.00					
Finland				1.00	1.00	=	1.02 G	1.02	=	
France				1.00	1.00	=	1.05 H	1.02	=	1.23
Georgia				1.00	1.00	=	0.96 L	1.02 P	=	0.97
Germany				1.03			1.00 I	1.01 Q	=	0.96 S
Greece	1.00	1.00	=	0.99	1.00	=	1.02 G	1.03	=	1.10
Guyana	1.00	1.00	=	1.00			1.07 G	1.06 M	=	

⟹ **Significant progress**
→ **Slight progress**
= **Stagnant**
⟸ **Slight regression**
Significant regression

Note: A: 1984 data; B: 1985 data; C: 1986 data; D: 1987 data; E: 1988 data; F: 1989 data; G: 1990 data; H: 1991 data; I: 1992 data; J: 1991/93 data; K: 1993 data; L: 1994 data; M: 1995 data; N: 1996 data; O: 1997 data; P: 1998 data; Q: 1999 data; R: 2000 data; S: 1998/1999 data; T: 1999/2000 data.

	LITERACY RATIO GAP (WOMEN/MEN)			NET PRIMARY ENROLMENT RATIO GAP (WOMEN/MEN)			NET SECONDARY ENROLMENT RATIO GAP (WOMEN/MEN)			GROSS TERTIARY ENROLMENT RATIO GAP (WOMEN/MEN)
	1990	2001	Progress or regression	1990/1991	2000/2001	Progress or regression	Initial data	2000	Progress or regression	2000/2001
Honduras	1.03	1.04	=		1.02					1.31
Hong Kong (China)	0.99	1.01	=					1.07 M		1.04
Hungary	1.00	1.00	=	1.01	0.99	=	1.04 G	1.01 Q	=	1.29
Iceland				0.99	1.00	=	1.04 K	1.05	=	1.72
Indonesia	0.97	0.99	→	0.96	0.99	→	0.88 G	0.96 Q	→	0.81
Iran, Islamic Rep.	0.88	0.95	→		0.98			0.92 N		1.00
Ireland				1.02			1.05 G	1.05 N	=	1.26
Israel	0.99	1.00	=	1.03	1.00	=	1.01 P	1.01	=	1.41
Italy	1.00	1.00	=	1.00	1.00	=	1.01 P	1.01	=	1.33
Jamaica	1.09	1.07	=	1.00	1.00	=	1.06 G	1.04	=	2.00
Japan				1.00	1.00	=	1.01 K	1.01 Q	=	0.86
Jordan	0.97	1.00	→	1.01			1.16 H	1.07 Q	=	1.15 T
Kazakhstan	1.00	1.00	=	0.99	0.99	=		0.98		1.21
Kenya	0.93	0.98	→	1.00	1.02	=	0.98 Q	0.97	=	1.00
Korea, Rep.	1.00	1.00	=	1.01	1.01	=	0.98 G	1.00	=	0.59
Kuwait	0.99	1.02	→	0.93			0.98 H	1.02 P	=	2.31 S
Kyrgyzstan				1.00	0.97	←				1.05
Latvia	1.00	1.00	=	0.99	1.00	=	1.02 M	1.08	=	1.65
Lebanon	0.93	0.96	→		1.00		1.15 Q	1.09 P	=	1.10
Lesotho	1.26	1.19	=	1.25	1.09	=	2.04 H	1.54	=	1.50
Libya	0.84	0.94	⟶	0.96						0.96
Lithuania	1.00	1.00	=		0.99		1.04 L	1.01	=	1.50
Luxembourg				1.09	1.01	=	1.08 M	1.08	=	1.25
Macao (China)	0.97	0.98	=	0.98	0.99	=	1.13 H	1.12	=	0.86
Macedonia, FYR				0.99	1.00	=	1.00 L	0.98 Q	=	1.33
Madagascar	0.86	0.92	→	1.00	1.01	=		1.03 P		1.00
Malaysia	0.99	1.00	=	1.00	1.00	=	1.11 P	1.11	=	1.07
Maldives	1.00	1.00	=		1.01		1.11 P	1.13 Q	=	
Malta	1.03	1.02	=	0.99			0.99 G	0.95 P	=	1.27
Mauritius	1.00	1.01	=	1.01	1.00	=	1.10 Q	1.04	=	1.30
Mexico	0.98	0.99	=		1.01		1.00 P	1.08	=	0.95
Moldova	1.00	1.00	=	0.99	1.00	=		1.03		1.29
Mongolia	1.00	1.01	=	1.02	1.04	=	1.37 L	1.21	=	1.75
Myanmar	0.96	0.99	→	0.96	0.99	→	0.98 P	0.95	=	1.88
Namibia	1.04	1.04	=	1.09	1.07	=	1.39 I	1.38	=	1.40 T
Netherlands				1.04	0.99	=	1.02 G	1.00	=	1.08
Netherlands Antilles	1.00	1.00	=		0.88		1.18 P	1.29	=	1.42
New Zealand				0.99	1.00	=	1.02 G	1.02	=	1.53
Nicaragua	1.01	1.02	=	1.04	1.01	=	1.76 B	1.18	=	
Norway				1.00	1.00	=	1.02 G	1.01	=	1.52
Oman	0.79	0.97	⟶	0.94	0.99	→	0.90 I	1.01	→	1.43
Palau					0.97			1.07 P		1.82
Panama	0.99	0.99	=	1.00	1.00	=	1.11 G	1.09	=	1.69 T
Paraguay	0.99	1.00	=	0.99	1.01	→	1.04 G	1.06	=	1.36
Peru	0.95	0.97	=	0.99			0.97 M	0.98 P	=	
Philippines	1.00	1.00	=	0.99	1.01	→	1.02 B	1.18	=	1.27 S
Poland	1.00	1.00	=	1.00	1.00	=	1.08 G	1.03	=	1.43
Portugal	1.00	1.00	=	1.00			1.17 I	1.08	=	1.35
Qatar	1.05	1.05	=	0.98	1.01	→	1.10 G	1.10 P	=	2.92
Romania	1.00	1.00	=	1.00	0.99	=	1.02 K	1.02	=	1.20
Russian Federation	1.00	1.00	=	1.00						1.29
Samoa	1.00	1.00	=	1.09	0.97	⟵	1.11 P	1.08	=	1.00
Slovakia					1.01			1.01		1.10

⟶ **Significant progress**
→ **Slight progress**
= **Stagnant**
← **Slight regression**
⟵ **Significant regression**

Note: A: 1984 data; B: 1985 data; C: 1986 data; D: 1987 data; E: 1988 data; F: 1989 data; G: 1990 data; H: 1991 data; I: 1992 data; J: 1991/93 data; K: 1993 data; L: 1994 data; M: 1995 data; N: 1996 data; O: 1997 data; P: 1998 data; Q: 1999 data; R: 2000 data; S: 1998/1999 data; T: 1999/2000 data.

	LITERACY RATIO GAP (WOMEN/MEN)			NET PRIMARY ENROLMENT RATIO GAP (WOMEN/MEN)			NET SECONDARY ENROLMENT RATIO GAP (WOMEN/MEN)			GROSS TERTIARY ENROLMENT RATIO GAP (WOMEN/MEN)
	1990	2001	Progress or regression	1990/1991	2000/2001	Progress or regression	Initial data	2000	Progress or regression	2000/2001
Slovenia	1.00	1.00	=	1.01	0.99	=		1.03 O		1.35
South Africa	1.00	1.00	=	1.02	0.98	←	1.15 H	1.12	=	1.21
Spain	1.00	1.00	=	1.00	1.01	=	1.03 P	1.03	=	1.16
Sri Lanka	0.98	1.00	=	0.96	1.00	→				
St. Lucia				0.97	1.01	→	1.30 P	1.28	=	0.89 S
Sudan	0.71	0.87	→	0.74						1.00 S
Suriname				1.03	0.96	←		1.13		
Swaziland	1.01	1.02	=	1.04	1.02	=	1.20 H	1.17 Q	=	0.83
Sweden				1.00	0.99	=	1.01 G	1.04 Q	=	1.52
Switzerland				1.02	0.99	=	0.94 G	0.95	=	0.79
Tanzania	0.87	0.95	→	1.02	1.04	=	0.94 Q	0.94	=	
Thailand	0.99	0.99	=	0.97	0.97	=				1.12
Tonga					0.98		1.11 P	1.07	=	1.33 T
Trinidad and Tobago	1.00	1.00	=	1.00	1.00	=	1.04 I	1.07	=	1.60
Tunisia	0.81	0.92	→	0.92	0.99	→	0.85 H	1.05	→	0.95
Ukraine	1.00	1.00	=	1.00	0.99	=				1.15 S
United Arab Emirates	1.08	1.08	=	1.04	1.02	=	1.13 G	1.13	=	
United Kingdom				1.02	1.00	=	1.05 G	1.02	=	1.26
United States of America				1.00	1.01	=	1.02 G	1.02	=	1.32
Uruguay	1.01	1.01	=	1.01	1.01	=		1.11		1.81
Uzbekistan	1.00	1.00	=		0.99					
Vanuatu				1.02	1.10	=	0.80 H	1.20 P	→	
Venezuela	1.01	1.01	=	1.03	1.02	=	1.50 G	1.20	=	1.46
Viet Nam	0.99	1.01	=	0.92	0.94	→				0.73
West Bank and Gaza					1.02					0.97
Countries above average										
Angola				0.96	0.91	←				1.00
Bangladesh	0.65	0.71	→	0.87	1.02	→	0.51 G	1.05	→	0.63
Bolivia	0.93	0.96	→	0.92	1.00	→	0.85 G	0.98	→	0.54 S
China	0.95	0.98	→	0.96						0.50 T
Comoros	0.78	0.79	=	0.73	0.87	→				1.00 T
Egypt	0.72	0.83	→	0.85	0.95	→	0.86 K	0.96	→	
Gabon					0.98					0.60 S
Guatemala	0.82	0.85	→		0.95		0.96 P	0.94	←	
Malawi	0.68	0.76	→	0.93	1.07	→	0.79 Q	0.85	→	
Papua New Guinea	0.84	0.90	→	0.94			0.78 P	0.77 Q	←	0.67 S
Saudi Arabia	0.86	0.96	→	0.82	0.92	→	0.82 G	0.95	→	1.25 T
Syrian Arab Republic	0.73	0.83	→	0.90	0.95	→	0.74 G	0.90	→	
Turkey	0.91	0.95	→				0.71 K	0.73 N	→	0.74
Zambia	0.88	0.95	→		0.99		0.72 L	0.87	→	0.67
Zimbabwe	0.95	0.97	→	1.00	1.00	=	0.91 Q	0.92	→	0.60
Countries below average										
Burundi	0.77	0.96	→	0.85	0.83	←	0.66 I			0.50
Cambodia	0.81	0.89	→		0.90		0.55 O	0.59	→	0.50
Congo, Dem. Rep.	0.72	0.86	→	0.78	0.95	→	0.57 H	0.58 P	→	
Congo, Rep.	0.95	0.99	→	0.92						0.11
Djibouti	0.78	0.90	→		0.77		0.64 B	0.68 N	→	1.00
Equatorial Guinea	0.92	0.97	→		0.89			0.36 P		0.50 T
Eritrea	0.68	0.76	→	0.98	0.86	←	0.89 K	0.74	←	
Gambia	0.68	0.76	→		0.93		0.53 H	0.70	→	
Ghana	0.86	0.95	→	0.87	0.95	→	0.80 P	0.86	→	0.40
India	0.74	0.82	→							0.62 T
Lao PDR	0.76	0.84	→	0.85	0.92	→	0.78 H	0.81	→	0.50

→ **Significant progress**
→ **Slight progress**
= **Stagnant**
← **Slight regression**
← **Significant regression**

Note: A: 1984 data; B: 1985 data; C: 1986 data; D: 1987 data; E: 1988 data; F: 1989 data; G: 1990 data; H: 1991 data; I: 1992 data; J: 1991/93 data; K: 1993 data; L: 1994 data; M: 1995 data; N: 1996 data; O: 1997 data; P: 1998 data; Q: 1999 data; R: 2000 data; S: 1998/1999 data; T: 1999/2000 data.

	LITERACY RATIO GAP (WOMEN/MEN)			NET PRIMARY ENROLMENT RATIO GAP (WOMEN/MEN)			NET SECONDARY ENROLMENT RATIO GAP (WOMEN/MEN)			GROSS TERTIARY ENROLMENT RATIO GAP (WOMEN/MEN)
	1990	2001	Progress or regression	1990/1991	2000/2001	Progress or regression	Initial data	2000	Progress or regression	2000/2001
Mauritania	0.65	0.72	➡	0.74	0.93	➡		0.78		0.17
Morocco	0.62	0.78	➡	0.70	0.91	➡		0.83 [Q]		0.82
Rwanda	0.86	0.96	➡	0.99			0.76 [G]			0.50
Senegal	0.60	0.71	➡	0.75	0.90	➡				
Sierra Leone							0.82 [Q]	0.83	➡	0.33
Tajikistan	1.00	1.00	⏸	0.98	0.92	⬅	0.89 [P]	0.84	⬅	0.33
Uganda	0.76	0.85	➡		0.94			0.72 [Q]		0.50
Countries in worse situation										
Benin	0.44	0.52	➡	0.49	0.69	➡	0.46 [P]	0.46 [Q]	⏸	0.17 [T]
Burkina Faso	0.39	0.52	➡	0.63	0.71	➡	0.53 [H]	0.65	➡	
Central African Republic	0.60	0.79	➡	0.66	0.70	➡				0.33 [T]
Chad	0.65	0.83	➡	0.45	0.67	➡	0.30 [O]	0.31 [Q]	➡	
Côte d'Ivoire	0.62	0.75	➡		0.75					0.40 [S]
Ethiopia	0.66	0.81	➡	0.75	0.77	➡	0.71 [P]	0.68	⬅	0.50
Guinea					0.79		0.40 [B]	0.38 [P]	⏸	
Iraq	0.44	0.50	➡	0.89			0.67 [I]	0.66 [Q]	⬅	0.53 [T]
Liberia	0.51	0.63	➡					0.67 [Q]		0.27 [S]
Mali	0.45	0.54	➡	0.59	0.71	➡	0.55 [G]			
Mozambique	0.48	0.63	➡		0.85		0.63 [I]	0.68	➡	
Nepal	0.41	0.57	➡	0.61	0.87	➡				0.29
Niger	0.37	0.44	➡	0.58	0.67	➡	0.43 [G]	0.67	➡	0.50
Pakistan	0.49	0.60	➡		0.74					
Togo	0.60	0.74	➡	0.71	0.82	➡	0.38 [G]	0.44 [P]	➡	0.17 [T]
Yemen	0.34	0.58	➡		0.58			0.40 [P]		0.29 [S]
Countries with insufficient data to summarise the area										
Afghanistan				0.55			0.37 [K]			
Cameroon	0.88	0.96	➡	0.87						
Cook Islands					0.96					
Guinea-Bissau	0.43	0.62	➡							
Haiti	0.96	1.01	➡	1.05						
Nauru					1.04					
New Caledonia							1.12 [G]			
Nigeria	0.82	0.95	➡							
Puerto Rico	1.02	1.01	⏸							
Serbia and Montenegro										1.26
Singapore	1.00	1.00	⏸	0.99						
Somalia							0.54 [B]			
Tuvalu					0.96					

HUMAN RIGHTS
The right to non discrimination on the base of sex is enshrined in:
UDHR - Art. 2 & 26
CESCR - Art. 3 & 7
CEDAW - Art. 7, 10 & 11
CRC - Art. 29

UDHR: Universal Declaration of Human Rights
CESCR: International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
CEDAW: Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
CRC: Convention on the Rights of the Child

INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS
Gender equity is considered in:
Millennium Development Goals – Goal 3
World Summit for Social Development
Fourth World Conference on Women - Beijing Platform for Action - Critical Areas of Concern

Sources: UNESCO Website Database 2003 (www.unesco.org) and World Development Indicators 2003, World Bank.

➡ **Significant progress**
➡ **Slight progress**
⏸ **Stagnant**
⬅ **Slight regression**
⬅ **Significant regression**

Note: A: 1984 data; B: 1985 data; C: 1986 data; D: 1987 data; E: 1988 data; F: 1989 data; G: 1990 data; H: 1991 data; I: 1992 data; J: 1991/93 data; K: 1993 data; L: 1994 data; M: 1995 data; N: 1996 data; O: 1997 data; P: 1998 data; Q: 1999 data; R: 2000 data; S: 1998/1999 data; T: 1999/2000 data.

GENDER EQUITY: The governments of the world agreed on…

Gender gap in economic activity and earned income

"Discrimination against women, denying or limiting as it does their equality of rights with men, is fundamentally unjust and constitutes an offence against human dignity."

Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Article 1. 1967

"We are convinced that … women's empowerment and their full participation on the basis of equality in all spheres of society, including participation in the decision-making process and access to power, are fundamental for the achievement of equality, development and peace"

Conference on Women - Beijing Platform for Action, Paragraph 13. 1995.

	WOMEN WAGE EMPLOYMENT IN NON-AGRICULTURAL SECTOR (AS % OF TOTAL NON-AGRICULTURAL EMPLOYEES)			ESTIMATED EARNED INCOME RATIO (WOMEN/MEN)
	1990 (%)	2001 (%)	Progress or regression	1991/2001
Countries in better situation				
Australia	44.6	48.1	➡	0.70
Bahamas	49.2	48.4	⏸	0.64
Barbados	45.5	46.6	⏸	0.61
Belarus	55.7	56.0	⏸	
Bermuda	48.7	49.3	⏸	
Bulgaria	53.6	50.2	⬅	
Cambodia	40.6	51.7	➡➡	0.77
Canada	46.9	48.8	⏸	0.63
Czech Republic	46.0	46.6	⏸	0.55
Denmark	47.1	48.9	⏸	0.71
Estonia	52.3	51.7	⏸	0.63
Finland	50.6	50.2	⏸	0.70
France	43.9	46.3	➡	
Hungary	47.2	46.1	⏸	0.58
Iceland	53.0	52.3	⏸	0.63
Israel	43.0	48.5	➡	0.53
Kazakhstan	59.9	49.8 [F]	⬅⬅	
Latvia	52.2	52.7	⏸	0.70
Lithuania	57.8	51.3	⬅	0.66
Macao (China)	42.7	49.0	➡	
Moldova	53.8	52.7	⏸	0.65
Mongolia	48.6	47.7 [F]	⏸	
Netherlands Antilles	43.1	48.0	➡	
New Zealand	47.3	50.9	➡	0.68
Norway	47.0	48.3	⏸	0.65
Poland	48.6	46.9 [H]	⏸	0.62
Portugal	42.3	46.3	➡	0.53
Russian Federation	49.9	49.7	⏸	0.64
Slovakia	48.2	51.9	➡	0.65
Slovenia	49.1	47.7	⏸	0.62
Sweden	50.5	50.7	⏸	0.68
Tajikistan	39.1	51.6	➡➡	
Thailand	45.3	46.8	⏸	0.61
Ukraine	52.1	53.0	⏸	0.53
United Kingdom	47.8	49.7	⏸	0.60
United States of America	47.4	48.4	⏸	0.62
Uruguay	41.9	46.5	➡	0.52
Countries above average				
Albania	39.6	41.1	⏸	
Andorra	44.2	45.5 [I]	⏸	

➡➡ **Significant progress**
➡ **Slight progress**
⏸ **Stagnant**
⬅ **Slight regression**
⬅⬅ **Significant regression**

Note: A: 1991 data; B: 1992 data; C: 1993 data; D: 1996 data; E: 1997 data; F: 1998 data; G: 1999 data; H: 2000 data.

	WOMEN WAGE EMPLOYMENT IN NON-AGRICULTURAL SECTOR (AS % OF TOTAL NON-AGRICULTURAL EMPLOYEES)			ESTIMATED EARNED INCOME RATIO (WOMEN/MEN)
	1990 (%)	2001 (%)	Progress or regression	1991/2001
Angola	34.6	42.7 [B]	➡	
Argentina	37.3	42.9	➡	
Armenia	61.3	45.5 [E]	⬅	
Azerbaijan	35.0	45.4	➡	
Botswana	46.5	44.8 [H]	⏸	0.60
Brazil	40.2	45.7	➡	
China	37.7	39.2	⏸	
Colombia	39.9	49.1	➡	0.47
Croatia	44.2	45.9	⏸	0.55
Ethiopia	44.1	39.9 [A]	⬅	
Georgia	43.5	48.6	➡	0.41
Germany	40.7	45.5	➡	0.57
Guatemala	36.8	39.2 [I]	➡	
Hong Kong (China)	41.2	45.5	➡	
Jamaica	49.6	45.8	⬅	
Kyrgyzstan	47.7	44.8	⬅	
Macedonia, FYR	38.3	41.9	➡	
Mauritius	36.7	39.0	➡	
Namibia	45.5	48.8 [H]	➡	0.51
Netherlands	37.7	44.3	➡	0.53
Philippines	40.4	42.2	⏸	0.59
Puerto Rico	46.5	39.0	⬅	
Romania	42.7	45.7	➡	0.58
San Marino	40.4	41.8	⏸	
Singapore	42.5	46.9	➡	0.50
South Africa	51.8	39.5 [C]	⬅	
Sri Lanka	39.1	46.6	➡	0.50
Switzerland	42.9	47.2 [I]	➡	0.50
Countries below average				
Austria	40.1	43.5	➡	0.50
Bangladesh	17.6	22.9 [H]	➡	0.56
Belgium	39.9	44.8	➡	0.44
Belize	37.4	41.0	➡	0.24
Bolivia	35.2	36.4	⏸	0.45
Cook Islands	38.4	38.2 [C]	⏸	
Costa Rica	37.2	40.1	➡	0.38
Cuba	37.1	37.9	⏸	
Cyprus	37.3	43.2	➡	0.47
Ecuador	37.3	41.4	➡	0.30
Eritrea	42.7	32.3 [D]	⬅	
Fiji	29.9	37.8	➡	
Greece	35.3	40.5	➡	0.45
Honduras	48.1	51.7	➡	0.37
Indonesia	29.2	29.7 [I]	⏸	
Ireland	41.7	46.5	➡	0.40
Italy	36.5	40.6	➡	0.45
Japan	38.0	40.4	➡	0.45
Kenya	21.4	37.8	➡	
Korea, Rep.	38.1	41.5	➡	0.46
Luxembourg	34.6	37.6	➡	
Malaysia	37.8	36.5	⏸	0.47
Maldives	21.2	36.7 [H]	➡	
Malta	28.7	30.8	⏸	

➡ **Significant progress**
➡ **Slight progress**
⏸ **Stagnant**
⬅ **Slight regression**
⬅ **Significant regression**

Note: A: 1991 data; B: 1992 data; C: 1993 data; D: 1996 data; E: 1997 data; F: 1998 data; G: 1999 data; H: 2000 data.

	WOMEN WAGE EMPLOYMENT IN NON-AGRICULTURAL SECTOR (AS % OF TOTAL NON-AGRICULTURAL EMPLOYEES)			ESTIMATED EARNED INCOME RATIO (WOMEN/MEN)
	1990 (%)	2001 (%)	Progress or regression	1991/2001
Morocco	36.8	26.6	←	
Oman	18.7	25.3	→	
Panama	44.3	41.7	←	0.42
Spain	32.6	39.3	→	0.44
Suriname	39.1	33.9	←	
Swaziland	35.1	29.6	←	
Trinidad and Tobago	35.6	39.9	→	0.45
Uzbekistan	47.3	37.9	←	
Venezuela	35.2	39.6	→	0.41
Countries in worse situation				
Algeria	8.0	12.2 [H]	→	
Bahrain	7.3	12.9	→	
Burkina Faso	12.5	12.5 [B]	=	
Chad	3.8	5.5 [A]	→	
Chile	36.2	36.6	=	0.38
Côte d'Ivoire	22.9	20.6 [F]	←	
Dominican Republic	35.5	34.3	=	0.36
Egypt	20.5	19.7	=	0.39
El Salvador	32.3	31.2	=	0.35
India	12.7	17.1	→	
Jordan	23.1	20.8	←	
Kuwait	30.3	23.2 [F]	←	
Malawi	10.5	12.2	=	
Mexico	35.3	37.2	=	0.38
Niger	11.0	8.6 [A]	←	
Pakistan	6.6	7.9	=	0.32
Paraguay	40.5	38.4	=	0.33
Peru	28.9	34.6	→	0.26
Qatar	17.2	14.5	←	
Saudi Arabia	17.9	14.2	←	
Sudan	22.2	20.1 [B]	←	
Syrian Arab Republic	14.2	17.4	→	
Turkey	16.7	18.9	=	0.46
United Arab Emirates	16.0	13.8 [H]	←	0.21
West Bank and Gaza	15.5	15.9	=	
Yemen	8.9	6.5 [G]	←	0.30
Zimbabwe	15.4	20.2	→	
Countries with insufficient data to summarise the area				
Afghanistan	4.7			
Benin	51.5			
Bhutan	11.9			
Bosnia and Herzegovina	43.4			
British Virgin Islands	48.3			
Brunei Darussalam	39.5			
Burundi	9.9			
Cameroon	24.3			
Cape Verde	50.0			
Cayman Islands	48.6			
Central African Republic	36.1			
Comoros	16.1			
Congo, Dem. Rep.	32.2			
Congo, Rep.	32.5			
Equatorial Guinea	13.3			
Gabon	43.2			

→ **Significant progress**
→ **Slight progress**
= **Stagnant**
← **Slight regression**
← **Significant regression**

Note: A: 1991 data; B: 1992 data; C: 1993 data; D: 1996 data; E: 1997 data; F: 1998 data; G: 1999 data; H: 2000 data.

	WOMEN WAGE EMPLOYMENT IN NON-AGRICULTURAL SECTOR (AS % OF TOTAL NON-AGRICULTURAL EMPLOYEES)			ESTIMATED EARNED INCOME RATIO (WOMEN/MEN)
	1990 (%)	2001 (%)	Progress or regression	1991/2001
Gambia	24.0			
Ghana	56.6			
Grenada	38.4			
Guadeloupe	55.0			
Guam	43.6			
Guinea	30.1			
Guinea-Bissau	10.5			
Guyana	44.8			
Haiti	39.5			
Iran, Islamic Rep.	18.0			
Iraq	12.7			
Korea, Dem. Rep.	49.6			
Lao PDR	42.1			
Lebanon	29.3			
Lesotho	40.4			
Liberia	28.3			
Libya	18.9			
Madagascar	26.0			
Mali	35.6			
Mauritania	43.3			
Mozambique	15.2			
Myanmar	35.2			
Nepal	11.7			
Nicaragua	49.0			
Nigeria	36.4			
Papua New Guinea	24.1			
Rwanda	16.7			
Senegal	28.1			
Serbia and Montenegro	46.4			
Sierra Leone	32.1			
Solomon Islands	33.3			
Somalia	27.6			
Tanzania	33.1			
Timor-Leste	27.9			
Togo	46.6			
Tunisia	19.7			
Uganda	43.2			
Viet Nam	52.9			
Zambia	36.1			

HUMAN RIGHTS
The right to non discrimination on the base of sex is enshrined in:
UDHR - Art. 2 & 26
CESCR - Art. 3 & 7
CEDAW - Art. 7, 10 & 11
CRC - Art. 29

UDHR: Universal Declaration of Human Rights
CESCR: International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
CEDAW: Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
CRC: Convention on the Rights of the Child

INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS
Gender equity is considered in:
Millennium Development Goals – Goal 3
World Summit for Social Development
Fourth World Conference on Women – Beijing Platform for Action - Critical Areas of Concern

Sources: The UN Statistics Division Website (unstats.un.org/unsd/) and Human Development Report 2003, UNDP.

Significant progress
Slight progress
Stagnant
Slight regression
Significant regression

Note: A: 1991 data; B: 1992 data; C: 1993 data; D: 1996 data; E: 1997 data; F: 1998 data; G: 1999 data; H: 2000 data.

GENDER EQUITY: The governments of the world agreed on…

Women's empowerment

"*Discrimination against women, denying or limiting as it does their equality of rights with men, is fundamentally unjust and constitutes an offence against human dignity.*"

Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Article 1. 1967.

"*We are convinced that .. women's empowerment and their full participation on the basis of equality in all spheres of society, including participation in the decision-making process and access to power, are fundamental for the achievement of equality, development and peace*"

Conference on Women - Beijing Platform for Action, Paragraph 13. 1995.

	FEMALE PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL WORKERS (AS % OF TOTAL)	FEMALE LEGISLATORS, SENIOR OFFICIALS AND MANAGERS	SEATS IN PARLIAMENT HELD BY WOMEN			WOMEN IN DECISION-MAKING POSITIONS IN GOVERNMENT AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL		
	Latest available data [F] (%)	Latest available data [F] (%)	1990 (%)	2003 (%)	Progress or regression	1994 (%)	1998 (%)	Progress or regression
Countries in better situation								
Andorra			4 [A]	14	→		18	
Bahamas	56	31	4	20	→	23	17	←
Dominica			10	19	→	9	20	→
Finland	57	28	32	37	→	39	29	←
Grenada			20 [A]	27	→	10	14	→
Luxembourg			13	17	→	9	17	→
Philippines	62	58	9	18	→	8	10	→
Poland	60	32	14	20	→	7	17	→
Seychelles			16	29	→	31	33	→
Slovakia	61	31	15 [A]	19	→	5	19	→
Sweden	49	30	38	45	→	30	43	→
Uganda			12	25	→	10	13	→
United States of America	54	46	7	14	→	14	26	→
Countries above average								
Angola			15	16	=	7	14	→
Argentina			6	31	→	0	8	→
Australia	45	25	6	25	→	13	14	→
Austria	48	29	12	34	→	16	20	→
Barbados	55	40	4	11	→	0	27	→
Bolivia	40	36	9	19	→	0	6	→
Botswana	52	35	5	17	→	6	14	→
Brazil	62		5	9	→	5	4	←
Canada	53	35	13	21	→	14		
Colombia	49	38	5	12	→	11	18	→
Costa Rica	28	53	11	35	→	10	15	→
Croatia	50	25	8 [A]	21	→	4	12	→
Cuba			34	36	=	0	5	→
Czech Republic	53	26	15	17	=	0	17	→
Denmark	51	21	31	38	→	29	41	→
Dominican Republic	49	31	8	17	→	4	10	→
Ecuador	44	25	5	16	→	6	20	→
Estonia	70	35	13 [A]	18	→	15	12	←
Gambia			8	13	→	0	29	→
Germany	50	27	26 [A]	32	→	16	8	←
Guinea-Bissau			20	8	←	4	18	→
Guyana			37	20	←	12	15	→
Honduras	51	36	10	6	←	11	11	=
Hungary	61	34	21	10	←	0	5	→
Iceland	55	31	21	30	→	15	8	←
Ireland	49	28	8	13	→	16	21	→
Latvia	68	38	9 [A]	21	→	0	7	→
Lithuania	69	47	18 [A]	11	←	0	6	→
Macedonia, FYR			3 [A]	18	→	8	9	→

→ **Significant progress**
→ **Slight progress**
= **Stagnant**
← **Slight regression**
← **Significant regression**

Note: A: 1997 data; B: 1998 data; C: 1999 data; D: 2000 data; E: 2001 data; F: latest available data taken from ILO Laborsta Database (March, 2003) as published by Human Development Report 2003, UNDP.

	FEMALE PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL WORKERS (AS % OF TOTAL)	FEMALE LEGISLATORS, SENIOR OFFICIALS AND MANAGERS	SEATS IN PARLIAMENT HELD BY WOMEN			WOMEN IN DECISION-MAKING POSITIONS IN GOVERNMENT AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL		
	Latest available data [F] (%)	Latest available data [F] (%)	1990 (%)	2003 (%)	Progress or regression	1994 (%)	1998 (%)	Progress or regression
Mali			2 [A]	10	→	10	21	→
Moldova	66	37	5 [A]	13	→	0	0	=
Namibia	55	30	7	26	→	10	8	←
Netherlands	48	26	21	37	→	31	28	←
New Zealand	53	38	14	29	→	8	8	=
Norway	48	26	36	36	=	35	20	←
Portugal	50	32	8	19	→	10	10	=
Romania	57	29	34	11	←	0	8	→
Russian Federation	64	37	10 [A]	8	←	0	8	→
Rwanda			17	49	→	9	5	←
Sierra Leone			6 [A]	15	→	0	10	→
Spain	45	32	15	28	→	14	18	→
St. Vincent and the Grenadines			10	23	→	0	10	→
Suriname	51	28	8	18	→	0	5	→
Switzerland	43	24	14	27	→	17	17	=
Tanzania			18 [A]	22	→	13	13	=
Trinidad and Tobago	51	40	17	19	=	19	14	←
Turkmenistan			26	26	=	3	4	→
Ukraine	63	37	4 [A]	5	=	0	5	→
United Kingdom	43	30	6	18	→	9	24	→
Uruguay	52	37	6	12	→	0	7	→
Countries below average								
Albania			29	6	←	0	11	→
Azerbaijan			12 [A]	11	=	5	10	→
Belgium	50	19	9	35	→	11	3	←
Belize	53	33	3 [A]	3	=	6	0	←
Benin			3	6	→	10	13	→
Bosnia and Herzegovina			29 [D]	17	←	0	6	→
Burkina Faso			4 [A]	12	→	7	10	→
Burundi			6 [C]	18	→	7	8	→
Cameroon			14	9	←	3	6	→
Cape Verde			12	11	=	13	13	=
Chile	50	24	8 [A]	13	→	13	13	=
Congo, Rep.			14	9	←	6	6	=
El Salvador	47	33	12	11	=	10	6	←
Eritrea			21 [A]	22	=	7	5	←
Ethiopia			2 [A]	8	→	10	5	←
Fiji			4 [A]	6	→	10	10	=
France			7	12	→	7	12	→
Georgia	60	23	7 [A]	7	=	0	4	→
Ghana			9 [B]	9	=	11	9	←
Greece	47	25	7	9	=	4	5	→
Guinea			7 [A]	19	→	9	8	←
Israel	54	27	7	15	→	4	0	←
Italy	44	19	13	12	=	12	13	→
Jamaica			5	12	→	5	12	→
Kazakhstan			13 [A]	10	←	6	5	←
Kyrgyzstan			1 [A]	10	→	0	4	→
Lao PDR			6	23	→	0	0	=
Lesotho			5 [A]	12	→	6	6	=
Liberia			6 [A]	8	→	5	8	→
Liechtenstein			4	12	→	17	14	←
Madagascar			7	4	←	0	19	→
Malawi			10	9	=	9	4	←
Malaysia	45	20	5	10	→	7	16	→
Mexico	40	25	12	23	→	5	5	=
Monaco			11	21	→	0	0	=

→ **Significant progress**
→ **Slight progress**
= **Stagnant**
← **Slight regression**
← **Significant regression**

Note: A: 1997 data; B: 1998 data; C: 1999 data; D: 2000 data; E: 2001 data; F: latest available data taken from ILO Laborsta Database (March, 2003) as published by Human Development Report 2003, UNDP.

	FEMALE PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL WORKERS (AS % OF TOTAL)	FEMALE LEGISLATORS, SENIOR OFFICIALS AND MANAGERS	SEATS IN PARLIAMENT HELD BY WOMEN			WOMEN IN DECISION-MAKING POSITIONS IN GOVERNMENT AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL		
	Latest available data [F] (%)	Latest available data [F] (%)	1990 (%)	2003 (%)	Progress or regression	1994 (%)	1998 (%)	Progress or regression
Mozambique			16	30	→	4	0	←
Nicaragua			15	21	→	10	5	←
Niger			5	1	←	5	10	→
Palau				0			20	
Panama	46	33	8	10	=	13	6	←
Paraguay	54	23	6	9	→	0	7	⟶
Peru	44	27	6	18	⟶	6	10	→
San Marino			12	17	→	17	0	←
Senegal			13	19	→	7	7	=
Singapore	43	24	5	16	→	0	0	=
Slovenia	54	31	8 [A]	12	→	5	0	←
Sri Lanka	49	4	5	4	=	3	13	⟶
St. Lucia			12 [B]	11	=	8	10	→
Syrian Arab Republic			9	12	→	7	8	→
Tajikistan			3 [A]	13	⟶	3	6	→
Thailand	55	27	3	9	→	0	4	→
Togo			5	7	=	5	9	→
Venezuela	58	24	10	10	=	11	3	←
Viet Nam			18	27	→	5	0	←
Zimbabwe			11	10	=	3	12	⟶
Countries in worse situation								
Algeria			2	6	→	4	0	←
Antigua and Barbuda			5 [A]	5	=	0	0	=
Armenia			36	5	←	3	0	←
Bahrain				0		0	0	=
Bangladesh	25	8	10	2	←	8	5	←
Belarus			5 [D]	10	⟶	3	3	=
Bhutan			2	9	→	22	0	←
Cambodia	33	14	6 [A]	7	=	0		
Central African Republic			4	7	→	5	4	←
Chad			17 [A]	6	←	5	0	←
Côte d'Ivoire			6	9	→	8	3	←
Cyprus	43	18	2	11	→	7	0	←
Djibouti				11		0	0	=
Egypt	29	10	4	2	=	4	6	→
Equatorial Guinea			13	5	←	4	4	=
Gabon			13	9	←	7	3	←
Guatemala			7	9	=	19	0	←
Haiti			4 [A]	4	=	13	0	←
Hong Kong (China)	38	25						
Indonesia			12	8	←	6	3	←
Iran, Islamic Rep.			2	4	=	0	0	=
Iraq			11	8	←	0	0	=
Japan	45	9	1	7	→	6	0	←
Jordan			1 [A]	6	→	3	2	←
Kenya			1	7	→	0	0	=
Korea, Rep.	34	5	2	6	→	4		
Kuwait				0		0	0	=
Lebanon			2 [A]	2	=	0	0	=
Maldives	40	15	6	6	=	5	6	→
Malta			3	8	→	0	0	=
Marshall Islands			3 [E]	3	=	8	0	←
Micronesia, Fed. Sts.				0		0	0	=
Mongolia			25	11	←	0	0	=
Morocco			1 [A]	11	⟶	0	0	=
Nepal			6	6	=	0	3	→

⟶ **Significant progress**
→ **Slight progress**
= **Stagnant**
← **Slight regression**
⟵ **Significant regression**

Note: A: 1997 data; B: 1998 data; C: 1999 data; D: 2000 data; E: 2001 data; F: latest available data taken from ILO Laborsta Database (March, 2003) as published by Human Development Report 2003, UNDP.

	FEMALE PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL WORKERS (AS % OF TOTAL)	FEMALE LEGISLATORS, SENIOR OFFICIALS AND MANAGERS	SEATS IN PARLIAMENT HELD BY WOMEN			WOMEN IN DECISION-MAKING POSITIONS IN GOVERNMENT AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL		
	Latest available data [F] (%)	Latest available data [F] (%)	1990 (%)	2003 (%)	Progress or regression	1994 (%)	1998 (%)	Progress or regression
Nigeria			3 [E]	5	→	3	6	→
Pakistan	26	9	10	22	→	4	7	→
Papua New Guinea			2 [B]	1	=	0	0	=
Samoa			4 [A]	6	→		7	
São Tomé and Principe			12	9	←	0	0	=
Solomon Islands			2 [A]	0	←	5	6	→
St. Kitts and Nevis			7	13	→		0	
Sudan			5 [A]	10	→	0	0	=
Swaziland			4	3	=	0	6	→
Tunisia			4	12	→	4	3	←
Turkey	31	8	1	4	→	5	5	=
United Arab Emirates	25	8		0		0	0	=
Uzbekistan			6 [A]	7	=	3	3	=
Vanuatu			4	2	=	7	0	←
West Bank and Gaza	32	11						
Yemen	15	4	4	1	←	0	0	=
Zambia			7	12	→	5	3	←
Countries with insufficient data to summarise the area								
Afghanistan			4			0	0	=
Brunei Darussalam						0	0	=
Bulgaria			21	26	→	0		
China			21	22	=	6		
Comoros						0	7	→
Congo, Dem. Rep.			5 [A]			6		
India			5	9	→	3		
Kiribati			5 [D]	5	=			
Korea, Dem. Rep.			21	20	=	0		
Libya						0	7	→
Mauritania			1 [A]			0	4	→
Mauritius			7	6	=	3		
Myanmar						0	0	=
Nauru			6	0	←			
Oman						0	0	=
Qatar						0	0	=
Saudi Arabia						0	0	=
Serbia and Montenegro							5	
Somalia			4			0	0	=
South Africa			3	30	→	6		
Timor-Leste				26				
Tuvalu			8	0	←			

HUMAN RIGHTS
The right to non discrimination on the base of sex is enshrined in:
UDHR - Art. 2 & 26
CESCR - Art. 3 & 7
CEDAW - Art. 7, 10 & 11
CRC - Art. 29

UDHR: Universal Declaration of Human Rights
CESCR: International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
CEDAW: Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
CRC: Convention on the Rights of the Child

INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS
Gender equity is considered in:
Millennium Development Goals – Goal 3
World Summit for Social Development
Fourth World Conference on Women – Beijing Platform for Action - Critical Areas of Concern

Sources: The UN Statistics Division Website (unstats.un.org/unsd/); The World's Women 2000: Trends and Statistics, UN Statistics Division and Human Development Report 2003, UNDP.

→ **Significant progress**
→ **Slight progress**
= **Stagnant**
← **Slight regression**
← **Significant regression**

Note: A: 1997 data; B: 1998 data; C: 1999 data; D: 2000 data; E: 2001 data; F: latest available data taken from ILO Laborsta Database (March, 2003) as published by Human Development Report 2003, UNDP.

PUBLIC EXPENDITURE: The governments of the world agreed on…

"*Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.*"

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 22. 1948.

"*We call on the industrialized countries… to implement the enhanced programme of debt relief for the heavily indebted poor countries without further delay and to agree to cancel all official bilateral debts of those countries in return for their making demonstrable commitments to poverty reduction.*"

Millennium Declaration, Paragraph 15. 2000.

	PUBLIC HEALTH EXPENDITURE (% OF GDP)			PUBLIC EDUCATION EXPENDITURE (% OF GDP)			TOTAL SOCIAL SECURITY EXPENDITURE (% OF GDP)			TOTAL DEBT SERVICE (% OF GNI)			MILITARY EXPENDITURE (% OF GDP)		
	1990 (%)	2000 (%)	Progress or regression	1990 (%)	2000 (%)	Progress or regression	1990 (%)	1996 (%)	Progress or regression	1990 (%)	2001 (%)	Progress or regression	1990 (%)	2001 (%)	Progress or regression
Countries in better situation															
Australia	5.3	6.0	▮▮	4.9	4.7	▮▮	14.5	15.7 N	▮▮				2.2	1.7	▮▮
Austria	5.2	5.6	▮▮	5.3	5.8	▮▮	24.2	26.2 N	→				1.0	0.8	▮▮
Barbados	5.0	4.2	▮▮	7.8	7.1	▮▮	8.6	10.0 N	→	8.3	2.6	→			
Belgium	6.6	6.2	▮▮	4.9	5.9 Q	▮▮	25.6	27.1 N	→				2.4	1.3	▮▮
Bhutan	1.7	3.7	▮▮	3.2 E	5.2	▮▮				1.8	1.2	▮▮			
Canada	6.8	6.6	▮▮	6.5	5.5 Q	▮▮	17.6	17.7 N	▮▮				2.0	1.2	▮▮
Denmark	7.0	6.8	▮▮	6.9 H	8.2	▮▮	28.7	33.0 N	→				2.0	1.6	▮▮
Finland	6.4	5.0	▮▮	5.5	6.1 Q	▮▮	25.2	32.3 N	→				1.6	1.2	▮▮
France	6.7	7.2	▮▮	5.3	5.8	▮▮	26.7	30.1 N	→				3.5	2.5	▮▮
Germany	5.9	8.0	→	4.7 K	4.6 Q	▮▮	25.5	29.7 N	→				2.8	1.5	▮▮
Iceland	6.8	7.5	▮▮	5.4	5.4 N	▮▮	15.7	18.6 N	→						
Italy	6.3	6.0	▮▮	3.1	4.5 Q	▮▮	23.1	23.7 N	▮▮					2.0	
Japan	4.6	6.0	▮▮	4.6 E	3.5	▮▮	11.3	14.1 N	→				0.9	1.0	▮▮
Luxembourg	5.7	5.3	▮▮	3.1	4.0 N	▮▮	23.4	25.2 N	→				0.9	0.8	▮▮
Malawi	1.5 H	3.6	→	3.2	4.6 P	▮▮				7.2	2.3	→	1.3	0.8	▮▮
Malta	5.9 M	6.0	▮▮	4.3	4.8 P	▮▮	13.3	20.6 N	→	1.9	3.8	▮▮	0.9	0.8	▮▮
Namibia	3.7	4.2	▮▮	6.7	8.1 P	▮▮		3.9 N					5.6 H	2.8	→
Netherlands	5.7	5.5	▮▮	5.7	4.9 P	▮▮	29.7	26.7 N	←				2.5	1.6	▮▮
New Zealand	5.8	6.2	▮▮	6.1	6.1	▮▮	22.2	19.2 N	←				1.9	1.2	▮▮
Norway	6.4	6.7	▮▮	7.1	6.8	▮▮	27.1	28.5 N	→				2.9	1.8	▮▮
Portugal	4.1	5.8	▮▮	4.1	5.8	▮▮	14.6	19.0 N	→				2.7	2.1	▮▮
Slovenia	5.2 H	6.8	▮▮	4.8 H	5.8 M	→							2.2 I	1.4	▮▮
Spain	5.2	5.4	▮▮	4.2	4.5 P	▮▮	19.6	22.0 N	→				1.8	1.2	▮▮
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	4.4	4.1	▮▮	5.5 F	9.3	→				2.3	4.2	▮▮			
Sweden	7.6	6.5	▮▮	7.2	8.0 P	▮▮	32.2	34.7 N	→				2.7	2.0	▮▮
Switzerland	5.7	6.0	▮▮	5.1	5.5 P	▮▮	20.1	25.9 N	→				1.8	1.1	▮▮
Tonga	3.7	3.5	▮▮	4.8 I	5.3	▮▮				1.6	1.6	▮▮			
United Kingdom	5.1	5.9	▮▮	4.8	4.7 P	▮▮	19.6	22.8 N	→				3.9	2.5	▮▮
Vanuatu	2.6	2.4	▮▮	4.6	7.3	→				1.5	0.9	▮▮			
Countries above average															
Belarus	2.5	4.7	→	4.8	6.0 Q	▮▮	15.1	17.4 N	→	0.1 K	1.9	←	1.5 I	1.4	▮▮
Bolivia	2.1	4.9	→	2.4	5.5	→	4.2	7.0 N	→	8.3	7.0	▮▮	2.4	1.6	▮▮
Botswana	1.7	3.8	→	6.2	8.6 Q	→	2.5	2.7 N	▮▮	2.9	1.1	▮▮	4.1	3.5	▮▮
Cape Verde	3.0 H	1.8	▮▮	3.6 H	4.4 P	▮▮	5.0			1.7	2.4	▮▮	1.8 E	0.8	▮▮
Comoros	2.9	3.2	▮▮		3.8 P					0.4	1.0	▮▮			
Costa Rica	6.7	4.4	←	4.4	4.4	▮▮	10.3	13.0 N	→	9.2	4.4	→			
Cyprus	3.9 M	4.3	▮▮	3.5	5.4 Q	→	8.1	10.3 N	→				5.0	3.1	▮▮
Czech Republic	4.8	6.6	▮▮	4.4 I	4.4	▮▮	16.0	18.8 N	→	5.5 I	8.7	←	2.3 K	2.1	▮▮
Djibouti				3.5	3.5 P	▮▮				2.3 M	1.8	▮▮	6.3	4.4 P	→

Significant progress
Slight progress
Stagnant
Slight regression
Significant regression

Note: A: 1984 data; B: 1985 data; C: 1986 data; D: 1987 data; E: 1988 data; F: 1989 data; G: 1990 data; H: 1991 data; I: 1992 data; J: 1991/93 data; K: 1993 data; L: 1994 data; M: 1995 data; N: 1996 data; O: 1997 data; P: 1998 data; Q: 1999 data; R: 2000 data.

	PUBLIC HEALTH EXPENDITURE (% OF GDP)			PUBLIC EDUCATION EXPENDITURE (% OF GDP)			TOTAL SOCIAL SECURITY EXPENDITURE (% OF GDP)			TOTAL DEBT SERVICE (% OF GNI)			MILITARY EXPENDITURE (% OF GDP)		
	1990 (%)	2000 (%)	Progress or regression	1990 (%)	2000 (%)	Progress or regression	1990 (%)	1996 (%)	Progress or regression	1990 (%)	2001 (%)	Progress or regression	1990 (%)	2001 (%)	Progress or regression
Dominica	3.9	4.3	→	5.3 F	5.1 Q	→	2.2	4.8 N	→	3.6	6.7	←			
Egypt	1.8	1.8	→	3.9	4.7 M	→	4.8	5.4 N	→	7.3	1.9	→	3.9	2.6	→
El Salvador	1.4	3.8	→	1.9	2.3 Q	→	1.9	3.6 N	→	4.4	2.9	→	2.7	0.8	→
Estonia	1.9	4.7	→	6.1 I	7.5 Q	→	13.1	17.1 N	→	0.1 I	7.3	←	0.5 I		
Fiji	2.0	2.5	→	4.6	5.2	→	6.1			7.9	1.5	→	2.3	2.2	→
Georgia	3.0	0.8	←	7.7 L							2.5		2.3 N	0.7	→
Guatemala	1.8	2.3	→	1.4	1.7	→	2.4			2.9	2.1	→	1.5	1.0	→
Guyana	2.9	4.2	→	3.4	4.1 Q	→	4.5	5.8 N	→	107.5	6.9		0.9	0.8 N	→
Honduras	3.3	4.3	→	4.0 F	4.0 P	→				13.7	5.4	→	1.6 E		
Hungary	5.9 H	5.2	→	5.8	5.0	→	18.4	22.3 N	→	13.4	27.2	←	2.8	1.8	→
Ireland	4.8	5.1	→	4.8	4.4 Q	→	19.2	17.8 N	←				1.2	0.7	→
Israel	3.8	8.3	→	6.3	7.3	→	14.2	24.1 N	→				12.2	7.7	→
Jamaica	2.6	2.6	→	4.5	6.3	→	4.0	4.5 N	→	15.9	8.8	→			
Kenya	2.4	1.8	→	6.7	6.4	→	2.6	2.0 N	→	9.8	4.1	→	2.9	1.8	→
Latvia	2.7	3.5	→	3.8	5.9	→		19.2 N		0.0 I	6.8	←	0.8 K	1.2	→
Lesotho	2.6	5.2	→	6.2	13.0 P	→				2.3	7.0	←	3.9	3.1 R	→
Lithuania	3.0	4.3	→	4.6	6.4 P	→		14.7 N		0.0 I	16.4	←	0.7 K	1.8	→
Madagascar	1.4 I	2.5	→	2.1	3.2	→	1.6	1.3 N	→	7.5	1.5	→	1.2	1.2 R	→
Maldives	3.6	6.3	→	3.8	3.9 P	→				4.5	4.0	→			
Panama	4.6	5.3	→	4.7	5.9	→	8.0 B	11.3 N	→	6.8	12.2	←	1.4	1.2 Q	→
Paraguay	0.7	3.0	→	1.2	5.0	→				6.0	5.0	→	1.2	0.9	→
Poland	4.8	4.2	→	51.0 H	5.0 Q	←	18.7	25.1 N	→	1.7	8.8	←	2.7	1.9	→
Samoa	2.8	3.9	→	3.2	4.2	→				3.3	2.9	→			
Saudi Arabia	4.2 M	4.2	→	6.5	9.5 P	→							12.8	11.3	→
Seychelles	3.6	4.2	→	7.8	6.0 P	←		11.6 N		6.1	2.4	→	4.0	1.8	→
Solomon Islands	5.0	5.6	→	3.8 H	3.6	→				5.6	2.7	→			
South Africa	3.1	3.7	→	5.9	5.5	→				2.2 L	4.0	←	3.8	1.6	→
St. Lucia	2.1	2.7	→	6.3 C	5.8	→				1.7	4.0	←			
Sudan	0.7	1.0	→	6.0	7.6 N	→				0.4	0.5	→	3.6	3.0 R	→
Swaziland	1.9	3.0	→	6.0	6.1 P	→				4.9	2.2	→	1.5	1.5	→
Tunisia	3.0	2.9 P	→	6.0	6.8	→	7.0	7.7 N	→	12.0	7.1	→	2.0	1.6	→
United States of America	4.7	5.8	→	5.1	4.8	→	14.1	16.5 N	→				5.3	3.1	→
Uzbekistan	4.6	2.6	→	9.5	7.7 N	←				0.1 K	7.5	←	1.5 L	1.1	→
Zambia	2.6	3.5	→	2.4	2.3 P	→	0.8 B	2.5 N	→	6.7	3.7	→	3.7	0.6 R	→
Zimbabwe	3.2	3.1	→	7.7	10.4 Q	→				5.5	1.5	→	4.5	3.2	→
Countries below average															
Albania	3.4	2.1	→	5.9	3.1 L	←		10.9 N		0.1	0.8	→	5.9	1.2	→
Algeria	3.0	3.0	→	5.3	4.8 N	→	7.6			14.7	8.3	→	1.5	3.5 R	→
Argentina	4.2	4.7	→	10.0	4.0	←	9.8	12.4 N	→	4.6	9.3	←	1.3	1.4	→
Armenia	4.7 I	3.2	→	7.0	2.9	←				0.1 K	2.5	←	2.2 I	3.1	→
Azerbaijan	2.7	0.7	→	7.6 K	4.2 Q	←	9.5	8.4 N	→		2.5		3.3 I	2.6	→
Bangladesh	0.7	1.4	→	1.5	2.5	→				2.5	1.4	→	1.0	1.3	→
Belize	2.2	2.1	→	4.7	6.2	→	3.1	3.5 N	→	5.1	13.4	←	1.2	1.5 O	→
Benin	1.6	1.6	→	3.1 M	3.2	→	1.3	2.2 N	→	2.1	2.1	→	1.8		
Brazil	3.0	3.4	→	1.7 L	4.7	→	10.8	12.2 N	→	1.8	11.3	←	1.9	1.5	→
Brunei Darussalam	1.6	2.5	→	3.9	4.8	→							6.7 H	6.1 R	→
Bulgaria	4.1	3.0	→	5.2	3.4 P	←	16.5	13.2 N	←	7.2	10.3	←	3.5	2.7	→
Burkina Faso	1.0	3.0	→	2.7	1.5 N	←				1.2	1.5	→	3.0	1.6	→
Cambodia	0.2 I	2.0	→	2.9 N	1.9	←				2.7	0.6	→	3.1	3.0	→
Cameroon	0.9	1.1	→	3.2	3.2	→	2.2			4.9	4.3	→	1.5	1.4	→
Central African Republic	0.9 H	1.4	→	2.2	1.9 P	→	1.9			2.0	1.4	→	1.6 H	1.2 N	→

→ **Significant progress**
→ **Slight progress**
→ **Stagnant**
← **Slight regression**
← **Significant regression**

Note: A: 1984 data; B: 1985 data; C: 1986 data; D: 1987 data; E: 1988 data; F: 1989 data; G: 1990 data; H: 1991 data; I: 1992 data; J: 1991/93 data; K: 1993 data; L: 1994 data; M: 1995 data; N: 1996 data; O: 1997 data; P: 1998 data; Q: 1999 data; R: 2000 data.

	PUBLIC HEALTH EXPENDITURE (% OF GDP)			PUBLIC EDUCATION EXPENDITURE (% OF GDP)			TOTAL SOCIAL SECURITY EXPENDITURE (% OF GDP)			TOTAL DEBT SERVICE (% OF GNI)			MILITARY EXPENDITURE (% OF GDP)		
	1990 (%)	2000 (%)	Progress or regression	1990 (%)	2000 (%)	Progress or regression	1990 (%)	1996 (%)	Progress or regression	1990 (%)	2001 (%)	Progress or regression	1990 (%)	2001 (%)	Progress or regression
Chad	2.5 K	2.5	=	1.6 H	2.0 Q	=				0.7	1.5	=	2.7 K	1.5	=
Chile	2.2	3.1	=	2.5	4.2	=	16.2	11.3 N	←	9.7	10.4	=	3.7	2.9	=
China	2.2	1.9	=	2.3	2.9	=	5.2	3.6 N	←	2.0	2.1	=	2.7	2.3	=
Colombia	1.2	5.4	→	2.4	3.5 N	=	4.8 B	6.1 N	=	10.2	7.9	→	2.2	3.8	=
Congo, Rep.	1.5	1.5	=	5.0	4.2 Q	=	2.2	4.2 N	→	22.9	4.8	⇒			
Côte d'Ivoire	1.5	1.0	=	6.8 I	4.6	←				13.7	6.3	→	1.5	0.9 Q	=
Croatia	9.5	8.0	=	7.2	4.2 Q	←		22.3 N		3.0 K	15.0	⇐	7.6 I	2.6	→
Equatorial Guinea	1.0	2.3	=	1.6 E	0.6	=				4.1	1.0	→	2.0 L	2.1 M	=
Eritrea	0.6 I	2.8	→	2.1 N	4.8 P	→					1.0		21.4 K	27.5 Q	←
Ethiopia	0.9	1.8	=	3.4	4.8	=	3.2	3.7 N	=	3.5	3.0	=	8.5	6.2	→
Gabon	2.0	2.1	=	2.8 I	3.9	=				3.3	12.1	⇐		0.3 P	
Gambia	2.2	3.4	=	3.8	2.7	=				12.9	2.8	⇒	1.1	1.0	=
Ghana	1.3	2.3	=	3.2	4.1 Q	=	2.2	3.1 N	=	6.4	6.2	=	0.4	0.6	=
Greece	4.7	4.6	=	2.4	3.8	=	19.8	22.7 N	→				4.7	4.6	=
Grenada	3.4	3.4	=	5.1	4.2 Q	=	6.9			1.6	4.4	←			
Guinea	2.0	1.9	=	1.6 F	1.9	=				6.3	3.6	→	2.4 H	1.7	=
Haiti	1.2	2.4	=	1.5	1.1	=				1.3	0.7	=			
India	0.9	0.9	=	3.7	4.1 Q	=	1.7	2.6 N	=	2.6	2.0	=	2.7	2.5	=
Iran, Islamic Rep.	1.5	2.6	=	4.1	4.4	=	4.7	6.1 N	→	0.5	1.1	=	2.7	4.8	=
Jordan	3.6	4.2	=	8.1	6.1 P	←	6.8	8.9 N	→	16.5	7.6	⇒	9.9	8.6	=
Kazakhstan	3.2	2.7	=	3.2	4.4 Q	=		13.6 N			15.7		1.0 K	1.0	=
Korea, Rep.	1.8	2.7	=	3.4	3.8	=	4.1	5.6 N	→	3.3	6.2	←	3.7	2.8	=
Kuwait	4.0	2.6	=	4.8	6.1 Q	=	9.4	9.6 N	=				48.5	11.3	→
Kyrgyzstan	4.7	2.2	←	8.4	5.4 P	←					12.1		0.7 I	1.7	=
Lao PDR		1.3		1.2 E	2.3	=				1.1	2.6	=	2.9 N	2.1	=
Liberia	2.0 M	3.1	→							2.8 E	0.2	=	7.4	31.2 L	←
Macedonia, FYR	9.2	5.1	←	5.1 I	4.1 Q	=				0.6 K	5.7	←	3.0 N	7.0	←
Malaysia	1.5	1.5	=	5.1	6.2	=	2.7	2.9 N	=	10.3	7.8	→	2.6	2.2	=
Mali	1.6	2.2	=	3.2 D	2.8 Q	=	3.1			2.8	3.2	=	2.1	2.0	=
Mauritania	1.1 H	3.4	→	4.7 H	3.0 Q	←	1.0	0.8 N	=	13.6	9.1	→	3.8	2.1 Q	=
Mauritius	2.1 H	1.9	=	3.8	4.2 P	=	4.8	6.0 N	→	6.6	4.5	=	0.3	0.2	=
Mexico	1.8	2.5	=	3.6	4.2 P	=	2.8	3.7 N	=	4.5	8.0	←	0.4	0.5	=
Moldova	4.4	2.9	=	5.6	4.0	=		15.5 N		0.2 I	12.0	⇐	0.5 K	0.4	=
Mongolia	6.5	4.6	=	12.3	2.3	⇐		8.8 N		5.0 K	4.4	=	5.7	2.3	→
Morocco	0.9	1.3	=	5.3	5.5	=	2.4	3.4 N	=	7.2	7.9	=	4.1	4.1	=
Mozambique	3.6	2.7	=	3.1	2.5 P	=		4.7 N		3.4	2.6	=	10.1	2.3	→
Nepal	0.8	0.9	=	2.0	3.7	=				1.9	1.5	=	0.9	1.1	=
Nicaragua	7.0	2.3	←	3.4	5.0 P	→	7.8	9.1 N	→	1.6	14.0 P	⇐	2.1	1.1	=
Niger	1.5 H	1.8	=	3.2	2.7	=	1.9			4.1	1.3	→	1.2 L	1.1 R	=
Oman	2.0	2.3	=	3.2	3.9 P	=				7.8	4.9 R	→	18.3	12.2	→
Papua New Guinea	3.1	3.6	=		2.3					17.9	9.5	⇒	2.1	0.8 R	=
Peru	1.3	2.8	=	2.8	3.2 P	=				1.9	4.1	←	2.4	1.7	=
Philippines	1.5	1.6	=	2.9	4.2 P	=	1.7			8.1	10.3	=	1.4	1.0	=
Romania	2.8	1.9	=	2.8	3.5 P	=		12.4 N		0.0	6.8	←	4.6	2.5	=
Russian Federation	2.5	3.8	=	3.0	3.5 P	=		10.4 N		2.0	5.8	←	12.3	3.8	→
Rwanda	1.7	2.7	=	3.8 F	2.8	=				0.8	1.1	=	3.7	3.9	=
Senegal	0.7	2.6	=	3.9	3.2	=	4.3			5.9	4.7	=	2.0	1.5	=
Slovakia	5.0	5.3	=	5.1	4.2	=	15.9	20.9 N	→	2.1	13.0	⇐	2.1 K	1.9	=
St. Kitts and Nevis	2.7	3.1	=	2.6	3.3 P	=				1.9	6.7	←			
Syrian Arab Republic	0.4	1.6	=	4.0	4.1	=				9.9	1.4	⇒	6.9	6.2	=
Tanzania	1.6	2.8	=	2.8	2.1 P	=				4.4	1.6		2.0 H	1.3 Q	=

⇒ **Significant progress**
→ **Slight progress**
= **Stagnant**
← **Slight regression**
⇐ **Significant regression**

Note: A: 1984 data; B: 1985 data; C: 1986 data; D: 1987 data; E: 1988 data; F: 1989 data; G: 1990 data; H: 1991 data; I: 1992 data; J: 1991/93 data; K: 1993 data; L: 1994 data; M: 1995 data; N: 1996 data; O: 1997 data; P: 1998 data; Q: 1999 data; R: 2000 data.

	PUBLIC HEALTH EXPENDITURE (% OF GDP)			PUBLIC EDUCATION EXPENDITURE (% OF GDP)			TOTAL SOCIAL SECURITY EXPENDITURE (% OF GDP)			TOTAL DEBT SERVICE (% OF GNI)			MILITARY EXPENDITURE (% OF GDP)		
	1990 (%)	2000 (%)	Progress or regression	1990 (%)	2000 (%)	Progress or regression	1990 (%)	1996 (%)	Progress or regression	1990 (%)	2001 (%)	Progress or regression	1990 (%)	2001 (%)	Progress or regression
Thailand	1.0	2.1	=	3.6	5.4	=	1.5	1.9 N	=	6.3	18.0	←	2.3	1.4	=
Togo	1.4	1.5	=	5.5	4.8	=	1.2 B	2.8 N	=	5.4	2.6	→	3.2	2.9 M	=
Trinidad and Tobago	2.5	2.6	=	3.7	4.0	=		6.6 N		9.7	2.8	→			
Turkey	2.2	3.6	=	2.2	3.5	=	5.9	7.1 N	=	4.9	15.3	←	3.5	4.9	=
Turkmenistan	4.0	4.6	=	4.3						0.2 K	10.7 P	←	1.8 L	3.8 R	←
Uganda	2.3 K	1.5	=	1.5	2.3 O	=				3.4	0.9	→	3.0	2.1	=
Ukraine	3.0	2.9	=	5.2	4.4 P	=		19.8 N		0.0 I	6.1	←	0.5 K	2.7	←
United Arab Emirates	0.8	2.5	=	1.8	1.9 P	=							4.7	2.5	=
Uruguay	2.0	5.1	→	2.7	2.5 P	=	14.2	22.4 N	→	11.0	8.1	→	2.1	1.3	=
Venezuela	2.5	2.7	=	3.0	5.0 L	→				10.6	6.1	→	1.8 H	1.5	=
Viet Nam	0.9	1.3	=	2.0	2.8 O	=				2.9	3.7	=	7.9	2.6 L	→
Yemen	1.1	2.1 P	=	5.7 K	10.0	→				3.5	3.4	=	8.5	6.1	→
Countries in worse situation															
Angola	1.4	2.0	=	3.0	2.7	=				4.0	23.7	←	5.8	3.1	→
Bahrain	3.2 M	2.8	=	4.1	3.0	=	3.4	4.2 N	=				5.1	4.1	=
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2.1 M	3.1	=								6.0			9.5 R	
Burundi	1.1	1.7	=	3.4	3.4	=	1.8	2.2 N	=	3.8	3.4	=	3.4	8.1	←
Dominican Republic	1.6	1.8	=	1.3 I	2.5 P	=	2.1	2.5 N	=	3.4	3.1	=			
Ecuador	1.5	1.2	=	2.0	1.6	=	2.1	2.0 N	=	11.4	9.6	=	1.9	2.1 Q	=
Guinea-Bissau	1.1	2.6	=	1.7 D	2.1 Q	=				3.6	12.7	←	0.2 F	3.1	←
Indonesia	0.6	0.6	=	1.0	1.3 N	=		1.7 N		9.1	11.1	=	1.8	1.1	=
Lebanon	2.1 I	2.5 P	=	3.2 F	3.0	=				2.9	8.3	←	7.6	5.5	=
Myanmar	1.1	0.4	=	2.4 F	0.5 Q	=		0.7 N					3.4	2.3 R	=
Nigeria	1.0	0.5	=	0.9	0.7 M	=	1.0			13.0	6.7	→	0.9	1.1	=
Pakistan	1.1	0.9	=	2.6	1.8	=	1.1 B			4.9	5.1	=	5.8	4.5	=
Sierra Leone	1.5 I	2.6	=	1.1 F	1.0 P	=				3.7	13.1	←	0.9	3.6 R	←
Singapore	1.0	1.3	=	3.1	3.7	=		3.3 N					4.8	5.0	=
Sri Lanka	1.5	1.8	=	2.7	3.1 P	=	2.5 B	4.7 N	=	4.9	4.4	=	2.1	3.9	=
Tajikistan	4.9	1.0	←	10.0	2.1 P	←					7.8		0.4 I	1.2	=
Countries with insufficient data to summarise the area															
Afghanistan	0.7 M	0.6	=												
Andorra	8.3 M	6.8	←												
Antigua and Barbuda	2.9	3.3	=	2.5 A	3.2 O	=									
Aruba				5.0	4.7	=									
Bahamas	2.8	4.4	=	4.0	3.2 N	=	4.2								
Bermuda	0.5			3.3											
Cayman Islands	2.1 K														
Congo, Dem. Rep.	1.2 M	1.1	=							4.1	0.4	→			
Cuba	4.9	6.1	=	7.5 L	8.5	=	15.2								
French Polynesia				0.4	0.5 K	=									
Hong Kong (China)	1.6			2.8	2.9 M	=									
Iraq	3.8	2.2	=	5.1 E											
Kiribati	7.8	8.0	=												
Korea, Dem. Rep.	2.5 M	1.6	=												
Libya	1.5 M	1.6	=	9.6 C											
Macao (China)				1.7	3.6	=									
Marshall Islands	13.0	5.8	←		16.6 Q										
Micronesia, Fed. Sts.	6.9 M	5.6	←		5.5 P										
Monaco	3.6 M	3.6	=												

→ **Significant progress**
→ **Slight progress**
= **Stagnant**
← **Slight regression**
← **Significant regression**

Note: A: 1984 data; B: 1985 data; C: 1986 data; D: 1987 data; E: 1988 data; F: 1989 data; G: 1990 data; H: 1991 data; I: 1992 data; J: 1991/93 data; K: 1993 data; L: 1994 data; M: 1995 data; N: 1996 data; O: 1997 data; P: 1998 data; Q: 1999 data; R: 2000 data.

	PUBLIC HEALTH EXPENDITURE (% OF GDP)			PUBLIC EDUCATION EXPENDITURE (% OF GDP)			TOTAL SOCIAL SECURITY EXPENDITURE (% OF GDP)			TOTAL DEBT SERVICE (% OF GNI)			MILITARY EXPENDITURE (% OF GDP)		
	1990 (%)	2000 (%)	Progress or regression	1990 (%)	2000 (%)	Progress or regression	1990 (%)	1996 (%)	Progress or regression	1990 (%)	2001 (%)	Progress or regression	1990 (%)	2001 (%)	Progress or regression
New Caledonia				0.5	0.6 K	▮▮									
Palau	6.6 M	5.7	▮▮												
Puerto Rico															
Qatar	3.5 M	2.5	⬅	3.5	3.6 P	▮▮									
San Marino	9.3 M	10.0	▮▮												
São Tomé and Principe	3.1 K	1.6	⬅	4.0 C						5.3	9.6	⬅			
Somalia	1.1 M	0.9	▮▮	0.4 C						1.3					
Suriname	3.5	5.5	▮▮	8.1	3.6 K	⬅									
Virgin Islands (US)				7.5 A											

HUMAN RIGHTS:
The right to health services, education and social security is enshrined in:
UDHR - Art. 22, 25 & 26
CERD - Art. 6
CESCR - Art. 9, 12 & 13
CEDAW - Art. 11 & 14
CRC - Art. 24, 26 & 28

UDHR: Universal Declaration of Human Rights
CERD: International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
CESCR: International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
CEDAW: Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
CRC: Convention on the Rights of the Child

INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS
Public expenditure and debt are considered in:
Millennium Development Goals
World Summit for Social Development
Fourth World Conference on Women - Beijing
Platform for Action - Critical Areas of Concern

Sources:
Total social security expenditure: Cost of Social Security - World Labour Report 2000, ILO (www.ilo.org).
Total debt service: World Development Indicators 2003, World Bank.
Military expenditure: World Development Indicators 2003, World Bank.
Public health expenditure: World Development Indicators 2003, World Bank.
Public education expenditure: World Development Indicators 2003, World Bank.

Significant progress
Slight progress
Stagnant
Slight regression
Significant regression

Note: A: 1984 data; B: 1985 data; C: 1986 data; D: 1987 data; E: 1988 data; F: 1989 data; G: 1990 data; H: 1991 data; I: 1992 data; J: 1991/93 data; K: 1993 data; L: 1994 data; M: 1995 data; N: 1996 data; O: 1997 data; P: 1998 data; Q: 1999 data; R: 2000 data.

TRENDS IN OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE (% OF GDP) A

	1986-87 (%)	1991-1992 B (%)	1998 (%)	1999 (%)	2000 (%)	2001 (%)	2002 (%)
Australia	0.40	0.37	0.27	0.26	0.27	0.25	0.26
Austria	0.19	0.14	0.22	0.24	0.23	0.29	0.26
Belgium	0.48	0.40	0.35	0.30	0.36	0.37	0.43
Canada	0.48	0.46	0.30	0.28	0.25	0.22	0.28
Denmark	0.88	0.99	0.99	1.01	1.06	1.03	0.96
Finland	0.48	0.72	0.31	0.33	0.31	0.32	0.35
France	0.58	0.62	0.40	0.39	0.32	0.32	0.38
Germany	0.41	0.38	0.26	0.26	0.27	0.27	0.27
Greece			0.15	0.15	0.20	0.17	0.21
Ireland	0.23	0.18	0.30	0.31	0.29	0.33	0.40
Italy	0.37	0.32	0.20	0.15	0.13	0.15	0.20
Japan	0.30	0.31	0.27	0.27	0.28	0.23	0.23
Luxembourg	0.17	0.29	0.65	0.66	0.71	0.76	0.77
Netherlands	0.99	0.87	0.80	0.79	0.84	0.82	0.81
New Zealand	0.28	0.25	0.27	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.22
Norway	1.13	1.15	0.89	0.88	0.76	0.80	0.89
Portugal	0.10	0.32	0.24	0.26	0.26	0.25	0.27
Spain	0.08	0.26	0.24	0.23	0.22	0.30	0.26
Sweden	0.87	0.96	0.72	0.70	0.80	0.77	0.83
Switzerland	0.30	0.41	0.32	0.35	0.34	0.34	0.32
United Kingdom	0.29	0.32	0.27	0.24	0.32	0.32	0.31
United States of America	0.21	0.20	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.11	0.13

A: Net disbursements at current prices and exchange rates.
B: Including debt forgiveness of non-ODA claims in 1991 and 1992, except for total DAC.

Source: OECD, Website Database 2004 (www.oecd.org).

Status of ratifications of the principal international human rights treaties

Up to January 2004

1: International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), 1966. Entry into force: 3 January 1976.

2: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR), 1966. Entry into force: 23 March 1976.

3: International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), 1965. Entry into force: 4 January 1969.

4: Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), 1979. Entry into force: 3 September 1981.

5: Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), 1984. Entry into force: 26 June 1987.

6: Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), 1989. Entry into force: 2 September 1990.

7: Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948. Entry into force: 12 January 1951.

8: Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951. Entry into force: 22 April 1954.

9: International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (MWC), 1990. Entry into force: 1 July 2003.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Afghanistan	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		
Albania	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Algeria	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Andorra		○	○	●	○	●			
Angola	●	●		●		●		●	
Antigua and Barbuda			●	●	●	●	●	●	
Argentina	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Armenia	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Australia	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Austria	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Azerbaijan	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Bahamas			●	●		●	●	●	
Bahrain			●	●	●	●	●		
Bangladesh	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		○
Barbados	●	●	●	●		●	●		
Belarus	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Belgium	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Belize	○	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Benin	●	●	●	●	●	●		●	
Bhutan			○	●		●			
Bolivia	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	●
Bosnia and Herzegovina	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Botswana		●	●	●	●	●		●	
Brazil	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Brunei Darussalam						●			
Bulgaria	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Burkina Faso	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Burundi	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Cambodia	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Cameroon	●	●	●	●	●	●		●	
Canada	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Cape Verde	●	●	●	●	●	●			●
Central African Republic	●	●	●	●		●		●	
Chad	●	●	●	●	●	●		●	
Chile	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○
China	●	○	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Colombia	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Comoros			○	●	○	●			○
Congo, Dem. Rep.	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Congo, Rep.	●	●	●	●	●	●		●	
Cook Islands						●			
Costa Rica	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Côte d'Ivoire	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Croatia	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Cuba			●	●	●	●	●		
Cyprus	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Czech Republic	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Denmark	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Djibouti	●	●		●	●	●		●	

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Dominica	●	●		●		●		●	
Dominican Republic	●	●	●	●	○	●	○	●	
Ecuador	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Egypt	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
El Salvador	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Equatorial Guinea	●	●	●	●	●	●		●	
Eritrea	●	●	●	●		●			
Estonia	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Ethiopia	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Fiji			●	●		●	●	●	
Finland	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
France	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Gabon	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Gambia	●	●	●	●	○	●	●	●	
Georgia	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Germany	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Ghana	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Greece	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Grenada	●	●	○	●		●			
Guatemala	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Guinea	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Guinea-Bissau	●	○	○	●	○	●		●	○
Guyana	●	●	●	●	●	●			
Haiti		●	●	●		●	●	●	
Holy See			●	●	●	●		●	
Honduras	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Hungary	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Iceland	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
India	●	●	●	●	○	●	●		
Indonesia			●	●	●	●			
Iran, Islamic Rep.	●	●	●	●		●	●	●	
Iraq	●	●	●	●		●	●		
Ireland	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Israel	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Italy	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Jamaica	●	●	●	●		●	●	●	
Japan	●	●	●	●	●	●		●	
Jordan	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		
Kazakhstan	○	○	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Kenya	●	●	●	●	●	●		●	
Kiribati						●			
Korea, Dem. Rep.	●	●		●		●	●		
Korea, Rep.	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Kuwait	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		
Kyrgyzstan	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Lao PDR	○	○	●	●		●	●		
Latvia	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Lebanon	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		
Lesotho	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	

Source: United Nations Treaty Collection Website, Database "Status of Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General" (untreaty.un.org).

● **Ratification, accession, approval, notification or succession, acceptance, consent to be bound or definitive signature.**

○ **Signature not yet followed by ratification.**

Status of ratifications of the principal international human rights treaties

Up to January 2004

1: International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), 1966. Entry into force: 3 January 1976.

2: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR), 1966. Entry into force: 23 March 1976.

3: International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), 1965. Entry into force: 4 January 1969.

4: Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), 1979. Entry into force: 3 September 1981.

5: Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), 1984. Entry into force: 26 June 1987.

6: Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), 1989. Entry into force: 2 September 1990.

7: Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948. Entry into force: 12 January 1951.

8: Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951. Entry into force: 22 April 1954.

9: International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (MWC), 1990. Entry into force: 1 July 2003.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Liberia	○	○	●	●		●	●	●	
Libya	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		
Liechtenstein	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Lithuania	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Luxembourg	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Macedonia, FYR	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Madagascar	●	●	●	●	○	●		●	
Malawi	●	●	●	●	●	●		●	
Malaysia				●		●	●		
Maldives			●	●		●	●		
Mali	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Malta	●	●	●	●	●	●		●	
Marshall Islands						●			
Mauritania			●	●		●		●	
Mauritius	●	●	●	●	●	●			
Mexico	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Micronesia, Fed. Sts.						●			
Moldova	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Monaco	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Mongolia	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		
Morocco	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Mozambique		●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Myanmar				●		●	●		
Namibia	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Nauru		○	○		○	●			
Nepal	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		
Netherlands	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
New Zealand	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Nicaragua	●	●	●	●	○	●	●	●	
Niger	●	●	●	●	●	●		●	
Nigeria	●	●	●	●	●	●		●	
Niue						●			
Norway	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Oman			●			●			
Pakistan			●	●		●	●		
Palau						●			
Panama	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Papua New Guinea			●	●		●	●	●	
Paraguay	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○
Peru	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Philippines	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Poland	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Portugal	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Qatar			●		●	●			
Romania	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Russian Federation	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Rwanda	●	●	●	●		●	●	●	
Samoa				●		●		●	
San Marino	●	●	●	●	○	●			

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
São Tomé and Principe	○	○	○	●	○	●		●	○
Saudi Arabia			●	●	●	●	●		
Senegal	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Serbia and Montenegro	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Seychelles	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Sierra Leone	●	●	●	●	●	●		●	○
Singapore				●		●	●		
Slovakia	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Slovenia	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Solomon Islands	●		●	●		●		●	
Somalia	●	●	●	●	●	○		●	
South Africa	○	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Spain	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Sri Lanka	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		●
St. Kitts and Nevis				●		●		●	
St. Lucia			●	●		●			
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Sudan	●	●	●	●	○	●	●	●	
Suriname	●	●	●	●		●		●	
Swaziland			●	●		●		●	
Sweden	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Switzerland	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Syrian Arab Republic	●	●	●	●		●	●		
Tajikistan	●	●	●	●	●	●		●	●
Tanzania	●	●	●	●		●	●	●	
Thailand	●	●	●	●		●			
Timor-Leste	●	●	●	●	●	●		●	
Togo	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○
Tonga			●			●	●		
Trinidad and Tobago	●	●	●	●		●	●	●	
Tunisia	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○
Turkey	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Turkmenistan	●	●	●	●	●	●		●	
Tuvalu				●		●		●	
Uganda	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Ukraine	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
United Arab Emirates			●			●			
United Kingdom	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
United States of America	○	●	●	○	●	○	●		
Uruguay	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Uzbekistan	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		
Vanuatu				●		●			
Venezuela	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		
Viet Nam	●	●	●	●		●	●		
Yemen	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Zambia	●	●	●	●	●	●		●	
Zimbabwe	●	●	●	●		●	●	●	

Source: United Nations Treaty Collection Website, Database "Status of Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General" (untreaty.un.org).

● **Ratification, accession, approval, notification or succession, acceptance, consent to be bound or definitive signature.**

○ **Signature not yet followed by ratification.**

Status of ratifications of fundamental ILO conventions

Up to January 2004

C87: Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948
C98: Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949
C100: Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951
C105: Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957
C111: Discrimination (employment and occupation) Convention, 1958
C138: Minimum Age Convention, 1973
C182: Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999

	FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING		ELIMINATION OF FORCED AND COMPULSORY LABOUR	ELIMINATION OF DISCRIMINATION IN RESPECT OF EMPLOYMENT AND OCCUPATION		ABOLITION OF CHILD LABOUR			FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING		ELIMINATION OF FORCED AND COMPULSORY LABOUR	ELIMINATION OF DISCRIMINATION IN RESPECT OF EMPLOYMENT AND OCCUPATION		ABOLITION OF CHILD LABOUR	
	C 87	C 98	C 105	C 100	C 111	C 138	C 182		C 87	C 98	C 105	C 100	C 111	C 138	C 182
Afghanistan	□	□	■	■	■	□	□	Dominican Republic	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Albania	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	Ecuador	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Algeria	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	Egypt	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Angola	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	El Salvador	□	□	■	■	■	■	■
Antigua and Barbuda	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	Equatorial Guinea	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Argentina	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	Eritrea	■	■	■	■	■	■	□
Armenia	□	■	□	■	■	□	□	Estonia	■	■	■	■	□	□	■
Australia	■	■	■	■	■	□	□	Ethiopia	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Austria	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	Fiji	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Azerbaijan	■	■	■	■	■	■	□	Finland	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Bahamas	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	France	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Bahrain	□	□	■	□	■	□	■	Gabon	■	■	■	■	■	□	■
Bangladesh	■	■	■	■	■	□	■	Gambia	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Barbados	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	Georgia	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Belarus	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	Germany	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Belgium	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	Ghana	■	■	■	■	■	□	■
Belize	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	Greece	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Benin	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	Grenada	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Bolivia	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	Guatemala	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Bosnia and Herzegovina	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	Guinea	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Botswana	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	Guinea-Bissau	□	■	■	■	■	□	□
Brazil	□	■	■	■	■	■	■	Guyana	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Bulgaria	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	Haiti	■	■	■	■	■	□	□
Burkina Faso	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	Honduras	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Burundi	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	Hungary	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Cambodia	■	■	■	■	■	■	□	Iceland	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Cameroon	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	India	□	□	■	■	■	□	□
Canada	■	□	■	■	■	□	■	Indonesia	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Cape Verde	■	■	■	■	■	□	■	Iran, Islamic Rep.	□	□	■	■	■	□	■
Central African Republic	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	Iraq	□	■	■	■	■	■	■
Chad	■	■	■	■	■	□	■	Ireland	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Chile	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	Israel	■	■	■	■	■	■	□
China	□	□	□	■	□	■	■	Italy	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Colombia	■	■	■	■	■	■	□	Jamaica	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Comoros	■	■	■	■	□	□	□	Japan	■	■	□	■	□	■	■
Congo, Dem. Rep.	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	Jordan	□	■	■	■	■	■	■
Congo, Rep.	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	Kazakhstan	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Costa Rica	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	Kenya	□	■	■	■	■	■	■
Côte d'Ivoire	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	Kiribati	■	■	■	□	□	□	□
Croatia	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	Korea, Rep.	□	□	□	■	■	■	■
Cuba	■	■	■	■	■	■	□	Kuwait	■	□	■	□	■	■	■
Cyprus	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	Kyrgyzstan	■	■	■	■	■	■	□
Czech Republic	■	■	■	■	■	□	■	Lao PDR	□	□	□	□	□	□	□
Denmark	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	Latvia	■	■	■	■	■	□	□
Djibouti	■	■	■	■	□	□	□	Lebanon	□	■	■	■	■	■	■
Dominica	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	Lesotho	■	■	■	■	■	■	■

Source: ILOLEX. ILO Website Database (www.ilo.org).

■ **Convention ratified**
□ **Convention not yet ratified**
● **Convention denounced**

Status of ratifications of fundamental ILO conventions

Up to January 2004

C87: Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948
C98: Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949
C100: Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951
C105: Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957
C111: Discrimination (employment and occupation) Convention, 1958
C138: Minimum Age Convention, 1973
C182: Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999

	FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING		ELIMINATION OF FORCED AND COMPULSORY LABOUR	ELIMINATION OF DISCRIMINATION IN RESPECT OF EMPLOYMENT AND OCCUPATION		ABOLITION OF CHILD LABOUR	
	C 87	C 98	C 105	C 100	C 111	C 138	C 182
Liberia	■	■	■	□	■	□	■
Libya	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Lithuania	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Luxembourg	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Macedonia, FYR	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Madagascar	■	■	□	■	■	■	■
Malawi	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Malaysia	□	■	●	■	□	■	■
Mali	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Malta	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Mauritania	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Mauritius	□	■	■	■	■	■	■
Mexico	■	□	■	■	■	□	■
Moldova	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Mongolia	■	■	□	■	■	■	■
Morocco	□	■	■	■	■	■	■
Mozambique	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Myanmar	■	□	□	□	□	□	□
Namibia	■	■	■	□	■	■	■
Nepal	□	■	□	■	■	■	■
Netherlands	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
New Zealand	□	■	■	■	■	□	■
Nicaragua	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Niger	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Nigeria	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Norway	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Oman	□	□	□	□	□	□	■
Pakistan	■	■	■	■	■	□	■
Panama	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Papua New Guinea	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Paraguay	■	■	■	■	■	□	■
Peru	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Philippines	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Poland	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Portugal	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Qatar	□	□	□	□	■	□	■
Romania	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Russian Federation	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Rwanda	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
San Marino	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
São Tomé and Principe	■	■	□	■	■	□	□
Saudi Arabia	□	□	■	■	■	□	■
Senegal	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Serbia and Montenegro	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Seychelles	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Sierra Leone	■	■	■	■	■	□	□
Singapore	□	■	●	■	□	□	■
Slovakia	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Slovenia	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Solomon Islands	□	□	□	□	□	□	□
Somalia	□	□	■	□	■	□	□
South Africa	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Spain	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Sri Lanka	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
St. Kitts and Nevis	■	■	■	■	■	□	■
St. Lucia	■	■	■	■	■	□	■
St. Vincent and Grenadines	■	■	■	■	■	□	■
Sudan	□	■	■	■	■	■	■
Suriname	■	■	■	□	□	□	□
Swaziland	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Sweden	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Switzerland	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Syrian Arab Republic	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Tajikistan	■	■	■	■	■	■	□
Tanzania	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Thailand	□	□	■	■	□	□	■
Timor-Leste	□	□	□	□	□	□	□
Togo	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Trinidad and Tobago	■	■	■	■	■	□	■
Tunisia	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Turkey	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Turkmenistan	■	■	■	■	■	□	□
Uganda	□	■	■	□	□	■	■
Ukraine	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
United Arab Emirates	□	□	■	■	■	■	■
United Kingdom	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
United States of America	□	□	■	□	□	□	■
Uruguay	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Uzbekistan	□	■	■	■	■	□	□
Vanuatu	□	□	□	□	□	□	□
Venezuela	■	■	■	■	■	■	□
Viet Nam	□	□	□	■	■	■	■
Yemen	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Zambia	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Zimbabwe	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Total of 177	**142**	**154**	**161**	**161**	**159**	**131**	**147**
Africa (53)	**46**	**52**	**51**	**49**	**50**	**42**	**46**
Americas (35)	**32**	**31**	**35**	**33**	**33**	**25**	**30**
Asia (44)	**20**	**26**	**31**	**34**	**32**	**23**	**30**
Europe (45)	**44**	**45**	**44**	**45**	**44**	**41**	**41**

Source: ILOLEX. ILO Website Database (www.ilo.org).

■ **Convention ratified**
□ **Convention not yet ratified**
● **Convention denounced**

Status of ratifications of international treaties mentioned in the Millennium Declaration

Up to January 2004

A: Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Rome, Italy, 1998. Entry into force: 1 July 2002.

B: Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction. Oslo, Norway, 1997. Entry into force: 1 March 1999.

C: Protocol II on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices as amended on 3 May 1996 annexed to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. Geneva, Switzerland, 1996. Entry into force: 3 December 1998.

D: Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Kyoto, Japan, 1997. Not yet in force.

E: Convention on the Rights of the Child. New York, USA, 1989. Entry into force: 2 September 1990. (See the table Status of ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties)

F: Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict. New York, USA, 2000. Entry into force: 12 February 2002.

G: Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography. New York, USA, 2000. Entry into force: 18 January 2002.

H: Convention on Biological Diversity. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 1992. Entry into force: 29 December 1993.

I: United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa. Paris, France, 1994. Entry into force: 26 December 1996.

J: Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. New York, USA, 1979. Entry into force: 3 September 1981. (See the table Status of ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties)

	A	B	C	D	F	G	H	I
Afghanistan	●	●			●	●	●	●
Albania	●	●	●				●	●
Algeria	○	●					●	●
Andorra	●	●			●	●		●
Angola	○	●					●	●
Antigua and Barbuda	●	●		●		●	●	●
Argentina	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Armenia	○			●	○	○	●	●
Aruba								
Australia	●	●	●	○	○	○	●	●
Austria	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	●
Azerbaijan				●	●	●	●	●
Bahamas	○	●		●			●	●
Bahrain	○						●	●
Bangladesh	○	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Barbados	●	●		●			●	●
Belarus		●				●	●	●
Belgium	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	●
Belize	●	●		●	●	●	●	●
Benin	●	●		●	○	○	●	●
Bermuda								
Bhutan				●			●	●
Bolivia	●	●	●	●		●	●	●
Bosnia and Herzegovina	●	●	●		●	●	●	●
Botswana	●	●		●	○	●	●	●
Brazil	●	●	●	●	○	○	●	●
British Virgin Islands								
Brunei Darussalam		○						●
Bulgaria	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Burkina Faso	○	●	●		○	○	●	●
Burundi	○	●		●	○		●	●
Cambodia	●	●	●	●	○	●	●	●
Cameroon	○	●		●	○	○	●	●
Canada	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	●
Cape Verde	○	●	●		●	●	●	●
Cayman Islands								
Central African Republic	●	●					●	●
Chad	○	●			●	●	●	●
Channel Islands								
Chile	○	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
China			●	●	○	●	●	●
Colombia	●	●	●	●	○	●	●	●
Comoros	○	●					●	●
Congo, Dem. Rep.	●	●			●	●	●	●
Congo, Rep.	○	●					●	●
Cook Islands		○		●			●	●
Costa Rica	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Côte d'Ivoire	○	●					●	●
Croatia	●	●	●	○	●	●	●	●
Cuba				●	○	●	●	●
Cyprus	●	●	●	●		○	●	●
Czech Republic	○	●	●	●	●		●	●
Denmark	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Djibouti	●	●		●			●	●
Dominica	●	●			●	●	●	●

	A	B	C	D	F	G	H	I
Dominican Republic	○	●		●	○		●	●
Ecuador	●	●	●	●	○	○	●	●
Egypt	○			○		●	●	●
El Salvador		●	●	●	●	○	●	●
Equatorial Guinea		●		●		●	●	●
Eritrea	○	●					●	●
Estonia	●		●	●	○	○	●	
Ethiopia		○					●	●
European Community				●			●	●
Faeroe Islands								
Fiji	●	●		●			●	●
Finland	●		●	●	●	○	●	●
France	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
French Polynesia								
Gabon	●	●			○	○	●	●
Gambia	●	●		●	○	○	●	●
Georgia	●			●			●	●
Germany	●	●	●	●	○	○	●	●
Ghana	●	●		●	○	○	●	●
Greece	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	●
Greenland								
Grenada		●		●			●	●
Guadeloupe								
Guam								
Guatemala		●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Guinea	●	●		●			●	●
Guinea-Bissau	○	●			○	○	●	●
Guyana	○	●		●			●	●
Haiti	○	○			○	○	●	●
Holy See		●	●		●	●		
Honduras	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Hong Kong (China)								
Hungary	●	●	●	●	○	○	●	●
Iceland	●	●		●	●	●	●	●
India			●	●			●	●
Indonesia		○		○	○	○	●	●
Iran, Islamic Rep.	○						●	●
Iraq								
Ireland	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	●
Isle of Man								
Israel	○		●	○	○	○	●	●
Italy	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Jamaica	○	●		●	●	○	●	●
Japan		●	●	●	○	○	●	●
Jordan	●	●	●	●	○	○	●	●
Kazakhstan				○	●	●	●	●
Kenya	○	●			●	○	●	●
Kiribati		●		●			●	●
Korea, Dem. Rep.							●	●
Korea, Rep.	●		●	●	○	○	●	●
Kuwait	○						●	●
Kyrgyzstan	○			●	●	●	●	●
Lao PDR				●			●	●
Latvia	●		●	●	○	○	●	●
Lebanon					○	○	●	●

Source: United Nations Treaty Collection Website, Database "Status of Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General" (untreaty.un.org).

- ● **Ratification, accession, approval, notification or succession, acceptance, consent to be bound or definitive signature.**
- ○ **Signature not yet followed by ratification.**

Status of ratifications of international treaties mentioned in the Millennium Declaration

Up to January 2004

A: Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Rome, Italy, 1998. Entry into force: 1 July 2002.

B: Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction. Oslo, Norway, 1997. Entry into force: 1 March 1999.

C: Protocol II on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices as amended on 3 May 1996 annexed to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. Geneva, Switzerland, 1996. Entry into force: 3 December 1998.

D: Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Kyoto, Japan, 1997. Not yet in force.

E: Convention on the Rights of the Child. New York, USA, 1989. Entry into force: 2 September 1990. (See the table Status of ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties)

F: Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict. New York, USA, 2000. Entry into force: 12 February 2002.

G: Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography. New York, USA, 2000. Entry into force: 18 January 2002.

H: Convention on Biological Diversity. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 1992. Entry into force: 29 December 1993.

I: United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa. Paris, France, 1994. Entry into force: 26 December 1996.

J: Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. New York, USA, 1979. Entry into force: 3 September 1981. (See the table Status of ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties)

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I
Lesotho	●	●		●	●	●	●	●	●
Liberia	○	●		●				●	●
Libya								●	●
Liechtenstein	●	●	●	○	○	○	●	●	●
Lithuania	●	●	●	●	●			●	●
Luxembourg	●	●	●	●	○	○	●	●	●
Macao (China)									
Macedonia, FYR	●	●			○	●	●	●	●
Madagascar	○	●		●	○	○	●	●	●
Malawi	●	●		●	○	○	●	●	●
Malaysia		●		●			●	●	●
Maldives		●	●	●	○	●	●	●	●
Mali	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Malta	●	●		●	●	○	●	●	●
Marshall Islands	●	○		●			●	●	●
Mauritania		●					●	●	●
Mauritius	●	●		●	○	○	●	●	●
Mayotte									
Mexico	○	●		●	●	●	●	●	●
Micronesia, Fed. Sts.				●	○	○	●	●	●
Moldova	○	●	●	●	○	○	●	●	●
Monaco	○	●	●	○	●	○	●	●	●
Mongolia	●			●	○	●	●	●	●
Morocco	○		●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Mozambique	○	●				●	●	●	●
Myanmar				●			●	●	●
Namibia	●	●		●	●	●	●	●	●
Nauru	●	●	●	●	○	○	●	●	●
Nepal					○	○	●	●	●
Netherlands	●	●	●	●	○	○	●	●	●
Netherlands Antilles									
New Caledonia									
New Zealand	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	●	●
Nicaragua		●	●	●			●	●	●
Niger	●	●		○		○	●	●	●
Nigeria	●	●			○	○	●	●	●
Niue		●		●			●	●	●
Northern Mariana Islands									
Norway	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Oman	○						●	●	●
Pakistan			●		○	○	●	●	●
Palau				●			●	●	●
Panama	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Papua New Guinea				●			●	●	●
Paraguay	●	●		●	●	●	●	●	●
Peru	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Philippines	○	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Poland	●	○	●	●	○	○	●	●	●
Portugal	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Puerto Rico									
Qatar		●			●	●	●	●	●
Romania	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Russian Federation	○			○	○			●	●
Rwanda		●			●	●	●	●	●
Samoa	●	●		●				●	●

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I
San Marino	●	●				○	○	●	●
São Tomé and Principe	○	●						●	●
Saudi Arabia								●	●
Senegal	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	●	●
Serbia and Montenegro	●	●				●	●	●	
Seychelles	○	●	●	●	●	○	○	●	●
Sierra Leone	●	●				●	●	●	●
Singapore						○		●	●
Slovakia	●	●	●	●	●	○	○	●	●
Slovenia	●	●	●	●	●	○	○	●	●
Solomon Islands	○	●		●				●	●
Somalia									●
South Africa	●	●	●	●	○	●	●	●	●
Spain	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Sri Lanka				●	●	○	●	●	●
St. Kitts and Nevis		●						●	●
St. Lucia	○	●		●				●	●
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	●	●		○				●	●
Sudan	○	●			○			●	●
Suriname		●			○	○	●	●	●
Swaziland		●						●	●
Sweden	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	●	●
Switzerland	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	●	●
Syrian Arab Republic	○				●	●	●	●	●
Tajikistan	●	●	●		●	●	●	●	●
Tanzania	●	●		●		●	●	●	●
Thailand	○	●		●				○	●
Timor-Leste	●	●				●			●
Togo		●			○	○	●	●	●
Tonga								●	●
Trinidad and Tobago	●	●		●				●	●
Tunisia		●		●	●	●	●	●	●
Turkey		●			○	●	●	●	●
Turkmenistan		●		●				●	●
Turks and Caicos Islands									
Tuvalu				●				●	●
Uganda	●	●		●	●	●	●	●	●
Ukraine	○	○	●	○	○	●	●	●	●
United Arab Emirates	○							●	●
United Kingdom	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	●	●
United States of America	○		●	○	●	●	●	○	●
Uruguay	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Uzbekistan	○			●				●	●
Vanuatu		○		●				●	●
Venezuela	●	●			●	●	●	●	●
Viet Nam				●	●	●	●	●	●
Virgin Islands (US)									
West Bank and Gaza									
Yemen	○	●						●	●
Yugoslavia									
Zambia	●	●		○				●	●
Zimbabwe	○	●						●	●

Source: United Nations Treaty Collection Website, Database "Status of Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General" (untreaty.un.org).

- ● **Ratification, accession, approval, notification or succession, acceptance, consent to be bound or definitive signature.**
- ○ **Signature not yet followed by ratification.**

Status of official countries' reports to the UN human rights treaty bodies

Up to January 2004

1: Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), 1984. Entry into force: 26 June 1987.

2: Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), 1979. Entry into force: 3 September 1981.

3: International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), 1965. Entry into force: 4 January 1969.

4: Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), 1989. Entry into force: 2 September 1990.

5: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR), 1966. Entry into force: 23 March 1976.

6: International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), 1966. Entry into force: 3 January 1976.

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Afghanistan	▽		▽	▽	▽	▽
Albania	⏸	■	■	⏸	▽	▽
Algeria	▽	⏸	■	▼	▼	■
Andorra		▼		■		
Angola		⏸		▽	▽	▽
Antigua and Barbuda	▽	▼	▽	⏸		
Argentina	⏸	⏸	■	■	■	▼
Armenia	▼	■	■	⏸	▼	▼
Australia	▼	▽	▼	⏸	■	■
Austria	⏸	▼	■	⏸	▼	▽
Azerbaijan	■	▼	▼	▼	■	⏸
Bahamas		▽	⏸	⏸		
Bahrain	▼	▼	▼	▼		
Bangladesh	▼	⏸	■	■	▼	▼
Barbados		■	▽	▽	▽	▽
Belarus	▼	⏸	▽	■	▼	▼
Belgium	■	▼	■	■	⏸	■
Belize	▽	▼		⏸	▽	
Benin	▽	⏸	▼	▽	▽	■
Bhutan		⏸		▽		
Bolivia	■	▽	■	⏸	▼	■
Bosnia and Herzegovina	▽	▽	▽	▽	▽	▽
Botswana	▼	▽	■	⏸	▼	
Brazil	▽	■	⏸	⏸	▽	■
Brunei Darussalam				■		
Bulgaria	⏸	▽	▽	▽	▽	▼
Burkina Faso	▼	⏸	▽	■	▼	▼
Burundi	▽	▽	▽	▽	▽	▽
Cambodia	■	▽	▽	▼	▼	▽
Cameroon	■	▼	▽	▼	▼	▼
Canada	⏸	■	■	■	■	▼
Cape Verde	▽	▽	■	▼	▽	▽
Central African Republic		▽	▽	▼	▽	▽
Colombia	■	▼	▼	■	⏸	■
Comoros		▽		▼		
Congo, Dem. Rep.	▽	▼	▽	▽	▽	▽
Congo, Rep.		■	▽	▽	▼	▽
Costa Rica	▽	■	■	⏸	■	▽
Côte d'Ivoire	▽	▽	■	▽	▽	▽
Croatia	⏸	⏸	■	⏸	■	■
Cuba	▼	▼	▼	▽		
Cyprus	■	▽	■	■	▼	▼
Czech Republic	⏸	■	■	■	■	■
Chad	▽	▽	▽	▽	▽	▽
Chile	⏸	▼	▼	■	▼	⏸
China	▼	▼	■	⏸		⏸
Denmark	■		■	⏸	■	⏸
Djibouti		▼		▽	■	■
Dominica		▽		⏸	▽	▽

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Dominican Republic		⏸	▼	▽	■	▼
Ecuador	⏸	■	■	⏸	▼	⏸
Egypt	■	▼	■	■	■	▼
El Salvador	▼	■	▽	⏸	⏸	▽
Equatorial Guinea		⏸		⏸	▽	▽
Eritrea		▽	▼	▼	▼	▼
Estonia	■		■	▽	■	■
Ethiopia	▽	⏸	▽	■	▽	▽
Fiji		▼	■	▼		
Finland	⏸	▼	■	■	⏸	■
France	▽	■	▼	⏸	▼	■
Gabon	▼	⏸	▼	▼	▼	▽
Gambia		⏸	▽	▽	▽	▽
Georgia	■	▼	■	■	■	■
Germany	⏸	⏸	■	⏸	⏸	■
Ghana	▼	▽	■	▽	▼	▼
Greece	⏸	■	■	▼	▽	⏸
Grenada		▽		▽	▽	▽
Guatemala	▼	■	▽	■	■	■
Guinea	▽	▽	▼	▽	▽	▽
Guinea-Bissau		▽		▽		▽
Guyana	▽	⏸	▽	▽	▼	
Haiti		▽	▼	■	▽	
Holy See			▼	▽		
Honduras	▽	▽		■	▽	■
Hungary	▼	■	■	▽	■	▽
Iceland	■	▼	■	■	▼	■
India		▼	▽	⏸	▼	▽
Indonesia	■	▽	▼	⏸		
Iran, Islamic Rep.			■	⏸	▽	▽
Iraq		▼	▼	▼		▼
Ireland	▼	⏸	▼	▼	■	■
Israel	■	⏸	▽	▽	■	■
Italy	▼	▼	■	■	▼	⏸
Jamaica		▼	■	■	▼	▼
Japan	▼	■	■	⏸	▼	■
Jordan	▽	▼	▼	■	▽	▼
Kazakhstan	■	▼	▼	▼	▼	
Kenya	▽	■	▼	▽	▽	▽
Kiribati				▽		
Korea, Dem. Rep.		⏸		⏸	■	■
Korea, Rep.	▼	⏸	■	■	■	■
Kuwait	▼	⏸	▽	▽	■	⏸
Kyrgyzstan	▼	⏸	▼	■	■	■
Lao PDR		⏸	▽	▽		
Latvia	■	⏸	■	▼	■	▽
Lebanon	▼	▽	⏸	■	▼	▽
Lesotho	▼	▽	▼	▼	▼	▽
Liberia		▽	▽	⏸		

Source: Amnesty International Website (web.amnesty.org/pages/treaty-countries-reporting-eng).

▼ **Overdue**
▽ **More than 5 years overdue**
⏸ **Pending**
■ **Not yet due**

Status of official countries' reports to the UN human rights treaty bodies

Up to January 2004

1: Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), 1984. Entry into force: 26 June 1987.

2: Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), 1979. Entry into force: 3 September 1981.

3: International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), 1965. Entry into force: 4 January 1969.

4: Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), 1989. Entry into force: 2 September 1990.

5: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR), 1966. Entry into force: 23 March 1976.

6: International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), 1966. Entry into force: 3 January 1976.

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Libya	▽	⏸	⏸	■	▼	▽
Liechtenstein	▼	⏸	■	■	▼	▼
Lithuania	■	▼	■	▼	⏸	⏸
Luxembourg	■	■	▽	⏸	■	■
Macedonia, FYR	▼	▽	▽	▽	▼	▽
Madagascar		▽	▽	■	▽	▽
Malawi	▽	▽	▽	▽	▽	▽
Malaysia		▽		▽		
Maldives		▼	▽	▽		
Mali	▼	▽	■	▽	■	▽
Malta	▼	⏸	▼	▽	▽	⏸
Marshall Islands				■		
Mauritania		▼	▼	▽		
Mauritius	▼	▽	▼	▽	▽	▽
Mexico	▼	■	▽	■	▼	■
Micronesia, Fed. Sts.				▼		
Moldova	■	▼	■	▼	■	■
Monaco	⏸		▽	▼	■	▽
Mongolia	▼	▼	▼	⏸	▼	▼
Morocco	■	■	■	■	▼	■
Mozambique	▼	▽	▽	▼	▽	
Myanmar		▼		⏸		
Namibia	▼	▽	▽	▽	▽	▽
Nauru				▽		
Nepal	▽	⏸	⏸	⏸	▽	■
Netherlands	▼		⏸	⏸	■	▽
New Zealand	⏸	■	■	■	■	■
Nicaragua		▼	▽	⏸	▽	▽
Niger	▼	▼	▽	▽	▽	▽
Nigeria	▼	⏸	▽	■	▽	▼
Norway	■	■	■	⏸	▽	▼
Oman				■		
Pakistan		▽	▽	■		
Palau				■		
Panama	▼	▽	▽	⏸	▽	■
Papua New Guinea		▽	▽	⏸		
Paraguay	▼	⏸		■	▽	▽
Peru	▼	⏸	▽	■	■	▽
Philippines	▽	▼	▽	⏸	■	▽
Poland	▼	▽	■	■	▼	■
Portugal	▼	▼	■	■	■	■
Qatar	▼		■	■		
Romania	▽	▼	▼	■	▼	▽
Russian Federation	▼	▼	■	⏸	■	■
Rwanda		▽	▼	⏸	▽	▽
Samoa		⏸		▽		
San Marino			▼	■	▽	▽
São Tomé and Principe				▽		
Saudi Arabia	▼	▼	■	■		
Senegal	▽	▽	■	▽	▼	▼
Serbia and Montenegro	▽	▼	▽	▽	▼	▼
Seychelles	▽	▽	▽	▽	▽	▽
Sierra Leone	▼	▽	▽	▽	▽	▽
Singapore				■		
Slovakia	▽	▼	▼	▼	■	■
Slovenia	■	■	■	⏸	▽	▽
Solomon Islands		▼	▽	■		■
Somalia	▽		▽		▽	▽
South Africa	▼	▼	▼	■	▽	
Spain	■	⏸	⏸	■	▼	⏸
Sri Lanka	▼	▼	■	■	■	▼
St. Kitts and Nevis		▼		▽		
St. Lucia		▽	▽	▼		
St. Vincent and Grenadines	▼	▽	■	■	▽	▽
Sudan			■	■	▼	▼
Suriname		▼	⏸	▼	⏸	▽
Swaziland			▽	▽		
Sweden	■	▼	⏸	⏸	■	■
Switzerland	⏸	■	■	■	■	▽
Syrian Arab Republic			▼	■	▼	■
Tajikistan	▽	▽	▽	■	▼	▼
Tanzania		▼	▽	▽	▼	▽
Thailand		⏸		▼	▽	▼
Timor-Leste	■	■	■	■	■	■
Togo	▽	▽	▽	⏸	■	▽
Tonga			▼	▽		
Trinidad and Tobago		▼	■	⏸	▼	■
Tunisia	▼	▼	■	■	▽	■
Turkey	■	⏸		■		■
Turkmenistan	▼	▼	▽	▽	▽	▽
Tuvalu		▼		▽		
Uganda	▽	▼	■	⏸	⏸	▽
Ukraine	■	■	▼	■	■	■
United Arab Emirates			▽	■		
United Kingdom	⏸	⏸	■	■	■	■
United States of America	▼		■		▽	
Uruguay	▽	▽		▽	▼	▽
Uzbekistan	■	▼	▼	▼	■	▽
Vanuatu		▽		▼		
Venezuela	■	▽	▽	▽	■	■
Viet Nam		▼	■	■	■	▽
Yemen	■	■	■	⏸	■	■
Zambia	■	▼	▽	▼	▽	⏸
Zimbabwe		▽	▼	▽	▼	▽

Note: This table brings together information contained in various sources of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in order to provide an overview of the status of reporting to the various Committees. For an official reference document please visit the United Nations Human Rights Database Website: www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf

Source: Amnesty International Website (web.amnesty.org/pages/treaty-countries-reporting-eng).

▼ **Overdue**
▽ **More than 5 years overdue**
⏸ **Pending**
■ **Not yet due**

Reports to be submitted to the UN treaty bodies during 2004 - 2005

	COMMITTEE ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD	COMMITTEE ON THE ELIMINATION OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN	COMMITTEE ON THE ELIMINATION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION	COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS	COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE	COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS
Albania	38th session January 2005				33rd session November 2004	
Angola	37th session September 2004					
Antigua and Barbuda	37th session September 2004					
Argentina					33rd session November 2004	
Armenia	35th session January 2004					
Australia	35th session September 2005					
Austria	38th session January 2005					
Azerbaijan						33rd session December 2004
Bahamas	37th session September 2004		64th session March 2004			
Bangladesh		31st session June 2004				
Belarus		30th session January 2004				
Belgium				81st session July 2004		
Belize	38th session January 2005					
Bhutan		30th session January 2004				
Bolivia	38th session January 2005					
Botswana	37th session September 2004					
Brazil	37th session September 2004		64th session March 2004			
Bulgaria					32nd session April/May 2004	
Canada					33rd session November 2004	
Central African Republic				81st session July 2004		
Colombia				80th session March 2004		
Costa Rica	39th session May 2005					
Croatia	37th session September 2004				32nd session April/May 2004	
Czech Republic					32nd session April/May 2004	
Chile					32nd session April/May 2004	
China	39th session May 2005					34th session May 2005
Denmark	35th session September 2005					33rd session December 2004
Dominica	36th session May 2004					
Dominican Republic		31st session June 2004				
Ecuador	38th session January 2005				33rd session November 2004	32nd session May 2004
El Salvador	36th session May 2004					
Equatorial Guinea	37th session September 2004	31st session June 2004				
Ethiopia		30th session January 2004				
Finland				81st session July 2004	33rd session November 2004	
France	36th session May 2004					
Germany	35th session January 2004	30th session January 2004		80th session March 2004	32nd session April/May 2004	
Greece					33rd session November 2004	32nd session May 2004
Guyana	35th session January 2004					
India	35th session January 2004					
Indonesia	35th session January 2004					
Iran, Islamic Rep.	37th session September 2004					

Source: UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Website (www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf).

Reports to be submitted to the UN treaty bodies during 2004 - 2005

	COMMITTEE ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD	COMMITTEE ON THE ELIMINATION OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN	COMMITTEE ON THE ELIMINATION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION	COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS	COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE	COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS
Italy						33rd session December 2004
Japan	35th session January 2004					
Korea, Dem. Rep.	36th session May 2004					
Kuwait		30th session January 2004				32nd session May 2004
Kyrgyzstan	37th session September 2004	30th session January 2004				
Lebanon			64th session March 2004			
Liberia	36th session May 2004					
Libya			64th session March 2004			
Liechtenstein				81st session July 2004		
Lithuania				80th session March 2004		32nd session May 2004
Luxembourg	38th session January 2005					
Malta						33rd session December 2004
Monaco					32nd session April/May 2004	
Mongolia	39th session May 2005					
Myanmar	36th session May 2004					
Namibia				82nd session October 2004		
Nepal	39th session May 2005	30th session January 2004	64th session March 2004			
Netherlands			64th session March 2004			
Netherlands & Aruba	35th session January 2004					
New Zealand					32nd session April/May 2004	
Nicaragua	39th session May 2005					
Nigeria	38th session January 2005	30th session January 2004				
Norway	39th session May 2005					
Panama	36th session May 2004					
Papua New Guinea	35th session January 2004					
Philippines	39th session May 2005					
Russian Federation	35th session September 2005					
Rwanda	36th session May 2004					
São Tomé and Principe	36th session May 2004					
Serbia and Montenegro				81st session July 2004		
Slovenia	35th session January 2004					
Spain		31st session June 2004	64th session March 2004			32nd session May 2004
Suriname			64th session March 2004	80th session March 2004		
Sweden	38th session January 2005		64th session March 2004			
Switzerland					33rd session November 2004	
Togo	38th session January 2005					
Trinidad and Tobago	39th session May 2005					
Uganda	35th session September 2005			80th session March 2004		
Yemen	39th session May 2005					
Zambia						34th session May 2004

Note: This schedule is tentative and the information might be updated during 2004. For official confirmation please visit the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Website.

Source: UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Website (www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf).

Glossary

AIDS (15-49 years old)
Percentage of adults (15-49 years) living with HIV/AIDS.
Source: Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS); extracted from The State of the World's Children, UNICEF.

Births attended by skilled health personnel
Percentage of births attended by skilled health personnel (doctors, nurses or midwives).
Source: The State of the World's Children, UNICEF.

Children reaching 5th grade
[Primary school entrants reaching grade five.] Percentage of children entering first grade of primary school who eventually reach grade five.
Source: UNESCO.

Contraceptive use among currently married women aged 15-49
Percentage of women in union aged 15-49 years currently using contraception.
Source: UN Statistics Division and UN Population Information Network.

DPT immunised 1-year-old children
Percentage of children under one year of age who have received at least one dose of DPT vaccine.
DPT: Diphtheria, pertussis (whooping cough) and tetanus.
Source: The State of the World's Children, UNICEF.

Estimated earned income ratio (women/men)
Ratio of estimated female earned income to estimated male earned income.
Source: Human Development Report, UNDP.

Estimated low birth weight
Newborns weighing less than 2,500 grams, with measurement taken within the first hours of life, before significant postnatal weight loss has occurred.
Source: WHO and UNICEF; extracted from World Development Indicators, World Bank.

Estimated maternal mortality ratio (per 100,000 live births)
Annual number of deaths of women from pregnancy-related causes per 100,000 live births. Due to changes in the model of estimation, 1995 and 2000 data are not comparable.
Source: The State of the World's Children, UNICEF

Female legislators, senior officials and managers
Women's share of positions defined according to the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88) to include legislators, senior government officials, traditional chiefs and heads of villages, senior officials of special interest organisations, corporate managers, directors and chief executives, production and operations department managers and other department and general managers.
Source: The World's Women 2000: Trends and Statistics, UN Statistics Division.

Female professional and technical workers (as % of total)
Women's share of positions defined according to the International Standard Classification of Occupations to include physical, mathematical and engineering science professionals (and associate professionals), life science and health professionals (and associate professionals), teaching professionals (and associate professionals) and other professionals and associate professionals.
Source: The World's Women 2000: Trends and Statistics, UN Statistics Division.

Gini Index
Measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or, in some cases, consumption expenditure) among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Gini index of zero represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality.
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank.

Gross tertiary enrolment ratio gap (women/men)
Ratio of female gross tertiary enrolment ratio to male gross tertiary enrolment ratio.
Source: UNESCO.

Illiteracy (15-24 years old)
Percentage of people aged 15-24 who cannot, with understanding, read and write a short, simple statement on their everyday life.
Source: UNESCO; extracted from World Development Indicators, World Bank.

Infant mortality (per 1,000 live births)
Number of infants dying before reaching one year of age, per 1,000 live births in a given year.
Source: World Bank staff estimates using data from the United Nations and UNICEF, State of the World's Children; extracted from World Development Indicators, World Bank.

Information and communication technology expenditure (% of GDP)
It includes external spending on information technology ("tangible" spending on information technology products purchased by businesses, households, governments, and education institutions from vendors or organisations outside the purchasing entity), internal spending on information technology ("intangible" spending on internally customised software, capital depreciation, and the like), and spending on telecommunications and other office equipment.
Source: Digital Planet 2002: The Global Information Economy, World Information Technology and Services Alliance, which uses data from the International Data Corporation; extracted from World Development Indicators, World Bank.

Internet users (per 100,000 people)
People with access to the worldwide network, per 100,000 people.
Source: International Telecommunication Union, Challenges to the Network: Internet for Development and database; extracted from World Development Indicators, World Bank.

Literacy ratio gap (women/men)
Ratio of female illiteracy ratio (15-24 years old) to male illiteracy ratio (15-24 years old). Calculated by Social Watch.
Source: UNESCO; extracted from World Development Indicators, World Bank.

Malaria (cases per 100,000 people)
The total number of malaria cases reported to the World Health Organization by countries in which malaria is endemic. Many countries report only laboratory-confirmed cases, but many in Sub-Saharan Africa report clinically diagnosed cases as well.
Source: Human Development Report, UNDP.

Measles immunised 1-year-old children
Percentage of children under one year of age who have received at least one dose of measles vaccine.
Source: The State of the World's Children, UNICEF.

Military expenditure (% of GDP)
(based on the NATO definition) Includes all current and capital expenditures on the armed forces, including peacekeeping forces; defence ministries and other government agencies engaged in defence projects; paramilitary forces, if these are judged to be trained and equipped for military operations; and military space activities. Such expenditures include military and civil personnel, including retirement pensions of military personnel and social services for personnel; operation and maintenance; procurement; military research and development; and military aid (in the military expenditures of the donor country). Excluded are civil defence and current expenditures for previous military activities, such as for veterans' benefits, demobilisation, conversion, and destruction of weapons.
Source: Yearbook: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI); extracted from World Development Indicators, World Bank.

Net primary enrolment ratio gap (women/men)
Ratio of female net primary enrolment ratio to male net primary enrolment ratio. Calculated by Social Watch.
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank.

Net secondary enrolment ratio gap (women/men)
Ratio of female net secondary enrolment ratio to male net secondary enrolment ratio. Calculated by Social Watch.
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank.

Official Development Assistance (% of GDP)
Grants or loans to countries and territories on Part I of the DAC List of Aid Recipients (developing countries) which are: (a) undertaken by the official sector; (b) with promotion of economic development and welfare as the main objective; (c) at concessional financial terms [if a loan, having a Grant Element (q.v.) of at least 25 per cent]. In addition to financial flows, Technical Co-operation (q.v.) is included in aid. Grants, loans and credits for military purposes are excluded. Transfer payments to private individuals (e.g. pensions, reparations or insurance payouts) are in general not counted.
Source: OECD.

Percentage of population with access to improved water sources
Percentage of the population who use any of the following types of water supply for drinking: piped water, public tap, borehole or pump, protected well, protected spring or rainwater. Improved water sources do not include vendor-provided waters, bottled water, tanker trucks or unprotected wells and springs.
Source: Global Water Supply and Sanitation Assessment 2000 Report, WHO and UNICEF; extracted from World Development Indicators, World Bank.

Personal computers (per 1,000 people)
Personal computers are self-contained computers designed to be used by a single individual, per 1,000 people.
Source: International Telecommunication Union, World Telecommunication Development Report and database; extracted from World Development Indicators, World Bank.

Polio immunised 1-year-old children
Percentage of children under one year of age who have received at least one dose of polio vaccine.
Source: The State of the World's Children, UNICEF.

Population below the national poverty line
Percentage of the population living below the national poverty line. National estimates are based on population-weighted subgroup estimates from household surveys.
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank.

Population living with less than USD 1 a day
Percentage of the population living on less than $1.08 a day at 1993 international prices (equivalent to $1 in 1985 prices, adjusted for purchasing power parity).
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank.

Population with access to sanitation
Percentage of the population with at least adequate excreta disposal facilities (private or shared, but not public) that can effectively prevent human, animal, and insect contact with excreta. Improved facilities range from simple but protected pit latrines to flush toilets with a sewerage connection. To be effective, facilities must be correctly constructed and properly maintained.
Source: Global Water Supply and Sanitation Assessment 2000 Report, WHO and UNICEF.; extracted from World Development Indicators, World Bank.

Poverty gap of population living with less than USD 1 a day
Mean shortfall from the poverty line (counting the non-poor as having zero shortfall), expressed as a percentage of the poverty line. This measure reflects the depth of poverty as well as its incidence.
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank.

Primary school enrolment ratio (net)
Number of children enrolled in primary school who belong to the age group that officially corresponds to primary schooling, divided by the total population of the same age group.
Source: UNESCO.

Public education expenditure (% of GDP)
Public spending on public education plus subsidies to private education at primary, secondary, and tertiary levels.
World Bank and OECD GDP estimates.
Source: UNESCO; extracted from World Development Indicators, World Bank.

Public health expenditure (% of GDP)
Recurrent and capital spending from government (central and local) budgets, external borrowings and grants (including donations from international agencies and non-governmental organisations), and social (or compulsory) health insurance funds.
Source: World Health Report, WHO and subsequent updates and from the OECD for its member countries, and from countries' national health accounts, supplemented by World Bank country and sector studies; extracted from World Development Indicators, World Bank.

Scientists and engineers in research and development (per million people)
People trained to work in any field of science who are engaged in professional R&D (research and development) activity. Most such jobs require completion of tertiary education.
Source: Statistical Yearbook, UNESCO; extracted from World Development Indicators, World Bank.

Seats in parliament held by women
Seats held by women in a lower or single house or an upper house or senate, where relevant.
Source: The World's Women 2000: Trends and Statistics, UN Statistics Division.

Share of poorest quintile consumption 1987/2001
Share that accrues to subgroups of population indicated by deciles or quintiles. Percentage shares by quintile may not sum to 100 because of rounding.
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank.

Telephone mainlines (per 1,000 people)
Telephone lines connecting a customer's equipment to the public switched telephone network. Data are presented per 1,000 people for the entire country.
Source: International Telecommunication Union, World Telecommunication Development Report and database; extracted from World Development Indicators, World Bank.

Tertiary education enrolment ratio (% gross)
Ratio of total enrolment, regardless of age, to the population of the age group that officially corresponds to the level of education shown. Tertiary education, whether or not to an advanced research qualification, normally requires, as a minimum condition of admission, successful completion of education at secondary level.
Source: UNESCO; extracted from World Development Indicators, World Bank.

Total debt service (% of GNI)
Sum of principal repayments and interest actually paid in foreign currency, goods, or services on long-term debt, interest paid on short-term debt, and repayments (repurchases and charges) to the IMF.
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank.

Total social security expenditure (% of GDP)
Expenditure on pensions, health care, employment injury, sickness, family, housing and social assistance benefits in cash and in kind, including administrative expenditure.
Source: Cost of Social Security, World Labour Report, ILO.

Tuberculosis (cases per 100,000 people)
The total number of tuberculosis cases reported to the World Health Organization. A tuberculosis case is defined as a patient in whom tuberculosis has been bacteriologically confirmed or diagnosed by a clinician.
Source: Communicable Disease Global Atlas Database, WHO.

Tuberculosis immunised 1-year-old children
Percentage of children under one year of age who have received at least one dose of tuberculosis vaccine.
Source: The State of the World's Children, UNICEF.

Under-5 children malnutrition (weight for age)
Prevalence of child malnutrition (weight for age) is the percentage of children under five whose weight for age is less than minus two standard deviations from the median for the international reference population ages 0 to 59 months. The reference population adopted by the WHO in 1983 is based on children from the United States, who are assumed to be well nourished.
Source: WHO; extracted from World Development Indicators, World Bank.

Under-5 mortality (per 1,000 live births)
Probability of dying between birth and exactly five years of age expressed per 1,000 live births.
Source: The State of the World's Children, UNICEF.

Undernourishment (% of total population)
Undernourishment is the result of food intake that is insufficient to meet dietary energy requirements continuously. The World Health Organization recommended that the average person needs to take a minimum of 2,300 Kcal per day to maintain body functions, heath and normal activity. This global minimum requirement of calories is broken down into country-specific differentials that are a function of the age-specific structure and body mass of the population.
Source: The State of Food Insecurity in the World, FAO.

Women aged 15-49 attended at least once during pregnancy by skilled health personnel
Percentage of women aged 15-49 years attended at least once during pregnancy by skilled health personnel (doctors, nurses or midwives).
Source: The State of the World's Children, UNICEF.

Women in decision-making positions in government at ministerial level
Decision-making position in Government is defined as a position at the level of minister or the equivalent, deputy or assistant minister or the equivalent, secretary of State or permanent secretary or the equivalent and deputy of State or director of government or the equivalent. Ministerial level includes persons at the level of minister or the equivalent.
Source: The World's Women 2000: Trends and Statistics, The UN Statistics Division.

Women wage employment in non-agricultural sector (as % of total non-agricultural employees)
Share of female workers in the non-agricultural sector expressed as a percentage of total employment in the sector.
Source: Human Development Report, UNDP.

Compilation of articles on human rights mentioned in the statistics tables

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 1948.

Article 2
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.

Article 19
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.

Article 22
Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.

Article 25
1. Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.
2. Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.

Article 26
1. Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.
2. Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.
3. Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children.

Article 27
1. Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.

International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), 1965.

Article 5
In compliance with the fundamental obligations laid down in article 2 of this Convention, States Parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms and to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment of the following rights:
(a) The right to equal treatment before the tribunals and all other organs administering justice;
(b) The right to security of person and protection by the State against violence or bodily harm, whether inflicted by government officials or by any individual group or institution;
(c) Political rights, in particular the right to participate in elections - to vote and to stand for election - on the basis of universal and equal suffrage, to take part in the Government as well as in the conduct of public affairs at any level and to have equal access to public service;
(d) Other civil rights, in particular:
(i) The right to freedom of movement and residence within the border of the State;
(ii) The right to leave any country, including one's own, and to return to one's country;
(iii) The right to nationality;
(iv) The right to marriage and choice of spouse;
(v) The right to own property alone as well as in association with others;
(vi) The right to inherit;
(vii) The right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion;
(viii) The right to freedom of opinion and expression;
(ix) The right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association;
(e) Economic, social and cultural rights, in particular:
(i) The rights to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work, to protection against unemployment, to equal pay for equal work, to just and favourable remuneration;
(ii) The right to form and join trade unions;
(iii) The right to housing;
(iv) The right to public health, medical care, social security and social services;
(v) The right to education and training;
(vi) The right to equal participation in cultural activities;
(f) The right of access to any place or service intended for use by the general public, such as transport, hotels, restaurants, cafes, theatres and parks.

Article 6
States Parties shall assure to everyone within their jurisdiction effective protection and remedies, through the competent national tribunals and other State institutions, against any acts of racial discrimination which violate his human rights and fundamental freedoms contrary to this Convention, as well as the right to seek from such tribunals just and adequate reparation or satisfaction for any damage suffered as a result of such discrimination.

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), 1966.

Article 3
The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights set forth in the present Covenant.

Article 7
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work which ensure, in particular:
(a) Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with:
(i) Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind, in particular women being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal work;
(ii) A decent living for themselves and their families in accordance with the provisions of the present Covenant;
(b) Safe and healthy working conditions;
(c) Equal opportunity for everyone to be promoted in his employment to an appropriate higher level, subject to no considerations other than those of seniority and competence;
(…)

Article 9
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to social security, including social insurance.

Article 10
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that:
(…)
2. Special protection should be accorded to mothers during a reasonable period before and after childbirth. During such period working mothers should be accorded paid leave or leave with adequate social security benefits.

Article 11
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. The States Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right, recognizing to this effect the essential importance of international co-operation based on free consent.
2. The States Parties to the present Covenant, recognizing the fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger, shall take, individually and through international co-operation, the measures, including specific programmes, which are needed:
(a) To improve methods of production, conservation and distribution of food by making full use of technical and scientific knowledge, by disseminating knowledge of the principles of nutrition and by developing or reforming agrarian systems in such a way as to achieve the most efficient development and utilization of natural resources;
(b) Taking into account the problems of both food-importing and food-exporting countries, to ensure an equitable distribution of world food supplies in relation to need.

Article 12
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.
2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to achieve the full realization of this right shall include those necessary for:
(a) The provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant mortality and for the healthy development of the child;
(b) The improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene;
(c) The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other diseases;
(d) The creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service and medical attention in the event of sickness.

Article 13
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to education. They agree that education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and the sense of its dignity, and shall strengthen the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. They further agree that education shall enable all persons to participate effectively in a free society, promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations and all racial, ethnic or religious groups, and further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.
2. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that, with a view to achieving the full realization of this right:
(a) Primary education shall be compulsory and available free to all;

(b) Secondary education in its different forms, including technical and vocational secondary education, shall be made generally available and accessible to all by every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free education;
(c) Higher education shall be made equally accessible to all, on the basis of capacity, by every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free education;
(d) Fundamental education shall be encouraged or intensified as far as possible for those persons who have not received or completed the whole period of their primary education;
(e) The development of a system of schools at all levels shall be actively pursued, an adequate fellowship system shall be established, and the material conditions of teaching staff shall be continuously improved.
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to choose for their children schools, other than those established by the public authorities, which conform to such minimum educational standards as may be laid down or approved by the State and to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.
4. No part of this article shall be construed so as to interfere with the liberty of individuals and bodies to establish and direct educational institutions, subject always to the observance of the principles set forth in paragraph I of this article and to the requirement that the education given in such institutions shall conform to such minimum standards as may be laid down by the State.

Article 14
Each State Party to the present Covenant which, at the time of becoming a Party, has not been able to secure in its metropolitan territory or other territories under its jurisdiction compulsory primary education, free of charge, undertakes, within two years, to work out and adopt a detailed plan of action for the progressive implementation, within a reasonable number of years, to be fixed in the plan, of the principle of compulsory education free of charge for all.

Article 15
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone:
(a) To take part in cultural life;
(b) To enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications;
(c) To benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.
2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to achieve the full realization of this right shall include those necessary for the conservation, the development and the diffusion of science and culture.
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to respect the freedom indispensable for scientific research and creative activity.
4. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the benefits to be derived from the encouragement and development of international contacts and co-operation in the scientific and cultural fields.

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), 1979.

Article 5
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures:
(…)
(b) To ensure that family education includes a proper understanding of maternity as a social function and the recognition of the common responsibility of men and women in the upbringing and development of their children, it being understood that the interest of the children is the primordial consideration in all cases.

Article 7
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the political and public life of the country and, in particular, shall ensure to women, on equal terms with men, the right:
(a) To vote in all elections and public referenda and to be eligible for election to all publicly elected bodies;
(b) To participate in the formulation of government policy and the implementation thereof and to hold public office and perform all public functions at all levels of government;
(c) To participate in non-governmental organizations and associations concerned with the public and political life of the country.

Article 10
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in order to ensure to them equal rights with men in the field of education and in particular to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women:
(a) The same conditions for career and vocational guidance, for access to studies and for the achievement of diplomas in educational establishments of all categories in rural as well as in urban areas; this equality shall be ensured in pre-school, general, technical, professional and higher technical education, as well as in all types of vocational training;
(b) Access to the same curricula, the same examinations, teaching staff with qualifications of the same standard and school premises and equipment of the same quality;
(c) The elimination of any stereotyped concept of the roles of men and women at all levels and in all forms of education by encouraging coeducation and other types of education which will help to achieve this aim and, in particular, by the revision of textbooks and school programmes and the adaptation of teaching methods;
(d) The same opportunities to benefit from scholarships and other study grants;
(e) The same opportunities for access to programmes of continuing education, including adult and functional literacy programmes, particularly those aimed at reducing, at the earliest possible time, any gap in education existing between men and women;
(f) The reduction of female student drop-out rates and the organization of programmes for girls and women who have left school prematurely;
(…)

Article 11
1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the field of employment in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, the same rights, in particular:
(a) The right to work as an inalienable right of all human beings;
(b) The right to the same employment opportunities, including the application of the same criteria for selection in matters of employment;
(c) The right to free choice of profession and employment, the right to promotion, job security and all benefits and conditions of service and the right to receive vocational training and retraining, including apprenticeships, advanced vocational training and recurrent training;
(d) The right to equal remuneration, including benefits, and to equal treatment in respect of work of equal value, as well as equality of treatment in the evaluation of the quality of work;
(e) The right to social security, particularly in cases of retirement, unemployment, sickness, invalidity and old age and other incapacity to work, as well as the right to paid leave;
(f) The right to protection of health and to safety in working conditions, including the safeguarding of the function of reproduction.
2. In order to prevent discrimination against women on the grounds of marriage or maternity and to ensure their effective right to work, States Parties shall take appropriate measures:
(a) To prohibit, subject to the imposition of sanctions, dismissal on the grounds of pregnancy or of maternity leave and discrimination in dismissals on the basis of marital status;
(b) To introduce maternity leave with pay or with comparable social benefits without loss of former employment, seniority or social allowances;
(c) To encourage the provision of the necessary supporting social services to enable parents to combine family obligations with work responsibilities and participation in public life, in particular through promoting the establishment and development of a network of child-care facilities;
(d) To provide special protection to women during pregnancy in types of work proved to be harmful to them.
3. Protective legislation relating to matters covered in this article shall be reviewed periodically in the light of scientific and technological knowledge and shall be revised, repealed or extended as necessary.

Article 12
1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the field of health care in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, access to health care services, including those related to family planning.
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph I of this article, States Parties shall ensure to women appropriate services in connection with pregnancy, confinement and the post-natal period, granting free services where necessary, as well as adequate nutrition during pregnancy and lactation.

Article 14
(…)
2. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in rural areas in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, that they participate in and benefit from rural development and, in particular, shall ensure to such women the right:
(a) To participate in the elaboration and implementation of development planning at all levels;
(b) To have access to adequate health care facilities, including information, counselling and services in family planning;
(c) To benefit directly from social security programmes;
(d) To obtain all types of training and education, formal and non-formal, including that relating to functional literacy, as well as, inter-alia, the benefit of all community and extension services, in order to increase their technical proficiency;
(e) To organize self-help groups and co-operatives in order to obtain equal access to economic opportunities through employment or self employment;
(f) To participate in all community activities;
(g) To have access to agricultural credit and loans, marketing facilities, appropriate technology and equal treatment in land and agrarian reform as well as in land resettlement schemes;
(h) To enjoy adequate living conditions, particularly in relation to housing, sanitation, electricity and water supply, transport and communications.

Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), 1989.

Article 17
States Parties recognize the important function performed by the mass media and shall ensure that the child has access to information and material from a diversity of national and international sources, especially those aimed at the promotion of his or her social, spiritual and moral well-being and physical and mental health. To this end, States Parties shall:
(a) Encourage the mass media to disseminate information and material of social and cultural benefit to the child and in accordance with the spirit of article 29;
(b) Encourage international co-operation in the production, exchange and dissemination of such information and material from a diversity of cultural, national and international sources;
(c) Encourage the production and dissemination of children's books;
(d) Encourage the mass media to have particular regard to the linguistic needs of the child who belongs to a minority group or who is indigenous;
(e) Encourage the development of appropriate guidelines for the protection of the child from information and material injurious to his or her well-being, bearing in mind the provisions of articles 13 and 18.

Article 24
1. States Parties recognize the right of the child to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health and to facilities for the treatment of illness and rehabilitation of health. States Parties shall strive to ensure that no child is deprived of his or her right of access to such health care services.

2. States Parties shall pursue full implementation of this right and, in particular, shall take appropriate measures:
(a) To diminish infant and child mortality;
(b) To ensure the provision of necessary medical assistance and health care to all children with emphasis on the development of primary health care;
(c) To combat disease and malnutrition, including within the framework of primary health care, through, inter alia, the application of readily available technology and through the provision of adequate nutritious foods and clean drinking-water, taking into consideration the dangers and risks of environmental pollution;
(d) To ensure appropriate pre-natal and post-natal health care for mothers;
(e) To ensure that all segments of society, in particular parents and children, are informed, have access to education and are supported in the use of basic knowledge of child health and nutrition, the advantages of breastfeeding, hygiene and environmental sanitation and the prevention of accidents;
(f) To develop preventive health care, guidance for parents and family planning education and services.
3. States Parties shall take all effective and appropriate measures with a view to abolishing traditional practices prejudicial to the health of children.
4. States Parties undertake to promote and encourage international co-operation with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the right recognized in the present article. In this regard, particular account shall be taken of the needs of developing countries.

Article 25
States Parties recognize the right of a child who has been placed by the competent authorities for the purposes of care, protection or treatment of his or her physical or mental health, to a periodic review of the treatment provided to the child and all other circumstances relevant to his or her placement.

Article 26
1. States Parties shall recognize for every child the right to benefit from social security, including social insurance, and shall take the necessary measures to achieve the full realization of this right in accordance with their national law.
2. The benefits should, where appropriate, be granted, taking into account the resources and the circumstances of the child and persons having responsibility for the maintenance of the child, as well as any other consideration relevant to an application for benefits made by or on behalf of the child.

Article 27
1. States Parties recognize the right of every child to a standard of living adequate for the child's physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social development.
2. The parent(s) or others responsible for the child have the primary responsibility to secure, within their abilities and financial capacities, the conditions of living necessary for the child's development.
3. States Parties, in accordance with national conditions and within their means, shall take appropriate measures to assist parents and others responsible for the child to implement this right and shall in case of need provide material assistance and support programmes, particularly with regard to nutrition, clothing and housing.
(…)

Article 28
1. States Parties recognize the right of the child to education, and with a view to achieving this right progressively and on the basis of equal opportunity, they shall, in particular:
(a) Make primary education compulsory and available free to all;
(b) Encourage the development of different forms of secondary education, including general and vocational education, make them available and accessible to every child, and take appropriate measures such as the introduction of free education and offering financial assistance in case of need;
(c) Make higher education accessible to all on the basis of capacity by every appropriate means;
(d) Make educational and vocational information and guidance available and accessible to all children;
(e) Take measures to encourage regular attendance at schools and the reduction of drop-out rates.
2. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that school discipline is administered in a manner consistent with the child's human dignity and in conformity with the present Convention.
3. States Parties shall promote and encourage international cooperation in matters relating to education, in particular with a view to contributing to the elimination of ignorance and illiteracy throughout the world and facilitating access to scientific and technical knowledge and modern teaching methods. In this regard, particular account shall be taken of the needs of developing countries.

Article 29
1. States Parties agree that the education of the child shall be directed to:
(a) The development of the child's personality, talents and mental and physical abilities to their fullest potential;
(b) The development of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and for the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations;
(c) The development of respect for the child's parents, his or her own cultural identity, language and values, for the national values of the country in which the child is living, the country from which he or she may originate, and for civilizations different from his or her own;
(d) The preparation of the child for responsible life in a free society, in the spirit of understanding, peace, tolerance, equality of sexes, and friendship among all peoples, ethnic, national and religious groups and persons of indigenous origin;
(e) The development of respect for the natural environment.

NATIONAL REPORTS

ALGERIA

Terror, poverty, crisis and earthquakes

Algeria is experiencing widespread and increasing poverty, and frequent terrorist attacks. Natural disasters - droughts, earthquakes and floods - have also ravaged the country. Together these are the main threats to human security. A series of economic reforms and a political crisis dating from the early 1990s have only made the situation worse.

Association El Amel pour le Développement Social

Human security is the primary objective of all policies aimed at social and economic development. However, the social and political crisis of the last decade poses a real threat to human development and human security.

In recent years, three factors stand out as obstacles to human security in Algeria: terrorism, poverty and natural disasters.

Public safety and the terrorist threat

Terrorist activities began in the early 1990s. Since then, lack of public safety has been the main obstacle to achieving human security. In spite of the best efforts of the police and security services to protect individuals' lives and public and private property, thousands of Algerians have died in the last 10 years. Estimates of the exact number of direct victims of terrorism differ, but it is clear that, to a varying degree, the wave of terrorist assassinations has affected all social sectors and regions of the country, with the following consequences:

- A large number of highly qualified people - writers, teachers, journalists, doctors and artists - went into exile because they felt under threat.
- There has been an exodus of peasant farmers from the areas where massacres took place, to the cities and their outskirts. As a result, lands and goods were abandoned and living conditions in urban areas deteriorated.
- There has been an increase in social tension and an intensification of collective demands in nearly every region of the country. Demonstrations and disturbances of public order are common. In some regions this has brought about a situation of such generalised disorder that many people fear for their safety.

The dimensions of poverty

Poverty has become a permanent feature of Algerian society, affecting one-fifth of the population (6.3 million people). The scale of the problem has turned it into a pressing political issue.

Eight per cent of Algerians were living below the poverty line in 1988; this rose to 14% in 1995. People living in extreme poverty were 3% of the population in 1988, increasing to 6% in 1995. The proportion of the population at risk of sliding into poverty given any change in their living conditions was 12.2% in 1988, but rose to 22% in 1995.

Structural causes

The period of increasing terror and poverty coincided with economic reforms, in the context of which structural adjustments were made as directed by the Bretton Woods institutions. Although political reforms were also carried out, these ended in failure with the suppression of elections and the political crisis which began in the early 1990s.[1]

Violence and the political and economic crises threatened human security and gave rise to contradictions: while the poor got steadily poorer, a new affluent class of people enriched by the crisis emerged, and the middle class gradually disappeared. While state-owned companies foundered, and several were closed, private banks and companies sprang up amid suspicions of corruption and a lack of transparency.

All of these circumstances, added to institutional incompetence and excessive bureaucracy, have discouraged production, profitable investment and employment. Consequently, economic development has been halted for several years. The profound employment crisis has been deepened by labour deregulation, there is a housing crisis, health services have been cut back, diseases and epidemics have appeared, there is not enough safe drinking water and the environment has suffered.

Unemployment

The structural adjustment programme has caused considerable deterioration in the employment situation in the last 10 years. Four hundred thousand jobs were lost and the informal sector of the economy grew. A total of 2,339,450 people are out of work, of whom 37.79% are peasant farmers (884,110 people). The unemployment rate is 26%.

Consumption

Average household consumption and expenditure went through major changes from 1988 to 2000. According to figures from the National Statistics Office, in 2000 families spent USD 22,400 million, an average of USD 4,938 per household, and USD 745 per person. In 1988, total spending was USD 4,027 million, an average of USD 132 per person. Average spending per person has therefore increased by a factor of 5.6 in 12 years.[2]

Over the same period, the difference in spending power between rich and poor households has also continued to increase: the poorest 20% of families accounted for only 7.5% of total expenditure, while the richest 20% spent 43.2% of the total.

Health

Although the population is afforded free public health care, the most vulnerable families now have less access to medical care, for various reasons. The high cost of medicines and the fact that some of these are not covered by health insurance systems have led to a reduction in the purchase of medicines. Other factors which contribute to restricting these families' access to medical care include the deteriorated condition of clinics and hospitals, malfunctioning equipment, lack of maintenance, the frequent lack of medicines and, especially in rural areas, the distance to health centres.

Indicators for 2000 show that 80% of mothers received antenatal care during pregnancy, and that 86% of these mothers received their care in public health institutions. Ninety-seven per cent of children had been vaccinated. In cities, 92% of children aged 12 to 23 months had received all their vaccines; in rural areas, only 86% were fully vaccinated.

1 "In the December 1999 elections, 40 per cent of … registered voters abstained. The first round, for 430 seats in Parliament, gave the victory to the FIS (Islamic Salvation Front), which took 188 seats. … President Chadli Ben Jedid resigned under strong pressure from the military and politicians fearful of a FIS victory. A Security Panel made up of three military leaders and the Prime Minister was put into power. … In February, the High Council of State proclaimed a state of emergency throughout the nation, for a year. The army was opposed to any possibility of sharing power with the FIS. In March 1992, the FIS was outlawed." From then on, Islamic militants resorted to violence and terror. See Instituto del Tercer Mundo. *The World Guide. An alternative reference to the countries of our planet. 2003-2004.* Montevideo: ITeM-New Internationalist Publications Ltd, 2003.

2 Office National des Statistiques (ONS). *Enquête sur la Consommation en Algérie*, Algeria: 2000.

Housing

According to the General Population Census of 1998 there were 5,021,000 housing units, of which 4,102,000 (81.64%) were occupied. Although the number of occupied houses increased, demographic growth was even higher. Consequently, the average occupancy index rose from 7.14 persons per household in 1998 to 8.6 persons per household in 2001.[3]

Furthermore, the number of people living in unsanitary housing conditions is nearly 3.7 million, that is nearly 12% of the population. This high proportion of inadequate dwellings, and the absence of recreational areas for children such as public parks, indicate a deteriorating living environment.

Education

School attendance by 6 to 14-year-olds stands at 94%. Schooling levels among people who have received some kind of education are distributed as follows: 39% have attended primary schools, 35% have reached middle schools, 19% have been to secondary schools and 6.5% have had a university education.

The illiteracy rate remains high, in spite of efforts by the Government and civil society. In 1998 32% of the population was illiterate, falling to 23% in 2002. Illiteracy is higher in rural areas (31%) than in urban centres (18%). It is also greater among women (30%) than among men (18%), and is particularly high among peasant women (40%) as opposed to urban women (23%).

School attendance, educational attainment and the years of schooling received are all factors of social differentiation. Children from peasant families have difficulty in completing a school cycle that lasts for several years. Additional differences between town and countryside, and between rich and poor, put these children at a disadvantage when looking for jobs. The most disadvantaged in this situation are the poorest, particularly poor girls who live in rural areas.

Natural disasters: droughts and floods

The following types of natural disaster have hit Algeria particularly hard:

Drought and desertification

Algeria suffered ten years of drought which caused serious crop losses and increased the costs of agricultural production. In consequence, more food had to be imported. Expenditure on food imports is almost USD 2 billion, and represents a high percentage of export earnings. These funds could have been spent on imported products of greater economic usefulness, such as spare parts and equipment needed for production, or on paying for new development programmes and reducing unemployment.

Ninety per cent of the population lives on just 12% of the country's surface area. In the absence of proper environmental policies, the area of cultivable land has been steadily reduced by erosion, drought, and demographic or developmental factors. Wilderness areas have increased in size: the desert is rapidly encroaching on agricultural land.

Floods

After the drought there were heavy rains in various parts of the country which caused serious flooding and great loss of life and property. The worst effects of the 2001 floods were felt in the city of Algiers, especially in the Bab El Oued district. Hundreds of people died, many more were declared missing, whole neighbourhoods were buried and there was considerable material damage.

Earthquakes

The most densely populated part of Algeria is the north, and it is also an area of frequent seismic activity. The latest earthquake alone, on 21 May 2003, caused the death of 2,500 people and left 30,000 families homeless. Public authorities are still struggling to rehouse them, even if only in huts. Other earthquakes in different parts of the interior have caused dozens of deaths. Many families have lost their homes, but there is no up-to-date information about their situation.

Social needs

Algerian society has many needs, all of them urgent.

After all that the population has suffered at the hands of terrorists, guaranteeing the safety of persons and property must take first place among social needs. Society demands better results from the security forces entrusted with public safety.

Poverty is a complex social phenomenon and as such requires sustained action, aimed at improving the present situation but also planned for long-term effectiveness. On this issue and also with respect to education different social sectors have expressed a range of demands:

- Revise, update and restructure the distribution of social welfare benefits, in coordination with civil society, and local associations in particular.
- Contain unemployment by encouraging the practice of training contracts, mainly for young university graduates, so that they can contribute to their family incomes and gain professional experience.
- Promote micro-businesses among young people by facilitating access to bank loans and simplifying administrative red tape.
- Increase salaries, especially those of public sector workers responsible for priority services such as health and education (including higher education), to increase their buying power and improve their standard of living.
- Improve housing quality and implement programmes to make houses affordable for the majority of the population; compel real estate companies, banks, and savings institutions to respect their obligations and commitments to their clients; prevent electoral considerations from determining housing allocation.[4]
- Guarantee free and compulsory schooling, especially for children from the neediest families and in remote areas, where children often have to do tough physical work in order to survive. Remove education from the political arena.

Finally, with respect to natural disasters and their consequences, civil society urges the following:

- More aid for the victims of the 21 May 2003 earthquake, and for all the victims of the other disasters (floods, droughts, etc.) that have occurred in different regions of the country.
- Address environmental problems by including them in the country's socio-economic development programmes, as well as in educational curricula. Encourage greater concern for environmental issues among different sectors of society.
- Combat activities and practices that are causing serious damage to the environment, which are steadily increasing and are a threat to large population centres; involve the population in measures to raise environmental awareness. ■

References

Conseil National Économique et Social (CNES), *Rapport sur le Développement Humain*, Algeria, 2002.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). *Rapport Arabe sur le Développement Humain 2002*, 2002.

Centre National d'Études et d'Analyses pour la planification (CENEAP), *Enquête sur les Résultats de l'Ajustement Structurel en Algérie*, Algeria, 2000.

3 Office National des Statistiques (ONS). *Résultats du Recensement Général de Population.* Algeria: 1998.

4 "Many Algerians say corrupt local mayors and other officials regularly distribute housing among family and friends - allegations that have sparked rioting outside municipal offices in Algiers." www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/2002/08/11/news/world/3839094.htm

ANGOLA

Peace under-mined

The signing of the Luena Accords on April 2002 between the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) Government and the insurgent National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), paved the way for a tense post-war period. Obstacles to human security abound. In the aftermath of the war, characterised by destruction and poverty, with thousands of people killed or mutilated by mines, the Government's response is repression and terror.

Sindicato Nacional de Professores (SINPROF)

Miguel Filho

War in Angola had continued without a break since 1975, until at last, the peace accords were signed in 2002. According to an Intermón-Oxfam paper, "around one million dead, 4 million people displaced in their own country, more than 500,000 refugees (out of a population of 12 million), millions of buried anti-personnel mines, and the destruction of the material infrastructure of the country… is the balance after 27 years of armed confrontation between the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), which has been in government since 1979, and National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). …the Memorandum of Understanding (known as MOU, or the Luena Accords) signed on 4 April 2002 by the Government and UNITA, and based on the Lusaka Accords of 1994, has opened the door for new hopes and a historic opportunity to reconstruct a country that has been totally devastated."[1]

The Luena Accords should have established a basis for the reconstruction of the country which, after 30 years of war, needs urgent structural changes. However, it is evident that although military authorities on both sides have declared their desire for national reconciliation, and the Government has announced new plans to overcome the crisis, in practice nothing has been achieved.

Insecurity, born of unemployment and the lack of basic foodstuffs, continues to be felt throughout the country even now that the war is over. The peace is the result of the surrender of one of the warring factions, and is tarnished by the process which made it possible, with all its inadequacies and improvisations.

There has been an alarming increase in crime since the end of the war. The return of hundreds of thousands of former insurgents has tripled unemployment and underemployment, which now affect over half of the population. The number of children living on the streets is increasing, and so is the number of people killed and mutilated by mines left behind by the Cuban, Soviet and South African armies.

TABLE 1

Human Development Indicators 2003		
Human Development Index rank	2003	164
Total population (millions)	2001	12.8
Annual population growth rate (%)	1975-2001	2.8
Population under age 15 (as % of total)	2001	47.4
Population over age 65 (as % of total)	2001	2.7
GDP (USD billions)	2001	9.5
GDP per capita (USD)	2001	701
Population with access to improved sanitation (%)	2000	44
Population with access to an improved water source (%)	2000	38
Births attended by skilled health personnel (%)	1995-2001	23
Physicians (per 100,000 people)	1990-2002	5
Undernourished people (as % of total population)	1998-2000	50
Life expectancy at birth (years)	2000-05	40.1
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)	2001	154
Under-five mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)	2001	260
Maternal mortality ratio (per 100,000 live births)	1995	1,300
Net primary enrolment ratio (%)	2000-01	37
Adult literacy rate (% age 15 and above)	2001	42
Public expenditure on education (as % of GDP)	1998-2000	2.7
Public expenditure on health (as % of GDP)	2000	2
Military expenditure (as % of GDP)	2001	3.1
Total debt service (as % of GDP)	2001	19.7
Internally displaced persons (thousands)	2001	202
Total armed forces (thousands)	2001	100
Total armed forces Index (1985=100)	2001	202

Source: UNDP. Human Development Report 2003; and UNICEF. The State of the World's Children 2000.

Poverty and repression

Immediately after the signing of the peace accords the Cabinet announced the Government's priorities, placing emphasis on re-opening the main roads to restore communications and transport of people and goods. The budget for the Economic and Social Programme for 2003-2004 stated the following priorities:

- Emergency shelter, food aid and health services for people displaced by the war and their families.
- Help for abandoned children.
- Help for those disabled by the war.
- Reintegration of displaced people and ex-combatants into society.
- Extension of State administration to all areas of the country.

1 Intermón-Oxfam. *Angola: construyendo la paz. Retos y perspectivas tras un año de la firma de los acuerdos.* May 2003. www.intermonoxfam.org/cms/HTML/espanol/86/Angola_construyendolapaz_mayo03.pdf

- Extension of health services and education to every community.
- Extension of financial services to the whole country.

The main obstacle to implementing the programme outlined above has been an obvious lack of political will on the part of members of the Government, as the army and the police have continued to receive the lion's share of budget allocations.

Since mid 2003, the necessities of survival have led to increases in both demand for jobs and criminal offences. The Government has responded with repression. Protests organised by political parties are banned. In order to confiscate weapons in the hands of the people, the police behave like terrorists and appear in full battle gear. Although the Constitution does not support the death penalty, alleged criminals are publicly executed. A special anti-terrorist brigade, a rapid response police unit, a helicopter brigade and a canine brigade have been created. The presidential bodyguards, too, are involved in spreading terror.

Meanwhile, the Judiciary, which is not yet independent from the Executive, is powerless to maintain constitutional legality. One serious threat to human security is that the principle of the equality of all citizens before the law is not respected in practice. An example is the case of MPLA diplomats put on trial for corruption, who are sure that they will never go to prison, unlike those belonging to the opposition.

Without schools or doctors

One of the cornerstones for building human security in the short term is education. It is through education that people must become conscious of the importance of freedom and the right to life. But it is a privilege that is beyond the reach of many children. There are too few schools - many areas have none at all - and obtaining a place means being exposed to the corruption that is prevalent there.[2] Non-governmental organisations have taken this problem on board, as in the case of the Catholic Church's Evangelisation and Cultural Foundation (FEC), which has recruited teachers and educationists in Portugal for educational projects in the interior of the country.

According to the Ministry of Education, about 3 million children and young people are studying, while more than 40,000 are on the streets waiting for schools to be built. Teachers have no teaching materials, no curriculum and no text books for their classes, and their average salary is USD 70 per month.

With regard to the health situation, there is one doctor per 20,000 people and only 30% of the population have access to health care. Infant mortality is more than 154 per 1,000 births and life expectancy is less than 40 years. Sixty-five percent of sanitation infrastructure was destroyed during the war.[3]

By the end of 2003 the Government had not repaired any major road. The Government is unable to provide food for the neediest and most remote population centres, such as the refugee camps for former rebel insurgents and their families, where deaths from starvation have begun to increase.

Landmines continue to be a major cause of death in rural areas. According to the National Institute for Removal of Explosives, around 10 people a day are killed trying to work or look for food in minefields. There are some 10 million unexploded mines spread throughout the country. Seventy thousand people have been mutilated by landmine explosions, of whom 8,000 are children.[4] Victims of the mines, whether civilian or military, have not received the medical attention they need.

Financial help from the Government is meagre, so international aid is being sought to deactivate the mines, and to provide artificial limbs for the victims. An African meeting on landmines will attempt to adopt a unified position to take to the Conference to review the Ottawa Convention, to be held in Kenya later in 2004.[5] ■

2 Information provided by *The World Guide 2005-2006*, which will be made available on the Internet in October 2004.

3 www.ibacom.es/Unicef/emergencia

4 *Ibid.*

5 The First Review Conference / 2004 Nairobi Summit on a Mine Free World will take place from 29 November to 3 December 2004 in Nairobi, Kenya. www.icbl.org/reviewconference/

Post-crisis reconstruction

The changes in the political and institutional system after the crisis of 2001 have caused large sectors of the population to again consider politics as a viable tool for improving the people's material conditions of life. However, the seriousness of the social crisis calls for urgent measures to guarantee the full exercise of economic, social and cultural rights for all Argentines. This means attaining sustained economic growth and a change of approach in the design and implementation of economic and social policies and in the relationship between the Government and the multilateral credit organisations.

Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales (CELS) - Programa de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales

Jimena Garrote / Luis Ernesto Campos

On 25 May 2003 the transition government's mandate headed by President Eduardo Duhalde came to an end when elected President Néstor Kirchner took office. This changeover represented a turning point at the institutional level.

An important step in the gradual restoration of the legitimacy of the political system and of democratic culture was the support shown by society at large when the new Governmet overhauled the Supreme Court and set up a new participative procedure for the selection of its judges.[1] Good progress has thus been made towards restoring legitimacy to the Supreme Court and to the battered judiciary in general, which had been a good example of the institutional crisis in Argentina.[2]

Other important measures taken by the Government that contributed to strengthening the country's democratic institutions included reopening lawsuits and criminal proceedings in relation to crimes of terrorism committed by the State, replacing the military leadership (which was seeking agreements to leave impunity untouched), opening to the public the security forces' and intelligence services' files, and the abolishment by parliament of the Due Obedience and *Punto Final* laws.[3]

However, the main indicators of the social and economic crisis still show values incompatible with the full development of a real democracy.

The Government's stance in treating social protest as a criminal offence was ambiguous. Although the Government has been moving closer to the social organisations most affected by this measure, it has been unable to find a legal solution to the problem of the people who currently stand charged with taking part in social protests.[4] In October 2003 the Government resorted to force in a demonstration by *piquetero* organisations,[5] and took legal action against them. Although it subsequently took steps to reverse this move, its ill-advised reaction has set a dangerous precedent in that it has established the idea that treating social protest as a criminal offence it is still a political option.[6]

Two years after the political and institutional crisis that came to a head in December 2001 it is only possible to analyse the situation if we study the relation between institutional reform, the evolution of socio-economic variables and the State's response to social protest.

Indicators are still alarming

Although macro-economic indicators began to show signs of recovery in the first quarter of 2003, the consequences of the implementation of neoliberal policies during the 1990s are still very much in evidence.

According to official data, in May 2003 the poorest 10% of Argentines received 1.5% of income while the richest 10% received 37%.[7] Nearly a year after the new Government came to power it had still not formulated a specific policy designed to reverse this trend.

In a survey carried out in the third quarter of 2003 it was found that 16.3% of the economically active population were unemployed, and that 16.6% were under-employed. This translates into at least 3.5 million people who have problems of access to jobs and who are actively seeking employment.[8]

However, these figures for the unemployed and under-employed do not reflect the full extent of this problem in the country as a whole since the study only covered 28 urban areas, containing approximately 64% of the total population, so the real number of people with employment problems is even higher. This indicator is further distorted by the impact of the Unemployed Heads of Household Programme (see below), and if we regard as unemployed all those whose main occupation stems from this programme the real unemployment rate is 21.4%.

According to the latest official information available,[9] in May 2003 54.7% of the population (just under 20 million people) were below the poverty line,[10] and 26.3% (approximately 9.5 million people) were living in extreme poverty. [11]

The proportion of children and adolescents who are poor and extremely poor is even higher. In October 2002 75% of children under 18 were living below the poverty line, and 42.7% were extremely poor.[12]

An official report from the same month found that 46.1% of children under two living in urban areas (around 332,000 children in this age group) were at nutritional risk. The high level of nutritional risk among this sector of the population reflects the effects of a prolonged crisis exacerbated by high inflation rates, with the most serious impacts afflicting the most vulnerable sectors. In fact, between May 1998 and October 2002 the number of children who were not assured of a minimum adequate diet and whose physical growth and development were definitely threatened more than doubled. For over half this group (23.3% of the total) the risk is critical.[13]

The latest official figures (from 2002) on deaths among children below the age of one show that there are an alarming 11,702 deaths per year, equivalent to

1 The new procedure for appointing members of the Supreme Court takes account of proposals that a group of civil society organisations formulated during 2002, and which were set out in a series of documents entitled "A Court for Democracy". The full texts can be found at: www.cels.org.ar

2 Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales (CELS). "The State's Response to the Social Crisis" in *Human Rights in Argentina: Report 2002-2003.* Annual report. Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI Eds, 2003.

3 Parliament's decision included repealing the decree prohibiting the extradition of military personnel accused of crimes against humanity, and granting constitutional status to the UN Convention on the Non-Applicability of Satutory Limitation to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity.

4 According to estimates from the Argentine Workers' Head Office, more than 4,000 people are facing court proceedings for taking part in demonstrations.

5 One of the most visible consequences of the social crisis of the 1990s was the emergence of many grassroots organisations whose main protest tactic was to block intercity highways. These were called *piquetes* (cf. English *pickets*), hence the name "*piquetero* organisations".

6 The Government acted in a similar way when it proposed setting up a special police group (this was later dropped) which would not bear firearms, to negotiate with the leaders of social protest demonstrations. This proposal meant giving the police a central role in the resolution of social conflicts thus reducing the demonstrators' original grievance to a fight for public space, and it ignored the fact that the basic duty of the State is to protect demonstrators, not neutralise them.

7 National Statistics and Census Institute (INDEC). *Permanent Survey of Households (EPH), Income in all urban areas.* May 2003.

8 INDEC. *The Labour Market: main indicators (3rd quarter 2003), according to the new Permanent Survey of Households.* December 2003.

9 INDEC. *EPH.* May 2003.

10 According to INDEC, the "poverty line" method consists in deciding if household income is sufficient to pay for goods and services needed to meet essential food and non-food needs.

11 INDEC's "extreme poverty line" consists in deciding if households have sufficient income to cover a basket of foodstuffs that satisfy minimum energy and protein needs.

12 In seven provinces poverty among people under 18 was above 80% and in five the rate of extreme poverty exceeded 50%. INDEC. *EPH.* October 2002.

13 System of Information, Evaluation and Monitoring of Social Programmes (SIEMPRO). *Nutritional risk in children under two years old.* July 2003.

an infant mortality rate of 16.8 per thousand, of which 6,898 deaths are considered avoidable.[14] Three things are worth signalling: this is the first time since 1995 that there has been a percentage increase in this indicator in Argentina; it is the largest annual increase since 1986; and it is taking place in an international context in which rates for this indicator are falling.[15]

The Government's response

The Government's main and almost exclusive response to the social and economic crisis is still the Unemployed Heads of Households Programme, initiated at the beginning of 2002. It established a payment of ARS 150 (about USD 40, a little under half the amount needed to satisfy the basic food requirements of a typical family) for all unemployed heads of household with children under 18. As time passed it became clear that it was not a serious strategy to combat poverty through a more equitable distribution of income, but rather a palliative measure designed to defuse the unprecedented levels of social conflict which were threatening the very survival of the institutional political system. In practice the programme fell far short of its pretensions to be granting people their due rights. The fact that the benefits were temporary, not universal, and subject to an application deadline meant that the programme continued the welfarist - rather than rights-based - logic underpinning the social policies implemented in the 1990s.[16]

The Government did not make significant changes to the design of the programme, so the problems outlined here still exist. On the contrary, it decided to strengthen and give priority to social programmes lacking objective criteria for accepting or rejecting applications for benefits from people who are in an identical situation in terms of the vulnerability of their rights.

The struggle over public service charges

In the 1990s the logic of economic and social policies was determined by the relationship between the Government and the international financial institutions (IFIs), giving rise to the biggest social and institutional crisis in the country's history. The unprecedented increases in the levels of poverty and extreme poverty, and the increasing impossibility for ever-larger sectors of the population to effectively exercise their economic, social and cultural rights, paralleled the implementation of policies promoted by the IFIs.

Over the past two years, a central issue in talks between the Government and the IMF has been the latter's insistence that charges for privatised public services be increased. Since the re-opening of negotiations in January 2002, IMF officials have been emphasising the losses suffered by privatised companies as a result of devaluation, and insisting that the charges for these services be raised despite the fact that the policy of imposing more and more increases on the people who are least able to pay has already been shown to be untenable.

In the present situation, imposing a generalised increase in charges for public services would condemn the majority of the population to subsistence in conditions that are even worse than they are now, by impeding or reducing their access to essential services such as water, electricity and gas.

Initially the IMF's constant demands that charges should be raised seemed to be a move to protect business interests. In fact, the IMF authorities represent a number of countries that have a direct economic interest in the performance of these privatised companies. This affects the IMF's impartiality and leads one to suppose that they are acting to defend the interests of these countries rather than to promote the interests of an international body that should not favour any one country over others.

These pressures are what lay behind the repeated attempts by former President Duhalde to raise the charges for public services outside the procedures established for the re-negotiation of the privatised companies' contracts. This approach, besides being morally questionable in the light of the seriousness of the social situation, turned out to contravene both national legislation[17] and the founding charter of the IMF itself.[18] Consequently the proposed increases were blocked by legal means, and up to the present have not been implemented.

However, the demand that charges be increased is still being reiterated today. It is now backed by an argument expressed by the director of the Western Hemisphere Department of the Fund, Anoop Singh, on his last visit to Argentina to the effect that one of the reasons the Heads of Household Programme was implemented was that people with very limited resources would thus be able to pay for services, and that therefore the increase in charges is viable.[19]

After President Kirchner took office, this accommodating attitude on the part of the Government seems to have changed since, unlike the transition government, the new administration has respected the prevailing legal norms governing the re-negotiation of contracts for public services, and has not attempted to increase charges outside this process.

The Presidency has however pushed through a new law modifying the Economic Emergency Law that regulates the procedure for raising these charges. While that law had made any kind of increase subject to overall re-negotiation of each contract, thus guaranteeing that no measures could be adopted that afterwards might turn out to be erroneous, the new law allows the Presidency to authorise increases in public service charges before the process of contract re-negotiation has ended. That is to say, while the Government has not attempted to increase service charges, it could do so at any time because it now has the necessary legal tools.[20] If this happens, large sectors of the population will be denied access to essential services, jeopardising still further the full exercise of their economic, social and cultural rights.

Conclusion

The changes made to the political and institutional system after the crisis of December 2001 allowed the focus of public debate to shift back to the definition of aspects of the reconstruction of democracy in the country.

The first measures implemented by the Government included changes to the composition of the Supreme Court and steps to remove impunity for violations of human rights committed under the military dictatorship that began in 1976. This has contributed to making large sectors of the population again consider politics as an effective tool for improving people's material conditions of life.

However, the seriousness of the social crisis requires that the Government adopt urgent measures to guarantee the full exercise of the economic, social and cultural rights of the whole population, this being the only way to rebuild a real democracy. This involves attaining sustained economic growth, as well as changing the logic of the design and implementation of economic and social policies that will allow a fair distribution of the wealth generated by the country. On this point it is vitally important that the relationship between Argentina and the multilateral credit organisations should respect these criteria rather than continue to stand in the way of the country's social development.

The incipient economic recovery initiated in early 2003 poses a great challenge to the Government. It is essential that it should face up to discussing the distribution of wealth in the country, and avoid replicating the process followed in the 1990s - when considerable growth in economic activity was taking place simultaneously with a social crisis on a scale unprecedented in Argentina's history - as well as effectively guaranteeing the strengthening of democratic institutions. ■

14 Ministry of Health and Social Action. *Vital statistics, basic information for 2002.* December 2003. See also DeCiDeS (Democracy, Citizenship and the Right to Health). *Other Victims of the Market Coup Appear.* Buenos Aires, February 2004.

15 INDEC, *Rates of infant mortality by political-territorial division of mother's residence,* at www.indec.gov.ar

16 For an analysis of the programme, see "Argentina: In the hands of the oligopoly of foreign capital", in *Social Watch Report 2003: The poor and the market.* Montevideo, 2003.

17 After the 2002 devaluation, Congress passed the Economic Emergency Law authorising the Government to re-negotiate its contracts with privatised companies so that they could adapt to the new economic scenario. This law laid down that tariff increases could only be made in the framework of a re-negotiation in which all contracts would be analysed and all interested parties (including consumers) would participate.

18 Article XII, section 4 of the IMF Charter.

19 IMF pressure to raise public service charges contrary to both Argentine legislation and the Fund's own charter were denounced to the Independent Evaluation Office of the Fund by users' and consumers' organisations and by the CELS. For more information on this subject see www.cels.org.ar/Site_cels/noticias/boletin/FMI_tarifas.pdf.

20 Besides this, the legislative reform has restricted participation by congress in the revision of the texts of the new contracts (once these are re-negotiated) that are submitted to it.

Progress and setbacks in a period of transition



Since the reforms initiated in the early 1990s, the country has taken steps towards repealing legislation and measures that adversely affect human rights and dignity. Although Bahrainis today enjoy more freedom than ever, the right of citizens to have a say in the country's affairs remains restricted, and the Government has still not addressed the pressing problems of unemployment, discrimination, women's rights and housing, nor for that matter, the human rights and conditions of thousands of Asian workers.

Bahrain Human Rights Society (BHRS)[1]

The Kingdom of Bahrain is going through a period of transition shaped by a range of factors, some of which have their roots within the country, while others are linked to Bahrain's integration into the globalisation process. Changes introduced include the Reform Project, initiated by King Hamad in response to popular demand, and the referendum on the National Action Charter. Other factors affecting Bahrain are the impact of the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC),[2] and the reforms required for accession to the WTO.

The Reform Project

In 2000, in addition to publicly promising to reinstate Parliament, the King for the first time appointed non-Muslims, including a Jewish businessman and four women, one of them a Christian, to the Consultative Council (a body created in 1992, whose 40 members monitor most of the Government's policies).

In the referendum held in 2001 Bahrainis showed overwhelming support for the political reforms proposed by the King in the National Action Charter. The reforms, which will come into effect in 2004, include Bahrain's transition to a constitutional monarchy, with the establishment of the three branches of government.

In 2001 several political associations and NGOs were officially recognised. In June the General Committee of Workers was officially registered as the General Union of Bahraini Workers and in July the Bahrain Human Rights Centre, the first institution of its kind in the Gulf region, was also registered. In September a trade union law was passed. The Bahrain Women's Union, an advocate of women's rights, was given official recognition in November.

A better balance

Since the start of the Reform Project several steps have been taken towards repealing legislation and measures that adversely affect human rights and dignity. The 1975 State Security Law was repealed and the State Security Court was abolished. A general amnesty secured the release of all political prisoners, and allowed the return of all exiles and the naturalisation of stateless people. This was in effect the end of a de facto state of emergency.

The new governance system, which should lead to a democratic constitutional monarchy (including also the establishment of a Constitutional Court and Financial Monitoring Bureau), has contributed to a better balance of state powers, improving safeguards for citizens.

Measures were also taken to ensure the independence of the judiciary. The Public Prosecutor's Office became the Attorney General's Office and was taken out of the Ministry of Interior and annexed to the Ministry of Justice. Although they do not enjoy complete independence from the Executive, courts now tend to take independent decisions even to the extent of countering government interests. This was clearly demonstrated in the cases involving three journalists who had been prosecuted at the instigation of the Government.

In January 2002 Hafez el-Sheikh Saleh, a journalist with the daily *Akhbar al-Khaleej* who also writes for *Ach Charq* and *Al Quds al-Arabi,* won a court case against Information Minister Nabil al-Hamer, who had banned him from working as a journalist. In June Mansour Al-Jamri, editor of *Al-Wasat*, a leading independent daily,[3] and one of its reporters, Hussein Khalaf, faced six months in prison or a fine of BHD 1,000 (USD 2,658) for reporting in March that three suspected terrorists had been released on bail. The authorities claimed that the journalists did not have the necessary authorisation from the Prosecutor's Office to publish information about the alleged terrorists. The King enacted a new press law in November 2002 guaranteeing the right to "express one's opinion and to disseminate it orally or in writing". However, offences "against the Islamic faith, the unity of the people and the person of the King" or "inciting division or sectarianism" are punishable by six months to five years in prison. The journalists won the case. In response to objections raised by the Bahrain Human Rights Centre and an independent union of Bahraini journalists (in the process of formation) the authorities announced that the new press law would be amended in consultation with journalists.

Apart from these incidents, freedom of expression is tolerated to a great extent. New newspapers have been licensed and journalists enjoy greater freedom in their work. There are no longer any restrictions on satellite reception and restrictions on foreign press are minimal. But freedom of expression is threatened by religious theologians, who consider that secularism equals atheism.

Open and free activities by political and civil organisations are now legal, and political and civil associations have been given official recognition, though falling short of the status of political parties. Meetings, demonstrations, strikes and sit-ins are usually held without police intervention or prosecution.

Remaining obstacles

These measures, among others, have contributed to the promotion of human rights and dignity, but basic flaws remain in both the state system and government policies that demand radical changes. Among the priorities to be addressed are the following:

- In comparison to the 1973 Constitution, the 2001 Constitution still lacks provisions that clearly separate the three state powers (executive, legislative and judiciary). The 2001 Constitution cannot be amended without the King's consent.
- A number of decrees and laws restricting the rights and freedom of citizens and organisations were passed before the National Assembly began functioning. Moreover Parliament lacks real authority to legislate and exercise control over the Executive branch of government, which still controls the State.
- The promised constitutional and legislative reforms have not materialised. The state bureaucracy, which is riddled by corruption and inefficiency, is intact; promises made by top

1 The report was written by a team headed by BHRS President Dr Sabeka Alnajar.

2 The Co-operation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC) is a regional organisation created in May 1981 by Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The creation of the GCC was prompted by these countries' sense of vulnerability resulting from the disparities between their oil wealth, their small and dispersed populations (28 million), their vast surface area (2.6 million km2) and their limited military capabilities in a generally unstable region. The GCC holds 45% of the world's oil reserves and supplies 20% of global crude production. "The EU & the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC)". http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/gulf_cooperation/intro/index.htm

3 *Al-Wasat*'s editor lived in self-imposed exile in London for many years and was the spokesperson of the opposition Bahrain Freedom Movement.

officials have not been kept. In short, the change has been more rhetorical than substantial.

- Reform requires a new government, but Prime Minister Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa has been in office since 1971. Government policy is hesitant and is failing to solve major problems such as unemployment, discrimination, poverty, housing, etc.

No security for the unemployed, no redistribution of wealth

Political stability has created a positive climate for investment and business in general. The country's fortunes have improved as a result of higher oil prices and increased production: Saudi Arabia agreed to cede all revenue from Abo Safa, a jointly-controlled oil field, to Bahrain; Abo Safa has increased its capacity from 130,000 to 300,000 barrels per day. GDP grew 4% in 2001-2003 and is expected to rise to 7% in 2004-2006. However, this growth has not been reflected in improvements in the population's welfare or human security. Social justice, the eradication of corruption and the restructuring of government spending in particular have not been addressed.

The country still lacks minimum wage legislation, unemployment security, an anti-poverty safety net and a taxation system designed to redistribute wealth. The social security system does not cover small businesses with fewer than five employees or the thousands of "free-visa" workers.[4]

Unemployment is still a chronic problem. Although there are no reliable statistics, it is estimated that around 18,000 workers (15% of the indigenous workforce) are unemployed. The foreign workforce has grown to around 270,000 workers (67% of the total workforce) and although the economy will grow, with the free influx of foreign labour and the absence of minimum wages, the indigenous unemployment rate will not be reduced.

In addition, the Government has not developed economic policies which will create new jobs to meet the current requirements of the labour market. This problem is compounded by the inadequacies of the formal education system, which has been criticised as too traditional and incompatible with the needs of the labour market. The outlook for most young Bahrainis, therefore, is bleak.

Although per capita income has been rising and is estimated at USD 10,000 per year, this figure is deceiving. In the absence of a taxation system or assets to guarantee social welfare, the equitable distribution of national wealth - a much-repeated slogan that was meant to epitomise Bahraini society both at home and abroad - proves to be a myth. Some studies calculate the required minimum wage to be BHD 180 (USD 477) a month, based on the assumption that in a family of five an average of two people work.

The de facto minimum wage in the public sector is BHD 150 (USD 398) a month, while thousands of Bahrainis earn less than BHD 120 (USD 318) a month in the private sector, and tens of thousands of Asian workers earn as little as BHD 50 (USD 133) a month. For them, a decent standard of living is a dream.

All inhabitants have free access to basic education and health services; however the current tendency towards making paid healthcare plans compulsory for citizens and introducing health insurance requirements for foreigners will add a new burden to low-income sectors. Public transport and municipal sanitation have been privatised.

Discrimination and violence against women

To sum up, while in general terms respect for the human rights and dignity of citizens has improved, not enough constitutional, institutional and legal guarantees have been established.

The internal détente has also unleashed religious, fundamentalist and intolerant forces that threaten to undermine human rights and democracy in the long run. The efforts to pass a family code were aborted by religious zealots. Though women were granted equal political rights in the 2001 Constitution, they are still politically marginalised by society. No woman has been elected to municipal councils or Parliament; and domestic violence threatens the personal safety and integrity of women and children.

In addition, the human rights and dignity of the foreign labour force have deteriorated. Asian workers, including domestic servants, suffer inhuman working conditions.[5] There are numerous credible reports that domestic workers, especially women, are forced to work 12- or 16-hour days and given little time off, besides being malnourished and subjected to verbal and physical abuse, including sexual molestation and rape. Between 30% and 40% of the attempted suicide cases handled by the Government's psychiatric hospitals are foreign domestic workers.[6]

The impact of the GCC: Globalisation and US leadership

No GCC member, not even conservative and influential Saudi Arabia, has undermined the pro-democracy movement in Bahrain. Bahrain's accession to the WTO had a positive effect on the processes of democratisation and promotion of human rights. Yet the US strategy of combining the war against terrorism with the reform of allied regimes such as Bahrain, while positive in the short term, could prove to be negative in the long term.

Bahrain was chosen as the focal point for the US-Middle East Partnership for democracy and human rights. Under this Partnership, the United States provides resources and expertise to Middle East countries to support their efforts to promote democracy and human rights. Reform of political and legal systems was encouraged, and this was reflected positively in the case of Bahrain. However, the reforms implemented are designed exclusively from a US perspective, which enhances pro-US interests and disregards the cultures and societal composition of the countries receiving assistance. As a result, in the long run the national interest could be sacrificed in the name of assimilation with US global policy.

The safety of human beings

Since the Reform Project got underway in February 2001, the security atmosphere has changed dramatically. Hostility between the security forces and the public gradually diminished as political prisoners were released and exiles were allowed to return home. Other measures were taken to normalise the situation in the country, such as legalising political organisations, ensuring freedom of expression, association and affiliation, and re-employing people dismissed for political motives. The Ministry of the Interior has taken measures to ensure that the police work within the law and respect human rights. We could therefore say that Bahraini citizens have made progress in matters of human security. Still pending is a solution to the problems endured by the Asian labour force - especially Asian domestic workers - whose human rights and living conditions are under constant attack. ■

4 Many influential members of society are involved in the "importation" of cheap labour with a "free-visa" arrangement. The importer (agent) charges a percentage of whatever income the labourer earns. According to government figures, an average of 80 free-visa labourers are imported every day (2,400 per month, 28,800 per year) to work in all types of activities. The Bahraini Government has recently issued a decree ruling that Bahraini employers found recruiting foreign labourers without first obtaining a license from the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs will be imprisoned and fined.

5 Bahrain's 200,000 foreign workers were granted the right to join trade unions in September 2002. www.migrationint.com.au/news/nauru/oct_2002-20mn.asp

6 See www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18273.htm. Arab countries (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, Jordan and Lebanon) receive a growing number of Asian domestic workers. Despite the lack of accurate statistics, available estimates indicate that most of them are women and come from Sri Lanka, Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and India. www.caramasia.org

The drawbacks of poor governance



The failure in governance in Bangladesh, one of the poorest countries in the world, is accompanied by a score of other specific threats to human security, including the pressures of globalisation, poverty, unemployment, an outdated legal system, a weak civil society, lack of political commitment, an insensitive approach to gender issues, etc. Both the Government and NGOs are trying to improve the situation. Their separate actions, however, have not yet managed to strengthen human security rapidly enough.

Unnayan Shamannay
Social Watch-Bangladesh

Atiur Rahman / M Ismail Hossain
Mahfuz Kabir / Arifur Rahman[1]

Human security encompasses those aspects of security that affect an individual, a community or a state, including economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security. Also, as stated in Transparency International's report, "in any civilized society the two most important factors which would be the indicators of the quality of life are firstly, the protection of life and property and secondly, the dispensation of justice. In Bangladesh, both these factors are largely absent".[2] This underscores the urgency of introducing good governance in a country so badly affected by poverty and want.

Although the country ranks 139th in the Human Development Index and is the very last in the Transparency International Index, there have been improvements in some aspects of human security. But there are many shortcomings as well and the pace of changes is still slow, and personal insecurity has increased, especially for women.

Economic security

Economic security has been increasing in Bangladesh as reflected in rising per capita income and declining poverty. The head count ratio of poverty decreased from 58.8% in 1991-92 to 49.8% in 2000. The poverty gap also decreased from 17.2% to 12.9% and the squared poverty gap from 6.8% to 4.6% during the same period.[3] However, the poverty reduction rate has been very slow - about one percentage point per annum. If the present trend continues it will take about 50 years to bring down the level of poverty to zero. While there have been some improvement in terms of poverty reduction measures, the absolute number of poor people has increased - about 65 million people were poor in 2000. Furthermore, poverty reduction during the 1990s was accompanied by increasingly unequal income distribution. Both the urban and rural poor have become more vulnerable in terms of income security due to privatisation brought about by structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), which have already left many people unemployed.[4]

Food security

The Constitution declares that the State is fundamentally responsible for ensuring the food security of its citizens. Total food-grain production in the country nearly doubled between 1980-81 and 2000-01. But increase in food per capita availability over the same period was outpaced by population growth. Considerable progress has been made, however, in agricultural production (especially rice), in the liberal import policy which facilitates the closing of the food gap rapidly in times of emergency, and in a number of food programmes targeted at the poor. Yet there are still seasonal and regional food problems. The recent widespread cases of starvation in the northern part of the country indicates that food sovereignty has not yet been achieved due mainly to an inefficient official distribution system and the fact that the poor do not qualify for unemployment benefit.

Health security

Health security (relative freedom from diseases, infections and malnutrition) has improved for most of the population, but the Government's overall health expenditures are not directed at securing poor people's health. The poor are more prone to illnesses than the non-poor irrespective of sex or other social indicators. Marginalised groups continue to face strong barriers to access a corrupt public health care system and are forced to attend private clinics. The rich always get priority and better facilities. This disparity between poor and non-poor in terms of access to government health care is more acute in urban areas. The urban ultra-poor are particularly deprived in terms of curative care and maternal health (Chart 1).

The health system also glaringly discriminates against women. More than 90% of births take place in the mother's home and are not supervised by trained staff, and deaths due to pregnancy-related complications affect three women per hour (26,000 per year).

Environmental security

There are mixed results in environmental security. Access to safe drinking water has increased and now reaches 95.44% of the population, yet there is the growing menace of arsenic contamination - 50 of the country's 64 districts are now exposed to this threat. On the other hand, although access to sanitation has increased from 21% in 1990 to 43.4% in 2000, it is still a far cry from the 80% sought by the Millennium Development Goals. Air pollution in Dhaka City has increased, and the land is degraded as a consequence of the excessive use of chemical fertilizers, deforestation and saline water intrusion due to shrimp culture. Deforestation has doubled the areas vulnerable to flooding. However, social forestry, nurseries and vegetable gardens are on the increase. Finally, Bangladesh faces a threat derived from the greenhouse effect: a rise in sea level which may affect coastal areas.

Personal security

Personal security has deteriorated in many ways. Law and order is marked by insecurity, coercion and violence. This has led to poor governance, criminalisation of politics and violation of citizens' rights. The media provide ample evidence of the disturbing crime growth and the troubling shortcomings of legislation, law enforcement system, court system and prisons.

The personal security of people from all social groups and strata is at risk, and women are the most threatened by lack of security. The most common manifestations of violence against them consist of dowry related violence, rape, injury or death by corrosive and poisonous substances (i.e. acid throwing) and slave trafficking (see box).

Lack of personal security has limited investment, especially direct foreign investment, and has slowed down the rate of poverty reduction.

1 Chairman, Unnayan Shamannay and Social Watch-Bangladesh; Professor, Department of Economics, Jahangirnagar University; Junior Consultant, Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies (BIDS); Fellow, Unnayan Shamannay and Coordinator, Social Watch-Bangladesh.

2 www.ti-bangladesh.org/docs/survey/overview.htm

3 Bangladesh Sangbad Sangstha (BSS). *Household Income and Expenditure Survey 2000*. Dhaka: Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, Planning Division, Ministry of Planning, Government of Bangladesh, 2003.

4 Rahman, Atiur *et al.* "Impact of Structural Adjustment Policies: An Assessment Using Participatory Tools". Vol II, Main Report (Mimeo). Dhaka: SAPRI, 2000.

CHART 1

Distribution of health expenditure in Bangladesh, 2000 (%)



Source: S R Osmani (2003).

Structural obstacles

The 2002 UNDP report stresses the need for establishing law and order in the governance system for all, particularly for the excluded. The report also states: "...until now there has been a critical lack of studies that analyse these complex issues and attempt to understand their deeper structural causes."[5]

A recent study[6] shows that more than 60% of suicide cases are associated with various human security issues. The determining factor in 70% of these cases was personal insecurity including family feuds, torture by family members, dowry disputes, rape, sexual harassment, forced marriage, divorce, poverty, indebtedness, illness, fear of being arrested/accused, etc. Again, about 60% of the victims were women, the majority of them housewives (72.3%), followed by female students (19.8%) and domestic workers(5.2%).

The overwhelming lack of democratic mechanisms makes good governance impracticable. Economic and food security issues can only be guaranteed by an equitable distribution of resources and personal security can only be improved by ensuring that law and order are respected. Political security depends on political will and commitment. Many of these issues can only be resolved by adhering to a participatory governance system.

Bad governance practice at the local level, where trails and verdicts (Shalish) are usually conducted by the chairman or a member of the local government (Union Parishad) together with a village leader (Matbor) and a religious leader (Imam) may be equally responsible for human insecurity.

Government strategies

Broadly speaking, Government interventions are aimed at:

- Accelerating and expanding pro-poor economic growth
- Fostering human development of the poor
- Supporting women's advancement and closing the development gender gap
- Providing social protection to the poor against shock and vulnerability

A fifth strategy, which is likely to gain importance in the near future, is to enhance participatory governance, by listening to the voices of the poor and improving the non-income dimensions of well-being.

Some of the recent steps taken by the Government to ensure human security are:

- Introduction of speedy trials[7]
- Establishment of an independent Anti-Corruption Commission
- Legal reforms (see box)
- Restructure of law enforcement agency
- Anti-Crime Operation[8]

The NGOs' role

There are more than 2,000 NGOs working in the country including large ones like the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), Asha, PROSHIKA[9] and CARE. Their activities directly or indirectly help promote human security. The main focus of their activities is development of income generation; education and health services activities; training and infrastructure support; providing micro credit and legal aid; and conducting awareness activities. Many national and international NGOs have been working to enhance the food security situation, some of them working only with the Government, others with partner NGOs and community based organisations. Their actions, however, are unable to achieve substantial impact due to poor governance.

Ways forward

Co-ordinated efforts are needed on the part of the Government, civil society organisations and NGOs to deal with governance problems in consultation with the people, particularly women and marginalised groups. Good governance cannot exist unless all stakeholders collaborate and participate in making it possible. ■

References

Economic Relations Division (ERD). *A National Strategy for Economic Growth, Poverty Reduction and Social Development.* Dhaka: Ministry of Finance and Planning, Government of Bangladesh, March 2003.

National Institute of Population Research and Training (NIPORT). *Bangladesh Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) 1999-2000.* Dhaka, 2001.

Osmani, S R. "Delivering Basic Health Services to the Poor in Bangladesh: A Right to Development Approach". Presented at the Seminar *Accelerating Growth and Poverty Reduction in Bangladesh*, organised jointly by the Bureau of Economic Research, Dhaka University and the World Bank. Dhaka, 26-27 June 2003.

Rahman, Atiur *et al. Assessment of Development Results Bangladesh: The Role Played by UNDP in the Areas of Poverty, Gender, HIV and CHT.* Dhaka/New York: UNDP, June 2003 (Mimeo).

Shahabuddin, Quazi. "The Right to Food: Bangladesh". Prepared for The Right to Development Project, FXB Center for Health and Human Rights, Harvard School for Public Health. Boston, December 2002.

Rising violence against women and children

In Bangladesh - and in Myanmar, Cambodia and Pakistan, among other countries - sulphuric acid, cheap and easily obtained, is used by men to disfigure, and sometimes kill, women and girls. The reasons for these attacks are refusal to accept marriage proposals, domestic fights and quarrels over the property of goods.

A dramatic rise in violence against women in Bangladesh led, in March 2002, to the adoption of laws punishing sulphuric acid attacks with the death sentence. According to police records, the use of acid rose 50% between 2000 and 2002. In 2001 there were 13,339 cases of domestic violence, six times more than those registered in 1995 (2,048). Khaleda Zia, who was re-elected Prime Minister in 2001, introduced two additional laws as a deterrent. That year, 2,343 people were arrested for domestic violence. One year later, not one of them had been sentenced for their actions.

A rise in the slave trade has also taken place. It is estimated that, every year, between 5,000 and 6,000 women and children are victims of this trade, mainly from rural areas toward the cities and to India and Pakistan. The main victims of this traffic are children and poor women stigmatised due to marriage failure or pregnancy out of wedlock. Representatives of Caritas Bangladesh reported in April 2003 that the slave trade, linked to drug and arms traffic, has close ties with Bangladeshi political leaders.

Source: Information provided by *The World Guide 2005-2006*, which will be made available on the Internet in October 2004.

5 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). *Human Security in Bangladesh: In Search of Justice and Dignity.* Dhaka, September 2002.

6 Rahman, Arifur. "Gender Analysis of Suicide in the Contemporary Bangladesh" (draft mimeo), supported by Bangladesh Mahila Parishad (BMP). Dhaka, 2004.

7 When Parliament passed this controversial Bill in 2002 for serious crimes like murder, rape, trafficking in illegal arms and explosives, and drugs trafficking, the opposition Awami League walked out in protest.

8 The torture and death of detainees held in custody during the recent anti-crime Operation Clean Heart, involving 400,000 members of the armed forces, seriously undermined human security.

9 PROSHIKA is an acronym of three Bangla words, which stand for training (*proshikkhan*), education (*shikkha*), and action (*karmo*).

Endemic poverty and state violence

Unemployment, extreme poverty and growing inequality are structural ills that plague Bolivian society. They set the stage for bloody conflicts in 2003. The outcome: President Sánchez de Lozada fled the country in October, leaving 80 dead in his wake. Such upheavals are the result of the economic model imposed on the country for decades that is making human security and human development impossible to achieve.

Proyecto Control Ciudadano - CEDLA

Tom Kruse

2003: an explosive year

On 13 January, organisations of peasant coca growers began blockading roads, demanding a halt to the policy of forcible eradication of the coca crop imposed by the United States Government. Further demands soon followed: land for farmers, rejection of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), the right to speak and vote on the future of recently discovered reserves of natural gas. The reaction to this was repression. After 11 deaths, dozens of wounded and hundreds of arrests, tentative negotiations began, only to be interrupted four weeks later.

On 9 February the Government announced new taxes on salaries. Among other measures, tax was now to be applied to those earning more than two minimum salaries (USD 115) per month. There was a popular uprising against the new law and the police mutinied in the capital. The army was mobilised to repress the people and the police. After two days, 31 deaths and dozens of wounded - many of them victims of military snipers - the Government withdrew its tax ruling and did all it could to prevent calling the armed forces to account.

On 20 September the army again went into action against a road blockade set up by peasants in the Altiplano,[1] killing five people. Hunger strikes began in El Alto, a city close to La Paz that has mushroomed during recent decades with the influx of large contingents of indigenous and peasant migrants. At the same time, also in El Alto, a general strike began in protest against new taxes and government violence. On 10 October, government repression started. Seventy-two hours later, there were 50 dead. The United States announced its unconditional support for then President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada and indicated that it would not recognise a change of government brought about under pressure; meanwhile, it gave direct assistance in co-ordinating repression. Hunger strikes multiplied all over the country, demanding the president's resignation. On 17 October, Sánchez de Lozada fled to Miami, leaving 80 dead behind him - a higher toll than that of Hugo Banzer's dictatorship (1971-1978).[2]

The causes of the explosion

The free market and the depopulation of the countryside

The economic model that has been espoused and consolidated by successive governments since 1985 under the auspices of international financial institutions, has been characterised by deregulation of money markets, complete and rapid liberalisation of foreign trade, the transfer of thousands of millions of dollars' worth of public assets[3] and pensions savings into the hands of transnational private companies, and flexibilisation (by negligence or design) of labour. This economic model was supposed to encourage economic growth, whose benefits would eventually "trickle down" and reduce poverty. However, although inflation was reduced, economic growth has been disappointing and unequal.[4] In the 1990s the economy grew at an average of 3.8% per year, which was lower than growth levels in previous decades.[5] Meanwhile, between the 1992 and 2001 censuses, the 20% of the population commanding the highest income increased its share of total income from 56% to 58%, while the corresponding share of the poorest 20% of the population fell from 4.2% to 3.2%.[6]

Private investment and exports were supposed to be the engines of this economic model, generating profits that would be redistributed. However public investment remains central to the process of capital accumulation, and most of it is dependent on debt financing and external aid. The coexistence of a weak private sector and a debt-ridden State creates a chronic imbalance. After participating in several debt-reduction strategies (such as the Brady Plan), Bolivia is still trapped in the vicious circle of public indebtedness which remains as unsustainable as it was 20 years ago. In other words, public funds are being invested at the price of mortgaging the public finances - including expenditure on human security - of future generations.

According to several definitions, among them those of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), internal violence, large displacements of the civilian population, poverty, lack of housing and hunger constitute threats to human security. These are facts of Bolivian life that result from the Government's neo-liberal policies.

The "emptying of the Bolivian Andes and its medium-sized towns and villages"[7] can be attributed to historical causes (changes in land ownership in the mid-twentieth century); climate change (the cyclical effects of El Niño[8]); and political causes (free market policies).

Trade liberalisation has been extremely radical. Mamerto Pérez describes the market reform as "one of the most liberal, if not the most liberal, in the whole of Latin America, because not one of the farmers' products has been afforded any margin of protection in the bilateral and regional trade agreements entered into by Bolivia since 1985."[9]

According to Pérez, since the free market reform, imports of products substituting for goods produced by peasant farmers have multiplied by ten,

1 Editor's Note: Altiplano: high plateau between the Eastern and Western chains of the Andes, occupying about one-third of Bolivia.

2 Ledebur, K. *Popular protest brings down government.* WOLA Special Update, November 2003. www. wola, org/publications/Dr._bolivia_nov2003.pdf

3 Kruse, Tom and Cecilia Ramos, "Bolivia. Water and privatisation: doubtful benefits, concrete threats" in *Social Watch Report 2003. The Poor and the Market*, pp. 98-99.

4 With reference to this, Dr J. Sachs, one of the architects of structural adjustment, stated: "I told the Bolivians from the outset that what they have is a wretchedly poor economy with hyperinflation; if you are courageous, if you have guts, and if you do everything right, you'll end up with a wretchedly poor economy, but with stable prices." Green, Duncan. *Silent Revolution. The rise of Market Economics in Latin America.* London: Latin America Bureau, 1995, p. 6.

5 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). *Crecimiento económico y pobreza en la Bolivia de la Nueva Economía.* www.pnud.bo/docs/IDH 2002/ 05 chap.2. pdf

6 CEDLA. "Informe sobre la situación del derecho humano al trabajo en Bolivia". In *Seguimiento a las recomendaciones del Comité de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales; Informe Intermedio.* La Paz: CBDHDD, 2003, pp. 71-72. UNDP confirms this from various sources: the Gini coefficient - a measure of income inequality - has worsened in the last decade. See UNDP, *op cit*, p. 84.

7 Calla, Ricardo. *La caída de Sánchez de Lozada, la cuestión indígena, y las historia reciente en Bolivia: algunos apuntes y temas par el debate.* La Paz: Plural y Universidad de la Cordillera, 2003, p. 5.

8 The El Niño climate phenomenon has a "periodicity of three years, and has devastating effects on crop and livestock production... directly affecting something over 15% of GDP...". UNDP, *op cit*, p. 87.

9 Pérez, Mamerto. *¿El último capítulo? Posibles impactos del ALCA en las comunidades campesinas e indígenas de Bolivia.* La Paz: CEDLA, 2004, p. 61.

especially since the agreement between Bolivia and MERCOSUR came into effect in 1996. This avalanche of imports caused a dramatic fall in the real prices of goods produced by peasant and indigenous farmers in the 1990s. In the last ten years, prices fell by 60% in the lowlands; in the Altiplano they fell by 30%. The gross value of production by farmers at the end of 1998 was 44% lower than in 1985.[10]

These figures are the result of free market policies and reflect a traumatic breakdown in production as well as the "emptying" of an entire region. In El Alto, the epicentre of conflicts in 2003, 70% of the population lack basic services, and over "60% of households live below the poverty line, half of these in extreme poverty".[11]

The world of work: more for less

In El Alto, as in other towns and villages, survival requires entering into a second arena which threatens human security: the labour market. In simple terms, under the present economic model families have to mobilise more members, at earlier ages, to work harder in less protected conditions for lower wages. By working harder, many are barely able to maintain themselves at the same level of poverty as before in a society which has become increasingly polarised. Long-term marginalisation and loss of human rights are the cumulative effect of this daily exposure to such harsh realities: they amount to a process in which people are permanently stripped of their status as citizens.

The structure of production in Bolivia is highly - and increasingly - polarised. Big companies, many of them controlled by foreign investment, produce about 65% of GDP, but employ only 10% of the workforce. In contrast, the small businesses that employ 80% of workers produce 25% of GDP.[12] This production mechanism generates fewer jobs and decreasing job security over time.[13]

The economically active urban population grew by 4.6% between the 1992 and 2001 censuses, a higher rate of growth than that of the population itself (3.5%). Urban unemployment was below 5% in the early 1990s, but today it is around 10%, according to official figures. Underemployment was never lower than 50% of the workforce throughout the 1990s, and is now about 59% of the working population.[14]

"Formal" work,[15] in other words work for which a salary is paid, reached a peak of 63% in the 1970s; today less than half (48%) the working population receive a salary.[16] These changes have weakened the foundations of social security. In 2001, fewer than one in five workers had a pension plan - a lower level than in 1992.[17] The labour market has become a powerful mechanism for regressive redistribution. According to UNDP, as a response to the loss in purchasing power, the number of family members sent out to work increased by 30% in 1985-1997, but poverty levels remained unchanged.[18] In other words, as we said before, more people are working harder for lower returns.

Doing away with the rule of law

Changes in the world of work are not merely the result of economic factors - they are above all the product of public policies, either directly because of the way they are designed, or indirectly because of what their omissions allow to go unpunished.

The various structural adjustment programmes initiated in 1985 introduced changes, including the so-called "freedom of contract", which facilitated hiring and firing at will. It also gave a go-ahead signal for systematic abuses by employers, constant violations of workers' rights and the use of "flexibilising" tactics against unions. Membership of unions - the only means of ensuring that workers' rights are respected - fell from 17.5% to 11% during the 1990s.[19]

In the knowledge that the adjustment measures would lay a heavy burden of cost on the poorest, "emergency programmes" to provide temporary work have been in effect since 1986. Although these were conceived of as temporary work programmes, they have in fact become virtually permanent. The latest version, the National Emergency Employment Plan, began in 2001 and continues to date. In spite of its praiseworthy aim, to stimulate some "trickle down" effects as a first-aid solution to the polarising effects of the economic model, its impact is clearly negative. Wages are very low and therefore exert a generally lowering effect on salaries, so that the Plan in fact indirectly subsidises private sector employers. The low wages paid can only contribute part of a family's income, so that underemployment is in fact "formally" encouraged.

The complete absence of employment benefits or real hopes for a stable job or any framework of legal rights accentuate the divorce between employment and social rights or the rule of law.[20] The erosion of the system of social rights protected by law is also due to state policies. The privatisations carried out in 1997 resulted in large transfers to the private financial sector and an increasing loss of protection for the people.

All of these factors mean that the world of work, with the consent and occasionally the active participation of the State, has become the arena for systematic rights violations, impunity and social polarisation and fragmentation.

Conclusions

Human security means freedom from fear and want. It implies creating political, social and economic systems that guarantee survival and the construction of human dignity. In these terms, 2003 has been a profoundly negative year for Bolivia. But it has also been a time for civil society to react against a State which exacerbates the threats to human security.

The people who participated in the mass demonstrations in October 2003 gave - however chaotically - a clear verdict on the limitations of the present economic model and expressed the need for major changes. The workers who took action demanded the right to be consulted on the future of strategic resources and laid claim to benefits from international trade agreements. In short, they demanded public policies focusing on the critical situation of the world of work. ■

10 *Ibid*, p. 66.

11 Escobar, Silvia. "Ajuste y liberalización: las causas del conflicto". *Coyuntura* 3 (1), 2003, p. 4.

12 UNDP, *op cit*, p. 85.

13 Understood here as "growth of underemployment; extension of the working day beyond legally regulated conditions; involuntary increase in part-time work; changes in contractual conditions... and payment on a piecework basis or on completion of contracted work...". CEDLA, *op cit*, pp. 63-64.

14 CEDLA, *op cit*, p. 66.

15 A "formal" job implies two things: being able to provide a sustainable income for a family, and a regulated environment, that is, where workers' rights are applied. In contrast, "informal" or casual work which predominates and is increasing in Bolivia, is quite the reverse: wages are too low to satisfy basic needs, and rights are violated daily with impunity. As such it is both an economic and a political threat to human security.

16 CEDLA, *op cit*, p. 66.

17 *Ibid*, p. 74.

18 UNDP, *op cit*, p. 85.

19 CEDLA, *op cit*, p. 73.

20 For further details, see the analysis by Arze in CEDLA, *op cit*, pp. 75-79.

Urban violence, public safety policies and responses from civil society

In 2000, 45,233 Brazilians were murdered, a national rate of 27 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, which places Brazil among the most violent countries in the world. For young people in impoverished urban areas, the rate is 230 killings per 100,000 inhabitants, which almost amounts to genocide. Civil society has been responding more and more to this violence with demonstrations, projects, programmes and local initiatives as ways to tackle the problem and promote human security.

Centro de Estudos de Segurança e Cidadania da Universidade Candido Mendes (CESeC)
Observatório da Cidadania - Brasil

Silvia Ramos / Julita Lemgruber[1]

Alarming indices of lethal violence

Brazil is not at war, but the indicators of violent death in the main urban centres are similar to those in countries that are involved in armed conflict. In 2000, 45,233 citizens were murdered. This national rate of 27 killings per 100,000 inhabitants[2] places Brazil among the most violent countries in the world, bearing in mind that rates in European countries and the United States are below 10 homicides per 100,000 people. In Brazil, when we study specific poor urban areas and focus on youth, we find rates of 230 killings per 100,000 inhabitants. According to some experts, what is taking place is the genocide of young people, black youths in particular. This is the result of a rapid increase in criminality and an unlimited access to firearms. Comparative analyses with countries that are at war or in situations of intense conflict conclude that over the same time periods there were more firearm-related deaths in the city of Rio de Janeiro than in the armed conflicts in Angola (1998-2000), Sierra Leone (1991-1999), Yugoslavia (1998-2000), Afghanistan (1991-1999) or Israel (1991-1999).[3]

The unequal distribution of death

The murders are mainly concentrated among young people between 15 and 24 years old. This is a nationwide trend, and it applies in states with higher murder rates, like Rio de Janeiro and Pernambuco, as well as in states with lower rates like Minas Gerais (Chart 1). More than 90% of violent deaths occur among males, so the distribution of lethal violence by sex in Brazil is in line with world trends.[4] Chart 2 shows that violent deaths in Brazil are dramatically higher among young blacks, a trend that reflects the unequal distribution of wealth and social resources (education, health, sanitation) between blacks and whites. In fact, as well as exposing the racial dynamics of Brazilian society, the indicators of homicide by age and colour show the social class of the victims: they are mostly poor, and most of the crimes occur in *favelas* (shanty towns) and in peri-urban areas.

In these areas, a high proportion of illegal drug violence has its genesis in the network of trafficking and consumption. The rapid increase in violent deaths in *favelas* and poor neighbourhoods can be explained by a combination of factors: the appearance of cocaine in urban centres like Rio and São Paulo in the 1980s and its high profitability, the increasingly violent and repressive behaviour of the police, the fights between rival gangs for control of the key distribution and sales points, and the use of military firearms. A contributing factor was the absence of public institutions (schools, health centres or police patrols) in these areas, which made it easier for groups of armed drug traffickers to establish themselves and extend their territorial control. Given these conditions, drug trafficking has an extremely powerful attraction for children and adolescents who find few opportunities for employment or for generating income, and whose prospects for the future are fragile. The quick profits and the "glamorous" lifestyle provided by the power and visible presence of firearms make many young people see drug trafficking as an attractive way out of their predicament, however lethally dangerous it may be. This feeds a culture dominated by despotism, machismo, arms and violence, which contaminates a high proportion of the young people in these areas, even those who are not directly involved in drug trafficking or crime.

CHART 1

Rates of homicide per 100,000 inhabitants in various Brazilian states

YOUNG PEOPLE AND TOTAL - 2000



Source: SIM-DATASUS / Waiselfisz, 2002.

Note: RJ: Rio de Janeiro; SP: São Paulo; PE: Pernambuco; ES: Espirito Santo; MG: Minas Gerais; BA: Bahia.

The priority of public security

The low socio-economic profile of the victims of violence, and their scant capacity to exert political pressure, help to explain the fact that Brazilian national and local government and civil society were slow to wake up to the problem of public safety and the need for modernisation, control and democratisation in the police.[5] It was not until the 1990s that systematic efforts began with a view to establishing public safety policies with a contemporary perspective identified with human rights and police efficacy. Until then, most of the regional governments had relegated the problem to the corporative spheres of the police themselves. During the 1980s and well into the 1990s, indifference and silence about the scale of lethal violence also predominated among intellectuals, universities, the media, and even among NGOs.

1 Silvia Ramos is co-ordinator and Julita Lemgruber is director of the Centro de Estudos de Segurança e Cidadania da Universidade Candido Mendes (CESeC).

2 Information System on Mortality (SIM), DATASUS, Ministry of Health.

3 Dowdney, Luke. *Crianças do tráfico: um estudo de caso de crianças em violência armada organizada no Rio de Janeiro*. Rio de Janeiro: 7 letras, 2000.

4 This does not mean that the problem of lethal violence against women should be minimised; it is one of the tips of the iceberg of the lack of safety issue. It is linked to domestic violence within the family and couples, and is connected in different ways to the more general problem of violence. See Musumeci, Leonarda. "Homicídios no Rio de Janeiro: tragédia em busca de políticas". *Boletim Segurança e Cidadania*. Centro de Estudos de Segurança e Cidadania (CESeC), July 2002.

5 In Brazil, the police come under the jurisdiction of the states of the Federation, and obvious preventive police functions in public places and in investigations are divided between two different institutions: the Military Police, who are in daily contact with the general public, and the Civil Police. The former in particular still have a bad name acquired during the two decades of military dictatorship (1964-1985).

CHART 2

Homicide compared to total deaths, by colour and age - 1997 to 2000



Source: SIM-DATASUS / CESeC, 2003.

As a result of the lack of investment or rational public policies, the majority of the police forces in the country degenerated and became violent and inefficient. Through mechanisms that operated on various levels, organised crime involved in arms and drugs corrupted large sectors of the police forces, from the lowest ranks all the way up to the top.[6] In some states, police violence became a major problem and directly affected the poor people of the *favelas* and the outlying marginal neighbourhoods, who were trapped between the violence of the armed gangs of drug traffickers and the violence and corruption of the police. In Rio de Janeiro, the police are responsible for more than 10% of killings, which totalled 900 in 2002 and 1,195 in 2003. Most of these occur in "confrontations" in the *favelas* (between 1993 and 1996, police action in 523 armed confrontations in *favelas* caused 512 fatalities), and the bulk of the victims are young people, mainly black. A study of these deaths revealed that most of the victims' bodies showed signs of summary execution; they had at least one bullet wound in the back or in the head.[7]

Some states, and more recently some municipalities, invited investigators and organisations from civil society to participate in the formulation and implementation of public policies. Besides this, during the 2002 presidential elections, the Workers' Party advocated the preparation of a National Security Programme, which came into being after an extensive nationwide consultation process in which more than a hundred specialists took part. For the first time, the country has a programme that is based on a systematic diagnosis and a strategic vision of the problem of violence. It combines social and preventive policies with police and repressive policies, and with control and modernisation of the police. It is too early to say whether the programme will be implemented or not. This will depend to a large extent on the capacity of society as a whole to pressure federal and local government to recognise the urgency of the problem of violence and the priority of public safety, issues which are hidden behind a veil of silence due to the difficulties that the main victims have in putting their complaints into words.

The Disarmament Statute

In 2003, an important step was taken towards reducing deaths by firearms thanks to the mobilisation of Brazilian civil society. Under the leadership of NGOs (mainly Viva Rio, in Rio de Janeiro, and the Sou da Paz Institute in São Paulo), which organised large public demonstrations, co-ordination with legislators committed to these policies, and support from a large part of the press, the National Congress passed the Disarmament Statute. This sets out a series of measures to control the sale and possession of firearms, and prohibits the bearing of arms to all except the police, members of the armed forces and municipal guards in cities with more than 250,000 inhabitants. The statute also provides for a national plebiscite in 2005 so that the population as a whole can decide whether the sale of firearms should be prohibited throughout the whole country.

New mediators: young people in *favelas* and peri-urban neighbourhoods

Recently, in the context of responses to violence from civil society, a widespread movement has begun to emerge among young people in *favelas* and marginal outlying neighbourhoods. This consists of projects, programmes, or local initiatives based on cultural and artistic activities, which in many cases are undertaken and co-ordinated by the young people themselves. Some examples of these initiatives are the *Olodum* group in Salvador; and the *Afro Reggae*, *Nós do Morro* and *Companhia Étnica de Dança* groups in Rio de Janeiro, as well as hundreds of local groups that have mobilised around the hip hop culture on the outskirts of São Paulo, in the shanty towns of Porto Alegre, and in neighbourhoods in Recife, Brasilia and São Luís.

These groups are competing with the drug traffickers for influence over young people, and they are using different but equally effective seduction techniques. They are committed to a culture of peace, but a culture that is also in tune with the spirit of the times (the groups value Internet, computers, fashionable sports clothes and shoes, travel, and regional and international exchange, as well as culture and the arts). In general, these groups have four main characteristics: a) they foster the generation of income and employment in the short term; b) they have a strong component of self-esteem, which includes training artists and leaders whose fame and success may serve as an example and attract other young people in the area; c) they have a strong component of territorial affirmation, and very often the words of their songs, the names of the groups and their leaders, and the t-shirts and other clothes that they wear reaffirm the names of their communities (*Vigário Geral, Cidade de Deus, Capão Redondo, Candeal*) as a sign of commitment to change in the community; d) there is a strong component of denouncing racism and affirming their black identity in the lyrics of their songs, in their look (afro hair styles and clothes), and in the names of their projects (*Música Preta Brasileira, Afro Reggae, Companhia Étnica*, etc.).

These projects and initiatives, which are heterogeneous and not co-ordinated with each other, are steadily growing in different cities around the country, and are becoming important[8] not only as centres for constructing a culture which is an alternative to drug trafficking, but also as mediators between youth and local government, the press, and very often international actors like foundations and co-operation agencies. These "new mediators" are bringing new elements into the field of NGOs, the Left, and traditional social, trade union and associative movements, such as an interest in the market and in joint ventures with a commitment to the community; the affirmation of territorial and racial identity combined with social identity; an emphasis on the subjective, individual background; on success and fame combined with the world of culture and the arts. These new elements should not be scorned by those who are seeking to support the solutions which Brazilian society is going to produce in this decade in order to confront the violence and construct paths towards safety, justice and citizenship. ■

References

Soares, Luiz Eduardo. *Meu casaco de general: quinhentos dias no front da segurança pública do Rio de Janeiro*. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2000.

Soares, Luiz Eduardo. "Pacto pela Paz: o consenso possível". In: www.luizeduardosoares.com.br, November 2003.

Waiselfisz, Julio Jacobo. *Mapa da Violência III. Os jovens no Brasil*. Brasilia: UNESCO, 2002.

6 Lemgruber, Julita, Leonarda Musumeci and Ignacio Cano. *Quem vigia os vigias?* Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2003.

7 Cano, Ignacio. *Letalidade da ação policial no Rio de Janeiro*. Rio de Janeiro: ISER, 1997.

8 Along with the creation of local NGOs. Pandolfi, Dulce and Mario Grynzspan (organisers). *A favela fala*. Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV, 2003.

Belligerent but poor

Bulgaria has the highest poverty rates in Europe, both in terms of overall numbers and as a proportion of the country's population. Without a referendum being held, or at the very least a public survey, Bulgarians have become involved in an illegitimate war, the war against Iraq, for which the National Annual Budget was readjusted, allocating an undisclosed figure to mount the "peace-keeping" operation. It is clear that the money for this operation was either relocated from other budget areas - possibly education, or social assistance - or borrowed, in which case it will make the burden of foreign indebtedness even heavier than before.

Bulgarian Gender Research Foundation
Bulgarian European Partnership Association

Plamenka Markova / Genoveva Tisheva / Ivan Petkov

As part of the globalised world Bulgaria is now subject to the mood of its new US "masters". In 2003 Bulgarians witnessed the shift from human security to corporate security and state security, and the growth of poverty and insecurity. The Government, detached from the concerns of the people, is manoeuvring in an imaginary world, congratulating itself on its brilliant foreign policy and contemplating positions in the EU and NATO. The Defence Minister's movements and opinions are covered by the media on a daily basis, while those of the Minister of Labour and Social Policy only on a weekly basis, if at all. Taking advantage of an exhausted and resigned population, the Government makes no bones about impunity.

In 2003 the Bulgarian people became involved in an illegitimate war - the war against Iraq - resulting from the invasion of an independent country in serious breach of its sovereignty and in gross violation of numerous rules and instruments of international law. Without holding a referendum or at the very least a public survey, the National Assembly voted to send Bulgarian troops to Iraq to join the US-led "coalition" forces in the fight against "terrorism". In its haste to implement this decision and meet the unexpected expenditure, the Government - the Ministries of Defence and Finance in particular - had to find the money to send a battalion to Iraq.[1]

This was done by reshaping the national annual budget and allocating an unknown figure to mount the "peace-keeping" operation. In spite of the Government's financial curtain it is not difficult to guess that this amount, which is believed to be almost BGL 100 million (around USD 63.3 million) has either partly or as a whole been relocated from other budgetary positions, possibly those for education or social assistance, or from loans, in which case it will make the burden of foreign indebtedness upon people's shoulders even heavier than before.

Bulgaria's involvement in the war has led to five Bulgarian soldiers being killed and another 30 wounded by Iraqi so-called terrorists fighting to free their land from foreign invasion. How many more will die is unpredictable, but numbers are bound to grow, since the US, fearing domestic discontent and protests, will be reducing the number of its troops in Iraq, thus exposing a greater number of nationals of the coalition's "member-states" to become war casualties.

Socio-economic security

Unemployment, job security, informal sector

In its "New Social Policy Strategy" (2002)[2] the Bulgarian Government envisages the implementation of nation-wide labour market programmes (one of which has been denominated "From Social Welfare to Employment") aimed at creating subsidised employment for disadvantaged social groups, i.e., the long-term unemployed.

The philosophy of the programme is broadly in conformity with the guidelines of the EU Employment Directives to the EU-Accession Countries. They also comply with recent post-modern social-democratic approaches to "activating" social policies. The efforts are shifted from providing compensation and benefits to ensuring employment. The emphasis is on prevention of long-term unemployment and social assistance. This means re-thinking the form of social protection and transforming it from direct (cash) assistance to providing competent and individual services.

The programme is aimed at providing employment for 100,000 people over a period of 12 months; its (gross) budget amounts to BGL 217 million (USD 137.4 million) calculated on the assumption that participants receive the monthly minimum wage while social security contributions (except unemployment insurance) are being paid.

The money available amounts to 0.6% of nominal GDP in 2003; net costs for the consolidated budget have been estimated at BGL 80 million (USD 50.65 million), amounting to 0.2% of nominal GDP.

According to official statistics, during 2003 there was a steady decline in unemployment. The very high unemployment levels registered in 2001-2002 were sharply reduced from over 18% in September 2003 to less than 13% in November 2003. Some economists believe that together with economic growth the main reasons for these results are the active labour market programmes and certain measures taken against informal employment.

Regardless of how the statistics for each factor are interpreted, they both deserve a closer look to attempt to determine their overall effect, unemployment in particular. The programme's effect is not permanent and is also contradictory. Most of the jobs created are low-paid, fixed-term jobs and it would be interesting to know to what extent the wages paid to the temporarily employed correspond to the real usefulness of the work they do. The programme only alleviates the keen need for jobs for short periods at a time. While it is in operation it will transform people with "unemployed" status into people with "temporarily employed" status and vice versa.

In this aspect it is a kind of time bomb that could blow up the labour market if unemployment figures again reached high levels. With the mandatory registration of employment contracts introduced in April 2003 some workers from the informal economy became visible and their working status is now legal.[3]

1 A 485-soldier Bulgarian Army infantry battalion serves at the Iraqi city of Karbala as part of a 9,000-strong 22-nation force under Polish command. Bulgaria is involved in peace keeping and not in combat operations.

2 New Social Policy Strategy - Minister of Labour and Social Policy. www.mlsp.government.bg/en/docs/strategy/index.htm

3 "During recent years, two developments on the Bulgarian labour market have caused particular concern among the authorities and social partners - the use of hired labour without a signed employment contract, and the widespread practice of employers paying social insurance contributions only on the basis of the national minimum wage rather than on employees' actual pay. The present Government has recently introduced two new inter-related measures - both long demanded by trade unions - adding to the efforts of previous governments to reduce the extent of these two problems. The National Council for Tripartite Partnership has agreed to these measures, which are: mandatory registration of employment contracts with the National Social Security Institute (NSSI); and the introduction of minimum social insurance thresholds, higher than the national minimum wage and set at different levels for the various economic sectors and occupations." European Industrial Relations Observatory. www.eiro.eurofound.eu.int/2003/07/feature/bg0307101f.html

As a result of this in some sectors like the garment industry for the period April-August 2003 there was an increase of about 40% in the total number of employed workers.

The scenario is confusing, since different institutions report different figures for the same periods. According to the National Statistical Institute the number of people employed in the garment industry for August 2003 was less than 140,000, while according to the National Social Security Institute it was over 180,000.[4] It is always possible to use statistics and figures to one's own benefit, so if a country reports it has achieved its aims in a particular programme, it can obtain one of the five global UNDP Poverty Eradication Awards for 2003. That is exactly what the former Ministry of Labour and Social Policy did.

Despite all these so-called achievements the real situation in the country is still threatening for a large number of marginalised people. It is hard for young people with higher education to find jobs, with emigration being one alternative. The privatisation policy, implemented without taking into consideration the social consequences and without developing alternative employment programmes, will continue to keep the unemployment level high.

As far as economic growth is concerned there is another discrepancy between the number and share of newly opened jobs and growth rates. The employment rate is still 40%, so compared to EU countries (68-69%) Bulgaria holds the last place in Europe.[5]

Poverty, income, living wage

The overall number of people and the percentage of the population living in poverty is the highest in Europe.

About 45% of the population live below the absolute poverty line. The share of the "working poor" is expanding and involves people with different social and professional background and status - ranging from seamstresses and construction workers to physicians, teachers and scientists. The social gap between the majority of the very poor and the rich (the middle class is practically non-existent) has become dramatically wide.[6]

The average wage of BGL 280 (USD 177.3) is the lowest among EU candidate-countries. The average cost of heating in winter is equal to an average pension. There is no equivalent to this in other countries in transition.[7]

Household expenditures have increased steadily over the last two years. The tariffs for telephone and communications, water, heating, electricity and other services are expected to rise in the future without any clear compensation policy. This will obviously be a burden too hard for household budgets to bear.[8]

At the same time only 17.2% of the unemployed receive regular unemployment benefits. The minimum unemployment benefit is BGL 70 (USD 44). The period of payment, conditioned on length of service, varies between 4-12 months. These minimums are in fact only 60% of the legal minimum wage based on which social security contributions are being paid. Furthermore the legal minimum wage of BGL 120 (USD 76) is at the level of the poverty line. The trade unions estimate it should be BGL 300 (USD 190).

A sense of social solidarity

Trade union membership has fallen, but still remains high by Western European standards. However, trade unions do not appear to have been successful in preventing the decline in the standard of living and working standards. The attitude of most workers is characterised by a widespread apathy, with most of them saying that they would not take action in response to unpaid wages or other adverse conditions in their work. Despite these negative features, according to sociological surveys Bulgarians appear to have retained a sense of social solidarity. In short, civilised values survive in economically insecure circumstances.

Bearing in mind all these conditions, it would be a miracle to expect new legislation to be implemented soon. The new Protection Against Discrimination Act and the new Law on Combating Illegal Trafficking in Human Beings in force since 1 January 2004 will need additional funds allocated by the Government. It will all depend on the priorities of the moment. ■

4 Information by the Bulgarian European Partnership Association.

5 Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria (CITUB); Institute for Social and Trade Union Researches. www.knsb-bg.org/e_index.htm

6 *Ibid.*

7 *Ibid.*

8 *Ibid.*

The race to meet the Millennium Development Goals



Despite the heavy flow of foreign aid into the country, only a small portion went into the national budget. Most of the funds were allocated to projects implemented by a third party, either NGOs or private contractors. So far, reform has gone at a snail's pace. Serious administrative and structural reform will have to be implemented in order to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015. Strengthening the judiciary and the rule of law should be prerequisites for large loans and Official Development Assistance.

NGO ESCR Monitoring Committee/Social Watch Cambodia SILAKA

Thida Khus[1]

Twelve years have passed since the 1991 Paris Peace Agreement, and it is 10 years since Cambodia had its first election under the sponsorship of the United Nations, after leaving behind its socialist past. Since then, Cambodia set forth as a democratic country, with a multiparty system and a free market economy. By the end of 2003, the country had conducted three parliamentary elections. The results were unfortunately marred by conflicts after the defeated political parties contested the results, but in each successive election the country has moved away from the violence that characterised the previous one. Disputes were resolved by compromises in which the different parties agreed to share power between them. After the third election however, the opposition parties demanded major reforms before a coalition government could be formed. These changes called for structural reforms in administration and governance, enforcement of the separation of powers between the three branches of government, and the resignation of the current Prime Minister, who had been in power for 20 years. By 31 December 2003 - five months after the election - the political stalemate continues, and the Prime Minister has not resigned.

For the past 11 years, the Royal Cambodian Government (RCG) has successfully made its way into the world economy by joining regional and international organisations. Cambodia has also signed most international conventions. Under the sponsorship of the international community, with an annual aid flow of over half the national budget of USD 409 million in 2001,[2] the country has opened itself up to globalisation with the influx of regional and international products which have flooded local markets. International aid for Cambodia is USD 32.2 per capita, ranking second highest among Southeast Asian countries, after the Lao People's Democratic Republic. From 1996 to 2001, Cambodia received a total of USD 2,672 million in foreign aid, USD 190 million went to budget support, USD 220 million toward humanitarian assistance, and the rest toward projects implemented by third parties. These projects were aimed at government capacity building on the one hand, and construction of infrastructure such as roads and hospitals, on the other. Most funds were not allocated via the national budget.

The economy and poverty status

Cambodia's annual GDP per capita growth was 2.0% in 1990-1995[3] and 1.6% in 1996-2000. These rates have not been sufficient to make much difference to its growing population. Cambodia's poverty rate is the third poorest in Southeast Asia, yet the estimated trend to reduce the poverty rate ranks as the lowest in the region. The prevalence of underweight children[4] has got worse, 40% to 45% between 1990 and 2001, whereas the population below the minimum level of dietary energy consumption improved from 43% in 1991 to 36% in 1998.

Education

The dropout rate of pupils starting grade 1 who reach grade 5 is the highest in the region, 48.9% in 1998. However, it is only a slight improvement from 49.2% in 1993. The rate of primary school registration has exceeded expectations, but the school retention rate (barely 48.2% by grade 5) is not sustained. The number of literate women compared to men has improved in the last decade. The ratio in 2002 was 0.93, from 0.82 in 1990.[5]

Health

Cambodia's health trend looks very dim, compared to other countries in the region. The under-five mortality rate increased from 115 to 138 per 1,000 live births in 1990-2001.[6] Cambodia's MDG to reduce the death rate to 40 per 1,000 live births by 2015 is unlikely to be attained and if the current trend continues it is more likely to soar to 165 by 2015.

The HIV/AIDS adult prevalence rate improved from 1999 to 2000. The rate dropped from 4.7% to 2.98% for young females aged 15-24. Seventy-seven of the 474 people with active tuberculosis died in 2000. The current rate of 474 tuberculosis cases per 100,000 inhabitants[7] is considered one of the highest in the region.

Government policy responses

During the past 11 years, the Government adopted a number of pro-poor policies. The RCG has successfully attracted the garment industry to invest in the country. Over the past five years the industry has employed over 240,000 young workers, mainly women from rural communities. However, in 2001 the creation of 15,000 new jobs failed to meet the needs of 330,000 people seeking employment. Most of these people entered the informal sectors, mainly in the agricultural sector.

Inflation has been stable and the exchange rate has been kept at KHR 3,980 to the US dollar for the past four years. With the loan from the Asia Development Bank, the RCG has implemented a rural credit scheme to provide small loans to rural families. This, however, has failed to strengthen small enterprises owing to the weakness of the banking sector, a weak legal environment, and the Government's inability to control the influx of foreign products. The low capacity of small and medium enterprises, which prevented them from developing and claiming their part in the market share, has been due to lack of access to capital, high cost of basic services such as electricity, gasoline, telephone, and lack of access to technology. The Government's inability to control corruption and contraband has been damaging to businesses trying to compete in the local market.

The Cambodian Government should be credited with the decision to decentralise the local administration in early 2002, although this has been hindered by the lack of progress made by the central Government. Nevertheless 1,600 Cambodian communes were decentralised for the election of commune councils.[8] Communes depend on the capacity of the councils and their access to funds in order to operate. The majority of the commune councils only have access to administrative funds. Given the inefficiency of revenue collection, commune funds tend to fall victim to yearly cuts in the

1 The author is grateful to Mr. Chum Phally, ADHOC, for his valuable input.

2 World Bank. *World Bank Indicators* www.worldbank.org/data/wdi2003/pdfs/table%206-10.pdf

3 World Bank, 2002.

4 UNICEF. *The State of the World Children*; United Nations. *Millennium Indicators Database*, April 2003.

5 United Nations, Common Database.

6 UNICEF, 10 April 2003.

7 United Nations. *Millennium Indicators Database* (UNICEF, WHO). April 2003.

8 A commune is a grouping of four to seven villages.

TABLE 1

Treasury expenditure (%)

FUNCTION	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Core Government	62.6	63.2	69.4	54.7	58.9	51.0
General Administration	17.0	15.7	26.0	19.0	29.1	25.7
Defence	32.5	32.7	29.5	25.2	20.2	16.5
Security	12.8	14.6	13.7	10.1	9.3	8.5
Judiciary	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.4
Economic Services	10.8	14.1	9.3	14.2	12.6	16.9
Agriculture	2.1	2.6	1.7	1.9	2.3	3.9
Transport	3.1	4.1	1.8	2.6	5.1	6.4
Public Works	2.6	2.6	1.2	2.2	4.7	5.4
Other transport	0.5	1.5	0.5	0.4	0.4	1.0
Other Economic Services	5.5	7.3	5.7	9.5	4.8	6.1
Environmental Protection	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.4
Rural Development	0.5	0.4	0.6	1.2	0.8	1.8
Social Services	19.5	21.2	18.8	26.4	24.8	28.1
Health	4.8	5.9	4.2	9.4	6.7	7.9
Recreation, Culture & Religion	0.6	0.8	0.6	0.8	1.8	1.9
Education	9.1	9.1	9.4	11.4	10.7	12.9
Social Protection	5.0	5.5	4.6	4.8	5.7	5.4
Other	6.5	1.0	1.9	3.5	2.9	2.2
Debt	6.5	1.0	1.9	2.5	2.0	1.8
Others	-	-	-	1.11	0.9	0.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Ministry of Finance.

TABLE 2

Comparison of public expenditure (%)

COMPARATORS	TOTAL	HEALTH	EDUCATION
East Asia & Pacific	15.0	1.8	4.0
South Asia	16.7	1.2	3.0
Low Income	18.4	1.2	3.8
Vietnam	21.2	1.0	2.8
Lao PDR	-	2.3	2.4
Cambodia, incl. External	25.3	2.9	3.0
Cambodia, Government only	12.8	1.0	1.7

Source: World Development Indicators, 2002.

national budget. The commune councils' accountability to their constituents remains low. Also, the village leaders remain unchanged, leaving the old administrative infrastructure intact, so that district offices, which are dominated by the political party in power, still control the communes.

In 2002, with support from the World Bank, the Government developed its Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper with participation from civil society. However the plan failed to prioritise investment in crucial areas, making implementation unrealistic owing to lack of resources. The process has been judged as short on Government ownership, since the projects were earmarked by the donors from the start.

This has occurred in the implementation of most projects, which tend to deviate largely from the initial plan or contract. The lack of transparency is evident in the management of state affairs of the central Government, from the Ministry of Finance to the technical ministries. In 2003 the spending of some ministries largely surpassed the budget approved by the National Assembly, whereas disbursement for priority ministries, such as Education, Health, and Rural Development, fell far below the approved level.

Records show that expenditure is concentrated in the central Government, and in the capital and urban areas, much less so in rural areas, where 79% of the population work in agriculture, and where 40% of the population live under the poverty line compared to only 9% in the capital city of Phnom Penh.[9]

Corruption has been repeatedly identified as a major constraint in Cambodia's development and a threat to its poverty reduction and economic growth agenda. Domestic firms cited corruption as the second most important obstacle to business, while 42% of foreign firms said corruption was the single most important obstacle for the operation and development of business.[10]

Irregular disbursement of public funds and lack of transparent and credible data regarding public expenditure are serious obstacles to curbing siphoning of public funds to private pockets. This has created serious problems in the collection of state revenue to support the functioning of basic government operations.

Summary and recommendations

Serious administrative and structural reform must be implemented if the Government is to meet the MDGs by 2015. Despite the heavy flow of foreign aid into the country, only a small portion went into the national budget. Most of the funds were allocated to projects implemented by a third party, either NGOs or private contractors. The Government has benefited from these projects through the capacity building of its institutions and staff; however this effort is not likely to be sustained if the Government does not claim ownership of the project.

Donors have to build in a monitoring and evaluating framework with capacity building components in all projects. Government institutions must be evaluated for organisational capacity before giving grants. Local organisations should be involved in the process to help monitor development, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of all projects. Clear guidelines and policies should be developed for all stages of their implementation and be transparent to the public. All major projects must involve the National Assembly as a means of sharing accountability.

The main focus should be on strengthening the judiciary and the rule of law. These should be the prerequisites for large loans and Official Development Assistance (ODA). So far, reform has gone at a snail's pace. Responsible giving requires close monitoring. It also requires the right conditions to help sustain the efforts involved and make sure that the results of development reach the majority of the population and not just a privilege few. Lastly, access to information on all government policies and guidelines related to contracts will help civil society collaborate in monitoring and evaluating their implementation. ■

9 National Poverty Reduction Plan 2003.

10 World Bank. *Cambodia Governance and Corruption Diagnosis: Evidence from Citizen, Enterprise, and Public Official Surveys*. 2000.

Trading off human security for fiscal balance

After posting a string of budgetary surpluses for the past six years, Canada is the only G7 nation to forecast budgetary surpluses. Looking back on this period of economic and fiscal luxury, will the country be judged as having squandered this unique fiscal opportunity? Canada appears poised to under-invest in its own people and in developing nations - the future of the globe - for the sake of "small government". A once-in-a-lifetime chance to invest in human development could be squandered for a little more debt reduction, and a little more consumer spending.

Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives

Armine Yalnizyan

Since 1993 the Canadian economy has grown by 66% in nominal terms and 41% in inflation-adjusted terms.[1] This is USD 361 billion more on an annual basis than a decade before, and growing. There is vastly greater capacity to finance social development initiatives, but that is not a political priority.

Fiscally, Canada appears exceedingly secure. But the very policy approach that has yielded fiscal surplus has also led to a scarcity of public resources that protect basic human security. That scarcity has been created by design, the product of political commitment to an agenda of tax cuts and aggressive debt reduction. Canadian politics in the surplus era - 1998 to 2003 - have not veered significantly from the course charted in the deficit era. Investments in the public goods and services that enhance human security have been limited, costly tax cuts and debt reduction measures have been favoured. Commitment to "small government" has coincided with larger economies, but deepening economic insecurity.

Canada has led the industrialized world in shrinking the scale of funding for public services. At the federal level alone, in an explicit attempt to create a permanently small government, programme spending shrank from 16.8% of GDP to 11.5% between 1992-93 and 2002-03, illustrating the Canadian Government's commitment to a "less is more philosophy".

Human security rests on a culture of human development that was first articulated in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. These goals were reinforced in the 1976 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and repeatedly reaffirmed as worthy of action by hundreds of nation states around the world: 1995's 10 Commitments of the Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development; the 12 Critical Areas of Concern for gender equality articulated in Beijing Platform for Action also in 1995; and, most recently, the 8 Millennium Development Goals in 2000.

All these documents have in common the acknowledgement that, in order to live harmoniously with one another and develop as individuals, people need the security of adequate housing, food, and income, and access to clean water, health care and education. That's as true in Canada as it is for developing nations.

Long before the events of 9/11, Canadians saw their own human security placed in jeopardy. Since the 1980s wages have been mostly stagnant or falling. Deep government cutbacks of the 1990s led to a pronounced reduction in public provisions. The result: reduced accessibility, adequacy and affordability of housing, education, and health services for a growing number of Canadians. Cutbacks affecting water quality even led to tainted water supplies, with thousands becoming sick, and at least seven dying.[2]

Deep spending cuts and rising revenues

From the early 1990s well into the surplus era and the "mini-budget" of October 2000, the focus was on ushering out the cost-heavy welfare state, making - and keeping - government small.

Budget 1995 saw the biggest cuts to programmes in Canadian history. The largest dollar amounts came from cuts to income supports (through reduced unemployment insurance benefits to the jobless), defence spending and human resource development. Funding was cut in half for the departments of transportation, natural resources and regional development. Supports to the provinces for health care, post-secondary education, and social assistance saw deep cuts, after a decade of funding not keeping up with growth.[3] Canadian municipalities also lost federal support for affordable housing programmes.

Deep spending cuts and rising revenues from an expanding economy produced more rapid results than expected. Large surpluses quickly began to roll in.

Priorities and choices in the surplus era - more tax cuts and debt reduction

Between 1998 and 2003, an era of choice was made possible by six years of large budgetary surpluses, but the focus remained on tax cuts and debt reduction. The public investments and initiatives that *did* address human security are summarised below, in order of financial commitment:

- *Children's agenda.* Child benefits delivered through the tax system were increased for the poorest working parents (but not those receiving welfare). The duration of parental/maternity leave for new parents was doubled to one year, but only for those eligible to receive Unemployment Insurance benefits (many Canadians are not eligible). A modest five-year plan for child care and early child development was launched. These changes have totalled USD 6.8 billion to date. Another USD 7.8 billion will flow by April 2005.
- *National security.* In the wake of the events of 9/11, the federal Government committed USD 5.8 billion over 5 years for increased police and intelligence, emergency preparedness, air security, border security and screening entrants to Canada. A new department of safety and security has been created, and the Defence budget is poised to receive a major injection of resources. A 10 year USD 750 million plan that supports the G8 initiative against the spread of weapons of mass destruction was recently announced. To date USD 4.3 billion has been spent, with a minimum of USD 8.7 billion committed to 2008-09.
- *Public health care.* A five-year commitment for USD 15.8 billion in new federal funds, mostly targeted to health care, was announced in 2000. Another five-year "health" accord, worth USD 26.2 billion, was announced in 2003. This was in response to a growing sense of crisis in public health care provision, an issue that grew out of the federal Government's initial retrenchment of support in the 1990s. The amounts directly flowing to health care has been USD 4 billion to date, with another USD 21.8 billion yet to come.[4]
- *Infrastructure.* About USD 2 billion was put aside for repairs and construction for roads, bridges, wharves, housing and "green" infrastructure over a five year period. Most of that

1 Statistics Canada, *National Income and Expenditure Accounts, Quarterly Estimates, Second Quarter 2003,* Catalogue No 13-001-PPB.

2 Yalnizyan, Armine. "The Road from Monterrey: a caution from Canada", in *Social Watch 2002. The Social Impact of Globalization in the World.* Montevideo: Social Watch, pp. 96-97.

3 Yalnizyan, Armine. *Paul Martin's Permanent Revolution.* Alternative Federal Budget Working Paper No 3. Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 26 January 2004.

4 Yalnizyan, Armine. *Squandering the Surplus.* Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, forthcoming (April 2004).

money has not started to flow.[5] Another USD 1.5 billion in surplus funds was set aside for development of major strategic infrastructure, such as highways, urban transport, and sewage treatment, money to be used over five years starting in 2003. Just last year, the federal Government announced it would fund another USD 2.25 billion over 10 years for strategic and municipal infrastructure projects. A further USD 1.5 billion went to energy production and conservation measures, through the five-year Climate Change initiative in 2003. It has not been verified how much of this money has flowed to date. Most of the funds were only operational as of 2003-04.

- *International aid.* The federal Government has promised to double the International Assistance Envelope (IAE) by 2010, from the base levels in 2001-02 of about USD 1.6 billion, at a growth rate of 8% a year. An Africa Fund has been created, targeting USD 376 million over the next three years to assistance initiatives in Africa, and dedicating half of the IAE growth to African support in the years to come. The Government has also provided USD 224.7 million in debt relief to the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) and offered another USD 56.4 million to the HIPC Trust Fund. About USD 1.65 billion has been devoted to improving IAE in the surplus era thus far, and another USD 1.65 billion is promised to 2010.

  Currently IAE is about 0.26% of GDP - USD 2.3 billion in a USD 900 billion economy. The explicit goal of the international community, first articulated in 1969 by Canada's Ambassador to the UN at the time, past Prime Minister Lester Pearson, is that developed nations put aside 0.7% of their GDP to support developing nations. By the time the IAE has doubled, to USD 3.15 billion, the economy will have also grown apace. Even at conservative rates of growth (an average of 2.8% growth every year) that USD 3.15 billion will represent only 0.28% of GDP by 2010-11. While this is an improvement, it does not meet the need, nor the stated target.

- *Affordable housing.* The federal Government announced a cost-shared initiative to deal with homelessness, worth USD 752 million to be used by 2007-08. This was in response to the mayors of Canada's largest cities declaration of a National Housing Disaster in 1998. It is an initiative which has been re-announced in various forms three times since 1999. Little of the money has actually been spent - USD 66.2 million to date - however, because the money was conditional on provinces matching funds and starting new construction, and the provinces have been equally focused on constraining programme spending in this period.

CHART 1

The priorities of a secure government (Canadian federal initiatives since the era of surplus budgets)



These amounts pale in the face of initiatives to cut taxes and reduce debt.

- *Tax cuts.* A five-year USD 75.2 billion plan to cut taxes was announced in October 2000. Further tax cuts have been announced in every budget since then. To date, foregone federal revenues total USD 51.3 billion. They will cost a further USD 52.1 billion by 2004-05.[6]

- *Debt reduction.* Surplus amounts in the federal budget since 1998 have also been used for debt reduction. To date, the payments have totalled USD 39.3 billion. Budget plans include a contingency line of USD 2.25 billion a year, which automatically goes to reduce debt if not used. Surpluses have exceeded this amount in every year for the past six years. Using the entire contingency budget (USD 2.25 billion) every year for debt reduction will reduce the debt to GDP ratio to 39.6% by 2004-05. Doing nothing but letting the economy grow will drop the ratio to 40.1%.[7] The new Prime Minister, Paul Martin, has stated the target should be a debt to GDP ratio of 25%.[8]

New government, old commitments?

The things that build security at home are the same things that build security abroad: affordable housing, clean water, access to health care and education. Canada's surpluses offer ready resources to vigorously and effectively pursue an agenda of greater human security and development, at home and abroad. But fiscal opportunity does not equal political will.

With as much as USD 37.6 billion in surplus funds for the next five years, averaging USD 7.5 billion "extra" each year, the federal Government could easily ensure support for the basics. Thoughtful analysis shows the following annual increases in federal funding, over and above current federal commitments, could get us close to our objectives: public health care (USD 3.76 billion),[9] children's development, (USD 1.13 billion),[10] infrastructure (USD 752 million),[11] a national housing programme (USD 752 million),[12] and international assistance (USD 150.4 million).[13]

These social investments are affordable, given our economic and fiscal capacity, and urgent, given unattended social deficits. The continuously growing gap between rich and poor, a trend which is shaking Canada's social foundations, is also exacerbating global tensions.

Instead, the tax-cut-and-debt-reduction focus continues to be marketed as key to the sound management of nation's finances for the foreseeable future. This is, at the least, an arguable approach to fiscal sustainability. Like deficits, surpluses cannot be indefinitely sustained. Despite unparalleled fiscal opportunity, Canada appears poised to underinvest in its own people and in developing nations - the future of the globe - for the sake of "small government". If that happens, a once-in-a-lifetime chance to invest in human development will be squandered for a little more debt reduction, and a little more consumer spending.

Squandering surplus, by design, may become the legacy of this generation of leaders. ■

5 Department of Finance Canada. *The Budget Plan 2000*, p. 121.

6 Department of Finance. *Economic Statement and Fiscal Update, October 2000*. Table A5.3, p. 97, plus Budget 2003.

7 Department of Finance Canada. *The Budget Plan 2003*, p. 202.

8 Paul Martin's Speech to the Board of Trade of Metropolitan Montreal, 18 September 2003.

9 Alternative Federal Budget (2004); The Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs Science and Technology. *The Health of Canadians, Vol 6, Recommendations for Reform* (2002); Lazar, Harvey and France St. Hilaire. *Money, Politics and Health Care*. Institute for Research in Public Policy, 2004.

10 Calculated from Campaign 2000, 2003 Report Card on Child Poverty in Canada.

11 Federation of Canadian Municipalities, *A Better Quality of Life Through Sustainable Community Development: Priorities and Investment Plan*, August 2001.

12 National Housing and Homelessness Network, *The 1% Solution*.

13 Calculated from Canadian Council for International Cooperation, Presentation to Federal Standing Committee on Finance, 21 October 2003.

Low-intensity democracy

Despite its economic stability and the substantial improvements that the Government has achieved in the rates of poverty and education, 52% of Chileans "feel they are losing out, and 74% have negative feelings about the country's economic system". This is no paradox, since according to the World Bank, Chile is among the 15 countries with the worst income distribution in the world. Things are not much better in politics, where the principle of "one person, one vote" is not viable in the "protected democracy" inherited from the military dictatorship.

Centro de Estudios de la Mujer (CEM)
Solidaridad y Organización Local (SOL)
Programa de Ciudadanía y Gestión Local
Fundación de Superación de la Pobreza
ACTIVA

Ana María Arteaga / Carlos Ochsenius

Chile stands out in the region as an example of economic, political and social stability. In little more than a decade of democratic government, the percentage of the population living in poverty fell from 39% in 1990 to 20.6% in 2003. In education it managed to increase pre-school education from 21% to 32%, secondary education from 80% to 90%, and higher education from 15% to 31% in 2000.[1] According to the 2002 Census, 96.1% of households have electricity and 91.9% have running water, both provided by public utility companies; 51.5% of households have a fixed line telephone and 51% have at least one mobile phone.

How can it be, then, that in spite of what these figures show, "52% of Chileans feel they are losing out, and 74% have negative feelings about the country's economic system (insecurity, anger, a sense of loss)"?[2]

The Human Development Report 1998 in Chile had already made a diagnosis to the effect that "in the wake of the population's extensive difficulties, there are serious problems with human security". Four years after this study was published, there are fundamental reasons why, in spite of the bonanza, the majority of Chileans still feel insecure.

The people's problems

According to the World Bank, Chile is among the 15 countries with the worst income distribution in the world, and, what is even more serious, as time passes this situation has tended to become more pronounced.[3]

TABLE 1

Distribution of autonomous income 1990-2000 (energy, gas and water)

SHARE IN TOTAL INCOME	1990	2000	SHARE IN TOTAL INCOME	1990	2000
Quintile I	4.1	3.7	Quintile V	57.4	57.5
Quintile II	8.1	8.2	Ratio 20/20	14	15.3
Quintiles III and IV	30.4	30.6			

Source: MIDEPLAN, Distributive Impact of Social Expenditure, 2000.

The present Government is aware of the high political cost which any redistributive formula would involve, and it has preferred to pursue a policy aimed at improving the population's opportunities, mainly through education. Consequently, it has, among other measures, considerably increased the ministerial budget in this area and submitted to Congress a bill which would raise the period of obligatory basic schooling from 8 to 12 years. This initiative (undoubtedly a step forward) faces two obstacles however that, at least in the short term, will be difficult to overcome.

The first is the enormous gap between the quality of municipal education, which handles around 70% of schoolchildren in the country, and in which there is an investment of approximately USD 50 per pupil per month, and that of private education, which spends three times more per month on each child. Naturally, this makes for inequalities in both groups.[4]

The second obstacle is that the kind of education that is being imparted to the population does not seem to guarantee access to the job market, nor has it become an efficient tool for overcoming the most severe poverty, as had been expected. This was shown in a recent study of the characteristics of extreme poverty in the country, which found that a high proportion (49%) of the people who lack the resources to meet their most basic needs had completed basic education (8 years of schooling), but that the average increase in schooling for this sector is not being translated into social mobility or improved living conditions.[5]

The young: no citizenship, no consumption, no work

Another sign of the discontent which is afflicting Chileans is expressed in the reduction in the number of people registered on the electoral roll. This fell from 89.5% in 1991 to 69.1% in 2003, which amounts to a reduction of 20.4 percentage points.[6]

What is more, in the last presidential elections (2001) 21.5% of people over 18 (voting age) were not registered. When we add spoilt or blank votes (12.65%) and abstentions (13.36%) to this total, it is evident that there is serious under-representation.

A particularly startling fact is that a more detailed analysis of the figures reveals that 83% of young Chileans between the ages of 18 and 25 are not on the electoral register. Surveys among young people show that they do not believe in elections as a mechanism to influence or bring about change in a society which discriminates against them because of their lifestyles, and their ways of thinking, dressing and behaving.

Young people "are distancing themselves from politics, and they see democracy as an elitist regime for which they do not qualify", in other words, "a system which makes them citizens without citizenship, consumers who do not consume, and workers who are out of work."[7]

Democracy in deficit

Among the key factors behind the high levels of dissatisfaction and distrust is the fact that the country is still ruled in accordance with a Constitution (1980)

1 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). *Human Development Report 2002, We the Chileans: A cultural challenge.* 2002, www.pnud.cl/noticias.htm

2 *Ibid.*

3 World Bank. *World Development Indicators 2000.* Table 2.8.

4 Arteaga, Ana María. "Chile. The brutal rationale of privatisation" in *Social Watch Report 2003, The Poor and the Market.* 2003, pp. 108-109.

5 "La nueva realidad de la pobreza en Chile". Instituto Libertad y Desarrollo, Santiago, December 2003.

6 "Índice de Participación Ciudadana". Corporación Participa, December 2003.

7 Fortunatti, Rodolfo. "Los marginados de la política" in www.portaldelpluralismo.cl/interno.asp?id=1915

that was made to measure by the military regime that ran the country from 1973 to 1991. In this system the basic balance of power is not maintained by the relations between the three powers of the State, but by their relations with other constitutional bodies that are guided by political forces and not by normative powers.[8]

In this model of "protected democracy" - a masterpiece of political engineering - electoral minorities are legally over-represented in parliament because of the "binominal" system in the two houses, and because of the political weight of senators who have been appointed for life. Not only does this violate the democratic will of the people, it also constitutes an almost insurmountable obstacle to any attempt at constitutional reform. Factors like these, the fact that it is impossible for the Presidency to nominate or remove the commanders-in-chief of the different branches of the armed forces, and the fact that the National Security Council, which is mainly made up of high-ranking military leaders, maintains a "supervisory" function, raise serious doubts about the quality of democracy for the citizens of Chile.

The military regime came to an end almost 14 years ago, but in the interim there has been no progress in modifying the "protected democracy" model which has been in force in the country since 1980. "Chile is still a low-intensity democracy in that the principle of 'one person, one vote' is notably absent. The armed forces are far from being subordinate to civilian power, and they enjoy a degree of institutional and budgetary autonomy that is unique in the Americas at the present time."[9]

Community problems, private fears

Along with the freezing of political institutions inherited from the military regime, and the staggering inequalities in Chilean society, there is a third key factor behind the high levels of dissatisfaction and human insecurity.[10] This factor is what has come to be recognised as the "privatisation of community life", or in other words, the capacity of the model to convert shared and collective problems into individual and private ones.[11]

This situation is highlighted in the Human Development Report 2000, where "in daily conversation people do not normally talk about the dreams that they all share. They talk about their expectations for individual and family well-being, but they do not seem to have an image of a collective life that they can aspire to."[12]

This individualisation of Chilean society - the loss of direction, the absence of collective projects (a dominant theme in previous democratic periods) - also becomes apparent in the personalisation of fears about the future, the fact that there are no allusions to society's shortcomings or to contradictions which affect society as a whole. Thus, instead of talking about inequality in society or inequality of opportunity, redundancies, threats to public safety, or people's lack of protection when faced with a specific event or after retirement people give responses that refer to personal apprehensions: "not being able to raise my children", "being the victim of a robbery", "my insurance not covering me against illness", "losing my job", "retiring with a small pension", or "not having any pension at all". In all these complaints, we can detect a profound lack of confidence in the institutions in charge of protecting the public.[13]

The crucial point here is that not only is the Chilean economy extremely open to foreign trade and lacking in regulatory mechanisms, a situation which will become accentuated when the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the United States comes into force on 1 January 2004, but also that most of the country's social, cultural and political institutions are increasingly subordinated to dominant market forces. This is what is happening in higher education, the mass media, the health and education systems, and in the institutions that create and disseminate culture. This makes it more difficult for the citizenry to exercise their rights or to make their voices heard through the usual channels.

The devices of public misinformation

The lack of interest that Chilean society shows in public matters is also evident from the fact that there was scant reaction to or public debate about the signing of the FTA between Chile and the United States. This puts an end to the long campaign run by the Government in collaboration with the business sector, to convince the Chilean public of the advantages of the treaty.

By minimising the concessions made to the United States (and not making any reference to the fact that the lowering of tariff barriers would result in increased profit margins for importers rather than in lower prices for Chilean consumers) the Government somehow managed to convey a message to public opinion that emphasised two main ideas: that the Chilean economy was mature, and that from now on the country and all Chileans would enjoy the prestige of "playing in the big league".[14]

The indifference with which the Chilean people received the signing of the FTA is surprising when we consider the negative effects that a treaty like this had in Canada and Mexico, whose economies are considerably larger than Chile's. This reaction can be explained partly by the fact that the average citizen is uninformed. Although 87% of households have television and the proportion connected to the Internet is rising swiftly,[15] ownership of the mass media is concentrated in the hands of two large consortiums, El Mercurio and the Consorcio Periodístico de Chile SA. They not only subscribe to neo-liberalism in economic matters, but to a profoundly conservative vision of society when it comes to values and cultural matters.[16]

The Catholic Church has systematically opposed the ratification of the facultative protocol of the Convention for the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), and refused to discuss therapeutic abortion and the very existence of a divorce law. It exhorts believers in parliament to follow their postulates when taking decisions on cultural matters or questions involving values.[17] Together with the Church, the ideological monopoly of the mass media does not only have an effect on the quality and kind of information that is given to the public, but it also hinders free and in-depth debate about important matters that affect Chilean society as a whole, and, what is more, about the course we wish to take as a country. ■

8 García P., Gonzalo. "La transición a la democracia ¿un proceso de confianza política?" in *Confianza Social en Chile. Desafíos y Proyecciones*. Santiago de Chile, March 2001.

9 Heine, Jorge. "Modernización y malestar: la segunda fase de la transición chilena" in *Perspectivas*, Vol. 4, No. 2, Santiago de Chile, May 2001.

10 Heine, Jorge. "¿Modernización o congelación política?" *La Época*, 4 September 1991.

11 Salazar V., Gabriel. "Proyecto y exclusión: Dialéctica histórica de la desconfianza en Chile". *La Época*, 4 September 1991.

12 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). *Human Development Report Chile 2000. Synopsis.* 2000.

13 "Percepción ante los riesgos: inseguridades de los chilenos". *Opinión Pública* No. 4. Fundación Chile 21, Santiago de Chile, November 2001.

14 Cademártori, José. "TLC: Chile cayó en la trampa de EE.UU.". 6 April 2003. www.portaldenegocios.cl/article2249.html

15 Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas. *Censo 2002. Síntesis de Resultados*. Santiago de Chile, March 2003.

16 Sunkel, Guillermo and Esteban Geoffroy. "Concentración económica de los medios de comunicación". *Nuevo Periodismo* Collection, Editorial LOM, Santiago de Chile, 2001.

17 La Morada Corporation (Coordination). *Informe Sombra CEDAW 2003*. Santiago de Chile, July 2003.

Eradicate poverty, negotiate war

Enjoyment of full human security cannot be guaranteed while the war escalates, and the poverty and inequality generated by neoliberal policies continue. Human security and human rights cannot be viewed as contradictory.

Corporación Región

Alberto Yepes / Rubén Fernández

The events of 11 September 2001 have ushered in a new world order in which security has become a key issue in national and international policies. But although security is one of the most essential public assets of a society, it has been adulterated and reduced to a set of rules and procedures based on fear and mutual distrust, granting security forces the power to set up mechanisms for social control and to impose restrictions on civil and political liberties and guarantees, which are the basis of a functional democracy.

A more secure world, in contrast, requires the recovery of the idea of security in the broadest sense, as the guarantee of a favourable environment for the full expression of human life and dignity, putting people at the centre of public policies. Security is expressed in the conditions of everyday life (food, housing, employment, health, public safety) that benefit all human beings, without discrimination of any kind. While it is true that legally constituted authority must take action against all criminal acts that threaten people's lives, safety, freedom and property, these actions cannot run counter to the principles that ensure enjoyment of all human rights by all human beings, namely, their human security.

The thousand fronts of the internal war

The internal war, poverty and increasing inequality, which violate human rights and civil liberties, are the main factors threatening human security in Colombia. As stated by the Ombudsman's Office (Defensoría del Pueblo), "violent death, arbitrary loss of freedom and social inequality prevent the vast majority of people from determining their own future and living with anything more than the most basic necessities".[1]

Colombia has been living in the midst of an armed internal conflict for over 40 years. In the last few years the war has escalated, leaving thousands of victims murdered, mutilated, exiled, displaced or missing. Intervention by the United States in the war against drugs and the so-called war against terrorism, defined in the national Plan Colombia, the Democratic Security Policy of President Álvaro Uribe Vélez and the pro-war attitude of the insurgent groups, especially the Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC), has led to an increase in certain styles of military confrontation and generated new violations of human rights and international humanitarian law (IHL), making a negotiated political solution to the conflict less likely.

Colombia today faces a severe social and economic crisis, due to the worsening of several concurrent conflicts. Poverty affects 60% of the population, 25% are extremely poor, and 61% of the economically active population are in the informal sector.[2] Forced internal displacement has affected more than 2.5 million people. Profound social exclusion denies basic human rights to large sectors of the population: "The country still has some 1,800,000 children (taking into account new school places created in 2003) outside the educational system"[3] and 48% of the population lack health care.

Concentration of wealth and income are the flipside of this situation. The richest 20% of households receive 52% of income, and earn 26.3 times more than the poorest 20%. In the countryside, where 80% of the population are poor and 60% live in extreme poverty, concentration of land ownership means that 1.1% of landowners hold over 55% of arable land.[4]

Corruption, drug trafficking and violence as ways of accumulating and stripping people of their land and wealth, have fostered the idea held by certain members of the elite that the State is part of their personal patrimony, to be placed at the service of the private interests of a privileged few. Along with the internal war and the drug trade, corruption has become one of the most destructive problems affecting the country.[5]

Breathing is in jeopardy

In 2004, the US intervention in Colombia will command a budget of approximately USD 700 million, approved as part of the Department of Defence's Foreign Operations budget.[6] This intervention puts large sectors of the rural, indigenous and Afro-Colombian populations at increased risk in areas where war is being waged on coca leaf growers. About 400,000 families are being subjected to the harmful effects of the aerial spraying of toxic substances, which is affecting life and health, water, animals and crops.

Under the Plan Colombia, at least 29,980 people were expelled from the fumigation zones, while 2,831 indigenous people fled from their territories and around 40,500 members of Afro-Colombian communities were forced to leave during the first nine months of 2003, according to a report by the Consultancy for Human Rights and Forced Displacement (Consultoría para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento Forzado, CODHES). During the same period an estimated 20,727 people moved into 45 municipalities along Colombia's border with neighbouring countries, while about 15,000 Colombian citizens sought refuge in Ecuador, Venezuela and Panama.[7]

This anti-drugs policy creates new factors of human insecurity among small-scale coca leaf growers, as they are given no other alternative for survival.

Security policy versus civil liberties

The wearing and demoralising effects on the civilian population of the frequent and serious violations of IHL committed by all the armed parties in the conflict, have fostered the desire among the public for a quick solution to the war, even at the cost of restricting human rights. The defeat of the guerrilla organisations and the conquest of security have been promoted as goals that can be achieved in the

1 Defensoría del Pueblo. *Seguridad y libertades individuales.* Bogotá: Alfaomega Colombiana S. A., April 2003, p. viii.

2 Garay, Luis. "Políticas públicas y garantía de los DESC", in *El Embrujo Autoritario. Primer año de Gobierno de Álvaro Uribe Vélez.* Bogotá: Plataforma Colombiana de Derechos Humanos, Democracia y Desarrollo, pp. 33-44.

3 Data from the Ministry of Education taken from: "Este año se abrirán 370.000 cupos". *El Colombiano* newspaper, 18 January 2004, p. 6A.

4 Garay, *op cit.*

5 According to official figures, corruption makes away with over COP 14.5 billion (USD 5,385 million) per year, while the budget for social investment is only COP 9 billion (USD 3,342 million). In "Contra la corrupción". Editorial. *Diario El país-Cali* newspaper, 13 August 2003.

6 "Aprobada Ayuda de Estados Unidos a Colombia". *El Tiempo* newspaper. 8 December 2003.

7 *CODHES Informa.* No. 46. December 2003.

medium term by means of the so-called War on Terrorism, the Democratic Security Policy and US aid and military cooperation.[8]

However, the lack of respect for internationally recognised principles of human rights and the arbitrary abuses committed by all sides are daily sources of insecurity and terror in wide sectors of the population. The guerrillas, paramilitary groups and government forces have continued to perpetrate serious violations of IHL and abuses against the civilian population. Between July 2002 and June 2003, 2,501 people were kidnapped, most of them by guerrilla organisations. At the same time, the excesses of the Democratic Security Policy have been notoriously more brutal among the poorer sectors and communities in both the countryside and cities. Forcible disappearances have increased: between January and August 2003, 684 people were reported missing, an increase on the previous year's figure.[9] Arbitrary mass arrests have increased to alarming levels. The Commander General of the Police acknowledged that in 2003 125,000 people had been arrested.[10] Many who had been detained after being named by anonymous informers later had to be released because of lack of evidence.

The Government's own evaluation of its security policy has been positive, pointing to achievements such as a reduction in homicides, massacres and kidnappings. The main highways in the country are now under the control of the authorities, and the National Police has established a strong presence in most of the country's municipalities. These government gains, however, must be contrasted with the increasing militarisation of society and the erosion of civil liberties ratified in several international treaties, as well as with the growth in military spending which has aggravated the fiscal crisis, while social investment, which would promote recognition of the population's economic and social rights, is underfinanced.

Rule of law undermined

Rights violations in recent years have led the United Nations' human rights body and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to make a number of observations and recommendations to the Colombian State and to the armed groups with the aim of overcoming the humanitarian crisis. In July 2003 the European countries' Panel of Donors made its aid and cooperation conditional on fulfilment of the recommendations of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.[11] Out of 24 recommendations that the State promised to implement, 17 have not been complied with, 7 have been partially carried out, and measures are being taken against 10 of them.[12] The illegal armed groups (guerrillas and paramilitaries) have totally ignored the three recommendations made to them, concerning kidnappings, massacres, protection of civilians and, in general, respect for IHL.

Acting against the recommendations of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Government sent Congress a constitutional reform bill (passed in December 2003) which ignores mandates on human rights contained in international treaties signed by Colombia. The reformed Constitution grants new powers to the armed forces to detain people for 36 hours, carry out house raids, tap telephones and record and intercept communications without a warrant, on the basis of accusations by the military and with no need for proper and impartial judicial inquiries. The armed forces may also carry out functions of the judicial police, including the use of forensic methods and interrogation of suspects.

Furthermore, nearly half the articles of the present Constitution are being rewritten to accommodate government strategy, in an attempt to strengthen presidential powers, eliminate judicial checks on the actions of the Executive and the armed forces, while restricting the independence of the other state powers. State responsibilities such as security, satisfaction of basic needs and justice are being devolved to community level, so that the majority of state resources can be channelled into financing the war and paying state creditors.

The crowning event undermining the rule of law is the Government's proposal to reform the justice system, preventing the protection of economic, social and cultural rights being invoked through the legal system, eliminating the *Acción de Tutela* (writ of injunction), and restricting the powers of the Constitutional Court to reach verdicts which interfere with government decisions.

Eradicate poverty, negotiate war

The standpoint taken by the recent National Human Development Report 2003 for Colombia *Understand in Order to Transform the Local Roots of Conflict* presented by UNDP argues that we are all losers in the war, and it contains proposals about which thousands of Colombian citizens and institutions were consulted. These should be taken into account by the democratic sectors and the international community in pressing for advances towards a negotiated outcome to the conflict.[13]

The only way to ensure human security, democratic rule and lasting peace in Colombia is through a negotiated end to the war, a reformed economic model that will reverse the process of impoverishment and concentration of income and productive assets, the defence and extension of the rule of law, and the creation of a new social pact that will guarantee human welfare, employment and the enjoyment of social rights in an environment where human rights and democratic participation are fully respected. Further requirements are a reduction in the cost of servicing the national debt through better conditions, lower interest rates and longer repayment schedules, and a gradual lowering of the debt owed to private creditors, in order to make financial resources available to address the social needs of the 60% of the population who live in poverty. ■

8 The Democratic Security Policy provides for strengthening security forces (from 240,000 to 400,000 members), setting up a network of one million paid informers, coordinated by the security forces and at their service, creating citizen security squads and adding 100,000 peasant militias to the army.

9 Declaration of Colombian NGOs to the UN Human Rights Commission, 60th Session, March-April 2004.

10 "Ponen en duda las cifras oficiales sobre muertes y desmovilizados en la guerrilla", *El Tiempo*, 16 September 2003.

11 See: Oficina en Colombia del Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Derechos Humanos. "Recomendaciones para Colombia 2003". Bogotá, March 2003, www.hchr.org.co

12 According to an evaluation carried out by more than 150 social organisations, trade unions, rural, ethnic, community, development, women's, human rights and environmental organisations and peace initiatives, participating in three broad networks: the Alliance for Cooperation for Peace and Democracy, Colombia-Europe-United States Coordination, and the Platform for Human Rights, Democracy and Development. "Colombia se raja en derechos humanos ante la ONU". See: www.viaalterna.com.co/index2.htm

13 This report contains proposals which aim to: a) prevent extension of the conflict to new victims and regions; b) reduce the number of illegal combatants and people affected; c) prevent outrages subsequent to action; d) achieve respect for IHL and human rights, while the confrontation lasts; e) compensate innocent victims; f) punish those responsible for criminal behaviour; g) reduce the harmful effects of the conflict on human development; h) shorten the conflict and put an end to armed action; i) ensure that the final solution to the conflict complies with the standards of justice and causes the least possible harm to or has the best possible impact on Colombia's future; and j) secure a firm and lasting peace, i.e. demobilisation of the armed groups with no new such groups emerging to replace them.

A risky business



The Free Trade Agreement (FTA) recently signed between Central American countries and the United States will have a marked effect on the region's economies, legislation and social policies, and will influence governance and, therefore, human security. Social organisations are pessimistic about any positive results accruing from the FTA for the benefit of ordinary citizens; they are more inclined to envisage considerable difficulties arising in the medium term.

Centro de Estudios y Publicaciones Alforja

Carlos Pentzke / Mario Céspedes Ávalos

Costa Rica has traditionally done quite well in terms of development and human security indices.[1] This is the result of a political and social consensus which in the past led to greater public investment in important areas, such as social security, education, and infrastructure. It is also the result of an integrative vision of the country, and the basis for designing public policies that complemented each other as they were being implemented. By following this approach to development the country has avoided putting all its eggs in one basket.

In the present national, regional and global context, Costa Rica is faced with two major challenges: to continue to nurture the original sources of its development and to strive to improve its participation in the new world economic order.

Negotiations with the United States over the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) have been the key item on the agenda of Central American countries. Starting in 2002, when regulations for conducting them were defined, the main rounds of negotiations took place in 2003. Toward the end of the year, in the ninth round of negotiation with the United States, the only country that had not signed the FTA was Costa Rica. Some Central American heads of state voiced their disapproval that the regional agreement had not been signed jointly by *all* the countries involved. Costa Rican negotiators pointed out that not signing the treaty simultaneously with the other countries did not mean that Costa Rica was opting out of the agreement. It had not signed the FTA because of the pressure exerted by the United States on highly sensitive areas of the economy such as telephone services, insurance and agriculture. Negotiations between Costa Rica and the United States were finalised in January 2004. As expected, the Costa Rican negotiating team came away with what they termed as a "fair and balanced" agreement.

Everything indicates that the "sacrificial lambs" were the industrial rice producers, the telecommunications and insurance sectors, and the public health sector. The lion's share of the benefits fell to business groups linked to the textile and sugar industries, and the financial sector.

The Central America-United States FTA will change the region profoundly, and it will leave its mark on each and every one of the signatory countries, since this is no ordinary trade agreement. Its impact will be felt in their economies, legislation and social policies, and it will influence the levels of governance of the entire region.

Some sectors of society have already identified the effects that they will experience as a result of the Agreement. Social organisations representing farmers, the energy and communications workers' unions, as well as the insurance services and the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, do not anticipate many social benefits from the treaty; indeed, what they envisage is greater difficulties in the short, medium and long term. The chambers of commerce of the pharmaceutical sector and the exporters sector share this view.

In order to make a reasonable assessment of the agreement and its impact on the chances for a dignified and secure life for individuals and society as a whole, it would be worth asking what was the starting point for FTA negotiations and to what extent the country was adequately prepared to sign it.

A new development model

The economic and political dynamics in Central America in the 1980s involved emphasising export earnings; downsizing the State, as well as changing some of its functions; opening up the economy to imports; market liberalisation; and attracting direct foreign investment and finance. This new development model has been promoted for the past two decades. With the negotiation of bilateral free trade agreements with Canada, Chile, Mexico, the United States and the European Union, this model has become more extended.[2]

So far, the expected benefits of the new model have not materialised. Nevertheless, advances have been made: inflation has been stabilised, economic growth has been reactivated, the influx of international capital has increased, there has been a remarkable increase in exports and the fiscal deficit has been reduced. Important as they are, these improvements are not enough, partly because per capita economic growth has not matched the levels reached in earlier years, poverty has remained high, and income distribution has deteriorated.

The economic and social performance mentioned above demonstrates that the policies adopted should be maintained and expanded by promoting education; preserving and strengthening democracy, justice and human rights; moving toward regional co-operation on environmental issues; strengthening the financial markets; and eradicating poverty - all these policies need additional attention (Summit of the Americas, April 1998). The Government and social institutions play an important role in promoting economic development, improving living conditions and ensuring people's human security. It would appear that in Central America - with the exception of Costa Rica - the lack of institutional development has had a negative effect on economic growth, and this in turn means that the State cannot afford the human resources needed to improve its institutions.

At this point, two big questions arise: a) What aspects of economic growth can contribute to create lasting agreements for development and human security? b) What challenges must the region face in order to build those agreements? Economic growth is not in itself a sufficient condition for designing those agreements, but without economic growth it is impossible to achieve the degree of

1 The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) *Human Development Report* for 2003 assigns Costa Rica a Human Development Index (HDI) of 0.832. This figure places Costa Rica in 42nd position out of 175 countries for which indices were calculated, and among the 55 countries described as having a high level of human development. When classifying countries according to per capita GDP, Costa Rica takes 52nd place, ten positions lower than its ranking on human development. The human poverty index measures deprivation in a population in matters related to health, education, and income; by this index, Costa Rica occupies 4th place out of 94 developing countries. If the human poverty index used only income measurement, Costa Rica would have been number 17. In other words, Costa Rica's high score on the human poverty index is primarily due to the high levels of access to education, health, drinking water and nutritious food enjoyed by the population. www.estadonacion.or.cr/Info2003/nacion9/informe_mundial.html

2 Information taken from UNDP. *Segundo Informe sobre Desarrollo Humano en Centroamérica y Panamá. Proyecto Estado de la Región.* San José, 2003, pp. 117-186.

human development desired. Economic growth is an indispensable, but not necessarily sufficient, condition.

Going global: access to international markets

A crucial issue in the debate on development is access to international markets. In Central America, countries have concentrated their efforts at the regional and national level in gaining access to free trade zones. In the 1990s, the globalisation process picked up speed, but economic growth was nowhere as dynamic.

El Salvador, Honduras and Costa Rica were the first countries in the region to move toward integrating into international markets. Various factors influence the moment and context in which a country joins the trend toward joining the global economy. Among them are the specific historical circumstances and internal conditions which characterise their economies: extent and quality of education; skills training of the labour force; infrastructure development; quality of and access to telecommunications; adequate electricity supply services; development of the financial system; social development (public health, social security programmes and income distribution); human security; structure of the business sector.

Costa Rica joined the global market with its traditional exports (coffee, bananas and sugar), to which new lines of goods and services were added: agricultural products (pineapples, melons, ornamental plants, flowers, cassava, and miniature vegetables); acquaculture products (shellfish and tilapia); forestry products and products made of wood (doors, window-frames, toys, furniture); manufactured goods (plastics, paper, metalwork, foodstuffs, sports gear); *maquila*[3] products (textiles, electronic hardware and software); services (call centres and medical services); processing and assembly of integrated circuits; and tourism. Costa Rican exports grew from USD 1 billion per annum in 1984 to more than USD 6 billion in 2003.[4]

Is the FTA a tool for development?

The question of development is central to any national or regional debate about the significance and consequences of FTAs with the United States or with any other country or region. To what extent can FTAs contribute to the achievement of nationally determined goals, favourable macroeconomic indicators, wider and more cost-effective social coverage, and better-equipped urban and rural infrastructure, among other projects?

The answer would appear to be obvious. Even in the best of cases, a trade agreement by and of itself cannot accomplish all these things. That is why support for or opposition to the signing of a free trade treaty with the United States should be debated in the context of a nation-wide, open discussion about long-term strategies for development, and the specific form such development will take. The national debate has been neither as profound or as transparent as its importance warrants.

Sectors in favour of the treaty subscribe intrinsically to global thought and take for granted that globalisation in any country of the world will, in the long run, automatically improve the quality of life of its people. According to this way of thinking, there is no need to take into account the specific situation of a given country; indeed, to do so would be to create an obstacle to the integration of that country to the international marketplace. For them national interests are substituted by global interests. Free trade, then, is the accepted national model.

On the other hand, sectors opposed to the signing of the FTA think differently, and exert pressure to open a public debate about the characteristics that they hope Costa Rica should have in the next 50 years. All the evidence suggests that this pressure is aimed at achieving nationally valid rules in order to set certain limits to and safeguard economic and social sectors that have historically characterised Costa Rica's national identity and should continue to be recognised as such. A country's trade policy is part of its economic policy, which in turn is part of a whole set of policies which taken together should reflect an integrative vision of the country.

Today's international context is changing both the form and the content of the conditions which until now were points of reference for the legal basis of a specific model of international trade relations. In many areas, particularly with regard to trade, the globalisation process requires new instruments and mechanisms that will enable the free movement of goods and persons. Any national legislation that hinders the aims of free trade will have to change.

FTAs are defined as the set of instruments and mechanisms that will change the terms of international trade in order to favour more dynamic regional markets and, consequently, provide better opportunities for the so-called weak economies. In theory, when put into practice, FTA mechanisms should favour the more dependent economies, since these will interact with stronger economies which will introduce capital that will boost local exports, thus benefiting the future economic development of developing countries.

Costa Rica's participation in the joint FTA negotiations carried out by Central American countries with the United States is based on the Government's conviction that signing the Free Trade Agreement will give the country the economic impulse needed for development. Some years ago, however, the country's social and economic development started to slow down; the initial impulse provided by progressive long-term policies devised in the 1940s and 1950s showed signs of deterioration in the 1980s, and finally came to a halt in the 1990s.

Since then, Costa Rica's development has been typically contradictory: on the one hand, the country has been able to keep its high development indices above the average for Central America and for many Latin American countries; on the other hand, the current economic crisis has made an impact on the country, whose consequences will only become clear in the next 10 to 15 years.

Today, when free trade is put forward as the road to salvation, there are many voices warning of possible future effects that will transform the country, negatively affecting its social and productive sectors. ■

3 *Maquilas* are factories owned by foreign or transnational companies which are set up in countries where labour is cheap, to manufacture or assemble some of the components of a finished product.

4 Ministry of Foreign Trade (COMEX). www.comex.go.cr

EGYPT

Time for democracy



Egypt, as well as other Arab societies, is afflicted by a significant amount of poverty and illiteracy resulting in a lack of knowledge and awareness of human rights and it suffers from a set of tightly bound values and traditions exemplified by submission and dependency. This clearly precludes any democratic process and stands in the way of creativity and free thought, thereby preventing improvement and development. There are many societal and cultural obstacles to human security (among them, the prevalence of tribal, ethnic and family allegiances), but the Government and its policies are the main political threat.

National Association for Human Rights and Development

Amir Salem

Government authorities as political obstacles

It is easy to identify government authorities as the main political obstacle to the human rights movement. Egypt has lived under a plethora of nationalistic slogans, most of which border on the chauvinistic and demagogical. These slogans are characterised by contradictory assertions, so that even during the worst eras of dependency and subordination, its regimes solemnly claimed to protect national independence and national sovereignty. Most regimes adopted the single party logic. In the best of cases there were various parties that struggled against the majority ruling party that had control over everything. The consequences today of these regimes and their logic are a clear lack of popular participation, the absence of freedom of thought and expression in all of its forms as well as the absence of the right to assembly and to form independent organisations and groups. This has weakened the ability of society and individuals to create and sustain both group and individual initiatives to the extent that society has become isolated and deprived of all tools and methods to participate in public and political affairs. Egyptians are impotent when it comes to demanding democratic rights and freedoms.

Current Arab legal systems can easily make applying international human rights conventions an impossible feat. The weaknesses and flaws in Arab constitutions, accompanied by the battery of freedom-restricting laws whose primary logic is to safeguard internal security present another huge obstacle to any human rights movement. At the same time, in an effort to gain acceptability at the international level, some states are working towards signing international conventions although they neither believe in them nor intend to apply them. Such moves are part of the regimes' window-dressing, employed to give them the appearance of modern states that respect human rights. This posture also conspires to undermine recently established human rights movements.

Towards a conciliation-based reform

Social reform is a vast process, requiring a consensus among the partners responsible for the achievement of the desired goals.

A critical element in the process of determining the direction and goals of any social reform programme is a close analysis of the nature of social dynamics along with the map of economic and social class, the individual's share of the total national social resources and the total domestic product in relation to the volume of internal and external debt. Such an analysis pushes the vision of comprehensive social development towards achieving substantial and measurable improvement in specific social indicators. Such analyses however should be accompanied by a comparison of the individual's share of the gross domestic product (in Egypt, according to the World Bank, it was USD 1,200 per year in 1999) with those of neighbouring states. This comparison allows us to aspire to an even higher per capita income and a more just distribution of these resources and assets.

The spread of poverty

International development reports inform us that the ratio of poverty in Egypt reaches 33.9%, while absolute poverty is 7.6%, which makes the total of those suffering from poverty in its different forms 41.5% of the overall population (World Bank, 1999). It is also a well-known fact that 96% of the population inhabit only 4% of the total land area. In addition the ratio of individuals in need of provision, that is, those dependent on another person's income, reaches 77%, the highest ratio globally (World Bank, 1999). A deficient distribution of economic resources and assets continues to exist, with 20% of the population owning 70% of the land.

The spread of poverty represents the main challenge facing the mechanisms of reform. Poverty is usually accompanied by unemployment, malnutrition, illiteracy, disregard for women's rights, environmental problems and limited access to social and health services. These factors contribute to the increase in the levels of disease and death rates as well as to decreased economic productivity. Poverty is also directly related to spatial distribution, inappropriate housing and the inappropriate use and illogical distribution of natural resources.

Poverty and social values

The general trend in social values is still characterised by patriarchal principles exemplified in obedience and submission to authority. The vast majority of Egyptians do not have the basics of reading and writing and of critical thinking skills and free expression. This leads to poor and ineffective participation in public affairs, and a serious lack of awareness, which are ultimately the result of abuse in the mechanisms of power and the disproportionate ownership of resources.

The circle of corruption

Egypt is experiencing a widening of the circle of corruption within the government apparatus and between the Government and the private sector. This has reached levels that threaten development and form a barrier around social and economic improvement and democratic reform.

Participation as a triangle

Participation, as defined implicitly above, is none other than the interlacing of three main complementary factors: the Government, civil society and the private sector. Their relationship is akin to the relationship between the sides of an equilateral triangle. The triangle symbolises the importance of balance and co-operation in the face of the conflict of interests that impede social integration and increase marginalisation and intolerance. Among the factors that constrain the balance of interests is a group of deficiencies that distort the sides of the triangle.

The State is hegemonic and exercises complete control, depending on its bureaucratic apparatus to allow the Executive to interfere in the Legislative and Judicial realms.

Civil society is caught between conceptual confusion, disorganisation, and the inability to fund itself. It continues to re-shape itself and find a role for itself as an effective and strategic partner in human development.

The private sector does not recognise the concept of social capital, which sets the conditions and mechanisms of the internal market to guarantee its sustainability and its ability to compete.

Building a civil society that provides for legal and political guarantees entails the following:

- Democracy and decentralisation for human development.

- Effective popular participation in political decision-making and human development through ensuring the participation of weak and marginalised social groups and those most prone to poverty such as women and children.
- Development and amendment of laws that conflict with democratic concepts and the principles of participation and human rights.
- The importance of allowing freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and the formation of parties and groups.

NGO responsibilities

In the process of civil society building and to achieve a just and balanced human development, NGOs carry important responsibilities, such as:

- Starting up and executing both short term and long term projects in order to raise popular awareness among NGO members and society in general, and holding training courses on effective popular participation in social administration and political decision-making.
- Motivating NGOs themselves and the State in all activities and projects that target social and human development.
- Taking up a popular monitoring role in co-operation with government authorities over the State's work and performance.
- Directing efforts towards finding means of self-funding from the local community to obtain the highest degree of independence.
- Providing exemplars of NGOs and initiating pioneering projects in the fields of combating poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, and in providing job opportunities.
- Releasing NGOs' creative energies and new initiatives by freeing them from bureaucracy. Focusing on grass-roots organisations and providing them with support.
- Ensuring that the relationship between NGOs and donors is based on co-ordination and mutual co-operation built on equality and partnership, in which NGOs from developed countries do not have advantages over local NGOs. This assumes that social democracy and participation play a critical role in the process of development, and is achieved by giving priority to actual local requirements based on just and balanced development.

Political reform and democratic dialogue

The Egyptian political regime is well aware that national and democratic movements such as parties, unions, civil society organisations, and writers and thinkers have for decades been demanding comprehensive political and democratic reform. They demand a shift from a single-party State where the security apparatus wields control over legislation, institutions and organisations, to a modern civil State where all citizens are equal before the law and where the legislative and judicial bodies enjoy independence. It is a State where all citizens are partners in policy- making and decision-making, based on its respect for civilians and human rights, with no discrimination between individuals because of religious belief, sex, race, social class or political orientation.

The national democratic movement reserves the right to struggle towards all-embracing democratic political and social reform and to demand of the official National Democratic Party to place reform at the top of its priorities. This is especially relevant in the light of the new vision and commitment the Party has declared for itself. Such a step will constitute the basis of an open dialogue between the Government and opposition parties and civil society organisations. It is worth noting that all opposition parties such as the National Progressive Tagamu' Party and the New Al Wafd Party as well as the Lawyers' and Journalists' Syndicates, the Judges' Union, and human rights organisations, during the first and second Justice Conferences held in the 1980s requested democratic political reform from the Government. Among the more important of these requests are:

- Amend legislation in order to comply with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Declaration on the Right to Development and all other agreements relating to rights and freedoms that Egypt has committed itself to.
- Cease the state of emergency that Egypt has been under for years on end. Remove state security courts and limit military trials to situations of war and general crisis. Release all prisoners and detainees who have not been tried.
- Provide legal and political guarantees to form parties, unions, associations and all other forms of peaceful, civil groups, and ensure their complete independence.
- Free the media from government control and allow the establishment of private media companies.
- Allow political dialogue and debate in the media between political parties, civil society organisations and human rights groups.
- Pass appropriate legislation and policies to guarantee free and fair elections in order to open the way for a multi-party system and participation in government which will allow authority to be passed on to others.
- Have all elections (presidential, parliamentary and gubernatorial) supervised by independent judicial bodies, and work towards applying the principle of equal opportunity among citizens to exercise their political rights, including the right to being nominated and elected to office.
- Establish the complete separation between the ruling National Democratic Party and the State and its institutions. This is to be accompanied by the President relinquishing his position as head of the Party in order to be the head of all Egyptian citizens, and limiting the power of the Executive in accordance with the Constitution.
- Pass laws on local governance to stimulate popular participation without the interference of the executive or security apparatuses or the control of the National Democratic Party. Such laws should enable the exercise of free and direct elections and participation in the local administration and popular supervision over the Executive.
- Reform and amend economic and social policies relating to wages, health and education that threaten the quality of life of ordinary citizens and widen the circle of poverty and unemployment, working towards instating alternative plans for human and social development in order to achieve social justice and protect all citizens' economic and social rights. ■

Between poverty and violence



Poverty, increasing inequality and a culture of violence are threatening the human security of the Salvadorean people. The acts and omissions of the Government, far from protecting people in the current critical situation, have deepened their insecurity. Actions taken by civil society are still fragmented, and have not managed to revert government inefficiency.

Control Ciudadano El Salvador[1]

Rosío Villatoro Pineda / Ana Murcia / Armando Pérez Salazar
Jeannette Alvarado / Mario Antonio Paniagua

Obstacles to human security[2]

Human security means respect for every human right, including access to food, health care, education and basic services, a healthy environment, and guarantees against violence and discrimination. However, there are a series of obstacles that prevent a large part of the population from enjoying this security. In this report we analyse those aspects which we consider most important for the country.

The economic threat

El Salvador has a population of 6 million, and almost half are poor. This limits their chances of access to a dignified and full life, and is the main obstacle to human security.

According to the Human Development Report El Salvador 2003,[3] at least 43 out of every 100 inhabitants are still poor, and 19 out of every 100 live in absolute poverty. The situation is worse in rural areas, where 55.8% are poor and 29.1% live in absolute poverty. In 33.6% of poor homes women are the heads of household.

The report also recognises that poverty has increased, and that the quantification of poverty is not correct since it is based on suppositions that are no longer valid. For example, it is assumed that the cost of the wider basic needs basket is twice that of the basic food basket, although the prices of some elements in the former (housing, education, electricity) have more than doubled in recent years. If prices were updated, the segment of the population classed as poor would certainly be larger.

The productive sector has not been able to generate jobs or salaries to meet the basic needs of the population. Official employment data give a rather distorted picture when they show that 94% of the economically active population are in employment. The reality is that 30% of employed people do not have a steady job, and make a living in the informal sector, where their earnings provide a mere subsistence income. In other words, 40% of the population have employment problems.

Because of stagnation in the agricultural sector and the absence of policies aimed at developing rural areas, unemployment has mostly affected the peasant population. "Workers employed in the agricultural sector, who in 1991 amounted to 35.8% of the total employed labour force, only made up 21.8% of total employment in 2001."[4]

But unemployment and underemployment are not the only factors generating poverty. The minimum salary in urban areas in the trade and services sector is USD 158 per month, in industry it is USD 155, and in textiles and clothing manufacturing, where the female workforce is concentrated, it is USD 151. With this level of income a family of five can just about afford the basic food basket (approximately USD 129), but they cannot pay for education, health care, housing and basic services.

In rural areas the situation is even more serious since the minimum salary (USD 74 per month) is not even enough to cover the cost of the basic food basket, and unemployment rates are high. This explains why the segment of the population in absolute poverty is concentrated in rural areas.

The precariousness of the quality of life for Salvadorean men and women is directly linked to inequalities in income distribution: "In 1992 the richest 20% of households in the country received 54.5% of national income while the poorest 20% received 3.2%. Ten years later, the share of national income going to the richest 20% had increased to 58.3% and that of the poorest 20% had fallen to 2.4%."[5] The Government has been criticised for its economic measures that foster an excessive concentration of wealth in the hands of a small group of families.[6]

Incorrect hypotheses

Government action to eradicate poverty has been inadequate. Its main strategy was aimed at attaining economic growth and raising foreign investment, which it projected would generate employment and social well-being. This theory has not been proved correct. "Starting in 1996, El Salvador registered a slowdown in growth, which worsened in the period 2000-2002 when per capita GDP was paralysed."[7] Besides this, foreign investment has been small-scale and of poor quality because it is based on light maquila-type manufacturing. Human insecurity (the lack of a sound legal system, criminality, etc.) is also a factor in businesses' reluctance to invest.

The money which Salvadoreans who have emigrated to the United States send back to their families is what has enabled the national economy to stay afloat. According to the Central Reserve Bank, in 2003, USD 2,105.3 million was received in remittances, the highest figure of all times. It is estimated that the families benefiting from this practice receive more than USD 200 per month. Remittances currently account for 14% of the GDP. The export of cheap labour, then, is profitable for the Government, which is why it has begun to promote it openly.

A second government strategy has been to increase social expenditure. Although total public social expenditure (including social security) increased from 5.5% of GDP in 1994 to around 8% of GDP in 2002, it is still among the lowest in Latin America. The widespread lack of access to basic services is evidence that there is scant investment. Of people aged 15 and over, 18% are illiterate. Social security excludes almost the whole of the rural population, and 24% of households do not have running water.

1 Control Ciudadano El Salvador: Asociación de Mujeres por la Dignidad y la Vida (LAS DIGNAS); Asociación Maquilishuatl (FUMA); Acción para la Salud en El Salvador (APSAL); Asociación Comité de Familiares de Víctimas de Violaciones a los Derechos Humanos de El Salvador (CODEFAM); Asociación Intersectorial para el Desarrollo Económico y el Progreso Social (CIDEP).

2 The authors are grateful for the invaluable collaboration of César Villalona, researcher and economist, and Roxana Martel, researcher and journalist.

3 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). *Informe sobre Desarrollo Humano El Salvador 2003. Desafíos y opciones en tiempos de globalización.* San Salvador: UNDP. 2003.

4 *Ibid.*

5 *Ibid.*

6 "A new oligarchic group has come into being whose visible face is seen in the control which a few families have over the financial system. Certainly, if we talk of an oligarchic group it is because these families also control other important sectors of economic activity like industry, trade, agriculture, transport, construction etc." Paniagua, Carlos. "El bloque empresarial hegemónico salvadoreño". *Estudios Centroamericanos (ECA)* 645-648. San Salvador: Universidad Centroamericana José León Cañas (UCA), July-August, 2002.

7 UNDP, *op cit.*

Another government initiative to free the country of poverty is to subscribe to trade treaties, the most important of which is the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the United States. However the situation of other countries like Canada and Mexico (10 years after the implementation of their FTAs with the United States) raises concern about the results of trade liberalisation. While the United States proposes a treaty which not only allows free access for its products but gives it control of public services and natural resources in the region, Central American countries can merely aspire to obtain free trade conditions for their products, mainly local crafts and agricultural produce, whose potential market would be none other than Central Americans living in the United States.

The main organisations opposing these treaties have pointed out that they have not been inspired by or constructed in the interests of the population, but are designed to guarantee local big business profitable alliances with transnational corporations. There are reasons to think that the Government's theories about FTAs will not prove correct.

The culture of violence

The violence that has been taking place during the last 10 years constitutes a second obstacle to human security in the country.

Criminality, the inability of the legal or police systems to cope with it, and the easy availability of weapons are some of the factors that have led to the intensification and institutionalisation of violence. The annual murder rate in El Salvador is 53 per 100,000 inhabitants.[8] According to the official register of the Public Prosecutor's Office (FGR), 3,163 people were the victims of murder in 2003, an average of nine murders per day.

But criminality is only one kind of violence. Social violence is also on the increase, particularly violence towards women in the public, social and domestic spheres. According to the National Civil Police (PNC), in 2001 half the firearm-related murders (47.8%) were classified as social violence.

The ability of both the PNC and the FGR to investigate crimes has always been questionable. According to data from the National Council of Public Security, in 1996 and 1997, the levels of police efficiency in the resolution of murder cases barely reached 6% and 8% respectively. Of the total summonses presented by the FGR to Justices of the Peace, only 54% managed to pass the instruction phase. From 1998 to 2000 there were 4,700 reported sexual offences (the vast majority against women and children), but only 2.8% resulted in court cases and only 1.4% led to convictions.

This inefficiency in the FGR and the police has worked in favour of corruption and impunity. According to data from Transparency International (2003), among the 133 countries evaluated and rated from 0 (very corrupt) to 10 (very clean) El Salvador is in 59th place with a rating of 3.7.

In El Salvador, there are around 450,000 (mainly illegal) firearms in the hands of civilians. This has evidently raised the murder rate at national level. According to the PNC, in 2000, 7 out of every 10 robberies and 7 out of every 10 murders were committed with firearms. Besides that, the national survey of attitudes and norms about violence and firearms shows that nearly 14% of people who said they possessed a firearm and had been the victim of a robbery were injured, whereas among people who were robbed and did not possess a firearm only 7.4% were injured.

The Mano Dura *(Firm Hand) Plan*

The Government ought to consolidate a culture of peace, promoting preventive measures, implementing justice efficiently and looking after the victims of violence. Nevertheless there is no state policy in this area, and action has been repressive rather than preventive. Proof of this is the Firearms Law, which allows citizens to bear arms to defend themselves from delinquency given the incompetence of the PNC, a law which has been defended both by the Presidency and the main parties on the Right in the Legislative Assembly.

The most recent measures against violence have been the passing of the Anti-gang Law and the implementation of the *Mano Dura* (Firm Hand) Plan, which seek to combat the criminal activities of gangs. This law, besides being unnecessary (because many of the offences it covers are already covered in the Penal Code and in the Juvenile Offender Law), is also unconstitutional in that it contravenes fundamental rights like the presumption of innocence. Similar government plans against gangs, or *maras*, have been passed in other Central American countries (the *Escoba* Plan in Guatemala and the *Libertad Azul* Plan in Honduras). As has been pointed out, the common denominator in these measures is that they are part of an electoral campaign strategy: "In El Salvador, the *Mano Dura* Plan which is guaranteed by the government party is a central component in their bid to attract votes in next year's elections". "The current President of Honduras, Ricardo Maduro, based his electoral campaign on a zero tolerance policy against crime."[9]

Monitoring by civil society

Civil society has undertaken development projects that aim to provide the most underprivileged communities with services that the Government is unable to provide like health care, housing, education, piped water, gender equity, etc. But their strategies have also aimed at tightening social control.

There have been organised protests against the privatisation of health services and in favour of an integral reform of the health system (1998-2003). This movement co-ordinated the activities of a good number of civil organisations and offered opportunities for citizens to voice their needs, as well as managing temporarily to halt the process of privatisation of basic services promoted by the Government.

The strategy of social control gained strength in the mid 1990s when a sizeable group of social organisations was invited to take part in the World Summit for Social Development and in the IV World Conference on Women. After the summits, the main task of civil society was to see that commitments made by governments were kept. Up until now, action taken by civil society has been fragmented, and its claims have not managed to influence government decisions.

In 2000, world leaders again committed themselves to achieving a series of goals: to eradicate hunger and poverty by 2015. Monitoring by citizen organisations will be indispensable if the Millennium Development Goals, which promote the full enjoyment of human security in the country, are to be met. ■

References

Cruz, José Miguel and Luis Gonzáles. "De la guerra al delito: evolución de la violencia en El Salvador." In: *Asalto al desarrollo: Violencia en América Latina.* Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank, 2000.

Dirección General de Estadísticas y Censos. "Multi-purpose Homes Survey". San Salvador: Ministerio de Economía, 2002.

González, Luis and Roxana Martel. *Pobreza y sociedad civil: El caso de El Salvador.* 2003.

Moreno, Raúl. *El Tratado de Libre Comercio entre Estados Unidos y Centroamérica: Impactos económicos y sociales.* San Salvador: Centro para la Defensa del Consumidor (CDC), 2003.

El Diario de Hoy, 17 January 2004, p. 43.

United Nations Development Programme. (Ed). *Ensayos. Violencia en una sociedad en transición.* San Salvador: UNDP, 2000.

United Nations Development Programme. *Armas de fuego y violencia.* San Salvador: UNDP, 2003.

United Nations Development Programme. *Indicadores sobre violencia en El Salvador.* San Salvador: UNDP, 2002.

8 *El Mundo*, 22 December 2003, p. 3.

9 *Proceso.* "Un vistazo centroamericano a los planes gubernamentales para la represión de las pandillas". I and II. San Salvador: Universidad Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas (UCA), 2003.

Social security under threat

Since public funds are tight, due not only to the country's sluggish economic performance but also to a drop in revenue following the introduction of tax reforms, the Federal Government seems determined to initiate a phase of more rapid cuts in welfare spending. Although economic and social insecurity that threatens livelihood will be the exception, a growing number of Germans will experience social exclusion and unpredictability in planning for the future.

Social Watch Germany[1]

Uwe Kerkow

Social security for the unemployed

Germany's public funds are tight as a result of its sluggish economic performance and a self-imposed drop in revenue following the introduction of tax reforms, which mainly ease the burden on individuals in medium and high income groups. Cuts are also being made in the *Länder*[2] and local authority budgets.

A particular cause for concern are the reforms to the labour market and wage replacement benefits. The changes agreed in December 2003 aim to reduce the unemployment benefit entitlement period and combine unemployment benefit and social assistance. In addition, jobless people will be obliged to accept any kind of work - even (part-time) jobs which are low-paid and therefore not liable for social insurance contributions.

The German Trade Union Confederation (DGB) sums up the situation thus: "The pressure on the unemployed and disadvantaged to accept any job is increasing." According to the DGB, unemployment benefit is falling anyway, so there is no need for any additional tightening of the legal criteria governing job acceptance. "This applies especially to jobs that do not offer social insurance protection." On the other hand, almost any kind of (pseudo-) self-employment is encouraged by the Government. As the trade unions have remarked: "Redistribution is continuing - from bottom to top."[3]

The *Diakonisches Werk*, the German Protestant Church's organisation for welfare and social work, also anticipates drastic cuts for the individuals affected. In its view, the new austerity trend marks a final shift away from the principle that publicly funded social benefits should be sufficient to meet claimants' needs. The Presidents of Caritas Germany[4] and the *Diakonisches Werk* conclude: "So far, all that is evident is a process of social exclusion. The cuts are directed primarily and to a substantial extent against the long-term unemployed without significantly affecting other population groups, yet they do not achieve any improvement in integration into the labour market. This course should not be pursued further under any circumstances."

The few positive social trends experienced in recent years are being reversed by the cuts. For example, experts are concerned that the number of homeless will start to rise again. Since 1995, the number of homeless has almost halved overall, as the Working Group on Assistance to the Homeless (*Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft Wohnungslosenhilfe* - BAGW) reports on its web site.[5] It is estimated that 400,000 people were homeless in Germany in 2002, with around 20,000 of them living permanently on the streets. If these people are deprived of essential social services in future, their human security will be directly threatened.

The anti-globalisation network Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions for the Aid of Citizens (ATTAC) describes the effects of the tax and labour market reforms as catastrophic. The new rules "force jobless people into poverty and substantially expand the low-wage sector", resulting in "coercion to work" and "working poor". According to ATTAC, it is "still only the elderly, the poor, the sick and the jobless" who bear the financial brunt of the reforms. ATTAC says that because the Government continues to ignore the massive protests against the swingeing social cuts, resistance will continue to grow.

In a timely prediction at Christmas, the German Society for the Protection of Children revealed what the reforms mean in statistical terms. Currently, around one million children in Germany live in (relative) poverty. The Society fears that if unemployment benefit and social assistance are combined, this figure will rise to 1.4 million.[6]

The changing nature of pension provision

The annual adjustment of pensions in line with wage development, which also serves to offset inflation, will be reduced yet again through the introduction of a so-called "permanence factor". This factor will be used to adjust - in other words, reduce - pension levels for the growing number of pensioners expected in future. Overall, the *Diakonisches Werk* warns about the growing burdens on low-income pensioners.[7] It fears that the level of poverty affecting the elderly - currently still below average - will increase over the medium term.

In view of the de facto cuts in pension provision - among other things, pensioners will have to manage without any increase in their pensions in 2003-2004 - the DGB highlights the lack of dependability in the system. In order to guarantee the necessary dependability now and in future, the aim must be to establish a "binding pension level which cannot be undercut. Yet the Federal Government is proposing to abolish the benefits target (currently 67% of income) entirely." As a result, the DGB argues, "the permanence factor" and taxation of pensions "will jeopardise the function of pensions insurance in the long term".[8]

Health care: an excessive burden for the poor and disabled

The *Diakonisches Werk* anticipates major additional burdens for all persons insured under the statutory health insurance scheme - including social assistance claimants - following the introduction of new health reforms. They include higher co-payments towards the cost of drugs and for hospitalisation and spa treatment as well as contributions towards the costs of visits to the doctor; in addition, dentures will now have to be paid for entirely by the patient.

In a provisional statement on the draft law to modernise the health system, the *Diakonisches Werk* points out, among other things, that increased co-payments will in some cases "impose an excessive burden on poor, chronically sick and disabled people".

1 Social Watch Germany: Bread for the World e.V.; DGB-Bildungswerk e.V.; Diakonisches Werk of the Protestant Church in Germany; Church Development Service - An Association of the Protestant Churches in Germany; Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung; Terre des Hommes Germany; Werkstatt Ökonomie; Vereinte Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft; World Economy, Ecology and Development.

2 Editor's note: Germany is a federation of 16 *Länder* or states (singular *Land*).

3 www.dgb.de/themen/hartz/fazit_hartz.htm

4 Caritas is a charity of the Catholic Church.

5 www.bagw.de/fakten/1.phtml

6 www.kinderschutzbund.de/cgi-bin/presse_detail.pl?id=37

7 EPD Sozial, 5 December 2003.

8 DGB. *Menschen brauchen Klarheit über Rentenhöhe.* Press release No. 324, 12 December 2003.

And the 2003 Annual Report of the *Diakonisches Werk* notes: "With all its different rules on co-payments and its financial impacts, the draft law further undermines solidarity in healthcare. Some individuals who are particularly affected by poor health are being systematically excluded."[9]

There are alternatives to the current misery in the health system. One idea, which is not new, is the concept of "citizens' health insurance", which has now re-emerged as a topical issue in the debate. Here, the aim is to oblige all citizens, as far as possible, to pay into the statutory health insurance scheme (GSV). This primarily targets civil servants, who do not contribute to the statutory health insurance scheme, and the self-employed and persons with a higher income who have private health insurance.

Social infrastructure: savings across the board

With its package of measures entitled "A Secure Future", the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) Government of Hesse[10] has announced an austerity package which aims to save more than EUR 1 billion (USD 1.22 billion) in 2004.

The "Keep Hesse Social!" appeal - drafted by academics and social work practitioners in protest at the "swingeing cuts in the social budget" - identifies the social services which will fall victim to the cuts because Hesse has no legal obligation to deliver them. It claims that the threatened under-provision will affect the traditional marginal groups in society first of all: "For example, homeless people will have no professional support in future. But the cuts will also affect services for citizens who are experiencing short-term financial problems (such as debt) or who have psychosocial needs (e.g. families facing difficulties bringing up their children)."

No basic rights for migrants

The majority of migrants living in Germany - despite many years of residence - do not enjoy permanent residence status. Furthermore, more than 260,000 are reliant on a status known as "temporary suspension of deportation", which means that they can be deported at any time. The latter group's deprivation of rights effectively precludes any human security.

The trade unions want immigrants who have lived in Germany for more than five years to be granted "a settlement permit" irrespective of their legal status. Furthermore, "the settlement or residence permit must include equal access to the labour market."

The DGB takes the view that Germany has a responsibility to grant protection to people fleeing from wars and civil wars or political persecution. In its opinion, the current rules and legal status of refugees often lead to treatment which is incompatible with human dignity. The DGB is therefore calling for "the adoption, without restriction, of the provisions of the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, including the recognition of persons subject to non-governmental or gender-specific persecution as entitled to protection." The blanket ban on work should be abolished. Germany must also withdraw its reservations about the application of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.[11]

No breakthrough in development policy

With regard to development policy, there is currently no apparent change in direction that would hint at a fundamental reappraisal of this policy area. There is considerable doubt whether the Federal Government can still achieve its self-proclaimed target of boosting the development aid budget to 0.33% of GNP by 2006. The development agencies Terre des Hommes and German Agro Action assess the situation in their report, entitled "The Reality of Development Aid: Eleventh Report 2002/2003"[12], as follows: "If the quota of 0.33% became reality in 2006, Germany would thus return to the level already achieved in 1977 and 1994. If the increase continued at the same rate, by 2020 we would have made good the decrease which has occurred since 1983. A "real" increase could only be achieved after that, and if the trend continued, the international target of 0.7% would not be reached until 2043."

The Church Development Service (EED) - an association of Protestant Churches in Germany - and Misereor - an organisation of the Catholic Church - voiced their criticism of the 2004 budget in a joint press release: "The Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) has been allocated a total of EUR 3.78 billion (USD 4.6 billion) for 2004." However, out of this amount, funds have to be paid over to other ministries. "Furthermore, savings equating to a global spending cut of EUR 39 million (USD 47.48 million) have been imposed on the BMZ. This means that in effect, the BMZ has just EUR 3.66 billion (USD 4.46 billion) left - EUR 9 million (USD 10.96 million) less than in 2000, when development spending fell to an all-time low."[13]

Following the recent decision to mobilise funds from the European Development Fund (EDF) for a Peace Facility (PF) in Africa, even the Minister for Development Cooperation, Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, warns that: "...resources allocated to combating poverty must not be used for other purposes. Additional funds must be made available for new tasks."

In the shadow of military intervention

In their position paper entitled "Development policy: In the Shadow of Military Intervention?" published in July 2003, the Churches' relief agencies expressed their concern that the lines between development co-operation, humanitarian aid and military spending are becoming increasingly blurred and that the resources for human security in developing countries could steadily diminish. In particular, they voiced the following concerns:

- Development policy is being "planned strategically from the outset as a means of dealing with the consequences of intervention and indirectly funding the costs of war, and is supposed to rebuild infrastructure destroyed by war (e.g. in Afghanistan and Iraq). In some cases, development assistance and humanitarian aid are also subject to direct attempts to impose conditionality and control.
- At the same time, this may result in changes to long-term (e.g. regional) priorities and commitments in development policy in favour of high-profile 'reconstruction' or even putative crisis prevention in potential regions of tension (e.g. Iran).
- Finally (…) more and more resources and public attention are being diverted away from long-term development processes towards humanitarian relief." ■

9 *Rechenschaftsbericht 2003* of the Diakonisches Werk of EKD, p. 74.

10 Editor's note: Hesse is one of the Länder (states) of the Federation.

11 *Kernforderungen des Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbundes für einen Perspektivwechsel in der Einwanderungs- und Integrationspolitik*, Berlin, 19 March 2003.

12 Terre des Hommes Deutschland e.V.; Deutsche Welthungerhilfe e.V. (Ed.). *Die Wirklichkeit der Entwicklungshilfe. Elfter Bericht 2002/2003. Eine kritische Bestandsaufnahme der deutschen Entwicklungspolitik.* November 2003.

13 *Neuer Bundeshaushalt: Schlechte Zahlen für die Armutsbekämpfung.* Joint press release EED and Misereor, 28 November 2003.

The frightening picture behind the pin-up

Against the background of a region racked by civil wars Ghana is highly regarded as an enclave of "peace and stability". However, mass formal unemployment, growing landlessness and insecurity of tenure and the upsurge in crime are growing threats to Ghanaians' human security. A leading Ghanaian organisation has described aspects of the situation as "frightening."

Ghana Social Watch Coalition

Geographically Ghana sits in a West African region wracked in recent years by multiple civil wars and is surrounded by neighbours beset by political and social turmoil or volatility. Côte d'Ivoire to the west has been split into two political zones and is in an uneasy truce since late 2001 when a failed coup against the elected government degenerated into a civil war. To the north the Compoare regime in Burkina Faso has turbulent relations with opposition parties at home, who accuse it of electoral fraud and violence. It has also been widely accused of involvement in civil wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire. In Togo to the east, dictator Gnassingbe Eyadema, Africa's longest serving ruler (in power since 1967), presides over a very volatile political situation and a serious economic crisis. By contrast Ghana has had three multiparty elections since the creation of the country's Fourth Republic in 1992, amidst the Africa-wide wave of political liberalisation. In the last elections in 2000 the long serving government of the National Democratic Congress (NDC) was voted out of power.

The former darling of the Bretton Woods Institutions

It is therefore hardly surprising that Ghana is highly regarded among African countries for its "peace and stability" as well as a multi party democracy, and that many Ghanaians perceive themselves to be a peace-loving people. In addition to its positive image, Ghana was the World Bank's African pin-up model for the proclaimed merits of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) from the early 1980s. The overall Ghanaian reality is however more complicated than appears from comparisons with its neighbours.

Economic conditions represent one of the most important threats to human security. Past Ghana Social Watch reports on education, health and poverty highlighted the growing poverty and inequalities in access to social services resulting from years of neo-liberal economic reforms. More recent studies attest to the exacerbation of this trend.

According to a 2002 survey[1] by the Ghana Centre for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana) two-thirds of Ghanaians face permanent economic uncertainty. This conclusion contrasts very sharply with the picture created by years of official celebration of two decades of neo-liberal economic reforms.

The CDD-Ghana study found, "a frightening picture of mass formal unemployment and underemployment" and a "widening of the gap between rich and poor". Almost two thirds of those interviewed described their economic conditions as dire, more than half said they lived from hand to mouth. Job creation and the reduction of poverty and marginalisation ranked as the highest priorities of respondents in the survey. Three quarters of respondents felt market reforms have not narrowed the gap between rich and poor. Twice as many blamed the reforms for widening the gap than thought it had narrowed it.

The study concluded that Ghanaians have a "deep ambivalence over market-centred economic reforms, reflected in strong support for state interventions that offset the expressions of lukewarm preference for a market economy". There were clear expressions of public opposition to some of the pillars of neo-liberalism. For example, two thirds of those questioned oppose trade liberalisation and would like trade policy to protect local industry and jobs even if it meant consumers paying more for goods. Nearly 80% oppose lay-offs in the public sector.

The New Patriotic Party (NPP) Government, which came to power at the beginning of 2001, has however shown a deep commitment to continuing the neo-liberal economic policies of the predecessor NDC Government. In its three years in power the NPP has been particularly proud of its "good relations" with the World Bank and IMF as well as bilateral creditors and donors. Its enthusiasm towards these institutions was clearly illustrated when in his presentation of the 2002 budget, Finance Minister Yaw Osafo Maafo proudly announced that Ghana, erstwhile darling of the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs), would soon reach an inflexion point within the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative. The government benches in Parliament - apparently seeing no irony in the national insolvency that is an outcome of the decades-long "love affair" with the BWIs - cheered to the rafters.

Under the terms of HIPC Ghana could have up to USD 3.7 billion of its USD 6.2 billion debt written off over a 20 year period, provided it fulfilled further stringent criteria of structural adjustment policies. Late in 2002, under strong pressure from the BWIs, a law liberalising public procurement was passed, effectively giving up the possibility of using the purchase of goods and services as an instrument for affirmative action in support of local economic activity.

Land tenure: tensions in State-society relations

In rural areas, where the majority of Ghanaians as well as the overwhelming majority of the poor live, the generalised economic insecurity in the country has an important specific dimension: growing landlessness and insecurity of tenure. A 2001 study concluded that "insecurity of tenure affects a greater proportion of society than is generally recognised and probably the majority. This extends beyond the economic poor and those who hold derivative rights, that is, those who access land belonging to others: tenants and sharecroppers, youth and women… Those with least status, knowledge or means are least well served. Loss of rights is widely occurring. Given the centrality of secure access to the social and economic fabric of society, instability threatens and in some parts of the country has already spilled into violence."[2]

The following sets of relationships are the main axes of the above-mentioned problems: the State and rural communities, traditional chiefs and their "subjects", members of land owning groups and non-members ("natives" and "strangers"), landlord and tenants, farmers and pastoralists, and men and women.

While the spread of commodity relations and the emergence of the modern Ghanaian State have significantly changed the traditional character of land relations in Ghana, the theory and ideology of communal ownership and associated rules have not changed.

The tensions inherent in this situation exert increasing pressure, transforming the above relational axes into flashpoints for violence in some cases: between the State's security apparatus and communities expropriated for the benefit of logging or mining companies, communal eruptions generated by

1 CDD-Ghana. *The Growth of Democracy in Ghana Despite Economic Dissatisfaction: A Power Alternation Bonus.* CDD-Ghana Research Paper 11, 2002.

2 Alden Wily, Liz and Daniel Hammond. *Land Security and the Poor in Ghana. Is There a Way Forward?* A Land Sector Scoping Study commissioned by UK Department for International Development (DFID), Ghana's Rural Livelihoods Programme. 2001.

chieftaincy disputes or between "natives" and "strangers" and between farmers and state security on one side and pastoralists on the other.

Conflict in state-society relations over land have been mainly generated by government expropriation of minerals and timber resources in the countryside and building land in the urban areas. The State has controlled timber resources since colonial times and has served as the facilitator of the access of logging firms in exchange for revenue. The historic owners of these resources have had a long history of conflict with the State and loggers on account of their exclusion from the use of what used to be their commons. Draconian laws forbid violation of forest reserves by villagers even as in bits and chunks logging firms have been allowed to reduce the size of Ghana's tropical rain forests over the last 100 or so years.

Since the mid-1980s there has been a new boom in large-scale surface mining by transnational gold companies, especially in the Western and Ashanti Regions, on concessions granted by the State that involved the expropriation of communities. People have been physically displaced from homes and farms to make way for mines. The destruction of community livelihoods is more than matched by the destruction of the ecosystem and water bodies. State policy has largely treated protests against the impact of mining as law and order issues that pose a threat to the attraction of foreign investment. The resultant community insecurity and discontent has occasioned cyclical violence involving the State and mining companies on one side and disaffected communities on the other.[3]

A much larger problem of insecurity is posed by the manner in which chiefs and family elders have evolved into de facto landowners dealing in communal land as if it were their private property. Serious accountability issues have arisen with respect to proceeds from sale and rental of land to strangers as well as royalties from mining and timber. As chiefs and family elders increasingly make "uncustomary" demands of entitled persons or sell off land to outsiders without due process, what is available for members of the community as a whole is sharply reduced, weakening the land rights and access of women in particular. While new migrants find it harder to access land, generations of migrants who have acquired rights and settled into communities increasingly find themselves objects of exclusion. There have been cases of dispossession of some such groups.

Inequitable access to a key agrarian resource has engendered violent conflict centred primarily on chiefs (succession, scope of authority and accountability), family elders, boundary disputes between and within communities, and between natives and strangers. The latter has acquired the status of an endemic low intensity conflict in a number of peri-urban areas. Around Accra, the national capital, the indigenous people, now mainly squeezed onto narrow strips and extremely poor high density areas along the coast are increasingly trying to assert their control over land against years of government expropriation and sale by unaccountable family heads.

In 1999 a National Land Policy (NLP) was announced. Unfortunately its evolution, like so many areas of policy-making in Ghana, has involved more donor and creditor agencies - especially the World Bank, the UK Department for International Development and the German Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit - than Ghanaians. The core weakness of the NLP is that it approaches the land issue as a technical issue that primarily requires administrative reforms rather than as an issue of social relations and politics.

Thus, it does not address the concerns of those with secondary interests in land - the poor, that is, tenants and sharecroppers (therefore the large body of migrant settlers) and women. This failure is not unconnected to the fact that the policy-making process has been dominated by the elite land-controlling groups, mainly chiefs and their allies in the state bureaucracy. Governments have tended to deny the inherent problems in chieftaincy within a republican setting, opportunistically using chiefs as their political agents, very much in the same way as the British colonial power had done.

There is no systematic response to the appropriation of community resources by chiefs in a manner that defends community interests. The status of the poor, especially sharecroppers and tenants, are not properly acknowledged or seen as a basis of poverty. There is also a failure to acknowledge the dangerous logic of the distinction between "natives" and "strangers", and therefore a failure to protect the property rights of the latter, within the logic of the rights created by Ghana's Constitution.

Possible links: economic liberalisation and upsurge in crime

More often than not when communal violence has erupted there is an appeal to all concerned to see how such conflicts led to civil war in neighbouring countries. The lessons from Africa's civil wars, of which Ghanaian governments and the population are acutely conscious, are reflected more at the level of public exhortation than public policy.

But the conflicts and instability in the West Africa region have a more substantive effect in Ghana than merely as salutary lessons. Ghana has tens of thousands of refugees who fled from the upheavals in the region. Their presence has generated xenophobic attitudes among some Ghanaians, with the blame ascribed to "foreigners" and refugees for the unprecedented wave of violent crime that Ghana has experienced in the past three years or so.

While there is anecdotal evidence that the proliferation of small arms in the region has fed the wave of crime, the evidence emerging from the arrests of suspected robbers show that they are overwhelmingly Ghanaians.

Economic insecurity is likely to be a factor in the crime wave, as indeed has been found in many other cases of the growing divide between rich and poor and unemployment. The wealthy neighbourhoods in Ghana's main cities have been aptly described as "ghettos" in which the rich live behind high fences topped by barbed wire reinforced by prowling guard dogs and security staff. One side effect has been the boom, in an otherwise thin employment market, in security service companies and companies advertising guard dog training services.

The policing response has two worrying dimensions. On the one hand it has heavily targeted the poor and on the other it is entrenching a role for the military in policing, contributing to assault type policing methods and the growing militarisation of Ghanaian policing.

Hundreds of young males were routinely rounded up in raids on poor neighbourhoods and showcased with media headlines blaring a presumption of guilt. Some looked as if they had been assaulted. Among the poor, police violence is unlikely to improve the public perception of the police force, which according to the CDD-Ghana survey is regarded (by 79% of respondents) as the most corrupt public institution in Ghana.

Yet because of the public anxiety about the wave of violent crime there is very little discussion either of the human rights issues raised by police methods or of the larger issues of the possible links between economic liberalisation, economic insecurity and the upsurge in crime. ■

3 Minerals are Ghana's largest export earner. Since the liberalisation of the mining sector in the mid-1980s it has been by far the greatest avenue for foreign investment inflows, attracting more than USD 5 billion in the period since. In 2003 Anglo-Gold took over the Ghanaian registered Ashanti, by far the biggest player in the Ghanaian mining industry, to create the largest gold mining company in the world. Newmont, the next biggest, is also active in Ghana.

Hungry for peace



The high rates of corruption, insecurity and violence; the low levels of state investment in education, health and social security; insecurity about food; the devaluation of life and the denial of human rights; the slowness of the legal system; all these factors contribute to the insecurity affecting the people of Guatemala. The recently elected Grand National Alliance Government represents an opportunity to attain a real democracy that will foster and guarantee the security of the people.

INIAP - Iniciativa Social

Luisa Eugenia Morales

To work for people's security is to help men, women and children in all the cities and villages in the world make an improvement in their lives. It is to protect people and their rights, a task which is at the core of international peace. Human security, then, must be seen as an integral concept based on objectives that include the elimination of poverty, access to basic education and health care, the protection of children, the promotion and defence of human rights, and the preservation and conservation of the environment.

Seen in this context, Guatemala has serious shortcomings which variously show weaknesses in the rule of law, the prevalence of structures of domination that cling to the traditionally established social and economic order, economic and social inequities, and high levels of corruption and impunity.

Hospitals do not have medicines, social security does not function, State security forces have such a shortage of resources that detainees are allowed to escape from detention centres, and there is a culture of impunity that is reflected in the lack of sanctions against corrupt public officials. All of this is daily fare for the people of Guatemala.

A consensus for peace

To these economic, political, social and cultural inequities, which are also the basis for the discrimination and exclusion that prevails in the national sphere, and which are sources of personal insecurity, can be added the growing presence of drug trafficking,[1] which generates parallel structures that act within and under the protection of State power.

Democracy has been reduced to just its formal aspects which are manifested in electoral processes every four years. The political parties (which should be acting as intermediaries between society and the State) reactivate their machinery for the elections but afterwards disappear from the national scene, or at least that is what has happened up to now.

These structural defects mean that in Guatemala insecurity has become a great limitation to the freedom of the individual and social coexistence. In January 2004, the Grand National Alliance, a coalition of minority parties on the Right, assumed power under President Oscar Berger Perdomo, who in his campaign proposed a plan for citizen security structured around an integral short, medium and long term vision. The Government now has to confront these great challenges facing the Guatemalan people, who are struggling to achieve the goals of development as a basis for achieving human security.

The 1996 Peace Accords between the representatives of the guerrillas and the Government constitute a valid agenda for progress towards development and democratisation in Guatemala. There is a nationwide consensus that they must be implemented. It is the State, the Government in co-ordination with civil society, that has to guarantee and push through the application of these agreements, and at the same time generate initiatives and actions to improve the conditions and quality of people's lives, and thus make real progress towards the construction of national peace.

The dimensions of insecurity

The 11,237,196 people who make up the Guatemalan population belong to 22 different indigenous groups, and most of them live in poverty: 54.3% of the population are poor, and 22.8% are extremely poor.[2] Life expectancy is around 66 years, public spending on education is 1.7% of the GDP, the literacy rate is 60%, and unemployment and underemployment levels have been rising.

The economy is based on the exploitation and export of agricultural products. The 2001 coffee crisis drove many coffee estates into bankruptcy, and thousands of agricultural workers were left unemployed. While tourism and industry generate an important but not majority share of national income, the cash remittances that Guatemalans living and working in the United States send back to their families represent a significant contribution to the country's economy.[3]

Agriculture is the main source of employment for the economically active population (38.4%). Although small-scale farming is on the rise (18.6%), a high proportion of the ownership of arable land (62.5%) is concentrated in the hands of an economically powerful sector and so people are forced to rent land to cultivate. The proportion of rural homes with property attached has fallen from 65% to 52%, and rented land has increased from 12% to 19%.[4]

Some 60% of homes in the country do not have the capacity to earn half the cost of their minimum food needs despite spending the greater part of their earnings on it.[5] This is why Guatemala has the highest rates of chronic malnutrition in Latin America and one of the highest in the world.[6]

Human rights in jeopardy

Today the country is in a post-armed conflict situation. In 1996, after long negotiations, President Álvaro Arzú's Government signed peace agreements with the old guerrilla movement, the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity, putting an end to a bloody internal war that had lasted 36 years (1960-1996). Berger, the new president, has made a commitment to organisations and leading figures from civil society to include in his work team "a number of people who promoted and subscribed to the 1996 peace agreements" as the best guarantee that those agreements will be kept.

However, there is a lot more to be done in the area of human rights, respect for which has deteriorated in recent years.[7] The initial impulse to reform crucial institutions (the police, the Public Ministry and the judiciary)[8] has become bogged down

1 It is estimated that half the cocaine transported along the Central American corridor to Mexico and the United States - some 400 tons per year - goes through Guatemala. In addition, agents from the Department of Anti-Narcotics Operations were involved in big scandals including the theft of confiscated drugs, torture and murder, before this unit was dismantled in October 2002. The number of drug traffic-related arrests rose from 189 in 1996 to 5,917 in 2002. US Department of State, *Narcotics Control Report*, www.state.gov/g/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2002/html/17941.htm

2 The XI Population Census and VI Housing Census, carried out by the National Institute of Statistics.

3 In 2002 remittances totalled USD 1,319,780,000. World Development Indicators, www.wordlbank.com

4 World Food Programme Report 2002.

5 *Ibid.*

6 UNICEF has identified 75,000 children suffering from severe malnutrition and also says that 67% of indigenous children suffer from chronic malnutrition.

7 See the 14th Report on Human Rights from the United Nations verification mission to Guatemala. November 2003.

8 Violations of rights by the police have increased, and impunity is the norm in the justice system.

before any changes could be consolidated. An obstacle impeding these institutional reforms from being carried through is their precarious financing.

Although the political system is competitive, political parties and Congress remain weak. The independent press has become stronger, but there are still problems in that members of the press have been threatened and intimidated because of their reports on human rights and government corruption. Some social communicators were even killed after following up subjects closely linked with big economic interests.[9]

The rising death toll

Threats to personal safety make social coexistence difficult and compromise individual freedom. The homicide rate (a very precise indicator of insecurity) increased in recent years from 27 to 32.3 per 100,000 people in 2002.[10] There are various reasons for this worsening situation: the authoritarian culture, poverty and inequality, the growing power of organised crime, and the inefficacy of the State in its duty to maintain law and order.

MINUGUA, the United Nations mission established in 1994 to verify compliance with the Global Agreement on Human Rights in Guatemala, reports that between July 2001 and June 2002 there were 57 incidents involving the attempted lynching of 139 people, 21 of whom died. Most of these lynchings took place in the west of the country where the internal armed conflict was most intense. These episodes are evidence that the justice system is inoperative and the State is absent from the local arena.

Against corruption

Guatemala ranks 100th in the Transparency International index of corruption. During the previous administration, the media uncovered cases of large-scale embezzlement in state organisations such as the Guatemalan Social Security Institute and the Ministry of the Interior, in which GTQ 90 million (USD 11 million) were stolen. While corruption also went on under other administrations, it became more widespread under Alfonso Portillo Cabrera (2000-2003), although his was the only government to try and imprison top public officials for graft.

The creation by the Government of a National Commission for Transparency and Against Corruption[11] aimed to help eradicate ongoing corrupt practices in the public as well as the private and social sectors, but the Commission's performance was low-key because it became politicised. Nevertheless it is still in existence thanks to international support and co-operation.[12]

Government commitments

The central Government has identified the main factors that stand in the way of human development, and has implemented strategies aimed at mitigating the country's major social, economic, political and cultural problems. Examples of this are the passing of the Urban and Rural Development Councils Law and the General Decentralisation Law and the changes made to the Municipal Code,[13] promoting decentralisation and establishing a role for society in monitoring public affairs.

The Presidential Planning and Programming Secretariat - set up in 2001 with the objective of formulating, evaluating and monitoring social and population development policy - was assigned the task of preparing a poverty reduction strategy, as well as specific strategies at departmental and municipal levels within the framework of the Urban and Rural Development Councils.

Besides this, the National Council of Food and Nutritional Security was set up to pool resources to be channelled to those departments and municipalities most in need; 102 municipalities with problems of malnutrition, hunger and extreme poverty (out of a total of 331 municipalities) were identified.

With the aim of improving the quality of life for small farmers, for the third year running the central Government implemented the fertilizer programme that allows farmers to buy this input below normal market prices.

An educational reform programme has been implemented, providing wider coverage and bringing the curriculum up to date. The National Literacy Programme received considerable support from the central Government and from the Ministry of Education, and the National Literacy Commission was set up, which has received international support and cooperation.

In the field of health, a vaccination programme for children from 0 to 5 years was created and the Programme for the Availability of Medicines has promoted the sale of generic medicines.

Conclusions

The coming to power of the new Government in January 2004 has fuelled new hope among the Guatemalan people, who are demanding that the new authorities ensure that the justice system function properly in order to create a feeling of security in the legal, social, food, political and economic fields. People are concerned about corruption in the public administration, and they are demanding much-needed transparency from the authorities in the management of public resources. Accountability, as an instrument of citizen control, is at the top of the agenda in Guatemalan society.

Today, Guatemalans resent the fact that their democratic system is so fragile. Although the authorities change every four years, and although some measures have been taken to support some aspects of human development, there still remain to be solved deep-rooted problems like unemployment, personal insecurity, corruption, the increase in organised crime and drug trafficking, and the scant attention to basic services like education and health. Together these constitute a series of flagrant personal, environmental, sanitary, food and economic threats to human security. ■

9 Threats against journalists and defenders of human rights from a mysterious group called "Guatemaltecos de Verdad" (True Guatemalans) show that acts committed by the army and paramilitary groups during the civil war (1960-1996) are still a subject that is not merely delicate but actually dangerous. The same goes for people investigating cases of corruption. According to the 2003 Reporters Without Borders annual report, the threats and the fiscal and judicial harassment which the independent press is subjected to have gone as far as the kidnapping and murder of journalists. www.rsf.fr/article.php3?id_article=6217

10 National Centre for Economic Research. *Study on the extent and cost of the violence in Guatemala.* Guatemala, May 2002.

11 Government of Guatemala. *Third Government Report to the Congress of the Republic*, 14 January 2003.

12 The words of Peter Eigen, President of Transparency International, explain this policy of co-operation, "Rich countries must give practical help to governments in developing countries which show the political will to fight corruption. Those countries with a high level of corruption should not be penalised since they urgently need help." *Index of Perceptions of Corruption 2003*, London, October 2003.

13 These came into force on 12 March 2002, 11 April 2002 and 1 July 2002, respectively.

An insecure and corrupt model

Honduras' economic model, driven by transnational investment, tourism and the concession of natural resources to foreign interests is causing an increase in poverty, inequity, criminality, gender violence and discrimination, all of which pose a serious threat to human security. The final ingredient in this scenario of insecurity is a corrupt and out-of-touch political system that is closed to dialogue with civil society.

Centro de Estudios de la Mujer (CEM-H)

Mirta Kennedy / Suyapa Martínez
Ana María Ferrera / Filadelfo Martínez

Causes and effects

The Honduran economy is characterised by foreign investment in *maquila*[1] industries, an industrial tourism sector and transnational investment to exploit natural resources, reflecting the country's commitment to globalisation. The direct and indirect effects of this neo-liberal model are obstructing the achievement of human security in all its dimensions.

Industry and gender violence

According to the Central Bank, there are 252 *maquila* plants, mostly in the textile sector, which generate 105,000 jobs of which 60% are occupied by women.[2]

Urban concentration around the industrial estates is creating problems of insecurity and violence, above all for female workers.

The main *maquila* district is Valle de Sula, where the female population rate is high, and where there is also a lack of basic services, pay is low, and labour rights are unheard of. Women's organisations have reported violations of workers' human rights, like denial of the right to organise, the closing of factories without redundancy payments, the dismissal of workers who get pregnant, compulsory pre-hiring pregnancy tests, bad sanitary conditions and age discrimination.

The San Pedro Sula Women for Life Forum has reported that, according to data from the Central Criminal Investigation Department, between January and June 2003 146 women suffered a violent death, 71 with a firearm or knife, 42 in accidents, and 33 that are still under investigation. By December 2003, the total had risen to 398 women. According to these same data, these murders share characteristics like shots in the head or the heart, decapitation and signs of torture, and the cutting up of the bodies; the majority of the women had been sexually assaulted before being murdered. In the same area, according to data from Forensic Medicine, in more than 60% of reported sexual attacks on minors the victims were girls.

The abuses of the tourist industry

Industrial tourism on the Caribbean coast is growing, coastal areas are being taken over, and the black communities there are being pressured into selling their lands. There is also increasing pressure to develop large tourist complexes in protected areas.

Linked to tourism is the phenomenon of sexual exploitation. At least 30% of girl and adolescent victims are abused by foreign tourists.[3]

Education

Successive governments have cited the economic situation as their excuse for not adequately attending to standards of secondary and university education in the country. At the present time, a little over 50% of secondary school students are in private schools, which have a greater number of teachers than state schools. The quality of the education system in general, and especially that of the public system, is considered "low". The National Survey of Epidemiology and Family Heath reports that 40% of girls and boys between 7 and 14 years old have come up against one of the three barriers to normal development in the education system: late enrolment, dropping out of the system, or slow progress up through the grades.

There are no formal obstacles impeding access to education for girls, and their participation percentages are similar to those for boys (only 2% fewer in primary education). However, they are the first to leave school when the family has some kind of problem.

People leave, the dollars come in

Poverty and lack of employment are prompting emigration, and consequently there is a steady traffic in people, mainly women, girls, boys and adolescents.

It is estimated that 35,000 citizens leave the country every year, principally for the United States. This emigration is profitable for the State and for a wide range of private financial operators. In 2003 the income in foreign currency from remittances, mostly sent back to their families by Hondurans in the United States, amounted to some USD 1 billion, and the figure might be even higher given that an estimated 25% of the money is sent in ways that are not controlled by the State. The current Government considers its foreign policy a success for having obtained another year's extension to Temporary Protection Status, under which special migration treatment is authorised for some 75,000 Hondurans who do not have the required documents. These remittances are now the main source of foreign currency, and the country is established as an exporter of cheap labour.[4]

Penal reform and murders

In his electoral campaign, the current President Ricardo Maduro, stressed the question of citizen security. He then pressured Parliament to reform the penal code, particularly article 332, to specify more severe penalties for members of gangs and other citizens "… who conspire to carry out actions designed to cause bodily harm, damage property, threaten people or commit extortion, or to commit any other act that constitutes an offence…" The penalty is from 9 to 12 years' imprisonment. Nearly 800 young people suspected of being members of gangs (called "maras") have been sent to prison since the reform was passed in mid 2003. In some neighbourhoods there has been a noticeable drop in *mara* activity. This reform has been denounced as unconstitutional by the Public Ministry, the National Commissioner for Human Rights, the Bar Association, and human rights organisations. However, Maduro has insisted on maintaining the reform.

In the context of urban violence, the Catholic Church and certain private and state humanitarian organisations have denounced the existence of "death squads" (in which some police participate), which are guilty of some of the murders attributed to gangs in the city of San Pedro Sula.[5]

1 The *maquila* are plants of a foreign or transnational company which are set up in countries where labour is cheaper, to manufacture or assemble some components of finished product.

2 Central Bank of Honduras. "Actividad Maquiladora en Honduras 2002". www.bch.hn/download/Maquila-2002.pdf

3 Information from the Direction of Criminal Investigation.

4 Data from the Social Forum of the Foreign Debt and Development.

5 Palencia, Gustavo. "Terror y dudas generan decapitaciones", in *Raíces desde El Salvador*. www.desdeelsalvador.com.sv

In 2003 Carlos Arturo Reyes, an Olancho peasant (Olancho is a province of Honduras), who was a campaigner for the protection of Honduras' forests and an opponent of a hydro-electric project, was murdered, as was the journalist Germán Rivas, from Santa Rosa de Copán, who was challenging the interests of the MINOSA mining company. Another journalist, Arístides Soto, from Tegucigalpa, was murdered on 6 October 2001 and his killers still go unpunished.

Insecurity and overcrowding in prisons tend to spark off violent episodes, like the murder of 58 convicts on 5 April 2003 at the El Porvenir prison farm near the city of La Ceiba.

From corruption to injustice

If laws are not enforced there can be no human security. In 2002, the country was in 71st place in the Corruption Perceptions Index of Transparency International, a year later it had dropped to 106th place (out of a total of 133 countries).[6]

Certain politically-connected economic groups responsible for the bankruptcy of a number of banks and private financial institutions, with losses that exceed USD 200 million, have gone unpunished, and the law has not been applied effectively. The funds belonged to small savers, mostly pensioners, and these people have had to be compensated with public money.

Another example of corruption was the approval given by National Congress for the cancellation of more than USD 250 million in debts in favour of defaulting farmers, above all coffee producers, among whom the main beneficiaries were members of the political class including the President of the Congress, who had one of the highest debts. Another scandal, which became the number one story in the press, involved Mario Facusse, a National Party member and current President of the Central American Parliament, who was prosecuted by the Director of Public Prosecutions for the alleged purchase of state land at artificially low prices.

In 2003 some members of the National Congress and the Central American Parliament were revealed to have links to drug trafficking, but the law has been unable to completely clarify the facts and it is very probable that corruption and impunity will prevail. According to recent reports, one of those tried for the crime of drug trafficking was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment, but this does not guarantee that all those involved, some of whom have powerful political connections, will be brought to justice.

The legal system itself is also involved in cases of corruption. Judge Blanca Valladares, a member of the Supreme Court of Justice, resigned alleging that there existed corrupt practices and that in certain cases decisions were biased in favour of government groups. The judiciary has also been criticised for the case of the seven official pardons granted to former President Rafael Callejas, who is accused of corruption and abuse of power.

Another area in which the inadequate functioning of the legal system is generating insecurity concerns gender discrimination in access to justice. Cases of domestic violence make up 60% of the total cases of violence and delinquency reported to the Preventive Police, indicating the serious scale of the problem. In the two biggest cities in the country, Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula, only 10% of cases in which legal proceedings are initiated result in a sentence, with low income women being most disadvantaged. One of the obstacles to women pursuing their cases are the high costs that they have to pay to get summonses issued against the guilty parties, although the law clearly states that this procedure should be free of charge.

Civil society: faced with the Government's monologue

In 2003, the Presidency was assailed by intense social and labour conflict, above all in the teaching and medical professions, where the unions oppose the abolition of the statutes governing professional and trade unions and the freezing of salaries, a measure required by the IMF as one of the conditions for signing a letter of intent.

In 2003, in the midst of rebellion by some of its Members of Parliament and a breakdown in the alliance with the Christian Democrats, the Government initiated a National Dialogue which many sectors considered inopportune or overdue, and which the majority of civil society organisations called a "monologue". One of the main weaknesses of the dialogue was that it did not consider short or medium term solutions to the nation's problems. Several civil society organisations and opposition political parties withdrew from the talks.

Just as the National Dialogue has been classed a failure, so other instances of participation created by the current and previous governments, like the Consultative Council for the Poverty Reduction Strategy and the Liaison Commission between civil society and the National Congress, have also had a poor record. Up until now these have not fulfilled their assigned functions since the government representatives on these commissions are always in a majority, preventing the representatives of civil society sectors from taking effective action. Civil society organisations must establish clear mechanisms for social monitoring and auditing to provide follow-up on these spaces. ■

6 Transparency International. "Corruption Perceptions Index". www.transparency.org

Neglected by the State



The paradox embedded in the Indian development model: on the one hand increasing mobilisation of civil society groups and attempts at empowering the marginalised at various levels with seemingly positive influences on policy pronouncements, while on the other, withdrawal of the State from its essential roles and functions especially in its constitutionally mandated function of ensuring social equity. The results are appalling, particularly regarding human security. Deprivation and increased repression of marginalised groups have led to communities being pitted against each other.

National Social Watch Coalition

Bobby Kunhu[1]

"Freedom is the connecting link between development and democracy. Poverty is the denial of the right to live with dignity… Development with equity, justice, distribution and participation is a prerequisite in the survival and growth of Indian Democracy."[2]

Substantial sections of the Indian population suffer from serious deprivation vis-à-vis a set of commonly acknowledged basic needs, such as adequate food, shelter, clothing, healthcare, primary education, clean drinking water and sanitation. Indeed, the major shortcomings of the State-led economic transformations after independence are not the lack of economic growth or industrialisation - on the contrary, in these respects Indian performance has been at least respectable - but in the policies and processes that facilitate the fulfillment of basic rights and needs. Moreover, there is some concern that the prospects may have worsened relatively with reference to some of these basic needs during what is commonly described as the period of economic reforms - July 1991 onwards.

Although the Messiahs of free trade salute a growth rate of 6% in 2002,[3] there is awareness of increasing inequality and marginalisation of groups that were already marginalised.[4]

The budget and socio-economic rights

When one takes a hard look through the maze of jargon and official rhetoric, the Government's commitment towards alleviation of poverty and implementation of socio-economic rights comes under suspicion.

For instance, since education became a fundamental right under the Indian Constitution, there have been regressive budgetary allocations for the implementation of this right despite regular promises by the Government to the contrary. In the 2003 budget, there was only a marginal increase in real planned budgetary allocation in education. The revenue account under unplanned allocation in education declined in real per capita allocation from a meagre INR 15.40 (USD 0.33) to INR 14.68 (USD 0.31) between 2002 and 2003. The planned allocation on education declined from INR 0.30 (USD 0.006) per capita in 2002-03 to INR 0.18 (USD 0.003) in 2003-04. Important educational schemes like the National Programme for Women's Education have been scrapped.[5]

The Central Government scheme *Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan* (Education for All) has seen an increased allocation of INR 15.12 billion (USD 328 million) but has hardly achieved the stated goal of having all children below 14 years in school by December 2003. The silence over this failure is perhaps too deafening for the Government itself. What is obvious is that there is an increasing dependence on market forces to fill the educational deficit.[6]

Health expenditure: the lowest in the world

The health sector scenario is not too encouraging, either. As stated in the *Citizens Report on Governance and Development 2003, Social Watch India,* "the level of public expenditure in the health sector is the lowest in the world. The Indian health system is the most privatised health system in the world. Of the aggregate expenditure on health 83% is allocated to private spending, while 43% of the poor depend on public sector hospitals for care. Privatisation and deregulation of the health system have resulted in rising drug prices. Riddled with contradictions as it is, new National Health Policy 2002 legitimises the ongoing privatisation of health. Public health expenditure, which is currently below 1% of GDP, is far below the 5% of GDP recommended by the World Health Organization."

The already meagre health expenditure decreased drastically in the 2003 budget. In fact most of the commitments made by the Government are related to privatisation of the health sector and were made on behalf of the interests of the market.[7]

The Pharmaceutical Policy 2003 is another issue at stake which has contributed to the process of making the Drug Price Control Order mechanism ineffective. This mechanism was instituted in 1978 to keep the prices of all drugs under control. However, the number of drugs under this scheme has now decreased to 35, which is about 22% of the total market. The consequence of this is decreased access to drugs and health care systems, especially for the most marginalised sectors of society.[8]

The Government has reduced expenditure on the overall nutrition programme from INR 79.2 million (USD 1.7 million) to INR 77.7 million (USD 1.6 million) in the 2003 budget. There has also been an inadequate allocation of USD 110 million with the impossible wish to uplift a quarter of the population living below the poverty line. There has been an overall decrease in spending on the social sector especially vis-à-vis the marginalised sections like the *Dalits,*[9] *Adivasis,*[10] women, etc.[11]

Unemployment

One of the most disturbing trends that have accompanied the shift to a market economy is

1 Bobby Kunhu is a human rights lawyer and coordinates the National Social Watch Coalition in India.

2 Samuel, John and Jagadananda, Eds. "Making Sense of Democracy. An introduction to Social Watch India". *Citizens Report on Governance and Development.* New Delhi: National Social Watch Coalition, 2003.

3 www.adb.org/Documents/News/2002/nr2002048.asp

4 Datt, Gaurav and Martin Ravallion "Is India's Economic Growth Leaving the Poor Behind?". http://poverty.worldbank.org/files/13504_GD1.pdf

5 CBA. *The Marginalised Matter.* 2003. Also see Samuel and Jagadananda, *op cit.*

6 "Although the literacy rate rose from 18% in 1951 to 65% in 2001, every third illiterate in the world is an Indian. Out of approximately 200 million children in the age group 6-14 years, only 120 million are enrolled. Inadequate budget allocation, dismal school infrastructure in rural areas, high dropout rates, caste-bias, gender-bias, etc. are the hallmarks of our education system." Samuel and Jagadananda, *op cit.*

7 "Public expenditure on health in India is one of the lowest in the world. Currently, public expenditure on health as a share of the aggregate annual public expenditure on health is 96.9% in UK, 44.1% in USA, 45.4% in Sri Lanka, and 24.9% in China, but for India it is a meagre 17.3%." Samuel and Jagadananda, *op cit.*

8 Ramachandran, P. "Unhealthy Policy", *Frontline,* 15 March 2002. Also see Samuel and Jagadananda, *op cit.*

9 Editor's note: The Dalits or untouchables are the most marginalised peoples in India. There are around 240 million Dalits (25% of the population) in the country and they are mostly relegated to performing menial jobs.

10 Editor's note: Adivasis are believed to be the original inhabitants of India. There are around 70 million Adivasis (8% of the population) in the country. They are mainly marginalised farmers or hunter-gatherers.

11 Samuel and Jagadananda, *op cit.*

TABLE 1

Public expenditure on health as a share of total public expenditure (%)

STATE	1980-81	1998-99
Andhra Pradesh	7.63	8.45
Arunachal Pradesh	5.43	—
Assam	5.23	4.65
Bihar	5.49	4.81
Goa	—	5.11
Gujarat	6.08	5.41
Haryana	6.51	3.84
Himachal Pradesh	10.65	6.38
Jammu & Kashmir	11.82	5.16
Kerala	9.57	5.47
Madhya Pradesh	7.59	5.80
Maharashtra	6.53	4.84
Manipur	8.66	4.67
Meghalaya	15.34	7.22
Mizoram	—	4.93
Nagaland	9.57	5.39
Orissa	6.70	5.58
Punjab	6.52	4.73
Rajasthan	10.21	6.42
Sikkim	5.65	2.84
Tamil Nadu	6.56	8.32
Tripura	4.57	4.69
Uttar Pradesh	5.89	4.10
West Bengal	9.07	6.49

Source: Draft Tenth Five Year Plan, Vol III. Planning Commission.

unemployment. While disguised unemployment continues to worry, open unemployment has become a serious problem. The collapse of the public sector and the resultant lack of opportunities and slow growth of the private sector have resulted in a sharp deceleration of employment in the organised sector. In fact, the share of formal sector workforce is only 8% and there are signs that the vulnerability of the workforce in the informal sector may be on the rise. What is most alarming is the increase in starvation deaths and suicides by small and marginal farmers that took place in 2003. These deaths can be attributed to the increase in insecurity related to livelihood within both the rural and urban spheres.

Land, displacement and conflict

The status of land distribution is also of interest. Except for rare instances such as the initiative of the Madhya Pradesh state government to grant small plots of land to *Dalits,* land distribution policies across the country have been on the whole regressive. Public land has been transferred to private corporations, as in the state of Tamil Nadu, while there is hardly any attempt to distribute it among the landless.[12]

In this context, the debate on mega-development projects and displacement is particularly serious and the discussion over the Narmada Valley project is the most glaring example. The Narmada Control Authority recommended that the height of the Sardar Sarovar Dam be raised from its present height of 95m to 100m.[13]

Large numbers of *Adivasis* were displaced due to the flooding of land that resulted from the increase in height of the dam, and their resettlement was most unsatisfactory. The conditions of the affected people in Madhya Pradesh are worse - a large majority of the 35,000 oustee families are yet to be resettled and a further 12,000 families face displacement this monsoon. The state government has openly declared that there is no land available for the oustees and is giving cash compensation, in violation of the Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal guidelines, which the Supreme Court upheld in 2000.[14]

The classification of revenue land as forest land is another process that denies rights of ownership and access to land to entire communities and their legitimate owners. This even led to violence in Wayanad, in northern Kerala, where the police opened fire on a group of *Adivasis* who were allegedly encroaching forest land and a number of them were killed.[15]

The construction of terrorism

A further human security problem is the construction of terrorism, which is used as a pretext for increasing military expenditure as well as for introducing repressive changes in the criminal justice system with scant regard for constitutional mandates. The best example is the recent pronouncement by the Justice Malimath Committee, which recommends the extension to general criminal law of the draconian powers of the police under special legislation like the Prevention of Terrorism Act.[16] Even within the present system, it is the marginalised groups that fare the worst.

Conclusion

Having analysed the State's attitude vis-à-vis budgetary commitment in relation to society in general and marginalised communities in particular, we should take a look at the actual conditions of specific communities. The deprivation and increased repression of marginalised communities by the State both in economic and cultural terms are leading to a situation where communities are pitted against each other in the scramble for the little the State has to offer in terms of basic human rights. This has led to situations like in Gujarat, where repressive and fundamentalist forces have used marginalised communities to attack minority groups. Indiscriminate privatisation and the resulting erosion of socio economic rights in India have had disastrous consequences. ■

12 *Ibid.*

13 *The Hindu*, 14 May 2002.

14 www.narmada.org/sardar-sarovar/damincrease.html

15 Thakkaekara, Mari. "What really happened". *Frontline*, 15 March 2002.

16 Narrain, Siddharth. "Rights and Criminal Justice". *Frontline*, 13 September 2003.

Longing for peace



Endemic violence and ingrained government corruption are the main concerns in relation to human security. These problems have caused social and economic conditions in the country to deteriorate. People will only finally be freed from fear if there is a thorough and complex reform of the whole system. The forthcoming general elections may provide just such an opportunity.

Centre for Development of Women's Resources (PPSW) Women Heads of Households Empowerment Programme (PEKKA)

Nani Zulminarni

The authoritarian legacy

President Megawati Sukarnoputri named 2003 the Year of Peace and Non-Violence. However, violent conflict remains a daily reality for the people of Indonesia. The authoritarian government of General Suharto, backed by the military and the official Golkar party, was in power from October 1965 to May 1998, and left the country plagued by different kinds of violence. For more than three decades, the Government employed systematic repression, banishment and censorship. The Government also attempted to annex East Timor, where the bloody consequences of the invasion in 1975 continue to this day. In 1979 the government policy of displacing whole populations, called *Transmigrasi*, increased separatist violence, the number of displaced people and refugees, and levels of inter-ethnic conflict.[1]

In 1998 General Suharto was succeeded by B J Habibie, who governed amid protests and inter-ethnic clashes until October 1999. At that point elections were held, and Abdurraman Wahid, leader of the Islamic coalition Nahdlatul Ulama, took office. In July 2001, after facing violent conflicts and being implicated in corruption scandals, Wahid was forced out of office and Sukarnoputri became president.

State violence and terrorism

At present there are conditions of extreme violence in the conflict-ridden areas of Aceh, Poso-Central Sulawesi, Maluku and Irian Jaya (West Papua). Thousands of people have been killed, displaced, or disappeared. In Aceh, in the westernmost part of the island of Sumatra, opposition to the central Government has from the beginning taken two different forms. One is a movement in favour of a referendum to decide the political future of the region, which has strong support from civil society; the other is an armed group, Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, or GAM (Movement for a Free Aceh). Indonesian security forces have used the same repressive measures against both. The conflict was characterised by abuses on the part of the police, army and GAM, until May 2000 when President Wahid's Government agreed to a humanitarian truce which lasted until 2001. However, assassinations still took place, including in Medan the murder of Aceh activists Jafar Siddiq Hamzah and Safwan Idris.[2] In the Aceh region there are still more than 5,000 families living in refugee camps. In the other conflict areas the refugee problem also remains unresolved: in Malucas only 16,000 families out of a total of 36,000 have been able to return home from refugee camps,[3] and in Poso-Central Sulawesi 18,000 families remain in the camps.[4]

Two events during 2003 indicate the resurgence of different kinds of violence: an attack on the offices of Kontras, the committee responsible for investigating cases of disappeared persons, which is opposed to government policy in Aceh; and an attack against the national newspaper *Tempo*, after it published an investigation into a fire at a textiles shopping centre, implicating an important businessman in accusations of corruption and nepotism. On the one hand, these attacks illustrate the use of violent and illegal methods to defend the interests of certain powerful individuals, and on the other, they threaten the freedom of expression.

Recent bombing attacks have also generated a climate of fear among the population. In October 2002, more than 180 people died as a result of a bomb attack on a nightclub in Bali. On the same day, another bomb exploded close to the United States consulate in Sanur. The Islamic network Al Qaeda was blamed for both attacks. The recent car-bomb explosion at the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta on 6 August 2003 left at least 10 people dead and more than 100 injured.

Violence against poor people and women

In addition to the local conflicts and terrorist attacks, there are other - less visible - forms of violence which seriously undermine human security.

Mass evictions, for example, are common in urban areas. In August 2003, 2,000 families working in the informal sector were brutally evicted in Jembatan Besi to the west of Jakarta. In September in Tanjung Priok, north of Jakarta, 189 houses were demolished, leaving homeless 550 people who had paid high prices for their plots of land. This kind of practice has continued in Jakarta and other cities, and clearly violates the rights of citizens enshrined in Article 27 of Indonesia's Constitution.[5]

Women are particularly subject to violence in different forms. Komnas Perempuan (the National Committee on Violence Against Women) claims that in 2002 violence against women increased by 62% compared to previous years. Data for 2003 have not yet been processed, but the information collected by the Committee indicates that it is still on the rise. Seknas Pekka (the National Secretariat of the Women Heads of Households Empowerment Programme) reports that the number of women heads of households has increased, especially in conflict areas. Most of them live in extreme poverty, with daily incomes of less than USD 1.

The dangers of corruption

Indonesia is listed 122th out of 133 countries in the Corruption Perceptions Index 2003, published by Transparency International.[6] This level of corruption constitutes an obvious threat to human security, because it has significantly slowed the process

1 For further information on the political situation in Indonesia since 1965, see: *The World Guide. An alternative reference to the countries of our planet. 2003-2004.* Montevideo: ITeM-New Internationalist Publications Ltd, 2003.

2 Human Rights Watch Report 2001.

3 Information from several NGOs and working parties.

4 POKJA RKP (Kelompok Kerja Resolusi Konflik Poso): Non-governmental working party for conflict resolution in Poso.

5 With regard to mass evictions in Indonesia, see: "Mass eviction of urban poor continuing in Jakarta". Asian Human Rights Commission. www.ahrchk.net/ua/mainfile.php/2003/583/

6 Transparency International. "Corruption Perceptions Index 2003". www.transparency.org

of social and economic recovery. According to the World Bank,[7] corruption threatens development, disproportionately affecting the poorest, it endangers Bank projects and undermines public confidence in development aid. The World Bank recommends that civil society work together with the Government, while avoiding co-optation, to reduce impunity and promote transparency. The Government has recently created the Corruption Eradication Commission (Law 30/2003).

A time bomb

Among the most prominent threats to human security are those posed by socio-economic conditions, affecting food, health and education. Indonesia has a population of about 217 million, 40% of whom live in urban areas.[8] According to official figures, more than 18% are living below the poverty line. Infant mortality is 38.09 per 1,000 births. As for access to education, although some progress was made in 2003, 9% of the population is still illiterate. Data collected in 2002 indicate that 12.69% of women and 5.85% of men cannot read or write.[9]

According to several different observers and agencies, unemployment has reached alarming levels. Recent ILO reports indicate that the work force is expanding by 2.5 million people per year. The annual rate of economic growth is 4%, which only allows 1.3 million new jobs to be created.[10] According to official figures, there are at present 10.8 million unemployed and 32 million underemployed. The Indonesian Business Association (Apindo) reports that 150,000 jobs were lost during 2003 in the forestry and textile sectors alone.[11] Andrew Steer, the World Bank representative in Jakarta, called the situation "a time bomb", and the Minister for Labour, Jakob Nuwa Wea, considers unemployment to be a serious threat to political stability, especially for the forthcoming legislative and presidential elections to be held on 5 April and 7 July 2004 respectively.[12]

Militarisation and elections

The Government has developed a range of strategies to deal with the problems described above.

Some of these have been controversial, for example the creation of a Military Operations Zone in Aceh in order to combat the GAM. In the other conflict areas, as well, government action has been predominantly military in nature.

Recent terrorist attacks have given rise to decrees 1/2002 and 2/2002, which enable the Government to create special units combining soldiers with police. These units may hold suspects for three days without trial, and information obtained by the intelligence services may be used as evidence. The decrees, which permit the death penalty in cases of terrorism, have been criticised by several sectors of society. From the legal point of view, it has been pointed out that Article 46 of Decree 2/2002 contradicts the 1945 Constitution (Article 281, paragraph 1) by applying the decree retroactively to people linked to the Bali terrorist attacks. Some NGOs have also criticised the decrees because they undermine action by civil society. Finally, since accusations of terrorism generally come from US sources, this tends to increase US intervention in national politics.[13]

In addition, the Government has initiated a process of decentralisation by putting into effect the Decentralisation Law (22/1999). One of the most visible results of this project is the increase in the number of provinces, from 26 to 33. This has brought about many changes, especially in the handling of financial resources, and exposes the need to explore new strategies on the road to decentralisation.

In 2003, the Government designed a new electoral system, which will be used in April and July 2004. It will be the first time that citizens of Indonesia have an opportunity to elect their representatives directly, and it is hoped that this change will strengthen democracy.

New challenges

Within this complex panorama, the prospect of a major change in the political system has powerfully motivated different civil society activist groups. These groups have concentrated their activities primarily on monitoring military operations in the conflict zones, fighting corruption in the Government and in political campaigns, protecting the rights of the poor in urban areas, defending the freedom of expression, and campaigning on environmental issues and women's rights. Some groups have also been formed to monitor government policies, on education, public debt, etc.

Building human security requires a complete transformation of economic, social, political and cultural systems. This is an arduous task. The forthcoming elections provide an opportunity for political reform which could signal the beginning of structural change. ■

7 World Bank. *Combating Corruption In Indonesia. Enhancing Accountability For Development.* Report No 27246-IND. 12 November 2003. www.worldbank.org

8 *The World Guide. An alternative reference to the countries of our planet. 2003-2004.* Montevideo: ITeM-New Internationalist Publications Ltd, 2003.

9 BPS-Statistics Indonesia 2003. *Statistik Kesejahteraan Rakyat* (Welfare Statistics).

10 *Asian Labour News.* 20 January 2004. www.asianlabour.org

11 *Ibid.*

12 *The Washington Times.* "Unemployment poses threat in Indonesia", 16 January 2004.

13 Sebastian, Leonard C. "Indonesia's New Anti-Terrorism Regulations". Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University. Singapore. www.ntu.edu.sg/idss/Perspective/Research_050225.htm

Insecurity for all



Eight months after the "official" end of war, the general feeling among Iraqis was that the US forces were doing nothing but obsessing about their own security. In the mind of the public the US presence in the country is as illegitimate as Saddam's regime. Iraqis today almost unanimously believe that the Bush administration wants to perpetuate the military occupation by maintaining chaos, exacerbating violence and promoting divisions among Iraqis. The facts seem to confirm this perception.

Iraqi Al-Amal Association[1]

Shiar Yousef

While the term human security may be of recent origin (it was first used by the United Nations in the early 1990s), the ideas that underpin the concept are far from new. For over a century - at least since the founding of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in the 1860s - a doctrine based on achieving security for people has been gathering momentum. Core elements of this doctrine were formalised in the 1940s in the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Geneva Conventions. Since the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report, however, the concept of human security has changed from simply meaning ensuring the security of the state to including the security of individuals. It is now widely accepted that human security involves the human rights of civilians and also contains many other dimensions relating, for instance, to the environment, food and development. More importantly, the state is no longer considered to be solely responsible for providing for and defending human security; all national and international organisations involved in humanitarian, development or other aid work are also regarded as key actors.

In essence, human security now means safety for people from both violent and non-violent threats. It is, then, an alternative way of seeing the world, taking people as its point of reference, rather than focusing exclusively on territorial or government security. And like other security concepts - national security, economic security, food security - it is about protection. Human security entails taking preventive measures to reduce vulnerability and minimise risk, and taking remedial action where prevention fails. In other words, human security provides the conditions under which people can enjoy freedom from fear and want and enjoy equal opportunities to develop their full potential.

The range of potential threats to human security should not be narrowly conceived. While the safety of people is obviously at grave risk in situations of armed conflict, a human security approach is not simply synonymous with humanitarian action. It highlights the need to address the root causes of insecurity and to help ensure people's future safety. Therefore, in a country as complex as Iraq it is difficult to provide a precise description of the security situation or to identify the obstacles to achieving human security, especially when there is a serious lack of information and statistics.

Post-war insecurity

The war on Iraq "officially" ended on 1 May 2003. But almost eight months later, the United States and Britain were forced to admit on more than one occasion that the security situation in Iraq remained "serious". For example, a recent CIA assessment of Iraq warns that the security situation will worsen right across the country, not just in Baghdad but in the north and south as well.

Naturally, the security referred to here is, primarily, that of the occupying forces, and "Westerners" in general. British Defence Minister Geoff Hoon stressed that his priority was "the security of British forces", and many US officers made similar comments. But since the "official" end to the war, security for Westerners has only meant insecurity for the locals, and the "honeymoon" between the occupying forces and the Iraqi population seems to be over, due to the fact, among other reasons, that their aspirations have not been met and there has been no improvement in their lives.

The continuing high level of insecurity, first and foremost, has a negative impact on the lives of ordinary Iraqis, who cannot access basic services, especially safe drinking water and health care, and whose personal safety is endangered when they venture out of their homes to do simple things such as going shopping or to work, or taking children to school. One particularly negative effect of the fear of kidnap or assault has been the restriction of women's and girls' freedom of movement, which reduces their ability to participate in education and employment. Furthermore, a considerable number of families have not yet sent their children back to school because of similar threats at universities and schools.

The current state of insecurity also entails a high degree of risk for humanitarian workers, at a time when humanitarian aid is still desperately needed in almost all sectors. Threats include possible injury or death due to bombings, crossfire, banditry, car-jacking and looting. This has a detrimental effect on aid delivery and reconstruction. Many international NGOs and humanitarian agencies (UN and ICRC) have moved their operational headquarters to the Jordanian capital, Amman, and suspended some of their projects in Iraq, evacuating foreign staff and replacing them with locals, who for the most part are not professionals and lack appropriate skills. Many embassies (such as Spain, Italy, Australia, etc.) have also reduced their international staff and a few have closed down their offices in Baghdad (the Netherlands and Bulgaria, for instance), after some received threatening phone calls or letters, or direct physical threats.

Another dimension of insecurity are the ethnic tensions (between Arabs and Turkmen, Arabs and Kurds and inter-tribal conflict) that are increasing in the northern part of the country, in addition to the tensions surfacing between the Shi'ite and Kurdish communities. In the Kirkuk area, for instance, the Dibis District Council decided to demolish 70 houses belonging to Arab families who were settled there by the former Iraqi regime under a government programme to "Arabise" this oil-rich area. Actions like this, although minor and not given serious attention (small clashes have so far killed a few dozen civilians), may ultimately have disastrous results or a huge impact on the balance of social forces in the country. One should not forget, however, that the US had tried (and failed due to the strength of feeling of national unity) to heighten tensions between Shi'ites and Sunnis in an attempt to provoke a civil war prior to invading, as well as supporting the Kurds in an openly provocative manner.

In this grim scenario, now more than ever there is an urgent need to ensure law and order. Health care is a good example: WHO said it had received disturbing reports from Baghdad that the ability of hospitals to do their work was being severely curtailed by the lack of civil order, and it was "extremely concerned" that this would have a very serious impact on health and health care in the capital.

The following facts are of relevance to the issue of human security in post-war Iraq:

- Even before the war Iraq's infrastructure was extremely fragile due to two wars and prolonged economic sanctions first imposed by the UN in 1991.

1 Iraqi Al-Amal Association is a non-political, non-sectarian association of volunteers actively engaged in projects for the benefit and well-being of the Iraqi population.

- Sixteen million Iraqi civilians are completely dependent on government food handouts.
- The UN estimates that 5 million Iraqis do not have access to safe water and sanitation. The country's main source of water, the Tigris, receives half a million tons of raw or partially treated sewage every day.
- Half of all sewage treatment plants do not work and of those that do, one-quarter do not meet Iraq's own environmental standards. According to UNICEF reports, only 45.7% (compared with 75% before the 1991 Gulf War) of homes have piped water of which 65% is not treated.
- One child in every eight dies before the age of five and under-five mortality rose from 56 per 1,000 live births in the late 1980s to 131 per 1,000 a decade later.
- One million (one-third) of Iraqi children suffer from malnutrition, which has risen by 160% in the last decade.
- Seven out of 10 infant deaths are from diarrhoea or acute respiratory infection linked to polluted water or malnutrition.
- According to USAID, there were only 9,400 doctors for a population of 25 million before the war.

The civilian cost of war

Shortly before the eruption of hostilities, the UN Secretary-General stated that the use of force without the Security Council's endorsement would "not be in conformity with the Charter". Similarly, many legal experts described the US-UK attack as an act of aggression, violating international law. Experts also pointed to illegalities in the US conduct of the war and violations of the Geneva Conventions by the US-UK with regard to their responsibilities as an occupying power. Indeed, Coalition forces have committed grave violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), of which the widespread use of cluster munitions has the most serious implications in the aftermath of the war. US Central Command reported that it used 10,782 cluster munitions, containing at least 1.8 million submunitions. The British also used some 2,170 cluster munitions containing around 113,190 submunitions. In addition, the invading forces' flawed targeting strategy and the bombing of "dual-use" targets,[2] compounded by a lack of effective assessment, significantly increased the damage incurred (all 50 acknowledged attacks targeting Iraqi leaders failed, while killing dozens of civilians).

Wartime violations on the Iraqi side were no less serious. Iraqi forces not only did not take adequate measures to protect civilians, but, as Human Rights Watch reports, repeatedly violated IHL in the following ways: by using human shields; using anti-personnel landmines; abusing Red Cross and Red Crescent emblems and wearing civilian clothing; and locating military targets in civilian and protected buildings such as mosques and hospitals.[3]

These violations by both Iraqi and Coalition forces caused extra civilian casualties that could have been avoided. Although an accurate assessment of total civilian casualties was almost impossible, some attempts to quantify the dead have been made. The Associated Press canvassed 60 of Iraq's 124 hospitals immediately after the end of major combat operations and calculated that at least 3,420 civilians died. The *Los Angeles Times* also did a survey of 27 hospitals in Baghdad and found that at least 1,700 civilians died and more than 8,000 were injured, in the capital alone. However, it is commonly acknowledged that the ground war caused the vast majority of deaths.

The civilian cost of the war was extraordinarily high. Apart from direct deaths, other losses involved the destruction of already deteriorated civilian infrastructure with a devastating long-term impact. These included:

- Electrical power facilities (in Nasiryya, for example);
- Media installations (3 media facilities were hit by US air strikes: the Ministry of Information, the Baghdad Television Studio and Broadcast Facility and Abu Ghraib Antennae Broadcast Facility);
- Civilian telecommunications facilities. US attacks virtually wiped out Iraq's telecommunications infrastructure (the main telecommunications gateway switches and a number of telecommunications exchanges in Baghdad), eliminating all long-distance calling capacity from Iraq to the outside world;
- Government facilities and buildings.

UXO and landmines

Having experienced three major conflicts in as many decades, Iraq is badly affected by the legacy of these wars. Estimates of the number of landmines in the country range from 8 to 12 million, not including unexploded ordnance (UXO) or other debris. The majority were laid during the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988. Additionally, a number of landmines and pieces of UXO remain from internal conflicts during the 1960s and 1970s and from the 1990-1991 Gulf War. Some of the explosives were even left behind after World War II.

The largest minefields are in northern Iraq (also called Iraqi Kurdistan) and along the country's borders with Iran and Kuwait. Baghdad, the capital, is also heavily mined, as is the southern city of Basra. In fact, the lack of minefield records has made the exact locations of many minefields extremely difficult to identify.

In addition to posing a threat to people's lives, landmines and UXO are a significant impediment to economic growth, especially in relation to foraging, cattle farming and agriculture. Mines are commonly found near water sources and in rural farmland, which complicates everyday activities. Minefields also hinder access to a number of important roads, ports, irrigation canals and power plants.

The landmine crisis was serious enough before the recent conflict, which has only served to exacerbate the situation. Saddam Hussein littered thousands of landmines around the key northern city of Kirkuk, as well as on main roads. Former Iraqi troops also mined stretches of the southern Persian Gulf in order to keep out Coalition ships and, in many cases, left mines behind when retreating from key areas, often near important locations such as wells, oil fields and major roadways. In addition, unexploded cluster bombs dropped by the Coalition forces present a grave threat because curious children often play with them and people try to take them apart to sell the metal.

Despite being an ever-present danger, mines and cluster bombs are not the biggest immediate peril for the population. According to the Mine Advisory Group (MAG), the primary threat (particularly south of Baghdad) comes from the large number of ammunition stockpiles, weapon systems and missile sites that were located within cities and civilian residential areas by the former regime. Looting has exposed and mixed up these stockpiles, and many of the weapons are unstable. While adult males and boys are most at risk of injury from such weapons, stockpiles and munitions caches are a serious threat to the population as a whole. One example is the case of the two children killed and two wounded when a device exploded in a classroom in Kerbalaa on 19 November 2003. Reports stated that it was not clear whether the explosion was the result of a deliberate attack or whether one of the children had brought a piece of UXO into school as a toy.

Large numbers of weapon caches, light and heavy weapons, ammunitions and explosive ordnance are being discovered every day all over the country. Even before the war, the UN Secretary-General estimated that clearing Iraq's minefields could take "anywhere from 35 to 75 years". Now, with the added effects of the recent conflict, the task of ridding Iraq of mines and UXO is a daunting one.

2 Editor's note: targets, such as electrical power facilities, that impact on both military operations and civilian lives.

3 Human Rights Watch. *Off Target. The Conduct of the War and Civilian Casualties in Iraq*. New York: HRW. December, 2003.

Weapons

Immediately after the war, the shocking sight of street-sellers trading weapons, among a range of other objects, was fairly common. All kinds of weapons were available on the black market: hand weapons, machine guns, hand grenades, etc.

Despite the disarmament campaigns conducted by the Coalition forces, Iraqis prefer to remain heavily armed, a decision they justify with reference to the climate of insecurity. We should not forget that Saddam's Ba'thist regime did not surrender; it retreated from Baghdad with many of its best weapons intact. According to the official US military count, only 123 pistols, 76 semi-automatic rifles, 435 automatic rifles, 46 machine guns, 11 surface-to-air missiles and 381 grenades have been collected in an appeal for the citizens to hand over their weapons. If we compare this to the fact that 6 million weapons were distributed by the Ba'th Party among the population before the war started, and a Romanian-made Kalashinkov can be bought on the Baghdad black market for less than USD 20, it is easy to imagine the high level of threat to the lives of Iraqi civilians.

Terrorist attacks

There has been a steady increase in attacks against the occupying forces in central Iraq (the Sunni triangle). In fact, pressure from anti-Coalition forces (basically former regime loyalists and extremist groups) is growing, as is the number of their successful operations. Coalition forces find themselves increasingly vulnerable and they cannot feel safe anywhere. This adds to the tension for Coalition soldiers who are already tired, which could lead to them reacting impulsively.

While most incidents so far were isolated and directed at individuals, or were the result of criminal actions, recent attacks reportedly appear to have been well-planned and are increasingly directed against foreigners. For instance, a large-scale explosion (diesel truck bomb) took place on 12 November 2003 at the Headquarters of the Italian Carabineers in al-Nasiryya (a Shi'ite area), killing 8 Iraqis and 17 Italians (15 soldiers and 2 civilians) and leaving around 100 wounded.

Following the use of Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG7) and mortars, new means of attack have recently appeared: "truck bombs" (especially garbage trucks) and UVIED (Under Vehicle Improved Explosive Devices). Another new tactic identified involves women carrying IED disguised as a baby while trying to enter hospitals (two hospitals were targeted in Baghdad in early November 2003 using this tactic, and so far reports claim that five women have attempted this kind of action).

Obviously, vehicle-bombs and suicide bombings, which have become the commonest forms of attack, are the most destructive. One of the most infamous incidents of this kind was the attack on UN headquarters in which the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative, Sergio de Mello, was killed together with 20 other leading UN officials. At that time this type of attack could be carried out due to a relative lack of security (physical protection barriers, security screening processes, etc.). Now most compounds are well protected, which reduces the "threat capability", although the "weapon capability" is still high. In any case, reports state that many police cars and ambulances have been stolen, and could be used for similar terrorist actions.

Other sorts of attack include sniper attacks and assassinations of Iraqi local authorities appointed by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), as well as of people "collaborating with the Occupation", such as interpreters. There have also been several cases of kidnapping. The first foreign target was a Portuguese journalist kidnapped on 14 November 2003. However, it appears that in most cases the primary motive for the kidnapping is extortion (the Portuguese journalist mentioned above was released after 36 hours on payment of a ransom).

Naturally, people living close to police stations and Coalition forces' bases are threatened and targeted. Now, however, new civilian targets are being chosen (Iraqi judges and officers, US contractors, etc.) apparently due to their close relationship with Coalition forces, and international organisations (ICRC offices, UN headquarters, CARE International offices) and civil facilities (hospitals, hotels, roads and railways) are also being targeted. In fact, the perceived links between the UN and some international NGOs and the Coalition forces may make it difficult to provide adequate security for staff working for the UN or these organisations.

According to statistics issued by the NGO Coordination Committee in Iraq (NCCI) on 6 November 2003, the distribution of attacks was as follows: 72% against Coalition forces; 11% against Iraqi police; 8% against government facilities; 2% against diplomats; 2% against the international community; and 5% unknown. There are currently almost 20,000 private contractors in the country, which is about the size, if not larger, than the UK army presence. In addition, at present there are 132,000 US personnel and 23,000 non-US soldiers.[4]

Assaults on Iraqis also increased. A large nationwide demonstration condemning terrorism was held on 10 December 2003. Nonetheless, more Iraqis are rushing to join the ranks of the guerrillas, many of whom are Sunnis who had previously been on the sidelines but now believe they can "inflict bodily harm" on the US forces. Ammunition is readily available, making it much easier to mount attacks. There are also reports of greater organisation and coordination among foreign insurgents (extremists including but not limited to al-Qaeda and Hezbullah) and members of the ousted regime.

The quest for governance

Any discussion of human security in post-war Iraq cannot avoid addressing political questions such as the US military occupation and the role of the UN. Will the US rule Iraq directly for a long period through a military occupation government or will a UN-sponsored authority take over sooner or later for a transition period? If the UN is involved, will it be subordinated to US priorities or relatively independent? Will US companies seize the lion's share of the oil and reconstruction contracts? There is also the issue of how ordinary Iraqis respond to and resist the occupation, and how they assert their democratic rights in the turbulent post-war context.

The primary responsibility for meeting humanitarian needs and providing security lies with the government of any country. A representative and accountable Iraqi government will ultimately ensure that Iraqi people are able to use their own considerable resources to build a better future. In the meantime, the CPA bears legal and moral responsibility for these. However, the imperative to defeat Saddam Hussein's government and to find and decommission weapons of mass destruction (which were not found) was so all-consuming that a local-level security vacuum was created. Local policing and security are unlikely to be priorities for the US military, and little Iraqi policing capability has survived the overthrow of the government. This has created instability at the local level impeding effective relief and reconstruction efforts. As a result civilians do not enjoy proper protection and are unable to resort to the law when their rights are violated.

In addition, the lack of a functioning infrastructure means that essential services are not delivered, which has a particularly devastating effect on the most vulnerable. The needs of reconstruction are enormous due to 20 years of neglect and corruption in the economic, environmental and services infrastructure, and also as a result of public money being spent to support the armed forces and maintain the regime in power, in addition to the devastating impact of armed conflicts and international sanctions which led to deteriorated living standards for the Iraqi people. The cessation of the Oil-for-Food programme and the subsequent transition to the Public Distribution System is a clear example. As nearly half the population were completely dependent on government

4 NCCI's *Security Briefs* (No 1-6). Distributed by NCCI (NGOs Coordination Committee in Iraq) Security Office, Baghdad.

handouts, there are serious concerns that this change may have a severe negative impact on poor families, including increased malnutrition and possibly starvation.

The IMF and the World Bank have estimated that the Iraqi economy will shrink by 22% in 2004, compared with 21% in 2002 and 12% in 2001. Average per capita income fell from USD 3,600 in 1980 to USD 530 by the end of 2003. According to the UN and the World Bank, it will further decrease in 2004. Iraqi Minister of Finance Ali al-Kelani mentioned in the last meeting of the International Forum in Dubai that the budget deficit for 2004 could reach USD 600 million, pointing out that some 500,000 government employees have not been paid. It is worth mentioning that the World Bank has stated that even if the International Community offered USD 35 billion, which is claimed to be the amount needed for the reconstruction of Iraq during the next four years (other estimates reckon USD 50-75 billion), it will not be possible to spend more than USD 5 billion due to the Iraqi State's lack of institutional capacity. This assessment of reconstruction needs, however, did not include such items as culture (a separate assessment was conducted by UNESCO), environment, human rights, security, etc.

Unemployment is the biggest problem facing the Iraqi economy today. Ministry of Labour figures show that as many as 12 million Iraqis are unemployed. Some estimates even claim that around 50% of Iraq's 24.5 million-strong population are either completely jobless or have part-time jobs, taking into account that 30% of the population were employed by the government prior to the war. According to Nouri Ja'far, the Ministry of Labour's deputy at the Governing Council, the main reason for the high unemployment rates is the dissolution of the army and police forces as well as the freezing of allocations to ministries and government institutions. Coalition forces have now started to re-construct the Iraqi army and have so far appointed one battalion with just 700 soldiers. The size of the army is ultimately projected to reach, at most, 40,000 soldiers. The CPA has also begun to fund 340,000 "urgent jobs" with salaries of USD 3 a day.

It may be one of Iraq's paradoxes that the World Bank - historically the principal sponsor of globalisation - has warned against the accelerated closure of 192 government institutions that are due to be privatised in 4 or 5 years' time. The World Bank's assessment emphasised that the priorities for reconstructing Iraq must contain three important items: enforcing independent, transparent and well-managed government institutions; reconstructing vital infrastructure and services which were destroyed or eroded throughout years of mismanagement and conflicts; and providing support in a transitional stage that would create possibilities of economic growth and social care.

The current feeling among the Iraqi population is that the US forces are doing nothing but obsessing about their own security. Thus, in public opinion US inertia is inevitably becoming associated with Saddam's regime: their presence is illegitimate, they are living in a bunker, exclusively dedicated to their own selfish interests and, when faced with dissidence, they react with brute force. Iraqis today almost unanimously believe that the Bush administration wants to perpetuate the military occupation by maintaining chaos, exacerbating violence and promoting divisions among Iraqis. The facts seem to confirm this perception.

The long road to recovery

Human security means building security from the bottom up. To use an analogy from economic theory, it is micro-security. Looking down the road 30 or 40 years, one can probably imagine the emergence of another mega-threat or two. But at least for now, it is the myriad of micro-conflicts and injustices that demand our attention. Therefore, we see national security and human security as two sides of the same coin: neither threatens global stability, but each entails unacceptable human suffering.

Hence, support for the re-establishment of civil society is of critical importance for the development of a stable and secure Iraq. This will mainly include support for the training and capacity-building of Iraqi NGOs.

Unlike in Afghanistan, there are very few NGOs and no UN agencies outside of Baghdad, especially in southern and central Iraq. This will pose extreme difficulties in providing humanitarian relief to vulnerable populations. Additionally, many NGOs still complain that the US licensing restrictions prevent agencies from providing an adequate humanitarian response. They believe that military forces should not engage in humanitarian assistance unless there is no other way to meet life-threatening needs and that relief and reconstruction efforts must be turned over to a civilian authority, as soon as possible, to ensure impartial humanitarian action in Iraq.

Operation *Iraqi Freedom* (the invasion and occupation of Iraq by the US and its coalition partners) embodies a new approach to post-conflict humanitarian action. This approach unifies security, governance, humanitarian response and reconstruction under the control of the Department of Defence. Humanitarian action is unilateral in character and linked inextricably to the US security agenda in the context of the global war on terrorism. UN agencies and NGOs, traditionally the coordinators and implementers of humanitarian assistance and post-conflict reconstruction programmes, are expected to play supportive roles within an effort managed by the Pentagon. The Pentagon's Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) excluded the UN and NGOs from its pre-war planning on the grounds that its plans were part and parcel of the war effort and therefore had to be confidential. With no policing capacity and the military unable to establish law and order, ORHA has been slow to restore basic services and perform what was supposed to be its top objective: establishing a legitimate Iraqi authority that could govern locally while a national political dialogue was prepared. As a result, the lack of local-level security has plagued the reconstruction effort from the outset and has deeply disappointed the Iraqi people who yearn for a sense of normality in their country.

Faced with the immensity of its task, ORHA is finally turning to the UN and NGOs for assistance. The problem is that roles and responsibilities are being defined on an ad hoc basis throughout the country, in the face of immense practical difficulties, rather than having been planned collaboratively in advance.

With the hope of eliminating fear and restoring a sense of security to the Iraqi people, a number of NGOs, both local and international, have actually begun to take on this responsibility. Indeed, NGOs are making significant progress in terms of security in comparison with previous experiences. For instance, unprecedented attempts are being made to monitor and report violations of IHL, share and exchange security information, and issue precautions and safety reminders, etc. Nonetheless, these NGOs do not have the capacity to pick up the full workload that the UN has been unable to deal with, nor play the same role as the government in the reconstruction of the country. ■

References

Human Rights Watch. *Off Target. The Conduct of the War and Civilian Casualties in Iraq.* New York: HRW. December, 2003. www.hrw.org/reports/2003/usa1203/

NCCI's *Security Briefs* (No 1-6). Distributed by NCCI (NGOs Coordination Committee in Iraq) Security Office, Baghdad.

Mackery, Rob and Dan Hubert. *Human Security and the New Diplomacy. Protecting People and Enforcing Peace.* Canadian Embassy in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 2000.

The Guardian. Special section on Iraq: www.guardian.co.uk/iraq.

■ ITALY

Sliding into insecurity

Over the last four years, decades of social achievements have been lost due to structural reforms and privatisation, benefiting a small proportion of the population. There is a clear decline in the quality of life together with an increase in inequalities (through the re-establishment of privileges for the few). Insecurity is growing, favoured by a government that shows increasing disdain for democratic rules, institutional and social dialogue, and the civil rights of those who are (politically, socially or culturally) "different".

ARCI
ACLI
Fondazione Culturale Responsabilità Etica
Manitese
Movimondo
Sbilanciamoci
Unimondo

Alessandro Messina / Sabina Siniscalchi / Jason Nardi

Over the last four years Italy has been steadily sliding down the ranking in the United Nations Development Programme's Human Development Index: in 2000 the country ranked 19th in the world, by 2002 it had dropped to 20th and in 2003 it came 21st.

In the Human Poverty Index, Italy remains in 11th place, with no progress since last year. The Istituto Nazionale di Statistica (ISTAT, National Institute of Statistics) has revealed that "there were 2.46 million Italian households living in relative poverty in 2002, a figure representing 11% of all households. Absolute poverty affects 926,000 households, that is 4.2% of the total".[1]

Italy also went down a place, from 20th to 21st, in the Gender-related Human Development Index, while - perhaps an even more alarming trend - the country dropped from 31st to 32nd place in the Gender Empowerment Measure. The latter takes into consideration women's participation in political and economic life, and the distribution of wealth by sex.

Insecurity is growing in the country, favoured by the attitude of a government that shows increasing disdain for democratic rules, institutional and social dialogue, and the civil rights of those who are (politically, socially or culturally) "different".

Institutional (in)security

The first element of insecurity derives from the bizarre fact that the Head of Government, Silvio Berlusconi, is at the same time the richest man in the country and controls around 75% of the media in general and 90% of national broadcasting. Although media monopolies are common in European countries, the Italian case is more worrying due to the direct and indirect control Berlusconi and his company-party exert over the private and state media sectors. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe's representative for media freedom, Freimut Duve, has declared that "this form of media control is clearly unconstitutional". In short, the current trend in politics in Italy is characterised by strong media influence with a consequent risk of populism.

It is worth remembering the alarmed tones of international press reports when commenting the start of the Italian Presidency of the European Union, in July 2003. The UK newspaper Financial Times referred to an "untouchable President for Europe", the German magazine Der Spiegel invoked the EU Treaty which foresees a procedure to sanction a member State which violates some of the EU basic principles, such as the freedom of the press or the fundaments of the States regulated by "right-based" principles, and the UK magazine The Economist said he was "not fit to lead the government of any country".[2]

In this context, some of the measures taken by the Government in 2003 are a cause for further alarm, such as the so-called Gasparri Law, that in practice grants the Prime Minister a yet greater concentration of the media in his hands. The Gasparri Law (named after the Minister of Communication) seeks to enlarge the advertising budget through the Integrated System of Communications by making it impossible to fix a ceiling to the amount of income a single telecommunications group can earn from advertising.

Mediaset - Berlusconi's company - is already in a dominant position (controlling 63%), limiting access to the market and new media groups' opportunities for growth. The new law de facto eliminates the conflict of interests by broadening the limits: for example, television channels, newspapers and broadcasting are grouped together with telecommunications, satellite systems, etc., so that Mediaset appears to have a smaller share of the whole. On the other hand, the pay-TV market is monopolised by another media giant - Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation. As Secretary-General of the International Federation of Journalists Aidan White has recently declared, "Italy is about to become one of the most concentrated media markets in the world."[3]

Social (in)security

The Government's plan of action is clear: to progressively shift responsibility for public services to the market and charities, thus reducing social spending and supporting the private sector. Modest welfarist measures have been introduced while cutting funds for local authorities to spend on social policies. This is a clear attack on the welfare state: the gates are being opened to the market and private companies. In return, Italians are promised a cut in taxes so that they will have more money to spend on the private market. However, 64% of citizens would prefer to pay more taxes for improved public services.

In the meantime, government policies on employment, social security and immigration (like reducing the average length of contracts, creating uncertainty regarding the age and quality of retirement, treatment of immigrants) contribute to an increasing sense of insecurity in the country. This is exacerbated by the fact that the mainstream media - especially the national broadcasting networks - turns every news item into a criminal case threatening "our lifestyle". This is especially true in the case of immigration. The year 2003 has been strongly marked by the enforcement of the new Act 189/2002, known as the Bossi-Fini Law, which clamps down on "illegal immigration". In fact, the only option open to the majority of the 2.5 million immigrants was to enter Italy illegally and take advantage of subsequent amnesties.

In response to pressure from entrepreneurs, who benefit from larger migratory flows, the Government takes measures to hamper people's freedom of circulation, weakening their legal status, hindering the process of social integration and effectively giving employers power over immigrants' right of residence; at the same time, the Government stirs up social fears regarding foreign citizens by portraying them as criminals. The result - actively sought by the Government - is the limitation of foreign workers' rights. In fact, when combined with

1 Istat Report 2003. www.istat.it

2 *The Economist*. www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=593654

3 International Federation of Journalists. www.ifj-europe.org

the measures introduced by the new Law No 30 (known as the Biagi Law), also passed in 2003, the rights of all workers are undermined.

Alongside the progressive dismantling of the welfare state, there has been an exponential growth in the number of people in prisons in recent years. At 31 December 2002, the prison population numbered about 57,000 plus another 35,000 serving non-custodial sentences and on probation, while 70,000 people were awaiting the Court's decision on non-custodial sentences. If we add to these figures people under house arrest, under electronic bracelet surveillance or subject to restrictive orders, the result is over 200,000 convicted criminals. The country therefore has a high detention rate: 100 prisoners per 100,000 inhabitants. Italian jails hold about 16,000 more people than the available bed spaces.

A review of the legal and socio-economic characteristics of the prison population shows that about one-third of them are non-European citizens, half of whom come from Islamic countries; one-third are people with drug and alcohol addiction problems; 16,000 people were unemployed before their arrest, 22,000 have not completed compulsory education, and over 17,000 are under 30 years old. Thus it is also clear that in Italy penal policies are tending to be used to deal with problems traditionally covered by social policies.

Economic (in)security

In 2003 the launch of a book entitled "The Disappearance of Industrial Italy"[4] coincided with the explosion of the Fiat crisis which presaged the crash of two major Italian food corporations, Cirio and Parmalat (the latter is perhaps the biggest in European history). These cases illustrate several dimensions of the profound crisis affecting the industrial sector and the economy as a whole. They relate to the production system, but also to government corruption and fraud against small investors and institutions. The Italian economy is going through a structural crisis concerning competitiveness, management and - it is now clear - legality.

Nowadays, finance is no longer a tool at the service of the real economy, but rather has an end in itself: in 2003, banks were responsible for 50% of mergers and acquisitions in Italy; these banks also support shady businesses since they are involved in their capital and investments (as in the cases of Parmalat and Cirio).

At the same time, the advertising market is shrinking, but the broadcasting sector's share has increased, and now accounts for almost 60% of the total. This trend has taken place under the control and to the benefit of Prime Minister Berlusconi. According to Forbes he is the 35th wealthiest person in the world, with personal assets worth EUR 7.2 billion (USD 8.77 billion): he owns shares valued at EUR 7.3 billion (USD 8.89 billion) on the Italian stock market and has declared an annual income of EUR 9 million (USD 10.96 million).

The Prime Minister has reacted to the current economic situation by proposing tax amnesties and remissions in favour of those who infringe building regulations, attacking the state social security system, creating a more precarious labour market, transferring the education system to the private sector, reducing taxes on large private assets, selling off public assets below cost and dismantling the state university and research sector. The message to the citizenry is unequivocal: it pays to be sly. It is exactly the opposite of what is needed in a country immersed in a productive and entrepreneurial identity crisis.

Environmental (in)security

In Italy environmental policies have never been brilliant, but they have rarely gone through such a dire phase: proper funds for the enforcement of the Kyoto Protocol have yet to be allocated, while gas and oil consumption as well as road haulage are still given preferential treatment. At the same time, fewer funds are being allocated to protect the sea and the environment (funds to manage waters in Venice, for instance, were cut by 70%).

Furthermore, the Government has declared a new amnesty in favour of those who infringe building regulations (the third in 19 years). Thanks to this measure, the State has lost yet more credibility: ordinary people will be tempted to break the rules and wait for the next amnesty. For the first time it will be possible to regularise infringements committed on property owned by the State: beaches or archaeological sites on which villas, restaurants and cafés have been built will suddenly attain legal status.

Based on the fact that 362,000 illegal new buildings were erected between 1994 and 2002 - with the total costs of attendant urban development being covered by local authorities in the sum of EUR 8.7 billion (USD 10.8 billion) - projections indicate that this amnesty will increase the rate of future infringements up to 44%, which means that in 2004 alone 60,000 new illegal buildings will be built, which for the most part will spoil the environment.

International (in)security

For 2004, the Government allocated EUR 1.2 billion (USD 1.48 billion) to cover the costs of Italian participation in the occupation of Iraq. This allocation represents more than a 5% increase in military expenditure, which had already grown over 10% in the last four years. The military budget (missions and the ministry budget) is the only one that will increase in a year of cuts and constraints.

In the meantime, funding for international co-operation faces a deep crisis. This is mainly due to the inadequacy of Law 49/87 that regulates Italy's commitment with respect to international co-operation, and to the progressive decline of the Directorate General for Development Co-operation at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (which today is almost paralysed). This Board does not even guarantee basic administrative work that would at least contribute to maintaining the projects already underway.

During 2003, the Executive Committee (the Directorate's operational and decision-making body) did not meet for months on end, while hundreds of projects were waiting to be processed and selected. Besides, Italian NGOs had spent as much as EUR 30 million (USD 36.5 million) on projects that had already been accepted: some NGOs are still waiting for funds granted in 1997.

There is an acute shortage of funding: only 0.2% of gross national income (GNI) was allocated to international co-operation in 2002, making Italy the penultimate country in terms of resource destination on the list of OECD countries. This situation belies the high-sounding declarations made by Prime Minister Berlusconi on several occasions, promising to raise this figure to 0.7% of GNI.

Signs of an awakening

In this context, we must acknowledge that there are signs of an awakening among civil society, which on many occasions has maintained a high level of mobilisation and awareness. Initiatives which deserve a mention include those taken by the *Girotondi* movement in defence of media pluralism and the independence of the judiciary, those taken by trade unions in support of the state school system, state pension schemes and labour rights, and last but not least, the campaigns in favour of setting new priorities in public expenditure, and in defence of the common goods. These types of initiatives are expected to grow, fomenting civic commitment and challenging political powers and institutions. ■

4 Gallino, Luciano. *La scomparsa dell´Italia industriale.* Einaudi, July 2003.

JORDAN

Globalisation and the impact of war



In 2002 the Government implemented a national strategy for eliminating poverty. It has also managed to make improvements in areas such as health and education. However, much remains to be done in a country threatened by a scarcity of water resources, foreign debt, political instability and threats to security, lack of gender equity, poverty and unemployment.

Jordanian Women's Union

Ghosoun Rahhal

Security, dignity and equity are basic to human security

Jordan has recognised the importance of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which were agreed upon at the Millennium Summit in New York in 2000. The signatory countries committed themselves to achieving the following by 2015: eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, achieve universal primary education, promote gender equity and empower women, reduce child mortality, improve maternal health, combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, ensure environmental sustainability and develop a global partnership for development.

The Jordanian Government has already made many attempts at implementing the MDGs at the social and economic levels, and in 2002 Jordan implemented a comprehensive national strategy for eliminating poverty with the creation of the National Aid Fund and the Development and Employment Fund.

The Government's approach to achieving universal education is laid out in the Ministry of Planning's National Report on the Millennium Goals, with the national budget allocating JOD 17.7 million (USD 25.14 million) to the Ministry of Education. Of these funds, JOD 3 million (USD 4.26 million) are to build new schools and classrooms, JOD 9.7 million (USD 13.78 million) are to provide schools with computer equipment, JOD 0.4 million (USD 0.57 million) are to provide kindergartens with equipment, and JOD 2.1 million (USD 2.9 million) are for teacher training.[1]

The Government, in compliance with MDG 3, has also adopted a plan aimed at empowering women and reducing the gap in gender equity in education, labour and participation of women in public and political life.

AIDS and malaria

The document on the MDGs also contemplates fighting HIV/AIDS through the National AIDS Programme, established after the discovery of the first cases of AIDS in 1986. This Programme was created to follow up all aspects of the disease. Jordan has one of the lowest HIV/AIDS rates in the world (331 cases were reported between 1986 and 2003).[2]

In 2001, 210 cases of malaria were detected (124 of them among foreigners, 86 among Jordanians) and the outbreak was rapidly controlled. More precautions should be taken to control malaria completely.

With respect to the development of a global partnership for development, Jordan has worked at the economic level to implement a structural adjustment programme, which includes privatisation, and has joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Through this programme the Government has been able to control inflation and stabilise the national budget and general economic indicators.

The main threats

However, despite all the above achievements, which were defined as objectives in the Ministry of Planning's framework strategy, the challenges of globalisation are still present in the country's limited water resources, foreign debt, political instability and threats to security, lack of gender equity, poverty and unemployment.

Wars and armed conflicts

In the first place, it is important to bear in mind the destructive effect on Jordan of the armed conflicts and continuous wars in neighbouring Palestine and Iraq. These tragic events have taken a heavy toll on the Jordanian people's sense of stability and security. Moreover, it is clear that the negative impact of the war against Iraq and the subsequent occupation is not limited to Iraq itself - it has affected the Arab world in general and Jordan in particular, because of the close relations between the two countries and the common economic interests that unite them. Iraq used to supply Jordan free of charge with part of its total oil requirements, with the rest being supplied at reduced prices, which significantly contributed to reducing fuel prices. Following the US occupation of Iraq and its takeover of oil production, Iraq is now selling its oil to Jordan at international prices, which has caused an abrupt and massive increase in fuel prices. According the Minister of Finance, Iraqi assistance to Jordan has decreased from 7% to 3% since the US occupation.

International policies, reflected on the one hand by UN Security Council resolutions, and on the other by US policy, have failed to solve disputes by peaceful means according to the UN Charter. On the contrary, whether by resorting to force in Iraq or by encouraging the use of force in Palestine, these policies have contributed to delaying the development of the Arab world and especially to endangering human security. Such policies have affected the means of production; GDP per Arab worker has fallen to USD 5,000.[3]

The Jordanian economy depends primarily on the exploitation of its natural resources. Raw materials constitute 90% of the country's exports, leaving only 10% of total returns in this field to manufacturing.[4]

Curtailment of civil rights

At the civil and political levels, the instability and insecurity in Palestine and Iraq have had a direct influence on the Jordanian Government, especially concerning the scope of general freedom. The Government has enacted numerous laws to limit the right to expression either in the press or on the Internet. A law was recently passed limiting the right to hold public gatherings and many human right activists have been detained because of their activities against the normalisation of diplomatic relations with Israel. Many of these activists are

1 Ministry of Planning. *The National Report on the Millennium Goals*. 2003.

2 "The Jordanian National AIDS Programme was established in January 1986, shortly after the first AIDS case was diagnosed. The National AIDS Programme is the responsibility of the General Directorate of Primary Health Care in the Ministry of Health. At the higher level of the programmatic structure there is National AIDS Committee, headed by the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Health, and includes in its membership experts in different branches of health from all health sectors. There is awareness among higher authorities in the country about the extent of the problem and NAP is recognized as an active department in the Ministry. Mobilization of local resources is still in the beginning, there is need for further work in this regard." www.emro.who.int/jordan/CollaborativeProg-HIV.htm

3 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). *Arab Human Development Report 2003. Building a Knowledge Society*. 2003.

4 *Ibid*, p. 134.

public figures, well-known politicians and professionals. Some demonstrations were violently repressed, leading to one civilian being killed and others wounded.[5]

The challenges of globalisation

Notwithstanding the positive impact of globalisation in making the world a smaller place and in speeding up the flow of information, the present process of globalisation is nothing but a tool for the more powerful states in the world to exert their domination in the areas of knowledge production and the economy, and therefore, of development.[6] Progress in the means of producing knowledge and information at the international level has turned this service into a private commodity, subject to new laws governing the protection of intellectual property. The world's most powerful states ensured that the laws protecting intellectual property contain clauses and conditions granting them what amounts to a monopoly over knowledge production.[7]

This approach has principally affected the medicine manufacturing sector in Jordan. Jordanian companies compete with their US counterparts in the medicine market by producing generic medicines and marketing them at lower prices. Buyers find Jordanian medicines more attractive than US drugs due to their availability and cheapness. However, since many companies were prosecuted under the new intellectual property laws, the sick and the poor are now unable to purchase medicines at affordable prices.

WTO and privatisation

Jordan joined the WTO in April 2000 and signed partnership agreements with the European Union and the United States. It also established duty-free industrial zones in Aqaba, Irbid and Karak and amended investment law to attract foreign investment. Jordan has also sought to comply with World Bank conditions by implementing its recommendations regarding structural adjustment and privatisation programmes.

Privatisation programmes were applied in two phases. The first phase included the following sectors: communications, tourism, industry, transport, and mining. In this phase the Government sold its shares in 44 companies for USD 900 million. The second phase included the national oil company, the Jordan Cement Factories, the Royal Jordanian Air Academy, the Water Authority of Jordan, the Ma'in Spa Complex, Postal Services, Assamra Water Treatment Plant, Jordan Silos and Supply General Company, Customs Department warehouses, Jordan Phosphate Mining Company, Arab Potash Company, and Civil Aviation Authority.[8] As a result of the mass privatisation of national companies, treasury funds have diminished and national revenue has been transferred to the pockets of foreign investors and transnational corporations instead of being spent on developing the country and improving the population's living conditions.

Official statistics indicate a reduction in foreign debt from 190% of GDP in 1990 to 77.7% in 2002, and a reduction in debt service from 43.2% in 1990 to 18.8% in 2002.[9] In addition, World Bank statistics show an increase in GDP from 4.22% in 1990 to 4.85% in 2002, while annual exports of commodities and services grew from 5.9% in the 1980s to 7.4% in the 1990s. However, poverty and unemployment rates are also at an all-time high.

Unemployment and poverty

There was a major increase in unemployment among young people aged 15-24, from 27% in 1991 to 31% in 2002. Statistics have also revealed that poverty affected 21% of the population in 2001. However, the reduction of poverty was not included in the national strategy of the Ministry of Social Development. Moreover, Ministry of Planning figures relating to Official Development Assistance, including loans and donations provided by the Government, do not match those released by the Ministry of Finance.[10]

Lack of gender equity

Equity for all people in society without discrimination on the grounds of religion, sex, language, etc., is the cornerstone of human security. Equity means justice, and without justice there can be no social order.

The Jordanian Constitution enshrines the equality of all Jordanians before the law, and guarantees women's right to education and work. However traditions and customs restrict women's potential contribution to the development process. Although the Government is attempting to integrate women into public life either by offering them high posts or engaging them in the decision-making process, there is still a noticeable gender gap in many sectors. Table 1 illustrates this gap.

A significant move towards enhancing women's status was the appointment of three women to the Cabinet and seven to the Upper House in 2002.

TABLE 1

Women's participation in society

YEAR	(%)	FIELD OF PARTICIPATION
2001	20	Paid labour excluding the agricultural sector
2001	25	Paid labour in general
2003	8	Parliament
2003	17	Upper House
2003	15	Cabinet
2002	2.9	Judiciary

Source: Ministry of Planning, (2003) The Millennium Goals Report.

Nevertheless, a greater effort is needed at legislative and administrative levels to enhance the status of women. And more action should be taken at the social level to change men's negative conceptions of women's participation in public life and the decision-making process.

Development policies should take into account the actual abilities and role of women, and employ them fruitfully rather than limiting them to micro-economic projects which do not make the most of their talents or promote their role in the development process. ■

5 *Ibid*, pp. 30-31.

6 *Ibid*, p. 11.

7 *Ibid*, p. 133.

8 Executive Privatization Commission. www.epc.gov.jo

9 Central Bank of Jordan.

10 Ministry of Planning, *op cit*, p. 6.

"Hot peace" and landlessness



With the end of the Cold War and the apparent halt to the nuclear arms race many Kenyans expected that the world (and their country in particular) would be a safer place. But poverty continues to grow and responsibility for the provision of basic needs is being abdicated by the State. The rise of organised crime has exacerbated insecurity at the social, economic and political levels. The end of the Cold War has given place to what people call a "Hot Peace".

Kenyan Social Watch Coalition (KSWC)[1]

Ownership of land: only for the very few

A very serious source of economic and social insecurity for Kenyans is the lack of access to ownership of productive assets, in particular to land. Many communities in rural areas depend on land for their production and livelihood. Data from the Welfare Monitoring Survey 1997 (WMS) indicates that in the country as a whole the rich own or work more land than the poor. While poor households, accounting for 70% of the population, hold 43% of the total land, the remaining 30% hold 57% of the land. In Nairobi, 60% of the population occupy only 6% of the land and live in informal settlements. Social insecurity in informal settlements is not restricted to ownership or user rights to land but extends to harassment by landlords and administration officials.

The 1997 WMS results show that more than 10% of the rural population are landless and about 44% own less than 2 acres of land. Only 26% of the rural population own more than 4 acres of land. Landlessness affects the ability to secure basic needs such as food, clothing and shelter. Despite the increasing importance of non-farming activities as sources of income and livelihood, access to farmland in rural areas still has great social and economic significance. Even those with industrial or intellectual sources of income feel insecure if they do not own land.

For the urban poor, invasion of public land became the only way of accessing land to put up their dwellings. This has recently changed, as wealthy individuals with political connections fraudulently alienated most of the public land in urban areas. The alternative left to the urban poor has been to take up residence on land that is unfit for human habitation: the sides of railway tracks or highways, where there is a high risk of accidents and problems of exhaust fumes and noise pollution; poorly drained areas that are prone to flooding; the banks of rivers and inclines that are threatened by landslides as a result of rainfall or the removal of vegetation; and areas around factories, where both air and soil are badly polluted.

Personal insecurity

According to Amnesty International Report 2003 "more than 100 people were reportedly killed by the police in circumstances suggesting they may have been extrajudicially executed. Torture remained widespread. Police used violence to disperse peaceful rallies and forcibly broke up demonstrations. Security officials and supporters of the ruling party committed human rights abuses with impunity."[2] Also, at least 126 people were sentenced to death in 2002, although no one was executed.

The Government has admitted that over half of victims do not report crimes to the police.[3] The total number of crimes reported between 1997 and 2001 increased considerably. Crime was highest in 2000 with 80,143 cases reported.

Insecurity affecting children and women - the most vulnerable groups - appears to be more pronounced, removed as they are from the mainstream of decision-making. From 2000 to 2001, reported cases of rape and attempted rape increased by 5.7%, while cases of assault on women increased by 6.3%. In 2001, cases of defilement (carnal knowledge of a girl under 14 years) and incest increased by 63% from 752 to 1,226 in 2000. Overall, reported cases of violence against women increased by 11.6%, from 7,890 in 2000 to 8,807 in 2001. Chart 1 shows the incidence of cases of violence against women between 1997 and 2001.[4]

Few jobs, scarce water and sanitation

The Population and Housing Census 1999 provides demographic data on migration, urbanisation, housing, social amenities and employment. Although the proportion of the population living in urban areas is still small in comparison to that in rural ones (the trend was 8% in 1970, 15% in 1980, 18% in 1990 and 19% in 1999) the inter-censal urbanisation growth rates for the periods 1979-1989 and 1989-1999 were 5.2% and 3.2% respectively.

However, the provision of facilities like housing, water, sanitation, energy, health and education did not increase in line with urban growth. Dwelling unit counts reflected a concentration of housing in rural areas. Some 10.5 million dwellings were recorded, out of which 81.4% were in rural areas. Most families lived in single rooms due to the high rents charged for dwellings with two or more rooms. The majority of urban residents (76%) lived in rented dwellings while in rural areas 86% lived in their own houses. Only 3.7% of

CHART 1

Profile of violence against women. 1997-2001



Source: Women's Bureau, Ministry of Gender, Sports, Culture and Social Services, 2003.

1 As represented by the following: Edward Oyugi (Social Development Network), Oduor Ongwen (Econews Africa), Alloys Opiyo (Undugu Society of Kenya), the late Ooko Ombaka (Public Law Institute), Eve Odete (Action Aid Kenya), Andiwo Obondo (DARAJA), Mary Wandia (FEMNET), Wahu Kaara (KENREN), Lumumba Odenda (Kenya Land Alliance), Gichira Kibara (Center for Governance and Development), Jennipher Miano (Kenya Human Rights Commission), Kangethe Mugai (People Against Torture), Churchil Suba (Education Rights Forum).

2 Amnesty International Report 2003. http://web.amnesty.org/report2003/Ken-summary-eng.

3 Republic of Kenya 2002, *Economic Survey 2002*, Government Printer, Nairobi, p. 50.

4 Amnesty International Report 2003, *op. cit.*

urban residents lived in purchased dwellings because of high house prices stemming from high interest rates on mortgage loans.

The composition and structure of households have remained largely unchanged over the last 10 years. Female-headed households account for 36.7% of total households. Since most women are not in gainful employment or are under-employed, the high proportion of female-headed households portends a serious situation as far as economic security is concerned.

Only 30.7% of Kenyans have access to piped water (15.1% rural and 77.1% urban), 21% use water from boreholes (24.7% rural and 9.8% urban), 28.3% use water directly from lakes and rivers (36% rural and 5.2% urban), 21% get their water from springs (15% rural and 1.7% urban), while those whose main sources are ponds or reservoirs account for 4.8% (6.1% urban and 0.9% rural) of the population.

As to sanitation, only 7.1% dispose of human waste through a main sewer. A staggering 72.8% use pit latrines while 2.5% use septic tanks or cesspools. A worrying 16.5% answer the call of nature in the bush, a figure that in some provinces is as high as 77.6%.

The limited growth of employment in most urban areas has rendered a vast percentage of the urban population jobless. The total unemployment rate in the country is estimated at 10% for rural areas and 38% for urban centres. This high urban unemployment rate is a source of social tension and escalating crime and insecurity.

The risks of being a woman

Kenya ranks 115 in the UNDP gender-related development index.[5] Cultural, social and economic factors have combined to put women at a serious disadvantage, especially in rural areas, where their labour is often under-valued and under-utilised. As Earlham College[6] states, "women living in Kenya are granted very few rights and are economically marginalised, holding few jobs other than those centred around childcare... Although women make up 52% of the population and 60% of the voting population, there have been only 6 female members in the Kenyan parliament…" Chart 2 shows labour force participation by sex. If poverty is to be reduced, female participation in employment must be included in government and private sector policies.

The dangers of being a child

Children, whether living with a traditional family or otherwise, bear the brunt of any social aberration or economic malgovernance. Their situation depends to a large extent on how the parents discharge their social responsibility of care and sustenance, which in turn is a function of the State.

Those who face insecurity the most and are in need of special attention today are street children, child labourers, refugee children, children with disabilities, children under the age of three living with their mothers in prison, children born out of wedlock and lacking parental care, children orphaned by AIDS, and children in correctional institutions like prisons, approved schools or juvenile remand homes. Children in these categories are collectively referred to as children in need of special protection.[7]

Prior to the enactment of the Children's Act 2001, child law was based on the premise of protecting society from the errant child rather than protecting the child from errant members of adult society. This has not changed and it is still common for children found roaming the streets of urban centres to be arrested for no apparent reason and to be treated as vagrants even though the Vagrancy Act is no longer applicable. The justification offered is that these children need care and protection under the Children and Young Persons Act. Closer scrutiny however, reveals an urge to "clean up" the streets of children who are considered an "eyesore".[8]

Side-effects of the global war

There is a last aspect to be signalled regarding human security. It overlaps with the current discussion of national and international security. These are events over which Kenyans and their government have no control and that have impacted decisively on their sense of security (and also on international perception of the security situation in Kenya). In August 1998, Kenya was the scene of a bombing incident that claimed more than 235 lives and left many maimed for life. The bombing was aimed at the US embassy in Nairobi and was linked to the Al Qaeda group, which has since been accused of the 11 September 2001 attacks in New York and Washington, DC. In November 2002 another bombing, linked to the same group, rocked the coastal city of Mombasa.

The consequence of these bombings is that even though the targets were US and Israeli interests, Kenya has been harassed and humiliated by the United States and its allies. Pandering to the dictates of the United States, the Kenyan Government recently published a Suppression of Terrorism Bill - a piece of legislation that if passed would wipe out all the gains made up to now in the field of civil and political rights. The most controversial aspect of the Bill is religious profiling and an overt anti-Islamic bent. The Bill virtually takes away all the rights enjoyed under the Bill of Rights and gives the police authority to:

- Enter and search any premises if they have reason to suspect that a terrorist offence has been or is likely to be committed.
- Search any person or vehicle found on any premises, which they are empowered to enter and search.
- Seize, remove and retain anything which is, or contains or appears to them to contain, evidence of commission of a terrorist act.
- Arrest and detain any person who they reasonably suspect of having committed or is about to commit an offence under this Act.

Under Section 7 of the Bill, collecting, producing or transmitting information of a kind "likely to be useful" to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism constitutes an offence. Transmission includes communication by telephone, e-mail, voice-mail or other telecommunications method, including making information available on the Internet. The Bill, in its various provisions, constitutes a major affront to personal liberties, and individual and group security.

Conclusions

As neo-liberal policies make headway, poverty continues to rise and the provision of basic needs is being abdicated by the State. The result has been social discontent. At least in part derived from this situation, the rise of organised crime (particularly in urban and peri-urban centres) has increased insecurity at the social, economic and political levels. Also, the War on Terrorism lead by the United States has taken its toll on the insecurity of Kenyans. ■

CHART 2

Labour force participation by sex. 1999



Source: Population and Housing Census Report, 1999.

5 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). *Human Development Report 2003.*

6 Earlham College is an institution that educates students to work effectively together with others, to better understand the ways human organisations work, and to make complex decisions in compassionate and visionary ways. www.earlham.edu/~pols/ps17971/terneel/kenya.html

7 According to a report produced by the African Network for the Prevention and Protection against Child Abuse and Neglect, Kenya Chapter (ANPPCAN Kenya), in 1997 a total of 1,864 cases passed through the juvenile courts, 1,601 of whom were boys and 263 were girls, giving a boy to girl ratio of 6:1.

8 Amnesty International Report 2003, *op. cit.*

Suicides, credit default, natural catastrophes and the threat of war



Korea, the last remaining divided country, is in a state of high military tension, and the threat of war is a source of fear to all Koreans. South Korea's economic troubles and structural social problems have led to an unprecedented spate of suicides. In addition, the lack of effective countermeasures to respond to large-scale accidents and natural catastrophes has deepened South Koreans' feeling of insecurity.

Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ), Policy Research Dep.

Daehoon Kim

The threat of war

Korea has been divided into South and North since its independence from Japan in 1945. During the Korean War (1950 to 1953), both South and North Korea suffered massive casualties, and the whole country was devastated. For the last 50 years, South and North Korea have perpetuated their historical military and political rivalry and maintained very large armies to defend themselves against each other. The division of the peninsula and the history of military confrontation have inhibited the political, economic and social development of both countries and generate a climate of fear for all Koreans.

Although in recent years the Governments of the two Koreas have made attempts to reduce the tension and find a peaceful solution to their differences (leading to the unprecedented summit on 15 June 2000 and the "Co-declaration by North and South"), the threat of war persists.

More recently, North Korea's nuclear development programme and the suspicion that it possesses nuclear weapons prompted the United States, in its most important stance on all issues concerning the peninsula, to impose restraints on North Korea in political, economic and military matters. This unstable situation has cast a cloud of uncertainty over the peninsula. In August 2003 the so-called Six Party Talks among North and South Korea, the United States, Japan, Russia and China were held to discuss possible ways to improve North-South relations, but these talks did not have any visible positive effects.

Civil society in action

For several decades, South Korean civil society has denounced the use of the military confrontation between North and South as an attempt on the part of the Governments of the two Koreas to keep themselves in power indefinitely. By encouraging co-operation and mutual understanding, South Korean NGOs have been in the forefront of the movement for peace and reunification of the two Koreas. Before the 1990s these efforts by NGOs were subject to great pressure from the Seoul Government. But as South Korea evolves into a more democratic society, the question of reducing tension and building a peaceful and stable situation, which were the main tasks of NGOs, have become important issues for the Government to solve.

At present South Korean public opinion is divided over the question of Seoul's policy on North Korea. One current of opinion favours reducing tension and resolving the conflict between the two countries; the other is in favour of military security and military alliances with the United States. This division has also influenced, both directly and indirectly, the policy of reconciliation and co-operation that existed prior to the inclusion of North Korea in the "axis of evil" defined by the White House.

Meanwhile, South Korean civil society has worked hard towards including the following aims in its agenda: to establish a peaceful coexistence and reduce armaments as a means of resolving the threat of war on the peninsula; to urge the international community to resolve the nuclear problem of the North; to monitor the policies of the Seoul Government and neighbouring countries regarding the peninsula; to insist that the two Koreas carry out the action plan which was co-signed at the summit; and to promote exchanges between both Koreas as a means of furthering mutual understanding.

TABLE 1

Human Development Indicators 2003		
Human Development Index rank	2003	30
Total population (millions)	2001	47.1
Urban population (as % of total)	2001	82.4
Population under age 15 (as % of total)	2001	20.6
Population over age 65 (as % of total)	2001	7.4
GDP (USD billions)	2001	422.2
GDP per capita (USD)	2001	8,917
Adult literacy rate (% age 15 and above)	2001	97.9
Population with access to an improved water source (%)	2000	92
Population with access to improved sanitation (%)	2000	63
Births attended by skilled health personnel (%)	1995-2001	100
Physicians (per 100,000 people)	1990-2002	173
Life expectancy at birth (years)	2000-05	75.5
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)	2001	5
Under-five mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)	2001	5
Maternal mortality ratio reported (per 100,000 live births)	1985-2001	20
Public expenditure on education (as % of GDP)	1998-2000	3.8*
Public expenditure on health (as % of GDP)	2000	2.6
Military expenditure (as % of GDP)	2001	2.8
Total debt service (as % of GDP)	2001	6.2
Total armed forces (thousands)	2001	686
Total armed forces Index (1985=100)	2001	115

Source: UNDP. Human Development Report 2003; * preliminary UNESCO estimate, subject to further revision.

South Korean NGOs were actively involved in humanitarian activities to help North Koreans - particularly children - suffering economic difficulties. Finally, there have been attempts to reach a consensus within civil society in order to present workable policy suggestions to the Seoul Government with respect to Pyongyang.

South Korean civil society is currently very critical of the Government's decision to dispatch 3,000 Korean combat troops to support the war led by the United States in Iraq, and large demonstrations to oppose it have taken place throughout South Korea. We strongly believe that there is no reason whatsoever for there to be a war in Iraq, since it could further increase the threat of war on the Korean peninsula.

Suicides and credit card defaults

The financial crisis of 1997-1999 exposed longstanding weaknesses in the country's development model, including high debt:equity ratios, massive foreign borrowing, and an undisciplined financial sector. Although growth (led by consumer spending and exports) reached 6.2% in 2002, poverty (as stated in Korea's Social Watch reports for 2001 and 2002) has become a serious problem. In 2001, the Government adopted a policy that guaranteed a basic livelihood to protect those living below the poverty line. Although 10% of the population are poor, the actual beneficiaries of this policy only amount to 3%. This is due to the inadequate sums allocated to this project in the budget and to the negative perception people have of the welfare system.

The effects of the crisis are illustrated by the massive and violent demonstrations and the shocking suicides of workers in protest against their working conditions that took place in 2003. On 9 November, a demonstration of 40,000 trade union members flooded the centre of Seoul in protest against the Government's repressive labour legislation. When attacked by the police, the workers responded with hand-to-hand combat and Molotov cocktails. Another motivation for the protests was the self-sacrifice of three workers who had killed themselves in separate incidents in October in a desperate gesture over their plight. The first to commit suicide was Kim Joo-Ik, former president of the Hanjin Heavy Industries Union, who hanged himself on the 129th day of a sit-in he was conducting on top of a crane. The other two workers killed themselves on two successive days later that same month.

The economic crisis also spiralled due to the rising number of credit card defaults. In the five years since the beginning of the economic crisis, the number of South Koreans defaulting on their credit cards reached four million in a population of 48 million. Furthermore, 10% of the country's current credit card debt is overdue by at least a month. After the start of the economic crisis the Government pursued a policy of promoting the issuing of credit cards in order to stimulate domestic demand. But as a consequence of this, many citizens contracted enormous debts which they were unable to pay, and some people either abandoned their normal lives or reached the extreme decision of taking their lives. In July 2003, when the Korean Federation of Banks reported an all-time record of 3.22 million credit card defaulters, in the city of Inchon a woman struggling with a huge credit card debt killed herself and her three children.

If the Government does not take drastic measures to re-establish credit and support the poor, tragic suicides will continue to occur.

Accidents and natural catastrophes

In February 2003, an arson attack on the underground in Daegu, the third largest city in South Korea, resulted in a toll of 192 deaths and 147 injuries. The arsonist, who was arrested, did not state any specific motive for committing the crime, and his attack caused grave fear among ordinary citizens that more acts of this nature could happen in the future. Government measures to counteract this kind of incident, however, are still in their early stages.

Meanwhile, Koreans cannot forget the series of large-scale accidents that took place in the recent past, such as the collapse of a department store in 1995, which resulted in many deaths and much damage to property.

Natural disasters such as tropical cyclones and sandstorms have also wreaked destruction. Typhoon Rusa, one of the strongest in Korean history, destroyed 650 ships and boats at the beginning of September 2002 and caused severe damage to the country's fish farms and harbour facilities. Many towns and villages were devastated too. Damage to property came to USD 4.9 billion, only USD 170 million of which were insured.

In March, April and August 2002 the country was hit by the worst sandstorms in recent history. Record dust concentrations were reported (maximum accumulation was 10 centimetres high). People suffered respiratory and eye diseases, schools were closed, flights cancelled, and huge losses to industry were reported. Typhoon Maemi battered South Korea in September 2003 with wind speeds of up to 210 km/h and massive flooding, which contributed almost USD 6 billion of damage to the total loss.

Civil society's response

South Korean NGOs are calling the public's attention to the calamities caused by these disasters, and is monitoring the safety measures in public facilities such as cinemas, department stores and underground shops. Whenever large-scale accidents occur, civil society and NGOs are actively involved in humanitarian relief and fundraising for the victims. NGOs have urged the Government to take preventive measures, provide an efficient system for responding to disasters, implement effective safety regulations, and allocate sufficient funds to cope with accidents of this nature, yet the Government has been remiss about taking action. ■

No guarantees, no security



Political, institutional, and psychological factors have led to the loss of any sense of security due to the lack of official and public legal and institutional guarantees. NGOs will not be able to face the challenges without the participation of other major civil society groups such as political parties, trade unions, and the private sector.

Arab NGO Network for Development (ANND)

Adib Nehmeh[1] / Zena Halabi[2]

The evaluation of the attainment of human security, whether for populations, communities, or individuals, requires a complex analysis of a number of interrelated factors. In the case of Lebanon, these factors are interlinked in a complex scheme, for the Lebanese tend to base their evaluation of their current and future situations on comparisons with periods of the past, most notably the period between 1975 and 1990,[3] and the period between 1990 and 2000.[4] These periods witnessed tremendous threats, from both individuals and groups, to the human security of Lebanese citizens.

The main obstacles to human security

The following political, institutional, and psychological factors lead to the loss of a sense of security due to the lack of legal and institutional guarantees, both official and public, that are expected to ensure the preservation of and respect for citizens' rights and sense of security.

Socio-economic obstacles

- Lebanon is witnessing changes similar to those taking place in the rest of the world, which can be summarised in the widening gap between the rich and the poor and the shrinking of the middle classes. This is accompanied by economic stagnation, an increase in poverty and unemployment, mainly among the young, as well as a rise in public debt that is affecting current and future economic prospects. A national study published in 1998 classified the resident population according to five levels of living conditions (very low, low, intermediate, high, and very high) using a nationally constructed Living Conditions Index (LCI). According to the LCI, 7% of households had very low living conditions, and 25% had low living conditions. A national survey is currently being carried out that will provide up-to-date and more accurate estimates of the incidence of poverty. However, it is expected to show that the situation has worsened between the mid 1990s and the present, due to economic regression in the late 1990s.[5]
- Since the end of the civil war, consecutive governments have been adopting market-oriented policies and inappropriate taxation systems that are increasing the prices of local production compared to foreign, regional, and international imports. This is leading to the weakening of national decision-making especially regarding agreements related to trade, investment, and competition and is causing social and economic instability. Poverty is leading to the expansion of urban slums around the major cities, as well as to the rise in delinquency and fundamentalism in urban areas.
- According to 2001 figures, national unemployment is close to 12%; however it rises to 20% among male youths and 30% among female youths, between the ages of 15 and 24.[6] It is worth noting that figures will exceed these levels if unemployment definitions take into consideration hidden unemployment and the hopelessness of finding jobs, which is widespread in developing countries.
- All of the abovementioned factors are reflected in alarming trends of emigration among Lebanese families .[7]

Uncompleted national reconciliation

The civil war ended in Lebanon in 1990 with the signing of the Ta'if Agreement,[8] designed to set the basis for social and political reconciliation in the country. National reconciliation resulting from this process has not been completed, however, as there is significant mishandling of the problem of sectarianism, which was one of the main causes of the civil war. The prevalence of national policies and political structures promoting sectarianism are evident in the increasing involvement of sectarian leaders in the country's political, economic, and social processes.

Precarious national security

The troubling situation of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon,[9] who are deprived of their essential social and economic rights, as well as the rights to own property and employment in skilled professions,[10] is adding to the complexities of coexistence in Lebanese society. Unemployment among the Palestinian community in Lebanon is reaching extreme levels and thus transforming the camps where most of the Palestinians reside into areas with inhuman living conditions and a sanctuary for delinquents. Consequently, national security is facing accumulating factors of instability and internal volatility that could represent a major threat that the Government cannot control.

Internal political process

- The system of patronage and clientelism that was consolidated in the post-war period within religious, feudal communities, business sectors and warlords has acquired a quasi-institutional character closely linked to the political process. Members of parliament and the Government tend to be wealthy, well-connected businessmen and traditional community leaders, responsible for the powerful militias and political factions that emerged during the war.
- This goes in parallel with the spread of corruption which affects the livelihood of all Lebanese citizens as it has reached all sectors vital to the country's social and economic systems. Indeed, sectors like telecommunications,

1 Center for Developmental Studies (MADA).

2 Arab NGO Network for Development.

3 The end of the Lebanese civil war.

4 The end of Israeli occupation of Southern Lebanon.

5 *Mapping of living conditions in Lebanon*, UNDP and Ministry of Social Affairs, 1998. MDGR, Lebanon, November 2003.

6 Université St Joseph, "L'entrée des jeunes libanais dans la vie active et l'émigration", 2003.

7 *Ibid.* Nineteen per cent of Lebanese families are eager to migrate, while 30% of Lebanese families are willing to send at least one member of the family abroad (the rate is 40% among the young and 60% among unemployed youth).

8 The agreement to end the civil war in Lebanon was signed in the city of Ta'if in Saudi Arabia at the end of 1989.

9 The number of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon is estimated to be 200,000 (the registered number in UNRWA records is around 350.000). Most of them live in 12 refugee camps and 45 gatherings. *Difficult past, Uncertain Future: Living Conditions Among Palestinian Refugees in Camps and Gatherings in Lebanon.* Fafo Institute for Applied Social Science, Report 409, 2003.

10 *Ibid.* These jobs require membership in professional associations, which is not given to foreigners.

health, electricity, water and education are manipulated according to the personal interests of the politicians in power. The serious levels of corruption are undoubtedly hampering the achievement of sustainable development, of which human security is a vital part.[11]

Institutional insecurity

In addition to the injustices resulting from the breakdown in political processes, the legal system itself contributes to the culture of injustice and human insecurity on several levels.

- Corruption has reached the heart of the legal system, with the obvious and frequent interventions by politicians in the work of judges and the courts making citizens distrustful of the legal system in the absence of guarantees and respect for their political and civil rights. A serious implication of mistrust is the participation of citizens in the corruption cycle, through systematic practices of bribery and cronyism, which undermines the work of the justice system and therefore threatens other citizens' security and right to justice. One of the most serious cases of fraud was the annulment of Gabriel El Murr's election to parliament (with 42,000 votes) during the 2002 by-elections for political reasons. The Constitutional Council nominated the third placed candidate, who had only won 4,000 votes, as the elected member of parliament.
- The poorly designed and undemocratic electoral system serves the authorities' interests. In addition to the bias shown by the electoral authorities, the electoral law in practice leads to skewed representation in parliament and a sense of separation between government and voters. Furthermore, the law consolidates the network of patronage and clientelism rooted in Lebanese political culture.
- The weakening of groups that can put pressure on the Government and push for change, like professional associations, trade unions, and political parties, results in low levels of public participation due to the lack of potential or opportunity for change. Indeed, under the pretext of national security, professional associations, student movements and lobbying groups are infiltrated by security agents who keep track of their activities and terminate their actions when it is deemed necessary. Some trade union leaders and journalists have been taken to court, and young activists from opposition groups are frequently arrested and interrogated and judged in military courts.
- The question of participation and inclusion is an issue that, on a cultural-institutional level, is vital for achieving and sustaining human security. The post-war Ta'if Agreement has failed to ensure the participation and inclusion of certain opposition groups in the political process. Indeed, Lebanese youth and women are still marginalised and excluded from the political system.

External factors

Lebanon has not yet escaped the obstacles introduced by war and conflict, since it belongs to a region that is still suffering from the Israeli occupation of Palestine, which lies on the southern borders of Lebanon, and from the implications of the United States' occupation of Iraq. This regional situation partly derives from the aggressive global economic and social policies towards developing countries in general, and towards Arab countries, including Lebanon, in particular. It is also partly the result of the political and ideological agenda of the current "war on terrorism". These factors have significant implications for Lebanese citizens, including political, social, and cultural pressures and reactions that could lead to social conflicts and security threats for both the individual and the community. This situation is likely to limit the potential for travelling and working abroad, including in Arab countries, which are expected to create opportunities for Lebanon both at present and in the future.

What is the Government doing about these threats?

Policies implemented by the post-war governments cannot be held exclusively responsible for the security deficit affecting Lebanese society. Indeed, the issues discussed above are all structural problems relating to the construction of the modern socio-political system. What post-war governments are accountable for, however, is the way they tackled these problems and the fact that their policies only served to deepen these security problems.

The historic strategic political relations with Syria that were originally conceived to neutralise Israeli aggression in the region are now undermining the viability of the current political system. The Ta'if Agreement has further consolidated Syria's vital role in Lebanese politics, which has proved controversial on several levels.

First, in economic terms, close-knit and unilateral relations with Syria have negatively affected the fulfillment of Lebanon's projected financial role in the region. This has partly contributed to the economic crisis that has deeply affected the agricultural sector. In parallel, the privileges that Syria has acquired within Lebanese political affairs have marginalised the opposition and increased its exclusion from political life. These privileges have also slowed down the national and social reconciliation process that has yet to take place in Lebanon.

At the level of the economy, the governments that opted for open-market policies were forced to increase public debt, which rose to USD 35 billion (around 1.7 times GDP), and real GDP stagnated while real per capita income declined. This situation led to a meeting being organised for borrower countries in Paris at the end of 2002, where the so-called Paris II Agreement was signed. Paris II imposed conditions requiring Lebanon to extend the privatisation process, reduce public expenditure, mainly in social sectors, and increase revenue, in order to consider restructuring the country's debts. The conference asked the IMF to monitor the implementation of this agreement. The first follow-up report presented by the IMF mission to Lebanon in July 2003 mentioned the slow process and steps taken by Lebanon.

What are NGOs doing about these threats?

NGOs are not able to face the challenges without participation by other major civil society groups such as political parties, trade unions, and the private sector. In this regard, it is worth mentioning the unconstructive role of the private sector, particularly the banking and trade sectors, which have attempted to benefit from the current economic crisis in order to increase their profits through high interest rates on much needed credit.

On another level, the political opposition and trade unions have lost popular support and effectiveness due to three main factors. First, the opposition's lack of a clear vision and strategies; second, the oppression and limitation of freedoms and democracy exercised by the Government; and third, the role of Syria in Lebanon and the ongoing effects of the civil war (1975-1990) which weakened political movements and undermined trust within civil society.

Lebanon has many NGOs relative to the size of the population, which are increasingly expected to be more efficient and active in facing the above mentioned obstacles to security. It is worth reviewing the principal actions recently taken by some NGOs to tackle current challenges.

On a political level, much effort was made to create a coalition of election monitors to evaluate an electoral system that remains unrepresentative of the diversity of political currents on offer, particularly within the opposition. In addition, NGOs and civil society have been active in monitoring and pressuring governments on their frequent breaches of human rights, while proposing a new penal law designed to protect social and political minorities currently excluded from the political system

On an economic level, NGO networks (like ANND members) also worked together to monitor the Government's economic policies especially in relation to the EU, the World Bank and the IMF. Internal economic policies are also on the agendas of many NGOs and research centres that regard the budget proposals, and privatisation and open market policies adopted by the Government as factors behind the escalating poverty and unemployment levels.

Finally, environmental issues, which are a vital part of the goal of sustainable development, are on the agenda of many NGOs concerned with the problems of deforestation, solid waste and water mismanagement. ■

11 Some examples: throughout 2003 and at the beginning of 2004, the Government faced three major conflicts related to corruption, all of them involving high officials: the privatisation of an electricity company, a mobile phone company, and fraud and money laundering in Al-Medina Bank. This was denounced in the media, and is a source of conflict within the Government itself.

Development at any cost



Malaysians have been vocal in advocating for better human security, taking stands against policies and development projects that impact on their health, social well-being, livelihood and environment. The current National Security plan adopted by the Government (conceived within the framework of the global War on Terrorism), has not helped to alleviate the sense of political insecurity affecting the country.

Consumers' Association of Penang

Mageswari Sangaralingam / Shamila Ariffin
Theivanai Amarthalingam / Meenakshi Raman

The concept of human security encompasses economic, health and environmental concerns. It is, as the United Nations Development Programme notes, an "integrative" as opposed to merely a "defensive" concept, and includes security of individuals and communities as well as territories and states.[1]

The appeal of the term "human security" is that it recognises the linkages between environment and society, and acknowledges that our perceptions of the environment, and the way we use the environment, are historically, socially and politically constructed.[2]

In this article human security is defined as encompassing the following dimensions:

- Economic security (assured basic income and livelihood)
- Community security (security of cultural integrity)
- Environmental security (access to sanitary water supply, clean air and a non-degraded land system)
- Food security (physical and economic access to food)
- Health security (relative freedom from disease and infection)
- Housing security (assured shelter)
- Personal security (security from physical violence and threats)
- Political security (protection of basic human rights and freedoms)

Displacement of indigenous peoples

One of the most insecure and vulnerable community groups in Malaysia are the indigenous peoples whose livelihood and cultural integrity have been severely undermined. The Orang Assli, as indigenous peoples are called in Malaysia, collectively refers to 20 sub-ethnic groups on the Peninsula and to more than 90 distinct communities of Sabah and Sarawak. They are all governed by different land laws[3] and their land rights and claims are often ignored by the different state governments: the major issue confronting these communities is the dispossession of land. In cases where some of the Orang Assli's rights are recognised, this recognition can be withdrawn in a non-transparent and non-participatory manner for whatever reason the authorities deem fit.[4]

Logging and development projects - generally dams and roads - often involve forced resettlement. Inevitably, such resettlement schemes entail the destruction of a community's social fabric and economic security and force them into deplorable living conditions. In Sarawak (a state located in Borneo) the activities of Malaysian logging companies have caused great hardship to the indigenous communities, especially the Penans, who were originally hunter-gatherers.

In 1999, 10,000 indigenous peoples from five ethnic communities were relocated against their will to make way for the financially unviable Bakun Dam in Sarawak. They now live in appalling housing conditions with little access to clean water, electricity, education, agricultural support and healthcare. With their forest resources destroyed and their rivers and air polluted, insufficient food supply, malnutrition and disease are common. With the best part of Sarawak's virgin forests gone due to extensive logging, the oil palm, pulp and paper plantations are bent on eradicating what little is left and converting self-sufficient landowners into low-level labourers.

On the Peninsula, the Orang Asli have lost their rights on thousands of hectares of their ancestral estates. Between 1995 and 1997, some 2,764 hectares of Orang Asli land were degazetted for development purposes. Less than 20% of more than 600 Orang Asli villages in the Peninsula have been gazetted as reserves. Conversely, the State can revoke the status of gazetted land without being obliged to pay any compensation or allocate an alternative site.

In 2000, part of the Temuan community was relocated to make way for a water-supply dam for Selangor, the human, cultural and environmental consequences of which can only be described as disastrous. Another group in Pahang may soon follow as authorities claim that more water is needed by 2007.

Today, the struggle to secure the land rights of indigenous peoples and their access to biodiversity resources depends on the communities effectively organising and mobilising, with support from local NGOs when the need arises.

A degraded environment[5]

Since Malaysia's transformation into an industrialised economy, pollution and resource contamination prevail in its environment. Rampant development in hills, wetlands and forests continues to plunder these sensitive ecosystems. Deforestation and land clearance not only compromise the quality of rivers and wetland reserves, but also influence climatic changes.

Out of 120 river basins monitored in 2001, 39% were found to be polluted, and 11% were very polluted. Human activities continued to pose a threat to the fragile ecosystems of the marine environment. The main contaminants in the coastal waters in 2001 were *Escherichia coli* bacteria, total suspended solids, and oil and grease. All these contaminants as well as mercury exceeded the Interim Marine Water Quality Standards. In 2000, the combined air pollution load from mobile sources, stationary sources and burning of municipal and industrial waste was approximately 3.2 million tonnes.[6]

Environmental deterioration has an impact on both the physical and social realms. Unhealthy ecosystems can be attributed to the mismanagement of natural resources. On the human scale, poverty, disease, loss of income and a decline in the overall quality of life are additional consequences of improper resource utilisation and inequitable distribution of the country's wealth.

The social implications of degradation usually target poorer communities and indigenous peoples,

1 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). *Human Development Report 1994*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.

2 Canadian Global Change Programme, The Royal Society of Canada. *Changes*. No. 5, Ontario, 1997.

3 The Orang Asli are not a homogenous group. There are at least 95 subgroups, each with their own distinct language and culture. However, they are all culturally and socio-economically marginalised. Only 0.02% of the Orang Asli have title to their land.

4 Consumers' Association of Penang. *Utusan Consumer*, December 1999.

5 Sahabat Alam Malaysia. *Malaysian Environment Alert 2001*. Penang, 2001.

6 Department of Statistics. *Compendium of Environmental Statistics 2003*. Malaysia, 2003.

who rely on the sustenance provided by forests, rivers and seas. But not only rural populations are affected; the urban poor also suffer from pollution, ill health, unsanitary living conditions and limited earnings potential.

Health insecurity

The health of the population is deteriorating. About 40,000 new cases of cancer are detected every year. In terms of risk, after correcting for unregistered cases, one in four Malaysians can be expected to get cancer in his or her lifetime. One alarming revelation is that Malaysians have among the highest rates of nasopharyngeal, laryngeal and cervical cancers in the world.

With the number of senior citizens above the age of 60 rising to about 11% by 2020 and the growing prevalence of unhealthy habits associated with an affluent lifestyle, such as smoking, inappropriate diet, excessive weight gain and lack of exercise, the incidence of cancer is expected to increase. According to Health Minister Datuk Chua Jui Meng, overeating has given rise to an increase in non-communicable illnesses like cardio-vascular disease, diabetes and high blood pressure. Furthermore, 25% of Malaysians are overweight while 4.4% suffer from obesity problems.

The National Morbidity Study showed that while the world prevalence rate for smoking stood at 47%, the rate in Malaysia was 2.2% higher. According to a World Health Organization study, the smoking habit is spreading among Malaysian teenagers, with about 50 new smokers emerging daily.[7] About 10,000 tobacco-related deaths are reported every year. Drug addiction is on the increase: 1% of Malaysia's total population are addicted to drugs.

No houses for the homeless

Rapid industrialisation and urbanisation since the mid 1970s have led to the influx of millions of people from villages and neighbouring countries to major urban centres. More than 35,000 families live in dire conditions in squatter colonies in Kuala Lumpur, Selangor, Johor, Sarawak and Sabah. It is estimated that nearly 20% of the population in Klang Valley are squatters. The existence of squatter settlements in many urban centres is evidence of the failure of the Government's housing policy.

In its planning and policies on housing, the Government is committed to the provision of housing but the planned targets have not been met, particularly in providing adequate housing to the lower-income sector.[8] The failure to achieve planned targets is attributed to the current adverse economic situation, overreliance on the private sector, misallocation of resources arising from inadequate control and supervision of the private sector by the authorities. Consequently, in December 2000 there were 514 abandoned housing projects in the country worth MYR 7.5 billion (about USD 2 billion) affecting 68,340 people.[9]

There is also the problem of vacant properties: in March 2003 there were 59,750 unoccupied residential units estimated to be worth MYR 7 billion (USD 1.84 billion) on the market. About 39% of these unsold houses have been on the market for over 24 months with not a buyer in sight. With better planning and control by the authorities these resources could have been directed towards providing houses for the needy.[10]

Malaysia lacks tenancy laws to guarantee security of tenure and this has left many tenants at the mercy of landlords especially after the Control of Rent (Repeal) Act 1997 came into force on 31 December 1999. The effects of this Act are still visible.

Malaysia needs a sound national housing policy to address the needs of house-buyers. Greater emphasis should be placed on providing public housing either through subsidising rented property or building at affordable prices. New approaches are needed to combat the existing inequality of purchasing power among people within different income brackets.

Personal insecurity

The crime rate in Malaysia is taking a turn for the worse. The Malaysian Quality of Life Index 2002[11] revealed a sharp decline in the public safety index with the crime rate measured by crimes per 1,000 population almost doubling from 3.8 in 1990 to 7.1 in 2000. Women continue to be the primary victims of violence, with statistics for rape and murder increasing yearly. Until March 2003 alone, about 400 women had been raped and 105 had been murdered.[12] A disturbing trend has emerged, in that assailants are younger, and young girls are increasingly targeted. There has also been a rise in child rape, rape of women in custody, rape of girls and women by people in positions of trust, and the use of extreme violence, in some cases resulting in murder.

In terms of safety at work, the workplace has become a dangerous place for workers in Malaysia. There were 85,869 industrial accidents in Malaysia in 2001.[13] These accidents resulted in 958 deaths and permanent disability to 11,162 workers. The number of road accidents escalated with an average of 16 people dying daily due to road accidents in 2001.

Food insecurity

Indigenous and rural communities in Malaysia have been steadily losing the land and resources that they depend on for their livelihoods and food security. With the introduction of development projects such as highways, dams, industrial estates, large plantations and aquaculture projects, many food-producing rural communities face displacement and loss of their livelihood. Traditional fishing communities in many parts of the country are affected by the invasion of trawl fishing, which destroys the coastal marine resources, and also pollution of waters from industries and other land-based sources.

Many agricultural systems in the country are currently affected by ecological degradation. The productivity, stability and durability of these systems are being threatened, thus endangering the continued provision of food. The country's food balance of trade is in favour of imports (MYR 13 billion - USD 3.42 billion) while yearly exports are about MYR 7 billion (USD 1.84 billion). About 34,000 hectares of idle land have been identified in Peninsular Malaysia. However only 12,000 hectares will be converted for agriculture-based projects, as the rest were found not suitable for agriculture.

Many of the chemical agents introduced into the food supply, including pesticides, fertilisers, plant-growth regulators and antibiotics are also harmful to humans at high doses or after prolonged exposure at lower doses. As the Agriculture Ministry gears up to make agriculture an engine of growth for Malaysia, it recognises that countries are particular about where their food imports come from and demand the highest sanitary and health standards. Whilst the Government is aggressively promoting agriculture, the plight of farmers with regard to insecurity of land tenure, credit, marketing and the impact of free trade agreements needs to be addressed. Unequal land distribution and the exploitation of landless peasants is another cause of rural poverty and insecurity.

State security and political insecurity[14]

In 2003, the continuing US-led "War against Terrorism" created a climate of fear which enabled the Malaysian Government to continue using the state apparatus to quell dissent. This had a negative impact on the human rights situation throughout the year.

State security was used as the justification for detention without trial of alleged "Islamic extremists/terrorists" under the Internal Security Act (ISA) and other oppressive laws. Malaysians also witnessed a crackdown on student movements and political rallies, and further curtailment of an already suppressed media.

The majority of ISA detainees in 2003 were alleged religious extremists/militants. To date no one has been charged in a court of law for any terrorist-related activities, although the penal provisions in the country are sufficiently comprehensive.

In the World Press Freedom Index released by Reporters Sans Frontières in October 2003, Malaysia remained among the countries in the bottom half of the table. Its ranking at 104 was only a marginal improvement over the previous year's ranking of 110. ■

7 "No Butts About It". *New Straits Times*, 16 July 2003.

8 The poorest 20% of Malaysians have access to only 4.4% of GDP. The poorest 10% have access to 1.7% of income. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). *Human Development Report 2003*.

9 "Tax Rebates for Housebuyers". *New Straits Times*, 18 September 2003.

10 *Ibid.*

11 Economic Planning Unit, Prime Minister's Department. *Malaysia Quality of Life Index 2002*. Malaysia, 2002.

12 "Violence Against Women on The Rise". *New Straits Times*, 8 September 2003.

13 "Enhancing Safety at the Work Place" *New Straits Times*, 31 August 2003.

14 Suara Rakyat Malaysia. *Civil and Political Rights in Malaysia. Executive Summary 2003*. SUARAM, Kuala Lumpur, 2003.

Rights and human security to break the vicious circle

Neo-liberal economic policies generate multiple vicious circles of human insecurity. One of these circles (involving indiscriminate trade liberalisation, the crisis in rural areas and migration) illustrates the extent to which economic, social, cultural and environmental rights are being violated. In December 2003, following recommendations made in the Diagnosis of the Human Rights Situation in Mexico, President Vicente Fox made a commitment to set up a National Human Rights Programme. It is essential that the State addresses the question of rights by taking a holistic approach that recognises their interdependence, in order to start creating "virtuous" circles of human security.

DECA Equipo Pueblo, A.C.
FIAN Sección México
Espacio de Coordinación de Organizaciones Civiles sobre DESC
Frente Democrático Campesino de Chihuahua

Areli Sandoval Terán[1]

The preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognises the aspiration to a world in which people can "live free of fear and poverty" but the fact that these rights are ignored and scorned has been a great obstacle on the road to this ideal. Article 25 of the Declaration consecrates economic, social and cultural human rights framed in the right to an adequate standard of living. This report analyses certain dimensions of social and economic life in Mexico in which the human right to an adequate standard of living is systematically violated, posing a threat to human security.

The Commission on Human Security has established that what is "needed are integrated policies that focus on people's survival, livelihood and dignity..."[2] The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has sounded warnings about economic (poverty, lack of housing) and food (hunger) threats to human security. Bearing in mind these perspectives, we analyse the following issues, which together constitute a vicious circle of human insecurity in Mexico: a) structural obstacles to the enjoyment of an adequate standard of living, b) rural and urban poverty, c) free trade and the crisis in the countryside, and d) the phenomenon of migration.

Structural obstacles

The civil and social organisations that have been monitoring and evaluating the structural adjustment policies (SAPs) implemented in Mexico over the last 20 years have documented and publicly denounced their economic, social, cultural and environmental impact, and demanded that the federal executive and legislative powers end this process of deterioration in people's standards of living, which we consider to be a systematic violation of human rights and therefore an attack on the human security of millions of people in our country.[3] Some of these observations were taken up in the Diagnosis of the Human Rights Situation in Mexico, carried out by the representation in Mexico of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNOHCHR) in the framework of a technical co-operation agreement with the Mexican Government.

The Diagnosis includes a section on the structural obstacles to guaranteeing the right to an adequate standard of living in Mexico, some of which are summarised below:[4]

- The economic liberalisation model that since 1985 has opened up the economy to foreign trade and promoted foreign investment has not achieved its goal of reactivating sustained economic growth in the country, and its implementation has been socially irresponsible.
- A sustained dismantling of institutions which supported the production and consumption of grains and oilseed produced by small peasant farmers, and the massive influx of imports of such products has created a dangerous level of food dependency and exacerbated rural poverty.
- Although a big effort has been made to increase resources to programmes to combat rural poverty at the level of individuals, the design and implementation of these programmes do not take the human rights perspective into account, and in their application and coverage they have generated exclusion and discrimination.
- The conditions that have been accepted in agreements and conventions with international financial institutions and in free trade agreements and treaties have restricted the Government's margin of autonomous action with respect to defining economic and social policy, and consequently social policies and programmes are subordinated to free market economic agreements.
- Over the last 20 years the main elements of Mexico's economic policy have included a dismantling of the State, the privatisation of public enterprises, market opening, control of inflation, balanced budgets, insufficient and volatile availability of credit, unfair competition against Mexican producers, an elimination of subsidies, salary controls and the deregulation of markets, all of which has wrought changes in the national production system. This has had serious repercussions for the standards of living and the economic, social and cultural rights of individuals and families.

Rural and urban poverty

SAPs have also generated social and economic insecurity, which in rural areas means that the population is pushed deeper into poverty.

The Secretariat for Social Development (SEDESOL) estimates that 53.7% of the population - around 53 million people - earn a daily income of MXN 28.1 (USD 2.6) per person in rural areas, and MXN 41.8 (USD 3.8) in urban areas, which is not enough to pay for basic necessities including food, education, health, clothing, footwear, housing and public transport. Of the total rural population, 69.3% are in this situation, while in urban areas the figure is 43.8%.[5] At the present time three quarters of the population (about 75 million people) are concentrated in urban areas, and a quarter (around 25 million) live in rural areas. This means that about 18 million are living in extreme poverty in the countryside and around 33 million in the cities.[6]

This gap between urban and rural areas is wider if we analyse the situation of the female population from infancy through to old age. According to the

1 Co-ordinator of the Programa Diplomacia Ciudadana of DECA Equipo Pueblo, AC, Social Watch focal point in Mexico. pueblodip@equipopueblo.org.mx

2 Commission on Human Security. *Human Security Now*. New York, 2003, p. IV.

3 For further information cf. "Informes del Ejercicio de Evaluación Ciudadana del Ajuste Estructural". CASA-SAPRIN. www.equipopueblo.org.mx

4 Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNOHCHR). *Diagnóstico sobre la Situación de los Derechos Humanos en México*. Mundi-Prensa, 2003, pp. 73-74.

5 Secretaría de Desarrollo Social and Comité Técnico para la Medición de la Pobreza. *Estudio sobre evolución y características de la pobreza en México en la última década del siglo XX*. August 2002, p. 31. www.sedesol.gob.mx

6 Estimates are based on rural-urban population evolution data from the National Population Council and the National Institute of Statistics, Geography and Computing. Executive Power, *Segundo Informe de Gobierno*, 2002.

UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), the proportion of rural women living in extreme poverty has risen to 52%.[7] Although few statistics disaggregated by sex are available, gender inequality in poverty is a reality. An example of this is the so-called triple or even quadruple working day that many women (including children and senior citizens) have to face in order to meet different needs, which range from feeding the family to caring for people who are ill, old, or have special needs, and who have no chance of accessing public services.

Free trade and the crisis in the countryside[8]

Mexico has subscribed to 11 Free Trade Agreements (FTA) with 32 countries on three continents, and 19 Agreements for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investment. In these, "national interests take second place to unregulated private transnational interests".[9] The archetype of all the treaties is the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA, 1994) which 10 years ago was presented as the way to transform Mexico into a great exporting nation, reduce poverty, increase employment and achieve macro-economic stability. However, none of these "benefits" has materialised, since although Mexico has a trade surplus with the United States, these exports mainly come from *maquiladoras*,[10] the automobile industry and oil production, and are classified as "exports of cheap labour and natural resources. Besides this, exports are concentrated in a few activities and are dominated by a very small group of transnational corporations."[11]

Turning to the rural sector, the World Bank itself has recognised that the "benefits" from NAFTA have not reached rural areas, and that the southern states have not gained from the treaty. On the contrary, a quarter of the 28 million people living in the states of Guerrero, Oaxaca and Chiapas live in extreme poverty, and inequality is increasing. Although the World Bank claims that this is partly because these regions were not prepared for economic opening, it also recognises that the share of social expenditure that the Mexican Government assigns to these regions is relatively low compared with their level of economic development, and that the fiscal situation could allow for an increase in spending.[12]

Since NAFTA came into force, agricultural imports into Mexico have increased, and with this the country's food sovereignty and security are being undermined. For millions of people this represents a huge obstacle to human security. The main direct impact has been on thousands of producers in the countryside. Some of the most significant data on this point are as follows:[13]

- NAFTA has meant an increase in agro-food imports. In 1995, imports of these products from the United States amounted to USD 3,254 million and exports were worth USD 3,835 million. By 2001 imports had jumped to USD 7,415 million and exports had gone up to USD 5,267 million. In 1995, Mexico had an agro-food trade surplus of USD 581 million with the United States, but now it has an annual deficit of USD 2,148 million.
- In 1990, Mexico imported 8.7 million tons of the ten basic crops (maize, kidney beans, wheat, sorghum, rice, etc.), but by 2000 this had soared to 18.5 million tons, an increase of 112%. Before NAFTA, the maximum import of grain in a single year had been 2.5 million tons, but in 2001 imports were 6.15 million tons.
- One consequence of unfair competition from foreign imports is that the real commercial value of national products has collapsed. Between 1985 and 1999, maize lost 64% of its value and kidney beans lost 46%, although in no way did this mean lower food prices for consumers: between 1994 and 2002 the price of the basic goods' basket increased by 257%.
- Poverty is driving the rural population to migrate to the cities and to the United States. According to SEDESOL, an average of 600 rural dwellers leave their lands each day. The countryside has lost 1.78 million jobs since NAFTA came into force.
- In the United States, subsidies from the Government to producers are worth an average of USD 21,000 per producer, but in Mexico the corresponding figure is USD 700. After the North American Agricultural Law becomes effective, subsidies to agricultural producers in the United States will increase by 80% over the next 10 years.

In November 2002, in the context of imminent tariff reductions for the majority of agro-food imports in line with NAFTA provisions, 12 regional and national peasant organisations initiated a movement called El Campo No Aguanta Más (The Countryside Can Take No More). Their basic demands are: renegotiation of the agricultural clauses in NAFTA; implementation of a structural land reform programme and mid- and long-term planning by a State commission; a sizeable and sustained increase in the rural development budget with the requirement that it be multi-annual; a system of rural financing designed to meet the needs of small and medium-sized producers; wholesome food that is nationally produced in sufficient quantities to meet the needs of all Mexicans; full implementation of the San Andrés agreements with respect to the rights and culture of indigenous peoples; a sustained initiative to overcome the social and legal marginalisation of the agricultural sector; and a revision of the agrarian legal framework.[14]

Migration: economic self-exile

In this context of poverty and the disintegration of the production structures in the countryside, it comes as no surprise that there is massive migration to the cities and large-scale emigration to the United States. The exodus is mainly from states in the south and west, the regions of the country with the lowest levels of human development.[15]

TABLE 1

Migrants' remittances

	2002	2003
Mexican population in the USA	9.5 million	9.9 million
Total remittances	USD 8,953 million	USD 14,500 million

Source: National Institute of Migration. www.inami.gob.mx

7 Comunicación e Información de la Mujer, AC, Periodismo con Perspectiva de Género. "52% of rural women in Mexico live in extreme poverty, the majority without access to education". Mexico, DF, 7 February, 2003. www.cimacnoticias.com

8 This section is based on Castañeda, Norma. *Pobreza y libre mercado en México.* DECA Equipo Pueblo, AC, mimeo, December 2003. nacastaneda@equipopueblo.org.mx

9 Witker, Jorge and Laura Hernández. *Régimen jurídico del Comercio Exterior de México.* Chapter 1: "Introducción al Comercio Internacional". UNAM, p. 14.

10 This is the Spanish word for the plants of a foreign or transnational company which are set up in a country where labour is cheaper to make or assemble some components of a determinate product.

11 Nadal, Alejandro, Francisco Aguayo and Marcos Chávez. *Siete mitos sobre el TLCAN.* December 2003. www.americaspolicy.org/articles/2003/sp_0312mitos.html

12 World Bank. *Estrategia de Desarrollo de los Estados del Sur*, Vol I. www.bancomundial.org.mx

13 Centro de Investigaciones Económicas y Políticas de Acción Comunitaria, AC. "Datos sobre la situación del campo en México. Algunos resultados del Tratado de Libre Comercio de América del Norte (TLCAN) en agricultura y alimentación" in www.ciepac.org/analysis/sitcampmex.htm; and Molina Ramírez, Tania. "Recuento de un desastre. El campo en cifras" in Bulletin No 264, Centro de Estudios para el Cambio en el Campo Mexicano, 12 January 2003. www.ceccam.org.mx

14 "Documento de Postura del Frente Democrático Campesino de Chihuahua". Mimeo, 24 April 2003.

15 For further information about the Human Development Index by regions and states, cf. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). *Informe sobre Desarrollo Humano México 2002.*

Migration has become a much more complex phenomenon than it was previously. Now rural workers emigrate definitively, they do not go alone but take their family with them, and they look for jobs in a range of employment sectors, rather than just agriculture. This form of "economic self-exile" is more like an indirect way of expelling hundreds of people who benefit in no way from the Government's policies, but are hit by all their negative consequences.

It is well known that most of the migrants cross, or try to cross, the northern border without documentation, risking their lives in their desperation to find some means of survival for themselves and their families. On the journey many men and women, young people, and even children die from a variety of causes: the hostile desert climate, a lack of food and water, being bitten by poisonous insects or attacked by wild animals, suffocating in the trucks where they are hidden, drowning in rivers and waterways, or death from abuse and attacks by the very people who are transporting them, the so-called *polleros*. They come up against the power of the big business of traffic in people without papers, as well as corruption, indifference and even negligence on the part of Mexican emigration authorities. They are the victims of abuse, ill treatment and other inhuman practices by the border patrols and other US authorities who have made immigration without the required documents a criminal offence. Once they have crossed the border they are still not safe, as they are often the victims of xenophobia and racism on the part of the locals, or white supremacist groups who even target agricultural workers who are already settled in the country. Once the new arrivals have settled, they are subject to various kinds of exploitation including economic, labour and sexual, perpetuating the vicious circle of human insecurity.

After the attacks of 11 September, the bilateral Mexican-US agenda on immigration was extended to include connections between national security and immigration. In January 2004 President Bush sent a bill to Congress proposing a new programme which would allow millions of workers without documentation, and people from other countries who had offers of employment in the United States, to work legally for three years, with the possibility of an extension if a United States citizen could not be found to do the job in question.[16] However, even if this proposal of a new programme for temporary immigrant workers in the United States is eventually adopted, it has flaws and is too limited to resolve such a complex problem. Besides this, in the context of economic interdependence, the United States Government ought not to define its immigration policy unilaterally.

Conclusions

A primary objective of both the presidential, legislative and judicial agendas must be to protect and promote human security. In December 2003 President Vicente Fox made a commitment to set up a National Human Rights Programme based on the recommendations of the national Diagnosis that identified structural obstacles to human rights, and therefore to human security. If it is actually established, the national programme will indicate that the political will to address these problems exists, but it will have to be judged on how effectively it is implemented. What is more, it is essential that, in tackling the social and economic problems of the country, such as are outlined in this report, the State adopt an integrated approach in line with its commitments and obligations regarding human rights, above all economic, social, cultural and environmental rights, which it has so far not shown any real interest in promoting or protecting. ■

16 News service in Washington, 8 January 2004. "Bush proposes big US immigration system reform. It would give temporary legality to workers without documentation." International Information Programs of the US Department of State. http://usinfo.state.gov/

Adding insult to injury



The main obstacle to human security in Nepal is poverty, with 38% of the population, or 9 million Nepalese, living below the poverty line. The absence of the rule of law, the on-going Maoist insurgency and the resultant pattern of gross human rights violations (killings, torture, disappearances, abductions, arbitrary arrests) and persistent discrimination based on caste, class, ethnicity and sex are other factors that pose a threat to human security.

Rural Reconstruction Nepal

Arjun Karki / Mukunda Kattel / Rakhee Lohani

Respect for human rights through rule of law is central to the concept of human security, by which everyone has the freedom and opportunity to live in a just and peaceful environment.

The main obstacle to human security in Nepal is poverty. The absence of the rule of law, the on-going Maoist insurgency and the resultant gross and systematic human rights violations, the lack of good governance and persistent discrimination based on caste, class, ethnicity and sex are other threats to human security.

Poverty

According to government estimates, 9 million Nepalese (38% of the population) fell below the poverty line of USD 1 a day in 2001. More alarmingly, the incidence of poverty is increasing "at an annual rate of more than 3%" with the "number of absolute poor almost doubled in the past 20 years (between 1977 and 1996)".[1] Poverty is predominantly a rural phenomenon - 86% of the population live in villages, and agriculture is their main livelihood. Of the total poor, "over 90% live in rural areas". The poverty rate varies according to geographical regions and is "highest in the more remote rural areas - the Mid-Western and Far-Western hills".[2]

The caste system maintains its rigidly vertical hierarchical form. By virtue of their caste position those in the lower echelons often find themselves discriminated against politically, economically and socially, while historically, small groups of high-caste people maintain a position of dominance. This situation of exclusion has a strong bearing on the causes and perpetuation of poverty. Poverty cuts across all caste groups (most of the poor belong to the *dalit*, the so-called low-caste) and ethnic communities that are excluded from policy- and decision-making opportunities because of their origins.

1 Nepal South Asia Centre (NESAC). *Nepal Human Development Report 1998*. Kathmandu, 1998, p. 12.

2 National Planning Commission (NPC). *The Tenth Plan. Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper*. Kathmandu: NPC/HMGN. 2003, p. 25.

Food security

Closely linked to poverty is the question of food security, which comes as a recent phenomenon in the poverty discourse in Nepal. Until the 1970s, Nepal was a food exporting country. With the onset of the 1980s the situation began to change for the worse due to the decline in food production in relation to the growth of the population and to the lack of state responsiveness in dealing with the causes of the shortage of food. Highlighting food insecurity as "the most serious problem of the poor", the Agriculture Projects Service Centre estimated that in 1996, 41 of the 75 districts of Nepal had food deficits, although other estimates are higher. All sources however agree that the problem is more severe in remote hill and mountain areas, where crop yields are low and off-farm employment opportunities are almost non-existent.

Every year, households in the hills and mountains experience lean seasons or deficits from their food production. The situation becomes precarious when there are droughts, floods or extreme price fluctuations. The current situation of armed insurgency has added another significant dimension to the problem of food security.

Poverty and food security largely depend on political decisions governing the methods and systems of production, food production, storage and distribution across the country. Food security is the political responsibility of the State and access to food is one of the fundamental human rights of every person. By maintaining a semi-feudal type of production system and by failing to introduce an effective mechanism for food storage and distribution, the State has clearly failed to ensure the human security of nearly half of its population.

Human rights violations

The 1990 Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal guarantees the fundamental human rights and freedoms of its citizens (Box 1). In the other hand, Nepal has ratified all the major international human rights instruments and key ILO Conventions governing freedom from discrimination, freedom of association, equal remuneration and criteria for access to employment. However a number of laws still conflict with human rights principles and constitutional directives, something that can be observed in the fact

Human Rights in Nepal

The 1990 Constitution guarantees the following fundamental rights:

- Right to equality
- Right to freedom
- Press and publication rights
- Right to criminal justice
- Right against preventive detention
- Right to information
- Right to property
- Cultural and educational rights
- Right to religion
- Right against exploitation
- Right against exile
- Right to privacy
- Right to constitutional remedy

Nepal is State Party to the following:

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (ICCPR) 1966*

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, (ICESCR) 1966

Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) 1979*

Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 1989*

Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) 1984

International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) 1965

* Including optional protocol/s

As a signatory to the ICESCR, the Nepalese State is to guarantee its citizens the following rights:

- Right to work in safe, just and healthy conditions
- Right to equal pay for equal work, with a fair wage that provides a decent living for workers and their families
- Right to social protection
- Right to adequate standard of living
- Right to education, cultural freedom and scientific progress ■

that, despite having ratified the United Nations Convention against Torture in 1991, torture is still not a crime in Nepal.[3]

To add insult to the nation's human rights injury, the Government passed the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act (TADA) 2002, giving security forces the power to arrest people without a warrant and detain suspects in police custody for up to 90 days. Strong opposition from human rights organisations and civil society groups have not prevented the TADA from becoming a major source of human rights violations.

Opposition to the State has traditionally been met with violence, and this continues unabated to this day. In recent years, particularly after the People's War started in 1996, killing has become an everyday phenomenon. Today, three lives per day are lost in the country (see *The Maoist Insurgency*). Torture is a longstanding phenomenon. Methods of torture include rape, *falanga* (beatings on the soles of the feet), electric shock, *belana* (rolling a weighted stick along the prisoner's thighs causing muscular damage), beating with iron rods covered in plastic, and mock executions.[4]

Cases of disappearances and abductions add to the gruesome record of human rights violations. The State was responsible for 250 disappearances from the start of the People's War and October 2003. In addition, "hundreds of alleged extrajudicial executions, thousands of arbitrary arrests and numerous instances of torture have taken place in the context of the People's War".[5] The Maoists have been responsible for over 250 abductions of members of political parties, civilians perceived not to be their supporters, journalists and anyone else who is critical of them.

Gender violence

The intensity of gender violence is equally shocking. Women, who bear the brunt of farming and household work, have very little access to real property, savings or credit. Their participation in political decision-making and administration is shamefully low. According to UNDP, they occupied only 6.4% of seats in parliament in 2000 and their participation in government administration is barely one tenth that of men.

Traffic in women and girls for commercial sexual exploitation is all too common. Each year up to 7,000 girls and children are trafficked from Nepal and forced into sex work in different parts of the world. In India alone there are at least 200,000 Nepalese women serving as sex workers.

Deep-rooted superstitious beliefs and attitudes also afflict many women. Women accused of practicing witchcraft become the victims of physical and mental torture and are compelled to live a life of humiliation and neglect. In the cruellest crime of its kind in the history of crime in Nepal, two elderly women accused of practising witchcraft were beaten to death in 2003. Over a dozen cases of witchcraft-related crimes are recorded every year. The ongoing Maoist insurgency adds another dimension to the violence against women, who are direct and indirect victims of the war. Many are displaced from their homes and communities, and the killing of male members of the family increases their burden of family responsibilities.

The Maoist insurgency

In 1996, only six years after the restoration of democracy by the People's Movement, a faction of the (Maoist) Communist Party of Nepal declared armed insurgency (the People's War) against the present socio-economic structure and the Government with the aim of establishing a new state styled after the one established by Mao Zedong in China in 1945. The insurgency, and the counter-insurgency measures adopted by the State to fight the Maoists, have resulted in a protracted threat to human security.

Between February 1996 and November 2003, 8,295 people were killed at the rate of three a day, and 5,597 of these killings were by the State. Many thousands have sustained injuries (in 2002 alone 1,019 people were injured) and much infrastructure has been destroyed (as many as 177 private houses, 33 health centres, 12 telecommunications towers, 31 school buildings, 54 police posts, 18 post offices, 93 government offices, 29 private offices and 31 electricity-related centres).[6]

The fear of being caught in the crossfire between Maoist guerrillas and state security forces has forced rural people to abandon their villages and belongings. In 2002 alone, 17,564 people throughout the country were displaced. This pattern of displacement is on the increase. The Geneva based Global IDP Project estimates the total number of the displaced to be somewhere between 100,000 and 200,000.

The impact of insurgency on education has been equally damaging. Around 3,000 teachers have stopped teaching in outlying districts, which has affected as many as 100,000 students. Around 700 schools across the country have been closed. The Maoists, through the All Nepal National Independent Free Students Union, have disrupted education throughout the country through a series of *bandhs* (shut-downs) and protests. The fear of insurgency has also deterred health workers from working outside urban areas, which had been relatively risk-free up until now.

Caught in the crossfire between Maoists guerrillas and State security forces, Nepalese people are living a fearful, uncertain and insecure life.

Lack of good governance

Corruption and irregularities are widespread at all levels of government, and they exist under the patronage of high-ranking political leaders and ministers. Lawlessness and the rulers' arbitrary orders have often shattered the essence of the rule of law and have institutionalised dishonesty in all administrative units of the State.

Nowadays corruption takes centre stage, lawlessness becomes the norm of governance and the financial resources of the State are channelled to the rulers and their cronies. This has been happening for many years, even during the so-called democratic era of the 1990s. As UNDP puts it, "poverty reduction policies and programmes" have fallen short of their aims and "basic social services" have been "inaccessible to large segments of the poor." "Public investments" have been rendered ineffective in "addressing poor people's needs." Rather, government institutions have often chosen to "exclude" the poor or "silence their voices." If corruption were not the order of the day, as Thapa argues "our country would have been able to provide good education, health care and drinking water from its own wealth of resources…"[7] Unfortunately, rampant corruption has been embedded in the governance system, crippling the already weak delivery of services which would otherwise give some relief to the needy.

Overcoming the threats to human security is a major challenge facing Nepal today. The reinstatement of democracy brought hopes that changes would occur in the governance system which would address the problems of poverty, discrimination and bad governance. Had that occurred, the problem of human security would have been to some extent resolved. But the Government in the 1990s was not significantly different from the former regime. The term "democracy" was a mere slogan rather than a standard for political decision-making and implementation. The result is that poverty continued to increase, the situation of human rights violations worsened, corruption and dishonesty marred the concept of good governance and, as an effect of all this, a new problem - the Maoist insurgency - emerged. Nepal is now in a dire state, and so is human security.

To ensure human security, Nepal needs to embrace inclusive, democratic governance that operates on the basis of the rule of law, with full and unconditional observance of human rights. ■

3 Also, although the Torture Compensation Act (TCA) passed in 1996 enables victims of torture or relatives of those dead in custody due to torture to apply for compensation to the district courts, neither the police nor the judiciary are fully adhering to the requirements set out in the TCA: officials often hinder victims trying to file cases or requesting medical examinations in order to gain redress under the TCA.

4 Amnesty International. "Nepal: A deepening human rights crisis". 19 December 2002. http://web.amnesty.org/library/eng-npl/reports

5 Amnesty International. Nepal: "Widespread 'disappearances' in the context of armed conflict". 16 October 2003. http://web.amnesty.org/library/eng-npl/reports

6 Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC). *Nepal Human Rights Yearbook 2003* (Nepalese). Kathmandu, 2003, p. 499.

7 Thapa, H B. *Anatomy of Corruption.* Kathmandu, 2002.

Richer than ever - and tougher

Although the issue of physical security is high on the public and political agenda in the Netherlands, it is insufficiently visible in the broader context of human security for all. The fact that the national economy has become richer did not lead to more space for humane policies and more tolerant attitudes towards migrants, refugees, the elderly or other vulnerable groups in society. On the contrary, more obstacles for human security have been put in place. On global human security, there has been continuity in Dutch foreign policies, but these policies are under increasing political pressure.

National Committee for International Cooperation and Sustainable Development (NCDO)
Novib/Oxfam Netherlands[1]

The Netherlands is proud of its longstanding tradition of promoting human security, both nationally and internationally. The country enjoys a good reputation, with one of the best social security systems in the world, a hospitable and tolerant attitude towards immigrants, and an active contribution to international peace and development. Unfortunately, Dutch society and politics, under pressure from an economic downturn, are moving away from this tradition and adopting a tougher attitude towards less advantaged people. Internally, this shift is reflected by a gradual decrease in social security. Externally, national interests are prevailing over international peace and development priorities.

Globalisation and the welfare state

As one of the most open economies in the world, the Netherlands was one of the countries in Europe that benefited most from world economic growth in the 1990s. The economy grew at an average of nearly 3% per year - compared to the European average of 2%. At the beginning of the 21st century, the Netherlands is richer than ever.

However, the economic boom has not been used to eradicate poverty everywhere: even inside the Netherlands relative poverty continues to exist. Globalisation increasingly means competition not just among businesses, but among countries as well. They compete for investments by reducing labour costs and relaxing fiscal regimes. Consequentially, minimum wage levels and national fiscal and social security systems are under continuous pressure.

The sufferings of the open economy

Now that the economic boom seems to be over, the open Dutch economy is suffering more than other European countries. In 2003, economic growth fell below zero for the first time in 20 years. The Government's "Poverty Monitor" reported that the percentage of low-income households in the country, which had dropped from 15% in the mid-1990s to 10% in 2001, will rise again to 11% in 2004. The percentage of low-income households among non-Western immigrants is three times higher than average: one third of them are below the national poverty line.[2]

Poor households suffer not just from the recession but are also affected by a deterioration of social services in public health insurance, housing subsidies and tax benefits. The situation for low-income groups is likely to worsen in 2004, as the Government is using the economic downturn to legitimise further cutbacks in the welfare state.

Globalisation has also meant an increased flow of immigrants into the Netherlands. The population, especially in the big cities, is becoming increasingly diverse. Non-Western foreigners make up ten percent of the total Dutch population, a quarter of the urban population, and a third of the (legal) residents of Amsterdam and Rotterdam.[3] This situation has not remained without inter-communal tensions. In 2002, integration of non-Western immigrants suddenly became the most important political subject in the election campaigns. Much of Dutch political debate nowadays centres on the acceptability of predominantly "black" schools, Islamic schools, pupils wearing headscarves and even Islam as such. In general, the political climate regarding immigrants, asylum and integration has toughened considerably.

Asylum and efficiency

When interviewed in 2002, UN High Commissioner for Refugees and former Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers showed his disappointment about European, and particularly Dutch refugee policies: "A high temperature against foreigners in Europe crossed a new threshold, especially in countries like Denmark and the Netherlands, traditionally major UNHCR donors and supporters. Interestingly, the number of refugees in Europe has dropped considerably, but many people and politicians still cry out as if they were facing national disasters because of them."[4]

Since the mid 1990s, the number of refugees seeking asylum in the Netherlands has dropped considerably as a consequence of the introduction of more restrictive and more efficient decision-making procedures. In April 2003, Human Rights Watch published an extensive report that raises great concern about recent policies adopted to hasten the processing of asylum claims at the expense of the protection needs of refugees: "Over the past several years, the Netherlands has left behind its traditionally protective stance toward asylum seekers to take up a restrictive approach that stands out among Western European countries."[5]

Human Rights Watch reports that the Dutch fast "AC Procedure"[6] is being used to process cases for which it is inappropriate. The procedure - which lasts only 48 working hours - was originally designed to screen out "manifestly unfounded" cases, but is now used to process at least 60% of asylum claims. Human Rights Watch stated that the process gives applicants little opportunity to document their need for protection, to receive meaningful advice from a lawyer, or to effectively challenge a negative decision on appeal. Particularly for cases involving humanitarian concerns or complex legal or factual questions, Human Rights Watch found the AC Procedure to be inadequate. "The Netherlands runs a very real risk of violating its obligation of *non-refoulement* (that is, not to return a person to a country where his or her life or freedom would be threatened because of persecution)."[7]

Dutch policy and practice regarding the care and protection of migrant children, as required under the Convention on the Rights of the Child, is also inadequate. Human Rights Watch found that

1 This contribution was edited by Bertram Zagema (consultant) and coordinated by Alide Roerink (National Committee for International Cooperation and Sustainable Development, NCDO) in close cooperation with Lindy van Vliet (Novib/Oxfam Netherlands). Special inputs were provided by Gerard Oude Engberink (researcher and advisor on social issues to the city of Rotterdam and Arjan El Fassed (Novib/Oxfam Netherlands) and Karlijn Rensink (NCDO).

2 Social and Cultural Planning Bureau (SCP). *Armoedemonitor 2003.* December 2003.

3 On top of that, an estimated 46,000 to 116,000 foreigners (0.3% to 0.7%) reside illegally in the country. Central Bureau for Statistics (CBS). *Statistische Dossiers.* No 7, 2003.

4 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). *Refugees.* No 129, 1 December 2002.

5 Human Rights Watch. *Fleeting Refuge: The Triumph of Efficiency over Protection in Dutch Asylum Policy.* April 2003, p. 2. www.hrw.org/reports/2003/netherlands0403

6 Editor's note: AC stands for *Aanmeldcentra*, registry centres for asylum seekers.

7 Human Rights Watch, *op cit*, p. 13.

interviews of children are often conducted in an inappropriate manner and without the benefit of consistent assistance from a lawyer or guardian. Moreover, the report criticised Dutch policy on asylum seekers' reception conditions, including food and housing. In one reported case, a family from Rwanda was evicted from the asylum reception centre after the immigration authorities rejected their asylum claim. When a court later overturned that decision, the family could not be found.

Development co-operation

The Government that started its mandate in 2003 has maintained the Netherlands' commitment to spending 0.8% of GNP on international development co-operation. However, like all recent governments, the new one has also burdened the Official Development Assistance (ODA) budget with expenses that do not contribute to poverty eradication in developing countries. Major expenses are related to the shelter of refugees during their first year in the country, amounting to almost EUR 200 million (USD 252.8 million) or 5% of the ODA budget.

Even larger is the amount that has been reserved for the cancellation of debts related to export credit insurance granted to Dutch exporters exporting to developing countries: EUR 500 million (USD 379.2 million) or 13% of the ODA budget in 2004. Export credits and guarantees are not an instrument of development co-operation but of export promotion. Moreover, at the UN Financing for Development Conference in Monterrey (2002), it was agreed that debt cancellation would be additional to existing ODA commitments.

These hidden budget cuts reflect a change in the political climate, rather than a change in public support. Ongoing research on public support for international development co-operation by the OECD and NCDO shows that the public is relatively well informed and highly engaged. Compared to most other OECD countries, Dutch public support for development co-operation is generally strong.[8] This strong public support may be explained by the Government's continued support for education campaigns in the Netherlands and for "people-to-people" development co-operation. A considerable part of the ODA budget is channelled through NGOs.

On the positive side, sustainable poverty reduction remains the main objective of development co-operation, and the Millennium Development Goals are its concrete goals. Dutch aid will focus on five sectors: education, health, HIV/AIDS-eradication, environment and water. An increasing part of the ODA budget (up to 15% in 2007) is earmarked for education, in a very positive response to the Global Campaign for Education. On the other hand, the gender equity strategy of the Government remains unclear. Gender equity will be "mainstreamed" in all policies and operations, but no strategy to make this work has been unfolded.

War and peace

An important new policy development is the integrated approach to international conflicts. Conflict prevention and peace-building are important priorities for the development co-operation minister: "Poverty reduction strategies do not work in a country where a violent conflict is going on. Peace and stability are necessary preconditions for development."[9] A Stability Fund has been established to be able to quickly finance peace and stability promoting activities.

There is a great common political and material effort in facilitating peace processes, particularly in the Great Lakes Area, Sudan, the Horn of Africa and Indonesia (Aceh). This has taken the form of common peace promoting missions of the two ministers of Foreign Affairs and Development Co-operation, active involvement in peace talks, putting pressure on conflicting parties, and dedicating funds to UN peace forces in those regions.

However, on only one occasion have Dutch troops been sent to Africa: to Ethiopia in 2002. In 2003, a military hospital ship was sent to offshore Liberia, but no troops landed. Dutch civil society and a parliamentary minority called in 2003 for troops to assist in the de-escalation of conflicts in Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The calls were rejected because the safety of Dutch troops could not be guaranteed. However, Dutch troops are participating as stability forces in Afghanistan and as occupation forces in Iraq, where safety is not ensured.

Arms and trade

The Netherlands is an ally in the plea by Nobel Peace Prize Laureates and the Control Arms campaign[10] for a legally binding International Arms Trade Treaty. Generally, the Netherlands strives to comply with the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, a politically (but not legally) binding instrument. The Code prohibits the export of weapons to countries where they risk being used for internal repression, against another country or in human rights violations.

However, even though complete overviews of export licenses are not public, it is known that the Netherlands has supplied arms and military goods to countries that do not comply with the EU Code of Conduct.[11] For example, the Netherlands has supplied arms to Indonesia, whereas the Indonesian army has been accused of systematic violations of human rights.[12] Those arms may now be used by the army in Aceh.[13] At least 20% of official export credit guarantees are being granted for military orders, thus encouraging international arms flows – including to Indonesia, Jordan, Turkey, Venezuela and South Korea, where the armed forces have questionable human rights records.[14]

The Netherlands, in the heart of Western Europe, is an important transit country, especially through Rotterdam Harbour (the world's biggest seaport) and Schiphol Airport (Europe's fourth biggest airport). There is little control or knowledge about the volume of transit of military goods. In contrast with its restrictive export policies, the Netherlands still allows transit of arms to countries that do no comply with the EU Code of Conduct, most notably to Israel. ■

8 See www.ncdo.nl. And: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). *Public Opinion and the Fight Against Global Poverty*. 2003.

9 Ministers of Foreign Affairs and for Development Co-operation. *Kamerbrief Oprichting Stabiliteitsfonds* (Letter to Parliament on Establishment of a Stability Fund). 3 October 2003. Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2003–2004, 29 200 V, No 10.

10 www.controlarms.org.

11 Ministries of Economic Affairs and Foreign Affairs. *The Netherlands Arms Export Policy in 2001*. 2002.

12 European Network Against Arms Trade. *Indonesia: Arms Trade to a Military Regime*. 1997.

13 A picture showing the use of Dutch military technology in Aceh appeared in *NRC Handelsblad*, 23 May 2003.

14 http://atradius.com/nl/dutchstatebusiness/overheid/afgegevenpolissen

NIGERIA

Widespread violations



Obstacles to human security in Nigeria are widespread. Governments have been high-handed, secretive and corrupt, and not accountable to the electorate. Discrimination on grounds of sex, ethnicity, tribe, colour, race, religion or political belief is rife. Massacres and forced evictions are common, while the fight to control or manage resources accruing from oil and other minerals has led to loss of hundreds of lives. The only conditions for peace and development are respect for human rights, the rule of law and the possibility to change governments through democratic and peaceful means.

Socio-Economic Rights Initiative
Concerned Professionals of Nigeria
Rural Women Empowerment Network
Legal Defence & Assistance Project
Gender & Human Rights/Social Watch-Nigeria
South East Budget Network

Ray Onyegu / John Onyeukwu / Mma Odi
Itolo Eze-Anaba / Gina Iberi / Cletus Onyegu

The role of the Government

Human security can only be attained either when conditions leading to conflict are avoided or such conditions are abated and conflicts resolved.

Obstacles to human security in Nigeria are widespread. Governments have been high-handed, secretive and corrupt; and have not been accountable to the electorate. There are ethnic and religious conflicts; and forced evictions have been common, while the fight to control or manage resources accruing from crude oil, gas and other minerals has led to loss of hundreds of lives. The examples that follow are pointers.

Forced evictions

The Government is duty bound to protect the right of Nigerians against destruction of their homes by third parties; and has the obligation to provide housing for all people threatened by the absence of roofing over their heads. Forced eviction, which constitutes a violation of a variety of human rights, is common in Nigeria. This report cannot cite a single instance where the Government took steps to respect, protect, fulfil or enforce housing rights.

In December 2001, the Lagos State government earmarked for demolition the sprawling slum of Ajegunle, home to over two million people - the majority of them women and children. Residents were not consulted and there were no plans for their resettlement. To halt the planned demolition, the former Shelter Rights Initiative (now named Socio-Economic Rights Initiative) mobilised the community and filed a suit at the Federal High Court challenging the eviction. An injunction restraining the Government was obtained. Rallies and protests were organised, and the Government was forced to abandon the project. The World Bank assured the communities that no further money would be released to the Lagos State government until the disputed issues were settled.

Towards the end of January 2001, due to the military authorities' negligence, bombs stored at the Ikeja Military Cantonment, Lagos, exploded, destroying houses in the barracks and its environs and leading to the death of over a thousand people, the majority of them women and children. Many of the people rendered homeless and unable to find alternative housing, were provided temporary accommodation at a police college. One year later, in what turned out to be a bitter anniversary gift, the victims were evicted. They were not paid any compensation.

Until 1 July 2000, Rainbow Town in Port Harcourt was home to about one million people, most of them in the lower income bracket. Backed by about 1,000 armed policemen standing guard, bulldozers of the Rivers State government levelled the town, sending women and children, whose husbands and fathers had left for work, into the streets. Lawsuits challenging the action were still pending in court, but the Government alleged it had taken this action for purposes of urban renewal and because the environmentally degraded shanty town was a hideout for common criminals. However, it had no plans to resettle the inhabitants. The land was later parcelled out to wealthy local residents.

A year earlier, the army killed 2,483 inhabitants of Odi town in Bayelsa State, home to about 50,000 people. All the houses in the town were razed to the ground and set ablaze. Survivors scampered to the bush and took refuge in neighbouring towns. The invading soldiers raped many of the women and young girls. To date, no compensation has been paid to the victims and the destroyed houses have not been rebuilt. The Government has neither apologised nor given any guarantee that this will not be repeated.

A similar fate befell some towns and villages in Benue State in October 2001. Soldiers again destroyed every building in sight in Pera, Kyado, Gbeji, Chome, Ifer, Joolashitile, Torja, Vaase, Zaki-Ibiam, Ise Adoor, Sunkera and Tor Donga. The soldiers used heavy artillery, alongside rocket propelled grenades. When they ran short of ammunition, they used petrol and dry gas to touch off the buildings. Zaki-Ibiam, to take an example, was a town of 20,000 inhabitants, reputed to have the largest yam market in the country.[1]

Governments in Nigeria have made a routine habit of demolishing markets and shops, which, due to the shortage and high cost of renting residential premises in major cities, serve as both commercial and residential habitats. Boundary Market in Lagos and several markets in Abuja, the Federal Capital Territory, were laid to waste. The Lagos stalls and shops had been built and let out to the victims by the Ajeromi/Ifelodun local government. The state government subsequently declared the buildings illegal. Many families were thus deprived of their means of livelihood.

In Satellite Town, a suburb of Lagos, 15 major corporations including the Central Bank of Nigeria, are engaged in a struggle to evict more than 2,500 families who acquired their property under the 1997 Federal Government Housing Policy. Under that scheme, the Government provided land to companies employing over 500 people on condition that they built houses and allocated them to their workers on an owner-occupier basis. The lands proved to be marshy; the cost of acquiring and reclaiming them, providing roads, drainage and electricity, were all borne by the Government. The outstanding costs were to be defrayed from the rents paid by allotees over a period of time until full amortisation. Today, although allotees have paid the cost of the buildings by over 2,000%, some companies are threatening to evict them.

Over the past four years there have been outbreaks of communal, ethnic, religious and political violence in different parts of the country resulting in loss of lives, destruction of houses and displacement of people. These crises, which took place in Jos, Kaduna, Modakeke, Idi-Araba, have had a far-reaching impact on the population. Violence in Warri is still raging. In all instances, the Government and its security agents have proved grossly incapable of performing their statutory function of protecting lives and property, particularly as the genesis of most of these clashes can be traced to their own acts and omissions. Payment of compensation to the victims has been completely abandoned.

Buildings collapse on a daily basis in several parts of Nigeria, and many people have lost their lives trapped inside them.

Lack of safe drinking water; energy for cooking, heating and lighting; sanitation; washing facilities and refuse disposal are still serious problems which the Government is not making any effort to tackle.

1 Yam is a staple food that is commonly consumed in Nigeria.

Women's rights and property ownership

As a result of the work of NGOs and other gender rights advocates, more women have become educated, and a higher awareness of women's rights has been created. These developments have entailed more access to public office and employment opportunities for women. The capacity of women to acquire property and secure higher economic status has increased. But the percentage of women involved is negligible.

Most women in Nigeria are still victims of discrimination regarding property inheritance. In spite of a decision of the Court of Appeal striking down discriminatory inheritance laws, it has been largely ignored in practice. Inheritance of landed property by means of written wills has remained the principal way of access to property for women in parts of Nigeria. But since the writing of wills is not common, only a small percentage are able to own landed property by inheritance. Many women who would have inherited property and who might have then wished to dispose of it to enable them to start small businesses have none to sell.

The practice of discriminating against women in the area of rented accommodation is still prevalent. Landlords presume that single girls or women are either prostitutes or at least sexually available.

In the North, where purdah is practised - an Islamic religious tradition whereby women stay indoors during the day, coming out only in the early hours of the evening with their heads covered - the story of entrenched poverty is the same. The result is malnutrition, health deterioration and other diseases.

Education

The percentage of Nigerians who have access to basic education is marginal.[2] Rural areas are the worse hit. The problem of education cannot be divorced from the dwindling economic fortune of Nigeria arising from corruption and declining income from crude oil, the mainstay of the economy. The inadequacy and lack of education deprives the young of the capacity to act as agents of change. Schools in rural areas - where they exist - are poorly equipped, and do not have enough teachers, most of whom prefer to work in urban areas. Those posted to rural areas would rather resign than take up their new posting. As if this were not enough, parents in rural areas still prioritise the education of their male children due to the belief that women are useful only in the kitchen.

Budgets

Public finance still operates in a clandestine style and information on budgets is treated with the utmost secrecy. The only way to guarantee transparency, accountability and popular participation in the budget process is to make available to the general public information on budgets at all levels of government.

Civil society actions and recommendations

Respect for human rights, rule of law and the possibility to change governments through peaceful means are among the basic conditions for peace and true development. Gross injustices and personal insecurity are antithetical to life, peace and freedom. Discrimination on grounds of sex, ethnicity, tribe, colour, race, religion or political belief are incompatible with human security. Since injustice is so prevalent, a number of NGOs are seeking to act as agents of change by advocating the following:

- The 1999 Constitution provides for incorporation of international treaties: after a treaty has been ratified, the National Assembly is required to pass laws for its implementation. This report recommends the amendment of the Constitution to make way for either the domestication or the automatic incorporation of all treaties ratified by Nigeria.
- It is high time the National Assembly passed the Access to Information Bill, so that the public can access information on the activities of public officials.
- Government officials should be more tolerant and stop hounding people who disagree with official positions.
- Conscious efforts should be made to reduce electoral malpractice.
- The Government should increase development in rural areas to reduce rural migration to urban centres. Rural schools should be equipped like their counterparts elsewhere, thus encouraging teachers to accept posts in rural areas.
- The education of more women is an effective tool for tackling cultural practices that discriminate against them.
- More vocational skills centres and facilities for adults should be built, especially in rural areas.
- Mass education should be instrumented through the media, workshops and other educational modes.
- Women living in slums and rural areas should be encouraged to form co-operative societies through which they can access funds from public institutions and raise funds for self-help community projects.
- The Government should make a conscious effort to ensure that funds for poverty alleviation programmes are disbursed as credit facilities to low-income-earning women in order to facilitate their economic empowerment and liberate them from poverty. Public funds for the poor should reach the target groups.
- There should be more transparency in governance in Nigeria. ■

2 The "Study on the Right to Education in Nigeria" carried out in 1998 on behalf of Shelter Rights Initiative by Professor Osita Eze of the Nigerian Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolutions put it at 40%, p. 7.

Israel's wall: less security for all



By imposing collective punishment, seizing and destroying private property, demolishing homes, making access to health and education difficult, separating families, annexing occupied land, and violating Palestinians' rights to work and freedom of movement, Israel is violating a long list of human, social, cultural, and economic rights as well as international laws.

Bisan Center for Research and Development

Izzat Abdul Hadi / Nadya Engler

Whether in the form of a chain-link fence, a concrete barrier, a trench, or a tangle of barbed wire, the "wall" that is being built by Israel in the name of security is certainly, as Israeli military orders term it, an "obstacle".[1] Extending eight metres high and up to 100 metres wide in some areas, the physical boundary that Israel began in April 2002 and with which it is unilaterally enclosing and isolating the Palestinian people of the West Bank is a severe threat to a population already suffering the effects of the long-standing Israeli occupation. It impinges on their basic rights to survival, livelihood, dignity, and freedom - the primary global concerns defined by the Commission on Human Security. In an April 2003 report, B'Tselem, the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, estimated that the barrier "will likely cause direct harm to at least 210,000 Palestinians residing in sixty-seven villages, towns, and cities".[2] While the wall is a tangible obstacle to the human security of Palestinians, it is only one manifestation of the effects of the illegal, belligerent, and humiliating Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Under the guise of counter-terrorism and state security, the wall violates the fundamental rights of Palestinians and promises to further shrink the possible land-area of any future Palestinian State.

An aggressive grab for land

The wall is being built by Israel ostensibly to halt Palestinian attacks on Israeli civilians. If its construction were really about security, then it would straddle the 1967 border of the West Bank - the Green Line - or have been established on Israeli land rather than creating physical boundaries that will influence future discussions about sovereignty without any bilateral negotiation. The wall will not increase security, but extend the conflict. Its construction is leading Palestinians to believe that a two-state solution is no longer viable. In the current climate, a one-state solution will be resented by extremists on both sides, and Israel will further institutionalise an apartheid system with the West Bank and Gaza Palestinian enclaves as marginalised Bantustans - a recipe for the continuation of the struggle and threatened security of both nations. It cannot be said too often or too firmly that the wall is not about security: it is an aggressive grab for land.

Although Israel claims that "the obstacle" is a temporary measure, the expense, effort, and sheer expanse of land confiscated speak otherwise. Most Israeli military orders relating to the wall expire in 2005, but these orders are easily renewed. And by issuing temporary military orders, complex legal proceedings required for permanent property confiscation are unnecessary.[3] If the wall were a stringent security measure based upon fear of attacks, the existing boundaries and checkpoints would be much more rigorously guarded. As it is, the majority of suicide bombers enter Israel through military checkpoints.[4] Palestinian newspapers run nearly daily photographs of children, students, elderly people, and others clambering over the existing barriers near Jerusalem or families trudging through muddy hillsides in rural areas to avoid these checkpoints often within sight of soldiers or settlements.

The wall currently deviates from the Green Line cutting into the West Bank as much as 7.5 kilometres in some areas. If completed as planned, this number will rise to 22 kilometres.[5] In places where it does ride the Green Line, additional barriers are planned several kilometres to the east - or further within Palestinian territory.[6] The wall is projected to cut off approximately 975 square kilometres of land from the rest of the West Bank. In effect, approximately 16.6% of the area of the West Bank defined by its 1967 borders will become a physically separate entity while much of the remaining area will rest under Israeli control - annexing de facto approximately 50% of the West Bank. The path of the wall itself creates a swath of destruction as houses are demolished, and orchards bulldozed to clear the area. Since June 2003, 102,320 trees have been uprooted and in one town alone 85 buildings were destroyed.[7] In the Jerusalem area, the wall will even run over a Palestinian graveyard.

The deprivation wall

For the Israelis, "[t]he lack of transparency regarding the path of the route flagrantly violates the rules of proper administration and hampers informed public debate on a project of long-term, far-reaching significance at a cost of hundreds of millions of shekels".[8] For the citizens of Palestine, the wall is one more step towards their further displacement and will "cause further humanitarian hardship to the Palestinians".[9] The wall is helping to plunge Palestinians further into entrenched poverty. There is evidence that as of autumn 2003 "there are 25,000 new recipients of food assistance as a direct consequence of the Barrier's [sic] construction".[10] Without proper access farmers cut off from their lands run the risk of losing their crops, and shepherds have to search for alternate grazing grounds. Movement of goods and equipment is curtailed and access to markets is uncertain. With little hope for sustainable livelihoods in the so-called "seam area",[11] many Palestinians are considering abandoning their land and risking its subsequent confiscation.

A large prison

Israel has repeatedly imposed collective punishment upon Palestinian civilians. This punishment is administered in the form of curfews and restriction of movement and often results in the killing and injuring of

1 See "Definitions", Article 1 of the "Israeli Defense Forces Order Concerning Security Directives (Judea and Samaria) (Number 378), 1970 Declaration in the Matter of Closing Territory Number s/2/03 (seam area) (Judea and Samaria), 2003" that went into effect on 2 October 2003. www.nad-plo.org/hborders3.php

2 B'Tselem. "Behind the Barrier: Human Rights Violations as a Result of Israel's Separation Barrier". The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories (B'Tselem), April 2003, p. 3. Italics in the cited text are original. www.btselem.org

3 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. *The West Bank Wall; Humanitarian Status Report, July 2003 - Northern West Bank Trajectory*, Humanitarian Information Centre in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, July 2003.

4 B'Tselem, *op cit*, p. 29.

5 Report of the Secretary-General prepared pursuant to General Assembly Resolution ES-10/13, United Nations General Assembly, A/ES-10/248, 24 November 2003, p. 3.

6 B'Tselem, *op cit*, p. 7.

7 Palestinian Environmental NGOs Network (PENGON). S*top The Wall in Palestine: Facts, Testimonies, Analysis, and Call to Action*, Jerusalem, June 2003, pp. 28 and 32-33.

8 B'Tselem, *op cit*, p. 8. USD 1 is equivalent to approximately 4.4 Israeli shekels.

9 A/ES-10/248, *op cit*, p. 6.

10 *Ibid.*

11 B'Tselem. "In early October 2003, the OC Central Command ordered the area between the separation barrier in the northern section of the West Bank and the Green Line a closed military area for an indefinite period of time. This area [is] known as the 'seam area'." www.btselem.org/English/Separation_Barrier/Enclaves.asp

innocent civilians. The wall is the latest manifestation of collective punishment and will effectively transform the West Bank and parts of the East Jerusalem area into a large prison for Palestinians. The Regulations of the Hague Convention of 1907, which have been accepted by the Supreme Court of Israel, explicitly prohibit collective punishment for residents of occupied territories.[12]

As the October 2003 UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/58/3 states, "the route marked out for the wall under construction by Israel, the occupying power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory…could prejudge future negotiations and make the two-State solution physically impossible to implement".[13] The route has serious political implications. By "creating facts on the ground" that will be difficult to reverse, many fear that the land that lies in the seam area is in danger of being permanently expropriated by Israel, as "Israel has expropriated land for not being adequately cultivated [or] pursuant to military orders".[14]

Controlling the "blue gold"

The land that is in danger of being expropriated is strategic both because of its resources - namely fertile farmland and access to the main aquifer in the area - and because of the potential it offers for the expansion of Israeli settlement. A member of the Palestinian Hydrology Group writes: "the appearance of the Wall was in no way a surprise, but an extreme physical application of the theoretical and the various efforts of Israel of the last decades to control the vital Western Aquifer…the Wall will make the upstream of the aquifer inaccessible to Palestinians ensuring that Israel will control both the quantity and quality of the water".[15] It is this Western Aquifer which supplies the necessary water (also known today as "blue gold") to the most fertile Palestinian agricultural land.

The wall infringes the right of freedom of movement as stated in Art. 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Art. 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The enclaves outside the barrier, yet not inside Israel - the seam areas – were designated closed military zones on 2 October 2003. Palestinians over the age of 16 residing in these enclaves now require a specific written permit to remain in their homes. Palestinians wanting to enter this seam area require special permission authorised by a military commander.[16] It is estimated that approximately 400,000 Palestinians will be trapped living in this closed seam area when the wall is completed.

Along the projected 720 kilometres of the wall, there is only a proportionally small number of projected gates or "passages" designated as crossing points. There are no guarantees that permits will be granted or if issued, respected on the ground. As it stands, the "gates" in the wall are open for only very short intervals (often 15 minutes) and do not follow a fixed schedule making timely access to health and educational services as well as employment nearly impossible. The military permit system is jeopardising children and teachers from reaching their schools, farmers from reaching their crops, the sick from reaching healthcare facilities, and Palestinians from all walks of life from reaching their places of work, to say nothing of family or other social, cultural and commercial resources. As Palestinian families traditionally fear for their women's safety and honour, preferring them not to travel too far to school or work, the wall is having negative effects on female education and employment. Until now most residents of the seam area have received permits, though they must be renewed at 1, 2, or 3 month intervals, but few residing outside the seam area are allowed to enter without a reason.[17] One report even notes that soldiers guarding the gates in the wall are refusing shepherds access to their own grazing land on the grounds that they do not hold special permits for their goats.[18]

What to do about it

Perhaps because of its mammoth proportions, the wall has and become an issue of international concern drawn much criticism. Solidarity movements are taking action and joining local residents to protest the wall, or accompany them to their fields or schools on the other side. Web sites and activist groups have been formed to track the wall's progress, monitor the confiscation of land, provide case studies of those who are being affected, and coordinate advocacy campaigns and activities to help stop construction of the wall, destroy what has already been built, return confiscated land and compensate people for the destruction of property and loss.

The Palestinian Environmental NGOs Network (PENGON) has taken the lead in the locally based campaign against the wall, which is fast receiving support from all over the world. The work against the wall is being co-ordinated between PENGON and the Palestinian NGO Network, who have hired full time coordinators in the Qalqilia and Tulkarem areas to monitor the wall and manage local media relations and campaign activities. In addition, the wall was a main theme for Palestinian organisations participating in the World Social Forum in Mumbai in January 2004. The Palestinian Authority, as of yet, has no clear agenda for addressing the issue, but is preparing itself for the coming trial in The Hague.

In October 2003, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution demanding that Israel "stop and reverse the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem".[19] A majority of members (144) voted in favour, while only four voted against (Federated States of Micronesia, Israel, Marshall Islands, and the United States) with 12 abstentions. In December, the General Assembly requested an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice in The Hague to determine the legal consequences of the construction of the wall.[20] The hearings took place from 23-25 February 2004 and the Court started its deliberations immediately afterwards.[21] While the Palestinian people await the outcome, one can only guess how much more of the wall will have been built by the time the Court announces its conclusions.

Some positive measures

While the wall continues to be an obstacle to peace, human security, real negotiations, or a viable Palestinian State, it is providing an issue that is beginning to mobilise different sectors of the Palestinian population to be active at a time when most energy had been exhausted in the three-year-long Al Aqsa Intifada, or uprising against the occupation. And despite the insecurity and uncertainty that Palestinians continue to feel in the hands of a hostile occupation and without a representative government, the past year has seen some very positive measures.

In spite of numerous invasions, closures and curfews, substantial programmes have been undertaken in development and emergency response. These can be divided into four main fields: continuing and improved service provision in different sectors; increased advocacy, both domestic and international; an increased focus on institutional capacity; and finally prominent public debate on democratic transformation and reform. Some specific successes of 2003 worth mentioning are the completion of the Palestinian Participatory Poverty Assessment by the UNDP and the Ministry of Planning, and the Welfare Consortium's USD 36 million programme to aid development and encourage partnerships between the NGO, governmental, and private sectors.

Conclusion

While killing civilians on both sides must be condemned, preventive actions must be monitored to safeguard the rights - whether they be human, civil, social, economic, or cultural - of all parties concerned. The wall will not provide security for Israel and it continues to violate Palestinians' rights. While there is much attention given to preventing so-called terrorist attacks, little is paid to the underlying reasons for them - poverty, inequality, and oppression. These issues need to be understood and addressed in order to ensure human security around the world. For the Palestinians, the immediate step in this process is that "this wall must fall".[22] ■

12 PENGON, *op cit*, p. 80.

13 UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/58/3, "Illegal Israeli Actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the Rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory", 21 October 2003.

14 A/ES-10/248, *op cit*, p. 6.

15 "Theory into Practice into Final Implementation: The Wall's Path is Based on Ultimate Control over Palestinian Water Resources", Abdel Rahman Al Tamimi, Palestinian Hydrology Group, in PENGON, *op cit*, p. 163.

16 *Op cit*, see footnotes 1 and 11.

17 A/ES-10/248, *op cit*, p. 6.

18 See "A Day in the North", PENGON/Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign, 10 January 2004, at www.stopthewall.org/latestnews/258.shtml.

19 A/RES/58/3, *op cit.*

20 "Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory" (Request for an Advisory Opinion), Order, International Court of Justice, 19 December 2003.

21 International Court of Justice. www.icj-cij.org

22 Graffiti written on the wall in English.

High spending, poor results



The greatest challenge for human security in a country where 40.5% of the people are poor and 26.5% are extremely poor is to fight poverty, especially in the rural areas and particularly among indigenous peoples. The high level of social spending has failed to have the expected impact due to an inadequate budget and to corruption.

Fundación para el Desarrollo de la Libertad Ciudadana

José Emilio Champsaur / Manuel Ferrer[1]

The "lost decade" of the 1980s, characterised in Panama by economic problems such as inequality, unemployment and poverty, was chiefly a consequence of the political crisis involving the United States and the huge external debt following heavy loans taken out in the 1970s, when attempts were made to promote industrialisation by implementing protectionist policies. The 1990s were characterised by strict compliance with the stabilisation and structural adjustments recommended by the IMF and the World Bank.

Although a moderate liberalisation policy for trade and services resulted in high economic growth during its first years of implementation (1990-1992), more radical liberal changes during the government of Ernesto Pérez Balladares (1994-1999) did not have the same positive impact. After the liberalisation (Employment Code, 1995) and privatisation (telephone company and hydroelectric system) implemented during that period there was no significant economic growth and inequality escalated. The resulting increase in poverty and inequality restricted access of the poor to privatised public services.

The present Government has not made any significant progress in the struggle against inequality. Although per capita Gross National Income is USD 4,020,[2] current poverty levels are alarming (40.5% of the population are poor and 26.5% extremely poor). The greatest challenge vis-à-vis human security that future Panamanian governments face will be to do battle against extreme poverty in rural areas (particularly among indigenous peoples) and to ensure that the poor receive the basic services required to enable them to interact successfully in society.

Education: another generator of inequity

Together with Costa Rica, government financing for educational services in Panama is one of the highest in the region. There have been advances in terms of national coverage (95% literacy rate in 2000 compared with 93.5% in 1990[3]) and in the national curriculum (a law making the teaching of English obligatory in public and private schools has been approved).

In spite of these gains, the UNDP National Human Development Report 2002 states: "instead of contributing to social integration and mobility, education has become another source of inequalities".[4] Students in urban areas are supported by an infrastructure of communications and institutions, which effectively boost their productivity in relation to students in rural or indigenous areas.

According to a World Bank study, government expenditure on education is in fact regressive, since 95% of its subsidies are targeted to higher education, of which only 5% of the poor takes advantage.[5] At the same time there is inequity in the distribution of public outlay in education at the regional level, where urban centres receive greater coverage than rural areas.

Education is an important instrument for families trying to emerge from poverty. However, in rural areas and particularly among indigenous populations (where over two-thirds of the population over 9 years are illiterate), a high percentage of individuals give "lack of money" as the reason for not attending school.[6] As a result, there are poor families who do not have access to the benefits of education. It is worth noting that in cases where these benefits do exist, they are equivalent to an increase of close to 5% of the hourly income received by a head of household per year of schooling completed.[7]

As part of the Government's strategy for providing education services, a considerable portion of financial resources are administered through local parents' associations in schools and the communities they serve. Recently, the national media have published several cases indicating that many of these resources are being misappropriated.[8] This also points to the institutional shortcomings shared by local governments and their communities.

In the last few years the Government has taken positive steps towards a better provision of educational services by securing active participation in collective initiatives on the part of political parties, organised civil society, workers' unions and business organisations like the Diálogo para la Transformación Integral del Sistema Educativo (Dialogue for the Transformation of the Education System) and the Mesa de Diálogo del Programa de Promoción de la Reforma Educativa en América Latina y el Caribe (Committee for the Promotion Programme for Educational Reform in Latin America and the Caribbean). Among other strategies, the Government is also addressing the specific situation of indigenous communities with projects such as the National Literacy Campaign "Reading in the New Millennium", a programme targeted at young and adult indigenous people, a bilingual literacy programme and a Spanish teaching programme for Ngobe, Embera and Kuna indigenous women.

Health: a problem of State

Expenditure on health is the highest in the Government's social budget (PAB 191 - USD 191 per person in 1999).[9] Responsibility for health management at national level is shared by the Ministry of Health and the Caja de Seguro Social (Social Security Department), which is institutionally the main provider of health and social security services in Panama and has the higher proportion of annual expenditure. But it faces serious financial problems which put at risk its role as main provider of government health services.

1 José Champsaur is an economist and a consultant to the Fundación para el Desarrollo de la Libertad Ciudadana (Foundation for the Development of Civil Liberty). Manuel Ferrer is a graduate in Latin American studies and a consultant to the same organisation.

2 World Bank. Country Profile, Table: Panama. 5 December 2003. www.worldbank.org/data/countrydata/countrydata.html

3 Contraloría General de la República. *Censo Nacional de Población y Vivienda.* Vol 2, Panamá, 1999 and 2000.

4 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). *Informe de Desarrollo Humano 2002.* Panama, 2002.

5 World Bank. *Panama Poverty Assessment Priorities and Strategies for Poverty Reduction - April 2000.* Washington DC, April 2000. www-wds.worldbank.org

6 *Ibid.*

7 *Ibid.*

8 Torres, Victor. "Investigan malversación de seguro educativo". *La Prensa*, 13 August 2003; Chery, Jean Marcel. "Destituyen a 10 directores" *La Prensa,* 16 May 2003. http://ediciones.prensa.com/

9 UNDP, *op cit*, p. 199.

Despite high expenditure in this area, lack of medical care is one of the most pressing problems. Poor people do not have access to high-quality health services since they live in communities where it is difficult to reach medical centres - the average time taken by those who live in indigenous areas to get to the nearest health centre is 52 minutes.[10] Mortality rates are higher in the mainly indigenous areas with the lowest coverage, where average life expectancy is 63 years, contrasting with 74 years in non-poor areas. In the provinces of Bocas del Toro and San Blas, areas with little health coverage, there is a high incidence of illnesses such as tuberculosis and malaria.

The major challenges facing the health sector are the need to expand health coverage to the poorest sectors, to reduce infant mortality, and to treat and prevent specific diseases such as HIV, which has increased alarmingly over the last 10 years. According to Orlando Quintero, president of the Fundación Pro Bienestar y Dignidad de las Personas con VIH/SIDA-PROBIDSIDA (Foundation for the Welfare and Dignity of People with HIV/AIDS), in March 2003 Panama was among the top four countries in Latin America with the highest number of cases of HIV/AIDS.[11]

President Mireya Moscoso's Government has acknowledged that the Social Security Department must deal with one of the most important challenges the country faces at present. In July 2001 she requested the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to organise and conduct a National Dialogue on Social Security to be carried out jointly by the Government, political parties, civil society and the unions in order to perform an analysis of the financial situation of the Social Security Department.

Four thematic commissions were formed, one for each of the Department's operational programmes, in which different representatives of society made their views known about the need to deal with the social security system as a problem of State. The participants also formulated strategies and initiatives for rescuing the Department from bankruptcy and guaranteeing its autonomy. To date, however, only the commissions concerned with the Department's general administration programme and the medical, pharmacological and maternity care programme have managed to reach a consensus.

At present the future of the Dialogue is uncertain, as well as that of the programme for workers' economic, medical and preventive assistance and the programme for old age, disability and widowhood pensions. The reason for this is that the trade unions - which exert significant social pressure - are opposed to the conditions under which the debates are being conducted and have decided to withdraw. This delay has increased popular unease and put social stability at risk, as it may lead the Government to attempt to settle this question without the consensus of the various social groups. In addition, the political situation arising from the proximity of the general elections due in May 2004 may well mean that the debate will be unnecessarily postponed until the next government is installed in September 2004.

TABLE 1

Disparity in basic sanitation services (% of population)

	NON-POOR	POOR (TOTAL)	URBAN POOR	RURAL POOR	INDIGENOUS POOR
Sewage system or septic tank	70	15	44	6	8
Latrine or hole	28	66	48	80	32
None installed	2	20	8	14	60
Rubbish collection	73	20	77	6	0

Source: Encuesta de Niveles de Vida de Panamá. Contraloría General de la República. Panama, 1997.

Sanitation services

Statistical records from the office of the Comptroller General of the Republic show that sanitation services are unequally distributed throughout the country. As with other basic services, the highest levels of deficient sanitation services are in indigenous communities (Wargandi, 99%; Kuna Yala, 92%; Madugandi, 84.3%; Nobe Bugle, 73.2% and Embera Wounaan, 57.1%[12]). Other sectors show disparities which reflect the level of urbanisation.

Records of areas covered by the piped water network reflect the greater difficulty in accessing drinking water posed to people living in rural areas compared with urban dwellers. There is a direct correlation between poverty and lack of piped water; this correlation, however, is lower than for education, health or sanitation services.

There is no overall plan for the disposal of solid waste. The main causes for the decrease in coverage provided by rubbish collection services are the lack of available resources from government funds, and lack of equipment and qualified staff.[13]

The Ministry of Health and the Institute of Aqueducts and Sanitation (IDAAN), the state-owned company responsible for water provision, are actively working to find solutions to the problems of basic sanitation and access to drinking water. IDAAN's most important project to supply drinking water is about to be inaugurated. It consists in a significant enlargement of the water supply pipeline network together with construction of two reserve tanks for communities in the province of Panamá Este.

Conclusions

Government plans for improving primary health care and increasing educational coverage should include strengthening local and municipal governments. These institutions, in addition to facilitating government management of basic services provision, will contribute towards a more active supervision of target communities.

The two main reasons why the high level of social spending in Panama fails to have the expected impact are the inadequate assignment of budgetary funds and widespread corruption. Government bureaucracy is also inefficient because it is generally built on party-politics and appointments are not based on technical and administrative criteria. These factors cause levels of care to be insufficient in quantity and quality in the poorest areas of the country. Transparency and impartial supervision of social management by central government, local government and NGOs are essential requirements to prevent corruption and the waste of precious resources. ■

10 World Bank. *Panamá. Estudio sobre Pobreza. Prioridades y Estrategias para la Reducción de la Pobreza*, Vol 1, 28 June 1999.

11 Tapia, Sady. "Panamá, segundo lugar en SIDA". *La Prensa*, 3 July 2003. http://ediciones.prensa.com/

12 UNDP, *op cit.*

13 Hernández, Arístides. *Estado de los Bienes y Servicios Ambientales en la República de Panamá en el Marco de la Apertura Económica.* UNCTAD: Panama, July 2003.

The redundant military

The Paraguayan State is still clinging to an outdated model of security based on military security rather than social development. In the last national budget, expenditure on the armed forces and the police increased while social spending went down. This means that Paraguay will not meet its Millennium Development Goals (MDG) in 2015, since the Government's policy will lead to higher rates of poverty and will limit still further the human security of the people.

DECIDAMOS - Campaña por la Expresión Ciudadana

Juan Carlos Yuste

The general national budget as a tool for development

Indicators show that there is very little social development in the country. Between 1995 and 2001 the poverty rate increased from 30% to 34% and extreme poverty rose from 14% to 16%. There is also gross inequality in the distribution of wealth: in 2001 the poorest 20% received 3% of total household income while the richest 20% took 60%. Many people do not have access to health services - in 2001 the rate of maternal mortality was 160 per 100,000 live births. In 2002 only 53% of the population had access to drinking water and the sewage network only reached 9% of the population.[1]

The real economic resources[2] available to the State to provide for the social rights of its citizens are allocated in the general national budget (GNB). The GNB has inbuilt economic limitations (like the 19.4% of the administration's expenditure needed to service the foreign debt) but ultimately these are the economic resources that the Government has to guarantee social rights. If social development programmes were given priority in the allocation of these resources the present poverty gap would be considerably reduced.

In the 1990s there was a steady increase in the budget allocation for social services, particularly education, but it was not enough to bring about any substantial reduction in the gap between rich and poor because at the start of the period public investment in social services was extremely low.

Paraguay is lagging far behind other Latin American countries. Average expenditure on social services per capita is USD 140 whereas in Latin America as a whole it is USD 696; investment in education is USD 66 per capita against the Latin American average of USD 169; and investment in health is USD 19 while the average for the rest of Latin America is USD 133.[3]

Since 2000, the steady (albeit insufficient) increase in spending on social services has been reversed and it has now begun to fall. In the GNB for 2004 social expenditure will fall by 11% compared to last year and by even more compared to the 2002 commitment to social spending.[4] Other structural problems, like corrupt relations between the private sector and the government party or maintaining obsolete and useless armed forces, are not on the parliamentary agenda so those budget allocations will remain unchanged.

Over the years too little of the GNB has been allocated to increased spending on social services, and priority has been given to sectors that are connected to keeping the government party in power.[5] This has been achieved by ensuring support of key sectors of society through nepotism and favouritism, and by satisfying the demands of the security institutions - basically the armed forces - in return for political stability. This bias can be seen from the way the 2003 GNB was implemented: the central Government spent 72% of its budget; the Ministry of Defence 84%, the Ministry of Health 70% and the Ministry of Agriculture only 52%.[6]

To reduce the gap in the provision of social services it is essential to increase social investment, so it is imperative that the budget be reorganised. At the present time the allocations are not in the least conducive to social development or human security since priority is still being given to the armed forces and power groups linked to the Government.

Military expenditure

Military expenditure increased by 111% between 1988 and 1999. The biggest increases have occurred when the armed forces intervened in politics - destabilising democracy incidentally - and the political factions that benefited from this repaid them by raising military expenditure. Those increases came in 1989 after the coup in which General Andrés Rodríguez deposed General Alfredo Stroessner and in 1992 when military support helped the Colorado Party win the elections for seats in the National Constitutional Assembly. Also in 1993 when the armed forces supported the Colorado Party candidate's election campaign and afterwards that of President Juan Carlos Wasmosy; as well as in 1996 after General Lino Oviedo's first military revolt.

In 1997 the armed forces managed to get the Statute of Armed Forces Personnel passed. One of the benefits of this connivance was that the salaries of the armed forces personnel would be raised automatically whenever there was an increase in the salary of the Minister of Defence, a law which ensured that their salaries would be continually raised. The law itself states that this is in "recognition for the fundamental democratic role played [by the armed forces] in the events that took place in March".[7]

In 2003 the budget for the Defence Ministry (MDN) went up to USD 54 million. Of this sum, 85% was for salaries, 10% for purchases (food, textiles, fuel) and the rest for minor expenses such as maintenance and construction work. Only 0.56% of the MDN budget was allocated to the purchase of weapons.[8] The proportion of the budget spent on salaries increased from 48% in 1988 to 85% in 2003, which shows that the pay of the armed forces has been given priority over the institution's military role.

From 1997 to 2000 retired military personnel, who are paid much more than they ever contributed toward their pension fund, generated a deficit of nearly USD 100 million with the Treasury;[9] and in 2003 alone the figure was USD 27 million. If to this is added the cost of pensions for the police and war veterans the deficit comes to nearly USD 90 million.[10] This expense is met by the taxpayer.

1 United Nations Paraguay. *Millennium Development Goals. Paraguay Report.* Asunción. 2003.

2 From taxes, charges, etc., not from loans with a set repayment date.

3 UNDP/UNICEF. *Social Expenditure in the Budget.* Year 1, No 1, Asunción, 2003.

4 *Ibid.*

5 The National Republican Association (ANR - Partido Colorado) has been in power continuously since 1947.

6 Treasury Report. December 2003.

7 This is in reference to the events that followed General Oviedo's failed coup against then President Juan Carlos Wasmosy in March 1996, when sectors of the armed forces intervened decisively in support of the President.

8 Couchonal, Ana and Orlando Castillo. *Military expenditure in Paraguay 2003.* Asunción: SERPAJ-PY. 2003, pp. 10 and 41.

9 Couchonal, Ana and Orlando Castillo. *Military expenditure in Paraguay 2001.* Asunción: SERPAJ-PY. 2001, p. 33.

10 Treasury Report. December 2003.

How not to meet the MDGs

UNDP Paraguay has calculated the additional financial resources the country will need to reach the MDGs in 2015, which were freely adopted by the Paraguayan Government at the Millennium Summit in New York in 2000. The total is approximately USD 160 million per year distributed as follows: poverty reduction (USD 26 million), reduction of malnutrition (USD 11.4 million), basic health services (USD 28.8 million), initial basic education (USD 25 million), access to drinking water (USD 26.9 million) and sanitation services (USD 39 million). To achieve this, an additional social investment plan has been proposed in which the allocation for 2004 would come to USD 70 million.[11]

Considering that the State has fixed financial commitments like servicing the foreign debt, covering the treasury deficit and paying salaries in the public administration, and that the current budget deficit stands at USD 158 million, there will not be very much left in the budget to meet the MDGs. It will be necessary to take measures which include raising taxes, reducing the number of public employees and implementing reform in the treasury.

While the reforms are being carried out, regardless of whether or not they are successful, it is necessary to focus on other expenses that do not result in any benefit for the general public, as is the case of military expenditure. This item alone amounts to a third of what is needed to meet the MDGs and 71% of the figure the United Nations set for 2004. This money could finance a qualitative leap forward for the population in social development, quality of life and access to social rights.

Year after year the country spends millions of dollars on military security presumably against threats posed by foreign nations, money which, in a zero-sum system like the GNB, is denied to other sectors. This money is diverted from social development and therefore generates poverty. In the current situation this expenditure is unproductive and unjustified, it does not yield any return or contribute to the wealth of the country.

The need to reduce military expenditure

After two wars in the last two centuries and various military dictatorships, the armed forces have attained an enviable position in the power structure through which they have obtained numerous privileges both as an institution and for their members. Military expenditure is justified explicitly for the country's defence against potential attack by another country, but the real justification lies in the role that the armed forces play in defending the existing power structure.

Historically armed conflict always involved Paraguay's neighbouring countries (Brazil, Argentina and Bolivia), but today the country is not involved in any official territorial disputes with any country and is in fact in the process of integration into a regional agreement with its neighbours.

In fact, the army's barracks and its personnel seem to have been constructed and deployed more with a view to controlling the capital city than to defending the country against foreign attacks. In any case, the armed forces are in no condition to fight any kind of war no matter how small because most of their military equipment is over 20 years old and therefore obsolete, their training is still based on outdated techniques and not geared to modern warfare, and they do not have access to modern military technology. Even if this were not the case, the military capacity of Paraguay's neighbours is so overwhelming that seeking a military solution to any conflict is simply not an option.

Besides this, as stated in the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report "the pursuit of human security must be carried out through development and not through arms".[12] The concepts of defence and of security have changed: no longer is it the country's borders or territory that have to be defended, but the human rights of its population. With the advent of globalisation, a State does not have in fact total control over its national territory or total power to regulate what happens in it. Transnational corporations, *maquilas*[13] and the IMF are the best illustrations to show that to extract a country's wealth or to impose regulations on it there is no need to physically invade it.

In the world today many more actors have a share in controlling a country and taking decisions about what happens there, ranging from supra-national bodies like the IMF and the International Court of Justice to social movements and public opinion, both domestic and international. Therefore the anachronistic absolute authority of the State which the armed forces used to guarantee by controlling the nation's territory has been completely shattered, so much so that today the armed forces cannot perform the new functions that are required for the security and defence of societies that are pluralistic, democratic and inter-connected. New institutions, new skills and new knowledge are needed to ensure that societies and their citizens can develop and survive in a global context.

"Let's disarm the budget"

Since 1997, a group of social organizations and NGOs have been running a campaign against expenditure in the armed forces called "Let's disarm the budget". They propose that military spending should be gradually reduced and the "dividends of peace" invested in social development. Once a year they publish a study of budget allocations to the armed forces and economic and political proposals for reducing these and investing the funds in social services. This publication is distributed among social organisations, members of parliament, journalists and the general public. They are also actively lobbying parliament for the reduction of military expenditure.

So far the campaign has succeeded in sensitising the public opinion, the press, and some people involved in decision-making. It has not brought about an effective reduction in the military expenditure but it has managed to restrain the constant increases that the armed forces enjoyed in the 1990s. It has also obtained some budgetary concessions for social expenditure such as free maternal and child care up to the age of 5, which will be implemented in 2004.

The dividends of peace

The country is incapable of sustaining any military confrontation with its neighbours. No matter how much is spent on the armed forces, it would still not act as a deterrent in a possible war situation. Therefore the cost-benefit ratio between military spending and national defence is nil. All the money invested in the armed forces is of no use to defend the country militarily, and it is wastefully diverted from other areas.

The real conflict and the need for human security in the country has to do with the people's poor quality of life, as reflected in the social indicators mentioned above. The budget should be realigned to focus on alleviating these sources of insecurity, and public policies and institutions have to be created to meet the new needs for security and defence, which consist in upholding human rights. As an institution, the armed forces are entirely out of date, since the role they played in the past pertains to a different model of defence and security. Today, rather than being a vehicle for defending society they have become an obstacle and even a threat to society. They are a danger to political stability and hinder human development because they absorb resources in unproductive activities. For the armed forces to adapt to the new security demands of the 21st century these military structures must be progressively dismantled followed by total demobilisation, giving way to institutions that are more able to respond to the challenges of a new era. The resources freed by this readjustment, the dividends of peace, will be an important tool for achieving sustained social development. ■

11 UNDP/UNICEF, *op cit.*

12 UNDP Paraguay. *Human Development Report.* 1994, p. 7.

13 *Maquilas* are plants of a foreign or transnational company set up in a country where labour is cheap in order to manufacture or assemble some (not all) components of a finished product.

Towards a new founding pact

After the most intense and prolonged period of violence in the country's history (during which the State showed its inability to guarantee human security), a process of national reconciliation is needed. This involves establishing a new founding pact between the State and society aimed at the construction of a country which must recognise itself as multiethnic, multicultural and multilingual. This report synthesizes the conclusions of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CVR).[1]

Conferencia Nacional sobre Desarrollo Social (CONADES)

Milagros Varela

The State's inability to guarantee human security

The internal armed conflict which Peru underwent between 1980 and 2000 was the most intense, widespread and prolonged in the country's history. According to the best estimate, there were 69,280 victims, of whom 79% were peasants, and 75% had Quechua or some other indigenous language as their mother tongue.

The main victims were the poor and uneducated rural populations of the Andes and the jungle, the Quechuas and Ashaninkas. Peruvians as a whole neither felt nor assumed this tragedy as their own; and the events exposed the State's inability to guarantee public order, human security or the basic rights of its citizens within a democratic framework.

Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path)

The principal and immediate cause of the outbreak of the internal armed conflict was the decision by the Partido Comunista del Perú-Sendero Luminoso (Peruvian Communist Party-Shining Path) to undertake an "armed struggle" against the State at a time (1980) when the country was beginning a new period of democracy with free elections. Sendero Luminoso was the main perpetrator of crimes and human rights violations, and was responsible for 54% of the fatal casualties.

The group acted with extreme violence, which included torture and brutality as forms of punishment and intimidation of the population they sought to control, including their own activists. They deliberately provoked the State into overreacting, expressing their potential for genocide and feelings of superiority over indigenous peoples with slogans such as "paying the price with blood" (1982), "inducing genocide" (1985) and "the triumph of the revolution will cost a million dead" (1988). They used educational institutions as centres for spreading their message and for recruiting minority groups of young people.

Sendero Luminoso considered peasants as a mass that had to be subjugated to the will of the Party, so individual dissent was punished with murder and selective liquidation, and collective dissent with massacre and the destruction of entire communities. This movement, and the counter-revolutionary response it provoked, revived and militarised old conflicts within and between communities. Lima and other cities were the scene of sabotage, selective assassinations, organised strikes and urban terrorism in the form of car bombs.

The MRTA

The Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru, MRTA (Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement) began its armed struggle against the State in 1984, and was eventually responsible for 1.5% of all fatalities. The MRTA characteristically took responsibility for its actions, its members wore distinctive badges to differentiate themselves from the civilian population, it refrained from attacking unarmed civilians, and on some occasions it showed signs of being open to negotiations. On the other hand, the group did not hesitate to execute dissidents within its own ranks. The MRTA attempted to create a climate that would lead the population to accept the idea that violence was a legitimate political measure, but this eventually worked in favour of the militaristic counter-revolutionary policies of President Alberto Fujimori's Government.

The police and the armed forces

More than a thousand members of the police force lost their lives or were maimed during this period. They were unable to oppose their enemy effectively due to their inadequate training in counter-revolutionary measures and deficient logistic support.

In 1982 the Government entrusted the armed forces with the task of combating the subversive groups. They, too, eventually suffered more than a thousand fatal casualties. At first, their strategy was indiscriminate repression, and, although later on they targeted their opponent more selectively, there were occasions when they engaged in the generalised and systematic violation of human rights. Like the police, their effectiveness was compromised by summary executions, forced disappearances, torture, as well as cruel treatment, particularly against women. Senior officers and their subordinates were involved in these violations of human rights, either directly or by allowing them to take place.

In 1989, the armed forces changed their strategy from trying to recapture territory to eliminating the People's Committees of Sendero Luminoso. They attempted to isolate Sendero Luminoso's military elements and win over the population by committing fewer violations of human rights. In the face of this strategy, Sendero Luminoso opted for unrestrained violence, not only against the Quechua and Ashaninka people but also in urban areas. In response to this offensive, numerous Self Defence Committees were formed. These were drawn from the poorest sectors of the peasantry, and they gave Sendero Luminoso their first strategic defeat in rural areas.

After their victory over Sendero Luminoso the armed forces justified Fujimori's 1992 coup and the Government's truce with drug traffickers, and they fell under the control of the highest ranking officers, who had made an alliance with the dictatorial government. The armed forces then started taking action outside the military sphere. The National Defence System was changed, as well as the National Intelligence Service Law and the Military Situation Law. These new dispositions violated guarantees of due process, instituting "faceless" tribunals and judges, and new criminal offences like "aggravated terrorism" and "treason against the nation" came into force.

This delegation of power by the civil government to the armed forces was met with tacit acceptance from a sizeable portion of Peruvian society, particularly the well-educated urban classes who benefited from the State's services and lived in areas far removed from the centre of the conflict.

Fujimori's role

In 1990, at the very start of his mandate, Alberto Fujimori[2] already showed signs of contempt for democracy. He handed the economic problems of the country over to technocrats, and he himself took control of anti-revolutionary strategy. He recruited

1 Comisión de la Verdad y la Reconciliación. www.cverdad.org.pe

2 Alberto Fujimori won the 1989 general elections with 56.4% of the vote. In April 1992 he led a coup claiming that Parliament was corrupt and inoperative. Re-elected by an overwhelming majority in April 1995 he amnestied members of the army and police convicted of human rights violations. In the April 2000 elections, in spite of constitutional impediments, Fujimori again ran for office. Finally, in the midst of corruption scandals, he fled to Japan and resigned in November 2000.

agents from military intelligence, the most emblematic of whom was Vladimiro Montesinos. The National Intelligence Service was strengthened, and the loyalty of the military leadership was assured.

In 1992 the emphasis was shifted to the selective elimination of subversive groups, and the "Colina" Group death squad appeared on the scene, carrying out murders, forced disappearances and massacres. Responsibility for this group's actions falls on Fujimori and Montesinos.

In September 1992, the top leaders of Sendero Luminoso and the MRTA were captured, and the Government used this victory to its advantage in the elections.

In the latter years of Fujimori's time in office, the internal armed conflict was manipulated so as to keep the President in power. The conflict lasted from 1980 to 1992, but the Government maintained a logic of war throughout Fujimori's mandate, until 2000. Peru sank into a new economic crisis, and the country showed signs of corruption, moral decay, a weakening of the social and institutional fabric, and a profound lack of confidence in public institutions.

The judiciary

The abdication of democratic authority included the judiciary. Judicial authorities set guilty people free and condemned the innocent; their officials did not fulfil their role of guaranteeing the rights of civilian detainees, and members of the armed forces who were accused of serious crimes were not brought to justice. In all legal disputes the ruling automatically went in favour of the military, and injustice went unpunished. Between 1980 and 1992 there was no clear standard definition of the crime of terrorism, and the prosecution process was murky.

In 1992, the executive branch started to interfere in the judiciary. Magistrates were dismissed en masse, provisional appointments were made, organisations outside the structure of the judicial system were created, and the Constitutional Tribunal ceased to function. In the new legislation, terrorism was over-criminalised, and it became normal practice to declare recourse to habeas corpus inoperative. All this contributed to a situation in which arrest would lead to torture. There were arbitrary executions and forced disappearances. People in custody were not guaranteed impartial or fair treatment, many innocent people were given long sentences, and all constitutional guarantees were violated. After a time, the State was compelled to grant new trials, but these were based on scant evidence. This discredited the system so much that it rebounded to the benefit of the real terrorists on both sides of the conflict - Sendero Luminoso and the groups linked to it, as well as the murder squads who had gone after union and opposition leaders with the support the Government itself.

There was also violent aggression from subversive groups against union leaders, businessmen and the staff of private companies. The objective of Sendero Luminoso was to destroy the unions, whereas the MRTA sought to make the unions work for their own ends.

The churches and human rights activists

Both the Catholic Church and the evangelical churches protected the population against crimes and violations of human rights. From early on, with few exceptions, the Catholic Church condemned violations of human rights committed by the State.

During the conflict dozens of civil society associations and NGOs organised the National Human Rights Co-ordination Committee, which became an ethical reference and a vehicle that allowed victims to demand truth and justice.

Brave investigative work was done by journalists, indispensable for identifying the people responsible for the atrocities. Many journalists risked their lives, and in some cases they lost them. From early 1980 the media condemned the violence, with each organisation giving the news a slant in line with its own ideological position. However, they did not uniformly condemn the violations of human rights and certainly not those committed by the State, and their interpretation was ambiguous or biased. The treatment and the presentation of the acts of violence were crude, little respect was shown for the victims, generating an overall lack of sensitivity toward the subject. In some cases the logic of business took priority, leading to gutter journalism which, by the end of 1990, went hand in hand with mega-corruption and the buying of the media.

Displaced people

The armed violence drove hundreds of thousands of Peruvians into poverty and uprooted them from the areas where they lived. This led to forced urbanisation, and there was a historic regression in the pattern of occupation of the Andean territory which restricted possible sustainable human development.

The people who were displaced lost their goods and their social networks, and they were stigmatised and discriminated against in the places they moved to. A whole generation of children and young people had their chances of development stunted. These people deserve preferential attention from the State.

Repair the damage, punish the perpetrators, do justice

In the 1980s and 1990s, people could claim that they were to a certain extent ignorant of what was going on, or that they did not understand it, but today that stance is no longer possible. In order to live in a civilised way, in peace and democracy it is essential to carry out institutional reforms to bring about the rule of law and prevent violence. This will be part of an ethical and political process to compensate and restore the dignity of the victims, and it is an indispensable element in the process of national reconciliation. The situation is doubly aggravated by the fact that the victims belong to the least-privileged sectors in the country.

An important component in this process of reparation is justice. This means compensating victims for the damage suffered, punishing the perpetrators of the crimes, and putting an end to impunity. For example, one aspect of justice and symbolic reparation is knowing where the murdered victims are buried so that they can be identified and so that Peruvians can mourn their fellow countrymen and women who disappeared. The National Registry of Burial Sites serves this function.

The general aim of the Integral Reparations Programme is to "Make reparations and compensate for the violation of human rights and for the social, moral and material loss or damage suffered by the victims as a result of the internal armed conflict". The victims and beneficiaries are defined as "all those persons or groups of persons, who, owing to or as a consequence of the internal armed conflict which the country went through between 1980 and 2000, have suffered from acts or omissions which violate the norms of the international law of human rights". The following are considered violations: forced disappearance, kidnapping, extrajudicial execution, murder, geographical displacement, arbitrary detention, the violation of due process, forced recruitment, torture, rape, and the wounds, injuries or death resulting from attacks in violation of international humanitarian law. A "beneficiary" is a victim who will receive some kind of symbolic and/or material, individual and/or collective reparation.

The Integral Reparations Plan combines individual and collective, symbolic and material forms of indemnification: a) redeeming the memory of the victims and bestowing dignity on them, b) providing education and mental health assistance, c) making individual and collective economic reparation (programmes for institutional reconstruction, communal development, basic services and generation of income).

The great aim of national reconciliation is that all Peruvians achieve full citizenship, which means establishing a new founding pact between the State and Peruvian society, and among the members of that society. Reconciliation should take place at personal and family level, in organisations within society, and in the reformulation of the relations between the State and society as a whole. All this has to be oriented towards the construction of a country which must recognise itself as multiethnic, multicultural and multilingual. ■

A question of (in)security



The Philippines is something of a paradox, since it is a democratic society (some say the most democratic in this part of the world) enjoying a large margin of freedom, and yet at the same time experiencing a great deal of human insecurity. As long as the Government talks peace but makes war, and as long as the economic model does not recognise the need to battle inequality and poverty, human security will remain a remote possibility.

Social Watch-Philippines

Isagani R. Serrano[1]

Although the Philippines had hardly enjoyed such a peaceful period since 2001, a sense of instability gripped the whole nation for much of 2003 and people no longer feel secure given the pervasive unease and political volatility that may well continue until after the May 2004 elections. Much depends on whether the electoral process and its outcome are seen and accepted as legitimate, honest and fair.

This will be hard to achieve, given widespread poverty and a disastrous fiscal situation, combined with increasing mistrust of the Government and government officials and widespread insecurity due to kidnappings and war. As long as the Government talks peace but makes war, and as long as the economic model does not recognise the need to battle against inequality and poverty, human security will remain a remote possibility.

Why is this country in such a critical situation? What might be obstructing its path to human security? Policy continues to be guided by national security orthodoxy rather than human security and sustainable human development. This is the origin of wrong-headed domestic and foreign policies applied to the handling of conflicts, whether in Mindanao or in Iraq.

Widespread poverty and fiscal constraints

While poverty declined steadily between 1985 and 1997, since that year the number of Filipinos living below the poverty line has increased significantly. In effect, while households living in poverty declined from 44.2% to 31.8%, in 2000 the trend reversed and 33.7% of all Filipino households were living in poverty.[2] This means more than a third of 76.5 million Filipinos were living in extreme poverty in 2000. Their number is likely to grow considering the rising unemployment and projected population increase to 81.1 million for 2003 (see Table 1).

Other data is consistent with the recent downturn that the Philippines has suffered in the last five years. From a ranking of 77th in 2000, the Philippines dropped to 85th in the Human Development Index in the 2003 Human Development Report. The Philippines has also consistently ranked among the worst in the Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International.

The Government is incapable of confronting the challenge of widespread poverty and inequality. The soaring budget deficit,[3] poor tax collection[4] and the debt trap[5] have left the State all but paralysed with respect to meeting the needs of the poor and the social service networks.

The Philippines probably will not collapse because of poverty and inequality. But the continuing failure of the Government to solve these and other related problems could make the current political unrest and instability turn nasty.

Work, survival and government futility

A survey carried out by the National Statistics Office reports that unemployment increased to 12.7% in July 2003 from 11.2% in the same month in 2002 (3.81 million to 4.35 million unemployed). Company owners would say the pressures of global competition and liberalisation left

TABLE 1

Poverty Incidence 1985-2000 - Philippines and by region (% of households)

	1985	1988	1991	1994	1997	2000
Philippines	44.2	40.2	39.9	35.5	31.8	33.7
NCR	23	21.6	13.2	8	6.4	8.7
CAR	-	41.9	48.8	51	42.5	36.6
Region I	37.5	44.9	48.4	47.9	37.8	37.1
Region II	37.8	40.4	43.3	35.5	32.1	29.5
Region III	27.7	29.3	31.1	25.2	15.4	18.6
Region IV	40.3	41.1	37.9	29.7	25.7	25.3
Region V	60.5	54.5	55	55.1	50.1	55.4
Region VI	59.9	49.4	45.3	43	39.9	43.1
Region VII	57.4	46.8	41.7	32.7	34.4	38.8
Region VIII	59	48.9	40.1	37.9	40.8	43.6
Region IX	54.3	38.7	49.7	44.7	40.1	46.6
Region X	53.1	46.1	53	49.2	47	45.7
Region XI	43.9	43.1	46.2	40.3	38.2	40
Region XII	51.7	36.1	57	54.7	50	51.1
ARMM	-	-	50.7	60	57.3	66

Source: National Statistical Coordination Board, cited in the Philippines Progress Report on the Millennium Development Goals January 2003, National Economic and Development Authority, Government of the Philippines.

1 Vice President of the Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement (PRRM) and co-convener of Social Watch-Philippines.

2 Poverty is not shared equally and there are wide disparities among regions. While in the National Capital Region it has decreased to less than 10%, in other regions such as the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), it runs up to 66%. Also in the country as a whole income disparity is widening. In 1988, the average income of the richest 10% of the population was 17.6 times that of the poorest tenth. It grew to 23.7 times in 2000.

3 The 2003 projected deficit was almost a third of the budget: USD 3.67 billion in a budget of USD 14.6 billion. In 2004, given the Government estimates of expenditure and revenue, it will have to borrow at least USD 18.16 million a day to cover the deficit and pay part of the USD 58.1 billion national debt.

4 Tax collection continues to be a struggle. While a slight improvement was seen in 2003 it was still inadequate to finance the huge budget.

5 Debt service for 2002 was 24% of the National Government Budget, not including principal payments. Indebtedness has been increasing steadily since 1981. Government borrowing in the last two and a half years of the Macapagal-Arroyo Government has broken all records. On a per capita basis Filipinos owe about USD 726.

them no choice but to downsize in order to stay afloat.

Underemployment grew from 5.16 million to 6.21 million during the survey period (20.8%, up from 17.1% in July 2002). The rising cost of imported inputs and the dumping of cheap agricultural commodities like rice, fruit, garlic, vegetables, meat, etc., have made farming a losing business proposition. As a result, agriculture is now less able to absorb workers than in the past.

Not only are workers' livelihoods less secure; business is also showing increased insecurity. This is apparent from the reports of the 29th Philippine Business Conference held in November 2003, organised by the Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry. At the conference the community urged the Macapagal-Arroyo Government to implement reforms in the following areas: good governance; peace and order; infrastructure development; key legislation on business development; credit and financing for agriculture, small and medium enterprises, and industry; environment; human capital; competition and market reforms; mining; and cost-cutting issues.

If labour and business confront increasing insecurity, the population is also faced with an increasing sense of insecurity, not just regarding their incomes but their very survival.

Personal insecurity

Tabloids and major newspapers abound with reports of murder, rape and child abuse, illegal drug trafficking, bank robbery, money laundering, smuggling, car theft ("carnapping") or plain robbery. Snatching of mobile cellphones has become rampant. The police, the military, and the Government are believed to be implicated in some of these crimes. If the upper classes are worried over threats to their property, privileges, and personal safety, the middle class is horrified at how fast its opportunities are dwindling and how corruption in government has become a fact of everyday life. At the bottom end, the poor as well as the not-so-poor are restless and making demands, and their frustration with government predisposes them to agitate for any sort of change, by any means possible.

Furthermore, the war in Mindanao, especially the war waged by government forces against the Mindanao Islamic Liberation Front, is nowhere near reaching a decisive and peaceful resolution. The situation is the same with the three-decade-long communist insurgency. A succession of regimes, from Marcos to Macapagal-Arroyo, has dealt with communist and Muslim insurgencies as if they were mere military challenges. Yet even the most comprehensive proposals that take into account the political, economic and social dimensions of the conflict have come to nothing due to the Government's overriding desire to defeat insurgency by military means. Time and results have proven that the military solution does not work.

What are we doing about it?

The Philippine National Development Plan speaks of poverty reduction as the overarching theme and overriding goal of national policy. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) framework is alluded to in the plan but is not really used as a reference guide to specify poverty reduction targets in planning and budgeting exercises. Local development plans and budgets are MDG-illiterate on the whole. More aggressive advocacy is needed.

On assuming office in January 2001 President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo laid out her framework of governance to achieve her vision of winning the war against poverty within the decade and set specific targets to attain this vision: an economic philosophy of free enterprise, a modernised agricultural sector founded on social equity, a social bias toward the disadvantaged to balance economic development, and good governance to build confidence in the nation and channel resources to the poor - basically a neoliberal strategy of addressing poverty.

Adjustment policies - financial and trade liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation - which have been implemented since the early 1980s, were boosted by the country's accession to the WTO in 1995. Tariff barriers have been lowered to levels below those required by the WTO. The energy sector was restructured, and the privatisation of utilities, like water and electricity, proceeded apace. Yet evidence is mounting that these policies have done more harm than good to the poor and the not-so-poor.

One example highlighted by Social Watch-Philippines is reduced public investment for social development. An analysis of the 2004 budget by Social Watch-Philippines lead convener Prof Leonor Briones reveals that the percentage shares of all sectors, except debt servicing (31.4%), are decreasing. Activist NGOs and social movements have campaigned against these policies.

The Government has fallen short of its promise to translate its international commitments into action at the local level. The Localisation of Agenda 21, for example, has been an outstanding demand since the Rio Summit in 1992. The Local Government Code of 1991 already provided the legal framework and possibilities for strengthening local capacity and decision-making. But efforts and initiatives toward sustainable local development have often been stymied by wrong-headed and counterproductive national policies, such as liberalisation in agriculture.

In 2002, Social Watch-Philippines conducted case studies on the extent to which commitments to social development were reflected in local development plans in four provinces and one city. These commitments were those pledged by the Philippine Government in the 1995 Copenhagen Social Summit, the Geneva 2000 World Summit on Social Development or Copenhagen+5, and the MDGs of the 2000 Millennium Summit. A specific focus of the case studies was to follow up the three component indicators of the Quality of Life Index, namely, under-5 nutrition, attended births, and elementary cohort survival rate.

Local practice and experiences in planning, budgeting and spending generally mirror what is happening at the national level, and these case studies reveal that no changes have taken place in local development planning and budgeting.

There is little awareness of MDGs among local authorities, which explains in part the slow progress in incorporating social development commitments into these processes. Except for those commitments already centrally mandated as statutory and budgetary requirements (e.g. 5% allocation for gender programmes), specific MDG targeting is not taking place. The bulk of internal revenue allocation, which is the main source of financing for local development, goes to personal services or maintenance of local bureaucracy.

The case studies show a picture of poverty changes at the sub-national level and suggest where and how to focus efforts in monitoring the implementation of social development commitments. The main challenge is how to build local capacity into planning, budgeting and spending to improve local governance.

In the Philippines, consultation of the people is constitutionally mandated and therefore a feature of policy making at all levels. There are processes and mechanisms in place that allow for citizen participation in formulating development plans for the whole country, for each sector, and for different localities. Thus what is worrying is not so much the absence of popular participation as the quality and impact of such participation. There is an excess of consultation on poverty, especially at the national level. Yet, while the voices of the poor are no doubt heard, they hardly matter when it comes to major decisions, especially those concerning budget allocation.

What might development plans look like if the poor made these plans themselves? Most likely they would not look as elegant as those made by government planning and budget agencies. But they would surely be more responsive to the needs of the poor and would reflect what the poor want to see happen in their lives. ■

PORTUGAL

A culture of irresponsibility



Unemployment, corruption, and problems linked to immigration, health and consumption; these are some of the factors that the Portuguese perceive as obstacles to their human security. In a context of economic crisis, general dissatisfaction and bleak future prospects, it is essential that democracy be strengthened through the exercise of a critical and responsible citizenship.

OIKOS

Rita Veiga / Catarina Cordas / Patrícia Melo
Isabel Costa / Bruno Nunes

The national economic downturn, which began in 2001 and was exacerbated by the international economic crisis, worsened after the events of 11 September 2001 and the rise in crude oil prices in 2002. The result was a punishing decline in people's living standards. Against this background, there is a growing impression that a culture of irresponsibility and impunity reigns in Portuguese democracy.

According to a survey carried out by the *Centro de Estudos e Sondagens de Opinião da Universidade Católica Portuguesa - CESOP* (Centre of Studies and Opinion Research of the Portuguese Catholic University) in July 2003, the major worries that respondents believe are obstacles to human security are the following: unemployment (60.1%), corruption (49.9%), drugs (47.4%), poverty (34.2%), crime (33.7%), bureaucracy (23.7%), lack of morality (11.3%), excessive immigration (10.5%) and pollution (6.7%).

More consumption, less employment

According to press reports, in the first half of 2003 an average of over 150 jobs were lost each day. In one year unemployment grew from 5.1% to 6.3% (third quarter of 2003), and it is expected that the average rate for 2003 will be 6.6%.[1] Official estimates from the European Commission anticipate unemployment rates of 7.2% and 7.3% for 2004 and 2005 respectively. The situation is aggravated by the lack of specialisation and vocational training among a very high percentage of workers.

Besides this, employment is precarious, and people who have recently graduated have difficulty finding their first job. According to the Institute of Employment and Vocational Training's monthly report for October 2003, the majority of those registered at job centres were workers whose temporary contracts had ended, while 15% were recent graduates. The latter numbered 44,000, of whom 60% were women. This figure is 28.5% higher than for the same month in 2002. But this is also the result of a mismatch between the qualifications of those seeking work and the needs of employers. This combination of factors means that people are unemployed more frequently and for longer periods, which is causing a fall in contributions to the social security system.

According to the Ministry of Labour and Social Security the average gross salary is EUR 1,035 (USD 1,310) - but according to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) it is EUR 957 (USD 1,210) - while the minimum salary is around EUR 360 (USD 455). These figures are the lowest in the European Union (EU). What is more, income distribution in terms of gross pay is extremely unequal: the richest 20% of the population earn 7.6 times more than the poorest 20%, compared with an average difference in the EU of 4.6.[2]

Thus the social security system is being undermined, provoking repeated cuts in pensions, which is one of the main causes of poverty among senior citizens.

In recent decades the Portuguese have become big consumers, and the worsening economic situation has not made them moderate their expenditure. The very high level of indebtedness of families,[3] which was already giving cause for concern, is now even more acute. Even with respect to mortgage payments - one of the last items people stop paying - arrears have reached 24%.

A corrupt machinery

In recent years a number of scandals have come to light in the private and public sectors involving administrative officials at all levels - for instance, mayors, government officials, members of parliament, as well as heads of sports clubs. The list includes bribery, economic-financial grand larceny, corruption, fraudulent practices in public tenders and the cover-up of criminal responsibility. Among the Portuguese the order of priority for putting an end to corruption is as follows: in political parties (18.7%), the health service (18%), the tax authority (14.5%), and the courts (14.8%).[4] Ordinary citizens have the impression that there is no systematic campaign against corruption, and that it has spread, is hindering development and social justice, and threatening democracy itself.[5] Besides this, the cumbersome bureaucratic machinery encourages both corrupt and corrupters to "resolve" difficulties in their own way. A study on crime and security in Portugal, published in 1998,[6] concluded that among 7.5 million Portuguese aged 24 or over, about 600,000 had at least once been invited to buy "favours" from civil servants.

The spread of these practices is having a demoralising effect. Some people believe that no one can be trusted, while others find it easy to forget ethical principles and the most elementary norms of conduct.

Fear of immigration

There has been a recent abrupt rise in immigration, which is perceived as a further factor contributing toward insecurity. In 1995 there were fewer than 170,000 immigrants, but in 2002 there were around 440,000, and more keep coming. Today they make up 5% of the population. According to the Frontiers and Foreigners Services (SEF) there were 200,000 "illegal" immigrants in April 2002.

In 2001, in an attempt to check the influx of "illegal" immigrants, the authorities set a special limited legalisation period, after which foreigners who did not have the proper documents would be deported. This strategy did not work, mainly because the "Eastern Mafias"[7] continued their traffic in people. The exploiters of cheap labour, especially for the construction industry and prostitution, profit most from this situation. In 2003 Portugal made the front page of US magazine *Time*, for being the entry point into Europe of an international women-trafficking network.

Every so often the media reports some more or less violent episode illustrating how these criminal networks use intimidation and extortion, or how unscrupulous employers exploit illegal workers, in

1 National Institute of Statistics. www.ine.pt

2 *Rendimento, Desigualdade e Pobreza* (Income, Inequality and Poverty). National Institute of Statistics (data from June 2002).

3 In 2001, 96.6% of families were in debt. Bank of Spain and Portuguese Association of Consumers.

4 Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer 2003. www.transparency.org/pressreleases_archive/2003/2003.07.03.global_corr_barometer.en.html

5 Morgado, Maria José (former president of the Portuguese Court of Criminal Instruction) and journalist José Vegar. *O Inimigo sem Rosto. Fraude e Corrupção em Portugal.* Publicações Dom Quixote, October 2003.

6 Viegas Ferreira, Eduardo. *Crime e Insegurança em Portugal.* Lisboa: Celta, 1998.

7 Mainly from Moldavia and the Ukraine.

some extreme cases in ways that amount to new forms of slavery.

The public is not indifferent to this issue; three out of four Portuguese are opposed to the new influx of immigrants. The idea of immigration as a threat is based on arguments mainly concerning cultural differences, insecurity, and the job market: 20% fear that citizens from Eastern Europe "are coming to occupy more important positions than many Portuguese", 30% think that "immigrants commit more crimes than the Portuguese", and 75% think that illegal immigrants "should be kept under surveillance so they do not cause problems". As for immigrants' legal rights, almost all Portuguese are opposed to unequal treatment, and while only 25% approve of immigration, 79.7% defend the legalisation of immigrants who are in an irregular situation. Also, 90% agree that "they should be protected against labour exploitation".[8]

It is worth contrasting these impressions with the positive effects of immigration. For years now as a result of various demographic and economic trends the job market has had a low capacity to respond to growth in productive activity. Were it not for immigrants, many productive activities would already have shrunk or even disappeared. What is more, in 2001 the balance between immigrants' tax and social security contributions and the costs that they generate for the State exceeded EUR 311 million (USD 393 million). That is, each foreign worker (legal, or in the process of becoming so) made a net contribution to the State of some EUR 1,390 (USD 1,758). This figure falls to EUR 995 (USD 1,259) if unemployed immigrants are also taken into account.[9]

The ailing health system

The National Health Service (SNS), which ought to be universal and as far as possible free of charge, is causing much concern, above all among people who cannot afford private health cover. The public system very often cannot respond to problems quickly enough, and it is permanently on the brink of collapse. The OECD, among others, attributes this dire situation to mismanagement.

Through a serious lack of transparency in the provision of medical attention and the prescription of drugs, SNS favours particular interest groups (pharmaceutical companies and medical service providers). Portugal is among the OECD countries with the highest per capita expenditure on medicines (19% of the health budget), but only recently has the use of generic medicines been promoted, and this has met with only moderate success.

One of the big shortcomings of the SNS is the fact that the under-utilisation of human and material resources generates long waiting lists, affecting many people whose illnesses alone should not cause the degree of loss of quality of life that they have to endure. There are delays in doctor's appointments, treatment, and above all non-urgent operations in some orthopaedic cases. Since salaries in the public health sector are not very attractive, many medical workers are forced to take a second job, which reduces the quality of attention for the public. Last year a special effort was made to reduce the ever-growing waiting lists by half. In 2002 there were 123,126 patients on lists for non-urgent operations alone. According to data published by the Ministry of Health, the reduction in the number of people on the lists last year was offset by an increase in cases, and now there are more people waiting.

Inefficiency feeds inefficiency. The lack of prevention generates illnesses that are more serious or chronic and which require more expensive treatment (medicines, hospital care) as well as other social costs.

Because of a lack of confidence in the SNS, people are turning to private health services, which account for 44% of spending on health. To meet the cost of these services more and more people are taking out health insurance - today 16% of the population as against 10% in 1998[10] - but the majority cannot afford to.

The disabled: unkept promises

In these adverse circumstances, one of the most vulnerable social groups are the disabled (636,059 people, representing 6.16% of the population, according to the 2001 census)[11] and their families. The economic crisis has affected organisations that provide services for the disabled, and it is feared that the programmes and services that are essential for guaranteeing the rights of these people, which are enshrined in national and international norms,[12] may be suspended. Equality of opportunities and non-discrimination must be complemented with the right of disabled people to benefit from measures that guarantee their independence, integration, participation, and life in the community.[13]

At the end of 2003, the European Year of People with Disabilities, the main national organisations representing these people publicly expressed their disappointment. According to the Association for Disabled People, promises were still being broken in the framework of the Basic Education Law[14] (there is even a proposal to segregate teaching for disabled children and youngsters), in the Labour Code (equal treatment in employment and professional activity) and in the Television Law (subtitles for the hard-of-hearing).

The Association also stressed the lack of a network of resource centres and residential homes which would ensure dignified living conditions for disabled people in their old age, as well as domestic help for citizens with complex needs. Still more flagrant is the continuing failure to comply with Decree-Law 123/97 of May 1997. This law requires the elimination of architectural barriers within a period of seven years, but there is a flagrant and ongoing failure to comply, as can be seen simply by looking at new construction work.

Finally, the reduction in the public health and social security budget for 2004 has raised concern among all those working on disability issues.

The Portuguese "civil war"

Portugal is in the unenviable position of coming first in the EU ranking for traffic accidents. An average of five people per day are killed on the roads, and 19 suffer serious injuries. The main causes are speeding, and dangerous and drunk driving. The situation is so bad that the press describes it as the Portuguese "civil war".

The data on domestic violence also gives cause for concern. The Portuguese Association of Victim Support,[15] founded in 1990, dealt with 10,009 cases in 2002, 70% of which were related to aggression in the home. Of the victims, 87.8% were women.

Delinquency is closely linked to drugs, and both phenomena were emphasised in the study referred to at the start of this report (CESOP). Around 70% of the prison population are convicted of drug-related offences. However, public concern about this issue varies considerably, and it has been found that to a large extent this depends on the importance that the press gives to specific cases. For example, an increase in the fear of being robbed was recorded at a time when statistics reflected a fall in such crimes. Unfortunately, the ideal journalistic criteria of objectivity and impartiality do not always prevail in the battle for increased circulation.

Conclusion: an open challenge

Portuguese society is poorly or badly informed, and so tends to react superficially to the situations affecting it. The Portuguese often swing from passivity or conformity to loud and disorganised protest. Sometimes someone - even the President - will appeal to citizens to fully assume their role in participatory democracy. The quality of the exercise of citizenship will undoubtedly depend on citizens' clear critical sense and their capacity to organise and take group initiatives in defence of their legitimate interests and wishes. This is an open challenge, and there is still a long way to go. ■

8 Research on recent immigration in Portugal, from the Chamber of Ethics and the Centre of Studies and Opinion Research of the Portuguese Catholic University.

9 Report on Immigration by the High Commissioner for Immigration and Ethnic Minorities. www.acime.gov.pt

10 Portuguese Association of Insurance Companies.

11 National Institute of Statistics. www.ine.pt/censos2001/censos.asp

12 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Declaration of Salamanca, Decree-Law 319/91.

13 Declaration of Madrid (2002).

14 *Jornal de Notícias*, 10 December 2003.

15 Associação Portuguesa de Apoio à Vítima. www.apav.pt

Corruption, poverty and other weapons



Thousands of light arms are in the hands of the population; the political system is weak and ineffective; poverty is rife and corruption is the norm. Given these conditions, in spite of efforts by civil society, it is impossible to build social, cultural and economic systems that guarantee human security in Senegal and bring it within reach of the Millennium Development Goals.

ADESEN

Abdoul Souleye Sow

Light arms and political failure

The proliferation of light weapons in Western Africa has without doubt nurtured more conflict in this region than anywhere else in the world. Estimates suggest that over 8 million light arms are in circulation in the region, causing thousands of deaths. Sixty percent of the victims are women and children. Many more people have been mutilated and orphaned.

Recent conflicts, especially in Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia, have exacerbated the situation in an area well known for its political instability. Within this regional context, national tensions in Senegal are running high.

On 19 March 2000 the heterogeneous liberal coalition of Abdoulaye Wade won a landslide electoral victory over socialist president Abdou Diouf, who everyone identified with the crisis. The change in government was achieved by mobilisations involving the entire population and above all a fierce struggle on the part of civil society organisations; however, it did not end the practices of the former regime. The President and his cabinet find themselves in an unenviable position amid growing discontent, due to scandals such as the "Joola" case[1] and the exposé by Aboul L Coulibaly,[2] among others, which have discredited the Government.

Wade's Government has been repeatedly accused of instigating attacks on the premises of opposition parties. The biggest scandal occurred in October 2003, when Talla Sylla, leader of the Alliance "Jëf-Jël" opposition party, was attacked with a hammer. Members of other opposition parties, including Djibo Ka, the leader of Democratic Renewal, blamed the Government for the attack. Thousands of people demonstrated on the streets of the capital, Dakar, in November, to express their repudiation of the attack.

Burn the guns

Civil society has launched a campaign against the circulation of light arms. The centre of activity has been the town of Ziguinchor in Casamance province, chosen because of the war of secession there. This has lasted for more than 20 years and caused the displacement of several thousand Senegalese, and the deaths of hundreds more.

Under the slogan "Let's control weapons", a one-day event was organised to coincide with the anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The aim was to raise community awareness of the dangers posed by retaining, using and circulating weapons, and was mainly directed at young people. Other objectives were to inform the authorities and the general population about the aims of the campaign, and to reflect on human security by initiating a civilian-military dialogue with an expert panel composed of members of the military and NGO representatives. A high point of this event was the symbolic burning of weapons.

The Council of Support for NGOs in Senegal (CONGAD) made its views about political violence known through a public communiqué: "…there is no excuse [that can justify] acts of violence. There are means available to stop the wave of assassinations, murder attempts and assaults. It is enough for the State simply to fulfil its designated functions of overseeing impartial application of the law, protecting individual freedoms and punishing those who wish to establish the rule of violence in our democracy."[3] CONGAD called on the President to co-ordinate with religious, cultural and political figures and the media to stop the spiral of violence and insecurity. "It is intolerable that the exercise of the freedom of expression should be punished by assaults against individuals' physical and moral integrity," CONGAD declared, adding that impunity is a violation of human rights and encourages bad governance. The communiqué also defended the freedom of the press and condemned the expulsion of Radio France International's correspondent Sophie Malibeaux, as well as condemning the assassination in Abidjan, the capital of Côte d'Ivoire, of Jean Hélène, who worked for the same broadcaster.

Taking the view that poverty contributes to generating violence, CONGAD called on the Government of Senegal to "fight energetically" against it. But the fight against poverty must begin by eliminating corruption - a step that those in power seem reluctant to take.

The cost of corruption

Corruption has a high price, which is paid by the national economy. The total loss due to corruption is estimated at USD 210 million from public expenditure alone. The volume of goods purchased by the State through the central administration, not counting brokering agents and public sector companies, amounted to approximately USD 147 million in 1999. In 2001, directly negotiated purchases, which are even more prone to corruption, were USD 43 million. Other purchases represented 70% of those authorised, that is USD 30 million. Nearly a quarter of the budget for buying in labour services was spent on directly negotiated contracts. Thus 70% of the consolidated purchasing budget was apparently spent on directly negotiated deals.[4]

In the private sector, according to figures from Transparency International which were confirmed by a World Bank survey, "the excess costs generated by corruption amount to between 25% and 30%".[5]

The draft decree to create a Council to monitor good governance and fight corruption is no doubt praiseworthy. However civil society is not entirely

1 On 26 September 2002 the "Joola", a ferry with capacity for 550 passengers, sank due to overloading when sailing from Ziguinchor in the south of Senegal to Dakar. Originally, the Government announced there had been 1,100 deaths, while the press claimed there had been nearly 2,000. Only 65 people survived. The Government finally decided to pay compensation to the families of the estimated 1,865 lives claimed in the disaster.

2 In his book *Wade, un opposant au pouvoir. L'alternance piégée,* La Sentinelle, 2003, journalist Aboul L Coulibaly explores the gap between the expectations of the people of Senegal after the historic change in March 2000 and subsequent political reality. The book's main theme is the excessive centralisation of power in the hands of President Wade ("a republican monarch"), his party and cronies. This far-from-flattering portrayal accuses Wade of a lack of professionalism, mistakes in the rush to establish economic priorities, liquidation of public companies to the benefit of foreign investors, liberalisation of peanut production - allowing speculators to cheat peasant farmers - and grandiose, impossible projects. The author also denounces attempts by the Government to interfere with the press and the judicial system, and attacks the corruption that prevails in public purchasing.

3 CONGAD. Public communiqué, 25 October 2003.

4 *Walfadjri* newspaper. 8 January 2003.

5 *Ibid.*

satisfied with the proposed Council and has expressed reservations about its potential effectiveness in three areas: awareness-raising, prevention and sanctions.

In order to promote transparency and good governance, the watchdog Council has drawn up a global communications strategy for maintaining, on the one hand, a high level of public services, and on the other hand, to publicise and reward virtuous behaviour, in both the public and private sectors.

As for prevention, no concrete proposals have been made. And civil society organisations have major doubts about penalties for corruption, especially since so many questions are not addressed at all in the draft decree: for example, the need for declarations of disclosure of personal wealth.

Political will is required to make the Council effective by endowing it with the powers it needs. Professional or banking secrecy cannot be allowed to hinder its work. Otherwise, Council requests for documents from authorities will be flatly refused, since there are no coercive measures in place.

In order to ensure institutional autonomy, the Council should be created by law, incorporating the draft decree and adjusting its statutes in line with existing international conventions on corruption.

The 2004 budget: continuing poverty

According to the World Bank, 65% of households live in poverty, in spite of the fact that Senegal was the first country in sub-Saharan Africa to embark on a structural adjustment programme to re-launch the economy in 1984.[6]

Poverty can only be combatted with a bold economic policy aimed at strong, continuous growth led by dynamic sectors of the economy, and by ensuring equitable distribution of the benefits of growth. This should be reflected in the Government's budget.

Unfortunately, Senegal's budget for 2004 maintains the status quo. This can be illustrated by examining key elements of the economy as they appear in the budget. The following four indicators, together with inflation (which has remained within acceptable limits), comprise the basis of any budget's macroeconomic and financial framework:

The 2002 growth rate

Wealth-generating activities, reflected in the growth rate, are in an alarming state. After controversies over the 2002 growth rate, the draft budget for 2004 at last showed that in 2002 Senegal's growth rate was actually 1.1%, although it had at first been forecast at 5.7%, a prediction that was later revised to 2.4%.[7]

The balance of trade

The balance of trade remains negative, and the deficit has in fact got worse. In 2002 the balance of trade was USD -740 million, and the estimate for 2003 was USD -790 million - an increased deficit of USD 50 million.[8]

The investment rate

Senegal is also failing on this front. In fact, in the last 15 years investment has ranged from 15% to 20%. This year the investment rate is expected to increase to 19.7% and the estimate for 2005 is 20%. These levels of investment are clearly inadequate to promote strong growth and place the country in the category of emerging economies, whose investment rates are typically between 25% and 30%.[9]

External debt

According to World Bank figures for 2001, the country's external debt is valued at USD 4,000 million, with an annual servicing cost of USD 214.2 million. And the debt continues to grow. The accumulation of old debt is too heavy for a country burdened by the problematic economic structures analysed above. The amount owed is equivalent to 60% of GDP and represents a debt of USD 400 for each of Senegal's 10 million inhabitants. In a country where 65% of households are living below the poverty line, this burden is intolerable.

In conclusion, from every analytical viewpoint, the proposed budget for 2004 signals no changes.

If present rates of growth continue to be weak and erratic, together with investment rates far below those required for the economy to emerge from stagnation, structural deficits in the balance of trade, and a national debt amounting to more than half of GDP, the country can only sink into abject poverty, which no sectoral plan will be able to reduce, let alone eradicate.

And the Millennium Development Goals will not be met. ■

6 EPPS 2001. Senegal Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, World Bank, 2001.

7 Budget proposal 2004.

8 *Ibid.*

9 *Ibid.*

SPAIN

Ineffective aid and emerging risks

The Government is projecting to the international community an image of inefficiency in matters of human security. This is reflected in the way that Official Development Assistance is allocated. The distribution of aid is tied to political and media strategies rather than to the people's needs, which postpones the fight against poverty and the humanitarian response in most crises. On the home front, terrorism is being tackled with repressive military and police measures, and responses to the problems of unemployment, domestic violence and immigration have been totally inadequate.

Intermón Oxfam

Eva Quintana / María Truñó

Insufficient and badly distributed aid

Millions of people in the world are threatened by poverty, international humanitarian aid does not get through to dozens of forgotten conflicts, and light arms are responsible for the deaths of 500,000 civilians each year. However, these threats to human security are of secondary importance to world leaders, who are giving priority to the struggle against terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. The Spanish Government shares this approach, as can be seen in the political decisions it has taken in a range of different situations.

In 2003 Spanish Official Development Assistance (ODA) amounted to only 0.28% of the Gross National Product (GNP); it should have been 0.33% as a step towards the 2006 target of 0.39%, the percentage that the European Union committed to at the Monterrey Conference on Financing for Development in March 2002. These scarce resources are not being channelled into the fight against poverty, with little more than 20% of the total being spent on basic social services, nor are they being allocated to Least Developed Countries, which only receive 0.03% of GNP instead of the 0.15% they should get. The majority of Spain's aid goes to middle income countries and Africa is systematically forgotten.[1] Moreover, the dispersal of state bodies responsible for ODA in more than six ministries contributes to inefficiency and makes it difficult to implement the much-needed improvements to the service and to put an end to the link between Spanish aid and the country's political and commercial interests.[2]

On top of this, the distribution of aid resources by the international community is not defined according to needs-based humanitarian criteria, but rather serves political and media interests. Although there are over 40 ongoing armed conflicts and 35 million people displaced from their homes in the world, each year most of the aid is channelled into one or two humanitarian crises. In 2002 nearly half the funds donated for humanitarian aid went to Afghanistan, while the rest was distributed among another 23 on-going crises. History repeated itself in 2003, with Iraq receiving more money than the 15 humanitarian crises afflicting Africa put together.[3]

UN data[4] confirm the general trend towards the politicisation of humanitarian aid. They show that in 2003 the Spanish Government made contributions to alleviate only 3 of the 21 humanitarian crises currently taking place (Iraq, Colombia and Burundi), and that of every EUR 10 (USD 12.5) that went to the UN for this kind of aid, nine ended up in Iraq and one went to the other crises.

More weapons, more deaths, more poor people

Conventional weaponry (anything that is not a weapon of mass destruction), and in particular light arms (which one person can carry), pose a serious threat to human security because they cause the most deaths worldwide and are the most difficult to control. Today in the world one person is shot dead every minute, so millions of people are living under the daily threat of armed violence.[5]

The damage caused by conventional weapons goes beyond the deaths caused by shootings, since on the one hand their uncontrolled proliferation encourages insecurity and violations of human rights, while on the other, the money countries spend on purchasing arms reduces the possibilities for combating poverty. Since 1999, countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America have spent USD 87 billion on arms. To put this in perspective, an annual sum of around USD 22 billion would be needed for those same countries to move towards their Millennium Development Goals of universal primary education and the reduction of maternal and infant mortality.[6]

Despite the high costs of the lack of control over arms sales, the arms trade is flourishing and there is no international legislation prohibiting exports that entail threats to development, human rights and International Humanitarian Law. Spain, which is eleventh on the list of arms-exporting countries, still refuses to provide transparent information on its arms sales, a good many of which are irresponsible.[7]

Alternative proposals

For a world without poverty

The Co-ordination of Non-Governmental Organisations for Development (CONGDE) and the autonomous regions launched a joint campaign called "0.7 Reclámalo" (Demand the 0.7%).[8] This calls on the central Government and autonomous regional and municipal governments to take resolute steps to reach 0.7% of GNP for ODA, and demands that these resources be used in the fight against poverty, focusing on the Least Developed Countries, the populations most in need and the provision of basic social services. The campaign also demands that the funds be managed with greater efficiency and transparency.

In addition, there are calls to prepare a framework plan in line with the co-operation law in order to improve Spanish co-operation for development. Such a plan would have only one aim: the fight

1 Intermón Oxfam. "Ayuda social para el desarrollo" in www.intermonoxfam.org/page.asp?id=394

2 For further information about Spanish development aid see "La Realidad de la Ayuda 2003-2004", Intermón Oxfam, Colección Informes No 26. Summary available at www.intermonoxfam.org

3 See "Más allá de los titulares. Una agenda de acción para proteger a los civiles en conflictos olvidados", Intermón Oxfam 2003, and also "La Acción Humanitaria en la Cooperación Española", Intermón Oxfam 2003. Available at www.intermonoxfam.org

4 United Nations "Consolidated Appeal" for 2004, presented on 18 November 2003.

5 Intermón Oxfam - Agencia de Noticias de Información Alternativa (ANIA). http://ania.eurosur.org/noticia.php3?id=7358

6 Oxfam international. www.oxfam.org/esp/policy_pape_armas.htm

7 "Vidas destrozadas. La necesidad de un control estricto del comercio internacional de armas", Amnesty International and Intermón Oxfam, 2003. Available at www.armasbajocontrol.org

8 There is further information about the "*0.7 Reclámalo*" campaign at the Spanish CONGDE web site: www.congde.org

against poverty. The plan needs to contemplate redesigning the Aid and Development Fund (FAD), breaking the link between ODA and commercial, cultural and strategic interests, and making policies towards countries in the South more coherent.

For a world without forgotten crises

If humanitarian action is still unable to respond to the needs of the population and the forgotten emergencies are ignored, human security will continue to be under threat. What is needed, on the one hand, is a coherent and multilateral approach to make sufficient funds available for all emergency situations, with special attention being paid to the "forgotten" crises. On the other hand, the link between the army and the FAD must be severed by reducing the role of the armed forces and limiting it to intervention and security tasks. In addition, as Spain is a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council it should promote a commitment on the part of the international community to preventing and resolving armed conflicts, and to improving protection and assistance for civilians trapped in those conflicts.

For a world free of uncontrolled arms

The war against terrorism has increased military and arms co-operation among supposed allies, which exacerbates the global proliferation of arms instead of controlling it. Every minute 15 new arms are put into circulation, in a world where there is already one weapon for every ten people.

To put an end to this critical situation, Spain must make a commitment to and promote the adoption of the Global Arms Trade Treaty for 2006. The Treaty should serve as an instrument to ban exports that contribute to violations of human rights and international humanitarian law and create obstacles to human development. Moreover, a national law is needed in Spain to regulate the transfer of military, security and police equipment, which should include transparency of information, parliamentary control over exports, strict application of the EU Code of Conduct, and regulation of the activities of agents. ■

Threats, risks and points of vulnerability in Spain

In Spain in 2003, a number of threats to human security became more acute. The political stance and legislative programme of the party in power have not promoted the climate of dialogue needed to strengthen human rights, which form the basis of human security. The main issues that stand out are the threat of terrorism, pressure for reform in the labour market, problems in the social welfare system, domestic violence and the question of immigrants.

Terrorism still occupies centre stage in the collective mind in Spain. The "Political Parties Law" targeting those who advocate terrorist violence has come into force. The Government's laudable firm hand in dealing with terrorism has in practice relied exclusively on using police and judicial measures to respond to the problem. In the political debate on terrorism certain sectors, including public institutions, and a number of democratic political parties have suggested that Constitutional reform may be needed. The Government has led the reaction against this proposal, insisting that initiatives be kept within the prevailing legal framework; meanwhile, it refuses to initiate talks which it considers would provide no guarantees as long as terrorist violence continues. There is increasing polarisation, and even signs of a possible institutional breakdown in the territorial configuration of the State and in the existing consensus on the Constitution.

The Government withdrew its 2002 labour reform plan because of opposition from social actors, but the issue is still on the agenda and there is a great deal of pressure to make the labour market more flexible. Growing European competitiveness and the trend towards delocalising production are often cited as motives for introducing reforms that would increase precariousness in the Spanish labour market, where the casual labour rate already stands at 55%. But little attention is paid to this issue in the debate on employment. The undermining of the mechanisms designed to achieve the economic integration of naturally vulnerable sectors of the population - like women, young people, or foreign nationals - is increasing insecurity for these groups and jeopardising their prospects for the future. Although there is more employment, it is precarious, which means less stability and less security.

Social welfare coverage in Spain has not improved nor is it expected to do so. Public expenditure on social welfare stands at 20.1% of GDP, which is still seven points below the European average of 27.3%. Besides the fact that this figure is low, an analysis of the evolution of the social welfare system yields worrying conclusions, with what used to be considered social rights enshrined in law now being transformed into concessions that may be granted through administrative channels and subject to other conditions. The Government's "zero deficit" policy goal, which it aims to meet through a surplus in the social security budget, in no way helps to improve social welfare in the country.

In mid 2003, a law concerning protection for the victims of domestic violence came into force, which helps to make the measures protecting this group more responsive. Even so, in order for certain provisions of the new law to be made effective reforms are needed to the penal code and the remand system. In addition, more financial resources must be allocated to ensure that the law is enforced.

At the end of 2003 a new foreign nationals law modifying the 2002 law came into force. The new legislation does not contribute to defining a proper system for integrating the growing immigrant population into society, which remains the big unresolved issue. The Government continues to focus obsessively on controlling migrant flows, which means that coherent measures and an integration policy based on respect for diversity and the management of opportunities is still lacking.[9] What is especially worrying is that there are so many illegal immigrants who are almost completely without protection. The Government puts the figure at 680,000, while social organisations estimate one million, and the new law will further undermine their security. ■

Cáritas Española

9 For further information, Cáritas Española will shortly be publishing its work proposal on the situation of immigrants, "Nadie sin Futuro" ("No-one should lack a future").

11 March 2004

Between 06.39 and 06.42 GMT on March 11, three days before the general election,10 bombs exploded in Madrid on four trains that were full of workers, students and schoolchildren. At the time of writing, the death toll is over 200 and there are 1,200 injured, some of them very seriously. Each bomb consisted of 10 kilos of explosives packed in a backpack, which were detonated by remote control.

The first three went off when the first train arrived at Atocha Station in Madrid; the other seven exploded at almost the same time on the other trains which were approaching the station, and the police found three further bombs that had not exploded.

At first the Government and some media blamed ETA, the Basque terrorist organisation, but later seven detonators and an Arabic language video were found in a stolen van near the station, and a London newspaper received a message from Osama bin Laden's organisation claiming responsibility. The following Sunday, Election Day, another video came to light in which a supposed al-Qaeda spokesman claimed responsibility for the attacks. The Government kept insisting that ETA was responsible, and it has emerged that the Minister of Foreign Affairs instructed her ambassadors to take advantage of "any opportunity" to put the blame on ETA.

The day after the blasts Madrid witnessed the largest demonstration in the country's history when 2 million people marched in silence to honour their dead and in protest against the terrorist attacks. It is estimated that 11 million people throughout Spain took to the streets that evening.

The night before the elections, crowds staged protests in different cities demanding the truth and that "the dead should not be used". Mobile phones, internet and all possible means of communication were used to let other voters know what had really happened: that the information released about the attacks and the government's investigation were completely biased, and that they were being backed up by the media.

The Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) headed by José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero won the general election on 14 March (the turnout was 8.5 points higher than in 2000). The PSOE ended up 12 seats short of the 176 seats needed for an overall majority, and to be able to govern they will have to come to some arrangement with like-minded minority parties. The Madrid newspaper *El Mundo*, said that never before in the history of Spanish democracy had a party with an absolute majority (referring to President José María Aznar's Partido Popular) been turned out of office. According to this newspaper, it was the government's hasty action in putting the blame for the attacks on ETA that cost them the election. Now that it seems al-Qaeda was responsible, people are again criticising the Partido Popular government for involving Spain in the war on Iraq, and this seems to have been one of the key elements in their electoral defeat. ■

Written by the Social Watch Secretariat based on information in the press.

SURINAME

Want in a rich country

Suriname ranks seventeenth among the world's richest countries in development potential. At the same time, the vast majority of the population live under the poverty line, and economic inequality almost doubled over the last 30 years. Decades of ethnical divide and rule, political patronage, and a stifled civil society have left governance institutions open to both national and international destructive influences.

Stichting - Ultimate Purpose

Maggie Schmeitz

Suriname is blessed with natural resources, yet 80% of its population live under the poverty line. Economic inequality almost doubled over the last 30 years, leaving the lower 50% of the population with 20.2% of national expenditure and the top 20% of the population with 50.5% of national expenditure.[1] The worst threat to human security in Suriname is the governance crisis, which is becoming increasingly unbearable. Decades of ethnical divide and rule, political patronage, and civil society stifled by an omnipotent state apparatus, have left governance institutions open to both national and international destructive influences.

Politics and power, patronage and poverty

Since the late 1950s the mining and processing of bauxite has kept the economy afloat. It has also provided successive governments with the means to distribute wealth without the need to stimulate or develop other production sectors. The strong centralised government control that still reigns today is built on a political patronage system whereby political factions, followers and friends can be rewarded with civil service jobs, houses, and other scarce commodities.[2]

The political patronage system works both ways: it gives jobs and positions to people who are politically loyal but not necessarily qualified or competent, and in return it expects their collaboration in serving the interests of political friends.

In a total population of 481,146, with an unemployment rate ranging between 11% and 14%, a total of 36,151 civil servants make up 37% of the labour force.[3] Furthermore, almost 25% of the labour force is comprised of office-based civil servants (23,987), a figure ten times the number of army personnel (2,042), more than twenty times the police force (1,142) and almost twenty times the total number of nurses (1,235)![4]

The majority of civil servants (middle and low ranking, mostly women) fall under the poverty line. In consequence many of them feel that they do not have to work for a salary that does not sustain them. It also makes the whole government apparatus even more vulnerable to corruption, since underpaid civil servants accept bribes more easily. Public Sector Reform has been on the agenda since 1995. Expectations are that it will still be on the agenda in 2005, the year of the next elections.

Data provided by civil servants show an interesting picture. Whereas non-response is 0 to 0.58% in harmless questions about age and gender, non-response jumps to 28% when it touches upon daily tasks, and to 43% with respect to level of education. Cross-reference of data, however, clearly shows the discrepancy between positions and qualifications.[5]

No pay, no cure

As the State can hardly maintain its enormous and inefficient bureaucracy, other sectors have to suffer. Health institutions such as hospitals, rural health services and the State Health Insurance Fund face government defaults time and again. Expenditure for basic social services (education and healthcare) averaged only 7.5% of total government expenditure over the period 1996-2000. Healthcare in particular was cut to a mere 3% between 1999 and 2000.[6] Patients are thus confronted with the "no pay, no cure" treatment. Since private health insurance is only affordable to the happy few, most civil servants hold on to their job because at least it guarantees that they and their families are insured. The Health Sector Reform Plans suggest that the State Health Insurance Fund should cover all citizens, providing them with basic healthcare. Like many other government plans, it has been discussed for years but has never reached the implementation stage.

Total control, but no checks and balances

The extensive role assigned to the State impedes development in the private sector and increases the risk of the arbitrary use of power by the State.[7] The Government's dominant position makes it profitable for individuals to invest in politics. Control over the apparatus means control over all public goods and services, including electricity, water, telephone, healthcare, access to land, tariffs, permits, etc.

The last budget account approved by Parliament dates to 1964. Since 1988 budget accounts are not even published by the Ministry of Finance, so control over expenditures is non-existent. Budgets for the following year are submitted without accounting for the expenditures of the previous year.[8] Throughout the decade 1990-2000, utility companies did not submit a single annual report. The Central National Accountants Agency, which supposedly controls them, has only one qualified accountant on its staff.[9]

Economic and monetary insecurity

With imports far exceeding exports, huge government expenditure (45.5% of GDP) and stagnant production, it is not surprising that the economic situation is poor. The exchange rate for the US dollar has been artificially fixed at around USD 1 = SRG 2,700 since 2001. To rebuild trust in the country's own economy and monetary system, the Central Bank created a new national currency, the Surinamese Dollar (SRD). Without taking any other monetary or economic measures, three zeros were disposed of in order to raise the exchange rate to USD 1 = SRD 2.7. The promotional campaign to support the launch of the SRD on 1 January 2004 was hampered by the fact that the new banknotes had not been printed.

Many questions have been asked about deals made by the Government with several transnational corporations in 2003. Although there is public support for attracting foreign investment, there has also

1 General Bureau of Statistics in collaboration with the Inter-American Development Bank. *Household Budget Survey Suriname 1999-2000*, Paramaribo January 2001.

2 Dew, Edward. *The Difficult Flowering of Surinam*, Den Haag, Boston, London, 1978.

3 General Bureau of Statistics. *Households in Suriname 1993-1997*, Paramaribo, May 1998.
In 1996 total unemployed were 10,699, constituting 11% of the labour potential. From 1993 to 1995 the average percentage work seekers of the economically active population was 12.3%.

4 Ministry of Home Affairs. *Registration of Civil Servants*, Paramaribo, May 2003, Table 7.

5 *Ibid*, Tables 8, 10, and 11.

6 Ministry of Finance, Budget Office, 2001.

7 Inter-American Development Bank. Economic and Sector Study Series, *Governance in Suriname*, Washington, April 2001.

8 Tjong Ahin, S. "Conceptualizing of the term Good Governance" in *Good Governance, Condition for Economic Development*, Association of Economists, Paramaribo, 2003.

9 National Auditors Office of Suriname. *Annual Report 1999*, Paramaribo, 2000.

been a great deal of criticism over the conditions involved and queries as to the benefits the nation will derive from these deals. Over the last decades, agreements have been made that not only did not benefit the national economy,[10] but damaged the environment[11] and uprooted local communities.[12] Unfortunately, negotiations are still dominated by short-term political and individual interests. For instance, two mining corporations - Billiton (Holland) and Alcoa (USA) - competing for a concession took advantage of the indecisiveness of their government counterpart by joining forces and presenting the Government with a joint agreement that was to their mutual benefit. Not a single deal so far has offered clear-cut guarantees regarding employment, transfer of skills and technology, or the use of local products.[13]

Crime, drugs and violence

"Nothing poses greater threats to civil society in Caricom countries than the drug problem; and nothing exemplifies the powerlessness of the regional governments more."[14]

Weak governance and weak institutions make it easier for criminal forces to penetrate government and financial and private institutions. The increase in institutionalised corruption goes hand in hand with an increase in drug consumption and drug-related crime. The actors are national and international criminal networks, whose crimes (money laundering, kidnappings, vendettas and extortion) are not only related to the drugs circuit, but also include fraud, gambling, prostitution, child pornography and child trafficking. The criminal networks are very well organised and have generated huge profits which they reinvest in both legal and illegal activities. Members of these groups protect themselves by infiltrating legitimate organisations, thus corrupting and compromising the legal order.

The effect on the social fabric is disastrous. Not only is the use of drugs increasing, but the consumption patterns and lifestyle of drug barons prove attractive to marginalised youth. Investment in law enforcement and security institutions is lacking, as well as adequate legislation to combat these new forms of crime.[15]

Crimes against property rose from 15,729 in 2000 to 19,071 in 2002. These crimes have also become more violent, and include grievous bodily harm, rape, arson and murder, and contribute largely to feelings of fear and frustration in society.[16]

Ordinary citizens are caught between a rock and a hard place; without the capital to invest in sophisticated security technology or professional neighbourhood watch,[17] they are the first to be victimised by criminals who choose the least risky operation. They are also the victims of police brutality encouraged by understaffing, fear and frustration within the corps. Suspects taken into custody are detained for as long as three months due to understaffing at the Court of Justice.

Who to trust?

With corruption within the police force widely recognised, and even acknowledged by the Minister responsible,[18] the average citizen thinks twice about reporting crime. Were that not enough, the average citizen is blamed for "not showing enough citizenship"[19] to report crimes. The fact is that the tradition of punishing crime is not very strong in Suriname. A former military coup leader accused of drug trafficking and sought by Interpol is now member of the National Assembly for his party. A former guerrilla and bank robber, accused of drug trafficking, is now paid staff in the National Safety Service.

On 8 December 1982, fifteen opponents of the military regime (journalists, lawyers, academics and trade union leaders) were murdered by the military authorities. *Decembermoorden (December murders)*, as it is known, is an issue in every election campaign of the ruling party, but the victims' relatives have still had to press the Government into continuing to investigate this atrocity regardless of the 18-year statute which would have proscribed the crimes in 2000.

Environmental crime

National and international environmental organisations have expressed alarm about the huge ground and river water pollution produced by the large quantities of mercury used in small-scale gold winning in the interior of the country. Gold diggers are usually foreigners, mostly from Brazil, or inhabitants of villages near gold winning areas. The 150 registered gold diggers are a small minority compared to the estimated 15,000 to 30,000 illegal gold diggers who operate without a permit. They use the cheapest method of gold winning, which causes 40% to 50% of the mercury to go straight into the soil and river. The rest of it ends in the atmosphere in the form of mercury vapour. Mercury intoxication affects local inhabitants who eat fish, use river water for drinking and inhale mercury vapour on a daily basis.[20]

Although not many cases of mercury intoxication have been reported in Suriname, on the Brazilian side of the border there is a growing number of cases in indigenous communities, where children are born with birth defects directly related to mercury intoxication of the mother during pregnancy.[21]

To date no legislation has been passed prohibiting the sale or use of mercury.

The environment and public health are also threatened by the generous use of pesticides in agriculture. Farmers associations acknowledge the use of heavy pesticides on vegetables up to the day before the harvest: "if you do not spray, you do not reap. And if you do not reap, you do not sell and you do not eat".[22] In 2002 exported vegetables were sent back to Suriname from the Netherlands because of the unacceptable high level of *monochrotophos* found in them. This pesticide, meant for rice farming and not vegetables, causes premature death, birth defects and brain damage, and affects bone marrow and DNA structure. The Ministry of Agriculture does not, however, consider it necessary to monitor vegetables for the national market because "as far as we know, all importers of pesticides comply with the rules and regulations".[23]

The challenge for civil society

The good news is that today there is widespread agreement in all sectors of civil society that governance reform is urgent. It will take courage and perseverance from civil society to take a stand and demand reforms before the next elections. Later could be too late.

Otherwise, human security will be nothing but a fleeting illusion, to be pursued but never attained.[24] ■

10 For example, the Bauxiet Akkoord, that had taxes fixed at an exchange rate of USD 1 = SRG 6.

11 Wood logging transnationals like Berjaya and Musa (Indonesia).

12 Concession given to gold mining multinational Golden Star (Canada) in the economic zone of the community of Nieuw Koffiekamp, a village whose inhabitants had already migrated once against their will to make way for a hydro-electric dam built in the late 1950s/early 1960s.

13 On the contrary, Cambior (Canada), a gold mining transnational informed local bakeries in the district of Brokopondo that they would not need their services any more because they would open their own bakery. Protests to the Ministry of Trade and Industry and the Ministry of Regional Development were of no avail.

14 Caribbean Community (Caricom). *Crime and Security Report*, 2002.

15 Santokhi, Ch. "Threats to Good Governance" in *Good Governance, Condition for Economic Development*, Association of Economists, Paramaribo, 2003.

16 *Ibid.*

17 Paid service offered by security officers and companies.

18 Minister of Justice and Police, New Year's speech, 2003.

19 Minister of Justice and Police in a radio-interview, Radio 10, January 2004.

20 Lie A Kwie, K. *Mercury intoxication as a result of small scale gold mining in Suriname*, 1997.

21 Lafaix, Philippe. *The Law of the Jungle*, Documentary, 2003.

22 Crab, J. "Poison on our Plate" in *Paramaribo Post*, 13 February 2003.

23 Acting Director of Ministry for Agriculture, Husbandry and Fishery in an interview for *Paramaribo Post*, February 2003.

24 Paraphrased from the lyrics of "War" by the late Bob Marley.

SWITZERLAND

At the crossroads

The country has reached a defining moment. On the one hand, the solidarity-based minimum retirement benefit and equal access for all to a high-quality healthcare system are firmly anchored in the public consciousness. On the other, these social rights are being gradually undermined. The fact is that tax cuts are making it increasingly difficult to achieve social improvements and inequality has grown. Furthermore, social inequality will grow steadily worse. The year 2004 will bring landmark discussions and decisions in social policy.

Swiss Coalition of Development Organisations
Swiss Coalition of Social Organisations

Pepo Hofstetter / Matthias Wächter

Economic context

Between 1992 and 2002, gross domestic product (GDP) rose by a mere 11.3%. This places the country in the company of Japan, Germany and Italy, which also recorded growth far below 20% for this period. Yet Switzerland falls clearly behind countries like the United Kingdom, USA, Finland, Sweden or the Netherlands, whose cumulative growth rates reached 30%-40%.

There are several reasons for this weak growth. On the one hand, it is the outcome of national finance and currency policy mistakes. On the other, the markedly export-oriented economy has been penalised by the weak growth of its major trading partners. However, middle class political parties and trade and industry associations highlight different causes. They blame the weak growth primarily on the rising tax ratio and government spending ratio, on the concomitant loss of "attractiveness as an investment location", and on the loss of "economic dynamism".

Weak growth was associated with falling tax revenue and led to increased deficits in the financial budgets of the Confederation and cantons. Income accruing in the social insurance system also contracted. At the same time, Switzerland, like other countries, has increased its expenditure in social security, owing - among other reasons - to rising poverty, mounting joblessness and an ageing population.

Given the situation, the public debate on social security and the social duties of the State is dominated entirely by financial issues.

The discussion on social issues is intensified by political changes. The parliamentary elections in November 2003 gave rise to a polarisation of the political landscape. Winners at the polls were the parties on the Left, namely the Greens (GP) and Social Democrats (SP), as well as the far-Right Swiss People's Party (SVP). The middle-class Centre, comprised of the Free Democratic Party (FDP) and the Christian Democratic People's Party (CVP), suffered considerable electoral losses, shifting further to the Right. Lastly, for the first time in 44 years there was also a marked shift to the Right in the Government (Federal Council), which is composed of the four major political parties.

The two middle class parties, the CVP and FDP, as well as the business associations, are exploiting the weak economic growth in order to demand: a) tax cuts, b) reduction in government spending to offset these tax cuts, c) cutbacks in social insurance, d) even greater privatisation of social security. According to them, Switzerland is undergoing a serious crisis and only these (classical neoliberal) measures would lead to substantial growth - and only then would it become possible to level out social inequalities. They are not merely accepting the worsening of the social inequalities that have become more pronounced over the past 10 years; rather, they see this as an incentive for greater "personal responsibility" and improved competitiveness.

The year 2004 will therefore bring landmark discussions and decisions in the field of social policy. As is usual in Switzerland, its citizens will have the opportunity to participate in a number of decisions through referendums and plebiscites. Within a few months, the people will be able to vote on tax legislation, a revision of retirement pension conditions (inter alia, increasing the retirement age for women from 64 to 65, and eliminating any social cushioning for early retirement for lower incomes), a revision of the compulsory health insurance system, as well as the introduction of maternity insurance, on which Parliament has at last taken a decision.

Tax haven

Globalisation is often used to explain the way domestic tax reforms are organised. Yet studies show that it is difficult to distinguish between autonomous and induced tax cuts. Tax competition among the 26 cantons is already leading to a mechanism that keeps taxes low. At the international level therefore, Switzerland can be described as a "first mover" which is exerting some pressure on the tax systems of other countries.

Compared to the European Union, direct taxes on income from wages and investment income as well as company taxes are very low. In recent years, cantonal inheritance taxes and taxes on assets were largely eliminated or sharply reduced. As a result of tax competition, there are individual cantons where even very high incomes are subject to falling tax rates. In reorganising the financial equalisation amongst the cantons, tax competition was left untouched and there was no attempt at tax harmonisation. Wealthy foreign nationals can negotiate an individual tax arrangement with the cantons, which will entail minimal tax rates and bear no relation to their economic capacity. Switzerland staunchly opposes the elimination of banking secrecy, which has made its financial and banking system one of the world's largest managers of private assets and has encouraged international tax evasion. There is even a parliamentary initiative that envisages enshrining banking secrecy in the Constitution.

The fact is that even now mobile incomes are already subject to negligible taxes. A study on "Globalisation and the causes of redistribution in Switzerland" shows that the relative tax burden on the lower income groups increased in the 1990s, while it fell for the upper income groups thanks to tax competition and legal possibilities for tax deductions.[1] The social inequality of incomes after deduction of all "compulsory contributions", such as taxes and social insurance contributions, has increased markedly. The factors that account for this include rising health insurance premiums which are collected on a per capita basis. Because rents primarily for smaller and family apartments have increased, the disposable income of the lower income brackets has fallen sharply, while that of the upper brackets has risen considerably. This has also exacerbated social inequality with respect to the possibility of having private pension schemes and bearing private education and health costs.

Regardless of this and despite massive deficits and cost-cutting measures in public budgets, Parliament approved a major tax relief package in 2003 affecting USD 1.6 billion, almost 4% of federal revenues. Tax relief for homeowners is the main subject of controversy. Relief measures primarily favour higher income groups. If the public accepts the proposal, social inequality will only get worse.

1 Müller, A et al. *Globalisierung und die Ursachen der Umverteilung in der Schweiz* (Globalisation and the causes of redistribution in Switzerland). Report for the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO), No. 12, 2002.

The tax cuts are further searing the State budget and making it difficult to effect social improvements. This applies to supplementary benefits, which are crucial to pension schemes above all, as they top up low pensions to a subsistence minimum. But difficulties also lie ahead for supplementary benefits for children or low-income families, as well as tax credits or at least a tax-free minimum wage for the "working poor". Furthermore, tax cuts are competing directly with further improvements of the premium reduction system for compulsory health insurance, aimed at offsetting the heavy burden resulting from per capita premiums for those with modest economic means.

In Switzerland, the tax system and the social transfer system are anything but transparent. This complicates the task of looking into tax justice and the incidence and effectiveness of social transfers. The debate about tax reforms is pervaded by efficiency and growth considerations. Yet that alone is not enough to answer the question "How should we tax ourselves?". If there is a political will, there is scope for redistribution, for binding national and international agreements to regulate tax competition. With substantial public participation, it is possible to draw up a new "social contract on burden sharing and social justice". Otherwise, social inequality regarding income and property will grow steadily worse.

Reform of the social insurance system

Social policy has invariably been and continues to be a "course of life" policy. One can gear the existing social security and public services toward three life phases. During childhood and adolescence, free access to schools, vocational training and universities ensure a certain equality of opportunity. During the adult phase of professional activity and family rearing, compulsory social insurances should cover risk situations such as illness, accidents and unemployment. And in old age every citizen should have a pension on which to live. Poverty should remain a marginal phenomenon that is taken care of through public assistance and integration efforts. Admittedly, doubts are now being raised about this social regime as a result of changing life patterns and social structures.

What is needed today is not the further development of social insurances (except in areas with clear shortcomings such as of maternity insurance) but a problem-specific reform. Reference is often made in this context to the pressures of globalisation. Globalisation, it is said, is leading inevitably to the end of the all-embracing welfare state of the post-war era. Together with the pluralisation and individualisation of life patterns and life situations, voices from the private sector and groups on the political Right are calling for a reduction in the basic social security financed by the State and for the expansion of private insurances. The reverse relationship between globalisation and social security is being overlooked, however. A well-developed welfare state would be tantamount to reinsurance for an open economy, which would create new risk situations, under the pressure to boost economic productivity.

Compared to other European countries, Switzerland displays a high degree of private responsibility for health insurance or retirement pension arrangements. Keywords are, for example, the per capita premium system in healthcare insurance, or the supplementing of the pay-as-you-go (State) pension system (Old-Age and Survivors Insurance) by means of a compulsory occupational (private) funded system. This means that the scope for greater privatisation, still being intensely debated in other European countries, is already largely exhausted.

Switzerland has now reached a defining moment. On the one hand, the solidarity-based minimum retirement benefit and equal access for all to a high-quality healthcare system are firmly anchored in the public consciousness. On the other, these social rights are being gradually undermined. As to the pension scheme, there is controversy over the scope of the benefits under the solidarity-based retirement pension. In the health sector, there is a move toward greater privatisation of healthcare insurance and a reduction of basic benefits under the compulsory health insurance system. Competition between medical service providers and health insurance companies should be fortified, and private providers put on an equal footing with public ones. In education too, private providers should be given equal status and education costs privatised.

Should the pressure for privatisation continue, Switzerland could well become an American-style "welfare state". Given the prevailing political climate, a sudden move toward a basic system of social security with only minimal guaranteed state support supplemented by a more extensive system of private insurances would seem possible. If on the other hand the plebiscites and referendums expected in 2004 can be used as an occasion for an intense public debate on the adaptation of the social insurances to more flexible life patterns and more individualised professional profiles, to changed demographic circumstances and more open economic structures, then workable solutions could be found, at the same time renewing and strengthening the values of solidarity.

Obstacles to human security

There is much domestic political discussion in the European countries about the threat to the welfare state from globalisation. Yet the picture will only be complete when the reverse action is also considered: the welfare state is striving toward and shaping globalisation. Social policy is closely bound with foreign and trade policy.

The "compulsion" toward quantitative economic growth is promoting European and worldwide economic integration and division of labour. A funded pension scheme is dependent on investment opportunities abroad. And in the choice of its national tax system, Switzerland is not merely reacting to pressure from the increased mobility of capital and goods, but is at the forefront of tax competition and liberalisation of international financial services. For the majority of Europe's citizens, the implications of the WTO, GATS, IMF, World Bank and the Environment and Social Summits of Rio and Copenhagen are still perceived as abstract and distant. Yet in adapting the social security network to the challenges of the 21st century, the close connection and shared destiny become all too obvious. No discussion of the future of social security can overlook the shaping of international relations and institutions.

Decisive years lie ahead for Switzerland. The crisis of the welfare state is being exaggerated by the political Right and circles close to the private sector so as to raise the pressure for the privatisation of social security and to secure further tax cuts. This will further compound social inequalities. After all, the economic situation is still good enough to obviate the need for any hasty corrective measures and instead allow for a well thought out, problem-specific reform.

To that end, at least two challenges must be met. First, any such reform will only succeed with the genuine involvement of a very wide public. A globalised world and an open economy have brought greater economic and social complexity. Achieving transparency regarding the most important interrelationships and presenting a subtly differentiated portrayal of interlinkages as the basis for a wide-ranging public debate will call for an extensive task of applied research and conveyance of information. The anti-globalisation movement has already worked hard to address its own economic competence. It would now be a good thing for such competence to be extended to the public at large.

Second, it is not enough to increase the pressure on Parliament and Government. A new kind of social contract can only be envisaged as an outgrowth of and in coherence with a series of reforms. This can only be driven by an emerging new social consensus. The opportunity for direct democracy as it is known in Switzerland lies in extensive public debate and support. The facts often portray a different picture: referendums and plebiscites are being used for obstructionist purposes and as strategic and tactical tools purely for the pursuit of self-interest. ■

The scourge of corruption, violence and robbery



As corruption becomes the surest way for people to access certain rights and services, Tanzanians are increasingly forced to dispose of their assets in order to obtain cash to bribe officials. As a result, corruption is exposing both households and individuals to a constant erosion of income or asset-related resources. In this context, violence, robbery and insecurity are prevalent even within households, where women are now at greater risk than in public places.

Concern for Development Initiatives in Africa (ForDIA)
Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC)
Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP)
Tanzania Women Lawyers Association (TAWLA)
Women Advancement Trust (WAT)
Women in Law and Development in Africa (WiLDAF)
Youth Partnership Countrywide (YPC)
Women Legal Aid Centre (WLAC)

TABLE 1

Crimes in Dar es Salaam. 1995-2003

Offence	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2003
Rape	198	266	195	337	302	316	370	335
Petty theft	36,213	34,011	35,160	26,112	29,012	31,002	28,411	27,180
Murder	111	123	126	105	180	159	155	118
House- breaking	9,002	7,958	6,582	7,266	8,653	7,653	6,775	5,907
Armed robbery	241	209	116	90	156	115	168	193
Number of people injured in armed robberies	46	31	24	16	10	8	26	31

Source: Dar es Salaam Regional Police Commander's Office, May 2003.

People's experiences in terms of security illustrate the high degree of risk and insecurity that people are exposed to due to the inability of police and local authorities to contain violent crime. In specific areas of Tanzania acts of crime and violence have caused social, material and bodily harm. Participation in income-generating activities is also curtailed, as people live in constant fear due to the rising levels of crime, and therefore do not feel free to pursue certain activities, such going to their "shamba" (a plot of land for growing crops).

Robbery and violence

In some cases robbery and violence lead to physical injury and trauma, more commonly in urban than in rural areas.

Crime undermines the viability of the economy even at local community level. For example, Tanzania Fisheries Company officials in the rural district of Kigoma reported that the impact of theft on the village of Mwakizega had been so severe that by May 2002 the local fishing industry was devastated, reduced to almost 20% of its 2001 levels.[1]

Violence is another obstacle to human security, leading to psychological, material and bodily harm. Tanzanians are being subjected to two types of violence: first, violence perpetrated by government agents (random arrests and detentions by militia or abuse by police and local authorities); second, violence inflicted by other civilians (rape, domestic abuse, armed robbery).

One example of the first type of violence is the use of excessive force and inhuman treatment by government agents such as the police when dealing with suspected offenders. Remand and prison conditions remain harsh and life-threatening in Tanzania. For example, in September 2002, at Mbarali police station in the Mbeya region, 112 suspects were detained in a small room capable of accommodating only 30 inmates. Seventeen of them died of suffocation. A report released in January 2003, which probed the deaths of the 17 prisoners, confirmed that the Government was grossly negligent in the handling of remand prisoners. Statistically, there are approximately 45,000 inmates in the country's prisons, which have a collective capacity for only 21,000 inmates, a situation that poses a serious threat to the human rights and security of Tanzanian prisoners.[2]

Women: even more vulnerable at home

Violence against women is prevalent and affects them in various ways irrespective of their age, education, origin, religion, marital status or place of residence. Women are more vulnerable at home than in public spaces. Domestic violence takes the form of battery, female genital mutilation, sexual abuse, marital rape, to which can be added institutionalised violence in certain tribes, such as cleansing rituals and forced marriages.

The issue of inheritance illustrates married women's unequal status with regard to property ownership, and provides insight into the persistently unequal conditions of women's lives. Inheritance rights are a critical issue for women because in Tanzania widows traditionally have had little right to inherit property from their husband's estate even when the property was acquired during their marriage. The issue is further complicated by a tripartite legal system consisting of customary, Islamic and statutory law. The uncertainty and confusion caused by this situation lead to exploitative practices, such as property-grabbing by the deceased husband's relatives. As a result women are often left destitute and homeless upon the death of their spouses.

Corruption, a scourge to justice

Tanzania - like most African countries - is faced with a problem of corruption, which has become endemic in both the public and private sectors. People see corruption as inevitable and claim that the phenomenon has become institutionalised, with little effort being made to contain the practice despite widespread complaints by the population.

In some communities, the village authorities, including the Village Executive Officers, are notorious for imposing severe penalties and fines for minor offences, or for demanding or receiving payment without issuing receipts.

Corruption within the police force is common and takes a number of forms, with the result that security, the protection of people's property and basic human rights are at risk. As commented by one resident:

"…In hospitals, at the courts, at the police station, they all demand bribes before attending you. An example is the TZS 80,000 (USD 77) bribe I was forced to pay at the court in order to free my relative who had been on remand for six months. The bribe completely exhausted the investment capital that I was saving for an orange fruit business. Even after paying the bribe nobody would set him free until I had paid an influential man TZS 2,000 (USD 1.90). He was then able to get him released without any constraints."

1 Tanzania Participatory Poverty Assessment (TzPPA). *Vulnerability and Resilience to Poverty in Tanzania: Causes, Consequences and Policy Implications.* TzPPA, 2002/2003, p. 87.

2 *Ibid*, pp. 86-90.

Corruption is an enemy to justice and fuels social instability. It exposes households and individuals to a constant erosion of income and asset-related resources, since people are often forced to dispose of their assets in order to obtain cash to bribe officials. This has led to a decline in confidence in the government system since corruption has increasingly become the surest means by which people can access certain rights and services.

Government efforts

With respect to security, law and order, the Government has taken various initiatives to improve efficiency and fairness in the delivery of legal and judicial services. Among these are the establishment of a Commercial Court in August 1999 for the settling of commercial disputes, recruitment of resident magistrates, primary court magistrates and state attorneys, and the creation of the Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance (CHRGG) in 2002.

The Government has undertaken several measures to root out corruption, namely by passing anti-corruption laws.[3] Other measures include the ongoing restructuring of the public sector.[4] Moreover, in 1995 the Government appointed the Presidential Commission of Inquiry Against Corruption (PCIC), more commonly known as the Warioba Commission. The Commission carried out a study on why corruption has became endemic in Tanzanian society and distinguished between those who receive bribes as a means of supplementing their meagre incomes (petty corruption) and those who indulge in corrupt practices because of excessive greed for wealth (grand corruption). The Commission also pointed out also that the greatest cause of corruption in the country is lax leadership, the absence of clear guidelines on accountability of leaders and the general erosion of leaders. The changes brought about by the liberalisation of the economy, with its resultant competitiveness and conspicuous consumption, have led the public to believe that one can do anything and get away with it.

The Government's practical response to both the Warioba Report and the ensuing public debates on corruption was to launch the National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plans (NACSAP). In November 1999, the Cabinet entrusted the NACSAP to act in three areas: a) to carry out relevant institutional reforms to erradicate corruption (corrective measure 1), b) to implement a public awareness campaign against corruption (corrective measure 2), and c) to bring together stakeholders working on rooting-out corruption in Tanzania (corrective measure 3). Government-level implementation of NACSAP activities started in July 2000 and by October 2000 all 22 government ministries had developed sector-specific action plans to address their specific corruption-prone areas by promoting transparency, simplifying procedures, simplifying rules and making information accessible to the general public.

Beyond the government level, the NACSAP has sought new partnerships for its activities by inviting civil organisations and the media to develop their own sector-specific action plans for addressing corruption. Local governments and the private corporate sector also remain earmarked for NACSAP partnership. In response to demands for effectiveness and efficiency in July 2001 the Government instituted - under the Chief Secretary - the Good Governance Coordination Unit (GGCU) to co-ordinate, among other good governance matters, the implementation of NACSAP activities.

The GGCU designed good governance and corruption reporting tools as well as a framework for implementing the NACSAP. This framework involves government ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs), and the specialised governance organisations - the Prevention of Corruption Bureau (PCB), the Civil Service Department (CSD) and the CHRGG - in reporting cases of corruption. It is also the agency to which Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and the corporate sector can report on corruption and bad governance in public services.

GGCU collects data from MDAs, specialised governance agencies and CSOs, and once it has analysed it, publishes the "Tanzania state of good governance" quarterly reports. So far the first and second quarterly reports 2002 have been published (see Table 2).

TABLE 2

Reports of corrupt and unethical behaviour

Source of information on the cases	First Quarter (January-March) cases	Second Quarter (April-June) cases
Raised in parliament	6	8
Reported in mass media	97	135
Letters received by MDAs	46	301
Referred by other Agencies	18	58
Referred by NGOs/CSOs	0	5
Other sources	0	0

Source: Second Quarterly Monitoring Report, April-June, 2002. President Office, Good Governance Coordination Unit (GGCU).

These figures show that between the first and second quarters there was an increase of 340 cases (about 200%). This jump is attributable to cases reported by the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security (MAFS), which alone accounted for 214 cases (71%) reported by the MDAs, and about 50% of all cases reported. To be noted is the fact that NGOs/CSOs did not report any cases, which shows a serious lack of awareness on the part of civil society and the community as a whole.

Cases reported by specialised governance agencies

The specialised agencies (PCB and CHRGG) registered a total of 269 cases (an increase of 69%) of bribery, corruption, fraud and other unethical conduct in the second quarter. Out of the 269 cases, 65 of them involved public officials covered by the Leadership Ethics Code (LEC). The cases of officials covered by the LEC were 50 for the PCB and 15 for the CHRGG. In the cases not covered by the LEC, PCB and CHRGG reported 194 and 10 cases respectively. This indicates a very high increase when compared to the first quarter, where in the category of corrupt and unethical behaviour only 34 cases were reported. The number of cases reported by citizens increased by 164 cases (496%).

Efforts of the civil society organisations

Almost all NGOs/CSOs in Tanzania are advocating for human rights and good governance through:

- legal and human rights education
- awareness programmes on human rights, good governance and the impact of corruption
- research on and documentation of those issues
- monitoring and evaluation of MDAs, etc.

As mentioned above, the NACSAP recognises the right of CSOs to become its partners, as a means of putting pressure on the Government to formalise the mechanisms for CSOs to participate in the implementation of the NACSAP. However, according to available documentary evidence, participation of civil society in the NACSAP has been marginal. If properly organised, CSOs could very well make a valuable contribution to subsequent NACSAP quarterly reports, thus counterchecking the MDAs' internally generated data. ■

3 Permanent Commission of Enquiry Act, 1996; Prevention of Corruption Act, 1971; Economic and Organized Crime Control Act 1984; Leadership Ethics Code, 1995.

4 Health sector reforms, civil service reforms, financial reforms, local government reforms, Financial and Legal Management Upgrading Project (FILMUP), Education Sector Development Programme, privatisation, Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA) tax reforms, etc.

References

Women's Dignity Project (WDP). "Poor Experiences of Health Services Survey (Korogwe, Mpwapwa and Tunduru districts)". October 2003.

Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA). *Policy and Service Satisfaction Survey (PSSS)*. 2003.

Tanzania Participatory Poverty Assessment (TzPPA), 2003.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). *Poverty and Human Development Report 2002*. 2002.

National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plans (NACSAP).

THAILAND

Two different worlds



The effects of globalisation on government policies, particularly in the field of natural resources management, has been even more devastating than the effects on human security of economic shortcomings and natural disasters. The construction of a gas pipeline in partnership with Malaysia and the monopoly of telecommunications in the hands of corporations owned by members of the political elite are the most alarming issues in a society where economic growth has widened the gap between the rich and the poor.

Social Agenda Working Group

Ranee Hassarungsee

Participation and authoritarianism

In the past, problems related to natural resources and the environment were limited to indiscriminate tree felling in the forests by local inhabitants. Things have now changed. The rights of communities, recognised by the Constitution, are under threat. Thais have always defended their rights within the institutional legal framework, and in this case too they have exhausted all local and regional opportunities to make their claims heard before resorting to street demonstrations. The Government has responded with authoritarian attitudes that discourage popular participation.

The gas pipeline of insecurity

The Government is committed to the globalisation process, which exerts a powerful influence on state policies for natural resource management. Other countries and transnational corporations are increasingly interfering in the formulation of Thailand's development policies. The Thai Government has become a stakeholder in the Thailand-Malaysia Gas Pipeline, a partnership between the Petroleum Authority of Thailand and Malaysia approved in 1999. Opposition to the project was immediate and continues to this day. Led by more than 1,000 academics and the people of Chana district,[1] opponents of the pipeline have publicly argued that the benefits of the project are insignificant compared to the dangers it represents to the ecosystem and to the lifestyle and livelihood of local communities. A local villager speaks: "Mab Ta Phud (a much publicised and promoted industrial zone on the east coast of Thailand) suffers from a lot of pollution. People there, the children and the adults, are not happy. Their complaints have not been heard. I ask myself, is this really development? If other people want this kind of development, good luck to them. I know that I don't."[2] There is also, of course, the risk of an explosion.

The Government of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra has the final power of decision in the execution of the pipeline project, but the Government has never given public explanations of its intentions and has consistently refused to enter into open dialogue with the opposition movement. The Government's attitude has encouraged the companies responsible for constructing the pipeline to simply ignore demands for a public debate over the issue. Their only response has been to take out advertising space in the media to publicise and praise the pipeline project.

The gas pipeline and other mega-projects aimed at developing infrastructure have not been managed properly. In addition to preparatory and operational difficulties, there has been a serious lack of transparency. Some projects have had to be cancelled because of their negative impact or because they turned out to be ineffective. This has disrupted the country's development, and some sectors of the economy have suffered large losses.

Political power plus economic power plus media power

After the 1997 economic crisis transnational corporations bought up so many bankrupt businesses that today it is hardly possible to talk of "national" assets. The benefits derived from the growth of the GDP must therefore be examined carefully in this context.[3]

Between January and October 2003, fourteen companies registered with the Stock Exchange and issued shares which were traded at 50% to 100% over their average prices. Recent press reports have revealed that the shares were snapped up by well-known business groups (CP Seven Eleven PLC, Matching Studio, RS Promotion, Advance Information Technology PLC, International Research Corporation PLC, and SC Assets).[4] These groups are closely linked to high-ranking politicians in the government party, Thai Rak Thai (Thais Who Love Thais).[5] The Shin Corp Group, a conglomerate owned by the present Prime Minister, is the most powerful one. This group operates cellular phone services (AIS), satellite communications (IPSTAR Co.) and television (ITV PLC). Not only do its activities essentially depend on public monies, they also directly affect the public sphere. The concessions granted to the political powers-that-be (through the workings of political manipulation), give the concessionaires perpetual rights and privileges which are not necessarily commensurate with their business management expertise. Supinya Klangnarong, secretary of the Campaign for Popular Media Reform, has said: "So far, the Prime Minister has done nothing to tackle the conflict of interests. Nor has the Royal Decree on Taxation on the Operation of Telecommunication nor the contract for ITV. (…) We are concerned that Thai society, shaped by media information, will be dominated by the Shin Corp group which is the only company with a strong political base."[6]

1 Since the Thai Government signed a contract for the construction of a gas pipeline to exploit gas reserves in the Joint Development Area between Thailand and Malaysia a few years ago, local people who inhabit the area around the construction site in Chana District, Songkha Province, have had no peace. Most of these people, who earn their living from small-scale fishery, are very conscious of the adverse impacts of this project on their lifestyle and environment. They have vigorously opposed the project, and security forces have responded with brutal repression. A major clash took place in December 2002, resulting in many people being injured and extensive property damage. Leaders of the movement were arrested on trumped up charges. UN Special Representative on Human Rights Defenders Hina Jilani, who visited the area, has deplored the arrests. Jilani has unsuccessfully lobbied the Thai Government to drop all charges. She described the situation faced by civil society movements in Thailand as one of "intimidation and fear". June 2003.

2 Testimony of Areeya Hmadeh in: "Reasons of the Anti-Thai-Malaysian Gas Pipeline Project Movement". NGO-Coordinating Committee on Rural Development/Southern Branch. Thailand, 2000.

3 According to UNICEF, the average annual growth rate of per capita GDP was 2.8% for the period 1990-2000. Regarding the purchase of assets by transnational companies, see: Prasertkul, Seksan, "Thailand on the Road to Democracy: Problems and Solutions Explored". Conference speech for the 30th Anniversary of the 14 October 1973 uprising, co-organised by the 14 October Federation and the Co-ordinating Group for the 30th Anniversary, Public Sector. 14 October 2003.

4 *Matichon Daily*, 1 December 2003, p. 12.

5 Pattamanan, Ukrit. *Matichon Weekly*, 5 December 2003.

6 *Post Today*, 30 June 2003. On 1 December 2003, Supinya was sued by Shin Corp for defamation due to her interview with *Thai Post* about the links between the corporation's profits and the Thai Rak Thai Government. 16 July 2003.

TABLE 1

Household debt - in Thai bahts (THB) per household per month

	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002
TOTAL HOUSEHOLDS					
Average debt (THB/household)	31,079	55,300	72,345	70,586	84,603
Relation debt-monthly salary	3.7	5	5.7	5.7	6.1
Percentage of debt spent on consumption	59.7	50.8	61.2	61	64.1
POOR HOUSEHOLDS					
Average debt (THB/household)	9,727	13,698	22,787	21,818	24,876
Relation debt-monthly salary	4.4	5.4	7.5	7.5	8.5
Percentage of debt spent on consumption	37.9	34.3	39.1	41.5	44.5
VERY POOR HOUSEHOLDS					
Average debt (THB/household)	11,830	18,593	22,968	20,083	24,188
Relation debt-monthly salary	9.1	12.2	13.1	11.5	15.2
Percentage of debt spent on consumption	53.4	26.9	40.4	37.7	50.2

Source: This table is adapted from information supplied by Somchai Jitsuchon at the annual conference of the Thailand Development Research Institute on Human Security 2003.

Note: A) "Very poor" households are those earning less than 50% of the amount defined as the poverty line (around THB 2,000 per household per month). B) THB 1 = USD 0.03.

The State maintains its monopoly on power, not by force of arms, but through control of capital and the media. Its power is therefore exercised more subtly, and people are unwittingly more vulnerable to it.

The growth gap

Social changes in Thailand have been consistent with capitalist logic and this has polarised Thai society. The gap between rural and urban areas has widened. Two worlds co-exist: the globalised, modern world of the haves, and the miserable world of the have-nots.

According to neoliberal doctrine, economic growth depends on increases in per capita consumption. As a result, more and more mega-projects are being approved, and more state businesses are being privatised. Thus, the Government and their political entourage accumulate wealth and profits via financial speculation, through their monopoly on the telecommunications industry, and by making political decisions subject to market principles for their own benefit. Far from solving the economic difficulties of the ordinary people, and the structural problems that cause them, this course of action simply makes matters worse. Table 1 shows figures for household debt which are eloquent in themselves.

The excluded majority

People's participation in decision-making is the essential foundation for building human security. One way of evaluating popular participation is to take a critical look at the composition of the legislature. According to Thailand's Electoral Commission, out of a total of 500 members of parliament (MPs), 453 are businessmen, former government officials, lawyers and politicians. In other words, fully 90.2% of MPs belong to the well-off urban classes; the agricultural sector and the working class are represented by only 3.2% and 2.8%, respectively. Although senators are now elected directly, the composition of the Senate is not very different, as the conditions for running for election were biased in favour of the elite. We can therefore conclude that Thai "representative" democracy excludes the poor majority of the population from decision-making at the national level.

It is hardly surprising, therefore, that not even the local communities most affected by big government projects, nor those whose natural resources have been allocated to private companies, approve of the bargains that have been made in the name of the "national interest". Neither is it surprising that anti-government protests are spreading among small local communities and throughout the poorer social sectors. The gap between the rich and the poor is widening under the impact of globalised capitalism, and may usher in a period of social and political violence in the country. If the present economic policies continue, drinking water, electricity, health and education will become commodities to be freely traded at market rates. Life for Thais will then be restricted merely to consuming or investing in goods and services.

Human security means protecting the vital core of every human being so as to enhance the enjoyment of freedom and human self-realisation. In contrast, the so-called development programmes in Thailand during 2003 in fact constitute a grievous assault on human security.

Communities and globalisation

The changes brought about by modernisation have made citizens more aware of their civil and political liberties. However, economic, social and cultural rights are increasingly being restricted. Local communities care greatly about their values, their cultural uniqueness, and their natural and intellectual resources; they have therefore been motivated to join forces in a common struggle against the threat of invasion posed by transnational corporations, and the commercialisation imposed upon them by Western industrial super-powers. Such a heightening of consciousness demonstrates that individual rights have come to be embraced as community rights. In order to guarantee these rights and empower the people, development initiatives must be democratically managed at grassroots level.

Concluding remarks

The issues discussed in this report can be summarised and concluded in the words of Seksan Prasertkul,[7] on the occasion of the 30th Anniversary of 14 October 1973 Uprising:

"It is true that we have not been capable of creating a society in which everybody has equal access to property. But at least we should not abandon the hope of creating a society in which all human beings are equal. In any case, material riches are not always important. Once the basic needs for adequate food and decent housing are satisfied, peaceful coexistence, cultural advancement, spiritual depth and the realisation of what it really means for us to live in this world for only a limited period of time, are more important than making profit. This concept is in direct opposition to the quantification of everything by market mechanisms; in fact it impedes the flow of capital and the accumulation of wealth. It means that investors will be barred from extracting resources from certain areas, and that the lifestyle of Thais will not lead to free-competition, but to collective co-operation. These choices and the diverse approaches to development will never be available to the people unless public participation in devising economic policies that affect their communities is recognised. We must appreciate local wisdom, decentralise development and political power, and put an end to the abuses of state authority and the power of capital."[8] ■

7 Seksan Prasertkul is a well-known Thai writer and intellectual, and Dean of the Faculty of Political Science at Thammasat University. He led students in a mass uprising that toppled the military dictatorship in October 1973.

8 Prasertkul, Seksan, "Thailand on the Road to Democracy: Problems and Solutions Explored". Conference speech for the 30th Anniversary of the 14 October 1973 uprising, co-organised by the 14 October Federation and the Co-ordinating Group for the 30th Anniversary, Public Sector. 14 October 2003.

Deteriorating living conditions and job instability



The last couple of years have witnessed the emergence of two contrasting trends in Tunisia. On the one hand, the Government is enforcing policies aimed at limiting the negative outcomes of structural adjustment programmes implemented since the early 1980s, while on the other hand, it is becoming increasingly more evident that the adoption of market-oriented policies poses serious threats to the economy.

Tunisian League for Human Rights

Salah Edeen El-Jourchi[1]

For several years now, efforts have been made to eradicate slums, whose residents live below the poverty line. Yet a growing number of layoffs in the public sector, even among profitable and stable enterprises, is leading to a lack of social security, causing social apprehension and fear of unemployment.

Three main issues dominated the socio-economic scenario in Tunisia in 2003: the increasingly negative consequences of privatisation, the "hidden"[2] migration of the young to Europe, and the growth of illegal trade, an issue related to the migration problem.

Privatisation

Privatisation in Tunisia has become a taboo subject in that it cannot be discussed or criticised. Attracting foreign direct investment (FDIs) has become an obsession with the Government, which believes that FDIs will improve exports. Economists find that the economic crisis, following years of economic prosperity during the 1990s, is leading the Government to concentrate on privatisation in order to hide the deficit in the national budget. One of the causes of the deficit is the decline in the tourist industry in the light of the incidents of 11 September 2001 and the Jarbah terrorist incident,[3] where 20 people were killed.

The country is indeed undergoing escalating economic difficulties due to decreasing tax returns and the detrimental effect to small and medium enterprises resulting from the implementation of the European-Tunisian agreement within the Euro Mediterranean Partnership project. This has led to increasing unemployment, diminishing taxation returns on imports and has affected the competitiveness of local companies faced with cheaper and better quality foreign goods, owing to which most of them went out of business.[4]

Fearing a rise in unemployment, the Government has followed a gradual, rather than speedy, privatisation policy since the 1980s. But there are increasing pressures from donors, especially from the World Bank, which has criticised Tunisia's privatisation process, considering its policies inappropriate.

However, in the 2003-2004 budget there is an increasing trend in favour of private investment by local and foreign companies, which will lead to the privatisation of 24 public institutions during 2004. In addition to these, the Government will allow privatisation of companies that have traditionally been controlled by the public sector, such as communications, energy and services. The mining sector, considered a sector of high strategic value to Tunisia, is also being opened up to private buyers, who are offered incentives to invest in this area.

In view of the negative consequences that could result from this process, especially the fear that transnational corporations might control focal sectors of the economy, several parliamentarians have requested more incentives and support for Tunisian investors. They have also questioned the degree of participation permitted in the mining sector to foreign investors, in order to prevent the damage of national resources and as a means of preventing potential threats to sovereignty of the nation.

Since 1987, 176 public institutions changed hands from the public sector to the local and foreign private investors, involving an estimated EUR 1.76 billion (USD 2.77 billion). As reported in the media, privatisation policies have shifted the monopoly of public institutions from the Government to the hands of a limited number of private owners. Subsequently many privatised companies went bankrupt and were resold. The trade unions have asked the Government to stop privatising stable and profitable public enterprises, as well as for more transparency in the privatisation process.

The primary worry for civil society including trade unions, are the growing layoffs of large numbers of workers, especially women. This is due to several interrelated factors including privatisation, new approaches to industrial development, economic difficulties and the harsh competitiveness that many businesses and economic institutions are facing.

Many employees from the textile industry and the coastal areas have organised hunger strikes in protest against layoffs, the closure of institutions or their sale to the private sector, without providing workers with any security. Economists note that Tunisia has reached its ceiling as far as job creation is concerned, and the problem of unemployment will probably become chronic, thus affecting the economic and social future of its population.

Hidden migration and gloomy prospects

Although official efforts toward decreasing poverty levels have led to significant improvements in many sectors, there is growing fear and gloom among the young, especially those from the middle and lower classes, over increasingly limited prospects for them in their professional and social lives. This explains to a great extent the trend of hidden migration to European countries on the northern coasts of the Mediterranean.

Tunisia is a major departure point for other nationals crossing over to Europe. Most of them come from the Maghreb and North African countries. Local networks involved in smuggling illegal immigrants are still uninvolved in human trafficking, but well-organised Turkish networks are spreading and have succeeded in making contact with local organisations.

Tunisian youth refer to migration as "the burning", a term that refers not only to their burning their identity documents but to the act of "burning their bridges", or getting rid of their past by breaking geographic borders and legal barriers, including their belonging to a nation that they believe has failed them. Symbolic as it may sound, burning their documents is the best way of not revealing their nationality in case they are captured.

1 Vice President of the Tunisian League for Human Rights (LTDH) and member of the Coordination Committee of the Arab NGO Network for Development (ANND), annd@annd.org

2 "Hidden" because the Government has been reluctant to make migration figures public.

3 Jarbah is a Tunisian tourist island in the Mediterranean Sea. An explosion took place on 11 April 2002, killing 20 people, most of whom where German tourists.

4 It is worth noting that the Government has invested in the textile sector although the country does not produce raw materials.

Despite the dangers involved in escaping across the sea to the Italian coast, an attempt in which hundreds have drowned in recent years, every couple of weeks Tunisians newspapers have another tragedy to report.

Even though the Government avoids revealing statistics about the victims, some studies by researchers in collaboration with civil society organisations (CSOs) reveal that the main cause for the increase in migration is unemployment. In addition, these studies show that most migrants come from poor families and have dropped out of school, although an increasing number of them have university degrees. They all dream of a "European heaven", in which both fortune and beauty are combined. They are under the grip of a culture of hatred and refusal, whereby migration becomes the only option for escaping fear and suffering. Finally, many perceive migration as the only way out of becoming involved in criminal activities.

Field research has also revealed that hidden migration from Tunisia is of an individualistic nature and not a family or communal affair. It is most prevalent among young men whose ages range between 19 and 35. Although so far most migrants have been males, more females are expected to join their ranks in the future. Seventy-five per cent of migrants are seeking a job, whereas the rest are either pushed by political reasons or are escaping from crimes they committed, especially crimes related to the financial sector.

In this respect, experts agree that this trend will probably grow due to economic imbalances, both global and local. Globalisation is threatening a greater number of the Southern population with poverty. Italian researcher Salvatore Palidda[5] considers that the war declared on immigration holds a tremendous threat for illegal workers in Europe. He explains that 30% of the Italian economy is based on the work of illegal immigrants, where double standards expose them to deceit and abuse. In many cases they are threatened to exposure by their employees in order to avoid paying them their salaries, obliging them to escape without asking for compensation.

Civil society representatives, especially the Association of Human Rights and the trade unions, have adopted hidden migration as a priority issue. They believe that dealing with the problem from a national security perspective fails to address the roots and real causes of the problem, an approach that has already failed to produce any solutions.

Corruption and illegal trade

The third issue that has negatively affected the social, economic and political development of the country is the combination of corruption and illegal trade. Economists and social practitioners fear that the quick increase in corruption has made the population more insecure, since it leads to a situation in which a small group of people become very wealthy, while the rest of the population become more exposed to threats to their living conditions and human security.

The negative effects of illegal trade have even caught the Government's attention. It is controlled by large and strong smuggling networks, who have sufficient power and ability to flood the local market with cheap, untaxed goods, thus threatening the survival of both private and public companies.

The growth in illegal trade has been encouraged by the Government's lack of transparency shown by the continuous obstacles it has put to making information available to the public. The situation is compounded by the lack of a free and plural media.

It is worth noting that while the Government is encouraging the private sector towards taking a bigger role in the process of development and investment, it is still trying to monopolise social work and to create obstacles for CSOs. This is limiting the role of civil society, while keeping all the activity of CSOs under the control and monitoring of government agencies.

Conclusion

In the light of the above challenges, all CSOs which are independent of the Government and are dedicated to development in its wider sense are constantly lobbying in order to highlight their role as partners and their right to take part in social and political debates at the local level. There are many factors that must become part of the debate on the threats to human security, including freedom of association for CSOs, freedom of the press, freedom to all political parties, independence of the legal system, as well as clean elections, especially municipal and parliamentary elections.

In spite of official efforts towards avoiding social conflict - a major problem during the 1970s and 1980s - what the Government is doing is not enough to protect the various social groups from deteriorating living conditions and the instability of jobs which threatens tens of thousands of employees due to privatisation.

In this respect, it is very beneficial that the Social Watch Network dedicates part of its work in theory and in practice to create policies and recommendations that may help individuals increasingly threatened by poverty and unemployment. In addition, we recommend that Social Watch organise workshops and discussions on the issues of illegal immigration, which has become a major problem in European countries. The Five plus Five Summit[6] was specifically organised to study different approaches to this problem which affects both shores of the Mediterranean. ■

5 Salvatore Palidda completed his doctoral studies in Sociology and European Studies at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales in Paris. He is professor at the Faculty of Educational Sciences, University of Genoa, and his research interests include deviancy and criminalisation, security and police problems, and international migrations.

6 The "Five plus Five" Summit took place on 5-6 December 2003 in Tunisia. Five "southern" European countries (Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, Malta), and five countries from the Maghreb (Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, Tunisia, Libya) took part. The 5+5 cooperation process in the east Mediterranean was launched in 1990 in Rome.

Forgotten crisis, irreversible damage



For the past seventeen years the north and east of the country have suffered an armed conflict that has been described by the UN Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs as "a forgotten crisis". In the context of the war between government troops and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) guerrillas the most brutal atrocities have been committed and the human rights of over two million people have been violated. The resolution of this conflict demands urgent international intervention.

DENIVA

David Obot

The impact of the conflict

For 17 years, the population in the north and east of Uganda has been caught in the middle of a devastating conflict.[1] The impact of the war includes the violation and denial of human rights to life, food, shelter, health, education, personal security, and access to public and international resources to two million people. Despair and insecurity plague the population. Children born or growing up in this environment have no future, in fact, they are hardly able to survive the present: since 1996 some 20,000 children have been abducted to serve in the guerrilla, and some two million have been displaced.[2]

Abduction, rape, murder

Abductees are tied together at the ankle, forced to carry heavy loads, and made to walk as long as eight hours a day without pause, until they reach Nichitu camp in Southern Sudan.[3] As soon as they arrive, they start receiving rudimentary military training. Any children who attempt to escape are killed or severely punished.[4]

Girls are raped by both LRA commanders and government soldiers. Other acts of aggression include the maiming of adults and children, ambushing of vehicles and destruction of homes, crops and infrastructure.

The conflict has seen some of the worst forms of merciless killings. It is estimated that over 23,520[5] people have been killed while two million people have moved to the Internally Displaced People's camps (IDP).[6] In one camp alone, there are about 10,000 children.[7]

Education

In the IDP camps there are no schools. Even if the necessary educational infrastructure existed, there would be massive overcrowding and constant fear of LRA raids, generating an unpropitious environment for learning. There would also be problems with recruiting teachers and obtaining learning materials. The negative effect of the conflict on primary education also led to a drop in farm production. A study by Deininger and Okidi shows that there is a strong relationship between years of primary school education and the value of farm production (an increase of 5% for every year that the head of household has attended primary school).[8] Years of primary education lost therefore imply a decrease in farm production.

Health

Malnutrition, malaria, HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and psychological trauma are common. In the IDP camps, sanitation is poor,[9] there are almost no medicines available, and people starve to death rather than risking venturing out of the camps to look for food. Water is a luxury: one borehole has to cover the needs of around 30,000 people.

The population cannot cultivate crop varieties that would contribute to food security and a balanced diet.[10] They sleep without mosquito nets, so the multiplication of malarial parasites goes unchecked. Furthermore, drugs to treat malaria are in very short supply. The result of these poor health conditions is a high death rate: on average, 100 deaths a day from malaria, measles, diarrhoea and respiratory infections were recorded in 10 camps containing 220,000 people.

In addition to the high number of rape cases, a report by the Gulu Social and Counselling Organisation (GUSCO) revealed that after abducted girls had been rescued and medically examined, 85% were found to be infected with various sexually transmitted diseases (STDs). Since there is a high correlation between STDs and HIV/AIDS, it is feared that most of the girls may be HIV positive.

Impact on the national economy

The coalition Civil Society Organisations for Peace in Northern Uganda (CSOPNU) estimates that the conflict has cost the country about 3% of its annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP), or around USD 1.33 billion for the past 17 years. The main costs derive from heavy military expenditure and loss of export earnings from primary goods such as cotton, tobacco, and *simsim* (sesame seeds) produced in the conflict region. Also lost are development opportunities, as in the case of international aid for four regional hospitals that had to be cancelled due to the lack of security.[11]

1 Populations for districts directly affected by mass internal displacement are as follows: Northern Uganda - Apac (676,244), Gulu (468,407), Kitgum (286,122), Lira (757,763), Pader (293,679); Eastern Uganda - Kaberamaido (122,924), Katakwi (307,032), and Soroti (371,986); totalling 3,284,157, i.e. 13% of the total 24.7 million-strong population. Populations for districts affected due their proximity to the areas in which insurgents operate are: Northern Uganda - Adjumani (201,493), Arua (855,055), Kotido (596,130), Moroto (170,506), Moyo (199,912), Nakapiripirit (153,862), Nebbi (433,466), Yumbe (253,325) totalling 2,863,749, i.e. 12% of the population. Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2001.

2 *The Monitor*, 26 October 2003, p. 1.

3 "Andrew Akera, 13, was abducted in 2001. He recalls that, during abduction, the legs of abducted children were tied and the camp set ablaze. Each child carried about 40 kg of looted items, and walked for nearly eight hours. They stopped to cook for two hours. Abducted children ate greens, while the Rebel Commanders ate fish, meat and flour. They slept in the bush. For a month, abduction of children and looting continued, and thereafter children were all taken to Nichitu Camp in Southern Sudan." *The Monitor*, 19 November 2003, p. 15.

4 "Orders were given that whoever tried to escape be killed. On one occasion [Andrew Akera] was whipped all over the body for attempting to escape and left for dead until the following day." *The Monitor*, 19 November 2003, p. 15.

5 Dorsey, J and S Opeitum. *The Net Economic Cost of the Conflict in the Acholiland Sub-Region of Uganda.* Kampala: Civil Society Organisations for Peace in Northern Uganda (CSOPNU). 2002, p. 7.

6 *The Monitor*, 20 November 2003, p. 1.

7 Oloch, James. "16,000 IDPs at Bala Stock Farm lack medical services and 10,000 children were not attending school." *The New Vision*, 10 November 2003.

8 Deininger, Klaus and John Okidi. "Rural Households, Incomes, Productivity and Non-Farm Enterprises" in: *Uganda's Recovery: The Role of Farms, Firms and Government.* World Bank, Regional and Sectoral Studies, October 1991, pp. 123-174.

9 Gulu District officials report that 250 people share one pit latrine in the IDP camps. *The Monitor*, 1 November 2003, p. 4.

10 *The Sunday Monitor*, 16 November 2003, pp. 14-15.

11 The Japanese had to cancel hospital rehabilitation grants to the districts of Yumbe, Moyo and Adjumani due to insecurity.

The Government has injected resources in an attempt to organise the displaced population into IDP camps. The camps themselves have not been safe from attacks by the LRA. Over two million people live in IDP camps, and providing for their basic needs is an uphill struggle.

Conflict resolution efforts

In the early 1990s peace talks were initiated between the Government and the LRA. The then Minister of State in charge of the northern districts represented the Government and went as far as holding meetings with representatives of the LRA. However this initiative failed since the Government insisted that the rebels surrender their weapons within a given period. The LRA refused to meet this condition and resumed their insurgency activities, which continue to the present day. The Government subsequently attempted to defeat the LRA by signing a military agreement with the Sudanese Government (Operation Iron Fist) allowing the Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF) to follow LRA fighters into Sudanese territory to destroy their bases. Little has been achieved so far.

There have been other peace efforts. The 2000 Amnesty Act granted amnesty and resettlement to surrendering rebels. Out of an estimated 50,000 rebels, only 10,000 have so far taken advantage of the amnesty, according to the Amnesty Commission. The amnesty expired on 31 December 2003 and the mandate of the Amnesty Commission expired on 17 January 2004. The Presidential Peace Commission has unsuccessfully tried to meet representatives of the LRA.[12]

Civil society organisations and individuals have also tried to initiate peace talks. In 2001, a Local Peace Initiative led by Father Tarcisio and Chief "Rwot" Joseph Oywak tried to persuade the LRA to enter into negotiations. However in one incident the UPDF stormed the venue and the initiative was abandoned. The Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI) also managed to meet LRA representatives and the Justice and Peace Commission of the Gulu Archdiocese has been trying to negotiate. In all these attempts it is clear what is lacking is a central peace co-ordinating mechanism.

At the national level 34 Members of Parliament from the northern region staged a walkout of Parliament in protest against the Government's inability to put an end to the suffering of the population.[13] President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni granted the MPs an audience and currently various local militia groups are being trained to defend the population in different villages.

Human security demands the involvement of the international community. In a recent visit, the UN Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs acknowledged that this conflict was "a forgotten crisis". The Netherlands Minister for Development Cooperation also informed the President that the military option had failed to bring peace and that she intended to campaign in the European Union to get the warring parties to the negotiating table.[14] Critical attention is also necessary in the Sudan. Although the Sudanese Government denies it,[15] the LRA maintains bases and receives support from southern Sudan.

Conclusion

There is no effective co-ordination of conflict resolution mechanisms. This is not the time to apportion blame. It is worth considering other options:

- Involvement of the UN Security Council, which would address concerns related to the LRA having bases outside the borders of Uganda.
- Direct negotiations through a third party or a process supervised by the international community.
- Development by the Government of a policy for disaster management and peace building.
- Sensitisation by the Government, civil society, the media and opinion leaders to make people aware that this conflict is of national, regional and international concern.
- Extension of the amnesty that ended on 31 December 2003.
- Urgent humanitarian assistance.
- A comprehensive programme for rehabilitation and development.

Although the damage is irreversible, it is imperative to find a solution to this complex geo-political situation. A legal framework for conflict resolution, consistency and commitment are desperately needed. ■

References

Reinikka, Ritva and Paul Collier, Eds. *Uganda's Recovery: The Role of Farms, Firms and Government*. Washington DC: World Bank. 2001.

The Monitor, Kampala. The Monitor Publications Ltd.

The New Vision, Kampala. The New Vision Printing and Publishing Co. Ltd.

Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2001. Kampala.

12 *The New Vision*, 25 October 2003, p. 3.

13 *The Monitor*, 20 November 2003, p. 1.

14 *The Monitor,* 15 October 2003, p. 4.

15 *The Monitor*, 25 October 2003, p. 1.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The poor are poorer and more insecure

In the United States, the concept of human security is often subsumed under that of "national security". The country has the highest degree of human insecurity among industrialized nations. For all the government's talk of national security, US citizens have rarely felt less secure.

Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy
Center of Concern

Steve Suppan with Alexandra Spieldoch

The national security context of human security

In the United States, the concept of human security is often subsumed under that of "national security", following the assumption that protection of "national interests" confers human security upon the inhabitants of a nation. The dominant US paradigm of national security largely excludes policies and programs whose implementation might achieve sustainable human security in the United States.

One benchmark document for evaluating the status of human security in the United States is the September 2002 publication of "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America". The cover letter to this Strategy, written by President George W Bush, begins: "The great struggles of the twentieth century between liberty and totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom - and a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise."[1] It is this vision of the twentieth century that the Strategy would presume to defend in the twenty-first. The initiatives proposed in the Strategy are guided by the justification that "[t]he events of September 11, 2001, fundamentally changed the context for relations between the United States and other main centers of global power and opened vast, new opportunities".[2]

In December, a special advisory commission to the Bush administration warned that the commission "has serious concerns about the current state of homeland security efforts along the full spectrum, from awareness to recovery".[3] Despite the numerous government initiatives taken in the name of 9/11,[4] a September 2003 poll by the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) finds that 76% of US citizens feel no more secure as a result of the "war on terrorism". The PIPA poll states "[a] very strong majority believes that reactions to US foreign policy in the Islamic world are creating conditions that make it easier for terrorist groups to grow".[5]

PIPA polling on terrorism prevention and prosecution legislation known as the US Patriot Act revealed that "Eight in ten think that American citizens detained under suspicion of being part of a terrorist group should have the right to meet with a lawyer and three in four are not aware that, with the US Patriot Act, this is not the case". Despite extensive criticism of the US Patriot Act and the refusal of US Department of Justice officials to explain how it has been used, the Bush administration has proposed further legislation, dubbed Patriot II, to "further untie the hands of our law enforcement officials".[6] One proposed bill would "compel testimony without probable cause of a crime, without a connection to a foreign power, and without prior review by a judge or jury" and would prevent the recipient of an order to testify from informing anyone of having received the order.[7] In response to widespread criticism of Patriot I, II and the US denial of due legal process to the 9/11 suspects detained at a US military facility in Guantánamo, Cuba, Attorney General John Ashcroft has responded with a Website (www.lifeandliberty.gov) and gone on a speaking tour to hand-picked supportive audiences.

Human security: the budget

Given the National Security Strategy emphasis on "free enterprise", it is not surprising that the Bush administration would both analyze human security and deliver government services for human security under a "free enterprise" model. In response to the Bush administration plan for a third consecutive year of tax cuts that are largely for the wealthy and for corporations, eight Nobel laureates and a hundred other eminent economists wrote in an open letter that the plan's "purpose is a permanent change in the tax structure and not the creation of jobs and growth in the near-term… Passing these tax cuts will worsen the long-term budget outlook, adding to the nation's project chronic deficits. This fiscal deterioration will reduce the capacity of the government to finance Social Security and Medicare benefits as well as investments in schools, health, infrastructure, and basic research."[8] Nobel Prize winner Daniel McFadden characterized the Bush budget as a "weapon of mass destruction aimed at middle-income households".[9]

A June 2003 analysis of Congressional Budget Office data by Citizens for Tax Justice finds that "one out of every three dollars the federal government spends this year outside of the self-funded Social Security system will be paid for by borrowing. This will be the highest share of deficit-financed spending since World War II." (By contrast, the Clinton administration borrowed 6% of what it spent.) The Bush administration and its putatively fiscal "conservatives" in Congress are seeking tax cuts that will "saddle our children with an additional USD 10 trillion in debt just ten years from now".[10] This debt will further decrease the already weakened ability of state and local governments to deliver basic human services in health, education and public safety.

Sheltering corporate criminals

Nevertheless, the US Congress continues to dole out corporate tax subsidies and tax shelters, so that "this year corporate taxes as a percent of US profits will fall to well under 15% - probably only about a third of the statutory corporate rate of 35%."[11] Indeed, even corporate criminals, such as WorldCom/MCI, continue to seek billions of dollars of tax relief from the US Treasury.

1 "The National Security Strategy of the United States", September 2002, at www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nssall.html

2 *Ibid*, Section VIII.

3 Cited in Robert Block, "Panel Criticize U.S. Security Efforts", *The Wall Street Journal*, 16 December 2003.

4 Editor's note: Abbreviation of September 11, 2001 referring to the tragic events that took place in New York and Washington, DC that day.

5 "War on Terrorism Has Not Made Public Feel Safer", Program on International Policy Attitudes, 9 September 2003, at www.pipa.org/whatsnew/html/new_09_03.html

6 "Updating the Status of 'Pieces of Patriot II' Proposals", American Civil Liberties Union, 8 October 2003, at www.aclu.org/news/NewsPrint.cfm?ID+14000&c+206

7 *Ibid.*

8 "Economists' Statement Opposing the Bush Tax Cuts", *The New York Times*, 1 February 2003.

9 Cited in David Moberg, "The War at Home", *In These Times*, 17 March 2003.

10 "Bush's $10 Trillion Borrowing Binge", Citizens for Tax Justice, 11 September 2003, at www.ctj.org

11 McIntyre, Robert S. "Testimony to the U.S. House of Representatives, Concerning 'Waste, Fraud [and] Abuse in Federal Mandatory Programs'", 18 June 2003 at www.ctj.org/html/corp0603.htm

Although during the Bush administration "jobs have not fallen for so long" since the federal government began keeping payroll statistics in 1939, with 2.4 million payroll jobs lost since March 2001, the Congress has not seen fit to extend the duration of federal unemployment benefits. Many of the unemployed lost their jobs due to corporate "outsourcing" and a shift in production and services abroad. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the ten-year cost of extending current corporate tax breaks will be USD 2.1 trillion. In contrast, the Congress has refused to extend benefits for the unemployed, who currently lose their benefits after 26 weeks of unemployment. This is in spite of the fact that the federal unemployment insurance trust fund contains USD 20 billion, more than enough to extend benefits to the growing number of long-term unemployed.

Disguising human insecurity

Mounting indicators of human insecurity have been masked by growth in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) that is publicized as evidence of a recovery. However, some of the factors driving GDP growth are unsustainable. For example, consumer debt, rather than rising incomes, has fueled consumer spending and the GDP. "In the second quarter of 2003, household debt increased at an 11.5% annual rate, the largest increase in 15 years, according to the Federal Reserve. Total household debt is now nearly USD 9 trillion and has grown by over 50% from 5 years ago." As one might expect during a period of long-term unemployment and falling wages, "in fiscal year 2003, non-business bankruptcy filings totaled 1,625,813 - the highest on record, and up 98% from 1994".[12]

Another factor that has masked the degree of insecurity is the federal monetary policy to keep interest rates low, allowing homeowners to borrow against their mortgages. The low interest rates for homes derive from the monetary policies of the Federal Reserve Bank, which during the Bush Administration has cut interest rates in "both in nominal and inflation adjusted terms (more) than it did during comparable periods in all but one of the preceding 12 four-year presidential terms since 1953".[13] The easy credit facilitated by low interest rates for homes cushioned the impact of the recession for homeowners and helped to fuel GDP growth even as household debt had skyrocketed to 82.6% of GDP by June 2003. Maintenance of this fragile financial architecture depends on the continued capitalization of the US economy by foreign investors at a rate of USD 2 billion a day. If foreign investors decide that there are more remunerative, or safer, markets in which to invest, the architecture risks collapse.

Another factor driving GDP growth "was an unusually large increase in defense spending".[14] However, the 45% annual rate increase, the highest since 1945, has not gone to a US industrial economy that produces high paying jobs, as in past wars, but to contractors such as Halliburton that have subcontracted "support services" to the US military with cheap US and foreign labor. A thorough investigation of the ongoing accounting and service delivery scandals related to the war in Iraq may reveal just how few and how much the few benefit financially from the "war on terrorism".

War on poverty or war on the poor?

Any analysis of US government action on poverty and its effects should begin with an acknowledgement of the refusal of the government to modernize the statistical definition of poverty. The current poverty threshold formula is almost unchanged from its first incarnation forty years ago. The National Academy of Sciences estimated that a poverty formula updated to reflect current patterns of consumption and costs would increase the threshold by up to 45%. A higher threshold would mean that the government would have to acknowledge a far higher poverty rate than the official poverty rate of 12.1%, or 34.6 million of the US population. And the already poor are getting poorer. According to US Census data of September 2003, "the average amount by which the incomes of those who are poor fall below the poverty line was greater in 2002 than any year on record, with these data going back to 1979".[15]

The 1996 legislation to "end welfare as we know it" has resulted in steep reductions in all forms of federal and state assistance to the poor, and particularly to the children of the poorest families in the United States. Children in families below 50% of the federal poverty line (e.g. about USD 18,000 of pre-tax income for a family of four) that received cash assistance fell from 59% in 1996 to 31% in 2000. There was a similar decline in the portion of children in very poor families that received federal food assistance through the food stamp program.

Gender and race impacts of human insecurity

The fallout of reduced federal funds to those living in poverty has gender and race implications, not least because women and ethnic minority groups comprise the highest percentage of the poor in the United States. In 2002, single women-headed households comprised half of the families living in poverty. The Institute for Women's Policy Research highlights some disturbing trends since the "welfare to work" legislation was enacted. In addition to the major decline in services to children, adult welfare recipients are receiving less health insurance than before the implementation of welfare reform. As a result of one "welfare to work" program, single mothers work more than single fathers yet receive less pay and struggle to receive education and healthcare benefits. The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities reports that the disparities in health coverage among different races and classes are substantial. Almost twice as many Asian and African Americans as white, non-Hispanic Americans lack health insurance. For Latinos, it is three times as many. Immigrant populations are increasingly vulnerable and almost half of non-citizens go uninsured.[16]

Conclusion

Macro-economic indicators of growth not withstanding, most economic and social indicators show the United States to have the highest degree of human insecurity among industrialized countries. The intensified attacks on welfare programs have contributed to a 9 million increase in US residents without any form of health care insurance - a total conservatively estimated at 43 million - while the remainder of the population has endured double-digit increases in health care costs for each of the last three years. For all the government's talk of national security, US citizens have rarely felt less secure. ■

12 "Economy and Jobs Watch: Consumer Debt Increases, Savings Rate Down", *The Watcher,* OMB WATCH, 2 December 2003, at www.ombwatch.org/article/articleprint/1938/-1/198/

13 "The Bush Fed In Perspective", Financial Markets Center, 8 December 2003, at www.fmcnenter.org

14 "Defense spending skews economic growth estimates", *Economic Snapshots*, Economic Policy Institute, 13 August 2003, at www.epinet.org.

15 "Poverty Increases and Median Income Declines for the Second Consecutive Year", Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 29 September 2003, at www.centeronbudget.org

16 "Number of Americans Without Health Insurance Rose in 2002", Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 8 October 2003, www.cbpp.org

In search of food security

The Commission for Human Security maintains that one of the keys to attaining economic security and eradicating poverty is that markets should function properly and that institutions should be set up outside them. It is necessary to redouble efforts to ensure sustainable standards of living and security for everybody through the creation of new jobs. This report outlines a series of measures the Government is taking to try to promote economic and food security for the whole population.

Frente Continental de Mujeres
Comité de Base "Juana Ramírez, la Avanzadora"
Red Popular de Usuarias de Banmujer

In December 1999 the constitutional foundations for promoting agriculture and food security in the country were approved following intensive consultations with important sectors of organised civil society. Subsequently, in November 2001, one of several instruments for constitutional development, the "Land and Agricultural Development Law" was passed in the form of a decree with the force of law. This decree was one of the reasons for the deepening of the rift between the Government and the opposition, and therefore lay behind the failed "Oil Coup" of 11-12 April 2002.[1]

The Government put special emphasis on foodstuffs because the country was heavily dependent on imports in this sector, and national supply was concentrated in the hands of large economic groups, which meant that the distribution of basic foodstuffs was over-centralised. It was clear to the national Government and to various groups among popular sectors of the public that this situation was a factor of insecurity, and was therefore highly destabilising both politically and socially. As the present Minister of Planning and Development has said, this made it necessary to work quickly and give priority to remedying this aspect of human security.

The constitutional framework of agrifood security

The basis for far-reaching and integral rural development capable of guaranteeing food security for the people had already been laid down in title VI, chapter 1 "Socio-Economic Regime and the Function of the State in the Economy", articles 305, 306 and 307 of the Constitution of December 1999.

Article 305 stipulates, "The State will promote sustainable agriculture as a strategic basis for integral rural development, thus guaranteeing the food security of the population, this being understood as the regular availability of sufficient foodstuffs throughout the country, and that the public consumer should have convenient and permanent access to them. Security in food must be attained by prioritising the development of internal agricultural production, this being understood as the produce from farming, livestock rearing, fishing and aquaculture. Food production is in the national interest and it is vitally important for the economic and social development of the nation. To achieve this, the State will act in the areas of finance, commerce, technology transfer, land tenure, infrastructure, and workforce training, taking the measures that are deemed necessary to attain strategic levels of self-sufficiency. Furthermore, it will take action in the framework of the national and international economy to compensate for disadvantages typical of agricultural activities… The State will protect fishing communities, including those using traditional techniques, and their *caladores*,[2] in continental and coastal waters as defined by law."

Article 306 adds, "…the State will foster conditions for integral rural development with the aim of generating employment, guaranteeing the peasant population an adequate level of well-being, and including them in the development of the country. It will also foster agriculture and the optimal use of land through the provision of infrastructure, inputs, credit, training and technical support."

Furthermore, article 307 states, "The system of large estates is contrary to the public interest. The law will determine the measures necessary to levy taxes on idle land, and will take the necessary steps to transform it into productive units. Besides this, land suitable for agriculture will be prepared for that purpose. Peasant men and women and other male and female agricultural producers have the right to own the land they cultivate in the cases and in the ways laid down in the relevant law. The State will protect and promote all co-operative and private forms of land ownership, and it will supervise the sustainable use of land suitable for agriculture so as to ensure that its agrifood potential is realised."

The Land and Agricultural Development Law

The constitutional articles laid down in the decree were passed on 13 November 2001.[3] The aims of the law state, "...The value of the agricultural sphere is not limited to its beneficial economic effects on national production but transcends this sphere and pertains to the all-embracing idea of the people's human and social development... Regimes contrary to social solidarity, such as the system of large estates, are expressly condemned... by our constitution... Other aims of the new legal framework include ensuring bio-diversity, effectively enforcing rights to environmental and agrifood protection, and ensuring agrifood security for present and future generations... therefore the development of agricultural production that does not merely have economic goals but is of prime importance as a basic measure to effectively and efficiently satisfy the food requirements of the people of this country is sought."

Section 1 of the Bases of Integral Rural Development, chapter 1, article 1, reads, "The objective of this decree-law is to establish the bases of integral and sustainable rural development because this is considered a vitally important measure for human development and economic growth in the agricultural sector, within the framework of fair distribution of wealth and democratic and participative strategic planning: eliminating large estates as a system that is contrary to justice, to the public interest and to social peace in the countryside, ensuring bio-diversity, agrifood security, and the effective enforcement of the rights of present and future generations to environmental and agrifood protection."

1 On 9 April 2002, due to the measures that President Hugo Chávez was adopting towards taking control of the state oil company Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), the management of the company went on strike, and other sectors that disagreed with the land reform law joined in. On 12 April a group of businessmen and officers from the armed forces removed Chávez from power and imprisoned him on an island where he was kept incommunicado. Pedro Carmona, head of the biggest business confederation in the country, took over the Presidency in a coup d'etat and was sworn in by decree to "reorganise public powers". He immediately dissolved parliament, dismissed the Supreme Court, disregarded the Constitution, called for presidential elections within a year and called for legislative elections for December. At midnight on 14 April, after violent disturbances, troops loyal to the legitimate Government took the presidential palace, and awaited the outcome of the operation that was to rescue Chávez and return him to power. Carmona was forced to resign and was taken into custody.

2 *Calador* (plural *caladores*): pirogue, a long narrow canoe made from a single tree trunk.

3 Official Gazette No 37323.

The Commission on Human Security maintains that access to land, credit, education and housing is vitally important, especially for poor women. For this reason it is important to emphasise article 14, "Female heads of household who undertake to work a plot of land to maintain their family group and join in developing the country will be given preferential treatment in the allocation of land, in line with the terms of this decree. Female citizens in agricultural production will be guaranteed a special pre- and post-natal food subsidy from the Institute of Rural Development."[4]

In article 19, "c*onucos*[5] are recognised as a traditional source of agricultural bio-diversity. In the areas developed by *conuco* workers, the Presidency will promote research into, and the diffusion of, traditional cultivation techniques, ecological pest control, soil preservation techniques, and the conservation of germplasm in general."

Food security policies

As a means of putting into practice the legal framework outlined above, the National Institute of Land and Agricultural Development (INTI), speeded up the so-called Zamora Plan[6] in a participative way as a response to the coup. Between March and 28 December 2003, almost 22,658 square kilometres of land were awarded to new owners through 9,000 agricultural charters. This allowed 35 Zamorano *fundos* (agricultural establishments) to be set up, benefiting 60,000 families, all of which was done in only 10 months.[7] This is has made a big impact on the situation that prevailed in the country before 1997.

The president of the INTI has said that "besides this handover of land on a massive scale, arrangements have been made with the Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing Development Fund to advance credits to make this land productive… for productive infrastructure and to provide adequate machinery."[8]

In addition to this, the national Government decided to give a new boost to the Strategic Food Programme which was set up in April 1996, by promoting the MERCAL Programme since April 2003. Before this, in March 2003, the Special Food Security Plan (PESA) had been set up. It was with these objectives in mind that in November 2003 the President created the National Commission of Agrifood Supply (MERCAL Mission) attached to the Ministry of Agriculture and Land.

Campaigns in the agrifood sector

At the beginning of January 2004 the peasant men and women, along with indigenous peoples' organisations and other organised sectors of society started a campaign aimed at getting the Central Bank of Venezuela to make available USD 1 billion to finance agriculture. The funds would come from international currency reserves (over USD 21 billion) controlled by the Central Bank. It is thought that USD 14 billion will be enough to back the economy, so part of the surplus could be made available for integral rural development and to overcome agrifood insecurity. A variety of mechanisms will be used that might even include reforming the law which governs the Central Bank itself.

The Women's Development Bank

President Chávez set up the Women's Development Bank (BanMujer), by decree-law on 8 March 2001. This is a public micro-financial institution, and between 2003 and 2006 it proposes to allocate an increasing proportion of its micro-financial resources to the agricultural sector for both livestock rearing and crops so that, by 2004, this will amount to approximately 16% of the total estimated for the year. ■

4 *Ibid.*

5 *Conuco* (plural *conucos*) small plots of land for cultivation, involving almost no irrigation or tilling.

6 Named after Ezequiel Zamora (1817-1860), Venezuelan peasant who fought for land reform and social justice.

7 INTI, 28 December 2003.

8 INTI, 27 September 2003.

ZAMBIA

No war but many victims



Inhumane policies inflicted on Zambian society by Western institutions and states have combined with ill-fated local policies, escalating poverty levels and HIV/AIDS to make it virtually impossible for ordinary citizens to live in dignity. Life in Zambia is a far cry from human security, an expensive paradigm for most children, women and men.

Women for Change - Social Watch Project

Michelo Hansungule[1]

Most Zambians' lives are marked by insecurity. A series of misguided policies have combined with other factors to make it impossible for people to enjoy a sense of security. The main policy failures are:

- Government failure to implement its Poverty Reduction Action Programme (which has since been suspended) and to introduce a Poverty Charter taking a holistic approach to addressing issues of hunger and reversing escalating poverty levels.
- Failure of the free market policies to ensure competitiveness of Zambian products on international markets.
- Government failure to meet the economic benchmarks set for qualification for the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative and to cut the coat according to the cloth, which resulted in a lack of fiscal discipline, leading to budget overrun.
- Inadequate policies to significantly reverse growing HIV/AIDS rates.
- Prolonged proceedings in the case of the petition filed contesting the result of the 2001 presidential election, which has created a climate of political insecurity in the country.
- Continued corruption and misgovernance on the part of political leaders in the present administration, especially during by-elections.
- Government failure to respond to numerous calls for specific legislation and effective action against gender-based violence.

Socio-economic forms of insecurity

The greatest insecurity derives from a series of failed economic and social policies. According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP),[2] more than 63% of Zambians have a daily income of less than USD 1, and 72% are living below the national poverty line. Newly released government statistics from the Central Statistical Office (CSO)[3] confirm this grim reality.

The influx of the "new poor" (using CSO terminology) and urban workers who have been made redundant on to the streets already overcrowded with the unemployed is a direct result of the Government's blind faith in unbridled capitalist policies. Sharp rises in the numbers of poor households prove the absurdity of the notion of Western market policies over indigenous models. Misguided strategies like wholesale privatisation[4] and economic liberalisation have led to forced unemployment (in 2000, the overall unemployment rate was 50%),[5] which has an unequal impact on different social groups; rural people, especially women, are hardest hit. In urban households unemployment and the prospect of an insecure future translate into increased domestic violence in which women and children are the main victims.

Attempts to try and reverse the economic decline by adopting policies friendly to foreign capital have only added to the difficulties facing the economy. Innovations in the area of international trade, like the African Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA)[6] under which some countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have had a selected group of their products granted free access to the US market (in exchange for adopting US policies), have not yielded results. Biased bilateral agreements like the AGOA and the entire multilateral trading framework have not benefited the country in any significant way.

State security over human security

On the other hand, the State is relatively secure. An example of this is the recent treason judgement[7] which clearly proved the priority given to state security over the security of individuals. In this judgement the Supreme Court went out of its way to prove its eagerness to protect a corrupt state system. In October 1997 a group of disgruntled military officers (calling itself the National Redemption Council) made a badly organised and unsuccessful coup attempt against President Frederick Chiluba. President Chiluba, who was the plotters' main target, was by his own admission not even ruffled by the attempt to overthrown him. Nevertheless, the country's most senior law lords still sentenced 46 of the accused to death by hanging. Zambian penal law still punishes crimes of treason, murder and aggravated robbery with the death penalty.

It is interesting to note that, among the other observations made in its appeal judgement, the full bench of the Supreme Court stated that a changeover in Government should only take place as the result of an election. This statement is an important reaffirmation of democracy. However, the judges failed to acknowledge the fact that President Chiluba himself had created the conditions for the soldiers' attempt to use force to remove him. They were aware of this when they presided over the post-election petition filed against Chiluba's election in 1996. The petition included serious allegations regarding illegalities and grand corruption during the election.[8] President Chiluba's actions constituted a two-pronged attack on the principle of free political expression. He reformed the Constitution to get rid of political opponents who were mounting a serious challenge to him and used his second term in office to consolidate his means of reaping the rewards of corruption. The opposition had no chance against him.

The second observation that the judges made in the course of the trial was that they had played their part: the only option left for the defendants was to seek a presidential pardon. This declaration

1 Law Professor, Centre for Human Rights, Faculty of Law, University of Pretoria, South Africa.

2 www.undp.org/hdr2003/indicator/cty_f_zmb.html

3 www.zamstats.gov.zm

4 The Zambia Privatisation Agency is currently working on the privatisation of the following companies: the Mukuba Hotel, Monarch (manufacturing and engineering metal products for the construction industry), Zambia Telecommunications Limited, Indeni Petroleum Refinery Limited, Nitrogen Chemicals Limited, Kafue Textil Limited, Zambia Electricity Supply Corporation, Maamba Collieries Limited, Engineering Services Corporation Limited, Zambia Postal Services, Zambia Educactional Publishing House, Mulobezi Railway, Zambia State Insurance Corporation, Kafue National Park. www.zpa.org.zm

5 www.nationmaster.com

6 Signed on 18 May 2000 by 37 Sub-Saharian countries (out of a total of 48).

7 The People v. Captain Lungu & Others. Unreported. Supreme Court of Zambia. 2003.

8 "The result is that Zambian citizens are plagued by restrictions on freedom of expression and assembly, intimidation of those in the legal system and harassment of opposition parties," said Peter Takirambudde, Executive Director for Human Rights Watch/Africa and one of the authors of the report. "Some of these abuses are the legacy of the Kaunda years, but in many cases human rights violations are the results of new initiatives by the Chiluba government. We are particularly concerned at increasing government efforts to undermine the NGOs and the judiciary. They are essential foundations of any democracy." Human Rights Watch (NY) Africa, 8 December 1996. www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/37/030.html.

surprised court watchers, who considered that in effect the country's highest law lords were washing their hands of the matter and instructing the defendants to present themselves before the very politicians whom they were challenging. This was seen as surprising because a court with the power to issue judicial resolutions cannot surrender its authority to the President (who can only issue political ones). Furthermore, even though the judges' statement refers to the constitutional prerogative of mercy, it can be misconstrued to mean that the President is part of the judiciary (which obviously goes against the principle of the separation of powers). This case illustrates the insecurity that those who try to engage in politics are likely to face.

The State Proceedings Act (SPA) is a piece of legislation that gives the State carte blanche to deal with individuals without any control from the courts. For example, court orders cannot be issued against the President, even if he has personally violated the Constitution. Under the SPA, writs are rendered void simply at the mention of the President or the executive branch. While the spirit behind the bill of rights enshrined in the Constitution is that it must act as a shield against state intrusion in individual liberties and freedoms, neither this bill nor the Constitution have precedence over the SPA. However serious the alleged breaches or irregularities may be, the President is (technically and practically) out of the reach of the courts.

This is what happened in the "malaria case".[9] In this case, an opposition leader, Brigadier-General Godfrey Miyanda, made an urgent court application seeking to obtain an *ex parte* order against Zambia's current President, Levy Mwanawasa, as first respondent, and the Attorney General as second respondent. The order sought to restrain the President from going ahead with a planned press conference at which he intended to make changes to his Cabinet in order to include opposition MPs, including some from Miyanda's party. To evade the court order, all the President needed to do was to cite the SPA as empowering him to act with absolute discretion in carrying out his functions.

Effect of corruption on human security

Corruption is yet another factor seriously threatening human security. Chiluba is finally in court facing 160 charges including corruption, bribery, abuse of office or plain theft.[10] However, proving these charges will not be easy. Corruption being what it is, the case is likely to be complicated and protracted. One of the charges relates to accusations that the former President and his senior Chief of Intelligence diverted USD 29 million of state funds meant for the installation of state-of-the-art security systems in high-profile government buildings. This project was not budgeted for and none of the officials at the Ministry of Finance at the time know where the money went or how much was involved. Projects like this were used to siphon off millions of US dollars into private accounts. This case is just one example of how little political will there is within the State to tackle corruption.

The current regime under President Mwanawasa, which has formally charged ex-president Chiluba, is not itself free from corruption. For instance, Mwanawasa has been accused in a highly controversial case of abusing his former position as Vice President to allocate to himself University of Zambia lands without following established procedures. His attempt to try and clear his name has instead left a trail of doubt regarding his integrity. Although it has been suggested that this claim is stale, and that it is a case of sour grapes since those making the accusations have no hard evidence, the fact of the matter is that a claim involving land cannot be stale. The African philosophy of law incorporates the idea of the imprescriptibility of crimes. As long as the University's stolen land is not given back, the accused will continue to be viewed as thieves.

Second, the tactics employed by Mwanawasa in his election campaigns are at present the subject of a presidential election petition case, instituted against him in the Supreme Court by opposition politicians. During election campaigns, Mwanawasa teams openly dished out food to the electorate, used state resources, bribed opposition officials, etc. He has also used the lure of development projects to pressure the electorate into voting for him.

Third, he has personally shielded his wife, Maureen Mwanawasa, from facing a probe in Parliament for using state funds in her "charity work".

Finally, apart from the legal action taken against Chiluba, during his two years in power Mwanawasa has not formulated any policies or introduced practical measures to stamp out corruption. In other words, his high-sounding anti-corruption rhetoric has not been applied in practice.

Gender policies and human security

A range of social and economic factors contribute to the insecurity affecting Zambian women and violate their human rights. The Government has developed no strategies to protect women from gender-based violence, be it at state or community level. Consequently, women are subjected to harassment on the street - such as being forced to undress in public if they wear short skirts or long trousers - on the grounds that they are offending public morals. Patriarchal attitudes like these are commonplace and openly fostered by the lack of concern for the issue in policy-making.

Even more disturbing, a number of women have been murdered by unknown assailants in public places, such as streets and parks. Not one of these murders has been resolved by the authorities. Women for Change and other pro-women's rights groups have frequently demonstrated to demand state action against murders of women. However, the police either ignores the demands or fails to initiate investigations at all. In the few cases that have been pursued, the investigations are half-hearted and yield no results.

Women also face gender-related violence at the hands of family members. Domestic violence has become the daily norm. Although there is a lack of research into the incidence of domestic violence, a survey published in 1998 by the World Health Organisation (WHO) revealed that 40% of women interviewed reported that they had been subjected to physical abuse by their husbands or partners in 1997. A study undertaken by the Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA) in 1999 found that a majority of women stated that gender-based violence was a common occurrence in their relationships and that this violence most often took the form of rape, beating, stabbing, burning, murder and threats of murder. The same study discovered that recorded cases of domestic violence had increased by 253% between 1998 and 1999.[11] There is no specific penal law on this issue, and the Government apparently does not consider itself responsible for ensuring the protection of the majority of the population - that is, women. Similarly, women suffer a great deal of insecurity in the social and economic spheres. For instance, rural women have no reliable access to resources. The most basic resource - land - is out of reach for most rural women due to prohibitive customs and traditions that discriminate against them. State policies contribute to discrimination against women by not explicitly targeting such practices and traditions, thereby perpetuating female poverty and insecurity.

Conclusion

Even though the country has not formally been at war since independence in 1964, prevailing conditions affecting human existence are equivalent to those in a country at war. Most of the factors inhibiting the enjoyment of human security are linked to both the international context and the local regime. Natural phenomena account for the rest.

Zambia has acceded to the six main UN human rights treaties, a feat some developed countries are yet to achieve. Similarly, the Constitution has a bill of rights even though this is restricted to only civil and political rights. Economic, social and cultural rights have not been given a place in this Westminster-style Constitution. Nevertheless, this is not the key problem. It is the implementation of these rights - defined in international and domestic legislation - that still eludes Zambia. In spite of the establishment of a democratic system of government in 1990, and the first democratic elections in 1991 (following 17 years of authoritarianism) Zambians have little possibility of exercising their political and civil rights. With respect to their material rights, they are even worse off. Inhuman policies inflicted on the population have sealed the fate of the majority Zambians. With hunger stalking them, human security is an expensive paradigm for most children, women and men. ■

9 Brigadier-General Godfrey Miyanda v. President Levy Mwanawasa and Attorney General. Unreported. High Court of Zambia. 2003. See also: *The Times of Zambia*, 6 February 2004. http://allafrica.com/stories/200402060378.html

10 *News 24.com*, 18 October 2003. www.news24.com/News24/Africa/News/

11 World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT), www.omct.org

Sources and Resources

UNITED NATIONS
The United Nations hosts a website which includes general information about the United Nations system, structure and mission. Access to databases, statistics, documents, news and press releases is also available at:
http://www.un.org/

Since 1990, the United Nations has held a series of international conferences and summits. The World Summit for Social Development Declaration and the Programme of Action, the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action and the Millennium Declaration are available online:
http://www.socialwatch.org/

DAW
Grounded in the vision of equality of the United Nations Charter, the UN Division for the Advancement of Women (DAW), as part of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) of the United Nations Secretariat, advocates the improvement of the status of women worldwide and the achievement of their equality with men. It aims to ensure the participation of women as equal partners with men in all aspects of human endeavour. It promotes women as equal participants and beneficiaries of sustainable development, peace and security, governance and human rights. It strives to stimulate the mainstreaming of a gender perspective both within and outside the United Nations system.
E-mail: daw@un.org
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw

ECA
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa.
E-mail: ecainfo@uneca.org
http://www.uneca.org/

ESCAP
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific.
E-mail: webmaster@unescap.org
http://www.unescap.org/

ECLAC
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean.
E-mail: secepal@eclac.cl
http://www.eclac.org/

FAO
The Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations was founded in 1945 with a mandate to raise levels of nutrition and standards of living, to improve agricultural productivity, and to better the condition of rural populations. Today, FAO is one of the largest specialised agencies in the United Nations system and the lead agency for agriculture, forestry, fisheries and rural development.
E-mail: FAO-HQ@fao.org
http://www.fao.org/

FAOSTAT (FAO Statistical Database) is an online multilingual database currently containing over one million time-series records from over 210 countries and territories covering statistics on agriculture, nutrition, fisheries, forestry, food aid, land use and population.
E-mail: faostat-inquiries@fao.org
http://apps.fao.org/

FAO publishes *The State of Food Insecurity in the World*, which provides the latest estimates of the number of chronically hungry people in the world and reports on global and national efforts to reach the goal set by the World Food Summit (WFS) in 1996: to reduce by half the number of undernourished people in the world by the year 2015. *The State of Food Insecurity in the World* draws on the ongoing work of FAO and its international partners in monitoring the nutritional status and analysing the vulnerability of populations worldwide. It represents part of FAO's contribution to the Inter-Agency Food Insecurity and Vulnerability Information and Mapping Systems initiative.
More information of the reports *The State of Food Insecurity in the World:*
http://www.fao.org/sof/sofi/

FINANCING FOR DEVELOPMENT
The International Conference on Financing for Development was held on 18-22 March 2002 in Monterrey, N.L., Mexico. This first United Nations-hosted conference to address key financial and development issues attracted 50 Heads of State or Government, over 200 ministers as well as leaders from the private sector and civil society, and senior officials of all the major intergovernmental financial, trade, economic, and monetary organisations. The Conference also marked the first quadripartite exchange of views between governments, civil society, the business community, and the institutional stakeholders on global economic issues. These global discussions involved over 800 participants in twelve roundtables.
E-mail: ffd@un.org
http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/

ILO
Since its creation in 1919, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) has always attached particular importance to its standard-setting activities. Its 174 Conventions and 181 Recommendations cover areas that include basic human rights, employment, social policy, labour relations, labour administration, working conditions and social protection.
E-mail: ilo@ilo.org
http://www.ilo.org/

ILOLEX is a trilingual database containing ILO Conventions and Recommendations, ratification information, comments of the Committee of Experts and the Committee on Freedom of Association, representations, complaints, interpretations, General Surveys, and numerous related documents.
E-mail: infonorm@ilo.org
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/

ILO published the *World Labour Report 2000*, which examines the vital role played by social protection in supporting, supplementing and replacing market incomes in the event of old age, incapacity for work, bearing and raising children, and unemployment. Also included is health care - without which many in the developing world are unfit to earn their living.
http://www-ilo-mirror.cornell.edu/public/english/protection/socsec/pol/publ/wlrblurb.htm

NGLS
The United Nations Non-Governmental Liaison Service (NGLS) is an inter-agency programme with offices in Geneva and New York. It was established in 1975 to strengthen UN-NGO dialogue and cooperation in the fields of development education, information and policy advocacy on global sustainable development, and North-South development issues.
E-mail: ngls@un.org, ngls@unctad.org
http://www.unsystem.org/ngls/english/Default.html

OECD
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) produces internationally agreed instruments, decisions and recommendations to promote rules of the game in areas where multilateral agreement is necessary for individual countries to make progress in a globalised economy.

The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is one of the key fora of OECD in which the major bilateral donors work together to increase the effectiveness of their common efforts to support sustainable development. The DAC concentrates on how international development co-operation contributes to the capacity of developing countries to participate in the global economy and the capacity of people to overcome poverty and participate fully in their societies.
Indicators are now available and updated online:
http://www.oecd.org/department/
E-mail: dac.contact@oecd.org

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
The High Commissioner is the principal UN official with responsibility for human rights and is accountable to the Secretary-General. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) is guided in its work by the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and subsequent human rights instruments, and the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action. The promotion of Universal ratification and implementation of human rights treaties is at the forefront of OHCHR activities.

OHCHR provides support to the Commission on Human Rights and its special procedures, the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, and the six treaty-monitoring.
E-mail: InfoDesk@ohchr.org
http://www.unhchr.ch/

POPIN
Population Division / Department of Economic and Social Affairs / United Nations. The Population Information Network (POPIN), founded in May 1979, strives to make international, regional and national population information, particularly information available from United Nations sources, easily available to the international community.
E-mail: population@un.org
http://www.un.org/popin/

Among its publications can be found *World Population Prospects: The 2002 Revision. The 2002 Revision* presents the eighteenth round of global demographic estimates and projections undertaken by the Population Division since 1950.
The information is also available in POPIN's online database:
http://esa.un.org/unpp/

UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION
United Nations Treaty Collection is a website database prepared and updated regularly by the Treaty Section of the Office of Legal Affairs of the United Nations. It offers access to over 40,000 treaties and international agreements.
http://untreaty.un.org/

UNITED NATIONS STATISTICS DIVISION
The UN Statistics Division compiles statistics from many international sources and produces global updates, including the Statistical Yearbook, World Statistics Pocketbook and yearbooks in specialised fields of statistics. It also provides to countries, specifications of the best methods of compiling information so that data from different sources can be readily compared.
E-mail: statistics@un.org
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/

The UN Statistics Division published *The World's Women 2000: Trends and St*atistics, the third issue in the series of that looks at the status of women through the lens of statistical data and analysis. *The World's Women 2000* is a statistical source-book that provides a comprehensive analysis of how women fare in different parts of the world. It highlights the main findings of statistical analysis on women's situation as compared to men's worldwide in a broad range of fields, including families, health, education, work, human rights and politics.
E-mail: genderstats@un.org
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/ww2000/

UNAIDS
As the main advocate for global action on HIV/AIDS, the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) leads, strengthens and supports an expanded response aimed at preventing the transmission of HIV, providing care and support, reducing the vulnerability of individuals and communities to HIV/AIDS, and alleviating the impact of the epidemic.
E-mail: unaids@unaids.org
http://www.unaids.org/

UNDP
Since 1990, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has annually published the *Human Development Report,* which contains the Human Development Index (HDI). The HDI attempts to measure the relative socio-economic progress of nations. The *Human Development Report 2003* offers a unique analysis of the world's progress in meeting the ambitious Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). It introduces a detailed new plan of action to meet the goals: the Millennium Development Compact.
The Report ranks 173 countries according to their level of human development. It also identifies 59 "priority" countries, which require intensified effort if the MDGs are to be met. In 31 of these countries, progress towards the goals has either stalled or, worse, has begun to reverse.
http://www.undp.org/hdr2003/
http://www.undp.org/

UN DIVISION FOR SOCIAL POLICY AND DEVELOPMENT
The main objective of the Division for Social Policy and Development is to strengthen international co-operation for social development, with particular attention to the three core issues of poverty eradication, employment generation and social integration, in contributing to the creation of an international community that enables the building of secure, just, free and harmonious societies offering opportunities and higher standards of living for all.
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Division for Social Policy and Development
E-mail: social@un.org
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/

UNESCO
In March 1990, the international community put education on the global agenda during the World Conference on Education for All (EFA) when governments set themselves the challenge of achieving universal primary education by the year 2000.
The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) publishes *Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2003/4 Gender and Education for All: the Leap to Equality*. The report is considered the most comprehensive survey of education trends worldwide. It measures efforts being made in all parts of the world to enrol more girls in school. *Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2003/4* also includes an EFA Development Index, providing an overall view of the progress countries are making towards the four Dakar goals that can be most easily measured: universal primary education, adult literacy, quality of education (survival to grade 5) and gender parity.
E-mail: efa@unesco.org
The Report is available online:
www.efareport.unesco.org
The UNESCO Institute for Statistics, hosted by the University of Montreal in Canada, develops an online searchable database containing selected indicators and its 1999 Yearbook.
http://www.uis.unesco.org/

UNICEF
The Children's Summit, held in New York in 1990, yielded an impressive action programme with very concrete objectives to improve the position of children in developing countries. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) publishes annual reports on the progress made by each country in implementing the agreements. The State of the World's Children 2004 focuses on girls' education and its relationship to all other development goals and to the promise of Education For All. It presents a multi-layered case for investing in girls' education as a strategic way to ensure the rights of both boys and girls and to advance a country's development agenda. The web summary touches on general points of the main text and presents panel abstracts highlighting successful programmes.
The complete report including supporting data and statistics can be requested from UNICEF:
E-mail: pubdoc@unicef.org
http://www.unicef.org/sowc04/

The UNICEF's key statistical online database has detailed country-specific information that was used for the end-decade assessment. Global and regional summary analyses and graphic presentations of key results of progress over the decade can be found on this web site as can a full set of technical tools for conducting Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS).
E-mail: webmeistr@childinfo.org
http://www.childinfo.org/

UNIFEM
The United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) promotes women's empowerment and gender equality. It works to ensure the participation of women in all levels of development planning and practice, and acts as a catalyst within the UN system, supporting efforts that link the needs and concerns of women to all critical issues on the national, regional and global agendas.
E-mail: unifem@undp.org
http://www.unifem.org/

UNRISD
The United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) is an independent research agency subsidised by governments, development organisations and other organisations. Through its research, UNRISD stimulates dialogue and contributes to policy debates on key issues of social development within and outside the United Nations system.
E-mail: info@unrisd.org
http://www.unrisd.org/

WHO
The World Health Organisation (WHO), the United Nations specialised agency for health, was established in 1948 and its main objective is the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health. Since its creation, WHO has contributed to major accomplishments resulting in a healthier world.
E-mail: info@who.int
http://www.who.int/

The WHO's Communicable Disease Global Atlas is bringing together for analysis and comparison standardised data and statistics for infectious diseases at country, regional, and global levels. The Atlas specifically acknowledges the broad range of determinants that influence patterns of infectious disease transmission.
The information can be accessed online:
www.who.int/GlobalAtlas

WOMEN WATCH
Women Watch is a joint UN project to create a core Internet space on global women's issues. It was created to monitor the results of the Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing in 1995.
It was founded in March 1997 by the Division for the Advancement of Women (DAW), the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) and the International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (INSTRAW).
E-mail: womenwatch@un.org
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/

WORLD BANK
The World Bank annually publishes the World Development Report.

The *World Development Report 2004: Making Services Work for Poor People* says that too often, key services fail poor people: in access, in quantity, in quality. This imperils a set of development targets known as the MDGs, which call for a halving of the global incidence of poverty, and broad improvements in human development by 2015.
The report is available online:
http://econ.worldbank.org/wdr/wdr2004/
To order the book contact:
books@worldbank.org

The World Development Indicators (WDI) is the World Bank's premier annual compilation of data about development. WDI 2003 includes approximately 800 indicators in 87 tables, organised in six sections: World View, People, Environment, Economy, States and Markets, and Global Links. The tables cover 152 economies and 14 country groups-with basic indicators for a further 55 economies. This WDI print edition offers the current overview of reliable data from the past few years. For time-series data from 1960 and onwards, please consult the WDI CD-ROM version or WDI Online. http://www.worldbank.org/data/onlinedatabases/onlinedatabases.html

Some global NGO resources

Amnesty International is a world-wide movement of people acting on the conviction that governments must not deny individuals their basic human rights. Amnesty International's yearly country by country report is available from:
Amnesty International Publications
E-mail: amnestyis@amnesty.org
http://www.amnesty.org/

AI Campaign on Treaty Bodies disseminates information on the activities of treaty bodies and encourages NGOs and individuals to participate in their work. The website presents a general introduction to the main functions of treaty bodies; a consideration of state party's reports and consideration of individual complaints and a section on the role of NGOs in the work of treaty bodies.
E-mail: treatybodies@amnesty.org
http://www.amnesty.org/treatybodies

The Arab NGO Network for Development is a democratic, voluntary, civil, independent, non-sectarian, and non-religious organisation consisting of Arab NGOs and national networks active in the fields of social development, human rights, gender, and the environment. The membership of ANND consists of 30 NGOs and 9 national networks from 12 Arab countries.
E-mail: annd@annd.org
http://www.annd.org/

ATD Fourth World is an international NGOs dedicated to overcoming extreme poverty. Its goal is to explore all possibilities of partnership with families living in chronic poverty and to encourage more private citizens and public officials to join this effort.
E-mail : information@atd-fourthworld.org
http://www.atd-quartmonde.org/

The Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives offers an alternative to the message that we have no choice about the policies that affect our lives. The Centre undertakes and promotes research on issues of social and economic justice. It produces research reports, books, opinion pieces, fact sheets and other publications, including *The Monitor*, a monthly digest of progressive research and opinion.
E-mail: ccpa@policyalternatives.ca
http://www.policyalternatives.ca/

Choike is a portal dedicated to improving the visibility of the work done by NGOs from the South. It serves as a platform where NGOs can disseminate their work and at the same time enrich it with information from diverse sources, presented from the perspective of Southern civil society.
Choike offers:
-A directory of NGOs organised in categories and sub-categories. This is not an exhaustive list but a selection of useful and relevant sites. The directory only contains Southern NGO websites; relevant information from other sources can be found in separate sections.
-A search engine that enables you to find information in the directory's websites. It is a tool designed to allow you to search the sites selected by Choike on the basis of their quality and relevance. NGOs that wish to include the Choike search engine on their websites can do so at the Choike portal.
-A selection of materials produced by NGOs which contain information of relevance to civil society and to people who are interested in what NGOs have to say. These materials can be accessed through reports, news items and information resources.
-In-depth reports on key issues, which provide comprehensive information and reflect different views, in particular highlighting the position adopted by civil society on these issues.
-Dissemination of NGO actions and campaigns.
Choike is hosted by the Third World Institute (ITeM) in Montevideo, Uruguay, an independent non-profit organisation.
E-mail: info@choike.org
http://www.choike.org/

CIDSE (International Cooperation for Development and Solidarity) is an alliance of 15 Catholic development organisations from Europe and North America. Since 1968, CIDSE member organisations share a common strategy on development projects and programmes, development education and advocacy.
E-mail: postmaster@cidse.org
http://www.cidse.org/

COHRE (Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions) promotes and protects the right to housing for everyone, everywhere. Its work involves Housing Rights Training; Research and Publications; Monitoring, Preventing and Documenting Forced Evictions; Fact-finding Missions; Housing and Property Restitution; Women's Housing Rights; Active Participation and Advocacy within the United Nations and Regional Human Rights Bodies and activities in all regions of the South.
E-mail: cohre@cohre.org
http://www.cohre.org/

Citizens' Network on Essential Services works to democratise national and global governance by supporting citizens' groups in developing and transition countries that are engaged in influencing policy decisions about basic services: water, power, education, and health care. CNES contends that citizens and their elected representatives should explore substantive policy alternatives to determine the kind of service provision that can best serve their social, environmental, and development goals.
E-mail: ncalexander@igc.org
http://www.servicesforall.org

CLADEM (Latin American and Caribbean Committee for the Defense of Women's Rights) is a women's organisations network that in all Latin America and the Caribbean are committed in unite our efforts to achieve an effective defence of women's rights in the region.
E-mail:oficina@clademorg
oficina@clademorg
http://www.clademorg/

Corporate Accountability aims to facilitate the flow of information among NGOs and social movements who believe that their governments, private sector and civil society need to make greater efforts to ensure the accountability of business and industry, especially transnational corporations, to society. It contains information about ongoing civil society campaigns on corporate accountability and about NGOs and trade unions who are active in this field. It provides comprehensive material on codes of conduct, multi-stakeholder initiatives and intergovernmental processes, as well as best and worst practice cases of corporate behaviour. Its website makes available documents and publications on corporate accountability and links to relevant research institutes and databases.
E-mail: weed@weed-online.org
http://www.corporate-accountability.org/

DAWN (Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era) is a network of women scholars and activists from the economic South who engage in feminist research and analysis of the global environment and are committed to working for economic justice, gender justice and democracy.
E-mail: admin@dawn.org.fj
http://www.dawn.org.fj/

Dignity International was created by the Council of Europe's "Globalisation without Poverty" Campaign 1998-2000. In January 2003 "Dignity International" was established as an independent NGO. Dignity International's mission is to work with the poor and marginalised communities around the world on education and training (capacity building for human rights) programmes focussed on economic, social and cultural rights in the context of its work to promote and defend all human rights for all.
E-mail: dignity@netvisao.pt
http://www.dignityinternational.org/

EURODAD (European Network on Debt and Development) is a network of 48 development NGOs from 15 European countries working for national economic and international financing policies that achieve poverty eradication and the empowerment of the poor.
E-mail: info@eurodad.org
http://www.eurodad.org/

EUROSTEP (European Solidarity Towards Equal Participation of People) is a network of autonomous European NGOs working towards peace, justice and equality in a world free of poverty. Its membership, rooted in their own societies, works together to influence Europe's role in the world, particularly in pursuing the eradication of injustice and poverty. It advocates changes in Europe's policies and practice based on the perspectives drawn from direct experiences of an active involvement of its members and their partners in development in over 100 countries across the world.
E-mail: admin@eurostep.org
http://www.eurostep.org/

ESCR-Net (The International Network on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) is a new collaborative initiative between groups from around the world working to secure economic and social justice. It seeks to promote the recognition of all rights but with a specific focus on economic, social and cultural rights (ESCR). Through ESCR-Net, groups and individuals can exchange information, develop a collective voice, amplify their actions, demonstrate the concrete advantage of an ESCR approach in working to eliminate poverty, and promote and advocate for fair economic, social and cultural policies and practices at all levels.
E-mail: escr-net@cesr.org
http://www.escr-net.org/

HIC (Habitat International Coalition) is an independent, international, non-profit movement of some 400 organisations and individuals working in the area of human settlements. Members include NGOs, CBOs, academic and research institutions, civil society organisations and like-minded individuals from 80 countries in both the North and the South. A shared set of objectives bind and shape HIC's commitment to communities working to secure housing and improve their habitat conditions.
Further information on HIC's mission, members and activities can be found at HIC's Housing and Land Rights Network, Middle East and North Africa:
http://www.hic-mena.org/
Information on the HIC's Latin American Secretariat:
http://www.hic-al.org/

Human Rights Watch is an independent, NGO, supported by contributions from private individuals and foundations worldwide.
To order Human Rights Watch's publications please contact:
E-mail: hrwdc@hrw.org or genaos@hrw.org
http://www.hrw.org/

ICFTU (International Confederation of Free Trade Unions) is a Confederation of national trade union centres, each of which links together the trade unions of that particular country. Membership is open to bone fide trade union organisations that are independent of outside influence, and have a democratic structure.
E-mail: internetpo@icftu.org
http://www.icftu.org/

ICSW (International Council for Social Welfare) is an international NGO operating throughout the world for the cause of social welfare, social justice and social development. It publishes *Social Development Review* which focuses on the monitoring of governmental and non-governmental action referred to the World Summit on Social Development.
More information may be obtained from:
ICSW General Secretariat
E-mail: icsw@icsw.org
http://www.icsw.org/

IHRIP (International Human Rights Internship Program) works to help strengthen the human rights movement by facilitating the exchange of information and experience among human rights organisations. IHRIP supports professional development and exchange projects for the staff of human rights organisations and activists in countries of the South as well as East Central Europe and the Republics of the former Soviet Union. Drawing on the experiences of activists in countries around the world, the Program has also produced a number of informational and training resources, most recently on economic, social and cultural rights.
E-mail: ihrip@iie.org
http://www.iie.org/

IDS (Institute for Development Studies) is an internationally renowned centre for research and teaching on development, established in 1966. IDS also hosts many innovative information and knowledge management services.
E-mail: ids@ids.ac.uk
http://www.ids.ac.uk/ids

IPS (Inter Press Service) civil society's leading news agency, is an independent voice from the South and for development, delving into globalisation. IPS intends to inherit the goals of the former co-operative of journalists and to carry forward its ideals. It is a public-benefit organisation for development co-operation. Its main object is to contribute to development by promoting free communication and a professional flow of information to reinforce technical and economic co-operation among developing countries.
E-mail: editor@ipsnews.net
http://www.ips.org/

Jubilee Plus is a programme of the New Economics Foundation, London, building on the achievements of Jubilee 2000 UK, and providing support to economic justice campaigns worldwide.
E- mail: info.jubilee@neweconomics.org
http://www.jubileeplus.org/

KAIROS (Canadian Ecumenical Justices Initiatives) unites churches and religious organisations in a faithful ecumenical response to the call to "do justice, and to love kindness and to walk humbly with your God" (Micah 6:8). Kairos deliberate on issues of common concern, advocate for social change and join with people of faith and goodwill in action for social transformation.
E-mail: info@kairoscanada.org
http://www.kairoscanada.org/

Mani Tese is an Italian NGO operating at national and international level to further justice, solidarity and respect among peoples.
E-mail: info@manitese.it
http://www.manitese.it/

ODI (Overseas Development Institute) is Britain's leading independent think-tank on international development and humanitarian issues. ODI's mission is to inspire and inform policy and practice which lead to the reduction of poverty, the alleviation of suffering and the achievement of sustainable livelihoods in developing countries.
E-mail: odi@odi.org.uk
http://www.odi.org.uk/

OXFAM International is a confederation of 12 organisations working together in more than 100 countries to find lasting solutions to poverty, suffering and injustice.
Oxfam International Secretariat
E-mail: information@oxfaminternational.org
http://www.oxfaminternational.org/
Oxfam International Advocacy
E-mail: advocacy@oxfaminternational.org

Public Citizen is a national, non-profit consumer advocacy organisation founded by Ralph Nader in 1971 to represent consumer interests in US Congress, the executive branch and the courts. Public Citizen fights for openness and democratic accountability in government, for the right of consumers to seek redress in the courts; for clean, safe and sustainable energy sources; for social and economic justice in trade policies; for strong health, safety and environmental protections; and for safe, effective and affordable prescription drugs and health care.
E-mail: california@citizen.org,
jcarraway@citizen.org
http://www.citizen.org/

Reality of Aid Project exists to promote national and international policies that will contribute to a new and effective strategy for poverty eradication, built on solidarity and equity. In the *Reality of Aid Report 2002*, written by NGOs from every continent, the welcome commitments of Presidents and Prime Ministers to build a more secure global order can be measured against existing approaches to global finance, political interest and human need.
For orders and requests contact:
E-mail: roa@devinit.org
http://www.realityofaid.org/

REPEM (Women's Popular Education Network) is a Latin-American and Caribbean regional network aiming at strengthening strategic links on gender, education and economy. Among its activities, the network monitors the Copenhagen Summit, Hamburg and Beijing Conferences. REPEM is Latin American and Caribbean secretariat of DAWN and hosts the International Council for Adult Education (ICAE).
E-mail: repem@repem.org.uy
http://www.repem.org.uy/

SAPRIN (Structural Adjustment Participatory Review International Network) is a global network established to expand and legitimise the role of civil society in economic policymaking and to strengthen the organised challenge to structural adjustment programmes by citizens around the globe. The network is working with a broad range of citizens' groups in various countries on four continents to organise public processes to assess the real impact of World Bank and IMF-supported economic-reform programs and to chart a new course for the future.
E-mail: secretariat@saprin.org
http://www.saprin.org/

SUNS (South-North Development Monitor) is a unique source of information and analyses on international development issues with particular focus on North-South and South-South negotiations. Over the years SUNS has provided unique in-depth coverage of the activities of the Non-Aligned countries, of the Group of 77 and other regional and inter-regional groups of the South and the NGOs. The SUNS has been an important source of information, from the Southern perspective, of the processes of negotiations, formal and informal, of GATT and the Uruguay Round, the Mid-Term Review Process, the Brussels Ministerial Session and since then, the UNCTAD Conferences, and of the entire debates and dialogue on environment/development issues, the Earth Summit and other major UN Conferences, as well as their follow-up.

Chief Editor and Geneva TWN representative:
Chakravarti Raghavan
E-mail: sunstwn@bluewin.ch
http://www.sunsonline.org/

The **Tax Justice Network** is a global network which arose out of meetings at the European Social Forum in Florence, 2002, and at the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, 2003. It is a response to harmful trends in global taxation, which threaten states' ability to tax the wealthy beneficiaries of globalisation.
E-mail: info@taxjustice.net
http://www.taxjustice.net/

The **Third World Network** (TWN) is an independent non-profit international network of organisations and individuals involved in issues relating to development, the Third World and North-South issues.
Its objectives are to conduct research on economic, social and environmental issues pertaining to the South; to publish books and magazines; to organise and participate in seminars; and to provide a platform representing broadly Southern interests and perspectives at international fora such as the UN conferences and processes. Its recent and current activities include: the publication of the daily *SUNS (South - North Develoment Monitor)* bulletin from Geneva, Switzerland, the fortnightly *Third World Economics* and the monthly *Third World Resurgence*; the publication of TWN Features; the publication of books on environment and economic issues; the organising of various seminars and workshops; and participation in international processes such as UNCED and the World Bank - NGO Committee.
The TWN's international secretariat is based in Penang, Malaysia. It has offices in Montevideo, Uruguay (for South America); Geneva, Switzerland; and Accra, Ghana. Publications can be ordered from TWN's secretariat:
E-mail: twnet@po.jaring.my
http://www.twnside.org.sg/

Third World Network-Latin America publishes the monthly magazine *Revista del Sur* and *Tercer Mundo Económico*:
Red del Tercer Mundo
E-mail: redtm@chasque.apc.org
http://www.redtercermundo.org.uy

TWN features are available electronically through the APC networks in the conference <twn.features>, and in Spanish in the conference <redtm.analisis>.
http://www.redtercermundo.org.uy/

TWN-Africa publishes *African Agenda*:
E-mail: contact@twnafrica.org
http://twnafrica.org/

The **Tobin Tax** is a proposal to tax currency transactions on foreign exchange markets, through multilateral co-operation, and to utilise the revenue for basic environmental and human needs. Such a tax will tame currency market volatility and restore national economic sovereignty. (The name Tobin Tax derives from James Tobin, a Nobel-laureate economist at Yale University.)
Tobin Tax Initiative, CEED/IIRP
E-mail: cecilr@humboldt1.com
http://www.ceedweb.org/iirp/

Trade Observatory is a joint project between IATP (Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy), Friends of the Earth International, and Centre for International Environmental Law that monitors WTO activity in Geneva in an effort to facilitate advocacy by civil society actors to redress imbalances in the world trading system. WTO Watch has merged with the IATP Trade Observatory to provide the most comprehensive collection of information resources related to trade, globalisation and sustainable development.
E-mail: iatp@iatp.org
http://www.tradeobservatory.org/

Transparency International is an international non-governmental organisation devoted to combating corruption, bringing civil society, business, and governments together in a powerful global coalition. Through its International Secretariat and more than 85 independent national chapters around the world, it works at the national and international level to curb both the supply and demand of corruption.
E-mail: ti@transparency.org
http://www.transparency.org/

WEDO (Women's Environment and Development Organisation) is an international advocacy organisation that seeks to increase the power of women worldwide as policymakers at all levels in governments, institutions and forums to achieve economic and social justice, a healthy and peaceful planet, and human rights for all.
E-mail: wedo@wedo.org
http://www.wedo.org/

Women, War and Peace Web Portal, created by PeaceWomen.org and UNIFEM, provides background information and timely updates on the impact of armed conflict on women and women's role in peace-building. It will systematically gather information and analysis both to inform decision-makers and to provoke greater response to women's experience of war and peace making. It is one of UNIFEM's contributions to the implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, passed unanimously in October of 2000. This groundbreaking resolution explicitly noted the "need to consolidate data on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls."
http://www.womenwarpeace.org/

The ***World Guide*** is a reference book updated every two years including the history, maps and statistics from all the countries and regions of the world. The *World Guide 2003-2004* contains a round-up of key global issues such us terrorism, global warming, slavery today, democracy and Islam, plus updated information on 238 countries and statistical tables on child health, literacy, access to water, land use, etc. The printed version of *World Guide* is available in Spanish, English, Portuguese and Italian. The CD-ROM, available in English, Spanish and Italian includes the Social Watch national reports as well as the Amnesty International national reports, both in English and Spanish. Danish CD-ROM and web versions are also available.
E-mail: guiatm@chasque.apc.org
http://www.guiadelmundo.org.uy/
The publication is regularly updated in Spanish online: http://www.guiadelmundo.org.uy/

World Council of Churches is a fellowship of 342 churches, in more than 120 countries in all continents from virtually all-Christian traditions.
E-mail: info@wcc-coe.org
http://www.wcc-coe.org/

World Social Forum. Under the slogan "Another world is possible", the World Social Forum aims at becoming a new international arena for the consideration of alternatives to prioritise human development and the separation of the markets in each country and in the international relationships by all those who are opposed to the neoliberal policies. Since 2001 the World Social Forum takes place in Porto Alegre, Brazil every year at the same time as the World Economic Forum, which happens in Davos, Switzerland, at the end of January. For the first time in 2004, the IV World Social Forum was held in Mumbai, India, between January 16 and 21, 2004. In 2005, the WSF will again take place in Porto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul (Brazil).

In India:
E-mail: wsfindia@vsnl.net
http://www.wsfindia.org/

In Brazil:
E-mail: fsminfo@forumsocialmundial.org.br
http://www.forumsocialmundial.org.br/

World Watch Institute is a non-profit public policy research organisation dedicated to informing policymakers and the general public about emerging global problems and trends, and the complex links between the world economy and its environmental support systems The World Watch Institute publishes the *State of the World. The State of the World 2004 Special Focus: The Consumer Society* examines how we consume, why we consume, and what impact our consumption choices have on the planet and our fellow human beings. The *State of the World 2004* Report is available online:
http://www.worldwatch.org/pubs/sow/2004/
E-mail: worldwatch@worldwatch.org
http://www.worldwatch.org

Help Social Watch identify more relevant resources! Please write to:
Social Watch c/o ITeM
Juan D. Jackson 1136
Montevideo 11200, Uruguay
Fax: +598 2 411-9222
E-mail: socwatch@socialwatch.org,
or visit Social Watch home page in the Internet:
http://www.socialwatch.org/

Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)

A special section of the United Nations site on MDGs is available at:
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/index.html

A comprehensive list of resources from the United Nations and civil society organisations on the MDGs is presented in **CHOIKE**, a portal on civil society:
http://www.choike.org/links/informes/302.html

United Nations Statistics Division Millennium Indicators Database
A framework of 8 goals, 18 targets and 48 indicators to measure progress towards the MDGs was adopted by a consensus of experts from the United Nations Secretariat and IMF, OECD and the World Bank. (*Road Map towards the Implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration*).
The United Nations Statistics Division, in close collaboration with United Nations agencies and funds, the World Bank, IMF, and OECD, coordinates data analysis and maintains the database containing the series related to the selected indicators, as well as other background series intended to supplement the basic 48 Millennium indicators, for more in-depth analysis.
The figures presented in the database are from international series compiled by the various agencies. The availability of data necessary to calculate the indicators in each country depends on the capacities of the national statistical services.
The information, is available in French and Spanish:
http://millenniumindicators.un.org/

The Millennium Project
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and the Administrator of the UN Development Programme (UNDP), Mark Malloch Brown, have launched the Millennium Project to recommend the best strategies for achieving the MDGs. Over a period of three years the Millennium Project will focus on costing the MDGs achievement and will define a more concrete strategy in a few countries that will be selected. The Millennium Project's research focuses on identifying the operational priorities, organisational means of implementation, and financing structures necessary to achieve the MDGs. Ten thematically orientated Task Forces perform the bulk of the research. They are comprised of representatives from academia, the public and private sectors, civil society organisations, and UN agencies with the majority of participants coming from outside the UN system. The 15-20 members of each Task Force are all global leaders in their area, selected on the basis of their technical expertise and practical experience.
E-mail: info@unmillenniumproject.org
http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/

UN Millennium Campaign
The Millennium Campaign was created to build political will for the achievement of the MDGs and to enable people's actions in holding their government to account to the Millennium Pledge.
The Campaign assumptions are:

- It is the lack of political will that is the biggest stumbling block to the achievement of the MDGs
- Political leaders are primarily accountable to their electorate, who are local and national
- The Campaign therefore will focus on the national level and below, while recognizing the need to influence global processes
- The Campaign will largely catalyse and facilitate campaigning by other actors, particularly CSOs, but also Parliamentarians and Local Authorities
- Working closely with the media, particularly local and national media, is central to the National Campaigns.

E-mail:
millennium.campaign2015@undp.org
A web page will be launched in July 2004.
www.millenniumcampaign.org

UN HABITAT
The UN Millennium Declaration and its Goals
The Millennium Declaration was adopted by the UN member states in the year 2000. It contains eight MDGs ranging from poverty reduction, health, and gender equality to education and environmental sustainability. The MDGs detail out 18 specific development targets, each of which has a target figure, a time frame, and indicators designed to monitor to what extend the target has been achieved. The target most closely related to UN-HABITAT's mission is Goal 7 Target 11 i.e. to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of 100 million slum dwellers by the year 2020.
http://www.unchs.org/mdg/default.asp

Global Urban Observatory
The Millennium Declaration requires a regular monitoring of its goals. Monitoring slums means local level data collection and analysis. Based on previous experience with global data collection (Urban Indicators 1993 and 1998), UN-HABITAT has developed a sample of cities to monitor the MDGs on slums on the local level. This exercise is backed-up by capacity building modules provided by the Global Urban Observatory.
http://www.unhabitat.org/programmes/guo/guo_databases.asp

WHO: MDGs
The importance of the MDGs in health is, in one sense, self-evident. Improving the health and longevity of the poor is an end in itself, a fundamental goal of economic development. But it is also a means to achieving the other development goals related to poverty reduction. The linkages of health to poverty reduction and to long-term economic growth are much stronger than is generally understood.
http://www.who.int/mdg/

WORLD BANK: MDGs Area
At the Millennium Summit in September 2000 the states of the United Nations reaffirmed their commitment to working toward a world in which sustaining development and eliminating poverty would have the highest priority. The MDGs grew out of the agreements and resolutions of world conferences organised by the United Nations in the past decade. The goals have been commonly accepted as a framework for measuring development progress.
http://www.developmentgoals.org/

Progress on the MDGs:
As one indicator of development progress, the World Bank tracks country performance against the MDGs. The Bank set out an analysis and an agenda for change in the World Development Report 2000-2001: *Attacking Poverty.* In March 2002 the Poverty Reduction Group reviewed progress in Poverty Reduction and the World Bank. The observations are based on this work and the statistics published in the World Development Indicators 2002. It should be emphasised, however, that data are poor in many cases, a problem discussed at length in the fall 2001 edition of the World Bank Research Observer.

UNESCO
Overall, the UNESCO Bureau of Strategic Planning is responsible for UNESCO's participation in and contribution to inter-agency programme efforts within the United Nations system to ensure coherence of orientations and efforts, especially in the follow-up to the United Nations Millennium Declaration and the pursuit of the MDGs.
http://www.unesco.org/bsp/eng/mdg.htm

SOCIAL WATCH REPORT 2004

"WE WILL SPARE NO EFFORT TO FREE OUR FELLOW MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN FROM THE ABJECT AND DEHUMANIZING CONDITIONS OF EXTREME POVERTY, TO WHICH MORE THAN A BILLION OF THEM ARE CURRENTLY SUBJECTED. WE ARE COMMITTED TO MAKING THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT A REALITY FOR EVERYONE AND TO FREEING THE ENTIRE HUMAN RACE FROM WANT."

Millennium Declaration adopted by 189 Heads of State, 2000

"WE'RE DOING ABOUT 50 BILLION DOLLARS FOR DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURES AND 1,000 BILLION FOR MILITARY EXPENDITURES, AND I FIND THAT OUT OF BALANCE."

World Bank President James Wolfensohn, 2004

"A PRINCE NEVER LACKS LEGITIMATE REASONS TO BREAK HIS PROMISE."

Niccolò Machiavelli, 1532

ISSN: 0797-9231
0797-9231

GRAPHIC DESIGN: MONOCROMO